THE ROLE PLAYED BY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN
SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICTS
A research dissertation submitted to the college higher degrees and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
By
Chol Gatkek Tut MIR/28879/141/DF
for the
award of masters degree in International Relations
and Diplomacy at Kampala International
University
October 2015 DECLARATION I Chol Gatkek Tut, the undersigned, declare that this dissertation entitled "the role played by united states of America in South Sudan conflicts" with the exception of the references, ideas and concerns is my own personal work and has never been presented to any organization or institution of higher learning for a degree or any other academic award.
Date:~/ J. !. /. ~/.?...... CHOL TUT MIR/28879/141/DF APPROVAL This is to certify that this dissertation by Chol Gatkek Tut has been done under my close supervision as university supervisor which is now ready for submission to college higher degrees and research for examination with my approval.
ii DEDICATION
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents; my mother Martha Nyadieng Ruey and my father Simon Gatkek Tut lam for enhancing discipline and up bringing me all through my academics. With all the preasure I dedicate this dissertation to my brother and Sister Nyaruach Gatkek Tut and Tut Gatkek Tut for their support and in term of physical financial and moral support as well.
I also dedicate this book to my my lovely husband Gatluak Tut Bol for caring, support and being there for me all through my academic. I also dedicate this book to my uncle in law Mr. Thomas Tut for his generous caring heart and provision.
iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
As per my studies are concerned; special thanks go to the almighty God who provided me with wisdom, strength, encouragement, breath of life, accessibility of all basic needs and all other provisions given to me during my studies. May the glory and honor be returned to HIM.
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the valuable contribution made by a number of individual to the unde1iaking of this study
I would like to thanks my late parent, my mother Mruiha Nyadieng Ruey and my father Simon Gatkek Tut lam for the unlimited care and their effort to make me chose and love education as my first priority in life and to all my sisters and brother. My sister Nyaruach Gatkek Tut and my brother Tut Gatkek Tut for their suppO!i and in term of physical financial and moral supp01i as well.
Special thanks go to my supervisor DR. Ongodia for his outstanding guidance skills, honesty and charisma and attention that sustained my motivation to the final accomplishment of this research.
Special gratitude goes to all my friends, brothers and sister, relative and to my uncle in law Tomas Tut Nyang Kunywho by his advice and encouragement developed strength in me and all their prayers that encouraged me throughout my education and more special with family and social stresses.
Finally I would like to send my wrumest thanks to my brother in marriage (Baba Thomas), my lovely husband Gatluak Tut Bol for his tireless dedication of his time and resource to keep families strong that has made me climb this tree today. I attribute my success to all and my God Almighty blesses our family with unlimited peace.
iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USA :United States of America
SSLM : Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SPLM/A :Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army
NIF : National Islamic Front
GONU : Government of National Unity
ESF : Economic Support Funds
NCP :National Congress Party
USAID : United States Agency for International Development
SS : South Sudan
FBI : Federal Bureau ofinvestigation
CIA : Central Intelligence Agency
FY : Financial year
AFRICOM : African Command
UN :United Nations
NGO :Non Governmental Organization
CPA : Comprehensive Peace Agreement
AU : African Union
UNMISS : United Nation Mission in South Sudan
UNISFA :United Nation Interim for Security Force for Abyei
GOSS :Government of South Sudan
SAF :Sudan Armed Force
GPS : Global Positioning System
v TALE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ...... i APPROVAL ...... ii DEDICATION ...... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...... iv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... v TALE OF CONTENTS ...... vi ABSTRACT ...... ix
CHAPTER ONE ...... I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUNDS ...... ! 1.0 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Background of the study ...... 1 1.1.1 Historical Perspective ...... 1 1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective ...... 5 1.1.3 Conceptual perspective ...... 5 1.1.4 Contextual Perspective ...... 6 1.2 Statement of the Problem ...... 7 1.3 Purpose of Study ...... 7 1.4 Research Objective ...... 8 1.5 Research Question ...... 8 1.5.1 Hypothesis ...... 8 1.6 Scope ...... 8 1.6.1 Geographical Scope ...... 8 1.6.2 Content Scope ...... 9 1.6.3 Time Scope ...... 9 I. 7 Significant or Justification of the Study ...... 9 1.8 Conclusion ...... I 0 I. 9 Organization of the thesis ...... 10
CHAPTER TWO ...... II LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 11 2.0 Introduction ...... 11 2.1 The intra state conflicts ...... 11 2.2 Theory ...... 12 2.3 Conceptual Framework ...... 13 2.4 Role of Diplomacy or Politics ...... 13 2.5 Economic, strategic and Diplomatic Interests Restrain the US in its opposition to Khmioum ...... 16 2.6 United States responses to South Sudan conflict ...... 21 2. 7 US target in South Sudan ...... 21 2.8 U.S. Policy and Interests ...... 24 2.9 Assessment of U.S. Foreign policy toward Sudan ...... 25 2.10 United States Interests in the South Sudan Conflict...... 26 2.11 The Status of Oil Production ...... 29
vi 2.12 The impact of the role played by United States in South Sudan conflict...... 31
CHAPTER THREE ...... 39 METHODOLOGY ...... 39 3.0 Introduction ...... 39 3 .I Research design ...... 3 9 3.2 Target Population ...... 39 3.3 Sample Size ...... 39 3.4 Research methods ...... 40 3.5 Data Collection Instruments ...... 40 3.4.1 Interviews ...... 40 3 .4.2 Questionnaires ...... 41 3.4.3 Document analysis ...... 41 3 .4.4 Observations ...... 41 3.5 Validity and Reliability of the instrument...... 41 3.6 Data processing ...... 41 3.7 Data Analysis ...... 42 3.8 Ethical considerations ...... 42 3.10 Limitations ofthe study ...... 43
CHAPTER FOUR ...... 44 DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STUDY FINDINGS ······················································································································································· 44 4.0 Introduction ...... 44 4 .1.1 Findings on Gender of respondents ...... 44 4.1.2 Findings on Age group of the respondents ...... 45 4.1.3 Findings of Education levels ofrespondents ...... 45 4.1.4 Findings on Marital Status of the Respondents ...... 46 4.2 Response on Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts ...... 47 4.4 Resource scarcity and competition for resources as cause of conflicts ...... 48 4.5 Response on whether Proliferation of arms in the society in South Sudan situation ...... 48 4. 7 Response on whether armed movements interfere with civil matters ...... 49 4.8 Findings on whether Weak/lack of good Governance in South Sudan is affecting peace and stability situation ...... 50 4.9 Challenges faced by USA's in trying to resolve the conflict ...... 51 4.10 Findings on Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing conflicts ...... 53 4.11 Response of Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts in South Sudan ...... )3 4.12 Findings on whether Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper efforts to curb conflicts by USA in South Sudan ...... 54 4.13 Findings on whether Losing hope and faith in leaders and USA hamper efforts to resolve conflicts in South Sudan ...... 55 4.14 Solutions to the conflict in South Sudan by USA Peace Keeping ...... 56 4.14.1 Response on the General or targeted development assistance in South Sudan situation ... 56 4.15 Response on whether USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan ...... 58 4.16 Response on whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan ...... 58
vii 4.17 Response on whether Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts ...... 60
CHAPTER FIVE ...... 61 SUMMARY AND DISCUSION OF THE FINDINGS ...... 61 5.0 Introduction ...... 61 5.1. Summary and discussion offindings ...... 61 5.1.1 The mandate ofUSA ...... 61 5.1.2 Challenges faced by USA's in trying to resolve the conflict ...... 61 5 .1.3 Strides Made by USA in South Sudan ...... 62 5.2 Conclusion ...... 62 5.3 Recommendations ...... 64 5.4 Suggested Areas of further research ...... 65
