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Please send your order to: The Editor, Nigerian Journal of Business and Social Sciences, University of Lagos, Akoka, Yaba, Lagos, NigeriJz. Adelaja Odutolo Odukoya. Ph. D POl'ffr Sector Privatizauon, Accumulation And Underdevelopment in Nigeria: Anatomy of (I Fractured Policy

1111 1'1 I 'I'tl,nON, ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT leadership led to frantic efforts by the Buhari administration to secure external financial support to N NI( .1',1 lA.: A.NA OMY OF A FRACTURED POLICY solve the economic crisis, It was not until General Ibrahim 8abangida took over power in a palace coup on 27" August, 1985, that financial accommodation was reached with the International Adelaja Odutola Odukoya Monetary Fund (IMF). The imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), as a home- Department of Political Science grown reform programme, was the fruit of the accommodation. A major component SAP was University of Lagos, Lagos privatization. • Privatization is one of the several programmes that have been used as a basis of engendering a It It iI new cycle of accumulation and capitalist development in Nigeria. The logic of privatization is to engender a private sector-led accumulation. The philosophical underpinning of privatization is that '" It 111,,111/10/ capital accumulation for capitalist development is not in doubt, so also is the the state is an incompetent capital accumulator. Contrariwise, the market is hypothesized and 1111/11//l'1'IIIIIlIty0/ electricity/or economic development. Neo-liberal orthodoxy adduced the failure contextualized as an efficient accumulator. To this end, it is theorized that for development to be 01 tI,I'I,ll/fllII '//1 in the Third World nation to states inability to accumulate capital. With respect to unleashed, nations faced with development crises are better off embracing market regime. In this NI 11" /11 dual crises of capital accumulation and the failure-of state managed monopoly power context, hitherto state-owned enterprises are to be stripped of state ownership and control in favour of MW/Of lire major militating. factors against economic development. Hence, the private sector, a private ownership. /'~ ·mplif/ed by the market, is canvassed as solution to these mutually reinforcing developmental ills. Opinions are however sharply divided as to the utility or otherwise of privatization as a policy Thus. yielding of the control. management and ownership over public enterprises to private mechanism for capitalist development in theNigerian economy. This paper seeks to interrogate the entrepreneurs through privatization has ..become a major policy thrust to galvanize market-led problematic of privatization asa policy framework for capitalist development in Nigeria, using the development especially in the power sector. A number of questions are pertinent in this context: to power sector privatization programme as an empiricalreference. The paper is divided into seven what extent has theory resonated in the empirical realities of privatization process and outcomes? sections, viz: conceptual and contextual issues;' privatization: types, methods and critique; an Has privatization engendered a new regime of capital accumulation as a fulcrum for capitalist overview of the Nigerian privatization programme; the effects of the power crisis on Nigeria's development in Nigeria? What hope for a privatized power sector delivering power to Nigerians? development; Nigeria's power sector reform; and conclusion. This paper interrogates the problematic of privatization against the background of the power sector reform as a policy framework for capitalist development in Nigeria. The paper argues that contrary Conceptual and Contextual Issues: to its theoretical promises. privatization has complicated the crisis and contradictions of capitalist Privatization has been variously conceptualized - whether as the transfer of ownership of State- development in Nigeria by engendering a regime of primitive capital accumulation with debilitating Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to private business interests (Guseh, 2001; Sava, 1987), or change from consequences for the capitalist underdevelopment of Nigeria. To this end, the paper concludes that bureaucratic management to private corporate management (COSATU, 200Ia). Ultimately, the solution to the underdevelopment trajectory of the Nigerian state lies in rein venting the Nigerian privatization entails increased control and transfer of public wealth to individuals and/or corporate state as a mechanism for development. entities (COSATU, 200 Ib). This is exemplified by transformation of property rights regimes, as well as the shrinking of the state and the expansion of the market (Scheider and Jager, 2001). Keywords: Privatization, Capital Accumulation, Primitive Capital Accumulation, Power Sector, The pre-eminence of the state in economic management after World War II was a product of Development. political economy conditions that commended it in a context of pervasive market failure. Similarly, the reconstruction of the war devastated European economy under the Marshall Plan, as well as the IUlroduction industrialization of the United States of America was all achieved with the activists and AI Ind pendence in 1960, Nigeria held enormous promises for her citizens.and the black race. developmental orientated states. The expansion of the public sector and the increased role of the state

