Open Border Policy and Western Balkans: Policy Option for Regions Economic and Reform Fatigue?

OPEN BORDER POLICY AND WESTERN BALKANS: POLICY OPTION FOR REGIONS ECONOMIC AND REFORM FATIGUE?

By Mirko Medenica Submitted to Central European University School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment for the degree Master of Arts in Public Policy

Supervisor: Evelyne Hübscher

Budapest, Hungary 2020

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I, the undersigned MIrko Medenica hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any other person except where due acknowledgement has been made. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted as part of the requirements of any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: 12.06.2020

Name (printed letters): Mirko Medenica

Signature:

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Contents Introduction ...... 1 Chapter 1: Western Balkans context ...... 3 1.1 Recent history and terminology...... 3 1.2 Political context ...... 4 1.3 Economy of the region ...... 8 Chapter 2: Open border policy ...... 10 2.1 The concept of open borders ...... 10 2.2 Effects of open border policy ...... 12 2.3 Implementation of open border policy ...... 16 Chapter 3: Labor and migration in Western Balkans ...... 19 3.1 Labor Market in Western Balkans ...... 19 3.2 Brain Drain and effects of emigration in Western Balkans ...... 20 3.3 Cross-border labor mobility - legal framework in Western Balkans ...... 24 3.3.1 Albania ...... 26 3.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina ...... 26 3.3.3 Kosovo ...... 27 3.3.4 Montenegro ...... 28 3.3.5 North Macedonia ...... 28 3.3.6 Serbia ...... 29 Chapter 4: Feasibility of open border policy implementation in Western Balkans and analysis of its effects and limitations ...... 30 Conclusion ...... 36 References ...... 37

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Abstract The Western Balkans region is currently in a political and social vacuum. For two decades, the

process of joining the European Union has been a driving force in institutional, political and

economic reforms. European enlargement fatigue has led to both economic and reform fatigue in

the countries of the region. As a consequence of slowdown of reforms and weak economy, a

large number of citizens is emigrating in developed countries. Labor shortages and brain drain

are becoming an obstacle to economic development and the region is failing to reach growth

rates that would bring it closer to European Union countries. In order to get out of this stalemate,

a radical turn is needed, both in terms of initiative for change and in terms of solutions. With the

lack of interest of European Union for the region, it is up to countries of the region to take the

initiative. The idea of open borders in the region is a possible solution that would alleviate

directly the economic and demographic problems and indirectly political problems faced by the

countries of the region.

Key words: open borders, Western Balkans, brain drain, migration CEU eTD Collection

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Introduction Migration is one of the most debated topics nowadays. In an era of a globalized world that has

reduced physical and cultural distance and thus increased mobility, an increasing number of

people are opting for migration. The issue of migration management in a large number of

countries is at the top of the agenda of police makers and in the focus of public. The effects of

migration are complex and in addition to positive, it also has negative effects. Often positive

effect for one party means negative consequences for other party involved. Good migration

management presupposes finding a balance between the needs of the economy and the desire of

people to improve their living conditions on one hand and the concerns of destination countries

that excessive migration will affect the way of life and concerns in countries of origin that mass

emigration will severely lower their capacities for development on the other hand. In this

circumstances the concept of open borders, which implies the removal of barriers for migration,

is even more controversial.

The political position of the Western Balkans region, which is reflected in the long-running

process of joining the European Union (EU), which is still ongoing without clear indications

when it will end, reflects the overall situation in the region. Transition to democratic societies

and institution building process is still unfinished. The economy is not succeeding to keep up

with other countries in surrounding. Excessive orientation towards EU and expectations from the

accession process have made the region vulnerable to internal EU’s dynamics. Enlargement

fatigue due to the EU's internal problems has spilled over into the region and caused social,

CEU eTD Collection political and economic fatigue.

As a consequence a large number of people emigrates from the region, which leads to labor

shortages and imbalances in the labor market, affecting the capacities of economic development.

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Due to the current lack of interest of the EU for Western Balkans, which for years initiated

reforms through the framework of accession process, there is a need for greater initiative of

region countries itself. As the countries of the region mostly share the same problems, there is a

space for joint action and common policies. Open border policy within the region is one of the

options that could respond to problems, primarily of economic and demographic nature, but also

indirectly to initiate processes that would reduce the space for nationalist and populist policies,

which negatively affect institutional and economic reforms.

Throughout the thesis I will seek for the answers on adequacy of open border policy for Western

Balkans region, feasibility of implementation and possible effects.

To answer these questions I will follow the following structure:

In first part, Western Balkans context will be elaborated, its historical, political and economic

aspects. A special focus will be on regions relation with EU and accession process dynamics. In

the second part concept of open border will be examined, its development, rationale, possible

effects, limitations and obstacles for implementation. Third part will explore the labor market

situation in Western Balkans, “brain drain” phenomenon in the context of the region and will

give the overview of regional legal framework on labor mobility. In forth part, implementation of

open border policy in the context of Western Balkans will be examined. Finally in conclusion I

argue that open borders policy in Western Balkans, despite its limited effects, is viable and cost-

effective policy.

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Chapter 1: Western Balkans context

1.1 Recent history and terminology

The term Western Balkan is both geographic and political. Geographically it covers the western

part of the Balkan Peninsula, politically it covers 6 countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Serbia. This term was initially introduced by

European policymakers with creation of European Council working group for Western Balkans

(Slukan Altic 2009) to refer to the part of the Balkan Peninsula that remained outside the

European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. Taking into account the negative connotations that

the term Balkan has, as a synonym for disorder and violence, the creation of the term Western

Balkans is a try of rebranding, adding to the term Balkans, the more “positive” term Western,

alluding to the “West” as an example of order and prosperity (Munoglu 2018).

Five countries of the Western Balkans were part of the former Yugoslavia. During the Cold War,

Yugoslavia and Albania were not part of the classical west/east division in Europe. Yugoslavia

chose the path of the so-called non-alignment and was one of the founding states of the Non-

aligned movement, while Albania pursued an isolationist policy. What they have in common is

that they were not in the direct sphere of influence of the great powers. Yugoslavia and Albania

retained their specificity even after the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also meant

the collapse of the communist form of government and the beginning of the transition of the

former communist countries, from an autocratic to more democratic form of government. Instead

CEU eTD Collection of transition, there was a civil war in Yugoslavia, and a state collapse in Albania. This period of

wars and instability lasted the entire last decade of the twentieth century and ended in 1999 with

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the war in Kosovo and soon after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia, who was

largely responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia (ICTY 2006).