REFERENCES ...... 66 APPENDICES ...... 66 APPENDIX I ...... 71 TRANSMITTAL LETTER FOR THE RESPONDENTS ...... 71 APPENDIX I: ...... 72 QUESTIONNAIRE ...... 72
viii LIST OF TABLES Table I: Shows Gender by respondent distribution ...... 44 Table 2: Age of the respondents ...... 45 Table 3: Shows educational level ofRespondents ...... 46 Table 4: Shows Marital Status of Respondents ...... 46 Table 5: Shows Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts ...... 47 Table 6: Showing the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts ...... 52 Table 7: Shows Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing Conflicts ...... 53 Table 8: Shows response on whether Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts in South Sudan ...... 53 Table 9: Showing the General or targeted development assistance for South Sudan Situation ...... 57 Table 10: Showing always whether USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan helps stop conflicts ...... 58 Table 11: showing whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan ...... 59 Table 12: Shows whether Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts in South Sudan ...... 60
ix LIST OF FIGURE
Figure I: The bar graph showing response on Resource scarcity and completion as cause of conflic ...... 48
Figure 2: Showing the bar graph showing frequency of respondent on whether Proliferation of arms in the society in South Sudan situation ...... 48
Figure 3: The bar graph showing frequency of respondent on Armed movements interfere with civil matters ...... 50
Figure 4: The Bar Graph showing reply by respondents on whether Weak/lack of good governance in South Sudan situation ...... 50
Figure 5: Shows frequency of whether Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper effmis to curb conflicts in South Sudan ...... 54
Figure 6: Shows frequency on whether losing hope and faith in leaders hamper and USA efforts to curb conflicts ...... 56
Figure 7: The bar graph showing response on whether civil society development can help curb conflicts ...... 59
X ABSTRACT The study aimed at the role played by United States of America in South Sudan Conflicts. Their main aim was to find ivory, slave, gold and other minerals, which were very useful in the Arab peninsula and to the Europeans. Arab invaders met a lot of resistance from the Nuba and Funj, who were at the time the inhabitants ofNmihern Sudan and rule there today. After many years of war between them, they signed agreements which allowed both sides to coexist in the Notih, (Deng 1995, p.9). Sudan faced her first civil war in 1955, a few months before the British depmiure (Deng, 1995; Wai, 1973).
The study used descriptive case study research design which used both the quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and the established sample size was I 06 respondents from population of 145 and this was enough guide in effective data collection on the topic under study. The researcher first obtained a letter of introduction from the university, assigning her to the field which she used to erase suspicion by the respondents.
From the findings the peace keeping to be resolved requires more appropriate means like resources to use however in regards to the situation, there were not available at the time therefore the table above indicate that most respondents 20(19.8%) agree that Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts, this makes the situation to worsen 21(19.8%) Disagree with it and 42(39.6%) Strongly agree with the statement. This implied that respondents feel that Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts.
In conclusion and recommendation the USA recent engagement in South Sudan has in some ways contributed positively to peace. For example, there clearly has been effective co-ordinated diplomacy to support the emergence of a fragile peace from decades of war. However, the emerging lessons from the CPA period suggest much that could be done to respond better to conflict in Sudan and South Sudan.
Promote sustainable community development and economic revitalization: where progress in conflict management is evident and where peace agreements remain intact, provide more resources for participatory community development, create peace situations and provide food for-work and food-for-training assistance.
xi CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUNDS
1.0 Introduction
The study aimed at the role played by United States of America in South Sudan Conflicts. This chapter presents the background to the study, statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions and assumptions, scope of the study, significance of the study, the justification of the study and the operational definitions of terms and concepts as applied to suit the context of the study.
1.1 Background of the study The purpose on this background was to provide the basis of the study. To this effect, it was presented in four perspectives: historical, theoretical, conceptual and contextual. The historical perspectives outline the evolution of the problem. In the theoretical perspective, the theory that informs the study was explained. At the conceptual level, key study variables are explained. The contextual perspective deals with the situation analysis.
1.1.1 Historical Perspective The conflict in the Sudan has many historical reasons, some of which relate to the colonial era. Thousands years ago, before Christ, Arab traders came to Sudan through Egypt (Alier 2001 ). Their main aim was to find ivory, slave, gold and other minerals, which were very useful in the Arab peninsula and to the Europeans. Arab invaders met a lot of resistance from the N uba and Funj, who were at the time the inhabitants of Northern Sudan and rule there today. After many years of war between them, they signed agreements which allowed both sides to coexist in the North, (Deng 1995). Sudan faced her first civil war in 1955, a few months before the British departure (Deng, 1995; Wai, 1973). When Sudan was close to gaining sovereignty, elites from the South attempted to persuade the British to divide the country before they left. Unfortunately, British and Arab Muslim elites held private meetings to discuss the process of handing over the country's affairs. (Cobham Alex., 2005) Southern elites were excluded in this independence arrangement. Within four months, Sudan declared her independence in 1956 (Lobe 1998, p.2). This move left southern elites with limited options and they decided to take up arms against the
1 newly formed nation. The rebel movement from the South, known as the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), declared its armed struggle against the Arab Muslim-dominated government in Khartoum (Deng, 1995; Glickman, 2000; Jok, 2001; Wai, 1973). The reason for slatting the war was to pressure Arab Muslim elites to reverse their notion of imposing Arab identity on non-Arabs. This conflict was difficult to resolve because these Arab Muslim elites were not cooperating with non-Arabs and non-Muslims in establishing a secular system.
According to Deng, 1995, the imposition of "Arabism" along with the Islamic religion remains, and continues to be a slatting point for serial conflicts in Sudan (Brosche, J. and D. Rothbart 2013). This association of religion with politics and social affairs has complicated coexistence between the North and the South for at least a generation and will likely continue unless Arab Muslims in the Nmth, non-Arabs, and non Muslims establish a secular system to accommodate all people and beliefs (Bartlett, 2008). The SSLM and the central government signed an agreement in 1972 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which established an autonomous government in Southern Sudan (Jok, 2007). Twelve years later, this government was dissolved because Arab elites considered the agreement an introduction of secularism in the state; President Nimeiri imposed Islamic Sharia Law nationally. This led to another civil war in 1983, for the existence of the conflicts in South Sudan, in May 16, 1983 a new rebel movement known as the Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was launched which maintained the occurrence of the conflicts (K.halid, 2012). This movement conveyed a vision for all marginalized Sudanese in the entire country. Its aim was to create a democratic Sudan under secular reform and preserve the Unity of Sudan (Flora, 2013), The SPLM/A's vision for establishing secularism in Sudan has not been realized.