It I unbly, the promise of independence in Nigeria soon fizzled out as a consequence of the state in the economy in the post-World War II were in tandem with its remarkable utility as a catalyst of 1111111b qu athed by colonial power, preference for prebendal and parsimonious politics by the development. It is also apposite to note that certain other logic apart from those mentioned above pili I \ 01 In s, the imperialist subordination and dependent nature of the economy and mal- equally inform the development of the public sector in capitalist economies. First, its acclaimed Hllllllli h ulon amongst other factors. The totality of these ensured that the oil-boom induced efficiency notwithstanding, the social management profile of the market is highly problematic. ~h VII 111\' of'the 1970s dovetailed into the austerity measure and debt-overhang of the 1980s and Market allocation of resources, whatever its advantages, if not tempered by social welfare 111'10 ' considerations has a potentially destabilising effect on society's overall development and stability, as 11IIlpl 11 iuunining the negative impacts of the crisis through the introduction of'a number against Adam Smith's theory of its beneficial 'trickle down'. It is for this reason that the state produces • III I W lit Inilurc as a consequence of the neglect of the structural underpinnings of the public goods which are germane to the welfare ofthe majority. It lit I .111 11 utmlni trations. During the General Moharnmodu Buhari administration, the Second, the existence of market imperfection, which is likely to impel allocative efficiency, is III ""111 1111 It 1'"1111 to 11r alization thatthe economic crisis confronting the nation was beyond another defining logic for the public sector. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) thus serve as a 1001 for Ih 1"11 11 I 1"1 Iy III III d mestic class. The helplessness of the domestic petty-bourgeois the correction of distortions created by the market. In cases where the required capital and technology.

50 51 Adelqja Odulolu Odukoya. Ph D POIl'wr S.Cfnr Pnwm;afl()tt, Accumulallon And UntJ.nk.,,~/uplII.nt In Nlgwrw ..4not'Jmy 0/ o Fmrfltrwd Po/le!

government deficit budget (Robinson, 1997; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Wright, 1994); and reduction of Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). The efficiency gain through privatization, it has been argued, on the long run would trickle down and be beneficial to all, in terms oflower prices for consumers, high quality services, increased lit 1111 1111111I1111111 nd consumption of certain products, like, productivity, increased investments in public utilities, and wider share ownership (Chong and Lo~z- 1111111111If! IIII1 11111111110d1e1fe,nce, energy, etc, has necessitated state's de-Slilanes, 2005; O'Malley, 1988). For Clarke (1993) the privatization M SOEs has shown lack of I1 III 11'h 1111 III 11111111 Nllt Ih least is what in Nigerian constitutional lexicon is social responsibilities and high scale of commercial inefficiency that were unacceptable from the '1111111111111111 /alllt fhi underscores the need for the government to invest in pre-privatized enterprises. Added to this is a new regime of private monopolistic exploitation of the IIIII1 111011111I'IHUlllllC life, the sensitivity of which precludes their control by people. Clarke (1993) therefore calls for the transformation of organization ethos and increased lilt I NI I1hU11I1foreign. It can therefore not be over-emphasized that the public corporate governance in the operations of SOEs in order to promote productivity and efficiency of III 11111I h I I fag was a useful tool for the capitalist system. Even the private public sector businesses instead of privatization. " I III III III IIW I XI tence and continued reproduction to the state and public sector in Privatization, Wolfe (1996) notes, accord private capitalist interests extended power of t I1 I III I • IIItin hi ( IlIkoshi (1998), the private sector not only depends on the state for survival accumulation beyond the allowable limits under social democratic governance. Based on the result of 11111I 1110111111111111b,oth Ihe Nigerian private and public sector interpenetrates. To that extent, their studies in the telecommunication sectors in Norway, Italy and Spain, Foreman-Peck and III 1111111111111 unbiguous. Manning (1988) conclude that ownership has nothing to do with corporate efficiency as the State- I1w t. in the context of the relationship between the Nigeria state and private capital and the Owned Telecommunication Company in Norway was more efficient than the British Telecom that I I1 cupuat model of accumulation rooted in primitive capital accumulation (PCA) they promote that was privatized in 1984. To Laxmi (2003) what makes public enterprises fail is not the fact of public NI na experienced transition