The Xavier Zubiri Review, Vol. 13, 2013-2015, pp. 57-76
Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology
Eric Weislogel Saint Joseph’s University Philadelphia, PA USA
Abstract
Ontology is defined as the study of what there is in the most general sense. Depending on the philosopher, ontology may or may not be a synonym for metaphysics. As is universally admitted, the definitions of “ontology” and “metaphysics” are generally contested, and some philosophers, such as Xavier Zubiri as we shall see, have tried to distinguish them. In this essay, I will first outline one particular position that is central to contemporary debates in ontology, a version of trope theory. In particular, the one-category “bundle theory” (the idea that things are bundles of tropes) that I will present will draw heavily (but not exclusively) from Peter Simons’ work. Ultimately, I’ve synthesized ideas from several trope-theoretical positions to formulate what I take to be somewhat strengthened version of trope theory. Let’s call this a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT). By “plausible,” I certainly don’t mean uncon- troversial, nor do I mean there could not be a more plausible trope theoretical ontology. I simply mean that if one were committed to developing a trope theoretical ontology, PTT would not be a bad place to start. Second, I will consider some significant criticisms of trope theory in general and bundle theory in particular, and how PTT might address them. Third, I will highlight key elements of Xavier Zubiri’s understanding of the nature of real objects as constitutionally sufficient unified systems of notes, which on the surface bears a resemblance to trope theory. In the process I will discuss Zubiri’s understanding of the dis- tinction and relation between metaphysics and ontology, presenting a condensed version of Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). I will compare and contrast the basic understanding of the terms “trope” and “note,” in part to determine whether Zubiri’s theory is committed to a one-category ontology. Finally, I will show the similarities and differences between PTT and ZM and raise some questions for further ontological reflection.
Resumen Ontología se define como el estudio de lo que hay en el sentido más general. Según el filóso- fo, la ontología puede o no puede ser sinónimo de la metafísica. Como se admite universal- mente, las definiciones de “ontología” y “metafísica” generalmente se disputaron, y algunos filósofos, como Xavier Zubiri como veremos, han tratado de distinguirlos. En este ensayo, voy a esbozar una primera posición particular que es central en los debates contemporá- neos en la ontología, una versión de la teoría de tropo. En particular, el de una sola catego- ría de “teoría del paquete” (la idea de que las cosas son paquetes de tropos) que presentaré se base en gran medida (pero no exclusivamente) sobre las obras de Peter Simons. En últi- ma instancia, he sintetizado las ideas de varios puestos de tropo teóricos para formular lo que estimo una versión mejor de la teoría de tropo. Vamos a llamar a esto una Teoría Plau- sible de Trope (PTT). Al decir “plausible” ciertamente no quiero decir “incontrovertible,” ni me refiero a que no podía haber un tropo ontología teórica más plausible. Simplemente quiero decir que si uno se compromete a desarrollar una ontología teórico tropo, PTT no
57 58 Eric Weislogel ______sería un mal lugar para comenzar. En segundo lugar, voy a considerar algunas críticas significativas de la teoría del tropo, en general, y el paquete teoría en particular, y cómo PTT podría abordarlos. En tercer lugar, voy a destacar los elementos claves de la comprensión de Xavier Zubiri de la naturaleza de los objetos reales como sistemas unificados constitu- cionalmente suficiente de notas, que superficialmente parece relacionada a teoría de Trope. En el proceso voy a hablar de la comprensión de Zubiri de la distinción y la relación entre la metafísica y ontología, la presentación de una versión condensada de la metafísica zubi- riano (ZM). Voy a comparar y contrastar la comprensión básica de los términos “tropo” y “nota”, en parte para determinar si la teoría de Zubiri se ha comprometido a una categoría única ontologíca. Por último, voy a mostrar las similitudes y diferencias entre PTT y ZM y plantear algunas preguntas para la reflexión ontológica.
I. Ontology and Trope Theory: Towards have the opportunity to examine one sub- a Plausible Trope Theory (PTT) set of trope theories, that of “bundle theo- ry”—in short, the idea that things are Thomas Hofweber, in his article “Logic bundles of tropes. This is what ontologists and Ontology” in the Stanford Encyclope- call a one-category ontology, meaning that dia of Philosophy,1 generalizes the issues the category of trope is, according to these of concern to contemporary ontologists as philosophers, adequate for articulating a follows: sufficient understanding of the basic na- The larger discipline of ontology can ture of real things. In the main, we will be thus be seen as having four parts: engaged with (O3) in this discussion, but (O1) the study of ontological commit- the other issues will no doubt arise. ment, i.e. what we or others are com- Allow me to address briefly a set of re- mitted to, lated questions that might arise for the reader at the outset: Is not science – in (O2) the study of what there is, particular, physics – sufficient for answer- (O3) the study of the most general fea- ing the concerns of (02) and (03)? Does not tures of what there is, and how the science tell us what there is and explain things there are relate to each other the most general features of reality? Is it in the metaphysically most general not the case that, today, metaphysics ways, simply reduces to physics?2 Does the trope-theoretical ontology to be discussed (O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. in these pages consider itself in competi- saying what task it is that the disci- tion with the ontology of science? pline of ontology should aim to ac- To fully address these concerns would complish, if any; how the questions it take us far afield of our theme here, but it aims to answer should be understood; must suffice to say that although these and with what methodology they can seem like reasonable questions, in fact, be answered. these questions rest on significant confu- In the process of addressing these sions about both science and ontology. broad concerns, ontologists involve them- Trope theorists (as is the case with most selves with a variety of specific questions mainstream ontologists and, for that mat- about objects, universals, properties, ter, Zubiri) are not concerned to develop a tropes, time, events, change, identity, sets, competing ontology. “Science,” if there is numbers, persons, free will, God, and so such a unitary thing, must necessarily on. We cannot, of course, deal with all have ontological commitments. Both work- these matters in the confines of this paper ing scientists and ontologists are, in a in the manner each deserves. Instead, we sense, triangulating towards a plausible will explore one particular ontological posi- ontological view of reality, one that tion, trope theory. Indeed, we will only squares with the practice of science but
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology 59 ______that is logically and metaphysically coher- in which the tropes “inhere.” This, of ent. So it is not a matter of an ontology course, should seem unsatisfying to one- competing with science so much as it is a category trope theorists, as it would intro- matter of (possibly) competing ontologies. duce the distinct ontological category of And it is not even necessarily a matter of substance and treat tropes as properties competing ontologies, as I hope to show in inhering in substances. But, on the other this paper, but rather of complementary hand, to say that a cue ball just is the ontological insights. Both trope theorists conglomeration of certain tropes leaves the and Zubiri mean for their philosophical theory vulnerable to saying that if a trope considerations of what there is in its basic white is over here and a trope spherical is structures to be a complement to and elu- over there and a trope weighs six ounces is cidation of the findings of the natural sci- at some third place and smooth-surfaced is ences.3 in yet another place, we’d still have a cue Tropes are “ontologically unstructured ball. That stretches credulity. (simple) abstract particulars.”4 Although Thus it is said that the “compres- Santayana first used the term “trope” in a ence”10 of these tropes constitutes the ob- philosophical sense, it is generally consid- ject. But, again, how should we under- ered that the locus classicus of trope theo- stand “compresence”? And what all is ry is an essay by Donald Williams.5 He compresent? The four tropes, white, spher- proposed that tropes (he adopts the term ical, smooth-surfaced, and weighs 6 ounc- “abstract particular”) es, are compresent, but is that compres- ence, itself, a trope? And white and spheri- …are the primary constituents of this cal are compresent - is that particular or any possible world, the very alphabet compresence a trope as well? In other of being. They not only are actual but words, are there relational tropes such as are the only actualities, in just this compresence? And if so, are there further sense, that whereas entities of all other relations between the compresence trope, categories are literally composed of itself, and the “atomic” tropes (white, them, they are not in general composed spherical, et. al.) of the kind we named? If of any other sort of entity.”6 so, does it lead to an infinite regress? And Thus, on this view, things are composed of even if that regress is infinite, is it vicious