Reflections of Russian Propaganda Georgian Media About the Autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy

Beyond Religion - Reflections of Russian propaganda Georgian media about the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy

The establishment of the independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine brings a fundamental change to Russian influence and soft power structure in post-Soviet countries. It revises the status of Moscow as the leading ecclesiastical center of the Orthodox Church, which remained almost intact for more than 300 years. This fundamental change is affecting all target countries, making it important to be aware of the latest developments of Russian propaganda in order to stay resilient in the face of hybrid threats.

Our analysts conducted cross-border monitoring of Russian propaganda messages in the local media outlets of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in their reporting on the establishment of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Media monitoring methodology consisted of two parts: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative media monitoring identifies numerical measures or indicators that can be counted and analyzed. Qualitative media monitoring is used to assess the performance of the media against benchmarks, such as ethical or professional standards that cannot be easily quantified.

Experts in each country selected 2 TV channels and 2 online media outlets, which are among the most influential ones in covering international news and politics and have ratings figures. Our approach was also to balance pro-European and Eurosceptic, pro- government and pro- opposition media outlets for each country .

Georgia’s results

By Natia Kuprashvili

I. Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Journalism Resource Center

In Georgia, media selection data from TVMR and TMI audience measuring companies were used and two broadcasters were selected for observation:

1. Rustavi 2 – TV channel, which during the observation period was affiliated with the influential opposition force in Georgia - United National Movement and as per

1 the reports of prestigious international organizations, pursued a strongly oppositional editorial policy against the government and also showed open pro- Western position.

2. Imedi TV, which, according to the reports of prestigious international organizations, pursued a loyal editorial policy towards the Georgian government and showed critical attitude against the opposition - United National Movement.”

TOP.ge data will be used as the basis for the selection of online media, as well as the surveys prepared by UNDP Media Monitoring Program1 and 2 media outlets were selected: 1. Netgazeti.ge and 2. Ipress.ge .

Analysis materials were selected based on the following keywords: ● томос; - ტომოსი - Tomos ● автокефалия; ავტოკეფალია - autocephaly ● раскол церкви; - ეკლესიის გაყოფა - church dissent ● Варфоломей; - ბართლომე - Bartholomew ● Филарет; - ფილატერი - Filaret ● Онуфрий; - ონოფრე - Onuphrius ● Епифаний; - ეპიფანი - Epiphanius ● украинская православная церковь; -უკრიანის მართლმადიდებლური ეკლესია - the Orthodox Church of Ukraine ● киевский патриархат; - კიევის საპატრიარქო - Kyiv Patriarchate ● московский патриархат; - მოსკოვის საპატრიარქო - Moscow Patriarchate ● მსოფლიო პატრიაქტი - Ecumenical Patriarch ● კონსტანტინეპოლის პატრიარქი - Patriarch of Constantinople

The observation period was determined from 1 September to 30 November 2018.

1 http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/ka/home/projects/media-monitoring.html

2 The total amount of time and space designated to the selected issue - establishing an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church was measured via the content analysis. After analyzing the selected empirical materials, the tone of the coverage through which the corresponding topics were covered - positive, neutral or negative.

General Context

Pre-election and general media monitoring by prestigious international and local organizations shows that Georgia has a highly polarized media2, namely, the TV field. Television still remains the main source of information (more than 70%) among the population of Georgia. The majority of the audience is divided between two national broadcasters, Rustavi 2 and Imedi.

According to various reports, the owners of Rustavi 2 were affiliated with the former government and the United National Movement during the observation period, while Imedi stands out for its loyalty and biased attitude towards the Georgian Dream and acting government.

Following factors are also important to consider in respect to the period under review: time falls with the period prior to the presidential election and the country is under an active election campaign. The scandal related to the Orthodox Church i.e. ,,Cyanide Case “ and related events were also relevant, revealing the controversy in the Patriarchate. Media that was critical towards the government have presented this confrontation as a confrontation between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces in the church, where pro- Western forces have been harassed by arresting the archbishop for alleged "cyanide case".

Monitoring results of TV companies

2 http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/ka/home/projects/media-monitoring.html

3 Rustavi 2

During the observation period, TV “Rustavi 2” dedicated 15 media products to the issue of autocephaly of the Church of Ukraine and 63.6 minutes in total, in just three months, most of which fall under the best broadcasting time. Monitoring showed that from other foreign news, the topic was the most important issue for TV channel and in many cases overlapped events inside the country. So, on September 16, the channel dedicated the entire 23 minutes of the main TV program of the week' – Post Scriptum. Apart from this main topic, only 3 other topics were included in this program.