from "nurtured capitalism" to "pirate capitalism" (Schatz, 1984). The ownership, but the inhibiting factors associated with governance of which public enterprises are a jrisis a~d contradictions all these engendered, in particular the unproductive accumulation that was micro-segment. In this same connection, therefore, the issue of efficiency between the pri vate and institutionalized III the context of a rentier and inert (Schatz, 1984) economy combined to facilitate public sector is a relative one (Mengisteab, 1995). conditions that commended the privatization programme in Nigeria. Scholars have established correlation between privatization and corruption. As Vickers and Yarrow, (1991) state, privatization is a victim of the rent-seeking predisposition of the state, its Privatization: Types, Methods and Critique bureaucracy and the political class in control of the instrilmentalities of the state. Many privatization Though there are variations in the methods and measures adopted to privatize, privatization has taken programmes bear testimony to the privatization-corruption nexus. For instance, Mkandawire (1996) place under three main modalities, namely: operational, organizational and ownership measures. used crony privatization in Cote d'Ivoire under Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Malian privatization. First, privatization by operational measures involves changes by public sector enterprises from under Moussa Traore as illustration of the privatization-corruption nexus (Mkandawire, 1994). P~,bJic bureaucratic management without budgetary constraints to private corporatist management Another example was the privatization, corruption and unproductive capitalism in Uganda under withbudget constramts under a performance-based system. An important dimension to this method President Yoweri Museveni (Tangri & Mwenda, 2001). It cannot be over-emphasized that ofprivatization is continued ~egime of public ownership over the enterprises, while operation is with privatization offers opportunity for well-connected individuals to fleece the masses of common pnvate operators. No.change.in property right takes place in this respect. patrimonies. Tt is either SOEs were under-valued and sold to favoured individuals or groups, or the Second, privsnzation by organization measures which could be through competition, revenue from the sale end in private bank accounts of government officials. unbundling, corporatization, and leasing entails a combination of public and private sector orientations. This is done either bylowering entering barriers, entering into hiring arrangement for An Overview ofthe Nigerian Privatization Programme the use of public sector facilities by pri~atCf interests, dc;:-rnonopolization, or the breaking of state While the post-colonial state in Nigeria is economically dependent, it also suffers from serious monopolies, mostly in utilities into smaller operating units, with .SOEs subjected to market political liability. This liability is exemplified by its weakness and lack of organization presence imperatives and re-orientation of qbjectives towards profitability. The ownership structure of SOEs making for fragile control over its citizens, contested claims over its statehood, fragmented political continue to be public though now oriented tqprofitability.just as private sector actors are allowed to elite, non-hegemonic ruling class. The crisis of the Nigerian state was aggravated by unfavoura~le rival and conipete with the SOEs in the market. conditions and contradictions of the international capitalist system starting from the early 1970s With Finally, for ownership measure privatization, the state sells public enterprises in full or in part the global oil crisis. The combine domestic and international factors make reform inevitable in ord~r t~ private investo~. Under this form of privatization, SOEs experienced either full or partial property that the Nigerian economy remains afloat. Privatization marks the after effect of the economic nght transformation as the case may be. A major argument in support of privatization is the issue of malfeasance and political mismanagement of the state. efficiency. Economic reform took off under the military President Genera11brah iIII Badamasi Babangida While the efficiency argument appears to be the most popular canvassed for privatization, in 1986, against the background of mounting debt profile, non-functioning public infrastructure, the~e a~e other reasons for pri~atization, viz: the need to widen share ownership by creating !>qpular increase unemployment, declining welfare conditions, de-industrialization, and under-utilization of capitalism (Rees, 1994; Robinson, 1997; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Wright, 1994); financing of productive capacities, as well as generalized crisis of capital accumulation within Nigerian . . the