For these reasons, it can be considered that the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania

actually began their transition with a decade of delay in relation to other countries in Central and

Eastern Europe, but also with the heavy burden of the wars and unrest of the 1990s.

1.2 Political context

Twenty years after the beginning of the transition, the current state of affairs shows that all the

countries of the Western Balkans have are still lagging behind in terms of democracy and good

governance, as well as economically (Bieber 2019).

As far as democracy and institutions are concerned, all countries are characterized by a lack of

democracy and weak institutions. According to the latest Freedom House report (2020), all

Western Balkan countries are classified as “Transitional or Hybrid Regime”. Hybrid regimes can

be defined through the two concepts of ‘defective democracy’ and ‘electoral authoritarianism’,

regimes that are on the path of transition but have not yet reached full democracy and built

democratic institutions (Bogaards 2009).

Looking at the results of the Freedom House survey in the last five years, it can be seen that there

is no progress, while in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the situation has worsened, Serbia in

2020 and Montenegro in 2019 were transferred from the “semi-consolidated democracies” group

CEU eTD Collection to “transitional or hybrid regime” group.

This trend is certainly not limited to the Western Balkans region, authoritarian tendencies are on

the global scale. What is specific for the countries of the Western Balkans is that their stagnation

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in terms of democracy and the building of democratic institutions takes place under the

supervision of the institutions of the European Union. All the countries of the region are part of

EU enlargement policy and are in different stages of accession process.

The country's accession process to the European Union, although often referred to as

"negotiations", is far from real negotiations. The two parties of the process are in very different

positions of power. On one side, it is the European Union, with a very dominant position, and on

the other a candidate country, which fulfills the tasks and conditions set out by the European

Union. The candidate country must fulfill the conditions set before it, and their fulfillment is

monitored and verified by the European Union. This is a principle of conditionality, which is a

core mechanism of accession process. These conditions are determined by the Copenhagen

criteria and relate to the stability of the institutions and their democracy, the rule of law, respect

for human rights, rights of minorities, functioning market economy, ability to take on the

obligations of membership and the adoption of the acquis communautaire (Juncos and Perez-

Solorzano 2019). Reforms in Western Balkans countries are influenced by accession process and

governments in the region tend to tie the progress of reforms to accession progress, making the

reforms vulnerable to the external factors, as EU enlargement depends also on internal factors

within EU.

Due to a general “enlargement fatigue” in quite a number of EU member states, as a

consequence of the economic crisis, disagreements over the common response to various

challenges such as the question of migrants and the atmosphere created by Brexit, there is a lack CEU eTD Collection of enthusiasm for Western Balkans accession in EU (Miscevic and Mrak 2017).

The internal issues of EU, shifted its policies to more isolationist position, democratization is not

in a focus of EU policy towards Western Balkans and its attention in the region is more focused

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on issues of more direct Member Countries or Union concerns, such as closing of the ‘Western

Balkan migrant Route’ (Bieber 2019).

As enlargement is not on the top of the EU agenda, the transformative power of the EU accession

process has weakened (Bieber 2019).

The accession process is still ongoing, and both sides officially still claim to be committed to the

process. In order to assess the success of this process, it should be compared with some previous

cases of enlargement. If we take as parameters the year when the countries officially acquired

candidate status and the year when they joined the European Union, in the case of the 10

countries of Eastern and Central Europe that joined in 2004, that period averaged 7 years. The

countries of the Western Balkans, which have the status of candidates, have been in that status

for almost 10 years on average, and they still needs years to complete all the stages (European

Commission 2020a).

Despite setbacks and slow pace, the process of European integration, still has a broad social

consensus among citizens in Western Balkans. This consensus emerged after 2000, and no

matter how remote this prospect is, hope of membership made it hard for political parties to gain

support, without at least rhetorically supporting the process, as EU recognition is a large source

of legitimacy for governments in Western Balkans (Bieber 2019). International diplomacy is

often not sensitive to issues of democracy, and many democratic governments have pragmatic

ties with autocrats in the name of realpolitik (Bieber 2019).

CEU eTD Collection The EU enlargement approach based on conditionality oscillates between the adoption of a strict,

non‐negotiable principles, and the practice of adaptable conditionality, which takes in to the

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account local specifies and security considerations. This leads to lack of critical assessment of its

political conditionality and to more adaptable evaluation (Anastasakis 2008).

As a consequence a specific form of government emerged in the region during last decade,

named stabilocracy. The governments formally accept democratic rules and institutions, while

informally taking control of these institutions through patronage networks and control of media,

with two constants being the external promise of democracy and autocratic reign at home (Bieber

2019).

Clientelism is also dominant in Western Balkan societies and it undermines democracy, rule of

law and institutions (Djolai and Stratulat 2017).

It can be defined as an informal network that operates within or coexists with formal institutions

and is focused on the patron’s exercise of power and influence (Weingrod, 1968). In the context

of Western Balkans political clientelism, giving material goods or benefits in return for political

support, is dominant.

Those included in the clientelistic scheme will tend to cast their vote in the elections in such a

manner as to maintain the political status quo (Djolai and Stratulat 2017). In this way the

elections as an ultimate tool for control and the assessment of the work of government are

compromised.

The grave consequences of clientelism are affecting the labor market. Often to obtain job does

not depend on one’s knowledge, education, experience or skills, but rather on whether people CEU eTD Collection know someone who is in a position of power and political party affiliation plays significant role

(Djolai and Stratulat 2017), lowering the opportunities for employment.

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Another important feature of this system is the constant production of crises by ruling political

elites in the region with sole purpose of these crises to shift the focus of public from state

malfunctioning (Bieber 2019). Volatile history of the region and history of ethnic tensions and

conflicts is exploited for this purpose. While nationalism is not a constitutive force of regimes

and it does not generates support, it is still use as a resource for reinforcing the regime, both

internally through making divisions and distraction of public and externally through support and

recognition from international community for maintaining the situation under control (Bieber

2019).