Congressional action has often influenced U.S. policy toward Sudan. U.S. relations with Sudan have long been turbulent, with the two countries routinely taking opposing positions on Middle East and Africa issues ensuring the 1970s to 1989, U.S. foreign aid to Sudan had risen substantially when Sudan was seen as a Cold War ally (Mousa, 2010). But in the wake of the 1989 coup that brought Omar a! Bashir and the National Islamic Front (NIF) to power, diplomatic relations were downgraded and aid was cut off (Carr, Edward Hallett, 2005). The Clinton Administration designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993. By 1999, some Members of Congress who were sympathetic to the cause of Sudan's southern insurgents
2 initiated efforts to tighten sanctions (Johnson, Hilde, 2011). At the same time they pushed to authorize not only food aid but development assistance, including programs to build local administrative capacity, for areas outside of Khartoum's control namely areas held by the SPLM. (Natsios, Andrew, 2012)
In 2002, Congress also appropriated non-lethal assistance for the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of armed and unarmed opposition forces (including the SPLM), to "strengthen its· ability to protect civilians from attacks. (Anonymous, 2007)" At the same time, Congress expressed support for Bush Administration efforts to seek a negotiated settlement to Sudan's civil war (Blanchard,2012). This score the beginning role played by United State of America to create new State of South Sudan. (Cobham Alex, 2005)
In 2005, the SPLM/A signed A Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Khartoum government, which established two different interim governments; one secular government known as the Government of National Unity (GONU) in Khmioum and a second Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in the South (Collins, 2008). The SPLM/A's vision of secularism was misinterpreted in that its aims were perceived as intended to eliminate Arab Muslims in the Nmih (Baldwin, David A. 2009). Though USA support, South Sudan held a referendum on the conflicts overwhelming the population violated for South Sudan independence (Cohen, Roberta, 2007).
Development assistance and Economic Support Funds (ESF) experienced a similar trend, dipping even before 1989 and then dropping off dramatically following the coup (Finnemore, Martha, 1996). These types of assistance programs went from $189.6 million in FY1985, to $17.1 million in FY1988, to only $17.4 Million over the next five years combined. After its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, the only assistance Sudan could receive from the United States was food aid most of which went to the South (Jervis, Robert., 2011). Clearly, Sudanese leaders are familiar with the extent to which America can assist them, as well as the loss that came with their broken relationship. (Keohane, Robert 0., and JosephS. Nye., 1990)
The itTigated, mechanized farming that occurs mostly in the Northern and Central Regions employs laborers from non-privileged tribes, especially Southerners living around Khartoum. U.S. sanctions against Sudanese agriculture to a great extent were passed off to these poor
3 laborers (Lacey, Marc, 2008). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that U.S. sanctions against Sudan's agricultural and oil industries were not very effective in limiting the NCP's access to funds for strengthening its military or paying off Northern elites (Moravcsik, Andrew, 1997). The bipolar strategy against the SPLA in Upper Nile (talks of peace, acts of genocide) can be seen partially as internal disagreement within the NCP governing council itself (Reeves, Eric, 20 13). Ali Osman at the time was making a big push for peace with the South because increased oil production as a result of security would give the NCP an absolute gain in oil revenue even when concessions to the South were taken into account (Schwartz, Alan., 2009). Nafie and the militant hard-liners, on the other hand, did not want to share wealth with the South and pushed for genocide as a way to remove civilians and rebels from areas near important oil infrastructure. (Tickner, J. Anne, 2006)
The loss of U.S. military suppo1i after 1989 was being replaced by military arms and equipment sold from Russia and China struiing in the mid-1990s. This development helped offset worries the NCP might have otherwise had about its military capabilities (Ahmed, Waleed., 2013). Overall, U.S. policy during this time period does not seem to have had an appreciable impact on the NCP governing council's decision to pursue genocide. U.S. pressure did seem to help achieve modest goals, like access for humanitarian aid or agreement to the presence of international peacekeepers. There is little or no evidence, though, that any U.S. effo1is had an appreciable impact on the NCP's decision to pursue genocide since 2000. (Terry Lovell, 2010) Positive developments in NCP behavior were largely superficial, meant to disguise their continued intransigence (Apiku, Simon., 2007).
As stated influence is essentially a bargaining process in which the sender tries to convince the target that compliance with its demands is better than all other alternatives. The problem in the case of U.S.-Sudan bilateral relations is that the NCP always had better alternatives, thanks mostly to foreign investment in its oil industry (David A., 2009). Khartoum could forgo the benefits of bilateral trade and aid without significantly hurting its ability to pay elites and fund its security apparatus. In fact, Sudan's greatest period of economic growth has occurred during U.S. sanctions. (Alex, 2005) It would seem that the United States' inability to impose costs or offer benefits that could not be replaced by other states almost presupposes an inability to influence NCP behavior at all, let alone regarding an important issue like genocide (Roberta, 2007).
4 Bashir's own words tell this lesson better than anyone else ever could: "Just when some countries gave us sanctions, God gave us oil (Coutsoukis, Photius, 2009).
1.1.2 Theoretical Perspective As Constructivism theory that examined state behavior in the context of state characteristics. All states are unique and have a set of defining political, cultural, economic, social, or religious characteristics that influence its foreign policy. States have identities and those identities define their behavior in the international system. The US has a foreign policy character. Russia has a foreign policy character. The cold war is a product of the clash of those identities. The end of the cold war may be a function of changes in the Russian identity. There are two sides of persuasion: the promise or use of negative sanctions (coercion) and positive sanctions (engagement), which are also commonly refe1Ted to as sticks and carrots, respectively. Negative sanctions can be either the imposition of harm (air strikes) or the withdrawal of a good (cancelling development aid). Either way, coercion works to the extent that the sender can theotcredibly impose costs on the target that are greater than the value the target places upon its current behavior. Similarly, positive sanctions can be either a reward (support in multilateral institutions) or the removal of harm (restore diplomatic relations). Either way, engagement works to the extent that the sender can credibly guarantee benefits that are greater than the value the target places upon its current behavior. In sum, persuasion is essentially a bargaining process in which the sender tries to convince the target that compliance with its demands is better than all other alternatives.
1.1.3 Conceptual perspective
The dependent variable in this study was role played by United States of America. The U.S. has a key role to play in the mediation effmis underway in Addis Ababa. Fundamentally, the current conflict is a political problem and requires a political solution. The U.S should focus now on ending the conflict, political reconciliation, and humanitarian assistance. In the long term, the U.S. should foster in South Sudan a more robust multi-party system (in advance of the country's scheduled 2015 election), security sector reform, and improved governance and accountability.
The independent variable in this study is South Sudan Conflicts; South Sudan, the world's youngest nation, is embroiled in a conflict that began as a political dispute but has been
5 intensified by pre-existing ethnic tensions. The number of casualties and refugees is straining government and international humanitarian efforts. If the situation deteriorates further, investments made by the U.S. and the international community will be squandered. Pressure must be applied to both the government of South Sudan and the rebel faction to reconcile peacefully.