52 53

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~I'~~.~..t :hJlii Adeto]« Odutola Odukoya. Ph. D PU..•e• r Sector PnvOICaliol1, Accumulation And Undf!rrJe\Jf!IOpm~nlln N'guia Anatomy of a FroclulYd Pollc)"

recommendations. Following the report of Messer Shawmont Limited on the technical details of the ECN and NDA merger, the Federal Government through Decree No. 24 of27'" June 1972, with effective date of I" April, 1972, created the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) as a national electricity monopoly from a merger of the ECN and NDA. Eight months after its creation, NEPA became operational under a General Manager. The government charged NEPA with the onerous responsibility of electricity generation, transmission and distribution nationally with minimal charges to consumers (NEPA, 1999).

The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and the Failure oCPower Supply in Nigeria At inception in 1972, NEPAhad a total installed generating capacity of523.6 MW, with national peak demand for electricity of390MW. This was in addition to 1,262KM and 1,012KM of330KV and 132KV lines complimented by another 15,000KM 415 volts network (NEPA, 1999). The Nigeria power sector has over the year undergone fundamental changes in terms of structure and capacity. Arguably, National Electric Power authority (NEPA) now known as the Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria (PHCN) is the most famous government institution in Nigeria. But paradoxically, this I'h 1,:r(ccl ofthe Power Crisis on National Development fame flows from the unreliable service and the pains the corporation causes the Nigerian people. As a ') la Nigerian PQwer sector was a colonial creation. The establishment of the Ijora Power Station, in result of the poor service of the electricity corporation, Nigeria is the highest importer of generators in Lugo , by the~ublic Work Department (PWD) in 1898 (NEPA, 1999; PSRC, 2008), was not for the world, with public power being the alternative power supply, while generator is the main 'source c mpelling need to develop the colonial territory, but rather to provide some semblance of modernity of power for the Nigerian people. and comfort for the colonial officers, white missionaries, merchant capitalists and officials of the The countries of East Asia, especially China are the principal beneficiaries of this state with imperialist trading companies domiciled in Nigeria. Given the concern that informed the building of the production of cheap and portable generators for the Nigerian market. These portable and cheap the power station, electricity supply was limited to the targeted population. However, with time the generators are popularly known in Nigeria as HI better pass my neighbour", underscoring the fact desire for modernity and the benefits of electricity compelled the Native and Municipal Authorities to that the ownership of generator in Nigerian has become a status symbol. Virtually, all households in establish their own power stations in different parts of Nigeria (NEPA, 1999). The year 1929 was the urban centre of the country have, and depend on generators for domestic power supply, despite the significant in the history of the Nigerian electricity industry with the operation of the first electricity attendant health and environmental hazards. With an estimate of 60 million Nigerians owning utility, the Nigerian Electricity Supply Company (NASCO) following the construction of a generators gulping about N 1.56 trillion of fuel annually, the country has become a dumping ground hydmpower station at Kurrafar Falls, Jos (National Electric Policy, 200 I). for all-manners of generators and inadvertently destroying its environment (Yusuf, 2009). The need and challenge for the integration, coordination and distribution of electricity in The frustration of Nigerians with this major public utility provider engendered the translation Nigeria led to the establishment of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), through the ofNEPA, the acronym of the National Electric Power Authority to "Never Expect Power Always" Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Ordinance No. 15 of 1950. Under the new legislation electricity (Olukoju, 2004). Even with the change of the corporation's name in the process of privatization to generation, transmission, distribution and sale all over Nigeria came under the exclusive legislative Power Holding Company of Nigeria (pHCN), Nigerians have interpreted this to mean, "Please hold list under the statutory responsibility of the ECN (NEPA, 1999). Twelve years after the ECN was candle/now"; to underscore the fact that the privatization exercise has not resulted in any gain in the established, the Federal Government by an Act of Parliament established the Niger Dams Authority Nigerian power sector. By and large, as a result of daily frustrations with the power supply condition (NDA) with the statutory responsibility for "the construction and maintenance of dams and other in the country, there is almost unanimity amongst Nigerians on the need to privatize the power sector. works 011 tJ1e River Niger and elsewhere" (NEPA, 1999:4). One of the reasons advanced for the This seeming consensus rather than being a result of believe in the workability of privatization, isa establishment of the NDA was increased demand for electricity immediately after independence consequence of extreme frustration and the desperation to experiment with any system that holds the (PSRC, 2008} A milestone in electricity as a public utility was the construction of the 132kV promise Of stable and reliable power supply. transmission network for inter-city power supply in Nigeria, which in 1962 made it possible for the . The power sector crisis in Nigeria has seriously affected the domestic capitalist development Ijora and IP!Ilh!n~owJ!r stations to be linked. and negatively impacted on the welfare of Nigerians, such that the popular refrain isfix power. all Nigeria harvested a very high degree of power failure in spite of these two institutions other things would/all inplace. The serious imbalance between the demand for and supply of power charged with el\l\ltriqity supply for the country. The institutional rivalry, lack of cooperation and continue to impose avoidable cost on economic activities and making productivity low. This has not collaboration betweenthe ECN 1;U1Nd DA did not make for efficiency and effectiveness in power been helped by the monopoly status of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PflCN), which. generation and distributipn in Nigeria. As a way out, the Federal Government retained Messer sometimes manifests in uncaring behaviour of officials of the electricity authority (Olukoju, 2004). Shawmont Limited to undertake a study of the Nigerian electricity industry and make This inefficiency in public monopolistic power provisioning in an economy with very large

54 55

~ ----~~- -- I j,.' r"I'IIII m/m .••Acculllu/alion And Unfkrdt!llt:/opnlfml in Nigt!ria: AMW",)' of 0 Fractured Policy Adeluja OdUIO/lI Odukoya. Ph.D PuU'er Secuw Pm'Olco/iun, Accumulation And Undenie'Vt!/opnU!II1 In Nigeria: Atu.,wmyof a Frncl"l'I!d Policy