tropes and the relations of location and or benign?11 Call these sorts of relations similarity.7 Now, this understanding of “internal relations.” tropes as primitive — i.e., considered as a Of course, we have not mentioned the one-category ontology8 — leads directly to further tropes, which Williams for one the “bundle theory” of objects: objects are would countenance, of “external relations”: nothing but bundles of tropes. the compresence of the white-spherical- A question arises for bundle theory: smooth-weighs-6-ounces and the green- what makes this object (this bundle of felt-flat-surface of the pool table. Must we tropes) this object?9 Specifically, must consider such tropes, if tropes they be, in there be some substrate in which the understanding the constitution of the cue tropes inhere or which in some other fash- ball? ion binds the tropes in such a way as to And what are we to say of two identi- constitute this object? Let’s take for an cal cue balls? Is it even possible to have example a white billiard ball. Among the two identical objects at all? And what key tropes that constitute this object are about the trope “white,” which constitutes “white,” “spherical,” “smooth-surfaced,” both cue ball A and cue ball B? In classi- and “weighs six ounces.” How shall we cal ontology, the white in cue ball A and think about this? Some philosophers ar- the white in cue ball B are instantiations gue that there would have to be some who- of “whiteness,” a universal (e.g., a Platonic knows-what (Locke called it a “bare par- form). The concern with universals for ticular”) that “underlies” these tropes and trope theorists (but not only them) is that
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 60 Eric Weislogel ______they seem to commit us to ethereal, inde- Tropes are not independent things, pendently existing abstract objects, which but are ontologically dependent. However, conflicts with the commitment of modern in their bundling tropes can also yield science to a physicalist metaphysics. As something emergent, something more then mentioned, PTT is meant to be a comple- just an agglomeration, something with an ment to the modern scientific worldview, independence of its own. not an alternative to it. But if tropes are The notion of dependence, here, is still particulars rather than universals, they problematic. As we saw, one-category on- cannot be in two places at once, as uni- tologists do not want anything in their versals allegedly can be. So how does trope theory that would commit them to a sec- theory explain two white cue balls?12 ond (let alone a third or fourth) ontological Trope theory holds that tropes are particu- category. So upon what are the tropes of a lars, and so either does not countenance given thing dependent? It certainly cannot universals or reduces them to classes of be a “bare substance,” on this view. exactly similar objects (with very little Simons proposes what he calls a nu- analysis of in what “exact similarity” or clear theory to attempt to address this “exact resemblance” consists)13. question. It is a “pure” bundle theory, if I One hopes that in addressing these may put it that way, a one-category ontol- sorts of issues we can come to a better ogy. There is no thought of substance or understanding of the constitution of real an “extra” substratum or otherwise prop- objects. Setting aside the question of uni- ertyless something-or-other that bundles versals for the time being, let’s at this tropes together. Simons’s theory, though, point keep in mind that tropes ought not will hold that there is “something” upon to be considered as parts of a thing such which tropes are dependent. But can he that a thing is “made up of” tropes. De- have his cake and eat it, too? Can he hold spite the way Donald Williams puts it (see to a one-category ontology that (1) answers above), that is not the best way to under- the question of how this object is this ob- stand bundle theory’s tenets. According to ject; (2) accounts for the distinction be- Peter Simons, “Trope bundles are not tween essential and accidental features of meant to be mere collections, and certainly things, and thus accounts for the intuition not collections of self-subsistent individu- that things can indeed undergo accidental als which could first exist and then be change; (3) does not sneak in through the assembled into a whole like an army is back door some notion of substance or built by putting men together, or a ship is substratum under another guise, thus built out of divers bits of steel, etc.”14 vitiating the claims of the sufficiency of Some philosophers would say that tropes one-category ontology? are not parts but ways things are. To see what he intends by this “some- On the other hand, Simons reminds thing” that is not another ontological cate- us, gory, we have to see how Simons thinks objects are constituted. Objects can be We should not however take seriously thought to be constituted generally in two the view that tropes, whether they are (non-temporal) stages. To understand ways or not, are not entities at all. what follows, we must make a brief detour Clearly a bundle theorist cannot, be- to discuss the meaning and the weakness cause then he would be building enti- of foundation relations as Edmund Husserl ties out of non-entities. Ways and sees them. According to him, a right un- tropes are not nothing, hence they are derstanding of foundation relations will something, hence they are entities. But stave off the threat of an infinite regress they are not THING-like, if by that we that arises if two objects can only be uni- mean substance-like. They are not res, fied via some third entity. Husserl recog- they are rei or rerum.15 nizes two forms of foundation relations that are immune to this threat:
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An individual A is weakly founded on ly dubious—again, PTT intends to com- an individual B iff A is necessarily such plement science. Second, it treats place as that it cannot exist unless B exists. a substratum—just what one-category trope theory hopes to avoid. Finally, it For instance, if B is an essential proper makes the whole idea of movement (and part of A, then A cannot exist without B identity throughout movement) to be mys- (or any other of A’s essential proper parts). terious. On this (mistaken) view, a trope is There is, however, a second type of what it is based on the place it occupies, foundation relation recognized by Husserl: so if it were to move (along with the thing A is strongly founded on B iff A is weak- it comprises) it would cease to be what it is ly founded on B and B is not a part of (and the thing it comprises would no long- A. er be the same thing). None of these solutions captures what Strong foundation works like this: A can- our intuitions tell us: that things have not exist unless B exists, but B is not a properties that can change while the thing part of A. For instance, a color trope could remains the “same” thing. Traditional sub- not exist without an extension trope, but stratum theory would be a strong con- extension is not part of color. tender for a satisfactory explanation were One can wonder, however, whether it not for the fact that, as we have seen, these conceptions are really helpful or the notion of “substratum,” itself, is highly whether they are not, in fact, merely vague problematic. 16 and confusing. Simon proposes this puz- Simons’ own proposal for understand- zler: ing the constitution of objects applies a Suppose that A and B are strongly mu- somewhat different concept of foundation tually founding, that is, neither is part relation, although it owes much to Hus- of the other, and neither can exist with- serl. out the other. We may now ask, what is Firstly, two particulars are said to be it about A and B that makes this so? directly foundationally related if either Consider that it may be an essential is founded, whether weakly or strongly, proper part of a Dry Erase Marker that it on the other. Two particulars are then be some color (there can be no Dry Erase foundationally related iff they bear the Marker that is no color at all), and yet that ancestral of the relation of direct foun- fact alone does not account for the fact dational relatedness to one another. A that some Dry Erase Markers are red. Si- collection forms a foundational system mons chalks up the problem to Husserl’s iff every member in it is foundationally carelessness about what holds at the spe- related in it to every other, and none is cies level and what holds at the instance foundationally related to anything level. Color is such (viz., as species) that it which is not a member of the collection. requires (is strongly founded upon) exten- If A is either weakly or strongly found- sion. But a given instance of an extended ed on B or if B is weakly or strongly object, while requiring color, does not re- founded on A, then A is directly founda- quire an instance of red. tionally related to B. So Husserl’s solution to our problem The condition, “bears the ancestral of of the constitution of particular entities is the relation” (in this case of direct founda- insufficient. tional relatedness) is derived from Frege. In an effort to have this thing be this Edward N. Zalta explains it by an example: thing, what about if we say that A and B are compresent if they are at the same The intuitive idea is easily grasped if we place, P? Simons objects that, first, it pre- consider the relation x is the father of y. supposes an absolute concept of place or Suppose that a is the father of b, that b space that is physically and metaphysical- is the father of c, and that c is the fa-