1.1.4 Contextual Perspective
Conflict has been rife in South Sudan since December 2013 when fighting erupted in capital Juba between soldiers allied to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to his former deputy, Riek Machar. The war there is the result of yet another Washington intervention in a foreign country, with the same results obtained everywhere else, which is destruction, violence, chaos and the victimization of the people. The developments that USA practiced within a fragile political and military structure and rather than being addressed and resolved were allowed to fester and eventually lead to the situation that are happening today in South Sudan. USAID has worked in South Sudan for decades, providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance, conflict mitigation assistance, and suppoti for key milestones of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which culminated in South Sudan's independence. USAID has helped provide essential services to the people of South Sudan, such as health care and education, built key infrastructure such as roads and bridges, suppotied agriculture initiatives, and established the basic foundations of critical institutions. The US role, militarily, the support provided by the US in term of military aid that include military budget, military training, military hard ware such as Uniform, weapons, ammunitions etc prevail the involvement US in the South Sudan affair. US have played a great role in Equipping the new nation with all the suppmi to strengthen new nation in all aspect by strengthening Military wing in term f financial as well as humanitarian aid, Diplomatically US was the second to recognize the independent of South Sudan six month after voting result in overwhelmingly for independent of South Sudan and together with international patiners allow the new nation to assign the first Un ambassador for United Nation following the recognition of the independence by the world body. The diplomatic office in capital Juba was station since 2005 as chancellor headed by charge de affair that was letter on turned to ambassador to give necessary support to the new nation. Washington was more interested in weakening the Republic in Sudan and encouraged the Republic of South Sudan to break away, but the looming civil war
6 will damage U.S. interests in the region," Abayomi Azikiwe, editor of Pan-African news wire, told RT a few days after violence erupted in the country. "The U.S. has a lot invested politically in the Republic of South Sudan and they were the main forces behind encouraging the Sudan People's Liberation Movement to break away from the Republic of Sudan in the north of the country. Therefore, they have a lot to say about the situation issues that are going on right now in this troubled nation," the expert said in an interview with RT.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The United States has had a long ambivalent engagement in South Sudan conflict from the liberation war to the cunent post-independence conflict. During the liberation war, the US did not like SPLM/A in the 1980s. Due to perceived threat of the Marxist Mengistu in Ethiopia, the US was aligned to Khartoum. With the end of the Cold War, however, the US switched its support to SPLM/A. The US then underwrote the session of Southern Sudan to the new state of South Sudan. Thus when the conflict between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, the US was expected to throw in her super power weight to defuse the conflict. However, the US has remained ambivalent. From the outbreak of the conflict in December in 2013 It took nearly 6 months (January -June 2014) for the US to declare SS conflict a national emergency; and it took about one and half years (April, 20 15) for Banack Obama to sign and Executive Order declaring SS conflict as posing a national security threat Therefore it is not clearly understood weather the role played by United State of America has contributed positively or negatively toward the current conflict in South Sudan. This study therefore seeks to understand this by answering question to be able to know the extent that the United State of America has contributed to the current crisis in the world youngest nation, South Sudan.
1.3 Purpose of Study
The purpose of the study was to understand the role played by the United State of America in the current South Sudan conflict that can inform peace building processes around the world. The main question that the study seeks to answers; does the US contribute to ending or perpetuating the conflicts?
7 1.4 Research Objective
1. To examine United States responses to South Sudan conflict 2. To identifY United States interests in the South Sudan conflict 3. To analyze the impact of the role played by United States in South Sudan Conflict
1.5 Research Question
1. How has United States responded to South Sudan conflict? 2. What are the United States interests in the South Sudan conflict? 3. How has the United States impacted on South Sudan conflict?
1.5.1 Hypothesis H1: There is a significant relationship between United States responses and South Sudan conflict.
Hz : There is a significant relationship between United States interests and South Sudan conflict
H3 : There is a significant relationship between United States impacts and South Sudan conflict
1.6 Scope
1.6.1 Geographical Scope
The study was carried out in South Sudan lies between latitudes 3° and I3°N, and longitudes 24° and 36°E. It covered in tropical forest, swamps, and grassland. The White Nile passes through the country, passing by Juba
8 A map showing South Sudan
South Sudan conflict • States affected by violence
739,1 00* Internally displaced people SUDAN
123,400 in neighbouring countries · Estimated. tota hkery to oe higher J ETHIOPIA West Bahr ai-Ghazal
DR CONGO
Source: OCHA. 27 January 2014
1.6.2 Content Scope
The variables in this study were South Sudan conflict as the independent variable and the role played by the United State of America as the dependent variable.
1.6.3 Time Scop~
This study covered the period that the from Comprehensive Agreement of 2002 to the present- 2015
1. 7 Significant or Justification of the Study
The research contributed knowledge to knowledge by enhancing an creating understanding of about the roles of the United State of America in either facilitating end of the SS conflict or perpetuating it. In this way the study SS conflicts and explored approaches that can be used in peace building processes to achieve sustainable peace. This shall therefore serve as a reference
9 material to peace building processes and further research in peace studies and international relations.
The finding of the study provided very important information which benefited the management and government of South Sudan and the management committee over conflicts resolution, the mineral resource controllers, the human resources officers in the districts, the parents, teachers, the Non-governmental organization and other related sectors in South Sudan.
1.8 Conclusion
The opening chapter has given an introduction to the study: its background, the study problem, research objectives and questions, scope and justification of the study.
1.9 Organization of the thesis
The thesis was organized in five chapters. In the second chapter literature on the topic reviewed with the aim of gaining clarity of the concepts and constructs used in the study, and also to establish gaps in the current research. The third chapter describes the methodology used to generate data to meet the study objectives. Data generated was presented, interpreted and analyzed in the fourth chapter. Lastly, the fifth chapter summarizes and discusses the results; conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.
10 CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction
This chapter presented the theoretical framework and reviewed related literature relevant to the study variables. The review consists of the following sections: The role of played by United States America South Sudan conflict; theoretical review on United States role on South Sudan Conflict.
2.1 The intra state conflicts
The seeds of South Sudan's return to violent conflict in December 2013 were sown long before the world's newest country achieved independence in July 2011. The consequences of the renewed conflict have been serious. (Daniel W., 2014), Tens of thousands of people have been killed, and almost 2 million displaced, with at least 400,000 South Sudanese having fled to neighbouring countries by July 2014 and as many as 715,000 refugees anticipated by the end of the year. The threats of famine and of sexual violence have increased dramatically; and ethnic tensions and violence have returned to the forefront of intra-South Sudanese relations. The psychological damage to people and to a country that was slowly shedding the spectre of civil war is enonnous. (Coutsoukis, Photius, 2009)
South Sudan matters internationally. Its independence marked a change in the dynamics of the Horn of Africa long a source of worry and insecurity for African and non-African pminers alike. The region is one of the world's most politically unstable, shaped and reshaped by a shared history of cross-border conflict, socio-economic and cultural ties, and competing claims over te1ritory. (Robe1i., 2011) What had previously seemed to be a single regional conflict dynamic with Somalia at its hemi (involving Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) has transformed into a less manageable dynamic, dividing international attention between conflicts on both sides of the Horn of Africa in the context of increasing global unce1iainty. An unstable. conflict-prone South Sudan will not change without improved and increased engagement by the outside world. (Cobham, Alex., 2005)
11 South Sudan's fotmation and independence from Sudan followed a significant and sustained international effort. The adoption of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 was meant to have brought an end to the history of violence and conflict between the two. (Kant, Immanuel., 2001) The agreement itself was not in fact comprehensive, given that several outstanding issues remained unresolved, including the status of Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile; the final demarcation of the two country's boundaries; and the arrangements for sharing oil revenues. In reality, the CPA was an elite pact between one of a number of Southern Sudanese leaders and the government in Khatioum. Almost a decade after the signing of the agreement, none of these issues has been resolved apart from oil revenue sharing. (Kathryn Sikkink. 1998) The omissions point to the fact that the CPA was more about preventing continued war than about establishing the conditions for stability and was therefore not a practical road map for sustainable peace. (Joseph S., 2002) This was reinforced by the difficulty in reaching the agreement, a process requiring a great deal of directive support from an international community that had little appetite for allowing the conflicts in Sudan to rumble on without resolution.