1.3 Economy of the region

Economically speaking region of the Western Balkans is well connected and integrated, both

with the European Union, as its main economic partner, and within the region. All countries are

signatories to the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. This contractual

relationship led to the opening of the market, and the trade of 95% of goods and services is free

to enter the Union free of duties and any quantitative limits (European Commission 2020b). At

the regional level, all countries are signatories of the CEFTA Free Trade Agreement, which has

enabled free trade between countries and significantly facilitated trade procedures (CEFTA

2020).

Looking at the region as a whole, GDP growth rates have been consistently positive since 2014,

but what is problematic is that these rates are averaging about 3 percent per year (European CEU eTD Collection Commission 2020c), which given the small initial base for calculating GDP is insufficient for

development, especially in the context of closing the gap with EU.

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Eurostat data shows that GDP per capita in relation with EU average in 2018 for countries of the

region was ranging from 31 percent in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to 48 percent in

Montenegro.

Labor market as an important factor of economy will be elaborated in Chapter 3.

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Chapter 2: Open border policy

2.1 The concept of open borders

The idea of open borders is a broad concept. What is common is the basic urge to alleviate the

obstacles set by states for the free circulation of people. What distinguishes the various

proponents of this concept is the degree of freedom of movement, on this broad scale on the one

hand are those who, under the idea of open borders imply the complete abolition of states and

thus borders. On the other hand, there are those who do not question the existence of borders, but

in various ways want to diminish their impact on people's lives.

The borders regime that is dominant today is normalized and rooted that it is easy to think that it

is a historical institution with a very long tradition. Immigration controls are perceived as a

matter of common sense, an unavoidable reality (Hayter 2003). In fact the border regime that is

dominant today is actually a relatively new concept and is fundamentally linked to the

development of modern nation states and their concepts of sovereignty (Casey 2010).

The first cross-state movement restrictions were introduced in the first decades of the twentieth

century, but even after, anyone who had the means to leave countries of origin could settle in

most countries of destination relatively easily until the 1970s (Casey 2010).

In the last few decades, we have witnessed the unprecedented levels of globalization on the

planet. This globalization was and is primarily economic, but also cultural. With few exceptions,

the process of economic globalization concerned goods, capital, and services. People are mostly CEU eTD Collection

excluded from this process of liberalization. In today's world, the freedom of movement of goods

is greater than ever, administrative barriers have been minimized or removed, but at the same

time the mobility of people - workers, has remained predominantly strictly controlled.

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The world is made up of states that are overwhelmingly based on the national principle. Due to

globalization, sovereignty, as a basic feature of every state, is shrinking. The control that states

have over who can enter and live on their territory remains one of the last features of sovereignty

(Casey 2010).

Borders play a key role in sustaining the idea of the nation, symbolically they signify a

separation between those who belong and those seen as not belonging to community, setting a

various regimes of rights, based on racialised, gendered and classed perceptions of whose

presence is legally desirable and who is not (Leuenberger 2019).

Borders gained significance with rise of industrial capitalism, and in order to maintain a social

and economic order and discipline of the emerging working classes, ruling classes turned to

ideologies of the nation (Cantat 2019). The idea of the nation become a key ideological resource

for the neutralization of class struggle and people with different, sometimes opposite interests

and class positions, were encouraged to perceive themselves as a part of community (Cantat

2019).

Through time the contradiction emerge, while nation states utilizing nationalism in order to

sustain capitalist interests through the diminishing of class struggles, capital’s expansionist drive

and its need for labor could not be satisfied inside the states (Marfleet 2016).

Migrations are closely linked to economic existence, and therefore to the issue of the labor

market. The search for jobs and economic well-being and stability are key factors that drive

CEU eTD Collection people to migrate, whether it is internal migration, within a country or international migration

(Casey 2010).

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In theoretical considerations of the idea of open borders, it can be concluded that there are two

spheres in which the effects of liberalized migration policies are considered. These two spheres

are economic and socio - cultural. Those who support the idea of open borders focus on the

economic aspect, while those who are skeptical of this idea focus on the socio - cultural aspects.

2.2 Effects of open border policy

It is widely accepted that the free flow of people, especially in the context of work, has an overall

positive impact on the economy (Casey 2010). Economic gains from labor mobility are

associated with differences in the levels of labor productivity in different places. Speaking

globally, these differences are large which points at the existence of potentially big gains (Casey

2010).

Gains are based primarily on better utilization of workers' potential, both in terms of personal

earnings, where the value of labor, and thus overall output increases, when a worker migrates

from a country where specific work is less paid to a country where the same work is better paid,

and in terms of better labor allocation, where surplus of labor force in one place, fills in gaps in

another (Dustmann and Preston 2019).

For destination countries net economic gains comes from increased opportunities for existing

economic activities, facilitated by the presence of immigrants and their families as both laborers

and consumers (Coppel et al. 2001).

CEU eTD Collection Another direct economic benefit from ending immigration restrictions is the saving of budget

money allocated for financing administrative and policing network designated for migration

control.

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The need to compensate for ‘‘demographic deficit’’, a consequence of low birth rates and at the

same time increased life expectancy is also a common economic argument (Casey 2010).

It is logical to assume that labor gains for a destination country are labor losses for a country of

migrant’s origin. If emigration is extensive, especially the emigration of highly educated and

skilled it leads to the so called brain drain (Kapur and McHale 2006). This phenomenon

negatively affects the potential for economic development in countries facing high negative net

migration. As destination countries are often developed counties, their efforts to assist

underdeveloped countries through aid is significantly undermined due to brain drain which leads

to poor governance in aid receiving countries (Docquier and Rapoport 2011). Brain drain does

have some positive externalities, for example it incentivize the increase in quantity and quality of

educational sector in countries of origin (Docquier and Rapoport 2011). Immigration is not a

zero-sum game (Casey 2010), there are gains and losses and it is on creation and implementation

of good policies to maximize gains and balance it for all parties.

The dominant way of controlling migration is currently based on the so-called “cherry picking”

system (Casey 2010), where the receiving countries facilitate the entry of educated and skilled

people, and make it difficult or almost impossible for others to enter. This intensifies the effects

of “brain drain”.

Additionally, policy of recruiting skilled workers on temporary contracts, leave them open to

extreme forms of exploitation (Hayter 2003). These migrants are captive with continuous

residence conditions that make it difficult for them to return home and discouraging circular CEU eTD Collection

migrations (Casey 2010).