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ther of d. Then Frege's definition of ‘x is a plausible trope theory (call it “PTT”). In an ancestor of y in the fatherhood- the next section, we will explore several series’ ensured that a is an ancestor of objections to trope theory and its at- b, c, and d, that b is an ancestor of c tendant bundle theory ontology. and d, and that c is an ancestor of d.17 II. Criticisms of Trope- and Bundle- In the present case, foundational relations Theories can be traced back to the direct founda- tional relations in the given object. That A. Problems with tropes object, here considered as a foundational Jerrold Levinson, in his “Why There system, is such if and only if every mem- Are No Tropes,”21 supplies many of the ber (here: trope) in it is foundationally re- reasons some philosophers have rejected lated to every other member (trope) in it, trope theory. and none is foundationally related to any- First of all, says Levinson, a trope is thing that is not a member of that collec- defined as a particularized attribute. Now, tion of tropes. This gives the object its “in- there are two kinds of attributes, proper- dependence” and its organic unity. ties and qualities. Levinson defines “prop- So consider a collection of co- erty” as follows: occurring mutually founding tropes. This Properties are exemplified by being red, collection forms a foundational system being heavy, being wise, being viva- (every member of the collection is founda- cious, being a bachelor, and are stand- tionally related to every other member and ardly designated by gerundive expres- not to any non-member). This foundation- sions, most notably, ‘being _____’. They al system forms the nucleus of the object. are conceptualized as conditions ob- It is the individual essence or individual jects can be in, and are not quantiza- nature of the thing.18 It is not a mere col- ble, that is, not things an object can lection of tropes, but a “connected unity”.19 have more or less of. In other words, But this will most likely not be a complete they are indivisible, non-partitionable thing, as it will also have a variety of other things. Properties can also be con- properties. Considered as tropes, non- ceived, although awkwardly, as being- essential properties can be borne in a a-certain-ways, that is, as entities that strong foundational relation with the nu- have ways of being, or ways things can cleus. These leave us with a view of objects be, at their core. that is consistent with our intuition that things (thought of in terms of the nucleus) On the other hand, “qualities” can change (by addition or subtractions of …are exemplified by redness, heavi- non-nuclear tropes) and remain the same ness, wisdom, vivacity, and are stand- thing (again, in terms of the nuclear foun- ardly designated by abstract nouns. dational trope system). Simons asserts They are conceptualized as stuffs of an that his theory combines the best of bun- abstract sort, and thus as a rule as dle and substratum theories.20 That which quantizable, that is, as things an object plays the role of substratum avoids the can have more or less of. In other who-knows-what character of the tradi- words, they are inherently divisible or tional view of substratum — it is, itself, partitionable things. nothing but a nucleus of mutually found- ed essential tropes. Given this understanding of the terms, The preceding was a brief introduction Levinson notes that tropes would have to to the idea of tropes, of one-category on- be particularized qualities. Tropes cannot tology, and some of the issues with which be “particularized properties,” as that trope theory must contend. In particular, I phrase, says Levinson, is oxymoronic. have singled out Peter Simon’s “nuclear” Properties cannot be quantized or parti- version of “bundle theory” as the basis for tioned. So if there are tropes, they would
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology 63 ______have to be particularized qualities (i.e., mately presuppose attribute thought. abstract stuff). Thus tropes are not only either inco- But can there be particularized ab- herent or unbelievable posits, but met- stract stuff? Only if there can be abstract aphysically otiose ones as well.25 stuff (i.e., qualities) in the first place. On In this thoroughgoing attack on the very reflection, Levinson came to think that idea of tropes (abstract particular attrib- such abstract stuff is incredible. There utes), Levinson raises many other objec- cannot be qualities, bits of stuff that are tions that I shall leave to one side. The somehow like material bits of stuff but upshot is that Levinson finds conceiving of abstract, and so there cannot be particu- tropes as particularized attributes is high- larized qualities. So there cannot be ly problematic, if not completely implausi- tropes. ble or incredible. He notes, however, that if Levinson takes Williams to task on his tropes are conceived some other way, then idea that there are “subtle parts” of objects this particular set of criticisms may very in addition to “gross” parts. Williams’ well not hold. Levinson writes, somewhat famous example is of three var- iously similar lollipops.22 Each lollipop has Thus, if tropes are proposed as non- an exactly similar “gross” part: their re- attribute-like abstract particulars of spective sticks. But they also share exactly some sort, their claim to recognition is similar “subtle” parts, such as their shape. not touched by what I have said here. Levinson finds the latter “parts” to be in- Similarly, if tropes are proposed as credible. How can there be parts that are property instantiations or property ex- non-decomposable and intangible? What emplifications, then since these are is it to say that an object is “made up of” simply varieties of states of affairs, they (in part) its shape?23 too are unaffected by the brief I have Simons, as we have seen, does not go presented. But in the sense of tropes as as far as Williams in claiming that tropes originally introduced into modern phil- are “parts,” but Levinson still objects to osophical discussion, that is, as par- Simon’s talk of tropes as “particularized ticularized, necessarily unshareable, at- ways” things are. Tropes, by definition, are tributes, able to serve as the primitive particulars (and not universals and thus building blocks of a coherent alterna- shareable). But even though it is clear that tive ontology, there are, I maintain, no for two objects, A and B, which seem to tropes.26 share a particular way of being, W, that A’s being W and B’s being W are different B. Problems with bundles (by the simple fact that A is not B), never- Even if Levinson’s objections to tropes theless there is no reason for not saying as the building blocks of all reality, as that W, itself, is exactly similar (or identi- Williams would put it, can be answered, cal) in each case. For instance, if W = what are we to make of the attendant “weighs 10 pounds”, there is no reason to “Bundle Theory” of objects? The notion think that W is not a shared attribute. Ten that objects are nothing but bundles of pounds is ten pounds. tropes is problematic. Even in a fairly so- Levinson criticizes Cynthia MacDon- phisticated bundle theory as that pro- ald’s proposals for tropes24 by saying, in posed earlier by Peter Simons, wherein effect, that trope theory is less explanatori- there is both a nucleus of essential tropes ly efficient than traditional (universal at- to which other, adventitious tropes adhere tribute) theory. Levinson writes, in some way, is open to significant ques- Standard attribute thought doesn’t tioning. need tropes, whereas trope thought, as- To meet the criterion of self-identity of suming there were any good reasons to objects, tropes must be compresent. This think there were tropes, would ulti- notion is under-analyzed in the literature,
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 64 Eric Weislogel ______however. We’ve already seen some issues culmination of his lifetime of philosophical that arise with this notion of compresence, endeavors. That book, entitled Man and including the fact that it may imply an God (El Hombre y Dios), was left uncom- unwarranted conception of absolute space pleted.30 Although Man and God is an am- and time. In addition, as Maurin points bitious and wide-ranging work, it does out, either compresence is an “internal” provide a convenient summary of Zubiri’s relation, in which case the tropes that are metaphysical vision of reality as it was laid compresent must always be compresent27 - out in his earlier works, especially On Es- - an unacceptable consequence -- or com- sence31 (Sobre la esencia)32 and The Dy- presence is an “external” relation, which namic Structure of Reality33 (La estructura would then lead to different metaphysical- dinimica de la realidad).34 ly unpalatable consequences (viz., Brad- Zubiri would make a distinction be- ley's Regress28). Again, the question is al- tween the terms metaphysics and ontology, ways: What makes this object this object? viewing the latter as founded upon the former. For Zubiri, reality is not merely a C. A brief rejoinder from PTT field of things. Thus to understand what The Plausible Theory of Tropes I've contemporary ontology might learn from a been sketching in this paper may be able Zubirian point of view, it is important to to address some of the key objections lev- establish what Zubiri means by the word eled by Levinson, generally by taking a cue “reality.” from Levinson's own parting remarks. The He begins his discussion by saying strategy would be, first, not to conceive of that “everything real is constituted by cer- tropes in the traditional language of at- tain notes.”35 Each note exhibits two mo- tributes (whether properties, qualities, or ments of a thing. First, each note “be- ways). Second, discussion of tropes should longs” to the thing, and, second, each note take place in terms of states of affairs. serves