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Aspects of the systems of military logistics during the Song dynasty (960- 1 278 A.D.): the procurement of horses, military agricultutal colonies, and the imperial ordnance Uidustry.

Alvin Chin-Wai Chung Department of East Asian Studies McGiil University Montreal, Canada

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fdfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts

Universal Copyright 8 1999 AlMn Chin-Wai Chung National Library Bibliothèque nationale (91 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue WellrngtOr, Ottawa ON K1AON4 Onawa ON K1A W Canada Canada

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sel1 reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or othewise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This thesis provides an institutional study of three elements of the systerns of military logistics in the Song dynasty (960-1278 A.D.): the procwement of horses, the military agicultutal colonies, and the imperial ordnance industry. While one of the main objectives of this thesis is to throw light on the importance of the logistical efforts of the Song atmy, this thesis also attempts to reveal the connections between the military establishment and the political and socio- economic realities ofthe Song period On the bisof an examination of the çffects of corn mercialization on Song's logistical agencies as wel l as these agencies' political relations with civil oficials, this thesis argws that the civil ofiicials' attempts at maintaining political dominance over the military establishment as well as certain cffects of commercialization of the Song economy were the two most prominent factors that undennined the operation of the Song's rnilitary logistical systems.

Cette thkse propose une &tude institutionnelle de trois éldments du système logistique militaire pendant la dynastie des Song (960-1278 AD): l'obtention de chevaux, les colonies militaires agriculturales et l'industrie du service impérial du materiel. Puisqu'un des objectifs principaux de cette thèse est de mettre en dvidence l'importance des efforts logistiques de l'armée des Song, elle tente aussi dc révéler le lien entre I'&ablissement militaire et les réalités politiques et socio- économiques de la péride des Song. En se basant sur l'étude des effets de la commercialisation sur les agences logistiques des Song et aussi sur les relations politiques de ces agences envers les officies civils, cette thése soutiens le fait qw Ics officiers civils tentent de maintenir une dominance politique sur I't!tabtissement militaire ainsi que certains effets de commercialisation de I'&mnornie des Song étaient les deux facteurs prédominants qui ont ébranlé les opérations des systèmes logistiques militaires des Song. Tibk of Contents

Page l

List of map and illustrations Page 2

Reign periods of Song emperors Page 3

The Song and neighboring empires Page 4

Conversion table for units of measurcment Page 5

Introduction Page 6

Chapter f The procurement of horses Page 222

Chapter II Military ogncultum! colonies Page 53

Chaptçr III The imperial ordnance industry Page 79

Page 1 10

Abbreviations for Chinese primary sources Page 1 13

Biblioyraphy Page 1 14 1 would like to take this opportunity to thank a nurnber of people for the appearance of this thesis. Throughout the process of nsearch and writing, my family has given me continuou financial support and an endless amount of encouragement. For this reason 1 would like to dedicate this thesis to my farnily, to whom 1 am forever indebted.

As an undergraduate student before whose interest of research was mostly lirnited to contemporary models of international conflict management of the Peuple's Rrpublic of China, I have gained a tremendous amount of insight in Chinese history of the imperial pend from the staff and fellow graduate students or MçGiIl University's Department of East Asian Studies; and among them Professor Kenneth Dean and Paola Carrozza in particular have been the most patient in offering me much useful and critical advice. Furthetmore. 1 wouid like to thank Sandta Richichi and Stéphane Jdras for translating the abstraci of this thesis îrom English into French for me. While 1 am grateful to Professor Grace Fang for providing me with valuable academic advice, 1 would also like to thank Dr. Peter Allan Lorge For his keen interest and recognition in the importance of my research topic. I hope this thesis wvould be seen as a contribution to the understanding of China's rnilitary past by Dr. Lorge and colleagues in the Chinese Military History Group.

Indred, as a student of military logistics myself, 1 cannot help but to give crcdit to the librarians who have provided me with the very much needed logistical support in the procurcment of research materials. In particular, 1 would like to t hank the Inter4 ibrary Loan staff of McGi Il University's McLennan-Redpath L.ibrary fOr king so efficient in responding to the endlas number of my requests for research materials. I should also mention the fibrarians of the Harvard- Yenching Library. In spite of the hectic visiting schedules of xholars from around the world during the period of the 1999 Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Boston, staff membea of the Harvard-Yenching Library were extremely patient and professional in providing assistance to young scholars like rnyself'.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to express my sincrre gratitude to my thesis supervisor and academic mentor, Professor Robin D.S. Yates. I was fint inspirrd to vurite an M.A. thesis on Song rnilitary logistics during Professor Yates' graduate level seminar which was entitled the Art of War in China. In spite of his active traching schedule and cornmitment in researching for his upcoming volume of Science und Civilisutim in Chinu, Vol. 5, Part WII, Professor Yates has been extrcmely patient in providing me with the most precious encouragement, guidance and supervision. I sincerely hope this thesis is not a disappointment to him. List of MID rad lllustntions

M~P

The Song and Neighboring Empires Page 4

Illustrations

The wol f-teeth cudgel (langyuhang %! 2 #)[Figure 3Aj Pap 106

The shutilc spear (suoyiung .#t Ift ) Fiyre 38) Page 106

Thc clawed spar (zhuuq;ung & ) [Figure 3C] Page 107

tiorse-resisting spean (jumuqiung .Ift ) [Figure 3DJ Page 107

Crossbows mounted on a wooden frame (chuungzinu l% f- 8 ) Page 108 [Figure 3E1

Thc sevcncomponent trebuchet (qi~huop-k #j a) Page 109 [Figure 3FJ Northern Song -k % (!Wb1 126 A.D.1

Emperon Reign Periods (A.D.)

Taizu 'Taizong Zhenzong Renzong Y ingzong Shenzong Zhezong Huizong Qinzong

Emperon Reign Periods (A.D.)

Goozong Xiaozong G uangzong Ningzong Lizong Duzong Gongzong Duanzong Dibing Domnins of the Northern Song and Cts Nckhbork bima

Non Han-Chinese Regima

1. Tufân Pk a (Tibet) 2. Xixia a (Khitan) 3. LUo a

Northtrn Song & % (960-1 126 AD.) Domaiai

4 The Circuit ofQinfeng % fi I#I. 5. TheCircuitofYon * OC @f sb. 6 The Circuits of HebeUlong R f Ob. Hebeixi R 11: BÎ B. ud Hêdo~ * Ob. 7 The Circuits of Chengdu Superior Prcfktwe & @ fi S. Lizha, # fl sb, Zizhou @ M and Kuihou # II. 8. The Circuits of iingji 2 a &&, Jingxhn -fi.ancl Jin* * &. 9 The Circuits ofhgdongdong X lL A %, Jingdongxi f 8. 10. The Circuits of Jinghurw fi # ill Md JimghubQ #! a a. II. TheCircuits~fHuainvdong i * & * B. i 2. ThCircuits of Liangzhe Bi # sb and fimgnudocig E flL a. 13. The Circuit of Jiienxi fZ ifi %. 14. nie Circuit of Fujian @ @ a. i 5. The Circuits of Guangnandong R fi R[ and GuangirPmci a EÏ sb.

Note: Durin8 the SoukSong period (1 127- L 278 AD.), aras 4.. 5., 6.- S. ad 9. were ocarpid by the Jin. Source: TanQixiangs a (ed.). DmggwaUshi Dint Ji ie Jt! a B. (The Historiai Atlas of China). Vol.VL (Shanghai: Cartographie Publkhbg Howe, 1982). Conversion Table for Unib of Maurement

Chiaese Imwrirl Svstem (Song dvnmtv) Met& Svstem

Area mu iiS11 0.58 sq. meters y ing Lfi ( 1 00 mu) 58 sq. meten

Distance hu ?k fi W

Capciîy slieng A- 0.98 liters Jou '1- ( l O sheng) 9.8 liters shi fi (or dm)( 100 sheng) 98 litcrs

Paul Christopher Forage, .VC.ieme, îécbf~m*l Wmin Song China: Rrflectins in th ihuh ïùlks/mnr the ikeam Creek &y Skn Kim (1031-1095). Donoral Dimation. LfNvenity of Toronto, Toronto, f Ann Arbor: University Mictofihs Intdd,1 99 1 ).

Paul 1. Smith, Tmi>g Hemn 's Store H0u.w: HUT.WS. Bureai~crat.and rhc Destrr~ctimof the Sichuatt ïka Irxhstry fO76l225. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 199 1 ). "The more 1 sce of war, the more 1 realize it depends on administration and transportation... lt takes linle skill or imagination to see where you wouid like your amiy to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks when those factors, and battles arc won only by taking risks"'

Perhaps no other words can best summarize the important roles military logistics plays in the conduct of warfare than the above said by Napoleon himself. Although the chaos in battles has been much sensationalized by writers and poets throughout the centuries. one should not immediately conclude that the conduct of warfare is ultimatrly dictated by the principle of chaos and that nothiny ihroughout the conduct of war can be detcnnincd. Indeed, the art of wdare is not the art of the impossible. But most importantly, what cm possibly be determiced in the conduct of' warfare is not sim pl y numerical strengths, rnilitary doctrines, intelligence, or cven rirrns and tactics, but fundamental requirements such as the procurement and transportation of supplies, their administration, as well as the network of cornnirinications in the very first place.2 Indeed, military logistics is the single rnost important factor that determines how long an army can sustain its fighting in a campaign regardless of the fighting skills of the soldiers. ln this sense, it is clear that military logistics involves not only the transportation and procurement of war rclated materials, but also the production, storage, and distribution of those materials before and during a war. More precisely, the domain of miiitary logistics can be seen as the economic aspect of the conduct and preparation of war that incorporates mathematical precision in not only the quaniity of materials soldiers need but also the quality of these materials specifically required for the completion of nated rnilitary objectives. Thus, arguably. logistics could be thought of as an independent variable that detemines the outcome of warfare. In spite of the obvious significance of logistics, i t appears that commanders of battles have been more capable in acknowledging the importance of military logistics than most of their historians. While conventionally most military historians have rnainly focused on the cunning plans of the generals and their miest strategies and tactics or those exciting aspects of actual fighting and attacks such as the "Charge of the Light Brigade" or "The Thin Red Line" in ihc Rattle of Balaklava, rnilitary historians have most ofien than not neglected to mention anything about the military cornmanderd logistical plans and the relations beiween logistics and die application of rnilitary strategies or tactics.' As a result. throughout history mies have often been oRen portrayed by iheir historiws as king capable of moving in any direction at any specd and at almost any yiven distance once their commandea had given the orden to do so.3 While part of the reason why rnilitary historians have ignored the importance of logistics cm be explainrd by the possibility that mathematical calculations behind the planning of logistics oRen does not appeal to rhc imagination, part of it cm be also blarned on those famous thinkers and rvriters of much-quoted military treatises throughout history who either le R the subject of logistics poorly drtined or simply not mentioned it at ail. ' For instance, although the fourteenth century political and rnilitary thinker Niccoli, Machiavelli included an elaborate arnount of information conceming the administration of the army in his Art of War, he only spent a Lw sentences on describing the procurement of horses and the suppiy of amrn~nition.~Furthemore, in his Art of Wur. nineteenth century soldier and writrr Genenl Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini regarded logistics as the "art of moving amies", and therefore limited his discussion of logistical rnatters to the lave1 of tmnsportation duriny a military ~am~ai~n.~As a consequence. although de Jomini argued that the responsibilities of staff oficen should be expanded hm the supervision of "the lodging of camps and the marches of columnsl' to the "arranging and superintending of the match of trains of baggage, munitions, and ambulances". he faiied to elaborate on the specific relations between logistical matters and the myMore it could even be put on the move or on the most fundamental aspect of logistics regarding the procurernent of those strategic materials."innlly, although Car1 von Clausewitz regarded logistics as one of his most important "actsn, or elements that conditioned the use of combat within the realm of military strategy, Clausewitz himself did not dedicate any chapter specifically to the topic of 10~istics.~ Indeed, what the above phenornenon illustraies was that although it is ciear that most generals must have faced logistical difficulties one timr or another in the conduct of banles throughout their rnilitary careers, military logistics in the West has not been perceived as a specialized or indepndent operational department of the army probably before the twentieth century. In other words, logistical efforts in the past were simply not handled by rnilitary or civilian personnel who were specialized in the tasks in the same way as what we have today. While today wt: take it Ior granted that an amy's logistical mattea should be handled by profcssionalized or specialized units and agencies that are specifically established for such tasks, the same cannot be said about a medieval army. For instance. although in the contemporary military system of the United Kingdom, the storage and Jistri butian of explosives and ammunition is supervised by specialized agçncy and units such as the Defence Munitions, the Royal Logistical Corps and the Royal Amy Ordnancr Corps, an average twelt'th century English soldier of the Crown was responsible for the manufacturing or procurement of his own weapon and ammuni tions. '9sthe English government during the medieval period had made no attempt at centralizing the arming of its soidiers, the salary of the early twçiRh ccntury English soldiers were cateprized and then paid by the Crown according to the type of armaments these soldiers had brought dong with them at the time of iheir enrollment into the amiy." If logistics is an aspect of western military history that has no1 received the amount of attention it deserves from the scholars, more so is the case of militüry logistics within the study of the history of warfare in China. For instance, although in the recent oars historians such as Michael McGrath, David Wright. Peter Lorge. Edmund Worthy and John Labadie have produced a valuable amount of materials on the institutional history of the Song militaiy establishment and its campaign expcriences, no effort has yet been made to study the Song's military logistical efforts as a whole.12 While Paul Forage did provide some interesting information about the Song military logistical systems in his doctoral dissertation, this information was only provided within the context of Forage's translation of Shen Kuo's & Mengxi Bitan 9 5.g ? 3, and therefore it is by no means intended to be a coherent study of the Song's miliiary ~oj$stics.'~ I believe these scholars' lack of attention to logistics has much to do with the tact that even military thinkers of the Song pet-iod did not write much on the subject maiter of logistics in the military texts they cornpiled. For instance, alihough the Song govemment had established a tradition of compiling Chinese military classics into volumes of military encyclopedias, most of these rnateriüls emphasized military tactics and strategies. In particular, although elabomte details about the types of weaponry rhat çould be uscd in siege warfare cm be found in Song dynasty military texts. such as the Comprprehensive Essentiuls qf'the li4ilitory

( 'lussics ( Wujing Zongyao & %! $8 % ), the Tiger Seul Mun wl ( Iiuqianjing ~k8 Fi!) and the Record in the Dejince oj'the Wulkd C'ily (Shouchenglir '$ h& %), the prodiiction, procurement. storage and distribution of armarnents wen not discusscd in a cohercnt rnanner under the rubric of militxy logistics. '' 1 believe the origin of this problem could be funher traced to the fact that although many intluential military texis. which wert: considerrd the foundation of Chincse military thought in the historical sense and were compiled or written in the Spring and Autumn (722- 48 1 D.C .) or the Warring States (403-22 1 B.C.) periods such as, Sunzi f% f- . Wuzi 2 f-or the Weiiiaoii #j itf -f-,çontain an elaborate amount of information on topics such as tactics. strategy, the selection of terrain, etc., no particular chapters are drdicated to the discussion of logistical matters in any of these texts in the Sevm il.lilitury Clarsics (Wujing Qishu & 1% t. Êf)." As it turned out, it was not until the Ming dynasty (1 368- 1628 A.D.) that military thinkers and writers wen rinüllj. able to incorporate the body of knowledge conceming rni1ib.t-ylogistics into cohcsive chüpters. In the Ming rnilitary text military text Drrc*.ri'ion.s of Mililary Preparutions (Wubei Zhi & f@ 8)for instance. fifi-four chapten of materials from land and sea transportation to the prucurement of food and weapons were coherently recorded in the logistical chapters (Junzisheng @ %).16 Indeed, suçh lack of any distinctive volumes or chaptea on logistical affairs in the Song texts may indicate a lack of professionaiization of the logistical corps or of the existence of a consciousness of viewing military logistics as a unique science or dornain within the conduct of warfare during that period. But given the frequency of warfare and the arnount of govemment expenditures on military affairs at the time. it is üIso true that perhaps no one could deny the importance of logistics to the military. fiscal. and even social well king of the Song state. Indeed, the establishment of logistical elements such as the rnilitcuy agricultural colony system (tuntiun IH), the imperial hone agency (mahung % 62). as well as the needs of the Directorate of Armaments (junqijian '@ # f!i) during the Song dynasty all indicate that the ruling court of the Song empire was quiie awarc of the importance in the procurement and supply of war related rnaterials. But in slairning rhat the deparmient of logistics was still not specialized during the period, 1 am simply refemng to the military thinkers' and plannerst lack of concem for incorporating matters conceming with the sustainability of the my such as the procurement, manufacturing. storage. transportation, and distribution of food. horses. and weapons as a coherent therne under the main subjeçt of logistics within these rnilitary treatiscs. As a matter of fact, the Song military thinkers' failure to view the army's logistics as a unique science wiihin a broad domain of military issues rnay retlect somcthing more profound about the political relations between the civil officiüls and the miliiary establishment. During the Song dynasty, the practice of not allowing rnilitiuy otlicials to specialize in logistical matters for their own my could bc seen as part of the central govemment's deliberate political orientation in "emphasizing civility and de-emphasizing the military" (;hongwen pingwu 'a 2 $9

LSE). " While it is clear what "emphasizing civility" means within the political frmework of Conhcian rulenhip, John Richard labadie rightly points out that there could be multiple levels of meaning in the de-emphasization of the military." In a nutshell. it could either rnean "looking down" on the military as a profession, in the political sense reducing the independence of the military, or through bureaucratie mechanisms in gaining control of the military by using civilian officials to command the army.'9 But Labadie believed that "de-emphasizing the military" actually meant something which was more fundamental in the Song dynasty. He argued thar "de-emphasizing the military" meant the rearrangernent of the political configuration between civilian and military ofFicials that existed diiring the Tang (618-905 AD.) and the Fivit dynasties (907-960 AD.)." In other words, it wu the central govçmment's decision to re-allocate political power tiom the military to the civil otficials. While Labadie clearly indicated that the Song government's policy in dc- çmphüsizing the military sirnply rcflccied thc civil oficials' attempts in maintaining political dominance over the military establishmcnt, this did not necessarily imply the govcrnment's desire to disarm the military or to adopt a pacitist political stand in the midst of the "barbarian" threat OS invasion per se. In this scnse, Labadie's insight into the relations bctween the Song militq establishment and thc civil otïicicils wÿs compatible with William McNeill's explanation of why the military logistical systems of the Song (or any other Chinese imperid dynasty for that matter) was put under the supervision ofcivilian oficials who may not have been spccialized in military logistical matters." Firstly, according to McNeill, the Song government's adaptation oT passive defensive policies and its reliance on networks ci t' defensive fortresses could assure civilian O t'ficialsf dominance over mil i tary ot'îicials wiihin China. Secondly. if the Song army was mostly assigned to guard thcse defensive posts and garrisons and were seldom taken on ofensive çampaigning. the Song ruling court believed that it could keep the military establishment well under the control of civil officiais by carefully regulating the army's Llow of supplies. Subsequently, it was believed thai the Song court çould rdy on the civil officials to oversee the provision of food and weapons as a means of political control over the rnilitary establishment. and to avoid the political dominance of the military and its subsequent militarized regionalism that was common during the Tang and the Five dynasties periods. .\part from military historical reasons, there are also socio-cconomic rrasons why the study of rniiitary logistics is important to the understanding of Song society. In his fiscal sociological study of the Song dynasty for instance, Paul J. Smith illustrated that there was indeed a coeval relationship between the Song state's tiscal existence and its rnilitary logistical efforts.'* As the Song state needed to secure a continuous supply of war horses, food, and weapons at the tirne of licqucnt "barbarian" harassment, the governmcnt had also seek to maintüin its cconomic growth to meet such military expenses. Whilc thç development and construction of canals and other means of transportation had enhanced the state's logistical efforts, the investment of resources into the development of thesc infnstructures also proved to be vital to the irnprovement of economic growth. In this sense, logistics was clearly a matter of resource management by the statc. At the grand strategic Irvel, the rolc played by the Song central govcrnrncni in managing war resources was especially important particularly at the tirne when a professional miiitary logistical corps still did not exist. I'herefore, studying thc dynasty's logistical efforts would retlcct not only on the rnattcrs about the army per sc. bu1 also policy orientations of the state at a much higher level. For instance, Richard von Glahn has argued that the Song's economic objectives arc the major functions of the governrnent's "spatial expansion" pol icy at the frontirr reb'Fions near ~içhuan.'~Wiihin ihis frarnework, Richard von Glahn suggested that the military played the economic role of being the major consumer of resources. while also the esecutor of' the state's expansionist policies at the frontier regions. In spite of the underlying importance of the conneciion between the Song rnilirary and state rcsources in this economic frarnework, von Glahn focused rnainly on the interaction between the central govemment and the indigenous people of Sichuan, without gctting into hrther details about the military and its contribution to the governrnent's policy orientations. According to one perspective, economics could be seen as a matter of supply and demand. Nevertheless, as scholars such as James Liu. Peter Golas and Rrian McKnight have illustrated aspects of commercialization and its effécts on rural villages or Wang Anshi's economic reform policies and the Song government's economic activisrn in order to illustrate the state's rok in creating incomc, not many details have been provided to describe how the myhad actually spent that money and how such great military expenditures had in retum aKècted the fiscal weil-king of the state as well ris the stnicturdl changes to those bureaucratic instit~tions.~"n other words, I believe that if the above scholars are correct in regarding that the Song dynasty was the crucial beyinning of a new economic enin irnpenal China because of its fiscal dpamism and achievements in new policy orientations. the lack of a coherent study about the dynasty's iogistiçal rlYorts would mean that only half the story has bern told. Pcrhaps no one couid possibly deny that it must have bcen an extrcmely di lïicult task for any govemment to maintain continuous logistical e tlbrts to sustain a standing army of well over one million men such as what the Song dynasty had, pürticularly when civil oficials of the Song govemment were not necessarily speciülizcd in logistical matten. Paradoxically. as the military logistical systerns during the Song dynasty were made possible by the socicty's çornmerciali;ration. readers will see in later chiipters of this lhesis that commercialiiration itself was alw one of thc most prominent factors undermininy the rHiciency and even affecting the survival of some of dynasty's logistical etyorts. While ironicaf ly the rnilitary establishment's professionalized use of violence and the budding class of proléssionalized merchants whose sole inierest was in the pursuit of profit were both contmdictory to the traditionai Confucian notion of propnety, the Song govenimrnt was constantly under pressure to maintain a fine balance between the survival of the state under the threat of the "barbarians" on the one hand, and the sumival of the econorny as the result of the fast-increasing population and the hravy financial burden of rnilitary expenses on the othd By 1065 A.D., rnilitary ex penditures already absorbed aimost five-sixths of the govemment's revenue mnua[ly.'6 While the overall population was increasing nt an extremely ri@ nte, the amount of arable land did not increase. For instance, accordiny to one estimation there existed about two million Bve hundred and eighty-eight thousand nine hundred and sixty-five civilian households in China during the reign of Taizu h #il (960-975 A.D.).~' By the year of 1038 A.D. however, the figure had incremed to ten million one hundred and forty-four thousand two hundred and ninety.28 As an agrarian society, the Song governrnent had to decide whether it wu best to use the limited amount of land to Pasture the armyls badly-needed horses For instance, or to allocate those lands to the civilians for flood and drouyht relief. I:rorn the above illustrations. it can be seen that the study of th<: Song's militas logistical systerns is indeed a very ineaningful ta&. &art fiom the political struggle between civil and militas. establishments. the Song dynasty's rnilitary logistical systems also reveal the inherent conflict between the ne& orthe military and the livelihood of the common civilians. Furthermore, while the Iück of specialization of the logistical systems by military otficials made thcx systems vulncrablc to comiption and the effects of political struggles between Wang Anshi's 1- 'ir' .( i ( 102 1 - 1O86 A.D.) reformisi party and the opposing conservative party led by Sima Guang 1% 1 10 18- 1O86 A.D.). the study of the Song dynasty's military logistical systrms also provides readers wi th rnuçh i nsight into issues conceming statecriift in that period. Finally? as many scholars have produced a great amount ol' information on the comrnercialization of the Song society to describe the means of revenue production. no study of the Song dynasty's fiscal reality can be cornpletc without also studying how the govemment's revenue was actually spent." As military expenditures constituted the majority of the govrmment's expenditure almost througliout the Song dynasty, its military logistical systems are indecd a "linkit bctween the military establishment and the Song society's socio-economic and political realities. This is indeed a very important "link" which serious scholars who are interested in the study of the Song dynasty must not ignore. In this sense, my study of the Song's military logistical efforts serves three purposes. Firstly and most importantly, my main objective in this thesis is to brhg to light the importance of logistics to the Song military, and hopefully through my analysis of the Song's military logistical systems more scholars would be encouraged to pay attention to the role of logistics in the military history of China. As 1 consider this an invoductory effort in the study of Song logistics in a çoherent manner, I intend to focus on the most fundamental aspect of the subject, Ihe institut ional history of bureaucratic units or systerns which wtxe responsi ble for the procurement or manufacturing of war-related rnaterials. Once we obtain a thorough understanding of the structure, responsibilities, functions and operation of these bureaucratic units or systems, then their connections with the Song society's socio- economic and political realities can be further investigated; and this is the sccond purpose of this thcsis. From the bais of my analysis of the structure and operation of the Soiig's logistical efforts and its relations with the society's political and socio- txonomical realities, 1 will argue that civil oficials' attempts at maintaining political dominancc over the rnilitary establishment as well as certain efkts of' commercialization of the Song rconomy were the two most prominent factors that undcrmined the operations of the Song's military logistical efforts. Last but noi Ieüst. the third purpose of the thesis is to illustrate the technological reaiity of the Song period through the study of selected elements of the period's logisticai cftbrts. :\s the mass production of war-related müterials are highly dependent upon thc lcvcl of technology panicular industries could achievr, 1 bclicve my illustmtion of the production OS these selrc~edwar-materials will provide readers with some insight into the connection between technology and productivi ty dunng the Song dynas ty. I selected the Song dynasty as the period for my analysis primrviiy because of the period's interesting devrlopment in both the economic and socio-poli tical spheres. Furthemore. the experience of a large standing amy during the Song period and the size of the central govemment's military expendhure could also provide me with good data for my analysis of the conneciion between the continiious high demand of war-related materials and the socio-economic situation. Finally. 1 believe the Song dynasty is an interesting period to look at because of the availability of Chinesr primary sources on institutional histones when compared with other periods in Chinese history, such as the Waming States or the Spring and .Autumn periods. Throughout this thesis, my analysis of the Song's military logistical efforts will be focused on the three most fundamental logistical elements of the Song army: the hone agency, military agriculturiil colonies, and the imperhl armament industry. As readen will see later, the unique achievements and failure of each of these elements reflected in their own ternis the relations between the Song society's cornmercialization and the central govemment's financial burden of military expenses. In terms of these Chinese primary sources, 1 relied for most of rny information on the institutional development of logistical agencies mainly from sepante chapters on "Military Aftairs" (Bing 8 ), "Horse Agency" (Mazheng !fi, & ), "Directorate of Armaments" (Junqijim % % E), "Otlicial Appointments" (Zhigiran a 'E). and also "Econorny" (Shihuo & E) from historical encyclopedias o t' the Song such as the Song Shi 'A 2,Yu Ilai li. B. and Wemian Tongkuo ZC # 3 %. Although scholars in the wcst such as Paul Smith. James Liu. Richard von Glahn and BtkMcKnight. etc. have produced much valuable background and analysis on the political and socio-economic history of the Song, it üpprars that conternporüry scholars in Asia such as Lin Ruihan 44 % 'iB, Li Wei !8. Li Jiaju i#li '% $1. and Jiang Tianjiw i1 A h:, etc. have produced more materials in the institutional study of individual logistical elements such as the horse agency and the military agncultural colonies.30 Whilr I rekmt the lack of materials written by Jüpanese scholars in this thesis due to my inefficiency in the Japanese languüge, 1 am detemined to have this problern rectifiecf when 1 elaborate the subject matter of' miliiary logistics further for my doctoral dissenation in the future. Due to the limitation of time in research. I also regret 1 am not yet able to includc some other important Chinese primary sources such as the Cefi Yuangui fi# fi ;~i%, Xu Zizhi 7bngjicin Chafigbian 3 %i ilfi î& %I , and Song Huiyao f$ %. etc. Neverthelsss, an attempt will be made to include these materials into my continuous study of military logistics in the imperial period of Chinese histos, for rny doctoral dissertation. Observant readers may notice by now that so Far 1 have regarded the body OF the Song dynasty's logistical etforts as involving different "systems" rather than one single "system". 1 deliberately treated them as multiple systems of logistics simply because in reality there existed no coordinated bureaucntic or administrdtive arrangements between the imperial amament industry, the horse agency, and the military agricultural colonies. In some cases, the horse agency's imperid pasturage systern was even in cornpetition with the military agricultunl colony systern for the use of valuable lands. While the impenal ordnance industry and the military agricultural colony system were both administered by fiscal officiais in the central government, the home agency was unique in being the only element of militvy logistics that was put under the control of the Ministry of War's Bureau of Military rlt'fairs. Perhaps the shortage of war hones throughout the Song dynasty wu so serious in cornparison with the numerical strength of the cavalry forces of the Xixiü and the Liao. that the ruling court believed the procurement of horses required the special attention of the Ministry of War. In any case. the horse agency of the Song government was also unique in being the one single elrment of the military logistics which the govemment had the least control of. While the development of superior metalluqical technique and the appearancr of new species of early ripening rice had both dlowed the imperial ordnance industry and the military agicultural colonies to attain certain level of success in the provision of weapons and food, ihm sirnply was iittle the Song government could do to create its own stock of battle-worthy horses due to ecological realities. In general, the best natural environment For the pasturing of horses were places where Fresh grasses were plrntiful and the weather was dry and cool. Unforiunately, many of those temtories were located to the north of Song where they were either occupicd by the Liao or under constant threat of "barbarian" invasion. Although pockets of areas in Fujian did produce horses for the Song army, these horses were seen to be toa small and tiagile for cavalry use. Worse still, the Song's supply of Tibetan horses waî later denied by the Liao after the capital of Kaifeng was captured in 1126 A.D., and the temperature in the southem parts of China had tumed out to be too wam for the pasturing of horses. Thus arnong al1 three logistical systems which will be discussed in this thesis, the horse agency was indeed the least self-sufficient one. The f'nctional reality behind the military agricultural colony system represented the agnrian economy's fwidarnental ideal of a tàrmer-soldier society. While in principle at lrast the military agricultural colony system was supposed to bc capable of providing a certain degree of self-reliance in food supply and military defense, the application of this system raised the question of how Far the governmcnt could actually push to divert the burdens of the state's two utmost important concems, agricultural production and rnilitary derence, al1 at once onto the shoulders of its standing myand civilians. Although elabrate levels of tield administration of the militiuy agricultural colony sysiem truly retlected the sophistication of the Song govctmrnent's bureaucratie mechanism. ai the end ihe system itsell' had to Facc challenges of mismanagement. corruption. and comoierciülizing Forces. In cornparison. the imperial ordnance industry was relatively successlùl. Thanks mainly to the pvernment's capability in the mas production of iron and stecl. the Song ordnance industry manufactured an impressive arrüy of traditional as wcll as newly designed weapons. Ln purticuliü: the innovation of highly skilled cmftsmen and artisans made possible the appearmce of a varirty of gunpowdcr wcapons which did not exist in previous dynasties. Nevertheless, the effrciency of the govcmment's ordnance industry was undemined by the mismanagrmeni of tiscal otlicials who were not necessarily knowledgeable about the production of weapons. Due to these offiçials' lack of specialization in their respective logisiiçal fields. ad hoc solutions would appear only &er problems had arken. As ade ers will sec. the civil officiais' lack of administrative insight due to the absence of specialization was whai contributed to the ad hoc nature and lack of sustainability of the Song dynasty's logistical sy stems.