The channel covered most of the news in a positive and neutral tone, whereas in some cases it was totally positive.

Journalist’s speech shows such positive statements as: "Restoration of historical justice"; "Order wins." "The most influential Church Representative already expressed his consent," "Refusing to declare the Autocephaly of Ukrainian Church will be a big historical mistake," "Russian Demagogy," "once, the Church of Georgia was under the patronage of Russia and acquired its independents after much endeavors and sacrifice.”

We can conclude that if the reportages are not critical towards the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and its autocephaly, the channel is clearly critical towards the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches.

The position of the Russian Church was mostly covered/presented with such terms and approaches:

“The black list in the church, the Russian Patriarchate finely started firing. Patriarch Kirill imposed political restrictions on his congregation” - the journalist's text. During the coverage of the Georgian Patriarchate, the main question the TV Channel kept asking was, "Will the Georgian Patriarchate support the decision of the World Patriarchate?"

The broadcaster sets the choice for this question (the journal's text) as follows: "It is our choice whether we will be on the side of civilized countries, or on the side of our occupier."

5 "The Patriarchate of Georgia must explain, whether they are under the influence of the Russian Church or in the spiritual unity with the World Orthodox Church?" – it was the text of the journalist as well.

Qualitative monitoring showed that Rustavi 2 had developed a kind of strategy for covering the topic. There was a specific journalist who was consistently fixed on given topic – Mr. Gigla Tumanishvili. In each-and-every reportage, specific terms were being repeated, such as "historical justice." Sources also were being repeated, most often theologian Giorgi Tiginashvili was seen, being clearly critical of the Russian Patriarchate, as well as critical of the Georgian Patriarchate, criticizing them for refusing to recognize the autocephaly.

Among the clergy, “Rustavi 2” broadcasted so-called "opposition wing" of the Georgian Patriarchate i.e. clergymen who were critical of the Georgian Patriarchate and supported the dean Giorgi Mamaladze, arrested on the Cyanide case. Mostly, it was Metropolitan Peter of Chkondidi, who supported the recognition of the Ukrainian autocephaly in his comments, worried about the possible influence of the Russian Patriarchate on the Georgian Church, and hoped that "a majority of Synod would support the truth".

Among the keywords the TV Channel mostly used was "Ukrainian Autocephaly", and often "Filaret", "World Patriarch" (Ecumenical Patriarch), the least used was "Church Clash", though "Russian narrative" is indirectly reflected in the reportages, while "Rustavi 2" is trying to respond to the Russian propaganda. For example, in the TV show, dated September 9, Rustavi 2 gets back to the topic, because of the speech of Metropolitan Ilarion, aired by Russia TV and thoroughly informs the audience - what Ilarion said there, including that the idea of the dissolution of the Church is for win.

On September 28, the reason of dedicating more than six minutes of reportage in the main news show, became an interview with the lesser-known priest. It is difficult to

6 explain why the interview with the less-known priest for one of the newspapers was noteworthy for the broadcaster, where the priest totally repeats Russian propaganda messages, if not the TV channel's desire to criticize the Georgian Patriarchate once again. From quite an extensive reportage, we understand that "the Archbishop of Saint Ketevan Church called the World Patriarch as a world speculator in newspapers, and then accused him of splitting the Orthodox world apart."

In the interview, which was fully showed in the reportage, the archpriest compares Filaret to a de facto Abkhazian clergyman – Dorothe in occupied Abkhazia, and an attempt to obtain Ukrainian autocephaly to a desire of the separatist forces of Abkhazia to make the Church of Abkhazia independent, which fully reflects the Russian narrative. However, the Georgian theologians in the same reportage have strongly criticized such positions of clergymen.

It is noteworthy that such reportages coincide with a period, when specific clergymen have been criticized by Rustavi 2 for their support of the government-supported presidential candidate Salome Zurabishvili, and for influencing their voters. Overall, the channel spreads the message that anyone who refuses to support or promote Ukraine's autocephaly or opposes it, is under Russian influence, whereas the Russian-influenced clergymen support the government. The aforementioned frame is notable as the TV channel covers the topic right in the pre-election period.

The frequency of topic coverage by months is also significant. Rustavi 2 most frequently covered the topic in September (10 journalistic material), i.e when it was the most active phase in the pre-election campaign in Georgia. It was less covered in October (2) and in November (3), when autocephaly actually declared in Ukraine, which as a rule, should have been more frequently covered. It is notable that by this time the pre-election campaign was already over.

IMEDI TV

Imedi TV dedicated 18.46 minutes to covering the issue during the period under review. In that very period, only 6 audio-visual products were found to be aired; the situation is quite different on the web site of Imedi TV, where we find 28 printed materials according to the search terms, but according to the research methodology, only the aired materials were analyzed.