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With fewer restrictions on movements, immigration flows will tend to circulate between

countries of origin and destination (Casey 2010). Circular migration is perceived as possessing

the highest capacity to generate benefits for sending and receiving countries and migrants, as

well to stabilize volatile labor market (Constant et al. 2012).

The question of migrations in the context of globalization is often perceived as a social

dimension of globalization (Casey 2010). This leads us to another argument in favor of open

borders. As Galbright pointed, migrations are the oldest action against poverty and it helps to

break the equilibrium of poverty (Galbright 1979).

Immigration is a safety valve for economies not able to create sufficient jobs for their labor force

(Casey 2010), thus reducing the pressure in society. By sending remittances, migrants also

significantly affect the income in the country of origin and contribute to consumption, and thus

to the growth of the economy. The amount of remittance at the global level greatly exceeds the

amount of aid developed countries send to less developed countries (Casey 2010).

Economically speaking, one of the biggest fears of citizens from receiving countries is that

migration liberalization will worsen their standard of living, both in terms of increased

competition in the labor market and in terms of the presumed pressure that migrants will exert on

social benefits system.

Migrations are not only economically significant but also have broader social and cultural

impacts, as countries do not differ only in economics (Casey 2010). Arrival of individuals with

CEU eTD Collection different social and cultural norms can be disturbing for some, as their social, cultural, religious

and linguistic homogeneity can be diminished (Dustmann and Preston 2019).

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Abolition of border restrictions is often connected with the image of uncontrolled surges of

immigrants, who would swamp the economy, culture, and well-being and even imperil physical

safety (Dustmann and Preston 2019).

Past experiences shows that free movement between richer and poorer areas did not in fact

produced continuing mass movement to the richer areas, citizens of Caribbean countries,

previously dominions, were free to move to their former suzerains United Kingdom and France,

but this movement was far from massive (Casey 2010).

As Philip points out the number one form of migration control is ‘‘personal inertia’’, migration is

the exception not the rule, as most people do not want to move away from family, friends and

feeling of safety and comfort of their language and ethnic group (Philip 2004). The assumption

that migration generally makes immigrants better off can be certain only if ‘‘better off’’ is

reduced to its narrowest economic sense (Bartram 2010).

Casey argues that there is a fundamental paradox in the goal of open borders, It seeks to

guarantee the right to migrate as a matter of choice, but the ultimate aim is to create a world in

which people would not be forced into that choice. He emphasize that open borders gives

freedom of emigration, but the idea also include freedom of return to one’s place of origin at any

moment and without consequences regarding the status in receiving country (Casey 2010).

When summarizing the arguments against open borders and concerns usually raised, it can be

concluded that key objections to free mobility from receiving countries are cultural, not

CEU eTD Collection economic (Dustmann and Preston 2019). Concerns about loss of cultural homogeneity and the

costs associated with the social tensions arising from integration of immigrants dominates the

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attitudes of citizens, overshadowing fears of negative economic effects (Dustmann and Preston

2019).

This fact should certainly be taken into account by the policy makers, the excessive insistence on

the indisputably positive economic effects of migration, and on the other hand the lack of

concrete solutions to address socio-cultural concerns is an approach that can hardly gain wider

support for open borders policy. Additionally such concerns regarding migrations are ideal

subject for manipulation and exploitation by populist political movements in order to get votes

(Dustmann and Preston 2019). In the social and cultural context migrations significantly

challenges the notion of identities associated with the nation state (Casey 2010), yet effective

free movement can help in creation of wider, more inclusive identities, like a regional identity or

‘regional consciousness’ (Nita 2017). More open borders beside positive influence on economic

cohesion and development, can also be an instrument for integration of political and social

values and norms (Casey 2010).

2.3 Implementation of open border policy

Globally speaking, opening borders and removing migration controls is a process. It is certainly

unthinkable for this idea to be realized simultaneously on all meridians. The perception of

differences between countries, economic strengths and cultures, as well as the fears that arose

from it, are too strong at this moment. This policy can be applied partially, in those regions

where the perceived differences are weaker. CEU eTD Collection As Dustmann and Preston argue, objections to liberal migration policies, especially on social and

cultural grounds are at their weakest where migration is between culturally and politically similar

locations. These similarities make the establishment of free movement within regional blocs a

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feasible project and historical ties and geographic proximity are also playing a role in facilitating

these processes (Dustmann and Preston 2019).

There are already territories in the world where migration restrictions are minimal or non-

existent between contracting states. The most famous example is certainly the European Union.

Article 45 of European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights proclaims freedom of movement

and of residence, paragraph 1 states that every citizen of the Union has the right to move and

reside freely within the territory of the Member States. This right is additionally developed by

EU secondary legislation and the Case law of the Court of Justice. EU citizens are entitled to

look for a job in another EU country, work there without needing a work permit, reside there for

that purpose and can stay there even after employment has finished. They enjoy equal treatment

with nationals in access to employment, working conditions and all other social and tax

advantages.

On a smaller scale there is an example of Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia

and New Zealand which allows citizens of each country to reside and work in the other (Spinks

and Klapdor 2016).

These agreements function on the assumption that citizens of certain countries, which share

similar values, should be able to move freely.

The advantage of open borders, but also the acceptance of limits that currently hinder wider

global application have been recognized around the world. There are numerous examples of

CEU eTD Collection regional organizations that are already implementing or are considering implementing the partial

or complete abolition of barriers for the free movement of nationals of member states (Nita

2017). This can take various forms, from the removal of visa-requirements and more freedom to

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migrate, to final aspiration and goal of comprehensive free movement rights in a common

economic space (Nita 2017).

Regional agreements are easier to reach in comparison to global level, as smaller number of

states are involved, there are more similar levels of socio-economic development and often

similar challenges which can be addressed through migration policies, which all contributes to

facilitate the process (Nita 2017).

Some regional arrangements do not aim towards a general free movement of persons but rather

intend to facilitate the movement of certain categories of high-skilled workers and service

providers. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its successor United States–

Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) are the examples of such an agreement.

Some other examples of regional cooperation have more ambitious goals in terms of migration

liberalization.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have adopted measures to establish a

borderless West Africa. The free movement protocol provided three phases of liberalization, first

provides the right of entry, followed by right to residence and finally right to establishment. First

phase was implemented and second and third are still not fully implemented (Adepoju et al.

2010).

