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Home , Africa (Petrarch), Italian Peninsula, Mediterranean Basin, Mediterranean Corridor, Turkey

Michaël Tanchum

FOKUS | 10/2020

Italy and ‘s -to- Commercial Corridor: and ‘s Geopolitical Symbiosis Is Creating a New Mediterranean Strategic Paradigm

A geopolitical symbiosis between and has found its most robust expression in of Italy’s foreign policy reorientation and Turkey is creating a Turkey-Italy- the effort to create Afro-Mediterranean its exercise of strategic . For the transportation corridor that promises to connectivity via the central – an past two decades, Italy’s trade with the reconfigure the patterns of trade between effort now augmented by the entrench- Mediterranean has shown robust Europe, Africa, and the . Slicing ment of hard power in . growth, with Italy’s exports to Medi- across the center of the Mediterranean terranean markets outstripping Italian basin, the Turkey-Italy-Tunisia corridor Italy’s Mediterraneo Allargato Strategy and exports to the and forms an arc of commercial connectivity its Pivot to Africa respectively.3 Italy’s strategic imperative, from the Maghreb to the wider Black to expand and diversify its commercial . The corridor’s central hub is Italy’s While Italy maintains its traditional three connectivity in the Mediterraneo allargato, deep-sea port of Taranto, located on the foreign policy pillars – Europeanism, transcends the ideologies of the particular Italian ’s southern tip in the Atlanticism, and Mediterraneanism, Rome political parties in government. Noting the strategic heart of the Mediterranean has been attempting to advance its global structural nature of Italy’s Mediterraneo Sea. Managed by Turkish port operator profile by becoming a central actor in the allargato agenda, leading Italian defense Yilport, the Taranto port began servicing wider . Italy’s strate- expert, Alessandro Marrone, observed: the Turkey-Italy-Tunisia corridor in early gic framework views the “The main issue is the maritime trade rou- July 2020. The Taranto-Tunisia segment as the centerline around which exists a tes accessed by Italy’s ports, an important simultaneously forms the core link of the horseshoe-shaped geopolitical continu- avenue for the global import–export trade corridor’s Europe-to-Africa transport route, um, termed il Mediterraneo allargato (‘The of Europe’s second most important manu- by connecting ’s coast to the enlarged Mediterranean’), formed by the facturing and a crucial element centers of Italy, , Maghreb and the on one in Italy’s GDP.” 4 and via Italy and Europe’s of the horsehoe and by the and high-speed rail systems. From Tunisia’s Middle East on the other. Rome’s strategic Italy and Turkey’s Strategic Symbiosis in ports, the corridor can also link via priority to expand its economic and political the Mediterranean to the Trans-Saharan Highway, potentially presence in the of the Mediterraneo extending Italy and Turkey’s Europe-to- allargato constitutes a central organizing Italy’s Mediterraneo allargato orientation Africa corridor southward into Africa principle for Italy’s foreign relations. enjoys a strategic synergy with Turkey’s as far as Lagos, . own drive to develop inter-regional Rome’s rebalancing to the Mediterraneo connectivity in the roughly overlapping Incorporating and Tunisia as key allargato has resulted in Italy’s pivot to Af- geographical space defined by the former transit nodes, the corridor is also giving rica, with greater active involvement in the territories of the . Italy has rise to a new Italo-Turkish-led geopoli- Maghreb, the , and the Horn of Afri- long been among the strongest advocates tical alignment anchored in the central ca.1 In January 2018, when Italy reassigned of closer EU-Turkey relations and the two Mediterranean basin. The new alignment troops deployed in and enjoy a very robust trade relationship. Af- is a geopolitical achievement for Italy’s re- to missions in Libya and , then Italian ter Germany, Italy forms the largest Euro- balancing toward the wider Mediterranean Defense Minister Roberta Pinotti famously pean market for Turkish exports, garnering basin where Rome has exerted its strategic explained Italian strategic priorities: “the Turkey $9.53 billion in revenue in 2019.5 autonomy, particularly in its pivot to heart of our interventions is the Mediter- With the exception of a conflict of interests Africa. In challenging ’s dominance raneo allargato, from the Balkans to the concerning Cyrpriot offshore in Africa, Italy has developed a mutually Sahel, to the Horn of Africa.”2 development, which the two countries beneficial relationship with Turkey, which have managed to compartmentalize, Italy has concurrently sought to increase its in- Placing Italy at the center of a nexus of and Turkey share a broad set of common fluence in Africa. Creating a new strategic Mediterranean commercial routes con- interests across the wider Mediterranean paradigm for Mediterranean geopolitics, necting Europe with Africa and the Middle basin, from the Balkans to North Africa and the symbiosis between Rome and Ankara East has been the primary driving force the Horn of Africa.