Most of the reportages were broadcasted during non-advantageous broadcasting time (4), but since on October 11, Imedi aired an exclusive interview with Filaret and dedicated 11 minutes to it, most of the time dedicated to covering the issue falls under the advantageous broadcasting time:

The coverage tone of the channel was mostly neutral and sometimes even positive, but we also meet critical coverage.

The results of the coverage tone and overall qualitative analysis show that the coverage of the topic by Imedi TV does not indicate the existence of an arranged coverage strategy and approach. Moreover, the discussed empirical examples prove that Imedi TV provides different, contradictory messages for its audience. For example, the tone of the News aired on October 16 Imedi is critical to Ukraine's autocephaly, which referred to the meeting of the Russian Synod in Minsk. The reportage completely reflects the Russian narrative that "the participants of the meeting blamed the Constantinople's Patriarchate in canonical violations." Reportage shows that Constantinople has annulled the 17th- century act, but the audience cannot understand which act is under the point.

The journalist also explains that Constantinople has removed the anathema imposed by the Russian Patriarchate, but what this anathema or its removal meant is not explained at all. The reportage quotes the secretary of the Georgian Patriarchate, who says that "the secretary of the Georgian Patriarchate described the confrontation between Russia and the World Patriarchate grievous and dangerous."

Along with such critical reportages, there are examples of positive coverage on the channel (3 reports), such as weekly TV show, exclusive interview with Filaret in Ukraine

9 for TV show MTAVARI. Positive reportages also often use the words - "historical reality". The exclusive interview with Filaret was being aired for 11 minutes. The journalist showed respect in her/his questions towards Filaret and at the same time emphasized close ties of the Ukrainian Church to Georgia, these connections were represented as a basis for the support of Ukrainian Church.. For example, the journalis’s question is: ,,how important is to deepen relations between Ukraine and Georgia against occupation oku, and how do you imagine the support of the Georgian Patriarch, whom you are well acquainted with from student years.”

In one of the positive reportages, Imedi TV expressly stated that the Georgian Church will support the autocephaly of Ukraine. However, we meet the following quote as well: When it comes to coverage of the issue, most Imedi TV sources tend to be more neutral than positive. Here's the position - if Constantinople manages to reconcile different churches in the Ukraine, "it will be a celebration of the Georgian Church." It is important that the most of the sources used in the reportages show more neutral attitude and necessity for being careful towards the issue. For example, the Georgian Patriarchate issued a statement condemning criticizing and defaming the high hierarchs of the Russian Patriarchate and the World Patriarchate.

The reviewed materials do not contain criticism against the Georgian Patriarchate. There is a question whether what position the Georgian Patriarchate will have, though the reportages show no clear answer to this question.

Comparison of the channels and key findings:

Imedi TV has an example of critical coverage of the issue and Rustavi 2 does not has one. However, Rustavi 2 has an example of clearly positive coverage of the issue and not a critical one.

Rustavi 2 has a clear strategy for reporting on the issue, with a special journalist, using repetitive terms. Imedi TV coverage is more chaotic and inconsistent/disarranged.

There is a sharp time difference dedicated to the issue, Rustavi 2 gives three times more time to the issue, than Imedi.

If Rustavi 2 is critical towards the Georgian Patriarchate while covering the given issues, Imedi TV is not.

11 The two influential broadcasting companies almost do not rely on the same sources, the only one shown by both broadcasters is Filaret, who was interviewed by both broadcasters. One interview was recorded by Rustavi 2, during Filaret's visit to the United States and the other by Imedi in Ukraine, where the TV channel specifically sent the journalist for covering the issue.

There is no coincidence between the issues; some issues are omitted on both channels: for example, Rustavi 2 did not provide the audience with a statement of the Patriarchate condemning defaming of the high hierarchs of the World Patriarchate and the Russian Patriarchate. Also, Rustavi 2 did not cover the statement of the secretary of the Georgian Patriarchate, who called the confrontation between Russia and the World Patriarchate grievous and dangerous. Unlike IMEDI, Rustavi 2 has never emphasized that Filaret and Georgian Patriarch Ilia II were friends.

Thereby, Imedi TV did not cover Filaret's visit to the United States. Imedi was never interested in the scandalous statements made by the archbishop of St. Ketevan Queen Cathedral. There have been no reportages that critically covered the restraint of the Georgian Patriarchate or, like Rustavi 2, no broadcasting time provided to those high hierarchs in the patriarchate, who were critical towards the restraint of Patriarchate, including Archbishop Peter.