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) grants freedom of mobility to nationals of Member States. This

case is specific as it still excludes majority of people residing in these countries due to the fact CEU eTD Collection that in majority of the Gulf countries, non-citizens constitutes the majority of residents (Vonk

2018).

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Chapter 3: Labor and migration in Western Balkans

3.1 Labor Market in Western Balkans

The labor market in the Western Balkans region, despite certain positive trends, still lags

significantly behind developed countries. What is especially worrying is the trend of decreasing

the total number of available labor force, due to the large number of outward migration, as well

as the aging population (World Bank 2020) which is already an obstacle to economic

development and expansion, and as this trend continues, its consequences will be even more

devastating.

Based on a World Bank data a brief overview of main factors of labor market in the region

follows:

The overall working-age population (15-64 years) of the Western Balkan countries dropped by

about 762,000, or 6 percent since 2012. By the last accessible data (2019 Q2), only in one year

from mid-2018 to mid-2019 the number dropped by 2 percent. Variations existed across the

region, since 2012 Bosnia and Herzegovina was affected most, with a decline of more than 20

percent, followed by Serbia by 10 percent, Albania 8.8 percent, Montenegro 3.1 percent and

North Macedonia -1.4 percent. Only Kosovo had increase by 5 percent.

Since 2012 the activity rate rose by 4.5 percent, driven by the increased labor market

participation of women at the regional level. Since 2012, over 900,000 jobs were created

increasing the number of jobs from 5.5 million in 2012 to 6.4 million in 2019. CEU eTD Collection

Unemployment is on all-time low in all Western Balkan countries but higher when comparing

with the EU. On the level of region unemployment rate is 13,3 percent (23 percent in 2012),

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lowest in Serbia 10.3 and highest in Kosovo 25.2 percent. Unemployment rate for young people

30.4 percent (48 percent in 2012). Long-term unemployment is 8.8 percent in 2019 Q2 (18

percent in 2012). Although these statistics are encouraging situation is worrying, as emigration

from the region was key to the reduction in unemployment.

Wages are steadily increasing in all Western Balkan countries, mostly due to rises in public

sector wages as well as labor shortages in some sectors. Accordingly to data from official

statistics institutions of countries of the region, despite having largest figures of unemployment,

average net salary at the beginning of 2020 is highest in Kosovo – 537 EUR, followed by

Montenegro 515 EUR, Serbia 515 EUR, Bosnia and Herzegovina 481 EUR, Albania 431 EUR

and North Macedonia 430 EUR. Characteristic of all countries is that wages are significantly

higher in the public sector than in the private sector. For example in Kosovo, average salary in

private sector is 333 EUR, which is only 62 percent of average salary on the level of country.

3.2 Brain Drain and effects of emigration in Western Balkans

Shrinking of labor force is a problem that is already present in the Western Balkans, and the

trend of departures continues. A special aspect of this problem is the so-called brain drain. This

phenomenon is reflected in the emigration of highly educated people as well as those with

specific skills, which leads to a lack of certain professions, a reduction in the overall capacity of

countries and undermines prospects of economic development. Countries facing this problem are

characterized by serious shortages and imbalances in the labor market. The massive emigration CEU eTD Collection from Central Eastern European states including the Western Balkans is one of the key predictor

of a slow economic convergence with the EU, in addition to accelerated ageing it undermines

local workforce, economic structures and cultural capital (Radonjic and Bobic 2020). At the

20

same time this process have certain positive effects like smoothing labour market tensions by

lowering the unemployment rates and improving budgets of local population through

remittances. This complexity influenced shift from previous “drain/gain” dichotomy narratives,

towards more positive debates on brain exchange, brain chain and brain circulation (Filipovic

and Putnik 2010). In this chapter this complex phenomenon focusing on Western Balkans will be

elaborated.

Human capital is the ultimate resource of twenty-first-century economies, and developed

countries are in constant demand for well educated and skilled labour (Zimmermann 2005). On

the other hand, the urge for people to move to places where they can better cash in their

knowledge and skills is natural.

In 2015, migrants accounted for 3.4 percent of the world’s population and contributed to the

creation of 9.4 percent of global GDP (Woetzel et al. 2016). This disproportion speaks in favor

of the fact that migrant workers are on average more educated and skilled, and the motivating

factor should not be neglected, because emigration is generally performed by those who are

younger, more motivated and committed to their careers (Radonjic and Bobic 2020).

Emigration is not new for the Western Balkans, this trend has been going on for decades. Since

the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been several waves of emigration. The latest

wave is ongoing, largely caused by disappointment in slow economic development and a

weakening prospects for EU accession, but economic reasons are not the only ones that motivate

the citizens of the region to emigrate, citizens often stated that corruption, primitivism, religious CEU eTD Collection

chauvinism, and nationalism are some of the factors that triggers the emigration (Vracic 2018).

21

Estimated (2013) 5.7 million persons originating from the Western Balkans live abroad, which

constitutes 31.2 percent, almost one thirds of the total Western Balkans population, ranging from

18.2 percent in Serbia to 45.3 percent in Montenegro (Petreski et al. 2018).

Western Balkans emigrants are predomonantly young and relatively high educated. Between 30

and 45 percent of the migrants that left Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia

have high education, which is three to four times more than a percentage of high educated people

in general population (World Bank, 2020).

This trend continues to be negative as it is showed in Gallup research on Potential Net Migration

Index. It measures how many people from a certain category of the population would leave to

other countries and how many people from the same category from other countries would move

to the country. Data shows negative values across the region, in Albania 50 percent among

highly educated and 46 percent among youth, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 40 percent and 57

percent, in North Macedonia 39 percent and 52 percent and in Serbia 27 percent and 46 percent

(Gallup 2018). Half of Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.8 milion people, stated they would be ready to

move and work abroad (Vracic 2018).

Emigration is not evenly distributed across occupations and certain occupations are more

affected. According to the data of the Medical Chamber of Serbia, in 2019, 800 doctors left

Serbia (N1 2020). German Federal Employment Agency data shows that in 2019 there were

50.726 healthcare proffesionals originating from Western Balkans working in Germany (Rujevic

et al. 2020). CEU eTD Collection

Engineers, IT industry workers are leaving in high numbers too, but also workers with a

vocational education (Petreski et al. 2018). This lost is threatening development, competitiveness

22

and sustainability (Taleski and Hoppe 2015). The loss of so-called “new economy” skills, like IT

and research, increasing overall labor market vulnerability to inevitable technological change

(World Bank 2020). The consequences are also being felt in less high-tech and sophisticated

professions, for example public transport in Belgrade is facing a problem of a significant

shortage of drivers and maintenance workers (N1 2018).