Endnotes for Introduction ' Archibald Pcrcival Wavell, Speaking Generally, (London: MacMillan, 1946). pp.68-70.

Manin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics fiom Waliem~einru Parfun, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). p. 1.

3.ro takc a more contemporary example, although the over-stretching of Nazi Gcrmany's supply Iine was the main reason for the failure of Rommel's campaign in Afiica between 194 I and 1942. no military historian has yct bothered to investigate deeply into the Germany's logistical etT'rt in Afiica during that period. Martin van Creveld ( 19771, p. 1.

' Van Creveld ( 1977). p.?.

5 Van CreveId ( 1 977), p.S.

Niccolo Machiavelli. Ellis Famwonh (irans.). The Art of Wur. (New York: Ds Cüpu. 1 965). pp. 1 38,202-204.

7 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The .4rt (.fl+'ur. (London: Green Hiil 13ooks. 1992). pp. 252-267.

8 de Jomini ( 1992). pp. 254-255.

" C~üusewitzcalled logistics the statistical elemenr. Apan from Iogistics, his other acts or t'krnents were the moral dement, the physical elemcnt (sizc and organimiion of the army). tririthcmaiical elerntmt (movcmenr and rnaneuvenbility of the army). and the geographicat elemcnt. Scc: Book l'hrec, "Of Stratcgy in Generat", Carl von Clausewitz On Wur. (London: Penguin, 1982).

10 Michael Prestwich, Arrnies and Warjùre in the Middle tiges: The Englîrh Fiprrienw, (New f laven: Yale University Pr=. 1996). pp. 1 33- 135.

" As a rnattar of fac~centralized governmcnt ordnance industry of the English Cruwn did no( evcn corne into existence until 1359 AD.. Prestwich, (1996), p.140.

" Paul Christupher Fongc. "The Sino-'rangut War of IO8 I-lO8S'. Journul of Asiun Hi.stnry, Vol. 25, No. l, pp. 1-28; John Richard Labadie, Rulers und Sddiers: Perceprion und Munugrment of rhe Military in Northern Sung Chinu. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Washington, Washington. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms Internaiional. 198 1): Petcr Allan urge. Wur und de Ckation ofthe Nurfhern Song Sruk (Chino). ûoctordt Dissertation, Univeni ty of Yennsylvania, Pennsylvania, (Ann Arbor: Universis. Microfilms International. 1996); David Wright, "The Sung-Khitan War of A.D. 1004-1005 and the Treaty of Shan Yuan". Journal r,j'Asiun tlirroty. 32, (1998). pp.348; MichaeI Charles McGrath. Military and Rrgiunul Adniinistrutiun in Horthhrrn Sung China (960-1 126). Doctoral Disenation, Princeton University, Princeton. (Ann tlrbor: University Microfilms International, 1988); Edmund Henry Wodhy Jr., The Founding of Sung Chinu. PSU- 1OUO: Integrutive Changes in Milirq and Political Ins~ituriom. Docturdl Dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1976).

1.1 Forage, Paul Christopher. Science, Technologv and War in Sung China- Rejlrcliou in rhe "Umsh Tufks/rom the Dreunr Cd"&y Shm Kuo. Doctoral Dissertation, University ofTorunto, Toronto, (Ann Arbor: t'niversity Microfilms International, 1997).

14 Zeng Gongliang 2 $$ , Wujîng ZG---.---,,,,, :? %! @ % ( 1044 A.D.), Sih Bingjiaki Congshu V4 lrk fi 'rÿ Xn f *, Vol. 1. (Shanghai: Shan&ai Guji Chubanshe, 1990.); Xu Dong fi fiPl , Hu Qian Jing &! P*; %! (1W4 A.D.), Zhonggw Bingshu Jicheng '1' fi ;'B % Idi, Vol. 6, (Shenyang: f iefangjun Chubanshe, 1988); Chen Gui &! ( 1072- 1 14 1 A.D.). Shou Cheng Lu M a, Zhungguo Bingshu Jicheng rt8 f. fl % a,Vol. 7, (Shenyang: Jiefmgjun Chubanshe. t 988).

!5 Ralph D. Sawyer (crans.), The Seven Militaty Classies oj'tlncient Chinu & $3 L !?, ( Doulder: Westview, 1993).

'" Mao Yuanyi 2: IL (fi (1 594-1 640 A.D.). Wubei Zhi I& % .$. Zhonggro Uingshu Jicheng cf1 R fi %C % idi, Vois. 27-36. (Shenyang: Jiefangjun Chubanshe. 1988).

" Labadie (1 98 1 ), p. I I .

I9 Labadie (1 98 1 ), p. I 1.

" William H. McNeill, The Pursirit O/ Power. (Chicago: University of Chicago Prca. 1 O82). p.34.

17 -'Paul J. Smith, Trrring ffeavrn's Storehouser: Horses. llureuucruts. rtn J the Destruction of the Sichirun 7ka lndustty 1074- 122, (Cambridge : tlarvard University Press, 199 1 ).

" Richard von ülahn. The Cùuntty ojStrrurns und Grottoes: ïrpurnion. Sritlemcnt. und thC'ivilizing ofthe Sic*huan I;iontic.r in Song Times, (Cambridge: f-larvard llniversity Press, 1987).

"' see James T.C. Liu. Refirm in Sung China, Wang An-shih (1021-IORfi} und llis New I'cilicies, (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1959); Hrian McKnight. Viffuge cind Bureaucrcrc~ in Sourliern Sung China, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 97 1 ); Peter Golas. "Rural C'hi na in the Sung", Journul of Asim Siuditis, Feb. IWO, XXXlX (2), pp. 29 1-523.

'' See Sechin Jagchid & Symons Van Jay, Peace. Wur. and ?iode Along the Greut Wull: .Vomudic-Chinese Interaction through Two MilIennia, (Bloornington: Indiana University I'rcss, 1 989): John Winthrop Harger (cd.), Crisis und Prosperiry in Sung ïhinu. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, t975), pp. 13-47; William H. McNeill(l982), p.40.

" SS chapter 173, Shihiio fi 126, rVungt10n 1% LI]. p.540.

'' ss chapter 173, Shihuo h fi 126.Nongtian 14 111, p.540.

"' I refer io scholars such as Mark Elvin, Shiba Yoshinobu, and James T.C. Liu. etc. For dctails plcase sre Mark Elvin (trms.), Shiba Yoshinobu % gr 6 a;;?;. Commerce und Society in .Sung C'hirru, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1970); lames T.C. Liu, Rrform in Sung Chinu. Ik'ang .4n-shih (1 02 1- 1086) und His New Poiicies, (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1959).

'O in Ruihan fi Kk! @, "Songdai jianmu fP 8Ctt.Tunghui Journal, Vol. X, No.2. July 1969. pp.15-22; Li Wei + bf, "LunSongdaixibei de tuntiun ;$ X fe W -IL 0(1 %! LIU", Deng Guangmin fR( IdB. & QiXia iïi f& ((eds.) ;Songshi yanjiu lumvenji 9a61f % % %. (Hebei: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1989). pp207-237; Li Jiaju # "Zuilun nan Song de tunrian he yingtion 6 3 rOi 'm' b!l $ il1 @ ?$ N ", Deng Guangmin f& Pf; & Li Jiaju #b '*C W (eds.). Songshi yunjiu lumvrnji 9 61f % & X ?& 1982, pp. 134- 1 57; Jiang Tianjian 11: k u,Bei Sung shima zhiyanjiu -II: % ïfi ,% 2 dff % . (Taipei: Guoli Pitinyiguan, 1995). pp. 146-267. Chanter 1 :The Procurement of Horses

Apan from the Great Wall, the ordnance industry, the large sianding myand the elaborate canal transportation system, Paul Smith described cavalry horses as one of the most important elements of China's integrated defense organizationO1This was particularly true for the Song dynasty, whose main adversaries to the north and west were politically unified empires which posse.ssed large formidable cavaly forces with soldiers who had literally grown up on horseback. Indeed, cavalry horses durinp that penod were the foundation of military power. Without the mobility and speed of attack provided by war horses, the offensive capability of an mycould not be brought out and be projected effectively towards its rniliw objectives. Gropolitically, the failure of the Song to recover the lost temtories in the northeast had constituted a serious threat to the regime's border security since the founding of the dynasty.' Without the natural strategic bamer provided by the mouniainous Imdscapes of the northeast. the vast amount of flat terrain within the Song temtory in the Yrllow River plain was dangerously exposed to the "barbarian" cavalry attacks.' Although mountainous terrain in the nonh-western hntier could provide the Song with a certain level of security against the enemy's cavalry attacks, the wide valley gaps in the areas of Jingzhou $!! !! and Yuanzhou .)H were seen as passages through which "barbarian" cavalry could enter easily." As a rcsult. the Song government had to compensate its strategic disadvantages by providing speed and mobilization to its forces, and to create effective offensive elements to connect its delénsive outposts and fortresses at the border regions. Indeed, such mobilization could only tx created and sustained if a strong cavalry force with an adequate number of war horxs and well-trained cavalry soldiers could be maintained by the Song. Unfortunately, the Song dynasty had faccd a series of politically unified "barbarian" empires that had managed to consistently deny the Song access to banle-worthy hones both in quantity and quality.5 Whilc CO-existingwith less politically unifkd "barbarian" regimes, the 'Tang empire was able to rnaintain about seven hundred and six thousand horses at its peak, the highest amount the Song had ever maintained was only four hundred and fifiy thousand during the reign period of Emperor Zhenzong % (998-1022 A.D.).~ Thus in spite of the myordnance industry's ability to provide the my with a good amount of innovative gunpowder weapons, the Song army was often rcstricted to the use of defensive tactics due to the lack of war horses. Collectively. the Song army's logistical effort in the maintenance of cavalry horses was known as the hone agency (mazheng .% a).Literally meaning "horse administration", the terni not only implied the procurement or horses, but also the pasturing and training as well as the govemment's effort in building up its own stock in order to achieve a certain level of independence rrom foreign supply.' As such. the horse agency of the Song dynasty. like that of the Tang dynasty, included not only bureaucratie units that were responsible for the purchme of horses. but also offices accountable for the establishment of pasturage and veterinaty institutes. Although the army's ordnance industry, the horse agency, and the military agricultural colony systems werc al1 fundamental aspects of the army's logistical arrangements, the horse agency was unique in being the only one that was under the direct control of the Ministry of War. While in modern Chinese the term zhcng also means "politics", the effectiveness of the horse agency during the Song Dynasty was ironically confounded by the difference of political orientations betwcen Wang Anshi's reformist faction and the opposing faction led by sima Guang. As readers will see later, factional politics played an important role in the inconsistent establishment and abolition of the imperial pasturage system dwing the Song dynasty. In spite of the Song empire's absence of geographical protection, once Emperor Taizong 'm' 5;: (r. 976-997 A.D.) consolidated his political grip in the regions of southern China, he believed that time had corne for him to dispatch an expeditionary force to conquer territories that were lost to the "barbarians" to the norih and the West since the founding of the Song. As a major part of this expeditionary force's military preparation, Taizong fmt had to make sure that his army possessed an adequate number of ca~alryhorses against the mighty "barbarian"horsemen. Thus, in 979 A.D., Taizong issued an order to gather horses from private civilians as well as horse dealers, and subsequently, about one hundred seventy thrce thousand six hundred horses were gathered? Al though the Song itself produced native horses in regions such as Huainan, Fujian, Hunan, and Lingnan, these hones were considered too small and fragile to be used in battles? Therefore, Taizong also tried to procure as many horses as possible from foreign sources as well. Throughout the Northem Song period, the government obtaincd most of its foreign horses from Tufan 41i b! and dichuan." As ad hoc missions were king sent to the border regions to purchase horses from the non-t (an Chinese horse dealers, the Song central government also issued orders which forbade Chinese civilians from buying hones for private use From thesr non- I [an Chinese horse dealers.' ' This was mainly because the Chinese civilians who çould atTord to maintain horses for their personal use were most likely to pay for their horses ai higher prices than those which the government missions were allowed to pay. As a result. the less competitive prices these ad hoc govemmental missions were paying only allowed them to procure five thousand horses a year by 979 AI). Furthemore. if the Chinese civilians were willing to pay better prices than the govemment, chances were that most of the good quality horses that were suitable for cavalry warfare would slip into the hands of these Chinesc civilians." l'herefore. the govemment had to deny its own civilians access to thesc forcign horses at the border trading posts. Paradoxically, the denial of Chinese civilians' access to foreign horscs backfired on the Song govemment's effort to procure horses. As Chinese civilians who were willing to pay competitive prices were not permitteci to purchase horses anymore, what was left for the non-Han Chinese horse traders were the Song govemment buyen who were only allowed to pay for their homes at lower prices. Subsequently. due to the decline in their profits, the non-Han Chinese home dealers became less and less willing to bring along their best horses to the trading posts at the Chinese borden.') As a result. the Song govemment had no choice but to allow the Chinese civilians to purchase hones again, but this time only those older and weaker ones unsuitable for cavalry use as determined by the Song offcials at the trading posts. Nevertheless. the govemment still reserved its right to conscript these civilian-owned horses when they were needed.14 Since the beginning of the Northem Song period, bureaucratie units in the capital were established by the Song govemment to ensure its mies' suppty OS cavalry honcs. Like the army's ordnance industry and the rnilitary agricultural colony systems, the institutional structure of the home agency during the Song pcriod was more or less modeled after its counterparts of the Tang and Five At the central level, Taizu authorized the establishment of the oniccs of the "L.en and Right Flying Dragon Commissioners" (zuoyucrj2iiongshi h: .h' Re iid tk) to oversee administrative mütters related to thc procuremeni and maintenance of war horses. In particular, these Flying Dragon Institutes (friion~yuanfi @! b%) were put directly undcr the control of the Bureau of Military AtTairs (shrimiyuan & $! 1%) of the Ministry of War. Later on, al1 administrative mntters pertaining to the hone apncy were paîsed on to the Court of the lmperial Stud (tuiptisi h: fa ) I-lowever, the Left and Right Flying Dragon Institutes werc renamed the "LeA and Right lmperial Corral Commissioners" (ruoyou tinnjiushi & li b$ f$) in 980 AD." Five ycars Iater, in 985 AD.. the olEces werc once again renarned the "Lefi and Right Mounts Service Cornmissioners"

(zuoyoic yijiyucrn & ki #! %).18 By 987 AD. thcrc cxisted six imperial pasturages within the capital region.'' In 979 A.D., the impcrial pasturage in the capital as well as in the prcfcctures maintained a total of about two hundred housand horse~.~'Occupying about ninely-eight thousand nine hundred qing of land, the Song empire's pastoral system was staffed by sixteen thousand and thirty-eight soldien." Nevertheless, thc Song govemment's horse pmcurernent and pasturage efforts in tbe capital as wcll as in the prefectures were not much coordinated during this period until the position of the Supervisor of Herd Office (rhizhi qunmu shi #ilP? & 5k) was çreated in the ninth month of 995 A.D.~In order to acknowiedge the importance of the home agency in defense matters, the Auxiliary Academician of the Bureau of Military Affairs (shumi zhixueshi @ e! fX k) Chen Yaosou kB d n! was appoii:ted to the position at the time of its first establishment in 997 A.D. " While policy orientations of the Herd Offce was still detemined by the Ministry of War and its Bureau of Military Affairs, daily administration of the Herd Office and its imperial pasturage was jointly carried out by the Supervisor's Assistant (fishi iiil fi! ), Director-in-Chiefs (doujian 811 %), the Lefi and Right Military Pre fecture Supenntendents (zuoyou xiungiirlian /r: & Ün #% $& ). Administrative Clerks (goloiryupan $4 fT %), and Headquarten Clerks (psipan "1 E).24 Judging by the number of horses the govemment's horse agency was able to purchase and maintain, Song Changlian '/# &@ considered the Song govemmcnt's home agency was the most successful during the reign penod of Emperor Zhenzong $4- :;< (998-1022 A.D.), and ai its peak the govemment maintained about four hundred and tïfty thousand hor~es.~~In 1007 A.D. for instance, the govemmcnt was so contident in its horsc agency's achievement that Chen Yaosou kK $2 'JE argued.