However, both channels use completely different experts. For the purposes of analyzing the issues, Rustavi 2 relies on theologians clearly positive to the Ukrainian autocephaly, also being critical of the Georgian Patriarchate, while Imedi TV relies on the theologians, who are more or less positive about the Ukrainian autocephaly, though note to show some caution.

Both channels sharply differ in reporting calendar, coincidence is seen only on 1 September and 16 October, both dates are related to the action of Russian Patriarchate:

12 On 1 September both channels cover the meeting of Russian Patriarch Kiril with the Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul, and on 16 October, meeting of the Russian Orthodox Church Synod in Minsk, making them trending.

Influential Georgian broadcasters covered the issue mostly in a neutral tone, also, there were numerous examples of positive coverage of the topic.

Qualitative analysis of the coverage of the research issue also confirms the political polarization of the influential media in Georgia, which in this case, shows manipulative coverage on both sides. Namely, Rustavi 2 shows manipulative coverage of some parts of the Georgian Patriarchate and the influence of Russia on the Georgian government, while loyal approach of IMEDI to the government has been transformed into a loyal approach towards the Georgian Patriarchate.

We find cases of repetition of the Russian narrative on both channels, also in both cases Russian propaganda messages are heard in the Russian media, following the statements made by the high hierarchs of the Russian Patriarchate. In both media, we find an example of broadcasting such information in a neutral way, but it is not opposed by anything. TV Rustavi 2, in one of such reportages, is trying to counter this content by recording theologians in Georgia, but being the defendant side, also paves the way for the Russian propaganda - for new dissemination. On Imedi, we find that such content (the position of the Russian Church) is further empowered by the statements from sources in Georgia. However, such content is relatively small compared to the general coverage of the issue.

In both media, the issue is related to the topic of the occupied Abkhazian Church, which also has a desire to gain autocephaly, though, reportages of RUSTAVI-2 explained repeatedly, why it is not legit parallel, unlike IMEDI, where we hear no explanation at all.

The most commonly used keywords are ,,autocephaly of Ukraine”, also use of "Tomos" and "Filaret" are common. We hear the terms "historical justice" repeatedly on both channels.

Monitoring results of Online Media

IPRESS

During the monitoring period, IPRESS dedicated 12 journalistic material to the topic of autocephaly in Ukraine and used a total of 4581 words, though most of the materials, with one exception, was simply news-style coverage and replication of other media coverage or posts published on social media.

However, the publication seeks to find sources that will inform the readers about the details of recognizing the Ukrainian autocephaly. Such is the status of Deacon Irakli Jinjolava on the social network, which explains from a historical point of view, why the decision of the World Patriarchate was righteous. Jinjolava writes: “One of the main questions that the world has towards the Patriarch Bartholomew is - why only now he remembered the issue of granting autocephaly to Ukraine and where he was before. This is the position of uneducated and uninformed people. "

It also replicates the status posted on the social network, whereas the post of Archbishop Zenon of the UK and Ireland is also being replicated. IPRESS quotes quite a comprehensive status of a high-rank clergyman, referring to a strong tradition of recognizing Georgian autocephaly and jurisdiction by the World Patriarchate. The status smashes down the myth spread by the Russian media that the recognition of the Ukrainian autocephaly may initiate the recognition of the autocephaly of the Abkhazian church.

The tone of coverage is mostly neutral, sometimes with positive and dramatically positive coverage of the issue.

The material that IPRESS receives, not from existing sources, but researches independently, is very positive. In his analytical interview, Beka Mindiashvili, a theologian strongly appreciates the granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church, this analysis contradicts Russian propagandistic narrative. We have the following observations: “It can be clearly said that this is not only a great achievement for Ukraine, it is of a millennium, a restoration of justice for the Ukrainian Church, and so on.

This is one of the most important steps in the context of the Orthodox and Christian world in general through the last millennium. This process is a big bang to the Russian imperialism.

Most of the material was published in October, the most active release is on October 16, and IPRESS offers a number of evaluations for this day.

NETGAZETI

Netgazeti - dedicated 9 publications and used 3 412 words in total about the issue, during the monitoring period. One of the first materials published on September 26, exceeded 1400 words and, along with the most extensive material, it is an analytical and in-depth publication. It is noteworthy that the magazine in this article provides a kind of direction and includes all subsequent material on the subject published in the further period - making it a recommendation text.

The product of a publication can generally be described as arranged, detailed texts, the tone of which is mostly neutral, sometimes with positive coverage, including one example of negative coverage.

A negative example is a piece of brief news about the announcement of the Moscow Patriarchate via RIA Novost, though this news is also balanced by a recommended article if the online user is likely to read such recommended material.