to determine what the thing is to However, this latter piece of advice which it “belongs.” I put the term “belongs” raises other sorts of problems. If a particu- in scare-quotes to indicated that there is lar state of affairs consists in part of a not a relationship between, on the one “property instantiation” or “property ex- hand, a thing and, on the other, a note. emplification,” we are still left with the Certainly, for Zubiri, there is no “thing” problem of the means of that instantiation that has a metaphysical (let alone tem- or exemplification. Or we could put it this poral) priority over its notes. His example: way: what are we talking about when we heat is a note of a thing, and heat deter- talk about properties in this case? We re- mines that the thing is a hot thing (and turn, thus, to the problem universals, and not some other kind of thing). Zubiri however we solve it, we are sure to be spurns the traditional term “property” in committing ourselves to at least a two- his exposition because of his objection to category ontology. In other words, there the traditional coupling of property with might be tropes, but there has to be more substance. On this traditional view, sub- than tropes. stance is conceived as a subject in which PTT, which is committed to a one- properties inhere. I like to call a simplistic category ontology, might propose the fol- version of this traditional substance- lowing workaround for this objection: metaphysics the “Mr. Potatohead Meta- states of affairs are adequately describable physics.” Mr. Potatohead is a children’s toy in terms of abstract particulars that are that consists in a brown ovoid plastic po- the constituents (not parts) of a given state tato with a variety of small holes in it, as of affairs.29 well as a separate set of attributes (eyes, mustache, ears, lips, etc) that can be in- III. Zubirian Metaphysics terchangeably plugged into the holes, thus At the time of his death, Zubiri was at giving Mr. Potatohead a variety of possible work on a book that was, in effect, the looks. On the simplistic view of substance-
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology 65 ______metaphysics that Zubiri rejects, the “pota- - something “physical” (by which term he to” represents the substance and the ears, does not mean simply material; he is dis- lips, eyes, etc., represent the properties. tinguishing “physical” from “theoretical” or Zubiri objects to the Lockean idea that “conceptive,” which are mere for Zubiri). there must be something underlying the Only certain kinds of things can appre- features or properties that is in itself, hend reality. To illustrate this point, Zubiri somehow, featureless.36 compares humans and dogs as they en- But what is reality? For Zubiri, reality counter heat. For a dog, heat is the signal is the fact that notes belong to a thing in for a certain response (move away, come their own right.37 The “in their own right” closer). That just is heat for a dog, and, if I is the key. This is the formality of reality. may put it this way, it’s all about the dog. To be formally real, a thing must have its But for a human, heat is a warming, and notes in its own right. Notes cannot simply not simply a stimulus invoking a response. be imputed to a thing, nor can they be It might invoke a response in a human, for simply signs of a stimulus-response rela- instance if the heat causes discomfort in tion if the thing to which the notes belong the human. But the human apprehends is to be a real thing. What does this mean? the heat in its own right, immediately (i.e., Suppose I imagine I am experiencing a does not have to reason towards that as a dragon. The dragon is large, green, scaly, conclusion). and fire-breathing. But none of these This, by the way, is the answer to notes of the dragon belong to the dragon “Cartesian anxiety” concerning the “exteri- in their own right, but are merely imputed or world.” How do I know there is a world by me. Thus the “dragon” is not real (be- “out there” that’s not just in my head? cause “its” notes do not belong to “it” in Zubiri answers: Before you even come to their own right). Take another example: I know the world at all you apprehend the am at work on a table. Its notes include otherness, the in-its-own-rightness, of that it is a fine workspace and it is aes- things. That is a precondition of knowing thetically pleasing. According to Zubiri, a (and hence questioning) anything at all. table is not a real thing - or as he puts it This capacity of human beings forms the more informatively - a table is a “meaning- basis of what Zubiri calls “sentient intelli- thing” but not a “reality-thing.” Yes, there gence.” is a real thing here in my office, a thing We can see – as we always do in met- whose notes belong to it in its own right. aphysical exploration – that the epistemo- That thing has a certain mass, shape, logical quickly enters into the discussion. physical makeup, etc. It is a physical ob- However, what Zubiri is describing here is ject. The fact that it is a “table” is a func- not, at bottom, epistemological but meta- tion of my having a need for this physical physical. He is not addressing the ques- object according to some project I am pur- tion of how we know but of what reality is. suing. Tables do not have their notes as Reality is not a function of human know- tables in their own right, but only as im- ing; rather, he says that reality is “activat- puted by some person or other. Meaning- ed” in sentient intelligence.39 Reality is things are not independent from reality- neither a concept nor an idea. Reality is things, of course, and certain reality- fundamental and, for Zubiri, an obvious things and not others have the capacity to fact. Where we philosophers go wrong is in be certain meaning-things. As Zubiri says, the “entification of reality”40—adopting the the reality-thing water has no capacity to idea that reality = things, and the “logifica- be a table.38 tion of intellection”41—the idea that reality How do we know that certain things is a function of predication. are real? We apprehend reality directly, To continue, things (generally) have a says Zubiri. Reality is not a concept or variety of notes, and real things have those abstraction nor is it the conclusion of a notes in their own right. Those notes form line of reasoning. It is - as he likes to put it a unity, but that unity—the unity of a real
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 66 Eric Weislogel ______thing—is not simply an additive unity but Zubiri does not think the “more” is a systematic unity. A real thing is a unified some extra thing, even though every real system of notes. What does this mean? thing is not just the sum of notes, not just Zubiri explains that every note of a thing a string of notes. Each note is constitu- should be understood as a “note-of” the tional in character, and the system of thing. In other words, there are no free- notes has constitutional sufficiency— floating notes, and a thing is not a mere meaning that this systematic unity is suf- conglomeration of pre-existing notes. To ficient for constituting this thing. The for- say that a note is always a note-of is to say mal notes (as opposed to the “adventi- that a note is what it is as a function of all tious” notes, notes that are a function of the rest of the notes of the thing. And it is the thing’s relationship with other things to imply that the thing is what it is solely in the world) in their systematic unity just as a function of the notes that it possesses are the real thing; they constitute the real in its own right.42 There is no Mr. Potato- thing. So where is the “more”? head apart from his notes, and the sys- Here, Zubiri makes another important tematic unity of his notes just is Mr. Pota- distinction. He coins another term, sub- tohead. The unity makes the notes to be stantivity, and then opposes it to “sub- what they are, and the notes make the stantiality.” The latter term refers to Aris- unity what it is. The key here is the prepo- totle’s (and St. Thomas’) notion of sub- sition “of.” Zubiri says that the “of” is a stance. In Zubirian terms, a substantivity moment of a thing’s reality. Things are, in is not a substance. The way Zubiri would effect, particular forms of “of-y-ness” (if put it, each organism is one substantivity you will forgive me this atrocious locution). comprising a multitude of “substances.” So is Zubiri saying something like, “A He gives the example of the substance, thing is nothing more than its notes”? No, glucose. It is a substance, not an “acci- he is not. Every note, insofar as it is a dent.” But it is taken up by an organism note-of, always points to something (say, a human being) in such a way that it “more.”43 Your notes, for instance, are loses its (on Aristotelian terms) substanti- “your notes”—not mine or anyone else’s. ality as it becomes note-of the human be- Your notes are notes at all only because ing. Zubiri reserves the term “substance” they are yours. It is not as if there is a big in the contemporary sense of “stuff” or bucket of notes somewhere and someone “material.” Things are substantivities.44 (say, God) grabs up a bunch of these pre- Again, this is the reason Zubiri wants existing notes and glues them together to speak of “notes” rather than “proper- and comes up with you. If that were the ties.” On Aristotelian terms, properties case, you would be nothing more than inhere in a subject (the word “sub-ject” these glued-together notes. Hume perhaps literally means “thrown underneath”). For thought something like this. There is no Zubiri, notes cohere among themselves, “substance” at all (that’s just a manner of comprising a systematic unity. The sys- speaking); all there is are properties. But tematic unity is substantivity. that is not what Zubiri is saying. He does Further, Zubiri makes the distinction not think that Hume’s position is defensi- between notes that are constitutive and ble. What would it mean to say that there notes that are not constitutive. All notes, is “big” or “green” or even “hairy” all by says Zubiri, are constitutional; some are themselves? If that is incoherent, things constitutive. He gives the example of “all won’t get any better if you string them white cats with blue eyes are deaf.”45 He together into a “big-green-hairy”—all by says these notes are constitutional (of itself it won’t result in a big, green, hairy blue-eyed, deaf, white cats), but not con- monster. You need something more. But stitutive. Why not? Because these notes the “more” is the question. Is it a sub- are “grounded in others.” What others? stance, something in some way “independ- The notes of the cat’s genes. These genetic ent” of the accidents? notes are constitutive of the cat (i.e., ac-