"Duc ta the lack of urgency in the procurement ofhorses, our soldiers (invoivcd in the horse agency) should be sent back to attend to agricultural rnatters.~~~

As the later decline of the imperial pasturage system demonstrated. Chen's confidence was shortsighted. Indeed, Chen's perspectives represented (hc rnentality or most Song onicials at the time. and this was what contributed to the ad hoc nature of the Song dpasty's horse agency in general. ln spite of that, Song Changlian attributed the success of the horse agency duriny this period to the existence of two offices within the hone apncy. One of these offices was the Bureau of Horse Grading (gumasi Iti % nj). Generally speaking, the responsibility of the Bureau of Horse Grading was to establish a gnding system and to organize horses freshly purchased from dealers into categories according to their quality or suitability for cavalry use. As an extension \O the grading system, the Bureau of Horse Grading was also responsible for prescribing different pnces to these categoncd dots according to the resources available in the govemment treasury. Throughout the Song dynasty, the Bureau of Horse Grading established numerous horse grading posts in various locations in the prefectures and in the border regions within the Song domain. In many of these locations. oficials of this bureau were even directly responsible for the purchase of horses from the non-Han Chinese home dealers. Afler the horses were purchased and graded, the Bureau of Horse Grading would then allocate them to the various imperial stables and pastures.27 The achievement of the Bureau of Horse Grading was particularly noted during Emperor Zhenzong's reign due to the Bureau's flexibility in categorizing the horses. Specifically, during the reign periods of Emperor Taizu h: $Il(976-997 A.11.) and Ernperor Renzong iz (1023-1063 A.D.), there existed only three categories of quality and therefore prices for the horses. But during the reign period of Zhenzong (998-1022 A.D.), the Bureau of Horse Grading established twenty- thrce cstcgories with pices tanging from thiny-five thousand strings of cash Tor the lowest grade t« eighty thousand strings of cash for the top quality horses." As the price categories for horses were numcrous. there was naturally more coherence between what the government was willing to pay and what the non-Han Chinese horse dealers had wanted to obtain in response to the market value OS the horses. Subsequently. the horse dealers were able to make profit from their dcalings with thc Song govcmment and were happy to return again with numerous of good quality horses." As for the locations of these horse grading or trading posts, they included prefectures in Hedong R j# such as Fuzhou %f Jfl. and in Shaanxi kk 14'. Qinzhou % fil. Weizhou 18 $11. Yuanzhou N,Yizhou ffi bd, Wenzhou fi. and so on?' At the beginning of Zhenzong's reign, the government was able to purchase about five thousand hones annually ai these trading posts through the Bureau of Clorse Grading, and by the end of the era, the figure had increased to thirty-nine thousand per year?' Apart frorn cash. tea and silk were also used as medium of exchange in these trading or grading posts. For instance, seven hundred catties of tea together with seventy rolls of silk and giA items were offered by the governrnent in exchange of horses in Shaanxi in 1 1 64 A.D.~* Another bureaucratie unit of the Song govenunent that had contributed to the success of the horse agency throughout this period was indeed the Herd Office itself (qunrnusi 4). Compared with the Bureau of Horse Grading, the Herd Office was responsible for a much broder variety of tasks. For instance, apart from having to select suitable areas for the establishment of imperial stables and pasturage, the Herd Office was also responsible for maintaining a continuous supply of food for the horses." Furthemore, the Herd Office was rnandated to conduct veterinarian research and to publish on ways that could improve techniques of pasturage and reproduction." Finally. the Herd Office was also responsible for the training of the horses for cavalry use and to maintain a rcward and punishmeni system for its staff and veterinarian~.'~According to the reward and punishment system issued in 1008 A.D. for instance, annually each irnperial pasturage had to maintain a survival rate of at least ninety percent for the horses.'' Whilc a roll of silk was awarded for every foai born, a monthts salary was to be deducted from the pastoral Administrative Clerk's paid if the death rate of horses cxceedrd tcn

On top of the management of irnperial stables and pasturdge, the Herd Ollice was also responsible for the establishment and administration of Veterinary Institutes (yunpu wu # .% f#) in the capital and in Tongzhou fil in today's 1.iaoning province.3g Whi le the l'ongzhou Veterinary lnstitute was founded in 1 O04 AI).. the one at the capital region was not established until 101 1 AD." In particular, the Vcterinary lnstitute in the capital region contained two veterinary pasturagcs, with number one pasturage responsible for treating slight illncsscs and the numbcr two pasturage more serious illnesses. In 1030 A.D.. however, the num ber one pasturage was abolished and its resources and responsi bi lities shared arnong the six imperial stables in the capital ~ea.~'Then in 1033 A.D.. the number two veterinary pasturage was ordered to treat sick horses regardless of their degree of illness. As such, it was a de facto amalgarna~ionof the number one and number two veterinary pasturages. Through the Bureau of Horse Grading and the Herd Office, four channels were developed which Song imperid horses were procured. The first among them was called the quama @ .% system. Simply stated, it was a system that employed the assistance of those non-Han Chinese home dealers to bring their horses into the Song realm and transport them al1 the way to the capital region. In particular, non- Elan Chinese horse dealers fiom the northwest would first divide their homes into groups (quan 8)of tens to a hundred each and then brought them to the Song official trading or grading posts at the borders. At that point, Song otficials would issue these dealers one thousand strings of advance cash for each horse and food rations for thcir joumeys to the capital. Once in the capital, the Bureau of I lorse Gnding would then pay the balancc amount according to the quality of the horses and to allocate them to the various imperial stables and pasturages.4 1 1-lowever. court officials in the Song yovcmmcnt were afraid that these

"barbarian" quanma dealers would take advantage of the opportunity of traveling to ihc capital and obtain critical intelligence about thc Song army and çovcmment. As a rcsult. another horse procurement system known as the shengma 6' AM, probably mcaning the "monitoring of horses". was developed." Also called the wangrnu @l !!i system (wang referred to a group of horses under this systern), its functioning was primarily the same as the quanma system. except that the transportation of the horses was conducted by Song herd oîficials instead of "barbarian" horse traders once the horses were purchased at the border trading posts. Since the govemment no longer needed to of'fer the non-Han Chinese hone dealers high rewards to encourage their long travel io the capital following the irnplementation of the shrngmu system, it was estimated that at least two hundred thousand strings of cash were saved by the govemment an nu al^^.^^ But due to the negligence and inexperience of the Song herd officials, it was realized that there was a much higher death rate among the horses transported by Song ofticials in the shewa system than in the quonma ~~stern.~~As a result. the quanma system was rejuvenated in 1 094 A.D.. but this fime specifically only Chinese and Tufan bk # hone dealers wcre allowed to be used? Apart from the quunma and shengma systems, another system known as the shernn $t .% system was also developed during the Song dynasty for the procurement of was horses. In particular, the shema systcm relied on the formation of societies (she fi)by the local militiamen, particularly those in the Hedong and the Shanxi regions, for the purchasing of horses. Nomally, each of these societies or she was made up of fi@ militiamen. On top of using funding by the govemment, these societies also supplemented part of the money needed for the procurcmcnt of hones. ARer the horses were procured, each society was also rcsponsible for the pasturing of their own horses? Finally, the govemment also obtained its supply of horses from Chinesc civilians. Known as hemai @ or kuomai fi8 . it was indeed a policy of half conscription and half purchase of horses that were pnvately owned by civilians." Although the Bureau of Horse Grading had forbidden Chinese civi lians from purchasing top quality horses that were fit for cavalry use. the need for the kmcii system and for these old and wrak horses belonging to civilians indicated the urgency ol the govemment's horse shortages t hroughout the Song dynasty in general. Needless to Say, the financial cost for maintaininy the horse agcncy must have bccn high. As mcntioned carlier, thc number of horscs purchascd by thc govcmmcnt between 998 and 1022 AD.had increased from five thousand to thiny- ni nc thousand annually.4R Although the number of hones purchased declined akr this period, the amount of money spent on the procurement of horses remainsd high. In the 1050s A.D., for instance, the number of horses purchased remained at about seventeen thousand per year. and just Shaanxi @ W alone required one hundred thousand liang of silver in order to purchase good quality horses from ~inzhou.3~Although thrreafter the amount of funding issued to each prefecture was limited to forty thousand liang of silver annually, this amount was supplernented by alrnost seventy-seven thousand rolls of fine si~k.~~If these resources were still inadequate, the prefectures were authorized to issue to the horse

dealen coupons which could be redeemed for governent monopolized tes and salt. Needless to Say, al1 these expenditures excluded saiaries and financial rewards for the herd officiais, soldiers and veterinarians, construction costs of stables, as wcll as the millions of bundles of straw required for the horses in the imperial pasturage. Apart from the six irnperial pasturages in the capital region, the Herd Office establ ished and admi nistered seventeen pasturage areas in the pre fectures during the first two decades of 1000 A.D.'' However, the irnperial pasturage system began to decline by the end of the Zhenzong era. For instance. the Chanzhou Zhenniny pasturage fl If !% was first abolished in 1022 AD., then the Xuzhou Shanzhen pasturage 8 q- R,the Xingzhou Anguo pasturage iAl fil 't;' 14 and the Henan Luoyang pasturage i"I i6i i# P1: % were also closed in 1027 and 1028 A.D. re~~ectivel~.~~This tendency continued into the later decadcs of 1000s AD.. and by 1067 AB., the total amount of imperial pasturage area in the prefectures had declined to tiAy-five thousand qinR.5' Furthemore, the six pasturages in Henan and Hebei only occupied thirty-two thousand and twenty-three thousand qing of land mspectively." In 1068 A.D., the total figure of al1 the pasturage areas had further declined to forty-eight thousand eight hundred yinK.'' Finally. by 1075 AD.,only the largest Tongzhou Shayuan pasturage :<:] # 'I'A !?i rcmained open. Indeed, the decision to abolish these imperial stables and pasturages retlected the high financial cost the government had to pay in order to maintain a state run pasturage systern. Due to the lack of soldiers who were able to maintain the imperial horses and die high cost in maintaining them, the government had decided to sel1 al1 the horses which were of the age of thirieen and above to private civilians and to rely on them to pasture the irnperial horses in 1017 A.D? Ikthermore. in accordance with the rneasures to cut spending, the govemment had also limited the arnount of horses purchased. For instance, between 1023 and 103 1 AD.. the govemment had purchased about three hundred and ninety-nine thousand horses? By 1050s AD., the figure was limited to no more than twenty thousand a year.58 Apart €rom limiting the arnount of homes purchased, the Bureau of Horse Grading had also lowered its prescribed values for horses. Although during Zhenzong's era the government was willing to pay as high as eighty thousand strings of cash for a horse of the first grade or category, by 1050s A.D., the prescribed value for a horse of the sarne category was set only at fi@ thousand strings of cash.59 While this was clearly an effort of the Song governrnent's to trim cxpenditure in the procurement of horses, it may also reflect the depreciation of the currency of the Song as a result of inflation and econornic problems aRer years of heavy revenue output on military expenses. Indeed, given the importance of horses to the army and the Song empire's lack of them, the govemment may not have made the decision to abolish most of the pasturages in spite of the high operating cost if the imperial pastut-dgc systrm had been effective in pmducing a great number of battle-worthy horses. The abolition of these imperid pasturages therefore reflected the ineffectiveness of the imperial pasturage system in producing quality horses for the rnilitary . According to the Bureau of Military Anairs and the Secretariat Chancellery (ihongshu 11' ilF). between 1069 and 1072 A.D. the pasturage in Henan and Hebei produced about one ihousand six hundred and fony foals an nu al^^.^^ Clowever, only two hundred and sixty-four of them had tumed out to bc battle-worthy." Furthemore. whilr iIie horses in the imperial pasturage constituted a total market value or thirty-six ihousand four hundred and ninety six strings of cash, it had cost the government îïve hundred and thirty nine thousand six hundred and thirty eight strings of cash to operate the pasturage.62 As the expenses werc much higher than the gain. the govemment might well use the pasturage land for agrîcultural purposes and to use th<: revenue to buy more horses. Due to the effects of war and the loss of valuable temtories in the north that were suitable for the pasturing of horses, the horse agency of the Southem Song was much smaller in scale than its counterpm in the Northern Song period. Part of the reason for this was that since the capital was moved to Hangzhou, the government believed that the Yangzi River could provide the Soutbem Song domain with natural protection against the "barbarian" cavaliy's crossinp." Seeing that the Yangzi River was now a more important strategic boundary needed to be defended, the government began to re-allocate its efforts and resourccs from the building of a strong impenal pasturage system to the establishment of a permanent navy." Furthermore, without its access to top yood quality horses from Tufan, the Southrrn Song government now souyht to procure its horses from Yunnan, Guizhou. and Guangci. Nevertheless, the govemment was only able to obtain about two thousand horses annually from these locations, and they were regarded as not as good for cavalry warfare due to their relatively srnall size." While the Herd Office and the Court of the Imperia1 Stud had to be closed due to the shortage of rcsources and lack of horses. most of the other elements and units in the horse agency were arnalgamated into one single bureaucratie unit under the Bureau of Equipment (jiubu .f# 8)within the Ministry of ~ar?Nevertheless. the Southem Song government still maintained its efforts to build up its horse stock. In 1 132 AD.. an irnpcrial pasturage was first established in Raozhou fi@ in ioday's Jiangxi province, and in the few ycars that followcd, scvcral othcr pasturages were also established in the capital of Linan % "ii in modem Hangzhou and sevenl other locations such as Yangzhou & fil, Suzhou &); H. Yingcheng & a,Exhou 3 M. and Yingzhou 9[1 fil, etcb7 Due to the small number of horses the Southern Song possessed, the main objective of the imperial pastumges systcm was stock- building.'?n terrns of scale, every one or these imperial pasturages usually maintained only about fivc hundred horses with a ratio of twenty-three studs for rvery hundred mares.69 Furthermore, about seventy civilian staK soldiers and veierinarians were ernployed in each of these pasturages.70 While a reward and punishment system was still maintained for the herd staff, ihey had to meet a quota of ai lest fiRy percent birth rate of horses and less than ten percent death rate among those which were born." Apart from being smaller, the home agency of the Southem Song was also less successful compared with the one in ihe Northern Song. Whik the %uthem Song govemment had lost its best supply of horses from Tufan due to the loss of its northern territories, the problem was also exacerbated by the humidity and wann temperature of the south which made the pasturing of horses more diffi~ult.~~In the 1160s and 1 170s A.D., a lot of these imperial pasturages were plagued with a combination of mismanagement and problems incurred by the ecological environment of the south. For instance, although the irnperial pasturage in Jingnan iif fii initially rnaintained about five hundred horses at the eve of the 1 170s A.D. Afier five years of operation there only remained one hundred and twenty homes and only trn foals.') While the pasturage in Yingzhou and Ezhou possesscd about a thousand of mares and studs, aRer ten years of operation thry were only able to obtain ten foals." As for the Yangzhou pasturage. it was established in 1163 AD.. but Ior reasons similar to those imperial pasturages mcntioned above, it was closrd in I 164 AD." Furthemore, although the imperial pasturage in Y ingchcng l!k hk was initially given about two thousand horses by the central govemmeni at around the same period. three yeaa later only three hundred and thirty horses were found to have survived and only fifty-one foals were born throughout the whole period.76 As a rcsult of kirIàilure and the high cost in maintaining them. these pasturages wcrc aholished. Indeed. the achievement and eficiency of Song dynasty's pasturage system was also challcnged by the exploding population and the growing need for arable land. This reflected an overall conflict between the military's logistical ntxd on the «ne hand. and the general population's economic needs on the othcr. According to one estimation. there existed about two million five hundred and eightyeight ihotisand nine hundred and sixty five families in China dunng the reign period of Tüizu (960-975 A.D.).'~ By the year of' 1038 A.D., however. thc figure had incrcased to ten million one hundred and forty-four thousand two hundred and ninety7' In spite of the drastic seventy four percentage increase in the population within a mere period of almost six decades, the amount of arable land available in China had not increased. While it required about fifty mou of pastunge land for the govcmment to maintain one hone, the same amount of land was enough for 1hc agfi-icultural use of three famiers and their frni~ies.~~ln this sense. the use of valuable and fertile lands for imperial stables and pasturage would seem highly uneconomicaî. This situation was exacerbated by the occasional floods and droughts, when the demand of arable land for relief purposes became of the utmost urgency. For instance, due to the flood of the Yellow River, the Baima Lingchang pasturage fi % a k! % had do be closed and its landed grantrd to civilians for agricultural purposes in 1 1 19 A.D.~' Furthemore, in a palace mernorial witten in 1051 A.D. to persuade the throne to release part of the imperial pasturage lands in Hebei to the civilians for agricultural purposes herd official Bao Zheng hf! stated that although the Guangping pasturage of Hebei occupied about fifteen thousand qing of rertile soil, the govemment only maintained about five or six thousand horses." According to Bao, before the area around the Guangping pasturage was tumed intu an imperial pasturage, the area had accornmodated nine thousand ihree and forty families, annually producing eighty-seven thousand five hundred shi of gnin, five hundred and fifly-six thousand bundles of straws, as well as thirty-one thousand two hundred shi of whed2 Now in tirnes of tlood and dmught. not only was the arca in Guangping unable 10 produce any food for civilians like before. the imperial pasturage there was also causing thc govcmmcnt almost three million strings of cash for thc pasturing of a mere five or six thousand horses. Apan from mismanagement and the conflict between the nced of the horse agcncy and the eçonorniç needs of the population, factional politics also played an important role in confounding the success of the Song governmeni's pastonl efforts. Although in theory policy orientations of the hone agency was set by the Ministry of War, in reality much of the horsc agency's policies were consiantly under the scrutiny of poli ticized factions in the court as a means to undervalue their opposition's poli tical wisdom. The factions involved were Wmg Anshi's "relimnist" faction and the opposing "conservative" party. In general. the conservative faction supported the traditional govemment pasturage systems in spite of the system's high maintenance costs and Iow birth-rate of foals. On the other hand, the refomist faction proposed the abolition of al1 impenal pasturaps and the reliance on the use of militiarnen in the mutual security system (baujia 1% 11) to pasture govemment hones. As leaders and memben of the conservative and refom~istfactions came to political dominance in the court altemativcly from the middle of the Northem Song until the end of the Southem Song, impenal pasturages werc abolished, rcopened, and then abolished again inconsistently according to whatever faction was more powerful at the tirne. For instance, when Wang Anshi irnplernented his New Policies in 1068 AD., he abolished almost all of the imperial pasturages and adoptcd the mutual security horse system (haoma W %). But when Emperor Zhezong fi $.' succeeded to the throne in 1 O86 A.D., politically dominant oficials of the conservative faction countcrcd Wang's previous policies of eliminating imperial pasturages and reliance on the rnutual sccurîty home system (which will be discussed below) and rcjuvcnated thc imperial pasturage system. In spite of the inetliciency of the imperial pasturages. the conservatives supportcd the system and were cri tical of the rcformists' policies firstly because the conservatives believed that it was important hrthc government to adopt bureaucratie and administrative models that existcd in prcvious dynasties as a means of political iegitimization. Secondly. the conscrvativcs werc also suspicious of any new policies thnt would subjugate the Song's logistical effons to private hands or commercial forces that would undennine the central govemment's direct comrol of the maintenance of hones. Nevertheless, the conservative faction at this point still did not attempt to get rid of any of the problems in the imperial pasturage system. As a result, the conservatives rcjuvcnated not only the imperial pasturage system. but also the kind or mismanagernent and corruption that existed in the system before. Thus by 1086 AI)., each imperial pasturagc was only able to maintain about five to six thousand horses, and nearly half of them were deerned unwonhy for battle? While Paul Smith has anributed part of Song empire's failure in horse pasturagc to thc unimportance of horses in Chinese aman society and the Clan Chinese consequential lack of experience and knowledge in hippological matters. a Ièw words must be said to explain why Chinese civilians under the mutual secunty horse system were in general more efficient in pastoral matters than the Song herd o fficials." Like the amy's ordnance industry and the military agricultural colony systems, the Song dynasty's horse agency was not immune from mismanagement and corruption. Before Wang Anshi's mutual security horse system was rstahl ished, the twelve imperial pasturages in Henan and Hebei altogether produced one thousand six hundred and forty foals between 1 O69 and 1072 A.D.~~However, only two hundred and sixty four of them werc deemed battle-~orth~.~~While the averüge amount the government paid for the purchase of a horse was only about twcnty-two thousand two hundred strings of cash during that period, it had cost the imperial pasturage about twenty-seven thousand strings of cash to pasture one herse." Later when the mutual security home system was implernented. it was Ibund thüt it would only cost the civilian volunteers or militiamen on average filuneen thousand and four hundred strings of cash to pasture one hors^.^^ As a consequençe. the imperial paqturage system was indced very cost ineffectivc. The mismanagement of the impetial pasturage or stable sysiem was first indicated by the central pvemment's appointment of otficials whosc prcvious bureaucratie functions and experience provided them no relevant knowlcdgc or in püsturagc matien. Thus although in cornparison with the army ordnance industry or the niilitary agricultural colonial system the horse agency was unique in being the only army logistical aspect that was under the direct control of the Ministry or War. «tKc ials involved in pasturage matters were not necessari 1 y more "spccial ized" in hi ppological matters than Tm Transport Commissioners in fecdi ng ihc army. At the prefectural level for instance. although the Supervisor of [lerd Oflicc was nominally responsible for pasturage affain in the prefectures. actual administration of these prefectunl pasturages was canied out by the Prefects of the Prefecture (zhizhou %l fi))'' and their Administrative Assistants. who niay or may not have had any experience or knowledge in pastoral matters whats~ever.'~As a result. decision-making power concerning pastoral matten at the prefectural level 1- not with the pasturage or stable administraton who personally managed the pasturage, but with the Prefects of the Prefecture and their Administrative Assistants. As an example, the Tax Transport Commissioner of Shaanxi l% Pi was appointed to monitor pasturage rnatten witliin his circuit in 1060 A.D.~'Whilr the ïàx Transport Commissioner himself may not have taken any actual role in the daily administration of the imperial pasturages. the actual administration of these pasturages was conducted by the Fiscal Commissioner (caosi ifl d), who was responsible for his circuit's taxation. 92 As there was no indication that any of these fiscal officials had receivcd any special instructions or training in pasturage malters bcforc thcy had taken up the task of administenng the imperial pasturage and stables, it is questionable whether they were capable of making insightlùi administrative decisions conçeming the efficiency of the imperial pasturage. Indced. apart from the Tax Transport Commissionen and Fiscal Commissionen. Salt Transport OfKcers (jieyunguun fi$ 1 '8') were also appointed to establish horse trading posts in locations such as Yuanzhou fi;{ $fiH1.Wrizhou $/ $H. Xizhou !!: # and dlezhou $11.~~ Judging from this orientation of' appointment. it appeared to many Song onicials that the administration 01' the horse agency was very much like that of the army's ordnance industry. While specialized knowledgc or cxperience in the trade might be appreciated. ir was not nccessary or required for thc administrative ofïxials to possess.'4 As the imperial pastoral system indicated. the lack of hippological knowledge of the home agency's policy drafters could oniy allow thcm to invest heavily in the purchase and replacement of horscs and not on the building of the Song army's own stocks. Furthemore' administrators would ncd Iiippological knowledge to correct much of the bureaucratie rnismanagemcnt that existed in the imprial pastoral system and to rectify how tmthful their subordinate herd officials had been in their reports conceming with the pasiunge system's state of affain. Thus although the fiscal officials might have besn able to rneet the quota of horse purchases as prescribed by the Bureau of How Gradin& without specitk knowledge on pasturage rnatters it was doubtful if these same fiscal officials could corne up with the kind of administrative insight that would surpass the horse agency's ad hoc nature and to provide it with a sort of sustainability in building and maintaining a reasonabiy ample stock of horses over an extended period of tirne. Apart from mismanagement, the large amount of annual funding thc horsc agcncy passessed also atîracted corruption. In 980 A.D. for instance. one palace eunuch known as Li E $? who was responsible for the imperhl stables and pasturage of the prefectures was found guilty in rnisappropriating funding that was suppoxd to be spent on the purchase of food for the horses. Consequently, one thousand and tive hundred horses had reportedly died as a result of the shonage of tb~d.'~Furthemore, in 998 A.D.. the Erudite of the National University (gzrozi hosehi M f- f!) -k), Li Jue $ & said.

"Now in the army therr: exist pienty ofmares. t-lowever, the number of foals boni is still very sinüll. Why? It is because the government has not issued enough funding for the supply of food tbr ihc mares."*

As thc lack of funding might have ken a rcason For the low birth rate. the existence of corruption and misappropriating of funding by herd otiiciais definitely played a rolc. When commenting on the horse agency's current state OC üffairs. the hous scholar Ouyang Xiu % bS also irnplird in 1060 A.D. the continuous existence of tunding misappropriation by Herd Officers. In particular, hr: stated

"As for the Bureau of Horse Grading, the benrfits and disadvantagcs it could bring to (the government) is obvious. If our country is generous in supplying funding for purchasing horses, thcn plenty of hone dealers will certainly retum for the high profit. But if the officials (in the Bureau of tlorse Gmding) rnisappropriatc their fiinding resources, then the dealers wiil suxly not nturn duc to the lack of

While incornpetence and mismanagrnent in the imperhl pasturage system was known, there was linle indication that the government had taken any serious measures to address the problems. Although there existed certain versions or the reward and punishment systems For the officials. it was also certainly possible that many herd ofticials had falsified documents in order to avoid blarne just like what their counterparts did in the army ordnance industry and the military agricultural colony system. Although it was truc that the success of the Song empire's horse agency was limited by ecological realities that were beyond the control of the empire's herd officiais, it was also clear that the irnperial pasturage system itsttlf was not quite successful in taking care of the horses it already possesscd. Ironically. the court offcials' efforts to try to rectify the pasturage system had turned into partly political battles between the reformists and the conservatives. As a resulr. the lack of consistency in policy implementation made the devcloprnent or any sustainable results dificult for the empire's horse agency. Whcn the reformist party came to power again in 1096 A.D., except the Shatuan pasturage in Tongzhou and the Dongpinp pasturage in Yunzhou, al1 the other thc imperial pasturages were again aboli~hed.'~For the Shayuan pasturage, it only niai ntained about six thoujand horses whilc occupy ing about ninc thousand qing of land.''9 Although on average the government had spent about four hiindred thousand strings of cash annually for the pasrurage. the death rate Tor the horses was as hiyh as alrnost IiRy percent in 1098 A.11.. while the rcmaining were also unfit for çüvalry warfare."' Furthemore. a system known as "püsturing for land" (zhidi yuungrnu Jic {fi ilk # .% &) was implemented in the sarne year. ln substance, the pasturing for land system shared a striking resemblance with the mutual security horse system. For every single volunteer who was willing to pasture a horse. he

was to be given one ying of governrnent land, hence "pasturing for land"."" t luwever. the pasturing for land system did not seem to be quite as successful as the mutual sccurity horse system. According to the Wemiun Tongkuo. there cxistcd only one thousand and eight hundred volunteers in the whole county in 1 107 A.D., and among them one thousand four hundred were in the west of the Hebei circuit. only nine in the Hedong circuit, few tens in other circuits, and absolutely no volunteers in Kaifeng the capital, the south OF Jingxi circuit and the east of Jingdong circuit.'02 However, the number of volunteers slightly increaîed wwhen the govcmment allowed civilians to keep one out of every hree imperial horses bey

pastured. 'O' In 1 120 A.D., the conservatives came to power again. Predictably, they attempted to rejuvenate the imperial pasturage system. Unfortunately, the life span of the imperial pasturage was even shorter as lands gradwlly slipped into the hands of private land ownen and govemrnent omcials during this period.'MIronically, as the Liao was destroyed by the Jin at this very moment, the urgency of the situation had forccd the conservatives to adopt the reformists' policy in using civilians to pasture imperîal horses. Thus in 1 126 A.D., the Lefi Grand Counselor (zuu chengxiung h! * $I),Li Gang 9 said:

"lluriiig the eras of our dynastic ancestors. horses were pastured in Our imperial pasturage. Ai that tirne thirty six pasturages were established in locations such as Shaanxi, Hedong, and Hebei, where thc tcmpcrature was cool and grasses were fiesh and abundant. But in recent years (since the rcforrnists came to power) most of the imperial pasturages were abolished. with their lands allocated IO the civilians for the pasturing of irnperial horses. As a matter of fact, the civilians were only willing IO pasture horses as a substitute for taxation and other dutics for the govenment. As for the o~ciüls(involved in the mutual security horse system), they oflen falsitied figures in order io avaid blamc. As a rcsult, the state of affain will surely forbid out dynasty's horse agency to return to ifs previous succcss. Unfortunately. part of Our northern territories is now being occupied by the "barbarians". While half of our army is without horses, we should adopt the ad hoc solution of gathcring al1 the horses available and allocate them ta the civilians (and allow thcm to paqturc thc I~o~~cs)".'"'