It'I 111,1h lily tkp ndent on electricity, underdevelopment of productive forces and preference for tyre importation, as well as divest into real estate due to high cost of production, , idversely impacted on productivity, as well as constrained capitalist occasioned by the cost of alternative power supply. Many other Nigerian businesses had since me illustrations are relevant in this regard. The deplorable state of followed the Michelin example. I It h 11 tt!,ply III NI nu is uch that to Nig~rians, generators are the source of power while the It is in this regard that Iwayemi (200S) declared that, "Unquestionably, Nigeria's electricity plIl,lll 1111• I 1IIIIIIUpulycompany is deemed the alternative power supply as a result of its legendary crisis significantly undermined the effort to achieve sustained economic growth, competitiveness in I I 11 11111IIIIH1 IHY M t hit by the poor power service are the nation's manufacturing and industrial regional and global markets, employment generation and poverty alleviation". There is a consensus I I "11 1111 IlIUIl ill bu iness production lines are powered using generators at a colossal cost. As at among Nigerians that the public provision of electricity has failed or fallen below minimum '1I11r. Iltlll' w 11 Flour Mill Limited, according to Mr. Emmanue1 Ukpabi, its Managing expectations in terms of service reliability, dependability and adequacy. Hence, the desire to subject Ill,. 1111/'(luof Executive Officer, used 600,000 litres of diesel monthly@N72 per litre, apart from the Nigerian power sector to reform was welcome largely by Nigerians. 1111t tI I uf maintaining its 1400 KVA generator (2006, Nigerian Tribune, Feb.6). When the wages of III WUIkCI, handling the generators and the maintenance costs are added to other production costs, Nigeria's Power Sector Reform: III nuplicationfor the company in particular and the economy in general is enormous. Electricity supply in Nigeria is not only poor and unreliable; it is inaccessible to majority of Nigeria loses $ billion annually to power outages in lost production, lost manpower hours and Nigerians. According to the PSRC (200S: 9), "The poor access to electricity could be gleaned from Ih . frustration of start-ups and small-scale industries. Bayo Ligali, the Chief Executive of Zain, one the fact that only 426 out of the 774 Local Government Councils were connected to the national grid". f'the GSM companies was quoted by Adekeye (2009, Tell, March 30) as saying: Even at that, only the headquarters of the affected Local Governments were so connected. With the inefficiency profile of the PHCN and electricity available to forty per cent of Nigerians and the This industry [telecommunication] is presently the highest user of electricity requirements of Nigeria' by 2010 at 20,000 MW, which would entail the generation of generators (over 9,000 in 2007, at purchase and maintenance cost of 25,000 MW of electricity (NEP, 2001), the question for Nigerians is not the desirability of reform but N80 billipn) and diesel, conservatively put at 200 million litres in what manner of reform and at what cost? It was against this background that former President 2007. 'Rfe sum oftheforegoing is that the cost of generating power for Obasanjo promised to embark on power sector reform. each base is 35per cent of its total construction costs and about 68per The Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) was the vehicle charged with the task of privatizing cent of its operating cost. the Nigerian power sector through the unbundling of the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA); the precursor of PHCN, and introduction of competition into the power sector. BPE promised to As a way out the GSM companies are investing $1 billion in alternative energy project. Any privatize the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) between July 2001 and December 2002. surprise therefore that Nigerians pay one of the highest tariffs for using mobile telephones in the Historically, however, the. process of privatizing the Nigerian power sector preceded the BPE. The world. liberalization process of the Nigerian power sector dated back to 1990 with the enactment of a new The Murtala Mohammed International Airport, Lagos, is not spared of the epileptic power Electricity Act as the nation moved towards the privatization of electricity under the auspices of the situation of the electricity authority. In July 200S, the drop of public power supply to the airport from Technical Committee for Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC). However, it was not until 15MW to 5MW, made the airport authority to shop for NS billion for generator procurement. On 5" the 1995 amendment to the 1990 Electricity Act that the regime of electricity liberalization started in March, 2007, the authority of the University oflbadan were forced on account ofthe terrible power Nigeria with the emergence ofTndependent Power Producers (!PPs) as players in the hitherto state- situation on campus to issue a special release entitled 'Current Electricity Crisis' postponing dominated industry. The philosophical underpinnings of the reform in the Nigerian power sector are: University's second semester examination by one week amongst other measures embarked upon to (i) Attract and encourage private sector participation; (ii) Attract capital to fund the sector; and (iii) ration electricity on campus. Ensure a level playing ground for all investors. The National Assembly, the Presidency, Ministries and government agencies were The privatization of the power sector met with opposition especially from workers within the appropriated several billions ofNaira for the purchase of diesel and generator maintenance for the industry. Some of the issues and objections raised against the privatization of the Nigerian power provision of power in the face of the failure of public power supply (Adekeye, 2009, Tell, March 30). sector by the National Union of Electric employees (NUEE) are as follows: According to U geh (2009, Thisday, September, 2S), N796.4 billion is spent by Nigerians for fuelling • That the problem of electricity in Nigeria is not that of manpower but of obsolete equipment generators annually - an amount equivalent to N796.7 billion which the federal government NEPA was like other government business, including government itself in Nigeria, so why budgeted for capital expenditure for 2009. privatize NEPAand leave a similarly inefficient government unprivatized. Consequently, high cost of production, industrial shutdowns, unemployment, mass poverty, • How dowe determine the value ofNEPA? and other associated problems are closely associated with the' power sector's inefficiency. While • What happened to the $2 bill ion collected from NEPA pension? Nigeria desperately shops for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (one of the logics for privatization), • What was the fate ofNEPA's workers, 20,000 of whom the BPE Chairman promised to lay- several companies are closing down to relocate in neighbouring countries. Michelin Tyre in the off. earlier part of2007 was forced out of Nigeria to relocate its plant in Ghana, while its competitor, • What was the rationale for spending N75 million for the refurbishment ofNI;.PA before its Dunlop according to Adekeye (2009, Tell, March 30) scaled down its manufacturing operations in privatization?