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology 67 ______count for its bare existence, so to speak), The unity of the system of notes de- unless of course science comes to show termine a thing’s “interiority,” what Zubiri that genetic notes are further grounded in calls its in. These notes form a constitu- more “fundamental” notes. But this, he tional systemic unity. But at the same says, is a matter for biology, not philoso- time, notes project outward. This is the phy.46 system’s ex. Zubiri, then, defines dimen- Compare this to Aristotle’s under- sion as “the projection of the whole ‘in’ into standing of the structure of the human the ‘ex.’”48 Each constitutional sufficiency soul. According to him, that structure is (laypersons call that a “thing”) has multi- based on functions. For instance, there ple dimensions, multiple ways it projects are the rational functions of the soul. “itself” outwards. And each dimension What mechanism allows for these func- projects the entire unity of the system of tions (e.g., brain, neurons, central nervous notes. system, etc.) is a biological question. The Even though notes are always “notes- metaphysical question is: What are the of,” each note, itself, is a form of reality. constitutive functions of any human being They are real. “The color green is the (no matter how they happen)? Or in other greenish form of reality.”49 An entire sys- words, what functions are essential if a tem of notes as a constituted reality is a thing is to be a human being? This is form of reality. There are various forms of something like what Zubiri is after here. reality. Zubiri says that the notes of a liv- He finds the essence of things in their ing being are “reduced to physico-chemical constitutive notes, the systematic unity of elements.”50 The living being qua living notes that are not grounded upon other being, however, has its own form of reality notes and that are necessary and constitu- (different from a star or a stone, he says). tionally sufficient for the thing. He writes, The corollary to this is that a living being is not reducible to its physico-chemical The constitutive notes comprise the elements. Those are different forms of real- radical subsystem of substantivity: they ity.51 are its essence. Essence is the struc- You might say that they are different tural principle of substantivity. It is not realities, but for Zubiri reality is always the correlate of a definition. It is the numerically one. There is just one reality, system of notes necessary and suffi- but it is comprised of multiple forms of cient so that a substantive reality may reality. And each form of reality deter- have its remaining constitutional notes, mines how that reality is “implanted” in including adventitious notes.”47 the one reality. Personhood, for instance, Here again, Zubiri is distinguishing is a “way of being implanted in reality.”52 himself from Aristotle. He is trying to de- Zubiri summarizes: fine what the essence of something is. [E]verything real, be it an elemental Traditionally, essence is presented in note or substantive system, has two terms of an idea or a definition. For in- moments. There is the moment of hav- stance classically, the essence of a human ing these notes: this is suchness. And being was to be an appropriate body with there is the moment of having form and a rational soul. A human being is an “em- mode of reality; which technically I bodied soul.” shall call ‘transcendental,’ designating For Zubiri, this seems “definitional,” with this term, not a concept, but a merely a way of speaking. For him, the physical moment….53 essence of anything is the substantive system of constitutive notes. That’s the We said that a substantive reality is technical definition of (the word) “essence,” “more” than the sum of its notes. What is but essence is not a technical definition. It the “more,” we wanted to know. It is not a is a reality. subject, a subjectum, that is standing un- der an array of properties. Zubiri writes,
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Each real thing, through its moment of Notice at this point that Zubiri is not reality, is “more” than what it is saying “in relation,” because a relation through the mere content of its notes. implies that there are at least two separate The moment of reality, in fact, is nu- things that then come together in that merically identical when I apprehend relation. But openness is a constitutive several things as a unit. This means element of anything real to be real at all. that the moment of reality is, in each To be the note that it is, the note has to real thing, an open moment. It is already be open to other notes and be con- “more” than the notes, because it is stituted by its openness to other notes. open to everything else. This is the Relations can only come after this consti- openness of the real. The openness is tutional openness, are only possible be- not of conceptual character. Nor is it cause of this openness of the real. If there the case that the concept of reality can were no openness of the real, there could be applied to several real things; rather, never be any relationships at all. There are reality is a moment physically open in thus systems of systems of notes, based in itself. That is the reason why transcen- the end on the most fundamental or con- dentality is not a mere concept, com- stitutive notes (in biology, this might be mon to everything real; transcendental- the notes of genes; in physics, perhaps it ity is not community. It is actually is superstrings). about a physical moment of communi- This insight leads Zubiri to a further cation.54 point about reality, the difference between relationality and respectivity. He says, “The moment of reality is numerically “Everything real, both in its suchness and identical,” just means there is one reality. in its reality, is intrinsically respective.”55 Each “thing” has its form of reality and He writes, “Respectivity remits [“sends each collection of things (say, a landscape) forward”] each real thing to another.” Real has its form of reality. But there is just things are like this because of their consti- one reality. tutive openness. The ground of the in-its- The “more” of each substantive reality own-rightness is respectivity. Each real lies in its openness to everything else. A thing is what it is in its respectivity to- tree is a tree and as such it is open in its wards what else is, in its constitutive implantation in reality to be an element of (which means “that which makes some- the landscape (which in turn has its own thing to be what it is”) openness. Each real form of reality, different from the mode of thing is implanted in reality in a determi- reality of the tree). Zubiri calls this the nate way, based on its capacities for re- openness of the real. When Zubiri writes, spectivity, based on its role (so to speak) in “transcendentality is not community; it is the system. The thing determines the sys- actually about a physical moment of tem and the system determines the thing – communication,” he means that openness and all this is before anything like “rela- does not merely mean that things can be tionships” develop. This is a constitutive set next to each other and considered as a fact – not a choice or an option, not just a collection of things, a “community” of way of looking at things – according to things. He means that openness of the real Zubiri. entails that all things are communicating (in a manner of speaking) with each other; Nothing is real if it is not “its own” re- they are being together essentially because ality, and nothing is “its own” reality anything real is always open to everything unless it has to be, by virtue of being else. Respectivity is always necessary; re- constitutively open. […] The result is lations are possibly accidental, but always that every real thing is open “towards” and necessarily founded on (prior) respec- other real things, and each form and tivity. mode of reality is open to other modes and forms of reality.”56