Most evident positive effects of emigration for countries of origin are sigificant income through

remittence and lowering of the unemployment. Insted of “brain drain“ narrative, from another

perspective this phenomenon can be seen as a way of preventing “brain waste” (Filipovic and

Putnik 2010), by utilizing labor, knowledge and skills which might othervise remain unused due

to lack of opportunities in countries of origin. Emigration has been a source of growth through

remittence, but also experiences and connections gained in developed countries which emigrants

can apply or share in country of origin (Vracic 2018).

Western Balkan countries yearly receive remittence in avearge of 8 percent of GDP, and in

Kosovo it amounts to 16 percent (World Bank 2020). This figures include only official transfers.

For all these reasons, it is hard to give a unambiguous answer to the overall nature of the effects

that emigration has on countries of origin. Recent study (Radonjic and Bobic 2020) tried to

calculate the net effects on the example of Serbia. Calculation was based on the figure of 44.000

people who emigrate in 2016. Costs side included direct costs (costs of education) and

opportunity costs (output which emigrant would generate if they stayed). It is estimated at 4.6

billion euros and when deducted for the amount of remittence recived net annual loss is 1.2 CEU eTD Collection

billion euros. This calculation is certainly not the most accurate because it does not take into

account indirect gains (experience and connections used in country of origin), and also the

23

amount of remittance is official and does not include money handed in cash. In any case, it gives

some idea of the overall effect of emigration.

3.3 Cross-border labor mobility - legal framework in Western Balkans

The legal framework for labor migration in the Western Balkans can be defined as relatively

strict, according to the possibilities for access of foreign workers to the domestic labor market.

Although in principle access is not prohibited, a number of legal restrictions significantly impede

cross-border labor mobility.

When considering the legal framework, we will start from international legal norms in the field

of labor and migration. All Western Balkan countries, with the exception of Kosovo, are

members of relevant international bodies, as well as signatories to conventions that deal in whole

or in part with labor rights, including migrant workers. Although formally Kosovo is not a

member of international organizations, including the United Nations, nor a signatory to

conventions, Kosovo implements international standards in its legislation. This body of law

includes UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), UN International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), UN Convention against Torture

(1984) and its Optional Protocol (2002), UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), UN

Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and Members of their

Families (1990) and several conventions of International labor Organization (ILO), like Migrants

for Employment Convention (1949) and Migrant Workers Convention (1975). CEU eTD Collection Western Balkans countries are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and party to the main

CoE legal instruments European Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter and

24

particularly important in the context of labor mobility Convention on the Recognition of

Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (1997).

As the countries of the region have aspirations to join the European Union and are currently in

various stages of accession, the laws of the European Union significantly affects the legislation

of the countries of the region. Candidate countries are obliged to successively harmonize their

legislation with the acquis communautaire during the accession period. The countries of the

region often adopt legal solutions from the acquis even before they are obliged to do so,

considering them a good practice. Negotiations between the EU and candidate countries are

separated in chapters. Matter of labor and migration is set in Chapter 2 – Freedom of movement

of workers, Chapter 19 - Social policy and employment and Chapter 24 - Freedom, security and

justice. Chapters 2 and 19 primarily cover equal enjoyment of labor and social rights by all,

including foreigners and Chapter 24 covers the legal aspects of regulating foreigners’ entry,

residence and access to labor markets. This a framework for aligning of regulations with EU

standards.

Comparing the laws in the EU member states (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany) with the laws

in the countries of the Western Balkans, it can be concluded that the latter have already fairly

unified their legislation in the field of labor and migration with the EU.

In all countries there are special laws that regulate the right of foreign nationals to work. All

provide for the same rights and treatment of foreign workers as domestic ones, but access to the

labor market itself is significantly limited. Obstacles are set in the form of work permits and CEU eTD Collection

quota systems. What differs is the different competence of state bodies in the procedure of

issuing work permits. Below we will give a brief overview of these legal regimes.

25

3.3.1 Albania

According to Law on Foreigners, No. 108/2013 an alien may be employed in the Republic of

Albania upon being provided work permit. EU citizens, Schengen countries citizens, Kosovo

citizens and USA citizens are exempted from this provision and enjoy equal rights with the

Albanian citizens in the field of employment and self-employment. Number of annually issued

work permits is limited by quota which is set by Council of Ministers of Albania every year. The

quota is determined in accordance with the policy of migration and labor market situation. Work

permit is issued by the relevant Labor Office corresponding to the business location of the

employer. Responsible state authority, prior to the adoption of the request of an alien to fill a job

vacancy, must assess if the place may be occupied by persons already entitled to work in Albania

and possess skills and qualifications required and are willing to work. Number of aliens working

for an employer does cannot exceed 10 percent of the total number of staff in the previous 12

months. Migrant worker who manage to obtain work permit is obliged to stick to the job for

which the work permit was issued.

3.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Matter of migrant labor is regulated both on federal and entities level. Under the federal Law on

Foreigners work permit shall be issued by the competent authority on the basis of established

work permit quota. Federal Council of Ministers is responsible for setting the annual quota of

work permits on the suggestion of entity authorities and in accordance with the migration policy

CEU eTD Collection and by taking into account the state of affairs at the labor market. In addition to the number of

work permits, quota also determine for which specific professions work permits can be issued.

Work permit shall be issued for a specific post and/or for a specific type of job. There is a

26

separate quota for seasonal workers for defined and differentiated activities, which may vary

from 90 to 180 days in a year. On the level of entities laws are giving provisions on procedure of

issuing work permit. The work permit is issued by the branch office of the Employment Agency

competent according to the headquarters of the employer. Work permit may not be issued to a

foreigner if there is an unemployed person on the register of unemployed, who meets the

conditions in accordance with the application for a work permit, unless the unemployed person

refuses employment.