56 57 Adelaja Odutom Odulcoya.. PkD Power Sector Pm'Clll:atiOfl, ACClUnUlatlon And Und~rtkwJopm~nl i" Hlgrria: Anoromy of a Froaured PolICY

",,' '" IHIIl ible for the BPE's inaction over the collection of the over N5 billion owed electricity by 2007. For this, the government obtained from the World Bank a $100 million credit for NII' I, I 111'1,1 vcmmentagencies. the upgrade of PHCN transmission lines. All these provided veritable platform for the use of the 'I u III r c n piracy to cover-up past and present looters responsible for the woes of power sector privatization in Nigeria as a mechanism for primitive capitalist Accumulation (PCA). NI I' Ih, luah pI ivatization. I'll 1IIIlIIOn would make electricity unaffordable to about 70% of Nigerians who presently Power Sector Privatization and Underdevelopment: IIIIIIClI njoy elcctriciry, Priority action to enable the unbundling and privatization of the electricity power sector set by the I'dv 1111011 n would widen the gap between the haves and have-nots. National Electricity Power Policy (NEPP) provided a major platform for corruption and PCA in the 1,1111 NEPA capacity when fully operational is 5400 mw as against the 20000 MW required power sector privatization in Nigeria. The task the Nigerian government set for itself as priority hy III ountry in 2010. The difference is what the private sector should fill rather than precedent to unbundling and privatization were: fl"VUIIZ NEPA. a) Improvement in electricity supply through the conclusion of Emergency Power Programme (EPP) contacts; 'f h 'I C i national security concern, given the sensitive nature of the power sector. b) Putting out the Tender for some ofNEPA's existing Power Stations as Rehabilitate, Operate • Pnvauzation would replace government monopoly with private monopoly in the Nigerian powcrsector. and Transfer (ROT) projects; c) Carrying out essential investments as proposed in NEPA's Action Plan, with agreement both That the BPE over-exaggerated the capacity of the Nigerian private sector, which is as on essential priorities and on what is to be financed by Government, as opposed to what is to corrupt, and inefficient as the public sector it seeks to supplant. be financed by the new owners; That Nigeria's problem is not government, but governance. d) Repairing and upgrading the system control and communications facilities; The power sector ,,:,ithout privatization will deliver with autonomous Board made up of e) Priority strengthening of the transmission network to be able to support new contact markets credible and professional Nigerians appointed to run the nation's power sector. for bulk power; f) Developing a strategy for the equitable treatment ofNEPA's employees during the reform From the pos!tion of the NUEE, it is clear why the nation's power sector remains the way it is process; and as a conse~uence of ItS use by members of the Nigeria comprador and petty bourgeois for primitive g) Developing a public awareness and public relation strategy (NEP, 200 I:233). accumulation. Also, the welfare implication of the privatization of the power sector on the Nigeria peop.le w~lch should be the c~erstone of any government programme is not taken into BPE promised to privatize NEPA between July 2001 -and December 2002. This is yet to be done consideration, It can be seen that what drives the privatization of the power sector is class interest almost ten years after the targeted date. The privatization of the power sector has been put on hold as a rather than economic rationality. result of the class forces that are not favourably disposed to the exercise. Contracts under the power The appointment by the BPE of Price Waterhouse Cooper (PWC) consortium in November sector reform were awarded to several non-existing companies. The House of Representatives 200 Iwith the responsibility to prepare the restructuring and unbundling blueprint ofNEPA signalled announced that $6.2b was paid to contractors that have no record of registration at the CAC, under the the commencement of electricity privatization in Nigeria. The PWC blueprint entailed the division of National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP) programme. The companies are: Special Projects, the NEPA into six Generator Companies (Gencos), one Transmission Company (Transcos), to take Matdol, Zumo, Trakis, Acqua Combined, Akpo International, Loomash, Aktra, Charley B Ceremic, ca~e of system an.d market operation simultaneously, eleven Distribution! Marketing Companies Alfa DDL, Tee Unique, Earnesco Galv, NTIC, Space Master, Eternity, Tajkay, Elektrak, Suchu (DISCOS).These DISCOSreflected the zones ofNEPA, but with Lagos, which consumes 45 per cent of Chase, Sassy Fund, Unihead'Nigeria Limited, Riverroacks, Danatec, PauIwells, Felden, Network, NEPAsupply produced two companies. The National Council for Privatization (NCP) approved this Ikelomu Group, Bristosin, International Merchant, Chrisob, Bangasa, Aolat Nigeria Limited, Chris blueprint on 26" August, 2002. In March 2005, the Electricity Reform Act was enacted. While inputs Ejik and international Limited (NLC, 2008). The controversial sale of Egbin Power Plant built by were sought from the workers' unions, and these were graciously provided, the final Act failed to take Marubeni to Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) for $280 million by the BPE was one of the acc.ount of the well-reasoned inputs of the electricity workers as contained in the position of their sore points of the privatization in the Nigerian power sector, especially given the fact that KEPCO Unions. In 2005, NEPA was formerly changed to the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). was not one ofthe initial companies that expressed interest. More surprising was the fact that the plant The eighteen successo: companies created out of the PHCN are as follows: seven generator was producing when it was illegally sold. This action was subsequently revised by the Yar' Adua companies, one transmission company and eleven companies in-charge of electricity distribution. administration. These companies were also registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) in November Regarding the privatization sale ofEgbin Power Station, the Senior Staff Association and National 2005. The establishment of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) came next. Union of Electricity Workers (SSANUEW) queried "why a plant presently producing 800 MW with Immediately, the NCP approved the staged privatization of the generation, transmission and a recent $28 million contract awarded for rehabilitation of the exploded boilers that will add another distribution companies to handle the electricity business in Nigeria. This is yet to take off. 440 MW to the system besides the initial $50 million contact awarded for upgrade of the same plant, In addition to this, the government planned to do a number of maintenance as well as build should be sold for a paltry $280 million" (2007; Business Day, Editorial, May 31). • new power stations to complement existing ones in order to meet its target of 10,000MW of While efficiency was canvassed as the hallmark of privatization, the power sector reform in