16 It is noteworthy that the online edition relies on different sources other than researched media outlets (for example, theologian Mirian Gamrekelashvili, Beka Mindiashvili, political scientist Grigol Gogelia), and provides an audience with the topics omitted in the researched media, such as preventing Moscow by Ukraine to use Pochayiv Lavra.

The online edition covers the topic in-depth, and the analysis of historical facts is profoundly positive towards the given issue. For example, in the article we read:

“The roots of the resistance and striving for the independence of the Ukrainian Church are deeper and eventually lead to the Middle Ages. The 10th century was coming to an end when the great Kyiv chief Vladimir the Great of Kyiv declared Christianity as the official religion of the Region and established the Kyiv Metropolitan. Until 1243, the high priests were appointed from Constantinople here. At the initiative of the Metropolitan, as a result of the Mongol invasion, from the newly demolished Kyiv, metropolitan moved to the capital Moscow only in the 14th century, though the title of Kyiv Metropolitan was kept. Despite numerous attempts, due to Moscow's resistance, the structure was never able to restore to its original form.

Theologian Mirian Gamrekelashvili notes that at the end of the 17th century, when Moscow finally took over the Kyiv metropolis, the canonical rules were violated. As he explains Moscow, which now speaks about the inadmissibility of autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, has declared the autocephaly of Constantinople. "

The edition also offers an analysis of the coverage of the issue by the Russian propagandistic media. We read the following in the article:

Messages from Russia about the possibility to grant autocephaly to the Church of Abkhazia have already been leaked in pro-Russian propagandistic media. In the propaganda material, the aforementioned prognosis is indeed seen as a threat, though it is not blamed on the "brother--in-

17 faith", but on the West instead, who has "split up" the church. The World Patriarch is portrayed in propaganda materials as being under the influence of the United States.

According to Grigol Gegelia, today Russian soft power stands on two pillars: disinformation and the myth of brother-in-faith, who will be completely destroyed if the latter recognizes Abkhazian autocephaly and thus enters into open conflict with the Georgian Patriarchate.

"If the Russian Church recognizes the autocephaly of Abkhazia, then even their small and weak pillar will collapse. Russian propaganda is now trying to portray itself as a brother- in-faith. Although this has no real basis neither in history or in practice. For some people in Georgia, unfortunately, it works well. One of the "real" arguments left in favor of Russia today is that the Russian Church does not recognize Abkhazia.

Netgazeti does not avoid discussing and trying to deeply analyze possible autonomy of Abkhazian Church from the side of Russia, writes: "Autocephaly of Abkhazian Church by Moscow will also decrease pro-Russian narratives from the side of Georgian churches". Definitely, the narrative of brothers-in-faith itself completely lies on a lie, as exactly Russia is the historical enemy of Georgia's autocephaly and church. "

Half of the researched material was published in October, but the publications in September and November are larger in volume and analytical.

Key findings of online media

• Online media outlets cover the issue more impartially, in-depth and consistently than TV companies. • Online media outlets offer both news and analytical articles to their audiences, relying on sources other than Telemedia, including experts. They also inform the audience about the topics missed by TV media.

18 • Of the keywords, online media most often mentions "Ukrainian autocephaly" and "Filaret", as well as "Patriarch of Constantinople" "Moscow Patriarchate", with the exception of "Splitting of the Church". • Russian propaganda narrative indirectly gets into observed online media, while online editions try to respond to the messages spread by the Russian media. • As per Russian propaganda "MessageBox for Georgia" is as follows: The World Patriarch is slaved by the West. With his hand, the West split the Orthodox Church. The declaration of the Ukrainian autocephaly makes it unavoidable to recognize the autocephaly of such churches as Abkhazia. Recognition of Abkhazia's autocephaly by Russia will be a forced step, as a result of the split from the Orthodox Church by the West. Recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly by Georgia will make the process of recognition of the autocephaly of Abkhazia and final separation from the Georgian Patriarchate irreversible.

What media outlets in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are writing about the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy

Armenia:

TV: 1st channel (Public Television of Armenia), Kentron TV Online: news.am, lragir.am

Georgia:

TV: Rustavi 2, Imedi Online: Ipress.ge, netgazeti.ge

Moldova:

TV: Publika TV, NTV Moldova Online: jurnal.md, sputnik.md

Ukraine:

TV: 1+1, 112 Ukraine Online: Pravda.com.ua, strana.ua

19 Each country archived the relevant media reports for the period of 1 September-30 November 2018. For TV channels, only news reports were studied, as not all talk show recordings were available in all countries. Therefore, any relevant talk shows were not taken into account in this report.