Nevertheless. this last minute effort had corne too little too late. Bcfore any results çould be achieved. the Northern Song empire was destroyrd by the Jin "barbarians" in 1 126 AD. While it was true ihat the imperial pasturage system was not nccessarily better than the reformists' mutual horse security system, il was clear that thc constant shifl of policy orientations and the recurring re-establishrnrn~ and abolition of imperial pasturages had made the development of sustainable progress

At this point, more must be said about the impact of Wang Anshi's reformist orientation on the Song empire's horse agency. As a consequence of the 'fangut war during the reigns of Emperon Zhenzong (998-1 022 A.D.) and Rrnzong ( 1 023- 1 063 A. Il.), inflation had drastically affected the govemment's revenue and the salt and tea industries thai provided the army with its fundamentai sources of funding for logistical supplies.'o6 In order to tackle the problems of the series of financial crises, the New Policies implernented by Wang Anshi in 1068 AD. were aimed at using experimental policies to refom those ossified bureaucratic institutions that Wang considered ineffective and obsolete. Thus in order to put his theory of bureaucratic entcrpreneurship into practice and to divert part of the central government's tinancial burden in horse procurement and pasturage, Wang proposed the implementation of two policies.'07 As mentioned above. one of Wang Anshi's main objectives in his New Policies was to attempt to relieve part of the government's financial burden on other secton in society. As a consequence, he implemenred the mutual security home system (baoma {x A%) and rdied on the militiamen of the mutual security system to pasture military hones on the government's behalf. Thus in the fiRh rnonth of 1074 A.D., horses purchascd from Shaanxi were issued to those militiamen in Kaifeng who had volunteered to pasture thesr govcrnrnent h~rses.'~~In the eighth rnonth of 1075 A.». more elaborate instruciions weni rcleased by the govemment describing the detailed rcgulations conceming the mutual secunty horse system. Those instructions were as foilows:

"For those of the mutual security groups in the various circuits who are willing io pasture govcrnrnent horses, each family shall pasture one horse, and for those who are financially strong, IWO horses. Horses are to be issued by local herd officiais. But money can be given to ille militiamcn to aliow them to purchase their own horses. No one should be forced to participate in lhis program. There should not be more than three thousand horses (kept under this system) within ihc boundary of the Kaifeng Superior Prefecture, As for the five circuiis, there shall not be more than fivc thousand horses within each of their boundaries. Apart from the pursuit of bandits, these horses should not be ridden more than three hundred li away from the ownefs residencc. For those in thc Kaifeng Stiperior Prefecture, two hundred and fiRy bundles of stmw will be cxempted annuülly frarn each voluntecr's taxation, On top, strings of cash and silk will also brl given (as reward). As for those in the circuits, every year they shall be exempted from selling their praperties to mcct their tax requirements..."'a'

And if any of the hones died when they were under the pastunge of the voluntecrs. ihcn the volunteers were financially respoosible for replacing them. As one of the main objectives of this system was to divert some of the hone agency's expenses to those non-govemmental sectors of the society. the number of horses the Kaifeng Supcrior Prefecture was allowed to keep was later increased to six thousand in 1076

A.I>.'Io Furthenore, the rewarding of rnoney and silk were also abolished. saving the central govemment about forty-NO thousand strings of cash.' ' ' Although at this point part of the govemment's financial burden in pasturage had been moved ont0 the shoulders of the mutual security militiamen, the financial burden that horse purchasing entailed had yet to be relievrd. As a result, the reformist faction implernented an alternative version of the mutual system in 1090 A.[), the "family hone purchase system" (huma /a P .% a)."' While in the mutual security horse system horses were given to the volunteers by the government, the family hone purchase system relied on civilians who had abundant material wealth to purchase horscs and to pasture them. As a consequence. the family horse purchase system by implication was more conscriptive in nature than the mutual security horse systcm. Like the mutual security home system. the family horsc purchase sysiem was implemented in the capital of Kaifeng as well as in the various circuits. Those who resided in the cities and whose property was worth thrcc thousand strings of cash, or those who resided in the countrysidc and hcld pmpcrty togethcr that was worth five thousand strings of cash were rcsponsiblc for the purchase and pasturing of one horse. 113 .ïhe more property a family owncd, thc more horses the farnily had to purchase according to the deabove."' ln ordcr to avoid the prices of horses from being raised by private home merchan ts dut: to thc sudden increase in demand of horses as a result of this policy. the pvernment also sold one thousand of its top quality horses to add a supply of Iiorses to tIic market.' '' Yci another policy of the refomist school that was aimcd at relicving thc g~vernment'sfinancial burden on the horse agency was the esiablishrnent of the Superintendancy for Tea and Horses (Joudai fui charnu si A( A f% % % % ). Aithough the horsç- and tea trade was first adopted dutiny the Tang dynüsty and had trxisted in the Song dynasty as well since 983 A.D., the reformists' creation of the Bureau of Tea and Horse Tnde in the 1070s A.D. was unique in being more elaborate in scale but comparatively decentralized due to Wang Anshi's notion or bureaucratic entrepreneurship.1'6 Generally. this policy rekd on the money o btai ned from the selling of the famous Y azhou @ tato ffund the govemment's horse procurement efforts."' In this sense. a delicate balance had to be maintaincd in the amount of iea sold. If too little tea was sold, then relaiively the pnce for the horsrs would be tao high for the govemment to afford. But if too much tea was sold, the market value of ka would also dccline, runher diminishing the maryin of' profit of the tea industry and making horses less affordable for the govcmment as well. In 1074 A.D.. when the Prefect of the Xizhou Prefecturc Wang Shao 1:. iK1 was appointeci as the Supervisor of Imperia1 Horse Purchasc. he suggesred that a good amount of tea he purchased by the government from the Chinesc ttea plantations due to the increasing demand of good quality t~a.''~As the profitability of tca was increasing and the cost of horse purchasing remained a financial burden for the govemmant, the Administrative Assistant of the Sait and lron Agency of the Siate Finance Commission (sansi yantie panpan 4 $1 'g) of the Chengdu supcrior prefecture as well as Supervisor of *kaPlantation (iiju chtzchmtg th! % 5 tbi), 1.i Qi ? td. suggested that the selling of tea and the buying of horscs should be amalgamated together and be put undcr the supervision of one single Il4 agency. Thus in 1086 AD.. the Superintendancy for Tea and 1-lorses (dotidai iiji churnct si AI h: #% P BC !W 4) was ofticially cstab~ished? Subsequentiy, six government posts were established by Li Qi in Sichuan and Shaanxi wherc: the trdding of Tibetan horses with Ica from Sichuan was concentrated, and the horscs were no longer purchased from the trading psts in Yuanzhou, Wcizhou. Shunzhou, and ~ezhou."' As Paul Smiih argucd. the tea and horsc trade of the Song dynasty was indeed a classical case which reflrcted the conflict between the Song army's logistical needs and the govemment's desire to grncrate financial profits through its tea trade. Althouyh the gains fmm the ka trade was supposed to supplement the Song govemment's expenses in purchasing horses. dispari ty in the goals between tea-selling officials and horse-purc hasing officials had disrupied both the tea and horse trades. More precisely. while the govcrnmcnt's tca trade could only be benefited from high tea prices. the horsc agency gained frorn low tea prices within the Song markeis. which would offer

Tihetan horse traders more amount of tea to bring back and sel1 at home. 'E But due to the fundamentai contradiction between the goals of tea oficials and horse- purchasing otEcials with the Superintendancy for Tea and Horses, the govemment's logistical efforts in procuring horses was eventually dismpted. For example, Horse Purchasing Intendant Guo Maoxun % 8 complained in 1083 A.D. that although the pvemmeni would nomally pay Tibetan horse traders in "Great Bamboo" tea priced at fourteen strings and six hundred and forty cash per unit at the trading post in Jiezhou, recently the tea otKcials had raised the price of tea to twenty to maintain thc tca trade's profitability and to meet the profit quota set by the govemment.'23 As the price of tea msc. 'fihetan home traders who travelrd to Jiezhou would be paid a less arnount of tea. Consequcntly, they would refuse to seIl their horses. A similar situation wa~also filund in 1 1 90 AD., when the tea offciais who were charged with the responsi bility of purchasing horses as well Iiad dclayed the buying of horses as they attemptcd to increase the prices of tea.'24 As a result. the govemment ordered the Tea and I-lorse Agcncy to release part of its funding to local military oftlcials to allow them io purchase their own hor~es.'~~ Although it was true that during the Southem Song period ihe need for a strong navy was probably more important than the purchasing of a great number of

\var horscs. one miyht wonder if it had been a wise idea for the Song government 10 depend Tor its supply of horses almost solely on the selling of one single çommodity, narnely tra. In the Northem Song period. the profitability of tea did attract Tibetan horse traders to bring great numbers of hones to the market, and as a result the Song govemment managed to purchase between tweive thousand and iwenty-two thousand horses annually between 1 082 and 1 1 22 A.D? Ironically, the great number of horses purchascd by the Song govemment during this period ülso cnabled a large amount of tea to flow into the tea market of Tufm, and deeply drove thc market prices of tea do~n.'~'By 1177 A.D.. it took the govemment alrnost one thousand catties of tea to purchase an inferior hor~e.'~hsa resuit of the rising cost of Iiorses in cornparison with the decrease in tea prices, the Song's horse procurement efforts were very much affected. 4 Perhaps there was no real solution to the Song's continuous need to purchase horses from foreign sources when domestic sources of supply were not plentiful. It was also true that ecological realities had made it even more diflicult For the Song to develop its own stock of battle-worthy horses. Nevertheless, it is clear from the above illustrations that poiicy drafters and administrators of the horse agency were equally griilty in rnismanaging the whole system. Althouyh the horse ügency was nominally part of the Ministry of War's subordinate unit, the general trend of civil otlicials' dominance in the horse procurement efforts had made the horse agency vulnerable to the cffkcts of political struggles between the conservative and reformist factions. Finally. while the tea trade itself was supposed io supplement the govcmment's expcnditures on the procwment of horses, market forces hrid ironically become a major factor undermining the success of the horse agency.

Endnotes to Choipter I : The Procurement of Horses

I Paul J. Smith, Taxing tleuven's St~lrfihouse:Horses. Burt!aucrars, und tire Dtc~rrucrion(4' rhti Sichuan Teu Indust~.1074- 122 1, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 199 1 ), pp. I 4- I S.

' Jiang Tianjian i C X @, Bei Song shimo :hi yunjiu -1k th' !.% mf % . (Taipei: tiuoli Pianyiguan, 1995), p. 12.

' Jiang ( 1995). p. 12.

4 - fhese were regions in today's Gansu province. Jiang (1995), p. 13.

' Smith (1991).p. 23.

7 Due to the timitation of space in this present thesis and for the purpose of analysis. the presrnt chapter will onIy focus on the procuring and pasturing aspects of the horse agency.

"his was a rather strict plicy, and those who attempted to conceal their homes from govemment purchase or conscription were punishable by death. W.UK. chapter 160, Bing 12. ,Mcl=heng .% &, p.1389.

' Smith (199 1). p.20.

10 Tufan, which is Tiùet and part of the areas in Qinghai. - ' ' Song Dai Umoliï~gJi % $i' k* 1,chapter 18 1. Mmheng % &, p.655.

" Prices paid by these government missions were prexribed into th~ecategories according to the quality of the horses. Lf the harses îèll between the top and the medium categories, the government officiais would only pay the price of the medium category. Duc to such intlexibility, the higher prices Chinese civilians were willing to pay would naturally seem more attractive to the non- Han Chinese horse dealers. SS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Muzheng ,% &, p.625.

13 SS, chapter 198, Bing 151, hiuzheng f6 iY[, p.625.

IJ Conscription of Chinese civilian horses occurred many times throughout the Song dynasty, the carliest one taking place in 987 A.D. SS, chapter 198, Ring 15 1, Muihrn~!Ji a, p.626.

l6 tlucker, entry 6204.

" Hucksr. entry 6692.

IR Hucker, eniry 6 1 5.

19 S.?, chapter 19.8, Bing 15 1, Maheng !% a,p.624.

?' S.S. chapter 198. Bing 15 1, M~zhrng!$ &, p.624.

" kfucker. entry 5449.

'' W.MK. chapter 160, Bing 12, Muzheng !JiW. 1 390.

W,Yi'K, chapter 160, Bing 12, Muzheng ,% dk, p.1390.

" WXfK, chapter 160, Bing 12, Mutheng .% B. p. 1390.

'"' Song ( 1 962), p. 19.

lu W,TTK. chapter 160. Bing 12, hfaheng % a. p. 1393.

" WUK,chapter 160, Bing 12, Maheng a.p. 1393.

" Smith (1 99 1 ), p. 269.

" Song ( 1 962), p.20. 34 According to SS chapter 207, Yiwenzhi ft: ii. Yiwen 6 % X ;i ,p.654, there existed one volume of The hianata/ of Horses (Mujing ,% @), one volume of Home Velerinury Manuul ( Yiinajing % 1% 5$), one volume of Diugrams for Distinguishing Horses (Diunmutu #$ I!; ); Song ( t 962). p.20.

3 5 Song ( l96S), p.20.

16 SS. chapter 198, Bing 1 5 1, Muzheng .% $, p.626.

" Every ycar. the Administrstive Assistant of the Supervisor of Herd Omcr would conduct inspections on al1 irnperial pasturages. .YS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Mazheng 15 fi, p.627.

" In particulor, the Vcterinary lnstitute in the capital was called muyang bingmo jiun #t fi ff !$ M. or later known as muyung jiun $2 R %. SS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1. Muzhcng !.$ 8. p.627.

39 .YS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1, M~heng5 a,p.627.

40 SS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1, hkchrng A!; A&, p.627.

'' Xie Chengxia dli idi %. "Songchao de yangmaye X W 161 A M 8 ", Zhonap~ jrmgmushi '1' # ff !Ji 2. (Beijing: Kexur chubanshe. 1959). p. 156.

"'Xie ( 1959). p. 1 56.

,1! SS, chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Muzheng !!; &, p.627.

4.1 S.% chapter 198, Bing 15 1. Mazheng !!ia, p.627.

J* This was a system inherited from the Tang dynasty, and the systcm's objective was to provide assisrançt: to local militiarnen in procuring the horses they needed for the defense of thcir own tcrritories. Xie ( 19591, p. 156.

"'Xie (1 959). p. 156.

JX W.tTK. c hapter 1 60, Bing 12. Muzheng % b,p. 1 390.

$9 I OO,MW) liung equals approximately 2,830 kilograms. It should be noted that this anaunt also equais half of the Song's total national production of silver during that poriod. Smith ( I W I ). p.48; S.% chapter 198. Bing 15 1. Marheng 1% &. p.627.

50 SS, chapter 198. Bing 1 5 I , Muzheng !$ &, p.627.

5 1 Lin Ruihan fi m, "Songdaijiunmu 'z fe t a",Tunghai Journul. Vol. X. No.2. July 1969. p.15.

" Apan from the capital region and the border prefectures where the purchasing and pasturing of hones was convenien~irnperial pasturages were also established as far south as Fujian (Fuzhou #iM and Quanzhou $! )H). However, it was believed that hocses procured and pÿstured in these areas were of less cavalry value due CO their srnaller size and height Lin ( 1969). p. 1 5.

" SS, chapter 198. Bing 15 1. Mmheng &. p.626.

54 KY. chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Mazheng .% &, p.626.

55 SS, chapter 198, Bing 1 5 1, Mcizheng !2$ a,p.626.

" YH, chapter 148, Bingzhi fi $4, Mazheng % & (1 ), p.20.

58 YH, chapter 148, Bwhi fi $1, hfazheng !% itS[ (1 ), p.20.

59 The lowest value for a fourth grade horse was only about twenty-five thousand strings of* cash. YI!. chapter 148, Binghi fi ai. Maheng .!!; uj[ ( 1). p.22.

MHucker. entry 1606: Lin ( 1969). p. 16.

"' Louise L.rvathes. Whrn Chino Ruled [hr Sm,(New York: Simon & Schusttér. 1994). p.42. b5 Xie (1 959), p. 172. fi

66 Ilucker. cntry 676; The only unit still existed independently was the Supervisor of' lmprrial !-torse Purchase, Xie ( 1 959). p. 164.

" Xie (1959). p. 168.

'>'H,chapter 149. Binghi IFiW. Maiheng !Ji iH[ (2), p.30.

70 YH. chaptcr 149. Bingzhi 'riii!, hfcheng .% & (2), p.30.

7? -!S.chapter 198, Bing 1S 1. htcheng If$8.p.625. .- ' S.S. chapter 198. Bing 15 1, rtiuzheng JI; 8.p.625.

"' YH, chapter 149, Bingzhi R ;M. hlaheng !$ H( (2), p.3 1.

76 SS. chapter 198, Bing 15 1. Mczhrng 15 &, p.625. - '' KUK, chapter 160. Bing 12. Meheng k 8.p.1390.

3 W.WK, chapter L60, Bing 12, hfcheng .% a,p. i 390. 79 Song ( 1962). p.20.

Xie (1 9591, p. 145.

% I Du obtained this passage from chapter 7 of Bao Sugong Ztroyi 1 $? 48 $, Du ( 1 990)- p.27.

83 SS, chapter 198, Bing 1 5 1, Maheng 1% &, p.625.

*' Smith ( 199 1 ), 20-2 1.

85 WXTK, chapter 160, Bing 12, hfaheng '5 &, p. 139 1.

86 WXTK, chaptcr 160, Bing 12, Muzheng .% a,p. 139 1.

117 CKWK, chaprer 160, Bing 12, Mcheng .% a,p. 139 1.

a8 W,VK, chapter 160, Bing 12, Mazheng ki ifk, p. 1392.

8') tiucker, cntry 965.

'M Xie ( 1959). p. 147.

" Xie ( 1959). p. 157.

'" I luckrr. entry 6929.

'j3 Xie ( 1959). p. 157.

Y4 The imperial ordnance indusrry will be discussed later in this thesis.

WYTK, chapter 160, Bing 12. Mcheng !!; B. p. 1393.

'UV Clucker. entry 3543; WXrk'. chaptcr 160. Bing 12. Mctzheng 11; d,p. 1390.

'' KYTK, chapter 160. Ding 12. Mcheng !$ a,p. 1394.

98 SS. chapter 198, Bittg L 5 1. hlmheng !Ji a,p.627.

'W WTK, chapter 160. Bing 12, hiazheng !JG 8,p. 1393.

100 WXTK. chapter 160, Bing 12, hfdeng 1); 8,p. 1394.

101 WATK. chapter 160, Bkg 12, Muzheng .$ &. p. 1392.

IO2 WXTK. chapter 160, Bing 12. Mazheng #% 1.p.1393.

Ia3S.S. chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Mazheng !6 &. p.627.

I OJ SS. chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Muzheng fi 8,p.627.

Io' tiucker, entry 483 ; Xie ( 1959, pp. 153- 154 106 Smith (199 11, p.38.

1O7 Smith ( 199 l), p.39.

10s WXTK, chapter 160, Bing 12, Mheng .% &. p. 1393.

IonClowever, the passage does not speciQ what other tax requirements militiamen had ta fultÏll; lV.TTK, chapter 160, Bing 12, Mzhrng SG &, p. 1393.

110 WXX,chapter 160, Bing 12, Muzheng dk, p. i393.

III CKITK, chapter 160, Bing 13, Mcheng 5% .&, p. 1393.

' " Chen Zhen B. "Lun baomajà &? î% !Ji In,Songshi yanjiu lunwenji .*: CR' .fL X %. (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1 %O), p.323.

III CV.\TK, chapter 160, Bing 12. ~Muzheng1% &, p. 1394.

I IJ The maximum number of horses a family was allowd to purchase and pasturc was hrw. H'ATK, chapter 160, Bing 12, Mazheng .% &, p. 1394.

'" M'.th: chapter 160. Biny 12. Muzhrng a.p. 1394.

Il6 Jiang ( 1995). p.32 1.

"'It was recorded that the non-Clan Chinesr were particularly fond of the Ya-Lhw tea at thc rimc. Song Drri Zhaoling Ji '$ h: 1% 3 ?k, chaptor 1 8 1, Maheng &, p.655.

f tX S.S. chapter 198, Bing 15 1. Marheng !.!$ Jk, p.627.

Il') S.S. chapter 198, Bing 15 1, Ma-heng 9; @, p.627.

"" Smith (199 1 ). p.249.

"' The fundunenial probkrn of the tea and home trade lay in the fact that the Song court was more despemre to buy horses than merchants from Tufan were to obtain tea. As Paul Smith pointcd out. the Song ofiicials wtxe more inclined to offer almost as much as whai the Tibetans had aslied for. while the Tibetan home traders were less likely to sel1 their homes for less silver, silk, ka. or èven salt. Smith ( 199 1 ), p.268-269.

'23 Smith (1991)- p.271.

'- SS. chapter 167, Zhigwn $i120. Tïji changping charnu shibo dengzhi If $i ')# 1'- 5 !!fIfi BA 3 a,p.5 10.