1 Italy and Turkey‘s Europe-to-Africa Commercial Corridor

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Within the Italian-Turkish symbiosis, to expand Turkey’s economic and political ranking Turkey as one of the country‘s top commercial connectivity with the central footprint across the .9 Despite foreign investors.12 Announcing a goal of Maghreb states Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya making significant trade and investment raising Turkey-Algeria bilateral trade to $5 forms a core shared interest between inroads in Africa, Turkey’s ability to esta- billion and calling for a free trade agree- Rome and Ankara as both seek to develop blish its own inter-regional commercial ment, Turkey’s president declared Algeria a greater economic presence in North Af- connectivity via North Africa is stymied in as “one of our strategic partners in North rica and the rest of the continent. Despite the western Mediterranean by Africa”, explaining that “Algeria is one of Italy’s proximity to the North African coast, and in the by Turkey’s most important gateways to the France remains the dominant foreign actor – both of whom share deep economic and Maghreb and Africa.”13 in the Maghreb, a region that is increa- military ties with France and the UAE. singly becoming an overland gateway Turkey’s overt military intervention during Italy is Algeria’s overall largest trade part- for Euro-Africa commercial relations with the first half of 2020 to preserve Libya’s ner as well as Algeria’s largest export mar- the widespread expansion of high speed GNA has created an important strate- ket.14 Rome has long promoted trilateral road networks across the contintent. While gic beachhead for Turkey in the central energy interconnectivity between Algeria, Italy has surpassed France in becoming Maghreb. By reversing the course of Libya’s Tunisia, and Italy, the most emblematic Europe’s second largest manufacturer, civil war through empowering the - symbol of which is the Trans-Mediterra- whose value of sold production exceeds based government against opposition nean (Transmed) natural gas pipeline. France’s value by approximately one-third,6 forces backed by Egypt, the UAE, France, Owned jointly by Eni and Algeria’s state- the development of Italy’s economic rela- and , Turkey has cemented its status owned oil company Sonatrach, the 2,475 tions in North Africa and the rest of Africa as a power in North Africa. Ankara’s km Transmed pipeline is one of the longest are constrained by France’s outsized influ- considerable air force presence at the in the , spanning Algeria, Tunisia, ence on the pattern of Afro-Mediterranean re-captured al-Watiyah air base, located 27 , and the Italian .15 Eni, Italy’s commercial connectivity. km from the Tunisian border, and its deve- largest company by revenue, has extensive loping naval presence in the GNA coastal oil and natural gas operations in in Algeria French manufacturing value-chains domi- stronghold of have increased in partnership with Sonatrach. In July nate the emerging Morocco-based Africa- Ankara’s clout in Tunis as well as in . 2020, the two firms signed a wide-ranging to-Europe commercial corridor.7 Despite Turkey’s new outsized military presence in breakthrough agreement to expand Italy’s burgeoning trade with Egypt and Libya now serves as a platform from which joint exploration and development.16 The the leading role of Italian energy major Ankara can promote Afro-Mediterranean electricity grids of energy-rich Algeria, Eni in the development of Egypt’s natural connectivity via the central Maghreb Tunisia, and Italy similarly are scheduled to gas industry, Italy’s influence in Egypt is states in conjunction with Italy, which become interconnected in 2025 upon the constrained by France’s strong security also backed the GNA and runs a military completion of a 192 km-long, 600MW un- relationship with Egypt. France is Egypt’s hospital in Misrata. dersea cable between Tunisia and Sicily.17 third largest weapons supplier8 and main- tains a naval base on the coast of Egypt’s However, until Libya’s security envi- Mirroring its efforts at creating Italo- close strategic partner, the United Arab ronment sufficiently stabilizes and the Tunisian-Algerian energy interconnectivity, (UAE). has also engaged in Tripoli-Ndjamena segment of the Trans- Italy has literally laid the groundwork for covert cooperation with Egypt and the African Highway system’s TAH-3 route is the expansion of the Turkey-Italy-Tunisia UAE to support General Khalifa Haftar’s completed, Turkey and Italy’s only option corridor’s extension to Algeria. Over the forces in eastern Libya against the western for creating a Europe-to-Africa commercial past decade, Italy’s leading Libyan Government of National Accord corridor through the Central Maghreb is firms have been deeply involved in the (GNA) supported by Italy and Turkey. The via Algeria’s segment of the Trans-Saharan modernization of Algeria’s road system, in- Franco-Emirati-Egyptian partnership was Highway,10 accessed via Tunisia’s ports.11 cluding the mega-project East-West high- put on prominent display in late August way traversing the entire length of Algeria 2020 with concurrent Franco-Emirati- Consequently, one month into Turkey’s parallel to the country’s coast. Italy’s Anas Greek joint air force exercises and Franco- game-changing Libya intervention, International and ITALCONSULT are buil- Egyptian-Greek joint naval exercises, in Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ding the 399 km eastern most segment support of in its eastern Mediterra- visited Algeria on January 26, 2020 as part that runs from Bordj Bon Arreridj to the nean stand-off with Turkey. of a 3-country trip to Africa that included Tunisian border.18 The upgrade accounts and Gambia, two of Africa ‘eco- for over half the 783 km distance between Turkey faces an even more formidable nomic ‘ with which Turkey has been Tunisia’s port of Bizerte, the Turkey-Italy- challenge in the Mediterranean basin expanding its commercial relations. Anka- Tunisia corridor’s African landfall, and from its systemic rivals France and the ra has already started to make a strong bid Algiers, the northern starting point of the UAE. From 2010 to 2016, Ankara opened for a strategic presence in Algeria through Trans-Saharan highway. 26 embassies in Africa as part of its push Turkey‘s $3.5 billion dollars of investments,