The research was carried out at the initiative of the NGO Internews-Ukraine, with the participation of Media Diversity Institute (Armenia), Journalism Resource Center (Georgia) and Independent Journalism Center (Moldova).

10 Key Conclusions: 1. Some Russian narratives about the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church are

“floating” ones — they appear in all four countries. Others are “adapted” to local developments.

The Kremlin aims to spread the same narratives everywhere where they could work. Due to direct Russian interference, media affiliation or careless choice of sources, some Russian narratives about the establishment of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church appear in all four countries.

The most widespread narrative in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is the one about the necessary unity of the Orthodox world in the perspective of Western intrusion. Hence, the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church is being positioned as a threat towards this unity, and one of the instruments being used by the West in its geopolitical showdown with Russia. This is another example of labelling the West an “enemy” in order to consolidate the Russians (and in this case — pro-Russian Armenians, Moldovans and Ukrainians as well) in the face of an imaginary threat. Additionally, in all four countries articles with narratives close to messages spread by Russian propaganda also make a move against the Eucumenical Patriarchate, which is being represented as the “hand” of the West.

At the same time, Russian propaganda is very versatile and adapts to local developments in each country.

In Ukraine, the United States are being directly pointed at as the main beneficiary of the split in the Orthodox world. The topic of the Tomos (decree on autocephaly decree issued by the Eucumenical Partiarchate) was also very closely connected to local political events, especially the upcoming 2019 presidential elections.

In Georgia, the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was often presented in the context of Georgian religious life, and the problem of the Abkhazia church’s autocephaly in particular.

In Armenia, it was hinted that the Tomos will not happen as the government of Turkey made a deal with Russia and will not let the Ecumenical Patriarchate recognize the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. At the same time, Ukraine is positioned as a country collaborating with the Eucumenical Partiarchate located in Turkey, which is important in the light of tensions between Armenia and Turkey.

In all of these messages there was one red line: the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church is a dangerous development for your country (be it Armenia, Georgia or Moldova) and, therefore, it should not be supported.

Our next points will focus on the details of messaging for each country.

20 2. Ukraine’s autocephaly was in the spotlight of Ukrainian and Georgian media.

The Ukrainian media’s coverage of the establishment of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church was by far the most active. There have been 502 media reports in the Ukrainian media selected under this project regarding the Tomos for Ukraine, which is ten times more than in the Georgian media selected under this project (42 entries), which occupies second place in terms of coverage intensity. In Moldova, the topic of the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox Church was covered in 24 media pieces. In Armenia, the topic saw the least coverage. Of four media outlets monitored, only one — news website Iragir.am — had at least a few reports (5 news articles).

3. In Ukraine, the reports were mostly neutral. But there are nuances.

All monitored Ukrainian media outlets were mostly neutral while covering the Ukrainian Church’s autocephaly. This is particularly true for TV channel 112 Ukraine (85.7% of news materials are neutral) and the site Ukrayinska Pravda (97.6% of neutral articles).

In the meantime, the TV channel 1+1 had a more positive attitude — 31.1% of media materials were positive or very positive. Strana.ua, on the other hand, had a significant share of negative posts — 43.3% of its articles were either negative or very negative.

4. Strana.ua has the biggest share of Russian propaganda messages among the four Ukrainian media outlets selected.

Three out of the four monitored media — 1+1, 112 Ukraine and Ukrayinska Pravda — have very few materials whose messages are close to those of Russian propaganda. However, strana.ua stands out — 37.9% of materials in this outlet are quite close to messages spread by Russian propaganda against the autocephaly of the Ukrainian church. Additionally, while 1+1, 112 Ukraine and Ukrayinska Pravda rely on such sources as the Ukrainian Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, Ukrainian officials and politicians, as well as the Ecumenical Patriarchate, strana.ua often uses sources from the Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate or the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as Ukrainian opposition politicians, all of which are biased against the Tomos. strana.ua also

22 calls the Ecumenical Patriarchate the “Istanbul Partiarchate” in order not to highlight its superiority over the Moscow Patriarchate.

Here are the most widespread narratives close to those spread by Russian propaganda:

• ● The Tomos may not even be granted to Ukraine; • ● If the Ukrainian church receives the Tomos, it will initiate a split in world Orthodoxy; • ● After receipt of autocephaly, the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra and other church buildings will

be taken away from the Moscow Patriarchate. In this case, Ukraine will face a civil

conflict on religious grounds;

• ● Ukraine is a canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church; • ● Constantinople is preparing not to give Ukraine autocephaly, but to establish an

exarchate — that is, a branch of the Ecumenical Patriarchate;

• ● The Turkey-based Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot rule the Orthodox churches,

because Turkey is a Muslim state, not an Orthodox one;

• ● If Ukraine held a referendum on the Tomos, it would not receive support; • ● The United States rules political and religious life in Ukraine; • ● Poroshenko bribed Eucumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to ensure granting of the

Tomos;

• ● In Ukraine, the authorities, President Petro Poroshenko in particular, began

persecuting priests belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate;

● In Ukraine, Christianity is forcibly imposed by nationalists. The Tomos is a key to this.