2.2 Theory
As Constructivism theory that examines state behavior in the context of state characteristics. All states are unique and have a set of defining political, cultural, economic, social, or religious characteristics that influence its foreign policy. States have identities and those identities define their behavior in the international system. The US has a foreign policy character. Russia has a foreign policy character. The cold war is a product of the clash of those identities. The end of the cold war may be a function of changes in the Russian identity. There are two sides of persuasion: the promise or use of negative sanctions (coercion) and positive sanctions (engagement), which are also commonly referred to as sticks and carrots, respectively. Negative sanctions can be either the imposition of harm (air strikes) or the withdrawal of a good (cancelling development aid). Liberal Constructivists place their emphasis less on actions than on ideas and norms that ultimately reside in people's heads (Neumann, Iver 1999). While Liberal Constructivists accept that material factors, including the distribution of power, are impotiant, they see the overarching structure of norms as even more important (Hansen, Lene Routledge, 2006). Moreover, such ideas and norms cannot be reduced to material power and material constraints do not determine the formation of particular ideas. Research focuses on
12 cross-cultural communication and such issues as explaining the creation of norms (such as the human rights norm), their dissemination among individuals and political actors, and their effects on the behavior of those actors (Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus 2006).
2.3 Conceptual Framework
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES [ DEPENDENT VARIABLES
~ole played by United States-America South Sudan Conflict
• Law and order Diplomacy and political means • Economic crisis Mediation • Loss of life and property • Social services Threats
Source: U.S. Department ofState, "U.S. Relations with South Sudan and the Researcher (20 15)
From the conceptual framework, the independent variable is role played by USA and the dependent variable South Sudan Conflict. The study united states of America intervening South Sudan conflict. This association, however, must be take account of the prevailing governance architecture. In the next sections these variables and constructs are reviewed.
2.4 Role of Diplomacy or Politics
Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment, and human rights (Reeves, Eric, 20 13). International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians. In an informal or social sense, diplomacy is the employment of tact to gain strategic advantage or to find mutually acceptable solutions to a common challenge, one set of tools being the phrasing of statements in a non-confrontational or polite manner (Drezner, Daniel W. 2014)
13 Politics is the practice and theory of influencing other people. More narrowly, it refers to achieving and exercising positions of governance organized control over a human community, particularly a state. Fmihermore, politics is the study or practice of the distribution of power and resources within a given community (a usually hierarchically organized population) as well as the interrelationship(s) between communities.(Edward Hallett., 2005)
A variety of methods are employed in politics, which include promoting or forcing one's own political views among people, negotiation with other political subjects, making laws, and exercising force, including warfare against adversaries. Politics is exercised on a wide range of social levels, from clans and tribes of traditional societies, through modern local governments, companies and institutions up to sovereign states, to the international level.( Cobham, Alex, 2015)
Like all influential Western and African powers, at first view, the US seems to be totally puzzled by the conflict in Sudan. As the American Ambassador for religious freedom Robert Seiple summarized for the US Committee on Foreign Relations in 2000: "Sudan is both simple and terribly complicated. If it were easy, however, it would not have gone on for seventeen years with the killing of two millions plus people, most of them noncombatants. It also has been, unfortunately, a war without heroes in the south, ce1iainly in the north. So it has been difficult sometimes to take sides and to know that the issues are going to be resolved. It is as complicated and as humbling as it gets."( Daniel W, 2014)
Yet, scholars and politicians observing the US policy towards Sudan propose a quite different analysis. For example, a congresswoman opposing the US's Sudan policy points out that "it is as if we really don't want the warring to end and that we are deliberately unwilling to fashion a policy that really will produce the stated desired results." More strongly, an article from Tufts University's Fenstein International Famine Center concludes that "the US, whether it wants to be or not, is a key player in facilitating peace, but instead appears to be fomenting war.(Finnemore, Martha !996)
On the international scene, the US openly adopts a very strong position against Khartoum; At first sight, there seems to be a strong will in American political circles to overthrow Sudan's
14 Islamic government. US policy on Sudan has been characterized since the early 1990s by a very strong international campaign to ostracize the Sudanese government. (Kant, Immanuel 1795)
Diplomatically, the US's main actions were to categorize Sudan as a "rogue state" in 1993, to prompt a realignment of forces against Sudan in the Horn of Africa in 1995, and to prevent Sudan's election as a temporary member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 2000. Militarily, the US launched Tomahawk missiles at a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons for Osama Bin Laden in 1998. (Keohane, Robeti 0 1998)
Economically, the US supported the 1996 UN economic sanctions against Sudan, and imposed its own bilateral economic sanctions in November 1997, blocking all Sudanese assets in the US, restricting expmis and imports, barring financial transactions, and prohibiting investment in Sudan by companies listed on the US Stock Exchange. (Klaus 2005)
Like many other Western countries, the US fears Khartoum's will to export Islamic rule into other countries, and accuses it of regional destabilization. The US is also adamantly opposed to Khartoum on the issue of terrorism, all the more since Khartoum's links with Bin Laden are supposed to have persisted long after Bin Laden's expulsion to Afghanistan. During political debates, the strongest pressure against Khartoum comes from human rights and religious groups. Among these, two networks seem especially influential: aid agencies and anti-slavery groups operating in South Sudan, and the religious lobby those allies Catholics and Protestants in their protest against the "religious war" waged by Khartoum against the South. (Reeves, Eric, 2013) The religious lobby seems to have become even more influential under George Bush Junior's administration. In 2001, right-wing senators and Christians allied over the issue of slavery in South Sudan and started to tum Sudan in a cause comparable to South Africa during the time of apartheid. The evangelical lobby was especially influential. (Reeves, Eric, 2013)
After much work, it finally obtained the nomination of John Danfort, ex senator and minister of the Episcopalian Church, as special envoy to Sudan, on September 6, 2001. At that time, i.e. five days before the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, observers were also expecting a tightening of sanctions against Khartoum, probably on oil or arms. As relations with the Sudanese government deteriorated in the early 1990s, the relations between the US and the Southern People Liberation Movement (SPLM) improved. Fragile in the early 1990s because of the poor
15 human rights record of the SPLM military branch, the Southern People Liberation Army (SPLA), the US-SPLM relations improved following the opening of humanitarian space in rebel areas and the effort of the rebel movement to at least appear to respect human rights. In 1997, the relations were even so good as to prompt the then secretary of state Madeleine Albright to officially meet the SPLM leader John Garang in Kampala, and to express suppmt for his objectives. A second official meeting between Madeleine Albright and the SPLM and National Democratic Alliance leaders took place in 1999 and, according to the press, this time Madeleine Albright promised help to the rebels. In parallel, from 1993 on, repeated demands were issued in Congress to overlook the issue of Khmtoum's sovereignty and to provide direct assistance to the opposition forces in southern Sudan "opposition forces" meaning the major rebel movement, the SPLM. Representatives linked with the religious lobby were usually the strongest advocates of the idea, but hearings and debates show that a large majority of American politicians favored the idea. This has resulted in two impmtant pieces oflegislation. (Shiffman, Gary M. 2006)
First, the Brownback amendment to the Fiscal year 2000 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act authorizes the administration to provide food aid directly to the SPLA. Second, the Sudan Peace Act introduced in the Senate in January 2001 and still under discussion also aims at countering Khartoum by providing direct non-lethal aid to the rebels until the Sudanese government accepts a peace agreement. Yet neither the Clinton nor the Bush administration has used the legal power it had to directly aid the rebels. At first sight, it is difficult to understand why. It seems actually to be due to the pressure of important lobby groups: economic, strategic and diplomatic interests restrain the US in its opposition to Khartoum. (Tickner, J. Anne 2006)
2.5 Economic, strategic and Diplomatic Interests Restrain the US in its opposition to Khartoum Influential economic groups lobby the US against most of its actions opposing Khartoum. First, Sudan is the primary and by far the most impmtant world producer of gum Arabic, a product indispensable to the fabrication of candies, soft drinks such as Coca-cola, and pharmaceuticals. Second, several of the oil companies involved in oil exploration or exploitation in South Sudan rank among the most important firms of the oil industry, and their influence on US policy
16 towards Sudan seems crucial. No US company is directly involved in Sudan, but US citizens are at the head of many companies doing business there Talisman Oil for example. (John A., 2005)
In addition, several American states seem to have an economic stake in oil exploitation in Sudan. Finally, a congress representative even evoked the fact that "many of the players in [the US] government, including in the Bush administration, have business interests and businesses that are doing business" in Sudan. As a result, it seems that the US economic sanctions are designed to pretend countering the government of Sudan but without really hurting it, and they are often denounced as ineffective. The gum Arabic lobby has obtained an exception to economic sanctions for the import of gum Arabic the only produce that the US was importing from Sudan, and Sudan's major export. As far as oil is concerned, an Office of Foreign Assets Control study shows that the measures taken are not strong enough to prevent US companies from working in the Sudanese oil industry, and that firms doing business in Sudan can perfectly well raise money on the US capital market. In spite of many requests by religious and human rights lobby groups to tighten the sanctions and render them more effective, nothing is done.