3.3.3 Kosovo

According to Law on Foreigners No. 04/L-219 work permits are issued on basis of an annual

quota set by the Government of the Republic of Kosovo. Annual quota for employment of

foreigners shall be determined in accordance with the policy on migration and the labor market

situation and in accordance with the needs and opportunities of employment of foreigners in the

Republic of Kosovo. Through the annual quota for employment of foreigners shall be defined

the activities and occupations for which the new employment is allowed and the number of

permits for each activity and occupation. Through annual quota for employment of foreigners

might be set out also the quota for seasonal employment. The work permit is issued by the

Department for foreigners of Ministry of Interior, with the consent of Ministry of Labor and is

bind by the contract. Work permit application should be accompanied with justification for the

employment of a foreigner containing data on the skills and professional qualifications and work

experience of the foreigner and the reasons why the workplace cannot be filled by the workforce CEU eTD Collection from the labor market in the Republic of Kosovo.

27

3.3.4 Montenegro

Montenegrin Foreign Nationals Law also stipulates quota system. Annual number of work

permits for foreign nationals is determined by the Government, in accordance with the migration

policy, status and movements on the labor market in Montenegro. The annual quota also

determines the business activities and occupations where the foreign nationals may be employed.

Within the annual quota, the annual quota for seasonal employment of foreign nationals shall be

separately determined. Work permit is issued by Ministry of Interior. A foreign national may

work in Montenegro only on jobs for which the work permit was issued. EU member state

nationals and nationals of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, Kingdom of Norway and the

Swiss Confederation are exempt and have equal access to labor market as nationals.

3.3.5 North Macedonia

Law on the Employment and Work of Foreigners regulates labor migration. It sets the provision

of quotas for work permits for foreigners that may be engaged on the territory of the Republic of

Macedonia. The Quota is set up annually by the Government. It cannot, on an annual basis,

exceed 5% of the population of the Republic of Macedonia that is legally employed, according to

the data of the State Statistical Office. The Government also may reduce and change the quotas

for employment and work of foreigners by regions, areas, legal entities and job positions.

Furthermore, it may place limitations and bans on the flow of new foreign workers on the whole

CEU eTD Collection or in certain municipalities. The Employment Service Agency is responsible for issuing of work

permits.

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3.3.6 Serbia

Law on Employment of Foreigners stipulates that foreign nationals are free to work in Serbia if

they obtain work permit. Citizens of EU and Swiss Confederation are exempt from this provision

and have equal rights and access to labor market as nationals. Work permit is issued by local

branch of National Employment Agency. Conditions for submitting the request for a work permit

are that employer did not dismiss employees due to technological, economic or organizational

changes at the jobs for which a work permit is requested and that before submitting the

application for a work permit for employment, employer did not find nationals with appropriate

qualifications registered at National Employment Agency. The Government may, by a decision,

limit the number of foreigners who are issued work permits in case of disturbances on the labor

market, in accordance with the migration policy and the situation and movements on the labor

market.

CEU eTD Collection

29

Chapter 4: Feasibility of open border policy implementation in Western Balkans and analysis of its effects and limitations

The problem of migration has been neglected in the region and public debates on this issue are

rare, fact that a large number of people emigrate tells about the quality of life, which is an

unpleasant reminder to the authorities, thus they avoid this topic (Vracic 2018). But as elaborated

in Chapter 3, the issue of emigration is significant and with even greater negative effects still to

come. Societies of the region started to reqognize this problem, 13 percent of people in the

region see “brain drain“ as one of main concerns regarding the economic development, rise from

0 percent in 2014 (Balkan Barometer 2019). In this sense governments of the region will need to

address this issue and provide solutions to enhace the positive sides of migrations and mitigate

the negative effects.

The answer to the question whether there should be freedom of movement in the region is clear,

as all countries in the region are striving for the EU, where freedom of movement is one of one

of the pillars. The opening of borders is therefore inevitable, the only question is when it will

happen.

As it can be seen from the analysis of labor mobility legal framework, countries of the Western

Balkans, due to their obligations in the accession process, and desire to show their commitment

to accession and to implement legal solutions from the EU as examples of good practice, have

already harmonized their laws in the field of labor and migration with EU laws. Albania,

CEU eTD Collection Montenegro and Serbia even went step further and accepted and unilateraly equated EU

nationals with their nationals regarding the right to residence and work. This led to a situation

30

where, for example, a citizen of Portugal or Ireland has the right to work and settle without

restrictions in these countries, while citizens of neighboring countries cannot.

When designing a labour immigration policy, policy makers are focusing on three fundamental

issues, first is how to regulate openness, how open should it be to foreign labor, second how to

select migrants, and lastly what rights to grant migrants after admission (IOM, 2015). Most

countries operate different labour immigration policies regarding to their specific needs. As

elaborated in previous chapters, societies in the region are facing very similar problems, both

political and institutional, as well as economic and socio-demographic in nature, thus needs of

countries of the region are similar, which gives space and opportunity for joint action.

In order to succeed, it is important for a policy to have public support. This is especially

important when it comes to migration policies, because as argued in Chapter 2, a negative

attitude and fear are often obstacles for implementation, despite undoubtable evidence of

economic gains from liberalization of migrations.

Balkan Barometer 2019, a survey conducted by Regional Cooperation Council shows that a

majority of people have positive attitude towards opening of borders in the region. On the level

of region 36 percent think that it would be good for economy, while 19 percent thinks the

opposite. The only country with narrow negative majority is Montenegro.

Previous cooperation between the countries in the region has a predominantly positive

perception, with 74 percent of people in the region see it as a factor which contributes to

CEU eTD Collection economic, political and security situation (Balkan Barometer 2019).

When asked to identify main problems the region is facing as a whole, socio-economic problems

dominated, while only 11 percent named political issues (political disputes, border issues,

31

minority problems). 8 percent out of this 11, named political issues (Balkan barometer 2019),

which are as Bieber argues, predominantly constructed by political elites.

An important aspect of opening borders is the socio-cultural aspect. The region of the Western

Balkans bears the burden of ethnic conflicts that ended two decades ago. There are still some

negative sentiments between people based on ethnicity or religion. They are manifested in higher

levels of nationalism which is a wider problem, not just in the context of feasibility of open

borders policy. Yet instead of obstacle for the policy of open borders, looking from another

angle, freedom of movement can be seen as an obstacle for spreading of nationalism. Increasing

connectivity could lead to diminishing of the role of nationalism. Through centuries of

coexistence, a similar culture and customs have developed, which makes Western Balkans

societies significantly more similar than might be inferred from the recent past. With the

exception of Albania, other countries in the region were part of Yugoslavia until its break-up in

1991, thus they share both that experience and a sense of a partially shared identity. It should be

added that the traditional perception of the region from the outside is based on collectivity, and

unfortunatelly mainly negativelly, sum up in the phrase “Balkans as European inner otherness“

(Gries et al. 2016). As Dustmann and Preston argue socio-cultural objection to the idea of open

borders are weaker where greater similarity exist.