5. Opinions in Georgia on Ukraine’s autocephaly clash.

Imedi TV (the pro-government TV channel) had the example of critical coverage of the Tomos, although positive messages on the topic prevailed; Rustavi 2 (the pro-opposition TV channel) did not contain critical coverage, and positive coverage was twice as big as on Imedi TV.

Another example of divergence is that both channels engage completely different experts. For the purposes of analyzing the issues, Rustavi 2 relies on theologians clearly positive towards Ukrainian autocephaly, and also critical of the Georgian Patriarchate, while Imedi TV relies on those theologians who are more or less positive about Ukrainian autocephaly, though note some caution should be shown.

Georgian online media outlets cover the issue more impartially, in-depth and consistently than TV companies. They offer both news and analytical articles to their audiences, including expert opinions. They also inform the audience about the topics missed by TV media.

6. Russian propaganda in the Georgian media is indirect.

On both Georgian TV channels, there are cases of repetition of the Russian narratives on the establishment of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Both media broadcast such information in a neutral way, but it was balanced by opposing views provided by these channels. However, such content is relatively minor compared to general coverage on the issue of the Ukrainian Church’s autocephaly. Russian propaganda narratives also get into monitored online media indirectly, even though online media outlets try to respond to the messages spread by the Russian media.

Here are the main propaganda narratives found in the Georgian media:

• ● The Ecumenical Patriarchate is a slave to the West and is being used to split the

Orthodox Christianity;

• ● the declaration of Ukrainian autocephaly makes recognition of the autocephaly of such

churches as the Abkhazian one unavoidable;

• ● recognition of Abkhazia's autocephaly by Russia will be a forced step, as a result of the

split of the Orthodox Church by the West;

• ● recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly by Georgia will make the process of recognition

of the autocephaly of Abkhazia and final separation from the Georgian Patriarchate irreversible.

7. In Moldova, even Russia-controlled media did not pay much attention to the Tomos.

In three out of four monitored Moldovan media — Publika TV, NTV Moldova and Jurnal.md — most reports were short pieces that presented limited information on the topic, usually quoting one source of information. Consequently, most reports lacked clarity. The background information provided was not enough to understand the problem clearly. Most

25 reports informed about the current development of the situation, without presenting historical background or giving a plurality of opinions.

On the contrary, in Russia-controlled outlet Sputnik.md, most reports were large stories that provided detailed background information on the controversy surrounding the Tomos. The tone of coverage was mostly biased, positive towards Russian Patriarchy and negative with regard to the Kyiv Patriarchy. Sources quoted were transparent (i.e. could be identified) but not diverse, in most cases representing opinions opposed to autocephaly.

8. Russia-owned media outlets applied different tactics in Moldova.

NTV Moldova, which broadcasts local content and rebroadcasts content produced in Russia, covered the issue of Ukrainian Church autocephaly irregularly in 2 news reports. The fact that NTV Moldova omitted to cover this issue may indicate a case of manipulation through omission.

Meanwhile, Sputnik.md spread the message that the Ukrainian Church attempted to divide Orthodox Christianity, and that it was schismatic. Sputnik also informed the Moldovan orthodox faithful on how to proceed further after the Russian Church announced that it has ended its relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.

Here are the main propaganda narratives found in Moldovan media:

●

● ● ●

26 Out of the four studied Armenian media, only one (online news site lragir.am) was seen to have posted publications related to the topic of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church during the reference period. This media outlet published five articles on the topic in September-November 2018. It is worth noting that in the further months selected for study, the media never returned to covering the Tomos.

The monitoring enabled the conclusion to be drawn that it was not just the Tomos, but also developments taking place on the majority of post-Soviet territory, including Ukraine, that failed to spark interest in Armenian media. Overall, Armenian media relatively rarely cover events on the territory of the former USSR, except for Azerbaijan (the country Armenia is in conflict with) and partially Russia (with which Armenia maintains the most intensive connections in various areas), as well as Georgia (a border state used by Armenia and its citizens for most of their land communications with the outside world). Additionally, it was a period of time when the interest of the Armenian public was focused on their own problems and events — the aftermath of the “velvet revolution” and situation on the contact line of the Karabakh conflict and at the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.