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Radical respectivity is not thing-to- mans (or something with consciousness) thing but mode/form of reality-to- experience something does that something mode/form of reality. So, for Zubiri, the exist. This is called “idealism,” and it has world – and there can be only one – is “the its roots in Platonic thinking. Idealism respective unity of all realities insofar as holds that what is real is the idea. Plato they are realities.” There might be more thought the ideas—the forms—were the than one cosmos, by which Zubiri means most real things and that they somehow an already constituted system of things possessed eternal being. Other idealists (maybe there are other possible kosmoi, think ideas are only found in people’s i.e., a multiverse), but there can only be minds. In either case, there is a distinction one world, one reality. What Zubiri is say- between idealism and materialism (which ing here does not contradict what we said holds that what is real is matter). above about there being one reality, that Zubiri is neither an idealist nor a ma- reality is “numerically always one.” Ulti- terialist in the classical senses of these mate reality is this total respective unity of terms. He is a philosopher of reality, and all modes and forms of reality that, to one for him both ideas and matter are real. implanted in reality in that way, certainly That means reality is not based on ideas feels like the “only” reality, and that makes or on matter; rather, these are based on the forms/modes of reality of others seem (or founded in) reality. like different “realities”. One world, one So Zubiri is, in a sense, equating “ac- ultimate reality. tuality” with being manifest to us, having And that reality is respective. Even if a role in our reality. “Actualness” is just there were only one real thing, it would be the idea that real things are (and, as real, “formally respective in and of itself.” It are open and respective). Things attain would be its own world. actuality as a function of sentient intelli- Zubiri makes a further distinction be- gence. There would be actualness without tween actuality and actualness. He ex- sentient intelligence, but not actuality plains that actualness is just like St. Zubiri writes that “Whatever is real Thomas’ understanding of act. It is the because of its respectivity is real as a opposite of potency. Actuality—and he function of the other real things. This is thinks this word is the one most philoso- the functionality of the real.”57 Now, every- phers equate with Thomas’s idea of “act”— thing is real because of its respectivity, so for Zubiri means, in effect, the way in everything that is real is real as a function which any real thing is here, now. Virus- of other things. es—his example—were always real, always “Function” is a familiar Aristotelian had actualness (there were not mere po- term, but the functional analysis that tencies). But humans didn’t always know Zubiri presents differs markedly from Aris- about viruses, didn’t always have to deal totle’s functional analysis of the human with viruses. Viruses were not a part of soul, for example. Functionality points to our reality, so to speak. But now they are. something deeper in the actualness of real Now, they are actual, they have actualized, things. Before anything can have a func- they have actuality. Actuality is founded tion (ergon) or a set of functions in the upon (or grounded by) “prior” actualness Aristotelian sense, it must be recognized (the founding/grounding is not temporal, that all real things are what they are as a of course). function of everything else. Zubiri means Why is Zubiri making this point? He the word “function” in something like the wants us to see the relationship between sense of “My buying Elton John tickets what is real, on the one hand, and what was a function of wanting to see him in we know to be real, what we experience as concert.” Buying tickets is nothing at all real, on the other. There are those philos- except with reference to the show and my ophers—Bishop Berkeley, to give one ex- wanting to go to it. However, Zubiri does ample—who like to think that only if hu- not necessarily mean function in the sense
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 70 Eric Weislogel ______of something I do, some act or set of acts I i.e, would have to make reference to our perform. He means function as in “func- human way of apprehending reality, in tion-of” (as he means note as in “note-of”). order even to get started. This is more or less a restatement of the Having brought to light some of the lesson that any “thing” is a constitutional- key ideas of Zubiri’s quite elaborate meta- ly sufficient system of real notes, and both physical vision—and before attempting to the notes and the system they comprise map his work onto contemporary discus- are constitutively open to the rest of reali- sion in ontology—we should pause to ty. The notes determine the thing; the highlight some key questions and prob- thing determines the notes; and everything lems raised by this work. determines (in one way or another) every- 1. Have we hit bottom? thing else. This is not because we think it’s this way; it’s because it is this way. In philosophy, starting points matter. Everything is the way it is as a function of Despite the last century’s philosophical the way everything else is.58 preoccupation with anti-foundationalism, Finally, Zubiri makes a distinction be- anyone hoping to develop a systematic tween being, the province of ontology, and theory—especially of reality, itself—has to reality, the province of metaphysics. He make a start somewhere, beyond which bases that distinction on the difference the theory cannot go. All sensible philoso- between actuality and actualness. Being is phers agree that at some point one has to to reality as actuality is to actualness. The put one’s foot down, so to speak, and ac- latter term in each pair is the ground or cept that other philosophers can always foundation for the former term in each question this starting point. There is no pair. A key implication of this distinction getting around this, and we must remain is that whatever we say in ontology ought humble about our choices of principles. to be grounded in reality, properly Zubiri—in some ways like Descartes— grasped. In On Essence, Zubiri makes a begins his metaphysical quest from an conceptual cut in this manner: experiential or epistemological standpoint. Reality, for Zubiri, is the foundation for all The view from without inward is a way that follows. There is no getting outside, of viewing as inhesion and leads to a underneath, or beyond reality. But we “get theory of the categories of being. The at it” immediately. We apprehend the “in- view from within outward is a view of its-own-right-ness” of things (and do not actualization or projection and leads to have to argue towards it or deduce it). It is a theory of the dimensions of reality. our starting point. These two manners of viewing are not Now, there is a long-standing drive in incompatible; rather, both are neces- thought for “objectivity,” a point of view sary for an adequate theory of reality.59 that is not any particular point of view, a Real things are unified systems of position that is absolute, and this for fear notes in their own right that can be un- that a subjective and relative position derstood from the point of view of either could only yield a parochial theory, per- the “in” (the “of-y-ness” of the respective haps no better than a idiosyncratic taste notes) or the “ex” (the outward projection, or predilection. This purported Holy Grail the dimensions, the actualness of the of theory has been described as view of thing as a function of all other things). things as if we never existed.60 But is such Zubiri would say that an Aristotelian- a goal attainable? I think not. I know of no inspired category ontology can (and must) one who has fundamentally doubted the be developed based on the former perspec- veridicality of one’s own general experience tive, just as a metaphysics of reality in all (even accounting for error as a modulation its dimensions would need to be developed of the veridicality of experience). It seems, on the latter. The latter project would have to me anyway, acceptable to start with this to take into account sentient intelligence, reality that we apprehend directly in its
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“in-its-own-right-ness” and see where this count for the difference between things. methodological starting point leads us. But what differentiates one note from an- One possible objection that could be other? Is it that notes, themselves, have levied against this option can be drawn notes? Does this lead to some sort of re- from deconstructions of what is called the gress? Would such a regress be vicious or “metaphysics of presence,” the idea that benign? being is not fully, transparently present to 3. What accounts for the systematic unity? apprehension but subject to position in I.e., why are there certain things rather differential systems and temporal deferring than others? (what Derrida called différance). Zubiri’s thought, I might argue, tends to be im- Again, to say that different things dif- mune from such criticism. A defense fer due to the different notes that form stems from the distinction Zubiri makes their systematic unity raises the question between reality and being and with the of why are there different systematic uni- notions of “openness,” “functionality,” and ties? What even accounts for these uni- “respectivity.” However, this argument ties? cannot be made here. Suffice it to say that 4. Is there a phenomenological basis of any philosophical position – including de- metaphysics, and if so is this legitimate? construction—has a certain “aboutness.” This may be a complementary ques- To the extent that a philosophical position tion to the first one raised here. I think we is not just meaningless chatter, it has an would agree that there is a difference be- object. Deconstruction is, to my mind, still tween asking about what there is and ask- too wedded to a philosophy of language. ing about what we apprehend that there Zubiri’s philosophy—while not reverting to is. We would all wager, I’m sure, that there pre-Kantian naïveté—is about reality. are things we do not apprehend (to say 2. What is the ontological status of nothing of comprehend). Does Zubiri’s “notes”? principle, that reality is apprehended im- But what, exactly, in addition to the mediately by sentient intelligence, leave us formality of reality (i.e., the “in-its-own- with a merely subjective or correlationist right-ness”), do we apprehend? What is, view of reality? Has he, in spite of himself, besides the formality, the content of that missed the point that reality exceeds our basic apprehension? It is the notes of indi- apprehension? This is the gist of the vidual things. Zubiri holds that “there is knock on Kant made by Quentin Meil- nothing real that is not individual.”61 lassoux.62 Kant rightly recognized that Those individual things are unified sys- human modes of apprehension deny ac- tems of notes. Now, we know that Zubiri cess to things-in-themselves – his “Coper- does not think that notes themselves are nican revolution.” But then Kant, says things, and so he does not hold to some Meillassoux, limits reality to what is struc- idea that things are mere conglomerations tured by the structure of reason— of notes. But what exactly is the ontologi- “correlationism.” Meillassoux suggests cal status of notes? How shall we think that Kant should have quit while he was about what he is calling notes? Notes are ahead, having undone anthropocentric not the imputation of human beings. They notions of reality. The problem, it seems to are realities or forms of reality (if not me, however, is that there is no way to not things). But what does this mean, ulti- have some degree of “correlation” between mately? In many ways, “notes” is an our thought and our world. Otherwise, our unanalyzed concept in Zubiri’s thought. thoughts are about nothing and the world What accounts for the fact there are differ- infinitely withdraws. Certainly, we cannot ent notes? Different things are different plumb the depths of reality with anything because they are each a systematic unity like comprehensiveness, let alone com- of different notes. It is the notes that ac- pleteness. There is an irreducible mystery
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 72 Eric Weislogel ______to being. But this does not mean we can (that are likewise respective). The core or make no headway in trying to understand essence is a matter for science to deter- reality to some extent. It is a story for an- mine (for instance, that it is the genetic other time, but Zubiri’s analysis of sen- material of organic beings that constitutes tient intelligence may provide substantial the essence of those beings). That there is tools for the project of understanding reali- such a core is a “physical” (i.e., not merely ty that does not simply determine things theoretical or conceptive) fact. Is there a to be correlates of thought or conscious- “more” to O? Yes, but only in the (im- ness. portant) sense of “transcendence in”, as As we will now see, Zubiri’s philoso- Zubiri puts it—in other words, in the phy is hardly the only one open to these openness of the real, i.e., vis-à-vis respec- kinds of questions and objections. tivity. (b) PTT, while not countenancing a IV. Conclusions: Similarities, differ- featureless substratum, nevertheless holds ences, and some further questions that there is a core or nucleus of mutually Clearly, similarities and differences founding tropes, each of which is founded exist between a plausible trope theory upon the others members and none of (“PTT”) and Zubirian metaphysics (ZM). Let which is founded upon any non-member. us explore some of them. This nucleus might then serve as a one- 1. Both Zubiri and PTT reject what I’ve way foundation for other tropes that might called the “Mr. Potatohead” substance- themselves be founded on other non- attributes ontology. Both ZM and PTT re- members of this essential nucleus. ject the idea of an underlying who-knows- (c) We can see, therefore, that ZM and what to which adhere various properties. PTT have similar intuitions as to the suffi- Both find the trouble with this notion of cient constitution of any object, O. But in underlying subject (or bare substance) to neither case is there some thing in addi- be that it is an empty notion. A that- tion to the notes or tropes that constitute which-lacks-any-features-in-its-own-right O. is literally unthinkable. 4. Neither ZM nor PTT accepts the ex- 2. Both ZM and PTT (as opposed to, istence of free-floating notes/tropes. How- say, Williams’ understanding of trope the- ever, there is a difference. ory), reject the Humean version of bundle (a) PTT seems to agree with all trope theory. ZM rejects it as strictly insufficient theories (whether they be exclusive or an to account for the constitution and identi- element of a multi-category ontology) in ty of things, and PTT rejects it for its in- seeing tropes as abstract particulars that soluble logical difficulties, as outlined have an “identity” of their own. Tropes above. come ready made, so to speak (despite 3. Nevertheless, both ZM and PTT rec- their not being free floating). Levinson, as ognize the importance for reasons of object we saw, criticized this position on a num- identity (especially through change and ber of fronts, but a key complaint is that over time) to posit something that counts this conception of trope would automati- as the essence of the thing that remains cally entail at least one additional ontolog- (essentially) the same over time and ical category: a universal. It would do so through change. because to even understand the trope is to (a) ZM maintains that an object, O, is see a trope as a token of a type (and there a unified system of notes whose essence is seems no getting around this with the its irreducible core of fundamental, consti- suspect notion of “exact similarity”). tutionally sufficient constitutive notes. The (b) ZM, on the other hand, finds the unification of the system is a function of “identity” of any note to be a function of all the respectivity or openness of reality – the the other notes to which it is both respec- notes of O are what they are as a function tive and open. In other words, a note is of (or with respect to) all of the other notes what it is because of all the other notes of
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 Zubiri and Contemporary Ontology 73 ______the object as well as of the object itself fundamental level, that of sentient intelli- (considered as a unified system of those gence, the intellect actualizes the reality notes) it characterizes. In addition, that that the table qua thing is in its own right. note is what it is as a function of how the But the truth of this intellection is prior to object as a whole is open and respective logos, prior to the articulation even of the the rest of reality. Not only are there not thing’s de suyo features. Does the intel- free-floating notes, there are also no sub- lect’s ability to articulate such features stantially independently identifiable notes imply a realist commitment to universals at all. or abstract entities? If the formality of re- (c) The question is whether PTT or ZM ality is the in-its-own-right, then are artic- is more satisfying of our explanatory ob- ulations themselves real? Or, if they are jectives. Short of a (paradoxical) Platonic indeed real, would they have any neces- view of a particularist ontology (i.e., trope sary connection to that of which they are theory), there is no adequate way of un- articulations? It is hard to see how they derstanding tropes themselves, as Levin- would, and if they do not then articulation son has argued quite vigorously. On the appears nominalistic. “Reality things” in other hand, ZM leaves us in the same bind logos turn out to be “meaning things” rela- as some of his illustrious predecessors, tive to particular theoretical programs of including both Parmenides and Heraclitus, one kind or another. as well as any contemporary process- The possibility I am raising here is relational metaphysicians (for instance, certainly arguable and depends on possi- Whitehead): How can we tell what O “real- ble interpretations of Zubiri’s metaphysical ly” is if its notes are subject to a constant position. I raise the issue in consideration flux of respectivity (or, the flip side of the of the question raised earlier: How can we same coin, if it is melted into a single Real- tell what object O “really” is if its notes— ity)? the ones it has de suyo—are subject to a (d) But what if Zubiri is a nominalist constant flux of respectivity? It would after all? What if “reality-things” are, seem the answer is that we cannot. themselves, (merely) “meaning-things,” The lesson to be drawn from this things that derive their identity and mean- (possible) conclusion is that the ontologi- ing as a function of their place in a human cal project, whether in the guise of a quest experiential scheme of one particular sort for an plausible trope theory (a desidera- or another (physics, say, or metaphysics)? tum of those adhering to the “unholy trini- Thomas Fowler63 identifies nominalism, ty” of nominalism, reductionism, and nat- the metaphysical view that only particu- uralism) or rather in the terms of Zubiri’s lars exist, that so-called “universals” and metaphysical program, is always a practi- “abstract entities” are simply manners of cal project, a praxis, and as such is a speaking, 64 as one of the three pillars of function of human projects generally. Nei- the “unholy trinity” in much contemporary ther PPT nor ZM—nor any other meta- philosophy of science (the other two pillars physical program—could possibly bring being naturalism and reductionism).65 the quest to get at the basic structures of Zubiri's view of what he calls “meaning reality to a close. things” is clearly nominalist in the sense Recognizing this, the terms of the de- that a table qua table has no de suyo (i.e., bate have changed. It is no longer a matter in-its-own-right) features. But what of the of seeking “adequacy” but rather a ques- “reality thing” that can manifest as a ta- tion of the nature of the praxis itself. What ble? For Zubiri, the table qua thing has its are we really after? reality de suyo, and not simply as a func- In any case, both PTT and ZM make a tion of human perception or practical in- substantial contribution to our metaphysi- terest. cal and ontological project. Both, though, But here it pays to recall Zubiri's in- have their weakness. PTT tries to account sight into the levels of intellection. At the for things in isolation in a way that Zubiri