IzbSmith ( 1 99 t ), pp.264-265. '3Sniith (1991). p.271.

srnith ( 199 l), p.269. Chapter II : iMilitarv APricultural Colonies

From campaign experiences as well as from the studying of ancient military classics such as Sunri, thc importance of food supply was clearly known tu Song military planners as an important element in the military logistical efforts. During the reign pcriod of Song Shenzong ;;< (1068-1085 AD.), the Song govemment cngaaged in a series of military campaigns against the Xixia Tangut kingdom. Alihough the Song army was in general successtÙl in bringing destruction to thc Xixia kingdom's major political and economic centres, the Song anny cncountrred a great amount of diftkuities in sustaining its attacks undçr the winter conditions.' Accotding to Forage. the key issue of these campaigns scemed to be thc Song's logistical problems in rnaintaining a coniiouous supply of food ro its large annies in the northwestcm frontier, and this was a pmblcm which appeared less than a full month into the ~arn~ai~ns.~Even as early as 1069 AD..Shenzong had abandoncd ihc idea of cornhining his major forces to launch a massive attack at the Xixia capital sirnply bccause of the Song arrny's ditliculty in provisioning itself.' Indeed. ihroughout the whole series of campaigns. logistical problems had recurrcnily hauntcd the Song army. causing starvation among the Song soldiers and causing [hem to he exposed to Tangut cavalry attacks in the Ordos desert. Out of thc combinaiion of the Song army's recognition of the imponancc oF a stable food supply Ii~rthe anny as well as learning from the practice of prcvious dynasties, the military agricultunl colony system was implemented as a logistical dort to produce hod for the soldiers. Apart front the former Soviet Union and former cornrnunist bloc countrics which organized demobilized soldiers into agricultural groups and communes. China was the only country that maintained different forms of the military fmn colony system for its standing mies throughout history4 The idea of militq làmi colonies was based upon the notion of "quartering soldiers as fmers" Ci.uhi12~ yunong '& fr; fi $4 ). an idea originally dcveloped by Han ministçr Chao Cuo % &'\ during the reign of Han Wendi 8 X c@(179-155 AD.)? Gencrally speaking. the term tuntian [El, or military agricultural colonies, referred to the use or regular soldiers to take on agricultural responsibilities in order to achievc a certain lcvel of self-reliance in faod-supply. In the tuntian systern, soldicrs were allowed to keep the majority of their agicultural produce as the anny's food supply, while the rcst was kept in govemment granaries for the preparation of war. droiight and famine. An alternative version of the tuntian system was the yingfinn system ?? Ill. or the state farm colony system. In the yingtian system, civilian farmers wcrc rmployed or given lands to cultivate food for the regular army soldiers. In this case. part of the produce was taxed by the govemment to producc the salaries ol* civil service officiais as well as fod supply for the amy. With the introduction of drought-resistant rice from Champa in central Indo- China. Chinese farmers were able to develop a variety of early-ripening n'ce by the heginning of thc clcvcnth ceniury? Furthemore, the invention of suprrior hydraulic control, new double-cropping techniques. better agriculiural tools. as wcll as thc dissemination of knowledge by means of agricultural trcatiscs hûd dl contrihutcd to a greaier output of rice and the expansion of the market in thc souih ol' china.' As a result. Chinese farmrrs in the south of China during thc Nonliern Song period wcrc able to extend their frontier of rice production from thc lowlands. deltas. and rivcr valleys to the comparatively well-watered bills.' Nevertheless. ihç innovation of ricc growing technology only bcnefitted China to a certain extcnt. as the main ricc producing regions in China were still limited to the south. Thcreforc. inland rcgions of the Song. such as the northwest. still had to rely on merchants to transport ricc from regions in the sauth of China to supplcrnent locally grown produce in the northwestem region. Similar to the policy of using govemment monopolized tea io trade for 'I'ibcian horses, the govemment relied on state-monopolized salt to cncouragc merchants to transport rice from the south of China to the northwestern regions. Oncç ihc rice was received by the local govemment in the nonhwest, mcrchants would then be paid in salt coupons, which could be redeemed Tor state- rnonopolized sait in the capital.' However, problems arose ~henit became apparent that the demand for grain by the northwest was increasing faster than the demand of salt by the merchants. As a solution, the govemment increased the number of salt coupons issued to the merchants to attract them to continuc thcir transportation of food to the northwest. Subsequently. the over-issuing of these salt coupons caused the market values of salt to devaluate.'* For example. although the Shaanxi goveniment on average received about five hundred and twenty thousand strings of cash annually through trade with merchants from the capital bctwcen 1048-1068 A.D.. during the sarne period the local government of Shaanxi had issued about nine million two hundred and seventy thousand strings OS cash worth of salt coupons annually to grain-tnnsponation merchants." Consider that on average the Shaanxi region only issued about four hundred and twenty thousand strings of cash in value of salt coupons to local civilians, the governinent's cxpcnditure in food-transportation to the northwest was indeed very high. Worsc still. in spite of thc shortage of' cash flow in Shaanxi. th<: Shaanxi local govcrnmcnt hüd to spcnd an extra amount of cash to purchase back the surplus amount ol'sdt coupons in the market in order to restore the economic equilibrium betwecn salt and Therefore. the goverment had to corne up with solutions to inducc scll~sulïiciencyin the production of food in the nonhwestem rcgions. II' the problem of transponing food from the south to the northwesi was diflicult enough. one can imagine the diffïculties in maintaining a continuous supply of food to the great numbers of soldiers at the border defensive outposts in Shaanxi should m armed conflict take place. According to the eleventh century writer Shen Kuo tk fi% (1 03 1-1 095 A.D.). a miliiary campaign could last for eightcen days (including return travel) only it'every soldier was accompanied hy a poncr rrsponsible for canying food.I3 If a rnilitary campaip required thiny-one dqs of travel. then three porters for every soldier would be needed to caq the amount of food required.I4 Thus if an army of one hundred thousand soldien was rnobilizcd for an extended period of time. about three quarters of ihr total strength wouid nred to be porters of food." Interestingly enough, at the beginning of the Northem Song priod the govemmcnt required that food be transported from the border region in the northwest to the capital as ii was bclicvcd at the tirne that the scattered non-Han- Chinese population in Shaanxi would not constitute any military threat to the Song border.'' However, concems about the proviçioning of food for the border region bcgan io appear in 982 AD., following the armed uprising of Li Jiqian 9 % 111 and Song's consequential rcsponse in increasing its border defense." At onc point. the Shaanxi yarrison had more than two hundred thousand soldiers, casting thc govemmcnt tifteen million strings of cash every year.'hlthough ihe governrneni had brought in six million shi of gain to Shaanxi through the rivers and canals cvcry year, il was reported that the arnouni of food was still inadequate." Worsc still. Li Jiqian focused his attacks on the Song anny's route of Tood transportation and atiempted to obtain the Song soldiers' food supply fbr his own soldicrs.'" Thus when 1.i attacked the defcnsive outpost in Lingzhou at ihc hcyinning 01'997 AD.. it was clear that the food supply in the grana. ihere must h;ivc hccn one main reason for his attack." Accordinp to IYrnxim Tongkm. it was hclicved thai for cvery two hundred and fifty thousand shi of ricc transportcd to the northwcst for ihe Song army's carnpaipn against Li. only about seventy thousand or cighty thousand shi had safely rcached its destinaiion due to Li's dismption ot' the Song's supply .&&73 And for evrry four hundred thousand shi of food transporicd spccilically to 1,ingzhou in order to relicvc its food shanage. only about sixty ihousand shi had mived safel y2' Due to the high costs and problems of transporting food to thc border rcgions. it was clear that the Song's border derense garrisons had to devclop ü system that could allow the soldien a certain level of self-sutticiency or food siipply. And from the illustrations of Shen Kuo. it was ahch- thai the ieçhnology of transportation was to rernain constant. then a panial solution was io establish a number of bases for food production and supply as close io the border rcgions or potential contlict zones as possible. Moreover. if the soldien were allowed to grow their own food. their source of food supply would also be less vulnerable or txpsed to Li Jiqian's attacks. Ln this sense, the establishment of tlrntian and yingtian colonies seemed to be the ideal solution. Although it usually took three or five years before a certain level of seIr- sufficiency could be reached by these colonies aRer they were established. the results were quite impressive in some cases. For instance, afier the Assistant Pacification Commissioner (xuanfu fihi Ti % @j *) of Sichuan had establishcd yingtimt colonies in Jiezhou l%fi and Chengzhou I& $11 in 1144 AD.. more than thrcc ying Lf'i of land were cultivated. and producing about one million eight hundred thousand shi ii of grain every year.24 As a result of the success in food production in this region, the arnount of grain needed io be purchased fiom Chengdu for thc defense outposts was reduced by one-ihird.'.' Indced. among the many manifestations of agriculture within the context oï statecrali. one is the maierialization of the state's grand strategic objcctivc in cnriching the statd6 As such, the founding principle of the tunricin and yingticrn systems was bastd upon the economic-political notion of the agrarian soçiety tliat al1 subjects of a dynastic regime wcre fundamentally and in majority soldiers and fàrmers." l'hus, although the army had already reached a relatively high Ic.vel of prokssionalization as both a bureaucntic establishment and a social institution hy

the tirnt of thc Song dynasty, this principle still led thc Song governmeni io hcl ieve that ils suhjects should be driven to farm during peace. while being trained as soldiers in tirnes of war? In spite of the gradua1 urbanizaiion and commercialiïation of the Song economy as well as the subsequent change of tax currency from grain to cash and other materials. the ideal of a ramer-soldicr still niaintaincd an important place in the govemment ideology in the Song timzs. ln subsiancc. the tunrian system differed from the yingtian system in that Iàrm lands within the funtirin colonies were cultivated by regular soldiers. while the lands of the yingtian colonies were cultivated by civilians. In return, the civilian yingtiun colonists would provide food to the soldiers through the ta~ingof their producc from these yingiicrn lands.29 Indeed. the formulation of the runtitrn system Juring the Song dynasty was mostly inherited from previous examples of this system in the Tang dynasty and the Five dynasties. Song officiais had &en borrowed the Tang dynasty's bureaucratic wisdom as these ofticials atternpted to justifj or legitimize their arguments concerning the establishment of funfian colonies within the Song domain. According to the section regarding Song's funfiansystem in the Wenxian Tongkuo for instance, the tuntiun system of the Tang dynasty was portrayed as an ideal policy which was not only productive cconomically but also vital to the morale of the whole regime in the grand strategy 3 0 sensc. According to this ideal, the govemment not only could save much of ils resources when "those without any economic means of living were driven to nourish uncultivated lands while attending mili tary duties", i t waî also hclievcd that "the objectives of the army and the farmers would not be scparatcd again".' ' Thus il' the government could materialize this ideal and to cany out thc policies OF riinfiun and yingtiun . then "farmers will not be resentful in nourishing the soldicrs. and soldiers will not bc: shamed in comrnitting themselves to agricultural dutiestt." Whilç historically it was the Han dynasty. and not the Song dynasty. which had first adopted the runtian system. the development or this systcm during thc Song period can be seen as the result of the combination of following the exampks of previous dynasties as well as the particular historical circumstanccs in thc Song dynasty. One OS these circurnstances was developrnent of a type of' rcgimcnt in the Song army callçd the "food-sceking rcgiments" (/iuli~n~un& :II). ny dctiniiion. food-seeking regimrnts refer to those amy units that traveled to or wcrc garrisoned in places where food could easily be ohtained. Although king pan of thc irnpcria! army stationcd in the capital ma, these food-seeking rcgiments were garrisoned mostly in provinces and counties away from the capital region. First coming in[« existence in 993 A.D.. the number of soldiers in thesr food-sceking regimcnts in local provinces was increased drastically between 993 and 1065 A.D. due to di ficul ties and heavy expenses in trmsporting food from the south or china

fi~rthe great number of imperid army soldiers in the capiial .33 I.ater on, the coun had corne to realize that soldicn recruitcd rrom the capital region were not as good in adapting to the particularities of defense matiers as local residents in the prefectural and county areas. As a result, the Song central governrnent ordered that new soldiers of these food-secking rcgiments be recniited from the local counties and prefectures." But unlikc those units of the irnperial amy in the capital region, family memben of these food-seeking regiments werc allowed to go dong with the soldien and to live togethet with them in the local arcas where food was easily avai~able.~~As a consequence. rnernbers of these food- seeking regiments and their families later became the population base which the central govcrnment nceded when new runricln and yingtian colonies were established throughout the northwestem border areas. Indecd, the transformation of thc hod-seeking regiments as a fom of the imperial arrny in the capital to locally- garrisoned reyiments al1 happened around the year of 1041, whcn thc amed con flicts ai the Shaanxi border region esca~atcd..'~Ttiercfore. it was no coincidence thai ihc increasing numhrr of funfianand yingtian colonies establ ished around the same period corrcsponded to ihis transformation of the food-seeking regimcnts hmhcing part of the imperial amy to localixd prcfectural units. As many prirnary sources of thc Song dynasty indicate. ülthough the runricin systcm could serve to take care of military drfense and logistical concems wiih one stroke. the primary objective of the rtrnriun system was largely for deknsc nthcr

ihün hr logistics. During the Song dynasty. terms such as "to consolidate thc horder" (shihion 'L'f di),or "to make prepantion for the border" (heihion fh! a) wcrc frequently used when Song govcrnment o ftïcials argued For the establishment ol'rimtiun colonies in diikrent ~ocations.'~Thiis in order to develop a defénsivc siruçturc that couid also allow soldiers in the northwcst to attain a certain level of independence in food supply. the LeR Grand Master of Rernonstrance (zuo jillnyi

tkifil 11- 8 8 ti A), Chen Shu bk .k!,was ordered tu establish the OffÏce of Agricultiire Commission (ying iian shi $? Ili l)in the eastern circuit of Hebei in 989 A.D.~' Furthemore, Wei Yu # was nppointed assistant to Chen. and the Righi Grand Master of Rernonstrance Fan Zhigu Xi] 6was ordered to establish anothcr Ot5ce of Agiculture Commission in the western circuit of Alihough the mili tary agricultunl colonies were part of the Song's military logistical efforts in providing food for the soldiers, the administration of the funfiun or yingtian colonies was put under the direction of the Ministry of Works (Ronghu -1: 31) in collaboration with the local military structures as well as Ihe Court of the

National Granaries (sinung si fil & i'i:). "O Nevertheless, not al1 luniiun colonies were garrisoned with soldiers at the beginning of the Northem Song dynasty. While many of the lands in these colonies wcrc initially culiivated by civilians and not soldiers at the beginning when the trrnriun system was first establishcd, these colonies were known to the govemment as "military agricultural colonies" only because they were located in regions whcrc thc riinriun system had been estahlished during the Five dynas~ies.'<'In this situation. these colonies had simply inherited the old titles lefl over Srorn the previous period as the Song govemment was still taking strps to reform thc administrdon of those colonies. The practicc of using civilians to cultivate ~lrniiun Iàrms was finally changed in the 990s AD.. whcn the colony in Xiangzhou '@ SN borrowcd soldien fmm neighhoring prefectures to attend to agriculturd duiies."* Finally in 10 16 AD.. a proposal was made to rename the Office of Siate Famis yingtiltn irtu ?? 111 6 as the Office of Military FmColonies tirntiun wu ~kIf1 4% ai I3aozhou {!# $11 and Dingzhou ;ji' Thereafter. the govemment bcgan to rccruit civiliüns from existing military agricul rural colonies to bccorne rcgular soldicrs or militiamrn to attend to both military and agriculiural du~icï.~'As a rcsult of this dcvelopment. the distinction between yingtiun and tltnritin in the Song dynasiy was established at this point in iime. Although the Office OS Agriculture Commission wac cstablishcd in 989 AI).. thc Northern Song's runriun system officially began in 993 AI>.. whcn an irnperial decree was issued to order the Commissimer of the Six Residenccs

(liuzhuishi Fi '2 9)He Chengju f$ 16 % to establish the Office of Military Agriculture Commission (ttrnrianshi ttl 9)in the border sector of f lebei." l'liercaftcr. He. together with his Administrative Assistant @unpiun Yi! 'tf) tluang Ma« iit B. inspected and selected different locations in Hetwi for the establishment of more ritntian colonies.46 indecd, due to the number of runrian and yirtgfiun colonies estahlished beiween the years 995 and 1067 A.D. as a response to thc increasing number of armed conflicts between the Song army and Li Jiqian's Corces. this seventy-two-year period cm be considered as the founding phase of Song's runiion system~' Retween 995 and 1067 AD.. several military agricultunl colonies were cstablished within the Shaanxi and Shaanbei areas. These included the Lingzhoti ~irntian%! fl % 111 (established in 999 A.D.), Zhenronp jun runfiun $fi fk % ~ki Il (997 AD.),Longgon chuan funrian & *?: )II 111 (101 1 AD.), ginHiun chrng frinliun i/r 14 hk I% Ill (1 040 AD.), as well as Qiaozi gu runtiun & ?$ 11 1

( 1 042 A.I>.)." With ihe construciion of fortresses in locations close to thcse colonies. the colonies ihemselvrs tbus can be considered part of the circuits' actual delènsc structure. Each of these colonies occupied about Iive hundrcd qing Il'i O!. land and wcre garriçoned with appmxirnately two thouçand ~oldicrs."~]:or instance. in 996 AD.. Transport Intendant (ccrochen if'i fi) Liu Zong # % reportcd that in the area around Yuanzhou fil the good quality lands had allowed liw thc production ol'about four hundred and tXy thousand shi of grain annually in ihe prcvious dynasties.'' Therefote. Liu requested that an oflice of runficin shi Ill 2 bc cstablished for the cultivaiion of five hundred qing of land with a gürrison or two hundred soldiers and cight hundred head of oxen granted.'' As a resiilt. bliliiary Commander (ihijun $3 '$) Li Jihr 9 P @ was given thc appointment 01' " Ilirccior Supervising the Iistabl ishment of Military Agri~ulturcColonies" (funticin :hi :hi shi LL III /kj R e),and four fortresses were constmcted with five hundrcd siddiers in each fortress." Thus following this procedure of estahlishrncnt. müny othcr coionies were also established in various locations of 1-lebci such as Haozhou !K $11. Xiongzhou & $11. Mozhou @ fi,and Buhou % fil. etc. 'T'hcre were scveral different sources of land on which the runtian or yirt,q(ipir~gficin Jli)!4 # HI and Xigu zhui yingiian P4 fi '3 lit. which wcrc cstablishcd in 1136 A.D.)." While the lands in the fnntiun colonics were ail cultivated by regular govcmrncnt soldiers. soldicrs were allowed to keep most 01' ihe produce as the army's food supply. As for the civilian openteci yingliun colonies. pan ofthe producc wcre taxed and distributed to the army as h«d supply or givcii to local of'tïcials as salaries. Indeed. a part oF the taxation hmthe vingiiun were also stored in governrnent granaries for flood and droughi relief as wcll. ln ternis of such I'orm of taxation in the Northern Song period. each yingrian colony had to pay to the governrnent a predetermined tau quota of three Jolr '1- and Iivc shrng II- hr every mu of land in the colony every yar."' In somr yingtidn colonies. howevcr. civilian militiamen had to pay to the governrnent as high as filiy pcrccnt of what they could produce every year.6J Nevertheless, due to the decrease in sizts of thçse funriun and yingrian colonies and the resulting decreaîe in the aniouni of' produce in the later course of the Southern Song period. the yingtion colonies gnerally needed to pay no more than forty percent or their anniial produce.65 In retrospect, the tuntian and yingtiun systems did provide part of the solution to rnany of the political and military logistical problems the Song govcmmcnt was facing at the time. As I have pointed out before, the yingtian and runriurr colonies not only were forms of defense systems themselves. they had also lowered the cost of food-transportation and were able to maintain a certain lcvel of sclf siifficicncy. Moreover, the close relations between colonists of the mutual sccurity groups developed as the result of working togethcr in the farms during peacc wuld also enhance the maintenance of efliciency and military disci pl inc during war.66 In spite of the govemment's effog in establishine and nourishing these yingticrn and tunriun colonies. some of the colonies had begun to show signs of decline by the last decade of the eleventh ~entury.~' For instance. ü repori addresscd t« a military commander in tkdong in 108 1 AD. stated that although the iunfitm colony in Mugztayuan (Ilunan) employcd as many as ninetren thotisand and five hundred soldiers and mititiamen, two thousand one hundred and nincty qing of land. and costing seven thousand strings of cash and more thün iwclvc ihousand shi of grain ~LF salaries for the soldicrs and officiais to cultivate thc lands tlicre. the colony could only produce aboui nine thousand shi of gnin cvcry ycar.""orse still. the ï'ax 'I'ranspot-t intendant also had to borrow moncy on' hchalf3'thr colonists every year in order to buy seeds. Furthermore. in 1 172 A.IX sirnilar rcports about the dcclinc in the productivity of colonics in L.uzhou )hl ;ils« appcared. Accordiny to one such report. it said that although it had cost thc government about one million one hundred and forty-tÏvc thousand strings of cash and thineen thousand nine hundred shi of grain every year for the cultivation or rtrnricin andyingfiun hmlands in Luzhou, the colonies were only able to producc a mcrc tivc thousand shi altogether each yar? But in order to have an objective assessment or the benefits and shortcornings of the runriun or yingtian system. one musi also consider the eflicicncy of alternative solutions availabic to the Song govemment at the tirnc. Firstly, sincc the beginning of the Nonhem Song period the strategically sensiiive arcas around the border regions in the northwesr had ken sealed off as restrictcd zones hy the Song govemment, and the importation of food frorn areas htyond tiie border had become i~le~al.'~As a result. the mili tary and civilian populations in the border regions had to rely on privatc merchants to transport food at a very high cost. Due to the high demand of cash needcd to pay for the transportation of food. much cash had to be ~msportedto these regions from the capital as well. Needless to

Say. this was a very problematic situation given the long distance from the south and the capi ta1 to the border regions in the northwest. Secondly, if the border garrisonts dependence on thc govcrnrnçnt and private merchantst food supply from the south was bad enough, strategically it would even hc worse if the Song myhad developed dependence on food supply frorn the "barbarian" siates. As famous scholar Ouyang Xiu i& 15 argued, thert: was indeed an ample amounr of land at the border region within the Song domain which was let1 uncultivated. and if the Song soldiers failed to make good use of those lands and to cul tivate food for thernselvcs to achieve a certain levt.1 of self-reliancc on Ibod supply. the shortage of food in the region would force the civilian population to secrctly purchase food from the "barbarians"." As a rcsult. the Song would br: nourishing the "barbarians" with its outtlow of cash or other materials fi~r tlic trading of food. while exposing its army's vulnerahility in the food shortage to ihc "barbarians". The izrnfiun and yingtian colonies were in principle border defense systcms that would providc solutions to the problem or rood supply as wcll. i3urcaucratic idcals and political rhetoric of Song oficials aside. one must be critical about whethçr one Stone can always shoot two birds in reality. Indeed. the deçline o T thc ftrniiun and yingliun systems at the end of the Southern Song period cannot be fully esplaincd by the simple answer of the Song govcmment's loss of tenitories io the "barharians" at the end of the Northern Song. By any masure, the tunliun and yingtiun systems were very ambitious policies that attempted to address at the same iimc two great issues a govemment had to face in any period of Chincse history. Unlike the Tang and the Han dynasties which were relatively more powerfiil than iheir "barbarian" kingdoms and regimes, the Song CO-existedwith the Liao and Xixia in a relatively even-powered multi-statr system. As such, the increasing amount of warîàre and frequent amed harassrnent at the border by the "barbarians" musi have put a tremendous arnount of stress and hardship on the livelihood of Song soldiers and civilians especially when ihry were asked to shoulder the burden of military and agricultural duties at the sarne time. While it was clear that the tosk of shouldering military and agricultural duties together entailcd rnuch hardshi p. the question remains as to how sensitive the Song govrrnment was towards the suffering of its soldiers and civilians when poliçirs conçerning with the tuntiun and yingtian systems werc enforced. Acçording to regulations issued by the central govemment during the Southern Song. soldiers and civilians involved in agricultural duties in the tunticzn and yingtim colonies had to participate on a voluntary ba~is.~'Among the twelve rcgulütions conceming with the administration of agricultural colonies issued by the Officc of Sector Directorate (

"king givcn the responsibility to cany out the faming policies but not having cnough voluntecrs to cultivate the tarrn lands, these officiais were womed about not having their ofilcial responsibilities ;iccomplished. As a result, the ofiicials would inevitably pas on thoir burden to the idlcrs. But when the idlers were proven to be unproductive and insuficient in numbers, the officiais wwld unavoidably en force the civilians to do the w01-k.""