10. Those few publications in Armenia still contain propaganda narratives.

All five available publications failed to mention the Ukrainian side of the controversy, the positions of other Orthodox churches, besides the Russian church, and parallels between the issue of the Tomos and the newly-acquired autocephaly of the North Macedonian Orthodox Church, etc.

Though the language of the publications was quite politically correct, some of the conclusions were definitely not. In particular, one of the articles contained an opinionated statement that the Turkish authorities have decisive influence over the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Apart from discussing the consequences of the Tomos, the news

Ukraine's "regime" acts against its own people and intervenes in the religious life of Ukrainians; The Orthodox world should be unified at any cost; If the Ukrainian church receives the Tomos, it would initiate a split in Orthodoxy; Patriarch Filaret is a schismatic who has been trying to split Orthodoxy.

Armenian media paid little attention to the Tomos, and only because it mattered to Russia. site quoted only Russian officials and politicians, including “predictions” made by LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky about “bloody clashes” in Ukraine.

Therefore, for Iragir.am, the biggest interest lay in the consequences of the Tomos for Russia and the connection between its loss of influence on the international stage as a state and its church, as the one striving for leadership in the Orthodox world.

Here are the main propaganda narratives found in Armenian media:

• ● The Tomos will not happen as the government of Turkey made a deal with Russia and will not let the Ecumenical Church recognize the autocephaly of the Ukrainian

Orthodox Church;

• ● The Tomos is deliberate reinforcement, legitimization of the schism within the

27 Ukrainian Orthodox Church;

• ● The Tomos is a mistaken decision by the Ecumencial Patriarchate that needs to be

changed if it wants to restore ties with the Russian Orthodox Church;

• ● The Tomos is part of the process of crushing the concept of "the Russian World" and

ideological grounds of Russian expansion.

Recommendations

Russian efforts can be countered if national governments, media outlets and civil society in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine work together. Here are the necessary steps:

1. Target countries should properly acknowledge the nature and the scope of information threats. Research into the Russian propaganda network should be carried out continually, and its results should be presented to a wider audience. 2. Media should be more conscious when selecting sources for its materials. Our research shows that media in all four countries often select only sources from one side of the conflict. Therefore, the coverage is not diverse and distorts public opinion. 3. Self-organization of journalists in target countries (through networking meetings, joint initiatives, etc.) is needed in order to discuss journalistic standards in the fight against disinformation and propaganda. The development of an informal “professional code” for journalists involving representatives of top publications in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 4. National information security strategies should be a priority. When Russian disinformation campaigns target Western countries, they form a pool of issues that matter most to the society in question. Consequently, the defense strategy needs to contain localized peculiarities in a given country. 5. There should be sanctions against agents of information influence. Countries which are targets of Russian propaganda should maintain a tougher stance, following the example of Ukraine and the Baltic States. 6. Russian state-owned quasi-media organizations (RT, Sputnik) should not be regarded as media in the same way as genuinely independent media. The term “media” suggests editorial responsibility and independence. Instead, RT, Sputnik and other government-controlled Russian outlets are fully dependent on Russian official information policy. They do not simply inform; they aim to create information disorder, demotivate and demoralize, and encourage distrust in sociopolitical models of democratic countries.

7. Lists and anti-ratings of media outlets that were caught creating or spreading

propaganda/misinformation should be created. This task could be entrusted to international organizations with a strong reputation of cooperation with the best national media organizations.

28 8. A “follow the money” approach should be used to uncover even more disinformation campaigns that originate in the Kremlin. The funding of radical parties, pro-Russian or West-skeptical quasi-activists, public events (conferences, round tables), “think tanks” and other agents of influence, should be looked into. Journalists, politicians and analysts should also note that business and government do not function independently in Russia and, therefore, business funding may well have political goals. 9. Enhancing the media literacy of citizens should be among the main responses to information warfare and disinformation challenges. Governments should play a central role here, specifically ministries of education. All possible types of communication channels should be used to spread media literacy skills. It is important that TV and radio spread this knowledge, but alternative platforms (online TV, online universities) should also take part. 10. The democratic societies of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine should not only dispel Russian narratives and fakes, but also formulate democratic narratives that will explain the values on which modern democratic societies are based in an interesting and non-trivial way.

The project benefits from support through the EaP Civil Society Forum Re-granting Scheme (FSTP) and is funded by the European Union as part of its support to civil society in the region. Within its Re-granting Scheme, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) supports projects of its members that contribute to achieving the mission and objectives of the Forum.

Grants are available for CSOs from the Eastern Partnership and EU countries. Key areas of support are democracy and human rights, economic integration, environment and energy, contacts between people, social and labour policies.