2 Italy and Turkey‘s Europe-to-Africa Commercial Corridor

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Italy and Turkey’s Europe-to-Africa Corridor Turkey-Italy-Tunisia corridor. Yilport is a on was the Turkish company’s first expan- subsidiary of the private family-owned sion beyond regional operations. Roughly The Turkey-Italy-Tunisia commercial group Yildirim Holding Inc. headed by its equidistant between Taranto and Tunis, corridor is a multi-modal transportation visionary chairman Robert Yüksel Yildirim. Yilport’s Malta terminal forms an important arc that carries the potential to become On July 30, 2019, Yilport entered into a 49- logistics center for the Africa-to-Europe an organizing principle for commercial year concession agreement to operate the segment of the Turkey-Italy-Tunisia corridor. connectivity between three . Taranto port. Although a thriving industrial The core connectivity arc stretches from center during the twentieth century, Taran- A Paradigm Shift in the Geopolitics of the Turkey’s major ports on the Aegean to to declared bankruptcy in 2006, staying Wider Mediterranean the corridor’s central node at Taranto in receivership for almost four years. The and, from there, to Malta and the ports of troubled port changed hands a few times21 Although still in its initial stages, the Biserte and Sfax in Tunisia.19 Leveraging until Yilport’s 2019 aquisition. Turkey-Italy-Tunisia corridor has already the Italian peninsula’s geographic position begun to rewrite the geopolitical rules of and Italy’s high-speed rail system with its With a vision to transform Taranto’s Contai- the Meditarranean basin, as witnessed by connections to the wider European rail ner Terminal into “a gateway terminal and the shifting positions of Malta and Tunisia. network, the corridor has a north-south also a transshipment hub of tomorrow,”22 Located equidistant from Tripoli and Tunis, axis connecting North Africa to major Yilport has committed a total of €400 Malta has been drawn into a security part- manufacturing and commercial centers of million for the terminal’s rennovation and nership with Turkey as Ankara builds up Europe. Connected to five active rail plat- expansion.23 Although delayed by three its presence in Libya. In late January 2019, forms that link directly to Italy’s national months due to the outbreak of the CO- during the initial phase of Turkey’s Libya rail , cargo delivered at Taranto can VID19 , the container terminal’s intervention, a Turkey-Malta Business reach within 9 hours and phase 1 development was completed in Council summit convened in and and within 17 hours. 2020. The terminal at Taranto is called for boosting Turkey-Malta bilateral able to serve ultra large container vessels trade to $1 billion.30 While the summit The Taranto-Malta maritime link is also with -16.5 meters draft and offers 160,000 highlighted the economic potential of supported by the as sq. meters of container freight station and Malta and Turkey’s efforts to create Afro- the southernmost link in the EU’s own empty container services .24 Yilport’s Mediterranean connectivity,31 Turkey’s “Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor,” development program envisions an ambi- Vice-President also gave voice one of the nine core network corridors of tious expansion of Taranto’s capacity to 4 to the growing security dimension of the the ’s Trans-Euro- million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) Turkey-Malta relationship, suggesting “the pean Transportation