Thus in this case, the civilians' participation in a~culturaland military duties could hardl y be seen as 'voluntary'. As the burden of agricultural and military duties were htlavy, morale would naturally be low among these regular soldiers and archcr militiarnen. Indeed, the correlation between morale and productivity constituted a profound consideration that military and political leaders could not overlook. Furthemore, corruption, mismanagement and the govemment O nicials' abuse of power had also undemined the operation of the tuntion and yingtian systems. For instance, an imperial decree issued in 1149 A.D. commenting on the yingiiun system's state of affairs stated explicitly that "pretèctural and county levels" government officials must be rcstricted hmover-diminishing the profits of the colonialist~".~~Again, if over-taxing and local officiais' corruption had not been rampant enough io affect these colonies production of food and subsequrntly drawing the central govemment's attention, such an instruction from the thronc would not have been necessary. Furthemore, although the central govcmment had rcgulated thai only fÏve sheng of produce could be taxed from evcry mir of land in a colony, most local officials had taxed six or seven clou extra for their own personül gain.85 As a rcsult, what was supposed to bc part of the regular army's food supply had n»w becorne part of the local oflicials' private wealth. Since the colonists wcrc drivcn into poverty due to high taxation, their initiatives in agricultunl dut ics uould natunlly hc affectcd as wcll. As the Court Attendant Censor (ciiunzhong duiyzd shi b(ii f!~ 511) Gong Kui 2) reportcd to the throne in 1136 A.D.,

"lt hris corne to my attention that thosc ofiÏcials in charge of the -ving~iuncolonies have abuscd their otlicial power and engaged in corrupi activities through their connections with local bandits, hegcmons and rich families. This inchdes ihe confiscation of the colonists' tools and propcrty. exhausting the colonis~sin agricultural activities. illegal occupation of sources of watcr supply. as well as unjustly taking advantage from the lands granted to thesc co~onists."~

Whik yingiirrn colonists were being pressured with heavy taxation and mili tary rcspoiisibilities. in several cases the local government had also failcd to providc these colonisis with the oxen. fming tools, and houses promised by the governmenc when the colonies were first being established.'' Subsequently, not only the productivity of food in these colonies was aff'cted. the amount of produce that had actually gone into the govemment's granary as the reguiar armyls food supply was also diminished due to the local otlkials' corruption. However, the major reason why the productivity of food in these militarized farm colonies had declined was the govemment's gradua1 loss of lwds that were once used for tuntian or yingtian purposes. Specifically, while the govemment of the Southern Song period had only possessed two-thirds of Northem Song's due to the Liao's invasion in 1126 A.D., the graduai commercialization of the Song economy also played an important role. Between the later course of the 1 I 00s A.D. and the beginning of the 1200s AD., much more govemment owned land had slipped into the hands of private land owners throuyh different çhannels due to thcse land owners' desire to generate more income at a time when the Song economy was growing at a rapid rate. In Sichuan, for example, there existed only one hundred thousand six hundred mu of land for ali the yingtian colonies in 1 18 1 AD." Xy 1205, the figure had dropped to only nine thousand four hundred mu." Although privatization of land occurred in the Northem Song period as wcll. the effect of land privatization on the production of food for the army wu more profound in the Southern Song period due to the smaller amount of land the Souîhem Song govemment possesscd to begin with. Furthemore, Richard von Glahn also pointed out that the extent of such land privatization in the Southem Song was higher than before due to the quality of lands involved. the connections between local officiais and the dite powerful families, as well as the vhety of rneans by which these Imds were tnnsferred from the govemment io these private o~nrrs.~')l'here were sevenl different rneans of land-privatization or land- transferral which the Southern Song govemment considered legal. The firsi among these was the gmting of land-ownership to individuals from the emperor. For instance. due to his rnilitary achicvements in rnilitary campaigns against the Xixia, Song army general Wang You 1: 6- was appointed as the Court Assistant Militüry Cornrnissioner (dirtnqionfudu zhihuishi Blfi $i611 # #iI;[I 9)in 1 172 A.D." In spite of the fact that the Pingjiang fu y il: fi yingrian colony of Suzhou was located in the region which had the highest productivity of food in the whole Song domain during that period, Wang was granted more than eight hundred and twelve mu of land and its pmduce in 1 173 A.D?~ domain dunng that period. Wang was granted more than eight hundred and iwelvc mu of land and its produce in 1 173 A.D.~* Apart from land grants, the selling of tuntion and yingiian lands was the most common way of land privatization in the Southern Song period. This was indeed a deliberate decision of the government to genente revenue at the time of Iinancial crisis. In order to encourage the selling of tunliun and yingticrn lands. the central government of the Southern Song even drveloped a system of reward and punishment for the local officials according to the arnount of pvemmcnt owncd lands these officials could ~ell."~I-iowcver, rnany rich famil ies hdmanaged to take advaniage of their power at the local level to influence local oficials who wcre in charge oal' the selling of runtim and yingtian lands. As Peter Golas pointed out. this connection hetween local officials and the elite Iàmilies stemmed out liom the simple fact that bureaucnts and career ofîïcials who administcred the state hm çolonics werc drawn for the most pan from the class of land-owning dile who werc nu nwrc inclincd to pay tacs than any othcr individuals in the private scctor ol'th~ socicty.04 As a result. the local ofticials Iiad olien assigned low valucs to those f'crtile or top quality lands for these rich îàmilies who werc interested in buying lands Tor commercial use and who had close connections with the local ollici~ls.~' While these good quality lands were being sold at low priccs. the local ofïicialssiill had to rnret the central governrncnt assigned quota value ol'land salcs in ordcr to daim their rewards and to avoid punishrnents. As a result. thc local oflicials woiild oRen transfer the arnount of value loss in the govemment's profil hmthe selling of these good quality lands at low prices to the pour quality lands that werc left to be sold and to assign high prices for the low quality lands. Subscqiiently. rnost of the good quality lands had fallen into the hands of private land owners for commercial use, while the poor quality lands remained as the only kind of land the govcrnment still owned as no one else was willing to buy them due to their quality.

Apart from the lands sold to these elite families at the local level. the Southem Song government had determined that lands of runtiun and yingficin lands these colonists were allowed to claim their lands again upon their retum acçording to Song govemrnent regulations. However, many local officials had taken üdvantage of this policy to claim many of these yingtian lands for themselves with îàlse documentation." At this point, one may ask by what means the pnvatization of tuntian and yingtiun lands described above would contribute to the decline in the govcrnmcni's procurement and supply of food to its army if the produce of these lands were to be taxcd as before. The tnith was these local dite families and ofticials had managed to escape taxation once the yingtian and tuniiun lands had Fallen into their hands. Sincc gnin was rcccivcd as a currency for tevation by the govemment, the local otliçiüls and dite families' evasion of tax wouid also mean a 1c.s~mount ofgrain would be received by the government. As a result, the army would also rcçeive lcss grriin as their food supply. For instance. the Director of the Census Bureau (hubu shilong F $$ {Q BI<) had reponed in 1 1 70 A.D. rhat among the ont: million five hundred iuid eighly-thrtx thousünd mu of former [unriun or yingliun lands in the west of Zhejiang, about scven hundred thousand mu had escaped Speci tically, the sarne report also described the evasion or tax from lands that belonged to local dite families and o fticials." While some yingticm lands were purchased lrgally by powerful tàmilies tiom the govemment, some were occupied iliegally by officials and local elites who had connections with these oflicials. In particular. such illegiil occupation of lands csisted in the tluaihe % region, Jingzhou fly $11, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Xiünyyüng $ M.* As a rnatter of fact, this was particularly common in Sichuan md Shanxi in the 12Xs A.D. afier the tuntiun colonies were abolished and the regular soldiers posted away for military training. Without the presence or regular impenal or prefectural mysoldiers, agicultural responsibility would naturally fall on the civilian colonists' heads. And without any potential challenge from the rnilitary establishment due to the absence of runtiun soldiers, local dites had ofkn taken advantage of the situation and illegally occupied lands assifled to the civilian co~oniçts.'OOIn these cases, the govemment obtained no tax fiom these illegd land owners at aV0' ln sum, due to the fact that rice itself was accepted by the Song govemment as a currency for tax, the miliüiry agricultural colony system could be considered an element of the Song's military logistical systems which had the closest connection with the empire's economy. For this reason, the operation of the military agncultut-d colony was heavily affected by commercializing forces that contribuied io the destruction of the system. Although the rnilitary agricultural colony systrm was primarily designed as a defensive structure that also served to provide food for the military, from the start until the end the system was administered by civil carcer officiais who mostly had a different agenda, Lhat of their own personal wealth, than the stated objectives of the govemment. In this situation, civilian yingtian colonists wcre the victims who were trapped between their tax and military responsibilities as well as the high-handed treatment of the local otlïcials.

Endnotes for Cha~terII : Militarv Apricultural Colonies

I Paul Forage, "The Sino-Tangut War of IO8 1-1085", Journal of hiun Hisfu~.Vol. 25. No.1, 1991. p.15.

4 Zhang Junyue $15 # kt], Lidai tuntian kao @ ff L-lr [rl 4, (Shanghai: Shangwu Y inshuguan, 1937), pi.

Some varieties of such early-ripening rice could mature in as early as 60 days. Ho Ping-ti. "Early-ripening Rice", James T.C. Liu & Peter J. Golas (ed.),Change in Sung Chinu: Innovarion or Renuvution. (Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Company, l969), p.3 1.

' Shiba Yoshinobu % @ & ih', Mark Elvin (m.).Commerce and Sociefy in Sung China, {Ann Arbor. University of Michigan, 1970), p.50.

R Since the arnount of well-waiered lowlands suitable for the growing of Iate or mediurn- ripening rice is rather limited, the invoduction of such drought resistant rice and the Chinese fanriers' ability to produce rice in more mountainous terrain now had Iiteralfy more than doubled the amof ricc culture in China. Shiba Yoshinobu (1 9701, p.3 1. ---.- Y Liang Y uyao ?#? M! W. "Song Shemong shidui xibei bionfiarg de choucuo #i ;;I Uif. fc Pi -IL 3 n

" Liang ( 1989). p.95.

''Liang ( 1989). p.95.

" According to Shen Kuo. a porter can carry 6 dou of ncc, while a soldier can cany 5 days of dry rations. Shcn Kuo i% . Chapter 1 1 , "Guamheng 'ET I". Xin Xiuozheng Mengxi Bitan Wi +k il: d Ti B. (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 1987). p.205; Paul Christopher Forage, .Sci~.ncr,Technolugv, and War in Song China: Reflections in the Brush Talkvfiom the Oream Cid /y Shen Kuo (103 1- IO95), Doctoral Dissertation, University of Toronto, Toronto, (Ann Arbor: 1 Iniversity Microfilms International, 199 1 ), p.378.

IJ Pandoxically, as more porters panicipated in the transportation of food for an army during a inilitary campaign, morc food was also needed to be camed for the extra number ol'porters as wcll. Nevertheles. Shen Kuo cunsidrred the ratio of three porters to one soldicr as optimum. Forage ( 199 1 ), p.278.

17 1.i Jiqiün (963-1004 AD.), founder of the Tangut Xixia cmpirc. When Li Jiqian invadcd I.ingzhou 8 H at the beginning of 997 AD.,it was reponed that the granary there was alrçady cmpty by the tîfih rnonth of the yenr. Jiang ( 1993). p. 15 1 ; YU, chapter 177, Shihuo fi fi, Tufifiun 4 [il, Shuuxing tunriun jlvi % % &II! lil !k a. Yingtian @un 8 L!l 2'(. p.37.

'' Li Wei 9 di, " Lun Songdui xibei de iuntiun ;iZ ff fl +IL #J t!i LI1 ". Deng Guangmin fli I#i fR: & Qi Xia & % (ed.), Songshiyunjiir lumvenji !k dJF Z $2 X %. (Hebei: Hebei Jiaoyu Chubanshe. l989), p.208.

"Jiang (1993). p.151.

" In 995 A.D.. the Prefeçt of Lingzhou. Pei Ji I iPI, wusent to establish a funriun colony therc. In the smc year, Pei Ji was ordered ta lead an expedition to stop the advance of 1.i Jiqian's ïorces. Howevor. Pei and his anny were surmunded and his supply line cut off by Li. Ou1 of despcntion, Pei wmte a mernorial with his omblwd requescing the govemment for a dispatch of an cmergency relief supply . Unfortunately. Ling-hou was besieged and Pei killed before the supply arrived. .YS, chapter 6, Zhenzong ji 51 ;i: 2,p.28.

" IY.WK, chapter 7. Tianfi Kl section 7, Tuntian [II. p.76.

" KkTK, chapter 7. Tiunjir Ill section 7. Tmiun BI. p.76.

" Hucker, entry 266 1 ; YH, chapter 177, Shihvo Û fi, Tuntian Dl, Shuo-ring tuntiun jlvi E(i It if! % P, Yingtian gvon R Lti '& . p.39. 3 YH, chapter 177, Shihuo 6t f3, Tuntiun Lt! LU. Shuaring tuntian jiyi * Ir1 'Ir a. Yingiian pan R Pl ii( ,p.39.

" Zhang ( 19371, p. 1.

?' KtTA', chapter 7, Tianfu [il JI& section 7. Tunri'an B ILI. p.76.

" WXTK. çhapter 7, Tianfi P! Ild. section 7, Tuntiafi Dl, p.76.

'' KYï'K. chapter 7. Tianfu Lii Y section 7, Tuntiun LI! III. p.76.

10 WWK, chapter 7, Tianfu II1 ld section 7, Tun~iun~k III, p.77.

ii W-TiX, chapter 7. Tiunfu III ld section 7, Tuntian IL Ill, p.77.

'' IV-YTK. chapier 7, Tïmfu KI l.& section 7, Tuniian LU. p.77.

13 During Renzhong's reign for instance, the amount of grain transponed îrorn the suuth to die capital region had reached the highest point of approximately 7,000,000 .hi annually. Qhng Xidong E fM a, "Songdaijiuliangiun jiami % a fi 'II[ i?$& ", Wen Shi Zlie V. !f! fi, ( 1 985)2, p.45.

15 In ordcr to lissure loyalty of the soldiers in the imperial army. family rnernbers of thcsc soldicrs wmmaintained in the capital region as hostages. Qiang (1985), p.47.

17 'lems such as shihiun 'Lif ;9f and heibim 6 3 can be found quite 0th in prirnüry siiiirccs when Song oficials were arguing for the benefits of applying the unr ri an systçm. In particular. soc S'hfCZY, chapter 105, Yingtuniian ?? ik In. pp.22-29.

t 6 Huçkcr. entries 834, 8022; the highest lcvel of central govemment ügcncy in charge ut' runriunrhi and yingiiunrhi was the Ministry of Works gomgbu 1: 3. YH chapicr 177. fintiun bI? !t 1. Duongong Hebei yingrian yingtiun shi id {!k iYl AL R DI R III *,Fungrian 1s' 11 1, p.32.

iY Suo Xiang # #l was appointed as assistant to Fan. Yff, chapter 177, Tunriun 11! 111. Dtwnyong Hebei -vingrion yingtion shi 91 # -k U1 'FF ii I 9,Fungtiun h [Il .p.3 3.

40 Hucker. entry 573 1.

'' WXTK. chapter 7. Tianfu III ld section 7, Tuntion In. p.76.

." WXTK. chapter 7. Tiunfi Ki l@. section ?, Tuntiun tk [il,p.76.

" W,YTK, chapter 7, Tianfîi Itl hi! section 7, Tuntian ik DI, p.77.

44 The military garrisons established in these colonies were listed as pan of the govarnmcnh prefectural myxiangiun M hl. Although olfcially the food-seeking regiments were listed as part of the imperid amiy jinjun X I and not the prefectural army. in mcing thmugh the course of development of the food-seeking regimental system as well as the locations where they were garrisoned, however. the present writer believes it is not at al1 unreasonable ro assume chat the militüry population in most of these iuniian colonies were actually soldiers of the food-seeking regiments.

" Hucker, entries 3780, 4323; YH, chapter 177, Shihuo & finfian LI!Hl. Cbhuu Hebei runrkn # !& fd -!t ik LU, Tunlian shi lk DI 2,p.32.

56 Up until the year 1066 A.D. there existed about 367 qing of tuniian lands in Hebei. producirrg about 35. 468 shi of produce per year. YW, chapter 177, Shiho & lii, Tuntilrn fil, Chunhua Hchei runtian 1'F W -IL lk ni. Tuntian shi ILU !&, p.33.

JR Linphou, now southwrst of Lingwu & in the Hui people's autonomous region ofs Ningxia: Zhenrong jun. now the Guyuan 1151 hi! counry within Ningxia's Hui people's autonornous region; Lunggun chuun. now the Longde F& iV county of Ningxia's Hui people's autonomous rcgion; Qingjim cheng and Qiuuzi gu. now the nurtharn shore of the Qingjian &er located northeast of Yanan 'Ci. Li (1989), p.2 13-2 16.

50 Ihcker. cntry 69 19: YH, chapter 177. Shihuo Tunriun L'L! Ill, .Yiunping funfiun wu ~fii11'. IL! Ili %B. Tuwiun shi ll< lil $, Jing& runtrunru @ 1k [II m. p.34.

" Y[/, chapter 177. Shihuo fi E. Tunnriun ~kKI, Xiunping runriun wu h!i '1'- 1k 111 fi. lrinlitrn shi [il g,Jingde runriun ru % iO III B. p.34.

'6 i-iczhou, now southwest of the county of Linxia Iùh Sl in the province of Gansu; Taozhou, prmntly the county of Lintan @ M in Gansu: Minhou, now the couniy of Min 4t in Gansu; Xixhou, now the county of Linyao !% ?#k. Li ( i 989), p.3 17.

57 As opposed to the rrgular impcrial army or the prefectura! army. the civilian archer inilitiaman in thesr yingtiun colonies were oficially listed as pan of the "township rnilitia" xiirnghing 1 fi according to the Song's military systern. As such, every 50 qing of land in these yingtiun colonies would constitute it ying $?. upon which, a rnilitary chah of command and cenmnhip was established. S.,chapter 1 76, Shihuu 4. Tunrian Il I ,p.553.

" ST, chapter 176. Shihuo B 4. Tuntiun [(! KI. p.553.

59 - Each zhuong would be given tools, an ox. money for seeds, as well as an extra ien mou of land Wr the growing of veptabhs. SS,chapter 176. Shihuo & 6.

'' SS, chapter 176, Shihuo & LI 4, Tuntiun ik [il, p.553. "'.YS, chapter 176. Shihuo & tf 4.Tunrian nkW. p.553.

63 .%Y, chapter I 76, Shihuo & & 4, Tuntian it! 111, p.553.

M For instance, the yingian colonies in the Xihe Iii W. S. chapter 176. Shihuo h fi 4. finfiun rk 111, p.554.

65 .YS, chapter 176, Shihuo fi & 4, lùnrian 'k [Il. p.554.

hR W,tTK, chapter 7, Tianfu III section 7. Tunriun [il. p.76.

"" WTK.chapter 7. Tianju III Yd section 7. Tuntian ~t!M. p.76.

'.I llrian E. MeKnight. 1.m und Orrirr in Sunx ('hinu. (Cambridge: Cambridge University l'rcss. 1092). p.395.

y7 LMQSL.. chapter 6. Tumian ik [il, p.78.

78 ILIL)S!.. chapter 6, Tuntian Ill, p.78.

f 9 MQSL, chapter 6. Tuntian ~kli 1. p.79.

$0 ,Cf@%!.. chapter 6. Tunrian 'k Ill. p.79.

X 1 MQYL, chapter 6, Tunrian IR, p.79.

R 2 blQS1.. chapter 6. Tunrian 'k Ir!. p.79.

W t SS, chapter 176, Shihuo l?fi 4, Tunrian 'k DI, p.553- " Sr. chapter 176, Shihuu fi 4. Tuntian Lt! [O, p.553.

" SS, chapter 176. Shihuo h & 4, Tuntian lk DI, p.553.

8u Although activities of local banditry had become less rampant by the 1 160s, agricultural production of the civilian yingfian calonists was still very much disnipied by the rcpressive behavior of the regular anny soldiers as well as rich families who had connections with the local military oftlcials. f lucker. entry 6562: Li ( 1982). pp. 1 39- 140; .%Y, chapter 1 76. Shihuo fi & 4, Tunfiun lk Ill, p.554.

87 Li (1 982), p. 138.

von Glahn (1987). p. i 22.

R') Von G lahn ( 1987). p. 122.

%' Von Glahn (1987). p.141.

" SS, chapter L 76, Shihuo fi b 4,Tunrian II! Ill, p.553.

'Q ,YS. cliapter 1 76, Shihua fi & 4,Tunriun VI, p.553.

'" .YS, chapter 176, Shihuo fi fi 4, Tuntiun Ili, p.553; According to t .i Jiaju. the rcüson hrsuch largc scale selling of government lands was that in reality the government could only pther a relaiivcly sniall amount of taxation from ihe nnlim and yin,plian colonies cornparrd with ihe amount tif inconie it could get from land sales. This reflected the low level of productivity in thcsc vingriun and riinriun colonies due to corruption and othcr reasons of mismanagement that have been dcscrihcd in the previous paiagtaphs. Li ( 1982). p. 142.

'" Petcr Golas. "Rural China in the Sung". Journal »/..lsian Srutlies, Februaq (1980). Vnl. XXXIX. No.?, p.31 I.

M S.S. chapter 176. Shihuo & it 4, Tunriun ~k.L! t , p.554.

'JO For ins~ance.between 1 135 and 1 170 AD.. many of the yingrian colonies in Jingzhou J;? phi iland l tuainan 8 !% were either destroyed or demrted duc to the etTects of war. .YS. chapter 176. Shihuo fi fi 4, Tunriun [Il, p.554.

'37 Huckcr. cntry 5278; .W.chapter 176. Shihuo h b 4. Tunrîun Di. p.554.

')3 According to another repon writkn in 1 186 A.D. commenting on the evasion of tain Xiangyang it was rrported that arnong the 914 qing of land in the area of Wuqu 6 %. 732 4h.q waî illegally occupied. WXTK. chapter 7. Tiunfu lit @ section 7, Tunrian 11! 111. p.76.

100 While uffïcially some might own about one mu of land. they had also illegally occupied an extra five to seven qing of land. Li ( 1982). p. 147; WWK, chapter 7. Tianfu !il section 7. Tuntian II!. Ill, p.77. Chapter III :The Imperial Ordnance Industrv

Apart from food and horses, the production and supply of maments was clearly another important aspect of a medieval army's logistical system. Within the domain of military logistics, the terni ordnance refers specifically to the production or procurement, supply, as well as maintenance of weapons and munitions. In this sense, military ordnance as a department of military production has to take into consideration not only the numerical strength of the army. but also the cosi and üvailahility of raw rnaterials, the most advanced productive tcchnology available, as wcll as the types of weapons required by the army for stated military objectives. 'fhcrefore. an effective ordnancc industry not only should be capable of producing the military's armaments on a large scale. it shoufd also maintain an effort in rcsearching and developing new weapons technology tto a level ol' sophistication that could provide the army with technological lrverage against an adversaryts armarnents.

In the Song army, military units specially trained in the use or purticular types of weapons werc maintaincd to check against the "barbarians"' cavalry tactics. I:or instance. whcn Wang Anshi implemrnted his rcformist mutual security group system (bur,ji

net just the development of the imperial arms industry, but also preventiny weapons and nrw designs from slipping unnecessarily into the hands of 'barbarians' and pnvate citizens. in the FiRh month of971 AD.. for instance. an imperial decree was issued to forbid civilians in the capital region from keeping any weapons in their houscholds. Soldiers, howevcr, were allowed to retain their own ~ea~ons.'~ Neverthcless, the weapons retained by soldiers had to be handrd ovrr to the military commanders for safe-keeping until they were needed for war. Furthermore, in 1037

A.11.. anothcr imperid deçrer was also issued to the area of Guangnan 11% fi tto forbid civilians from keeping a certain kind of knife in their househo~ds.'~~his was hecause the bandits in the Lingnan a réi area had favored the use of this weapn in conducting their criminal activities. Thus, according to this imperial dccree, thosc who violated the dccree could be arrested and be dealt with according io the Tang dynasty.I0 While the Chinese output had increased at an impressive pace of twelve times between the years of 850 and 1050 AD., the Song metdlurgical industry was able to produce between seventy-five thousand and one hundred and fifty thousand tons of iron by 1O78 A.D.' ' Furthemore, instead of using firewood, the innovative use of refined wal as Fuel for the fumaces during the Song dynasry allowed a high tempenture of combustion to take place directly for the melting of clay crucibles containhg iron ore and anthracite dust.I2 While the double-acting piston bellows powered by water and animal was invented in the Han dynasty, Song craftsrnen perfected this technology with the use of refined coal as fuel and allowed the creation of powerful çontinuous draA in the box-bellows with specially arranged valvcs to mainiain a continuous fiow of air for the high temperature blast furnace.I3 As a rcsult ol'such innovations. ironworkers of the Song period were able to produce escellent quality iron and steel which was suitable for the use or the ordnance industry. '' lfver sincc the beginning of the Song dynaîty. the governmeiit had alrcady rccopnized the importance of the production of its own weapons. As a conscquence, the govemment's policy conceming statr armaments had focused on nor just the devcloprnent of the imperial arms industry. but also prevcnting weapons and ncw designs from slipping unnecessarily into the hands or 'barbarians' and private citizens. In the fifth month of97 1 A.D., for instance. an imperid decrce was issued to hrbid civilians in the capital region îrom keeping any wcapons in their houscholds. Soldiers. however. were allowed to retain their own weapons." Nevertheless, the weapons retained by soldiers had to be handed over to thc rnilitary conirnanders for safe-keeping until they were needed for war. Furthemore, in 1037 A.11.. another irnpcrial decree was also issued to the area of Guangnan (9i to forbid civilians frorn keeping a certain kind of knife in their hou~eholds.'~This was because the bandits in the Lingnan i%area had favored the use of this weapon in conducting their criminal activities. Thus. according to this imperial decrec. those who violated the decree could be arrested and be dealt with according to the govemment's law forbidding civilians from maiotaining household weapons. As for a peson who was caught manufacturing weapons illegally. his name would first be recorded by the Office of Police Commissioner (zeidaosi % 6 k~j)),and if caught again, the accused and his family could be sent to exile." Indeed, there were very good reasons why the Song govemment would be anxious to prevent its mililiuy technology from king transferred from its imperial ordnance industry to the 'barbanan' kingdoms. Fintly. it was the simple fact that both the Liao and Xixia mies almost completely relied on mounted arche? as ihcir major offensive striking force, whi le the Song army was also dependent on the projectile power of its bows and crossbows to compensate Tor its lack of war honcs and therefore mobility against the 'barbarian' cavalry. As a result, many resources and cllorts were put by the Song's otdnance industry to design and produce powerful bows, crossbows and arrows with impressive range of action and fimnidable striking power. Therefore. in order to avoid the 'barbarians' from güiiiing access to the dcsigns of these weapons and usine them againsi thc Song inlàntry one day. the Song govemment had to be very cautious in controlling the sccuriiy and production of weapons within its imperial ordnance industry. Secondly, the Song govemment had learned the consequences of' such ni i l iiary iec hno Iogical leakage to the 'barbarians' through Chinese experts. 1n particular, it was believcd that the transfer of techniques and skills of metallurgy or i ronworking to the 'barbarians' had been made possible only through the migration