XAVIER ZUBIRI REVIEW 2013-2015 74 Eric Weislogel ______would find, in fact, implausible. Respectiv- fault, unable to account adequately for the ity and the openness of reality demand at identity and perdurance of objects without least the addition of other strategies. ZM, the supplement of categorical ontology. on the other hand, may be holistic to a
Notes
1 Hofweber, Thomas, “Logic and Ontology”, The tropes and their connections of location and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring similarity.” Williams, p. 8. 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 8 I.e., a single category is sufficient for ade-
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17 Edward N. Zalta, “Frege,” Stanford Encyclo- it could not serve as a building block of reali- pedia of Philosophy, ty, as trope theorists want tropes to do. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/ 28 See Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Trope Theory and Accessed 10/14/2014 18:11. the Bradley Regress,” Synthese 175, no. 3 18 Simons uses the term “substance” in this (2010). and Anna-Sofia Maurin, “Bradley’s discussion, but there is an ambiguity at Regress,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 11 work. Substance can mean one of two (along (2012). “Bradley’s Regress” is the same sort with property) metaphysical co-principles of of objection that Aristotle’s “Third Man” ar- things. This is the propertyless something-or- gument held against a Platonic theory of other of what I will refer to later as the “Mr. forms. Potatohead version of substance theory. But 29 What I have in mind here as a strategy is substance can also mean that which is apt to akin to Donald Davidson’s “anomalous mon- exist in itself, a whole existing in its own ism” theory of mental events. His view on right and not as an intrinsic part of anything that issue is that all mental events are physi- else. Here, Simons means the latter. To keep cal events, but that they are anomalous. That matters - to my mind, anyway - more clear, I means we have not two different ontological will just use “object” or “thing” instead of categories (mental and physical), but rather “substance.” two irreducibly different explanations of men- 19 “A foundational system is not just a mere tal events. See “Mental Events” in Donald collection or plurality of things, but a con- Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events nected system.” Simons, “Particulars in Par- (Philosophical Essays of Donald Davidson) ticular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of (Oxford University Press, 2001)., pp. 229- Substance.”, p. 563. 244. 20 Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: 30 El Hombre y Dios was originally organized Three Trope Theories of Substance.”, pp. and completed by Ignacio Ellacuría and pub- 567-568. lished in 1984. That version of the book went through five editions. The English transla- 21 Jerrold Levinson, “Why There Are No tion, Man and God, by Joaquín Redondo Tropes,” Philosophy 81, no. 04 (2006). (with critical revisions by Thomas Fowler and 22 See Williams, “On the Elements of Being: I.” Nelson Oringer) was made from (apparently) pp. 4 ff. the 2nd or 3rd edition of El Hombre y Dios, 23 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. both from 1985. That translation appeared in 570. 2009 (University Press of America). In 2012, a greatly expanded New Edition of El Hombre 24 See Cynthia Macdonald, “Tropes and Other Things,” in Readings in the Foundations of y Dios appeared. This has yet to be translat- Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. S. and C. ed to English. In this paper, I will be citing Macdonald Laurence (Oxford: Blackwell, from the English translation [hereinafter MG] 1998). and the 5th edition of the Spanish original [hereinafter HD]. 25 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. 31 527. E. J. Lowe is criticized in a similar fash- Xavier Zubiri, On Essence. Translation and ion. See pp. 575-6. Introduction by Robert Caponigri (Catholic Univ. of America, 1963). 26 Levinson, “Why There Are No Tropes.” p. 32 579. Xavier Zubiri, Sobre La Esencia / About the Essence (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish 27 As an example of an internal relation, if John Edition) (Alianza Editorial Sa, 1962). Original- is shorter than Mary, that is simply by virtue ly published in 1962. of the fact that John is the height he is and 33 Mary is the height she is. There is nothing Xavier Zubiri and Nelson R. Orringer, Dy- “additional” at work here. If John is the namic Structure of Reality (Hispanisms) (Uni- height he is and Mary is the height she is, versity of Illinois Press, 2003). then they will always be in the height relation 34 Xavier Zubiri, Estructura Dinamica De La they happen to be in - necessarily. Note that Realidad / Dynamic Structure of Reality an internal relation would not, therefore, be a (Obras De Xavier Zubiri) (Spanish Edition) trope, as it has no “independent” reality. I.e., (Alianza Editorial SA, 1994).
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35 Xavier Zubiri, Man and God (University Press 51 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, of America, 2009)., 24. this insight might be fruitfully applied to is- 36 “The idea then we have, to which we give the sues in the philosophy of mind by those the- general name substance, being nothing but orists hoping for a viable non-reductive phys- the supposed, but unknown, support of icalism. those qualities we find existing, which we 52 Technically, a form of reality has a particular imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, mode of implantation. See Zubiri, Man and without something to support them, we call God, 27. that support substantia; which, according to 53 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. the true import of the word, is, in plain Eng- 54 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. lish, standing under or upholding.” John 55 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under- Zubiri, Man and God., 27. standing; book 2, chapter 23; “Of our Com- 56 Zubiri, Man and God., 28. plex Ideas of Substances” 57 Zubiri, Man and God., 29. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_the 58 Note that this idea consonant with concept of ory evolution and natural selection. 37 Zubiri, Man and God., 24. 59 Zubiri, On Essence ; Translation and Intro- 38 Unless, I suppose, the water is in the frozen duction By a. Robert Caponigri., 148. state and is shaped in a particular way. See 60 One contemporary school of philosophy that Zubiri, Man and God., 25. goes by the name of “speculative realism” 39 Zubiri, Man and God., 38. (and sometimes “object oriented ontology”) finds the central flaw of both Anglo-American 40 Zubiri, Man and God., 48. analytic philosophy and continental philoso- 41 Xavier Zubiri, Sentient Intelligence (Xavier phy to be their adherence to “correlationism,” Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1999)., the idea that things are merely correlates of 35. human thought. The speculative realists 42 Again the phrase, “it possesses,” here can be want to get at what things are in themselves misleading. There is no separate, metaphysi- beyond any correlation that might exist with cally independent “it” that then “possesses” consciousness. What this project could notes. To say, “it possesses,” is just a manner amount definitely remains to be seen. It of speaking. should be noted, though, that one important proponent of this school, Graham Harman, 43 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. specifically names Zubiri as a key influence 44 To be clear: Zubiri contrasts his idea of “sub- on his thinking “from the point of view of ob- stantivity” with that of the traditional notion jects.” It is not the purpose of the present of “substance” in the sense of the Mr. Potato paper to unpack and assess this relationship Metaphysics. But there is an ambiguity. For between Zubiri’s ideas and those of specula- Zubiri, a substantivity is a unified system of tive realism. notes, and some of those notes are “sub- 61 Zubiri, On Essence; Translation and Intro- stances.” This latter usage, however, does not duction by Robert Caponigri., p. 156. refer to classical metaphysics. Rather, “sub- stance” in this latter usage means something 62 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude (New like “material” or “stuff” of a certain kind. I York: Continuum, 2009). do not believe Zubiri is implying that this lat- 63 Thomas Fowler, “Reductionism, Naturalism, ter usage was Aristotle’s or St. Thomas’s, and and Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and the difference between their metaphysical Its Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy,” The theories still holds (despite this ambiguity). Xavier Zubiri Review 9(2007). 72 45 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. 64 Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science a-Z 46 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). 163 47 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. 65 Fowler, “Reductionism, Naturalism, and 48 Zubiri, Man and God., 26. Nominalism: The “Unholy Trinity” and Its 49 Zubiri, Man and God., 27. Explanation in Zubiri’s Philosophy.” 71 50 Zubiri, Man and God., 27.
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