Besides, most probably under the influence of these the oil and gum Arabic lobby groups, the US has begun softening its position on the issue of terrorism in Sudan. In summer 2000, a team of FBI and CIA agents arrived in Khartoum to work on terrorist issues in cooperation with the Government of Sudan. The first result came just few months later, in February 2001, with the (discreet) expulsion of the authors of the assassination attempt on president Mubarak. This beginning of cooperation became a close collaboration after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. From this day on, the Khartoum government has come to serve as a principal collaborator to the US in its attempt to understand the functioning of international terrorist networks.
Khartoum gives names of terrorists and of organizations backing terrorist associations, arrests suspects upon Washington's request, helps Washington map out terrorist networks, etc. As a result, on September 27, 2001, the US abandoned its veto on the lifting of UN sanctions against Khartoum, and the multilateral sanctions were finally revoked. Probably to appease the human rights and religious groups infuriated by this gesture, the US kept its bilateral sanctions (it renewed them for one more year in November 2001), but nevertheless backed away from a more effective piece of legislation banning companies doing business in Sudan from the US stock
17 exchange. Thus, if the 2001 shift of US policy towards Sudan seemed prompted by the aftermath of the September 11 attack, it actually reflects the logical conclusion of a process that started more than a year before. The return of terrorism as a first priority for the Bush administration was the occasion to reward Khartoum's new position on terrorism without losing too much credibility in the eyes of the US human rights and religious lobby groups.
US policy on Sudan is thus determined by contradictory influences: human rights versus economic interests, and divided political, geo-strategic, and security interests. To further complicate the issue, the US cannot take the risk of helping the rebels seize power in Khartoum. First, the SPLM's human rights record is so poor that putting it in power would expose the US to many moral criticisms. Second, no influential party in US politics has any interest in seeing the rebels in power. Oil companies currently engaged in the oil business in Sudan would encounter huge difficulties due to the probable renewed insecurity around the oil fields, and to the risk of their assets being confiscated. Egypt would have difficulties in exploiting Nile waters, and Egyptian interests have to be preserved at all costs so that Egypt's cooperation in the Middle East peace process can be secured. As a result, keeping the current state of war going seems the easiest way to balance all these different interests: the rebels do not seize control of the whole country, hence no one is faced with any problem of secession, accountability for human rights abuses, or economic backlash; and on the other hand Khartoum is kept off-balance, and cannot concentrate too much on propagating terrorism or fundamentalism.
Consequently, the best strategy for the US is to find a way to support the rebels enough to enable them to counter the government of Sudan, but not enough to help them win, and not too openly in order to preserve US economic and strategic interests. Supp01iing the rebels is especially important now that, with the renewed exploitation of oil fields and the resulting upgrading of Khmioum armaments, the Government of Sudan is in the best position ever to defeat its opponents. Humanitarian aid seems the best tool for this strategy.
The United States may have midwifed the birth of South Sudan, the world's youngest nation. But China has quickly become among its most imporiant patrons, building its roads and pumping its oil. Now, more than a year after South Sudan's leaders plw1ged their country into a nasty civil war, the nation has become something of a test of diplomacy between the United States and China, raising the question. To pressure the warring sides toward peace, the United States has
18 circulated a draft Security Council resolution, dangling the threat of sanctions and setting up the possibility of an arms embargo somewhere down the road.
Peace talks- funded by both Beijing and Washington- are underway in Ethiopia this week between factions loyal to President Salva Kiir and his rival, former Vice President Riek Machar. Yet prospects for a breakthrough by a Thursday deadline set by the mediators appear slim. Mr. Kiir, for his part, has refused to show up. So far, neither Washington nor Beijing has advanced a comprehensive strategy to stop the civil war. Both nations have been hesitant to substantially defang the kingpins of the war, including imposing an arms embargo or limiting how oil revenues might be used to fund the conflict. Both measures are among the recommendations of a recent International Crisis Group report on South Sudan.
The ability of the United States and China to work toward a common strategy for peace in South Sudan is a test case for their ability to work together on the continent and beyond," said Casie Copeland, the Crisis Group's South Sudan expert. She described both countries as "sOli of walking in a circle.
Although China and the United States have stubbornly been on opposing sides of the issue of Darfur, the long-suffering Sudanese region, the two superpowers share a lot of common ground on South Sudan. China has strong economic stakes in the country; the United States is heavily invested politically. They both have an interest in restoring stability to the country and avoiding disruptions to its oil flow. Both capitals have also opted to go slowly. Obama administration officials have deep emotional ties to South Sudan, and so far they have resisted taking any steps, like an arms embargo, that would weaken the government in Juba. As the administration's former South Sudan envoy, Princeton Lyman, put it this week, "The position is hardening in the administration, but it has taken a while."
All the while, fighting between forces loyal to Mr. Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and Mr. Machar, an etlmic Nuer, has killed tens of thousands, displaced two million people, brought the country to brink of famine and left a trail of rape and killing. The United Nations children's agency last week said school children had been conscripted by a militia loyal to Mr. Kiir's forces. The United States and China have vastly different histories there. The United States championed its
19 independence from Sudan, whose president, Omar al-Bashir, it loathed, and whom it referred to the International Criminal Court on charges of genocide in Darfur.
China, by contrast, was one of Mr. Bashir's most important allies and still is. But when South Sudan split off, it took vast amounts of oil with it, so China soon courted the new government in Juba and kept its stake in the oil fields. That helps explains why China has taken an unusually active role, considering its traditional policy of noninterference. It has dispatched its own soldiers to the United Nations peacekeeping mission there and persuaded the Security Council to include a most unusual mandate for the mission: Peacekeepers there are tasked with protecting not just civilians, but also the country's oil installations, which have been attacked. China has also stopped shipping arms to the government in Juba.