58 59 t .••••, pt ;"1 1'","'1 11110" Ar.: u",ulatlortAnd UnderdewJopnlent in Nipr;a: .4110/0111,.'of a Fractured Policy Adeloja Odutoia Odu/c.oya. Ph.D Power Sector Privatization: Accumulation And Underdevelopmem m Nigeria; Analomy of n Fractured Pulicy

""001 hi 11I1 II'Y nd waste, as the case of the $404million 8 gas turbine with a Power Sector which alleged that over $16 billion dollars was expended on the power sector by the III 110 MW imp rtcd for the country by General Electric Corporation (GEC) Obasanjo's administration with no improvement in public power supply had been discredited and 111h1 11 were 10 be distributed among the seven power stations being built by dumped, the report was nonetheless an eye opener to the accumulation in the name of power sector 11 dlh I these gas turbines were very old - the same as were used during the reform. One of the several revelations from the Power Sector probe by the House of Representatives 11ylll these ga turbines from the port to where they were to be used proved to be was the discovery of the award of a contract for the feasibility study of the 2,600MW Mambilla It 1'111'" 1111111to II k of c nsideration of conditions of road as well as political factor evident in Hydro Electric Power Project to a World Bank (WB) blacklisted company; Lameyer of Germany on 111111 1II'In 1111It of the President Yar'Adua administration (A!lthor's field Interview, 2008). account of corrupt practices (Ayorinde, 2008, The News, March 24). 11111, Iw IIty y rr peri d between 1979 and 1999 when Obasanjo handed over power as a military The upgrading of the nation's transmission line for which $100 million loan was obtained I1 111011 ,'tilt t civilian administration of President Shehu Shagari and his return as an elected from the World Bank was not implemented. Similarly, the repairs of the generating units across the I'll Ide ,It UIl 9th May, 1999, succeeding administration paid little or no attention to the Nigerian country were yet to be completed despite colossal amount spent on them. The power sector reform pelw I t r. NOI only were new stations not constructed, regular maintenance were not done with was characterized by lack of transparency and accountability. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) Ih n III n' power sector transformed into a haven of corruption, inefficiency and mal- in a release on corruption under the guise of power sector reform quoted the former Finance Minister, idmln i Iration, The need to improve power efficiency is better appreciated when attention is called to Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala to the effect that President Obasanjo sanctioned the exclusion of power Nigeria's global ranking in electricity generation and consumption. Adekeye (2009) comments on the sector transactions from the administration's due process protocol. The NLC in the same document mparative performance of other nations thus: implicated Olusegun Obasanjo for awarding the contract for the pre-paid meter to a Chinese company that acted as a front for the President. The disappearance from site after misappropriating Finland, a country of 5.2 million people by a 2007 report generates N4.5 billion of the N5.9 billion for the construction of the New-Haven-lkot Ekpene 330kva about 12,078 MW; selling 2,836 MW to its neighbour, Russia. Also as Switching sub-Station by Paym Bargh and Carpalark Engineering Services was another case that at that year, Canada was generating a total of 108,533 MW for a shows how the reform of Nigeria's power sector has become a platform for indiscriminate population of 33 million people. Each province, territory in Canada accumulation for the politically connected. All that the company did for the N4.5billion it collected generates its own power. As at last year, the province of Alberta, made was a fence work! up of three million Canadians, was generating 9,774 MW; while the province of Ontario made up of J2 million people was generating Conclusion 27,2335MW,farabove the wholepowergeneratedin West Africa. The Nigerian privatization programme demonstrates that sound economic policies require far more than good intentions. It is evidential that technically based policies devoid of structural As ~t the time the administration ofPreside~ Olusegun Obasanjo assumed power on 29" May, 1999, considerations and the overall political economy dynamics are doomed to fail as well as aggravate the although ?