When it comes to the economy, as recent study of OECD showed the countries of the region are

not of a great competition to each other. Tourism dominates the economy of Montenegro, and

this sector will also be important in Albania, which has great tourism potential and is expanding. CEU eTD Collection On the other hand, Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have significant

industry. Serbia leads the region in terms of investments and the opening of new factories.

Kosovo's economy is dominated by small businesses and services (OECD 2019). Kosovo has the

32

youngest population in Europe and is certainly a large reservoir of labor force, and it also faces

the highest unemployment. Imbalances between labour demand and supply exist mainly in

tourism, construction and agricultural sectors (IOM 2015).

For Western Balkans, the domestic economy is key and it can be expected that emigration will

slow down once the economy expands (Vracic 2018), but in order to expand the economy needs

labor force to support the growth. Weak economy leads to emigration, labor shortages hinder

economic development and this forms a vicious circle. Keeping at least some of the emigrants in

the region would be a step towards getting out of this situation.

Free cross-border mobility in the region can contribute to balancing and better matching of skills

and jobs, increasing productivity and job creation (IOM 2015). Creation of regional pool of skills

and workforce will certainly make the region more attractive for investments, as regional market

would be capable to better match the needs of investors (IOM 2015).

The usual concern that accompanies the opening of borders related to the excessive number of

migrants that will pose burden for the social and welfare system is not realistic in the case of the

Western Balkans. It is to be expected that this type of migration will fill the gaps in the labor

market, and the relatively smaller appeal in comparison to emigration to developed countries will

certainly keep this number at levels even lower than the needs of the market. Additionaly the

level of average salaries is balanced, thus there is no incentive to migrate if one has already have

an appropriate job in home country.

CEU eTD Collection As stated in the Chapter 1, clientelism and especially the political subtype of this phenomenon is

widespread in all countries of the region. It negatively affects the prospects for employment.

33

Open borders in the region would alleviate this problem to some extent, giving citizens more

employment opportunities, especially in finding a job which match one’s skills and needs.

The question also arises as to why someone would immigrate to a country that is in a similar

economic position. A study from 2015 shows that out of the total number of migrants in the

World, one third migrated from a developing country to another developing country (Woetzel et

al. 2016). A recent survey showed that 11 percent of people in region answered postivelly when

asked whether they would consider living and working in another country of the region, which is

one quarter of all who consider moving abroad (Balkan Berometer 2019). This ratio would

certainly move towards regional migration in case of open borders.

Although intraregional emigration cannot be compared to emigration to developed countries in

terms of improving of standard of living in material terms, it certainly have some comparative

advantages. First of all, it would be significantly simplier and more accessable. Other aspects

such as individual happiness (Bartram 2010) should not be neglected either. Certainly, an

environment that is culturally significantly closer to potential emigrants would contribute to

easier adaptation and integration. With the exception of Albania, language barriers are not

significant. We should also have in mind the geographical proximity, which allows more

frequent visits to the country of origin. Part of these migrations would also be in border areas,

which would mean that migrant workers would not need to change their places of residence.

These factors would also affect the increase of circular migration, as from the socio-economic

point of view the most profitable form of migration (Constant et al. 2012), with reduced harmful CEU eTD Collection

effects, such as integration costs or permanent loss of labor force for the country of origin.

34

Greater mobility would positively affect connectivity among people in the region which would

lead to reduction of ethnic tensions, thus to weakening of the nationalism, as Bieber argues a

resource for reinforcing the populist policies and distraction (Bieber 2010) from substantial

problems like corruption and poor governance. Lowering the influence of nationalism will

diminish the power of political elites to neutralize class struggle (Cantat 2019) and can lead to

stronger organization of working class, which can have positive effects for democratization and

the building of democratic and accountable institutions.

As argued in previous chapters accession process and prospect of joining the EU was a driving

factor for reforms, but as enthusiasm in the Member States for further enlargement is fading and

prospects of accession are blured, the countries of the Western Balkans found themselves in a

vacuum. Both authorities and citizens expect improvements through the accession process and

eventual membership. But as this process predominantly depends on the other side, that position

is unenviable. In that sense, taking the initiative by the countries of the region would be a

positive step forward, both for the countries themselves and even for the eventual accession to

the EU. Any improvements in the region will make it more attractive for accession and give less

space for skepticism in EU for further enlargement. Opening of borders can be a good example

of such initiative, as integration is not bind only for the context of EU integration, it can be also

implemented locally.

In order to maximize positive effects of migrations, they should be viewed as circulation,

mobility and flow, not necessarily leading to permanent stay and should be approached without CEU eTD Collection fear, based on the notion of opportunity (Casey 2010). Western Balkans fulfill these criteria

regarding the nature of migration, but also lack of reasons for common fears associated with the

policy of open borders.

35

Conclusion First part of the thesis elaborated on the current context of the Western Balkans, as well as the

problems region is facing, in political, economic and socio-demographic terms. Second part,

elaborated on the idea of open borders, analyzing its positive and negative aspects. In the third

part, the possibility of implementing the idea of open borders in the Western Balkans region was

analyzed. There are clear arguments in favor of opening of borders. Socio-cultural, political and

economic similarities make the implementation viable. The effects of this open border policy

would be limited because there are no significant differences in standard of living, which are the

main incentive for migration. On the other hand, possible negative effects of migration, like costs

and tensions regarding the integration or mass migration are not expected. Despite limitations

policy will to some extant mitigate the shortages and misbalances on labor market and would

offer new opportunities both for individuals to find appropriate jobs and investors to find the

adequate labor force. Certainly, expectations regarding the effects cannot be high in the

beginning, both at the macro level, in terms of economic development, and at the micro level, for

life improvements of individuals. Having in mind eventual positive effects on society from

increased connectivity and with the absence of negative effects, the net effect of open border

policy in Western Balkans will have overall positive effects.

CEU eTD Collection

36

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