The American-drafted resolution would impose travel bans and asset freezes on individuals who threaten the peace and security of South Sudan, including those who are accused of committing serious rights abuses, using child soldiers, and attacking United Nations personnel. It would set up a committee to evaluate who should fall on the sanctions list. The measure would raise the possibility of an arms embargo fmiher in the future.
Crucial to the effectiveness of these measures are South Sudan's neighbors, including Uganda and Ethiopia, which have ties to the rival parties. Only if the countries in the region agree to punitive measures, like sanctions and an arms embargo. There are a lot of actors in this situation. We've been waiting for the right moment." The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of diplomatic protocol. "Everyone is sort of rowing in the same direction," he added. A wild card is what to do about the potential war crimes committed by both sides in the conflict. The African Union has completed its own investigation into human rights abuses, but refused to make it public while peace talks are continuing. The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki moon, has urged the organization to release it.
United Nations investigators have chronicled a litany of honors since fighting broke out in December 2013. "In Juba, I met people whose whole families have been executed, primarily due to their etlmicity, and women and girls who were taken as sex slaves after their husbands were killed," the United Nations assistant secretary general for human rights, Ivan Simonovic, told the Council last week, urging the panel to ensure accountability for the victims.
20 2.6 United States responses to South Sudan conflict
United state held the incident to end the conflict as quickly as possible. Ongoing instability is not in the interest of the South Sudan, the U.S., or neighboring countries. The U.S. has stated did not recognize the "violent overthrow of a democratically elected government," but it has been reluctant to actively support the government in the current conflict. If this is actually U.S. policy, the Administration should explicitly endorse the current govemment and provide support designed to more quickly secure victory or pressure Machar to end his rebellion.
Implement sanctions on those interfering in the peace process. The Obama Administration testified that it is "exploring" pressuring "individuals on both sides who interfere with the peace and reconciliation process in South Sudan or are responsible for serious human rights abuses." Congress and the Administration should jointly announce that targeted sanctions were employed against such individuals, including high-ranking members of the current government like Kiir if wmTanted.
Ensure all factions remain committed to free and fair multi-party elections by 2015. The U.S. and other stakeholders should press South Sudan to finalize and adopt a permanent constitution through democratic means. Make greater accountability and transparency a condition of economic assistance. Those found complicit in corruption was subjected to travel sanctions and asset freezes. Right-size UNMISS; The Security Council has authorized troop and police increases for UNMISS. Although it is unclear how quickly this may occur, some of these forces are expected to come from other existing operations, which could compromise their mandates. Given the size of South Sudan and its challenging infrastructure, UNMISS has a limited capability to protect civilians there. Moreover, its mandate specifically places UNMISS second to the SPLA in order of responsibility for protecting civilians.
2.7 US target in South Sudan
In the previous sections, on the one hand it has been showed that US have provided South Sudan with a horizontally extended security (not only military security therefore, but also human, economic and territorial security). On the other hand, it has been argued that through this postcolonial fonn of intervention, US established the influence of its hegemonic umbrella over
21 South Sudan currently seeming a US protectorate a condition which makes Juba a weak, small, and indebted state not independent on strategic issues such as oil. Furthermore, it has been claimed that South Sudan will support US regional strategy, and that South Sudan's securitization cannot be justified by LRA's insurgency. Therefore, South Sudan is taking the role of a US regional proxy to contrast China and to size strategic energy reservoirs.
US intervention in South Sudan provides Washington, DC with the possibility to take American corporations back to this oil-rich region and to threaten Chinese companies' hegemony. Not by chance, as said above, South Sudan has been included in the GPS, in order to ease the shipping of oil towards US (section 2.3). However, what is even more striking, is that a non-independent South has reached an agreement with Kenya- a US' strategic ally- for building a new pipeline which will divert the flow of oil to Lamu's port and deprive Sudan- China's strategic ally- of transit revenues. Juba will invest 4 billion for it, and a Japanese firm has already carried out a study for its feasibility. In addition to this, it has to be considered Government of South Sudan's (GOSS) authorities pressures on and clashes with the Sino-Malaysian consortium Petrodar, which appear as a US-maneuvered strategy to hinder Chinese geopolitics of oil in South Sudan.
The picture of South Sudan contrasting China on oil, matches Harvey's illustration - rather than the one put forward in Empire and by Co !its - when he says that "the control over Middle Eastern oil reserves would serve US interests very well if it ever felt it necessary to rein in Chinese geopolitical ambitions". And with regard to South Sudan, Harvey's perspective seems to find evidences, with US' scramble for South Sudanese oil which is going to rein "Chinese geopolitical ambitions" in the region. Furthermore, US intervention only damaged Sudan and China interests, since the birth of South Sudan brought last winter to the stop of oil flow for few months, damaging that market that Colits and Hadrt and Negri pretend to be by US protected in the name of global right.
Nevetiheless, despite US is clearly attacking China, the latter has not reacted. Instead, Beijing keeps participating to UNMISS, which represents a US-sponsored mission aiming at maintaining control over a distant territory. This means that in South Sudan there has not been any inter imperialist tension. China demonstrates to be currently willing to cooperate with US through US designed multilateral institutions, and still to respect rules of a US-designed world order.
22 However, US interventionism against China, appears clear as much in the Pacific as in South Sudan.
North America; United States - In the first days of the conflict, the U.S. embassy in the country reported that while it was aware of "security incidents and sporadic gunfire in multiple locations" it could not confirm "that gunfire and insecurity have fully ceased. The embassy recommends that all U.S. citizens exercise extra caution at all times. The U.S. Embassy will continue to closely monitor the security environment in South Sudan, with particular attention to Juba city and its immediate surroundings, and will advise US citizens further if the security situation changes."
The embassy's Twitter account repmied that it denied rumours Machar had taken refuge at the baseand also reiterated warnings for its citizens to "remain calm." On 18 December, the U.S. embassy asked all its citizens to "depart immediately." President Barack Obama then called for an end to the fighting amid warning of being at the "precipice" of civil war. This followed his 18 December statement that he had deployed 45 troops to the country to protect U.S. personnel and interests while warning that "recent fighting threatens to plunge South Sudan back into the dark days of its past. Fighting to settle political scores or to destabilise the govemment must stop immediately. Inflammatory rhetoric and targeted violence must cease. All sides must listen to the wise counsel of their neighbours, commit to dialogue and take immediate steps to urge calm and support reconciliation.
South Sudan's leaders must recognise that compromise with one's political enemy is difficult; but recovering from unchecked violence and unleashed hatred will prove much harder." He also condemned the coup. After the evacuation of some citizens from the country, in accordance with the War Powers Act, Obama wrote to Speaker John Boehner and Senate President Pro-Tempore Patrick J. Leahy (2014) that he was ready to take more action to suppmi U.S. interests and citizens there. The country's envoy to South Sudan, Donald Booth, said prior to 25 December that "we notice that the African Union has said there is Christmas season upon us, and called for all parties to cease hostilities. We suppmi that call." Secretary of State John Kerry called on both parties to "accept a cessation of hostilities and begin mediated political talks. At the same time. U.S. Defense Department's Africom announced the deployment of a "platoon-sized" USMC
23 contingent to neighbouring Uganda in order to protect U.S. citizens and facilities in South Sudan and to prepare for possible further evacuations. This was in addition to the nearly I 00 U.S. troops in South Sudan, including the reinforcement of security at the U.S. embassy. Further, about roughly 150 USMC personnel were in Djibouti on 24 December, along with cargo planes and helicopters.