-.'EPAhad an installed capacity of6OOO MW, complimented with a transmission capacity of cnsis of underdevelopment. The Nigerian power sector no doubt requires surgical operation. Be that 4O()OMW, national power generation was only 1520MW. And of the 79 generating units ofNEPA as it may, it would be counter-productive to throwaway the child with the bath water. Cutting off the only; 19 were' working. This condition carmot be separated from the neglect, lack of attention and head has never been a remedy for headache. The sale ofSOEs has grave implications for pattern of corruptiorr in the running of the nation's power sector for many years. The Obasanjo government capital accumulation and development. As Wilson (1988: 24), rightly notes, "there is also the reality promised to,change the fortunes of NEPA to the delight of Nigerians. Within six months power that. privatization affects material interests and shifts power among local government officials, generation was to be increased by 56.25 percent, from 1600 MW to 2500 MW. The administration's busmessmen and multinational corporations." Therefore, the retreat of the state as a consequence of first Minister.of'Powerand Steel, Chief Ajibola Ige, put in place the "Power Creed" as the agenda for privatization provides a fertile space for private capitalist exploitation of social resources, thus radical transformanon of the nation's sick power sector to the delight of most Nigeria and the making privatization a mechanism for PCA by other means. Transparency and corruption are major cynicism of others. According to this creed, the Obasanjo administration hoped to achieve the issues in the privatization programme. Paradoxically, these are the very basis for the privatization following milestone in the Nigerian power sector: improvement in power supply by 50 percent programme in the first instance. However, given that the state is both a mean and a modality for PCA, within S~~ohths,.by: 75. percent in 12 months and by almost 100 percent in 24 months. Later in the the privatization exercise has been perverted to serve the pecuniary interests of political and li~ otthe6basanjo~inistration, a target of 10,000 MW by the endof2oo7 was set by' the Minister bureaucratic heavyweights and their foreign patrons. As we have shown with the power sector, ofEriergy Dr. EdmundDaukoru. privatization in Nigeria has effectively been transformed into a clever scheme through which the state . .,.The privatizatigp cfiNEPA and the delivering of a reliable and efficient power supply were indirectly hands over the means of production to that class in whose interest the state exists and for major trust of t~~ OblJ&3llje{s~nistration programme. Massive ingestion of funds into the power whom state dominance is beneficial. sector along with the aggresJ~ve pursuit of reform measure took place under the Obasanjo Given the malfeasances highlighted above, it is pertinent to conclude that privatization has administration. Unfortu,nat~y:,the,several billions of dollars pumped into the Nigerian comatose f~led .to engender a new round of capital accumulation for development in Nigeria. On the contrary, power sector to deliver- on President Obasanjo's promise were mired in controversies of corruption. pnvanzation has concretized the hold of the social forces, both domestic and foreign, responsible for Though the Honourab!e Elumelu Rower Report of the House of Representatives Committee on the the capitalist underdevelopment of Nigeria through the reinforcement a regime of primitive capital

60 61 • Adt!/aj" O(hllolu O""J:O,I'fI. Ph.[) p()w¥I'SrlC'I'" l'III'IIII:(I(IIIn. Iccumllllll/ml Anei ('nJlflt'fH'ftloPIII,IIU ill Nlge,.,,, .Iru.liom.v of (I l'-I~I(III1'tJd l'oU,)

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