Network, or TEN-T, by 2028.25 As Robert Yüksel Yildirim noted at defense and security sectors in particu- program.20 TEN-T’s Scandinavian-Mediter- the July 30, 2019 signing ceremony,” being lar” were “strategic areas” for enhancing ranean Corridor is the central north-south able to enter Italy and work here in Taranto Turkey-Malta cooperation.32 By May 2020, transportation artery of the European is like filling in the missing piece of a puzzle Malta withdrew from Operation Irini, the Union, a route spanning the Scandinavian that we are building globally.”26 EU’s naval effort to enforce the UN arms peninsula, , Germany, , embargo on Libya, which can potentially Italy, and Malta. Because the Turkey-Italy- Connecting the pieces of the Turkey-Italy- impede Turkey’s sea delivery of weapons Tunisia corridor’s Taranto-Malta segment Tunisia corridor is CMA CGM, the world’s to the GNA.33 Subsequently, Turkey and was previously designated as TEN-T’s fourth largest container transportation and the GNA have engaged in close security Scandinavian-Mediterranean corridor’s shipping company, in which Yilport chief cooperation with Malta concering illegal southern terminal link, Italy and Turkey Robert Yüksel Yildirim is a 24% stakehol- migration and illicit trafficking.34 have become the gatekeepers of what der.27 CMA CGM began service to the may become the most prized Europe-to Taranto port on July 10, 2020, marking the While Tunisia has been careful to main- Africa corridor. By interconnecting the resumption of container traffic at Taranto tain a strict neutrality in the Libyan civil EU’s Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor after a five-year hiatus. Taranto is poised war, officially refusing to allow Turkey to with Africa’s Algeria-to-Nigeria Trans- to become the geographic crown jewel in establish operational facilities on its soil,35 Saharan Highway, the Turkey-Italy-Tunisia CMA CGM’s TURMED service that already Tunisia similarly has been drawn into a corridor potentially forms the vital link for links Turkey and Tunisia via Malta.28 Eight deeper defense relationship with Anka- the creation of a mega-corridor spanning years before Yilport’s Taranto acquisition, ra.36 Although France wields considerable Europe and Africa from 60o N. latitude to 6o the Turkish port operator acquired a 50 economic leverage as Tunisia’s leading N. latitude. percent stake in Malta’s Freeport Terminal at trade partner, particularly as a market for the Marsaxlokk port on the southern coast Tunisian exports, Italy does constitute The Turkish port operator Yilport is the of the .29 Occurring within the same Tunisia’s second largest trade partner.37 commercial juggernaut that is assembling time frame that Yildirim acquired his share Augmenting Italy’s trade and investment the transformative connectivity of the in CMA CGM, Yilport’s 2011 Malta acquisiti- position, France’s economic advantage is

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being offset by the sizable investments in Tunisia by Turkey’s strategic partner . Following a pattern witnessed elsewhere in Africa,38 Turkey has been seeking to advance military cooperation with Tunisia while Qatar has focused on economic investment. With approximately $3 billion of investments in Tunisia,39 Qatar ranks as Tunisia’s second largest investor, behind France and ahead of Italy and Germany, who rank third and fourth respectively.40 Easing Tunisia’s economic dependence on France has enabled Tunisia to exert more autonomy in its foreign relations.