O!' Chincse experts at the end of the Tang dynastyf8With the abundance of iron. the 'harbarians' were tinally able io cover their cavalrymen and horses with full armor. While in the past when the 'barbarian' cavalry forces were without full amor. the cavalrymen had to suffer many casualties during an advance as the Song infantry's crossbows were effective at five hundred paces and the 'barbarian' bows only had an etl'ective rangc of about one hundred and twenty to three hundred ~aces." As a consequence. the 'barbarian' cavairy had to krep advancing under heavy Song çrossbow tire without much protection until the Song infantry was in rang for the 'barbarian' bows. But now, as a resulr of the abundance of iron and the ability to mass produce these full armor suits, the 'barbarian' cavalry forces were able to advance safely and attacked only when the Song irûantry was in range for the 'barbarian' bows. In this sense, even the most formidable Chinese crossbows had lost their comparative advantage. As a result, the Song govemrnent not only had to corne up with more lethal weapons with greater range and better penetrating power against the 'barbarian' annor, it had to also prevent the transfer of such sensitive technology from happening again. According to William McNeill. Chinese technological innovation around the period of the Song dynasty appeared to have concentrated particularly on the development of arma ment^.'^ As 3 result of the "barbarians"' increasing access to products of Chinese artisanal ski11 mentioned above. the Song's imperial armament industry had to face the utmost responsibility of preventing the technological gap of armarnents between the Chinese and the "barbarians" from being narrowed too fa? Taking advantap of the market economy and the gradua1 process of commercialization. armament workshops were assured of a steady fiow of requisite matenals for the production of weapons." Nevertheless. the imperial ordnance industry had also to maintain great efforts in researching and developing new rnilitary technologies for the mass production of lethal weapons for the Song soldiers. As the Song dynasty was unique in the beginning of an era that was highlighted by the popular use of cold-weapons alongside fire-weapons. this also meant that the Song imperial ordnance indusüy had to maintain a body of tec hnicians who were knowledgeable in the production of conventional weapons as well as new types of fire-weapons. Thus it was under this framework of ever- increasing demand for innovative armament technology and the narrowing of technological gap between the Chinese and the "barbarians" that the Song's imperial ordnance industry operated. Although it is not the purpose of this present chapter to provide an exhaustive list of weapons that existed in or were produced by the govemrnent's ordnance industry during the Song dynasty. it is important to illustrate the composition of certain types of weapons to provide readen with some insight into the operation of the Song government's ordnance industry. Arnong the variety of cold-weapons that existed in the Song dynasty, the spear was one of the most widely manufactured and issued infantry weapons. While the Song inherited the military structures of the Tang and the Five dynasties, it also inherited the use of the variety of armarnents adopted by the regular mies of the Tang and the Five dynasties." From the illustrations and narratives of spears in the Wujing Zongyao. it is clear that by 1044 A.D., the Song ordnance industry was responsible for the production of at least twenty five varieties of spears." While many of them resembled a conventional spear, some were "hybrids" of spear and other weapons such as knife or the "wolf-teeth cudgel" (langyabong % % #) (Figure 3A). For instance. the shuttle spear (suoqiang @ & ) (Figure 3B) was a spear that was attached to a relatively long blade at its tip, resembling a knife with an extended handle." Therefore, the hybridity between a spear and a knife allowed the soldier * to pierce or to slash. Furthemore, right beneath the tip of the clawed spear (zhiraqiung bn &T ) (Figure 3C), "sideclaws" or hooks resembling those of the "wolf- teeth cudgel" (iangyabang %i% #) were attached around the pole.26 Therefore. this weapon could be used for both smashing and piercing in battles. Although figures of the arnount of each type of spear produced by the imperid ordnance industry annually are not available in pnmary sources, the great variety of spears and their hybrid nature reflects the level of sophistication of weapons design during the Song period. Throughout the Song dynasty, the spear was a popular weapon of the infantry that was widely produced and issued by the imperial ordnance industry. In 1027 A.D.. for instance, fifteen thousand spears with iron tips were produced by the irnperial ordnance industry and were issued to the ganisons of Qinzhou % H. Weizhou @/ H. Huanzhou @ M. and Zhenrongiun @ tk 4%-- 27 The popularity of the spear in the Song amy could be explained by two reasons. Firstly. the spear was a weapon which was both cheap and easy to mass pmduce. While the tip of the spear was usually cast fiom iron or steel in one piece, al1 that was lefi was to fimly aaach the tip to a wooden or bamboo pole.'8 As wood and bamboo were not expensive materials and the metallurgical technology of the Song petiod also enabled craftsmen and artisans to produce the tips efficiently at a relatively low cost. the mass production of spears was naturally welcomed by the Song government. Secondly, the spear was also a highly flexible weapon in tems of its application. In ternis of its offensive application, as most spears pmduced during the Song dynasty were on average seven feet long. the length this weapon provided could compensate for the lack of mobility of the Song infantry compared to the "barbarian" cavalry forces to a certain e~tent.2~As readers will see below. the effective range and destructive capability of a spear could also be enhanced with the attachment of incendiary devices. Furthemore, bundles of spears could be attached to a wooden log as a defensive weapon. Known as the "horse-resisting spears" (jzrmuqiang 9É .% k&) (Figure 3D) according to the Wujing Zongyao. this weapon could be used as a spear blockade or static defense mechanism against the "barbarians"' cavalry charge.30 Since at least seven spears were needed for the production of just one of these defensive mechanisrns according to the illustration of the Ry'ing Zongyao. this indicated that the spear must have been a widely produced weapon in the imperiai ordnance industry?' Apart from spears. bows and crossbows were also widely produced and used during the Song dynasty. Although bows were invented long before the Song dynasty. it was particularly during the Song dpasty that a great variety of them were invented. Simply speaking, the making of a Chinese composite bow involves the binding of materials such as barnboo and hom with glue made from the intestines and bladdes of fish?' Then the whole binding is reinforced by winding a sinew taken from the spine of an ox around it.33 Finally. before the bowstnng is attached to the bow. sofkned birch bark is used to cover the bowfs handg~i~.~" Generally. it would take between ten days to two months for the glue to dry completely. ARerwards, the bow needed to be polished and reinforced with sinew. glue and laquer again before the production process was complete? Many types of powerful bows and crossbows, such as the powerfùl "mighty arm crossbow" (shenbinu #J R e),was invented by artisans and officiais during the period.36 In particular, the mighty am crossbow is reportedly in Shen Kuo's ik fi$ ( 103 1- 1095 A. D.) Mengxi Bitan 9 9 $6 to have ken presented to the Song court between 1068 and 1078 A.D. by Li Ding % a ,a former Tangut leader who had sworn allegiance to the Song court?' According to Shen Kuo, the mighty arrn crossbow was described as

"a 'cany-pole' crossbow... that resembled a (large) bow fitted with a (crossbow) stock and stimp. (Loaded) by stepping on the stinvp against the ground and drawing the bowstring, this bow can shoot three hundred paces (about four hundred and sixty meters) and is able to pierce layered amour plate....""

From the implication in this passage, McNeill argues that foot stirrup for crossbow was indeed invented by Li Ding during the Song period.39 However, what Shen Kuo clearly illustrated was that the mighty arm crossbow was "presented" to the Song court by Li Ding between 1068 and 1078 A.D.. thus the stirrup for crossbow or rven the mighty arm crossbow was not necessady invented by Li himself. Nevertheless. it is clear that stimps had become standard for crossbows in the Song by 1044 A.D. and possibly also in the Tang period.)O As the mighty arm crossbow was quite impressive in ternis of its effective range, by the 1100s A.D. every imperial workshop was made responsible for producing at least two thousand of hem annually.'" Mile the mighty am crossbow and other varieties of bows and crossbows were believed to be invented in 1068 A.D. and aer, fiom the illustrations of the Wujing Zongyao it is clear that by 1044 A.D., the imperial ordnance industry was responsible for the production of at least eight different types of bows, which were al1 composite reflex bows made of materials such as barnboo. horn, antler. wood, sinew, and cork? Apart fiom the variety of bows, Wujing Zongyao also illustrated two different types of crossbows with stimps that were based on the material designs of the bo~s."~According to Dr. Needharn. the trigger mechanism of the crossbow was probably invented during the Warin%States pied." One main technical difference between a bow and a crossbow was that the cocking rnechanism of the crossbow allowed the bowstring to be pulled not only by the strength of the arm, but also the strength of the legs and the waist? As a stronger pull would ailow more potentiai energy to be stored in the bowstring of the crossbow, the arrow shot could then travel at greater velocity, greater effective range, and more penetrating power?6 Secondly, as the string of a crossbow could be pulled by a variety of means apart frorn the strength of the ami itself. this also meant that the use of the crossbow was less dependent on the physical strength of the archer compared with that of the bow? Furthermore, as the holding mechanism of the trigger mechanism allowed the bowstring to be held in the firing position until the aigger was pulled, this allowed the archer to take a more accurate aim before he fired his ~ea~on.''~ Nevertheless, the simple skill required for proficient the use of crossbow was ofien counter-balanced by the high skill needed for the detailed measurement and assembling of the trigger rnechani~rn.''~ According to Dr. Needham. an extraordinary level of standardization in the production of the crossbow's tngger mechanism had already been achieved by the Han dynasty.50 Although the W(I'ing Zongyuo does not contain any detailed narratives or illustrations of the Song crossbows' trigger mechanism. it was most likely that the Song impenai ordnance industry must have maintained that high lcvel of skill and standardization achieved by the Han. When sets of crossbows were grouped together. the effectiveness of the weapons would obviously be enhanced. By 1044 A.D., when the Wujing Zongyao was compiled. there existed eight different varieties of these multiple crossbow weapons system. known as "crossbows mounted on a wooden frarne" (chuangzhu & ? %) (Figure 3~).'' Although this weapon was invented by about the Qin dynasty (221-209 B.C.), it was during the Song dynasty that its effective range was increased fiom around seven hundred paces to one thousand paces.5' In particula. the ch~iangzinuof the Song contained three or four crossbows together, wvith winch systems to enhance the pulling of the strings. Another type of weaponry which the Song imperial ordnance indusv was responsible for producing was large scale projectile machines. Due to the Song govemment's reliance on the network of defensive fortresses, large scale projectile machines were particularly useful in providing Song soldiers with long range offense capabilities behind fortress walls. The trebuchet, in particular, was one of the oldest of artillery pieces in Chinese techn~logy.~~in Chinese, the terminology for trebuchet @ao 6é1) is rather confused because the projectile or the bomb was never clearly distinguished fiom the machine which propelled it." Nevenheless, it was clear that by the Song the term huopao k a$ (fire-bomb or fire-trebuchet) referred to both bombs or grenades filled with gunpowder as well as the trebuchets that projected them. and even possibly hand-guns.55 Although Professor Robin D.S. Yates' detailed study of the Mosi text makes clear that trebuchets were already used in battles as early as the Warring States period. it was not until the Song that explosive bombs or grenades were used as arnm~nition.~~Indeed, the destructive power of the huopm was quite well known even to the Song army itself. and it was recorded that during the siege of Kaifeng in 1 126 A.D.. the Song army's hiropau intlicted heavy casualties arnong the Jin soldiers when the Jin mywas still quite unfarniliar with the effectiveness of this ~ea~on.~~Throughout the Song dynasty. trebuchets and incendiary as well as explosive ammunitions were mass produced by the imperial ordnance industry. Among the various imperial workshops, the one in

Jingzhou jfq $11 was the largest in scale in its production of hti~~ao.~'Between 1253 and 1258 A.D. for instance, the Jingzhou workshop manufactured about two thousand sets of trebuchets in merely one m~nth.~~As the scale of armaments production during the Southem Song period was relatively smaller than that of the Northern Song, one could imagine how large the scale of production of hitopao was during the Northem Song period. In the Wujing Zongyao, there existed sixteen different types of such hit~~ao.~~(Figure 3F) Judging by the detailed and precise measurements in every single part of these trebuchets given in the Wujing Zongyao. it appears that a certain kind of regulation or standardization had already been established for the irnperial ordnance industry's production of these weapons? As for the ammunition used for the Song dynasty's trebuchets, they could either be large pieces of stone or incendiary and explosive munitions produced by the imperial ordnance industry. The incendiary and explosive ammunitions in particular, were grenades made up of bamboo containers and with extemal Fuses which required ignition before they were loaded onto the trebuchets and thrown at the enemy.62 Ln particular, the destructive power of these grenade rounds had corne fiom the explosive (which allowed for the all-mund dispersion of rnetal or porcelain Fragments inside the grenade rounds) or incendiary effects of the gunpowder rnixt~re.6~ In the Wujing Zongyao. in which the fint gunpowder formula in history was printed and published. there are records of three different recipes of. or composition for. incendiary powder that were packed in the grenade rounds? While a detailed translation of these recipes in English has been provided by Dr. Needharn. briefly the main inyredients of these recipes al1 contained chernicals such as sulphur. saltpètre. massicot, dry lacquer, and hemp ro~ts.~~Particularly worth mentioning here is a recipe for a type of ammunition known as the "poison smoke ball" (diiyre ycrnyiu 8 185: E B )? Literdly a chemical weapon which could create poisonous smoke, it contained such ingredients as arsenious oxide. saltpetre. powdered croton beans. charcoal. resin. wolfsbane, suiphur. etc.6' As a result. this indicated that rnany artisans in the imperial ordnance industry during the Song dynasty must have possessed a good amount of knowledge and expenence in dealing with these chemical substances in order to facilitate the mass production of hiiopao and their incendiary ammunition. Dr. Needham called the Song period "the frontier between (the development O incendiary gunpowder and explosive gunpowder".68 In general. gunpowder that contains a low quantity of nitrate produces incendiary effects. and while gunpowder with a high quantity of nitrate induces explosive effects. While the fire bombs of the tenth and eleventh centuries contained low-nitrate content gunpowder that was effective in setting fire to siege machines and towers, the appearance of a new type of fire bomb known as the thunder-clap bomb (pilipao % %a)in the twelfth century marked the beginning of the development of explosive gunpowder weapons.69 According to Dr. Needham's translation of the description of the thunder-clap bomb that can be found in the Wujing Zongyao, this weapon appears to be

"something like a maroon, consisting of higher-nitrate gunpowder, enclosed in a weal case of bamboo, carton and the like; with the property of giving a loud bang when exploded, and therefore more suitable for causing fnght rather than serious injuring to the enemy's horses and men ...a weapon widely used in the nuelRh cent~r~.**~~

As a description of the thunder-clap bomb cm be found in the Wujing Zungyao. this indicates that at least by the first half of the eleventh cenniry Song artisans already knew what differences in the effects of gunpowder it would make when the percentage of saltpetre in the gunpowder mixture was added or subtracted." Although the thunder-clap bornb was primarily designed to confuse the enemy rather than to hmthem, it was the development of the thunder-clap bomb and the Song artisans' recognition of the explosive effects of high-nitrate gunpowder that contributed to the invention of the iron-bomb (tiehuopao @ k fi) in the thirteenth century. In particular. the iron-bomb is a weapon that contains a high quantity of nitrate in its gunpowder mixture and cm be projected from trebuchets to cause serious injuries in enemy ~00~s.~Thus although the phrase himpao seems to have appeared fini in co~ectionwith the conquest of the kingdom of the Southem Tang by the Song army in 975 A.D.. it was the Song artisans who explored the explosive application of gunpowder ~ea~ons.~~ Indeed. the body of knowledge available during the Song dynasty on explosives and incendiary devices was applied not only in large scale projectile machines. but also in weapons that were used by individual soldiers as well. With the destructive power of the incendiary devices, the effectiveness of conventional cold-weapons. such as spears, could be Merenhanced. Reportedly, it was the compiler of the Song military text Shou Cheng Lu S .tl% B. Chen Gui l% &! . who invented a weapon known as huoqiung & in 1132 A.D." In fact, a similar incendiary weapon can be seen on a painted silk banner found in Dunhuang and held in the Musee Guimet in Paris which was dated to the tenth century by Dr. Clayton Bredt in 1978.'' Although it appears that the huoqiung originated about 950 A.D. in the Five dynasties period, it was during the Song period that the propellant effect of the gunpowder mixture in it was greatly improved." As the name of the weapon suggests, huoqiang was a spear with incendiary device attached to it which allowed the spear to become a five-minute flame thr~wer.'~In the Jin Shi (& g),a description of how the huoqiang was manufactured can be found:

"....take thick imperial yellow paper and to make it into a tube (with walls composed) of sixteen layers, about two feet long. It was then filled with a mixture with willow charcoa!, iron in the form of powder, porcelain Fragments, sulphur, arsenious oxide, and other things. It was then bound with cords to the end of the lance. Each soldier carried with him, hanging dom (Front his belt) a srnaIl iron fire box (or glowing tinder). At the appropriate time during combat he lit (the fuse), and the fiame shot forth fiom the lance head more than a dozen feet. Afier the composition had burnt out the tube was not darnaged. When Pienching (Kaifeng) was king besieged (in 1126 A.D.) these fire- lances were wda great deal. as they still are today (1230 A.D.)"."

Although saltpetre was not mentioned in this passage, it was obviously present in the mixture judging from the effects of the ~ea~on.'~

Apart [rom the huoqiung. a similar weapon known as the fire-tube (huotong ff ) was developed during the Song dyna~t~.*~While the huoqiang was a hybnd between conventional polearm and gunpowder weapon, the huotong was a shorter version of the hitoqiang that can be used as a pistol. Like the hzïoqiang. the nature of the gunpowder mixture of the huotong was essentially incendiary. and instead of beiny attached to the head of a spear, the barre1 was attached to a short wooden handle." In spite of the fact that the gunpowder used in the huoqiang and huotong was mostly incendiary in nature, the little propellant effect it canied did allow the weapon to propel very small articles such as sand to blind and confuse the rnemy while buming therm8' Furthemore. judging From the fact that al1 the formuiae of gunpowder existed in Chinese texts fiom the eleventh century onwards had illustrated the tendency to mix poisonous substances with gunpowder mixture. Dr. Needham believes that the huoqiung probably was also used to generate smoke screens or poisonous-smokes.83 Although the huoqiang and the huotong relied on the incendiary capability of the gunpowder mixture to inflict injuries on the advenaries, the development of huoqiang and huotong in the Song dynasty also rnarked the development CO-viativeprojectile technology in gunpowder weapons." According to Dr. Needharn, the CO-viative projectile technology in gunpowder refers to the development of a gunpowder which is not fully propellant, and the object or objects did not fully occlude the whole bore of the tube8' With the development of the huoyiang and the huotong as well as the CO-viativetechnology. Song artisans were eventually able to increase the propellant effect of the huoqiang and the huotong by adding more nitrate to the gunpowder mixture, dlowing the weapon to propel larger objects such as bits of broken metal and pottery with sharp edges to increase the weapon's destructive p~er.'~Fmm the development of the gunpowder technology itself throughout the Song dynasty. it was clear that the imperial ordnance industry must have been quite active in the research and development aspects of annarnents production. Since the Qin dynasty (22 1-209 B.C.E.). the responsibility for weapons production had been put under the Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues (shuofi< 9 $f)?' Under the Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues and one of its subordinate agencies. the Director of Imperia1 Manufactories (shangfangling (4 3' 9 ). there existed a specialized office responsible for the supervision of the production of agricultural tools. saddles, stimps, weapons and various kinds of products used by the governrnent." This specialized position was called the Director of Imperia1

Workshops (kaogongling 3 1 ). 89 In the Tang dynasty, however. another new agency called the Directorate for Armaments ÿunqijiun @ 'i B) was created. 90 But unlike the Director of impenal Workshops who monitored the production of a variety of tools needed by different parts of the govemment. the Directorate for Armaments was established particularly for the supervision of arms production. During the Song dynasty, the office of the Directorate for Armaments was also maintained to oversee the production of impenal weapons. According to the Song Shi. the officia1 responsibilities of the Directorate of Arrnaments specifically included. fintly. the procurement of raw materials necessary for the manufacture of weapons; secondly, to supervise the founding of workshops and institutes in the various circuits and provinces; thirdly, consider advice fiom his subordinates pertaining to the benefits and shortcomings of the amiy ordnance industry? Very much like the Tang and previous dynasties, the appointment to the Directorate for Amaments was usually given to senior government officiais who were responsible for the making of fiscal policies such as the State Finance Commissioner (sami 2 ) Under the Director of Armaments, there was also an Administrative Assistant (panguon $1 g),an Associate Administrative Assistant (tongppn p/ ), Recorders (zhubu Z R), Superintendents (zhuguan % ;%), as well as Assistant Directors (cheng %)y3 While the Director of Amaments and his immediate assistants were responsible for the making of policies, the rest of those oficials were responsible for the actual supervision and administration of the workshops in the circuits. The first task of the Directorate for Armaments was to standardize and catalogue the great deal of information that existed on weaponry. The resulting manual compiled by the Directorate for haments contained one hundred and ten chapten of references describing the variety of materials that could be used for the manu facturing of weapons. seventy- four chapters on tools and parts, four chapten on reparation and production process. ten chapters on bows and arrows. and twenty- one chapters on miscellaneous items? Later on. information about the variety of knives and spears produced and designed domestically as well as fiom "barbarian" origins were also catalogued and included. In order to maintain a certain standard in the quantity and quality of weapons produced for its million strong standing army, the Song government had also established the Office of Imperia1 Amaments (yuqian junqi siïo #Y $ $ % fi)in the capital region? Following the pattern of design and quality standard of the weapons made by the Office of Imperia1 Armaments, workshops (zuofang f? th)and the "Bow and Crossbow Institutes" (gongnuyuan 5 2 ) in Kaifeng as well as in many different locations throughout the country would then be able to produce quality weapons according to the government standard? In the capital region. the two main government workshops were known as the South Workshop (nam~to/ing~ ft -%) and the North Workshop (beizuofung -IL {$ ~i).~'Each or these workshops was further divided into fi@-one different production groups (zuo (1: ), each specializing in the production of differcnt weapons or working parts oh wcapon.''' In order to naintain the level of productivity, the Director for /\rmsrnents had to report to the ihrone on the progress of production once every ten daYs.'" As for the production of firearms, it was the responsibility ofa specialized works hop kno wn as the "S içgc Equiprncnt Workshop" (Xuunghci gongcheng ruo JI% % k & 1 ) Apart !'rom siege engins and various kinds of Iireüms, ihc Sicge kiqui pment Workshop also produced gunpowder as well as inflamrnuble solveni l'or the army's incendiüry ~ea~ons.'~~ Later on. as Wang Anshi implemented his re tormist border expansion policy in 1068 AD.. the govemment began to realize the problems in having to riiüintain a continuous transportütion of the great amount of wcapons CO the largc standing amy at the fronticr rcgions. Furthemore. it was also realizcd that it woiild cost the govovçrnment a trrmendous sum to maintain a continuous supply 01' steel and pig iron from the mining area to the capital for the pioduction of' thcsc wxipons. .As a result. many of these rnilitary workshops and i3ow and C'mssbow Institutes wcre gnduaily deçentralized in the eleventh cantury and rstablished clox io ihose rnining areas away from the capital region.'O1 Following ihis dcccntnl iwtion process of military workshops, local military circuits and commands were now expected to supplement raw materials supplicd by thc centwl govcmment. As a consequence, local military authorities would be requircd io piirchase raw materials either from nearby prefectures. or to establish their own mines and smel ters by usine soldiers as minen.'" In the latter case. these soldiers tiom local rnilitary garrisons would be responsible for thc production or their wcüpons as well. IO3 .4lthough civilians were forbidden io manufacture weapons, the Song government had eventually corne to realize that imperial workshops aione could not possibly meet the dernands of weapons needed by g&sons in the various circuits. 'fhus aput from the imperial arsenals, civilian artisans were later encouraged and supported by the govemment to manufacture weapons for the rumy."" Specifiçally, the Chamberlain for the Palace Revenues established regulations or standards spccifying the cumiculum and the arnount of time these civilians had to be trained before they could practice in their tnde probssionally or be employcd as crifismen in the imperial armories. When the imperial armories had fullen behind their production schedule to rneet the quota required. these civilim artisans and their workshops would be cornrnissioned to manufacture the balance arnount.'" But in ordcr to avoid the weapons produccd by thcsc civilian artisans from being slippcd

inio ihc hands of the "barbarians", the weapons they produced had io be submitted

to the governrnent within thirty days atier they were produced.'Oh Atter thc weapons were produced, they were kept safe in imperial armories until they were necded Tor üctual combat and training purposes. In the capital area, therc existcd Iivc armories locütrd outsidc the east wing of the imperial palace, and each of ihcm u cre scparately responsible tor the saî'r-keeping of di ffixent mili tary items. such as body armor. spears. crossbows, arrows. and miscellantvus equi pmeni such as uni hrm and c~othin~.'~'