The Turkey-Italy-Tunisia commercial corridor, with its central hub at Italy’s Taranto port, may establish the developing Italo-Turkish-led alignment as a lasting feature of Mediterranean geopolitics. Italy’s assertion of strategic autonomy in the wider Mediterranean and its develo- ping partnership with Turkey occur within the framework of Italy’s NATO and EU commitments. Taranto is both home to an important NATO naval base41 and services the EU’s own Scandinavian-Mediterranean transportation connectivity program. By creating a Europe-to-Africa commercial corridor through the central Maghreb, the geopolitical symbiosis between Italy and Turkey has achieved a paradigm shift in Mediterranean geopolitics that is res- haping the contours of NATO’s and the European Union’s strategic agenda.

Prof. Michaël Tanchum is a senior associate fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES) and teaches inter- national relations of the Mediterranean and the Middle East at the University of Navarra, . He is also a fellow at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University, , and at the Centre for Strategic Policy Implementati- on at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey. 42

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Endnotes 21) N.A., Il piano di Yilport: oltre 400 milioni di investimenti in 49 38) Michaël Tanchum, “Turkey‘s String of Pearls: Turkey‘s Over- anni per il Terminal container di Taranto, ShipMag, 4 June 2020, Naval Installations Reconfigure the Security 1) Silvia Colombo and Anja Palm, “Italy in the Mediterranean – https://www.shipmag.it/il-piano-di-yilport-oltre-400-milioni-di- of Mediterranean- Sea Corridor,”AIES Fokus 4/2019, Austrian Priorities and Perspectives of a European ,” Found- investimenti-in-49-anni-per-il-terminal-container-di-taranto/ Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES), 21 May 2019, ation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), 2019, p. 7, https:// 22) N.A., “YILPORT HOLDING MOVES FORWARD FOR THE https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2019/fokus-19-04.php www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/study%20 TARANTO CONTAINER TERMINAL CONCESSION,” Yilport Holding 39) N.A., «Amir’s visit vonfirms Tunisia’s distinguished ties with on%20the%20mediterranean%20-%206%20-%20dp_hd.pdf Inc., n.d., https://www.yilport.com/en/media/detail/YILPORT- Qatar,» Gulf Times, 25 February 2020, https://m.gulf-times.com/ 2) N.A.”Pinotti: meno militari in Iraq e Afghanistan più in area HOLDING-MOVES-FORWARD-FOR-THE-TARANTO-CONTAINER- story/656843/Amir-s-visit-confirms-Tunisia-s-distinguished-ties- Mediterraneo,” SKYtg24, 15 January 2018,https://tg24.sky.it/ TERMINAL-CONCESSION/55/2005/0 with-Qatar mondo/2018/01/15/Missioni-militari-pinotti-aumenta-presenza- 23) N.A., «Investment in Italian Port Resumes,» PortStrategy, 29 40) N.A., “Country Profile Tunisia,” Nordea, July 2020, https:// mediterraneo May 2020, https://www.portstrategy.com/news101/world/euro- www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-market/tunisia/invest- 3) Alessandro R. Ungaro, “Italy in the Mediterranean: Commercial pe/investment-in-italian-terminal-resumes ment Challenges, Changing Infrastructure, and New Maritime Traffic,” 24) N.A. “Taranto, Italy – Mediterranean Terminals,” Yilport 41) N.A., “Allied Martime Command,” NATO-OTAN Allied Maritime in Italy and Security in the Mediterranean, eds. Alessandro Mar- Holding Inc., n.d., https://www.yilport.com/en/ports/default/ Command,n.d. https://mc.nato.int/default; rone and Michele Nones, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2016, p. 26 Taranto-Italy/1170/0/0 Francesco Bechis, La Cina sbarca nel porto di Taranto. E minaccia 4) Alessandro Marrone, “Security in the Southern Neighbor- 25) Julia Louppova, Yilport on the way to Italy, port.today, Ue e Nato. La denuncia della Lega, Formiche, n.d., https://formi- hood – A view from Rome,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 6 August 2018, https://port.today/yilport-develop-taranto- che.net/2020/05/cina-porto-taranto-lega/ 20202, p. 4 container-terminal/ 42) The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. Daniel “Mac” 5) N.A., Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary 26) Yilport Holding Inc., “YILPORT Holding signs 49-Year conces- Lang for preparing the map image. 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