Although the Song govemrnent was able to produce quality iron and steel at a reletively eî'ticient pace. the govemment had still to spend a grrat amouni 01' its rcvenur to produce an adequate amount of weapons for its larg standing army. I'or instance. in the third month of 1 130 AD.. the Transport Intendant of Jiangdony i I. ?k rcqursted threc thousand xts OC body mor for the local garrisons.'ox As ihe cost of producing one set of body armor was eighty strings of cash. it would cost thc govcmrnent twenty-four thousand strings of cash for body armor just For the J iangdong reyion.'Ov While the Jiangdong garrison had required threr thousand sets of armor. other garrisons, such as the militia gdson of Shanxi in 1040 AD.. had reqursted as much as thirty thousand sets."' tndeed, body morwas not the only item the government's ordnance industry was responsible for producing. While it

would bc dificult to calculate the exact the arnount the central govemment spent

for the production of armaments cvery year, an estimation cmbe provided fiom tb amount of resources a circuit spent on ordnance in a given year. In 1083 A.D., for instance, the circuit of Liyan 16 f- requested the centrd govemmcnt to gant the local ganisons there one million strings of cash, one thousand craftsmen. fifty thousand jin of iron and steel, as well as trn thousand sheets of leather for the production of weapons.' " While this was only the amount 0f'resources spent on armarnents production for a circuit, the mount needtd for the workshops in the capital area must have been much higher. This estimation wu logically made from the fact that imperial workshops in the capital region ottcn cn~ploycdmore crafismen than the ones in the circuits, and thereforc must have bccn laqer in tenns of their scale of production. At the beginning of the Northcrn Song period. for instance, each imperial workshop in the capital areü had cniploycd hctween three thousand seven hundred and five thousaod cmftsrnen and soldiers. " ' f3y thc beginning of 1130s A.D.. the average number of cnRsmen employed in cach workshop in the capital region was increased to five thoiisand six hundrcd. while ihc number of craftsmen cmployed by each circuit ai the sürne period was only aboui two thousand nine hundrrd.'I3 Thus in combining the arnoiint ol'moncy and rcsources the government spent on the salaty of these craHsmen as well aï rdw iniiisrials needed for the production of armarnents in the capital and the circuits. the Iitiancial burden of army ordnancc must have been trernendous. II4 Although Song miners and ironworkers were able to producc an abundani amount ol' iron and steel for the manufacturing of weapons. the ellicicnçy and productivity or the governmrnt's ordnance industry was confounded by the Directorate Ibr Armament's mismanagement and the my's negligrncc in müintaining the weapons. In particular. in spite of the throne's establishment ol'the Dirttctor~tet'or Arrnarnents as a bureaucratie chah-of-cornmand to monitor thc crown's ordnance industry. the Directorite tOr Amaments' policies were passive and short-sighted. In particular, ad hoc solutions surfaced only afkr preventable problems arose. Perhaps this had much to do with the fact that the Director for ~\rmmcntshimsclf and his imrnediate subotdinates were more otten than not civilim fiscal orticials wha were neither spxialists in armaments nor pro fessionals at anns. While it was irue that the procurement cf raw materials and the manu facturing of armaments involved fiscal arrangements at the highest levels, the gencral tendrncy of the Directorate for Armament's adrninistrdtion showd that it might wei: be possible that these officiais had seen the management of the ordnünct: industry as mrreiy a tzaiier of arranging statistical Figures. As a resuli. thcse o tficials were in general more concemed about whether or not the workshops could mcct the production quotas than the quality of weapons producçd. l'bis rcflccted tioi only the lack of supervision iii the production of armaments on the Director li~r Armümcnt's part. but also his lack of CO-ordinationwith the otlicisils in chargc of the storage of weapons who could raise qucstions about the quality «F weüpons produced as well. lndeed. such an imbalance between concerns ol'quantity and quülity had an ovcrdl nrgative impact ütliecting the achievernent of the ordnance indusiry. For instance. ülthough the Directoraie for Armaments was responsible hr the cstahlishmcnt of workshops in the various circuits, it appçared thai atkr these workshops were founded noi much continuous supervision and inspection were givcn to these circuit workshops for qwlity control and maintenance. Indced. ii was not until 1029 A.D.. when a report carne to the Directoraie Tor Arrnanicnts itboiit huw poorly the weapons in the circuits werc müintaincd, ihat çcntrd govcrnment of'ticials were then hally sent to inspect and supervise the rrrparation ol' ~cü~ons."~From 1040s AD. on, the circuits were required to report to the Ilirccior tor Armarnents annually the amount of weapons each circuit had produced iind maintained.""~eveflheless, there did no1 appear to be ÿny requiremcnt that qua1 iiy-testing results of the weapons should be included in iheir reports. Indced. the situation for the imperial workshops in the capital region was no1 much ditkrcnt than the ones in the circuits. In 1060 AD,, for instance, the thrune was notiiied by the Directonte for Armaments on the lack of quality of weapons manulactured by imperial workshops in the capital, and il was not until then that coun otricials were ordered to select samples frorn the impetial workshops' production groups for quality tesiing ' l7 If the Directorate of Amaments was responsible for the lack of ovrrsight OC the administration of the govemrnent's ordnance industry, the mywas rqually puilty of negligence in maintaining their weapons in order. From 1054 A.D. on ward, the Di rectorate of Amaments issued instructions ordering so Mers in Ilebei, Fiedong, and Shanxi to expose their weapons and mrto the sun every sumrner.' ' Furthemore, the instruction stated that if therc was any mal funct ioniny in the weapons the soldiers were ordered to repair them. And if the weapons wcre still not in perfect condition upon a second inspection, the local Administritivc Assisiants or military commanders of the circuits were to be informed to imposc disciplinary punishrnent."9 ln spite of such elaborate instructions to control thc maintenance of the weapons. it wüs highly quesiionable if these regdations wcre consistently carried out. For instance. in the spring of 11 19 A.D. reports came to the thronc staiing ihiii soldiers had bcen trüdiny their weapons. shields and body ürrnor wiih the çivilians in reitirn for cookcd food as regiments wcre marching through towns.'20 Supcrticiall y, the soldirrs daimcd that ihcy werc merely dcpositing ihcir cqui prncnt t'or the civilians' de-kceping until the soldiers could retum to pay for thc lbod. I lowevcr. the reports argued that these were sirnply cases of'desertion from military duty. Later on. as the Directorate I'or Amaments atternpted to repossess thesc weüpons from the civilians. alrnost four thousand two hundred pieces of weilpons and niilitary cquipment were rccovered within a mrre three day period.''' This indicates that il' those instructions issued by the Directonte for Armaments on inspections of weapons wem consistently or frequently camed out. such cascs of 'missing weapons' would not have been so prevalent. Indeed, as military weapons

werc lost through such means, the local gmisons would have had to urdcr additionai amounts frorn the ordnance workshops to replace them. As a result. this would put a certain arnount of burden on the productivity of thc ordnance industry. As a matter of fact. as early as 1094 A.D. the throne had ülready realizcd problems the imperial ordnance industry had in meeting the increasing dçmand. Subsequently. the Vice Minister of the Coun of lmperial Stud (ruipu shrcuqing .k 1% 9 W) was ordered to hold a meeting with the Minister of Works and thc Director of Armaments to discuss the prospects of levying thc production of' armaments as a means of taxation.'22 ln the end, the plan did not rnaterialiu. as it was realized that mismanagement and wastage, and not the ordnance industry's lack of productivity was the cause of the ever-increasing demand of weapons in the circuits. As the productivity of the ordnance industry was being compromiscd by such wüstage, ollicials in the Directorate for Amaments olten had to f'alsif'y production ligures in order to avoid punishment. In 11 19 A.D. for instance. thc district J udicial Commissioner (titlian xinmu gongshi kk! jpj g& fi Lfl) of 1-lunan rcponed that the amount of weapons produced in that region had met the standard and quota prcscribed by the centrd govemrnent. Thewtke, he wquestcd the ccntml government to reward those involved as encouragement.'23 According to thc cornmentary in the Song Shi. howevcr. ofiçials at the higher wd lower levels had conspircd to üdjust the tigures in their reports when the workshops and ürscnals wcrc unable to meei the requirement and quotü set by the central government. Nevertheless, the government's ordnance industry was in general quitc an important part of the Song my's logistical systems. In spitç of ihe rxistencc ol' burcaucratic mismanagement, which was al1 too common to the Song's militüry logistical efirts. overall, the imperial ordnance industry was well capable of taking advantüge of the market economy and oc making good use of the materials available in the production of weapons. While the problem of bureaucntic mismanagernent could be blamed on the administrative offiçials' Iück of specialization in rnatters of armaments, the imperial ordnance industry in generd was receptive to the ideas and designs of new weapons from civilian artisans and those ot'ticials who were more familiar in military matters.

' IKYTK. chapter 7, Tiunfi [II a section 7. Tuntiun DI .p.75.

' WJZY, Qirtrsji fii %, chapter 12, pp.260-264.

During the Cold War era. for example. it was not uncommon to see mies of Communist bloc countries adopting Soviet made or supplied AK 47 assault rifles as their standard infantry weapons. Likewise. Amencan designed or manufâctured rifles and anti-tartks missiles have alw been widely adopied by NATO member amies even in the post-Cold War era. Fur funher information on the sharing of annaments and military technology among NATO countrirs. scr M içhael Yardley, "Towards the Future". David Chandler (ed.) The Oxford Iilustruted Ilkmy of the Britirh hmy. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). pp.435-452.

Mark Elvin. The Pattern ofthe Chinese Pari. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. i973). p.84.

' According to Kong Deming, ihc "Five Classical Weapons" (wubing ii fi) reïorded in the Zhouli !Aj 10. liiuguunji B 2 . were muu 8. gong shi '; X, shu 2,gr %, and ji %. Kong Deming f L @ 1/11, " Bingqi A # ". Zhongguo gudai &hi. pngju, zhiguun # c'i fC gli. 11 !!. 4% I'i,(Beijing: Beijing Guanbo Xueyuan. 1996). p.2 10.

" WJZY. Qiunji 6.f 8.chapter 1 3. p.443.

' Kong ( 1 996), p.209.

' Ilucker, entry 6502; Wang Zhaochun li % F. , Zhonggtm kmr jirhushi . junshi jishjwn lit Bi & ? k$ #f 9.W -35 @jB. (Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe, 19981, p.97.

" Wang ( 1 W8). p.97.

" Kobcn 1 Iartwell, "Industrial Developments: 'The lron and Coal indusrrics" in Jarncs T.C. I .iu 8: Petcr J. Ciolas, Chunge in Sung C'hinu: lnnovatiori or Renovatiun? (Massachusetts: D.C. t kath & Company. t 969), p.35.

" Donald Blackmore Wagner. The Han Iron In&try, Unpublished draA material prepared hr the symposium, China's past unearthed: the rcconciliation of the new discovrrics and the historical records of the early imperhl period, San Francisco, Match 26-28, 1980, pp. 63-64.: Shinoda Koichi a LI1 !fi . . Gu Shiguang a ~fr (mns.), Zhongguo wbingqi duyuun 111 P4 ifi fi 8 .k *. (Hong Kong: Wanli Shudian, 1 W6),p. 17; Mark Eivin ( 1973), 85.

IJ This type ofiron pmduced was probably grey-fracture cast-iron. Ir was obtained through the slow cwling of the casting, which made the rcsulting iron both hard and twgh cnough to be used Sur weapons. White-Fracture cast iron, on the other hand, was producd by rapid eooling or the casting, which made the imn tough but briak. On the other hand, steel was produccd by the dccarburiziition of iron. Funhermore. if the iron ore was melted at lower temperature. such as 800 to 900 C. the resulting mecal would have been low in carbonate content and thetefore too soR to be iised for the production of weapons. But with the combinative use of reîîned coal and hydraulically or animal-powered bellows. Song ironworks were able to conduct hision nt l ZOO C. Waper (19801, pp. 22-24; Shinoda (1996), p.! 7.

''.YS, chapter 197. Bing fi I 1, Qijia Ai zhi % 4' 2 $1, p.622.

'' SS,chapter 197. Bing fi I I , Quia -hi zhi # Y L M. p.622.

'' .SS, chapter 197. Bing fi i i , Quia thi ;hi '1' 2 a, p.622. . - .-. - .- -- .- -- 18 It was believed that the founder of the Khitan empire was able to establish his tirst sinelter itt the beginning of the tenth ccntury with the help of Chinese border-settlers who were seeking protection in the midst of chaos after the fall of the Tang dynasty. Elvin (1973). p.88.

'hilliarn H. McNeill, The fJursuifof' Powcr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1082). p.39.

" McNeill ( 1982). p.39; Joseph Needharn and Robin D.S. Yares. Scierice und Civilisution in C'hlinu, b'd. 5. C'hrmisiry und Chernicul Ttrchnoloy, PW Yi Mililury Ttichnofugy: Missiles clrd Sieg~),..(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 105.

'*Ye ( 1978). p.395401: WJLY. Qimji 6i B. chapten 12 and 13. pp. 4 13.442-443.

"WJZY, Qiunji 8.chaptcr 13. p.440.

'" WZY, Qiunji 6i %. chapier 10. p.379.

" WJZY. Qiunji fi 'II. chapier 10, p.379.

'" Sung Yinptlsing. E-tu Zen Sun & Shiou-Chuan Sun (trans.), T'ien-kung Kiri-wu: C'hincw fichnology in the Sewnteenrh C'enwy, (University Park & London: Pennsylvania Staic llniversity Press. 1966). p.262.

17 Sung ( 1966). p.262.

" Sung ( 1966), p.262

" Forage ( 199 1). p.30 1.

in Here I use Forage's translation of Shen Kuu. "Carrying pole crossbow" refcrs to powrrful composite bows anached to a stock. Forage (199 1). p.301.

3') hicNeil1 (1 982). p.36; Forage (1 991 ). p.303. 4 1 YU, chapsr I 5 1, Bingrhi fi ;fiil, Xining dienbigmg % P eji fl ;, p.25.

" WJZY, Qianji fi %, chapter 13. pp.436-438; Needham & Yates (1 994). pp. 102- 104.

"'W'SLY. Qianji f %, chapter 13, pp.436-438.

t-8 Needham & Yates ( 19941, p. 139.

46 Kong ( IW6), p.? 18.

47 Needham &Y ares ( 1994). p. 1 20.

LU Kong t 1994), 2 18.

" MRY. Qianji dil 2,chapter 13. pp.437440.

" Ncedham & Yates ( 1994). p. 188: Sung ( l985), p.68.

il Needham & Y atcs ( t 994). p.205.

CJ Needham & Yütes ( 1994). p.205.

!? In June 1085, Professor Robin D.S. Yates discovered the relief of a bombard licld by a sniall dernon tïgurc in a Buddhist cave-temple in Sichuan, and in general sçholars agreed that thc Iigiires in the relief are of the Song period. Joseph Needhm (1 986), p.58 1 ; Needham & Yates ( 1094). p.205.

" Needham & Yates ( 1994). p.207.

" Zhou Gucheng )A/ fi !J& (td.). Zhongguo gdui huopnoshi '1' R i'i fC 'II. (Shanghai: Shanghai Renn~inChubanshe. 1984). p.11.

5 8 Zhou ( 1 984), p. 13.

'"hou ( i984), p. 13.

" WfLY. Qiunji 8 ?k.chapter 12. pp.4 14423.

b' IVJZY, Qionji I]il %, chapter 12, pp.4 14-423.

'' WJZY, Qionji I% %, chapter 12. p.427.

63 Zhou ( 1984), p. 15.

WWJZY. Qianji 1 0,chapter 12, p.427; Needharn (1986), p. 1 17.

h5 Needharn ( 1986), pp. t 17- 1%. '" WJZY, Qiunji f% %, chapter 1 1. pp.393-394.

h7 Partington (19601, p 263.

" WY,Qianji % %, chapter 12. pp.428-429: Needham (1 986). p. 163.

"'Nrrdham ( 1986). p. 163.

-.. ' Needham ( 1986). p.220.

ÏW tlerc I use Dr. Needham's translation. Needham (1986), p.228.

14 %hou ( 1984). p. 13; Needham ( 1986), p.220.

& Sincc the development of the co-viative technology in gunpowder happened in bath mctiil-barrd huoqiung and non metal-barre1 huoqiang made of bamboo, Dr. Needham concludcd that the manipulaiun of the amount of saltpetre in the gunpowder mixture, and no1 the griidwl shiH tiom the use of non rnetd-baml to metal-baml. was the rnost important tactor that contributcd to ihc improvement of the propellant cfkcts of gunpowder in the Song dynasty. Ntxdhum (1986). p.220.

" Hucker. entry 5097.

an Hucker, entry 4992; Shinoda ( 1996),p. 15.

H9 Hucker. entry 3 157.

93 tluçker, entries 14 1 3, 1399,457.

'hl Regrettably, the Yu Hui did not specitjl the tidcs of thcsç materials compilcd by thc [iircctonte of Armaments, thereforc it is not clear if these materials still exist today. Y//, chüptcr 1 S 1 , fjingzhi fi. $1, Xining gongshi ?! ' ) LX Junyi thidu # FE, p.26.

'13 Uy 1 040 A.D., tor instance. there were about 1 25 million men in the Sang standing army. Arnong them. 300,000 were garrisoned in Hebei against the Khilan, and 450,000 in Shanxi against Xixia. Elvin ( 1973), p.84; Hucker, cntry 8 1 15.

'16 Every ycar the Bow and Arrow Institutes produced an approximatr amount of 16,500.000 diifirerit items, including bows, rirrows, crossbows, bow-strings, projectile machines, etc. YII. c1i;iprt.r I 5 1. Binghi fi. $1, Songchao junqi wuku '4 @i VC 3 fi ldi , p.24; Ytl, chaptcr f 5 1. Ilingzhi fi- itill. Shuu.ring krdigong % fi $IL @ ;, p.28.

'" Annual ly, thc Nonh and South Workshops produced an arnount of 32.000 ditlicretit iteias including bladcs. saws, riciing equipment. quivers, etc. YH, chapter 15 1. Ringzhi %l, Songchuo jtrnyi wrrku '.F.' Cil: % fi i&.p.24.

IO1 Açcording to Ciartwell, this policy could cut transportation cosis by haIf, tis the tiniil product wcighed only 40-50% as much as raw iron or steel. Hartwell (1969), p.37.

I(l1 ln the contemporary military system, al1 weapon systems are produced by government or privately owned companies. Furtherrnore, specialized units, such as the British Amy's Royal Amy Ordnance Corps and the Royal Electrical and Mechmical Engineers are responsible for thc rcparition. improvcment, and maintenance of weapons. [ri the Song army, however, rcgular infants, and cavalry soldiers were responsible for the production, reparation, and maintenirncc of thcir weapons. To a certain extent, this reflects the difference in the level of specialimion between a medieval rinny and a twentieth-century my. Mike Chappell, The British rlrmy in the fY~Y0.v. (L,ondon: Osprey, 1987). p. 29.

10.8 Nevertheless, civilian artisans were forbidden to produce certain kinds of weapins that were considered particularly powerful by the Song government. Presumably, "barbarian" intelligence agents responsible for steaiing information about Song army's armaments might bc pan of the reason. Ytf. chapter 15 1, Bingzhi r5 !?IV Xining shenbigong EL! '-F@ fl LJ. p.25.

!O5 Shinoda ( 1996), p. 1 5. IW Shinoda ( 1996). p. 15.

1 07 Y/?, chapter 151, Bingzhi %il,Surzgcftac~junqi wuku BI hi % fi )di, p.24.

108 YH, chapter 15 1. Bingzhi fi $1, Jianyun mingjujiu ik R# % IV, p.34.

lO9 Later on in 1140, the amount of body annor required in that resion had risc to 5,000 sets. Yfl,çiiapter 151, Bingzhi fi ;If, Jic~nyanmin~ujiufP % 'B. p.34.

t IO .YS, chapter 197. Bing fi 1 1. Qdiu =hi :hi % Ili 2 $4. p.623.

Iil SS. chapter 197. Bing E- -l 1. Qijiu =hi rhi '& Ilf 2 1#. p.623.

113 .YS, chapter 197, Bing J% 1 1, (Iijiu zhizhi % hl 2 $1, p.624.

l I-I According to thc Song shi, each crattsman was paid 180 strings of cash diily and 7 rk)u of cice por nionth as salary. S.!!, chapter 197. Bing fi 1 1, Qijiu :hi :hi Ili 2 ;Id!, p.624.

"'SS, chapter 197, Bing I 1. Qijirr zhi zhi ;tfC VI 2 al. p.624.

"'Presumably tu dry and to prwent the roning of equipmrnts. .CS. chapter 197. Bing 5:. 1 1. Qoiu :hi rhi i%11' 2 a. p.623. ' '" SS, chapter 1 97. Bing fi I I . Qijiu .-hi :hi LI1 2 ibll, p.623.

"' !tucker. entries 620 I & 5090; SS, chapter 197, Bing fi I 1, Qijiu ;hi :hi % '1' 2 $1. p.623.

"' Huckrr, entry 6473; S.chapter 197. Bing fi II , Qijia ai;hi # 111 L $1. p.623. Figure 36 The sh~ttle-spear(.,urx,~m~p @ #! ) WJZY, $i % 13. p 443 Figure 3C The clawed-spear (zhunqiml: * #) ) WJZY, fiii % 13, p. 41 3

Figure .3D The horse-resisting spwrs (lr~mmiiu~~x$1 !-Ci M WIZY, $i ?l!1 O. p 379 Figure 3E A crossbow mounted on a wooden frame with threc bows (s~u~gonp-2' ?f ). Thc arrow illustrateci on the top lefi hand corner is known as the sword-arrow. With seventy men oprating, this weapon system could tire thrcc sword-arrows at thc samc timc wiih cach launch. and tntvcf a distance of three hundrd paccs. t WJZY, Gr ?#i13, p. 440.

Conclusion

As the previous chapters illustrate, it appears that the logistic aspect of war and military preparations is nothing but an endless succession of difficulties with one succeeding another. Judging by the Song's case in particular, problems constantly appcared, developed, merged, resolved, and then only reappeared later in différent forms. This phenornenon is the most obvious in the case of Song's horse apncy. Throughout the Song dynasty, the govemment had to spend a tremendous arnount of financial resources in buying horses from Tibet as a result of the iack of baitlc- worthy horses in the Song domain. Worse still, the efliciency of the impen'al pasiurage system was constantly undermineci by its officials' incornpetence and misrnanagement. When the govemment carne up with the solution of using the tea trade to supplement the expenditures for horse procurement, fluctuations of tca priccs in the market tumcd ironically into a dominant factor that negatively affectcd thc govcrnment's abili ty to purchaîe hotses. While some of the factors that contributed to the appearance of the logistical problenis, such as ccological real ities, were unfortunately not within thc con~mlof Song bureaucrats and offtcials, others had developed from mismanagement and the effccts of political stniggles between Wang Anshi's rcformist political faction and Sima Guang's conservative faction. In the case of the Song's harse agency. Tor example, the imperial pasturages were inconsistently established and abolished due io ihc difference of these political Factions' political perspectives and policies. Apan Smrn the horse agency. the rate of the rnilitary agricultural colonies and siate farm colonies also demonstrates how mismanagcrncnt and corruption of officials at the local level, as well as the refonnists' desire to privatize govemment lands io mate revenue. were major factors in contrihuting to the demise of one of the army's own food producing and defensive systems. The striking similarities between the Song horse agency and the military agricultural colonies are that they both reflected the negative effects of commercialization as well as the conflict between the needs of civilians and of the military establishment. As both the imperial pashirage system and the mi lit^ agricultural system required a great amount of good quality lands for the pashnng of hones and the production of food for the =y, these same lands were ah needed by civilian farmen to increase their incomes in the fast-growing economy or for relief in times of flood and drought. While a healthy economic well-being was what the Song governmeni needed to finance its large standing arrny, the central govemmcnt was constantly under pressure to try to maintain a balance between two important objectives: its military logistical efforts on the one hand. and to generate revenue on the other. From the institutional development of the horse agency and military agricultural colonies, it appears that, particularly during the las1 one hundred and fifty years of its existence, the Song govemment was more concemed about the latter objective than the former one. While ir is obvious enough that high militas, expenditures was the reasan for the Song govcmment's obsession with gnerating revenue, I believe the civil oftkials' artempts to maintain political dominance ovzr the militaly establishment was also an important reason why the maintenance of these military logistical systems secmed less important than the creation of revenue. In al! three of the logistical systems 1 studied in this thesis. their policy drafters and high level administrators were mostly civil oficials in the State Finance Con~mission. Without haviny knowledge on the logistical subject matters they were responsiblt: for. these civil oficials could only corne up with ad hoc solutions just to meet thoir quota of production or profit. Furthemore. since the policy dnfters and high level administrators themselves lacked the experience and knowledge in particular logistical matiers, it was more difficult for hem to verie the reports from lower lcvel oficials who were responsible for the hands-on administration of the logistical systerns. Therefore, mismanagement and incompetence bred as corruption and falsification of reports went unchecked. Although, the three logistical eIements studied in this thesis were constantly undermined by effects of commercialization and the civil officiais' desire to maintain political dominance over ihe military establishment, this is not to say that the Song's military logistical efforts in gcneral were a complete failure. The imperial ordnance industry, in cornparison with the home agency and the military agricultural colonies. was a relatively successful one. Although problems of misrnanagement did exist in the imperial ordnance industry as well, the industry itself was quite capable of taking advantage of the technologies available and produced a great number and variety of weapons with utmost innovation. Indecd. the Song's ability to produce a great amount of iron and steel was one of thc positive effects which the commercialization of Song's economy contributed to ils military logistical efforts. Following the establishment of the oflice of the Dircciorate of Armaments. the Song governmcnt had managcd io set up a hurcaucratic framework to oversee the development and maintenance of a body of knowledge in armaments technology. With this technology. the highly skilled artisans of the imperid ordnance industry were then able tu produce a formidable arsenal of gunpowder weapons that were second to none in any of the ci~ili~tions cxisiing at the same tirne. Abbreviatioaa for Cbimese Primair Sourcea {A) Primaw Source-

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