2.8 U.S. Policy and Interests
During the Cold War, Sudan originally benefited from Soviet arms sales. However, Soviet Sudanese relations diminished in the 1970s. The United States began to see Sudan as a nation threatened by neighboring Libya and Ethiopia, which at the time received heavy military assistance from the Soviets, so the Americans began offering military assistance the late 1970s. During the 1980s, the United States made Sudan its largest recipient of development and military assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the United States suspended all development and military aid to Sudan following the 1989 coup. Relations soured even further as Turabi pursued a number of provocative activities: verbally supporting Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, aiding destabilizing rebel movements in neighboring countries, and promoting intemational terrorism. These activities led to Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, the cutting off of diplomatic relations in 1996, and comprehensive economic sanctions in 1997. Since being stripped of his power in 1999, Turabi has no longer been able to use the Sudanese state as his personal ten·orist incubator, and the two countries even began cooperating on counte1ierrorism.
Right before 9/11, President George W. Bush starting shifting U.S. focus in Sudan to ending the genocide in the South. On September 6, 2001, Bush appointed Senator John Danforth U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan with the goal of pressuring the two pmiies to reach a peace agreement. Since then, the United States has utilized a number of diplomatic and economic tools to influence the Sudanese regime's genocidal behavior.
It is curious that the United States became so involved opposing genocide in Sudan considering it had resisted action in other genocidal conflicts. There are a number of factors that might explain the active U.S. stance in Sudan. First, the North-South civil war has been depicted as a
24 conflict where Muslim aggressors persecute a minority Christian population an unsettling idea for a Judea-Christian nation like the America. Second, the United States was already pressuring Sudan over an issue that was a direct threat to national security: international terrorism. With Turabi expelled from the NCP, and the Sudanese government cooperating with the CIA on counterterrorism, other Sudanese issues had a chance to receive greater attention.
Third, Clinton's comprehensive sanctions eliminated most of the economic ties between the United States and Sudan, so by the time Bush decided to pursue genocide prevention, there were very few American special interest groups to oppose an escalation of pressure. The Sudanese government and business interests simply did not have any friends in U.S. politics that could put pressure on Bush or Congress to ease off. Fourth, instability in South Sudan limited oil production and exporting. Fifth, media attention for Darfur was significant, with about I ,300 English-language newspaper articles in August 2004 alone.
The release of Hotel Rwanda, a movie which depicts the horrors of genocide in 1994 Rwanda, just two days after then-Secretary of State Colin Powell testified that the conflict in Darfur was genocide further focused public attention on Darfur. By 2005, Darfur was the spotlight of "the largest American civic activist movement on Africa since the anti-Apmiheid campaign."22 Lastly, since 2005, the United States has spent more than $5 billion on humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance to Sudan and eastern Chad, with $1.7 spent in FY2007 alone. Genocide may not cost the United States much directly, but it does incur substantial indirect costs. Each of these factors contributed to U.S. involvement with genocide prevention in Sudan since 2000.
2.9 Assessment of U.S. Foreign policy toward Sudan
This part of the case study will provide an assessment of U.S. diplomatic and economic effmis to influence the Sudanese government's behavior regarding genocide and mass killing. It must first be noted that during the Clinton administration, U.S. policy toward Sudan focused mostly on Khartoum's support for international terrorism. By the time the Bush administration turned its focus to stopping the genocide in the South, a number of U.S. influence efforts were already in place. First of all, the United States had already suspended all development and military aid after
25 the 1989 coup. Second, the United States had already designated Sudan a state sponsor of terror on August 12, 1993. Third, President Clinton suspended diplomatic relations in 1996. Fomih, Clinton issued Executive Order 13067 on November 3, 1997, which imposed comprehensive trade, economic, and financial sanctions against Sudan. E.O. 13067 severely limited (but did not prohibit) bilateral trade and blocked all property of the government of Sudan within the United States or in control of U.S. persons. Ss this record makes perfectly clear, when U.S. focus took on the additional task of genocide prevention, the ability of the United States to unilaterally impose further costs on Sudan was significantly limited.
However, because America tied the continuation of these imposed costs to genocide, these effotis are still very much relevant to this analysis of genocide prevention. Furthermore, there was still room to impose more costs. From here, this study will look at the major economic and diplomatic tools utilized to influence the Sudanese state's cost-benefit calculus regarding genocide. To assess the effectiveness of these instruments, three questions will be answered regarding U.S. policy in different time periods.
Strictly from the point of view of the U.S. Sudanese bilateral relationship, what were the costs or benefits of U.S. policy to the NCP governing council's ability to repress dissent and buy support? The answer to this question provides us with a measure of the costs and benefits to the decision-makers. Second, how did the regime's behavior regarding genocide change subsequent to U.S. efforts? The answer here tells us the extent to which behavior could be a result of U.S. influence effmis. Third, does the impact of U.S. policy explain the regime's behavior, or did other factors affect the target's cost-benefit calculus? This answer corrects for the influence of other external and internal developments. Based on those answers, this study will then answer the most important question: Why did U.S. policy have the impact that it did? This answer is the final explanation this assessment seeks to achieve.
2.10 United States Interests in the South Sudan Conflict
US' geopolitical interest over Southern Sudan was firstly manifested when Chevron stmied exploration of new deposits during the oil embargo of 1973. The American corporation remained in Southern Sudan until the beginning of the '90s, but without being able to extract a drop of oil,
26 before leaving the country because of the precarious status of domestic security. "With the worsening of political ties between the United States and Sudan in the mid-1990s and the withdrawal of US companies, Chinese oil firms stepped in to fill the vacuum" on a fertile and competition-fi·ee ground. This articles argues that behind US-designed road map towards South Sudan independence begun in 2005, and behind US' security strategy in the new country since 20 II, there is the intention of a re-appropriation of local resources coherently with the shift on the importance of Africa in terms of energy security occurred with Bush and Cheney - against Beijing, the economic actor which took the lead in the area over the last fifteen years.
South Sudan represents a confluence of interests for the US, Europe, and China. For the US, South Sudan holds special geostrategic importance, especially following the creation of the US Africa Command AFRICOM. At the same time, the presence of Chinese companies in the region represents an economic challenge for the Americans, who seem interested in investment opportunities in agriculture, mining, and forestry. Before the secession, the Sudanese govemment held long-term contracts with China that prevented it from gaining a foothold in the South's vital oil industry. The British also have interests by virtue of having been the colonial power in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. All of these parties, along with their regional partners, are now moving fast to contain the situation in South Sudan before it spirals out of control.
Yet shortly after secession was achieved which happened less than three years ago we saw that this new nation was exposed to a major crisis that affected its entity and squandered the southerners' dream to live in a safe nation. The core of the crisis boils down to a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy, Riek Machar. Although both parties agreed on a cessation of hostilities, the agreement has been broken by both sides, after clashes left 10,000 dead and 860,000 homeless, as well as 3.7 million others in need of food. According to UN estimates, it will require $1.3 billion to deal with the crisis.
Regional and international interactions with the crisis expressed the goals and motives of various pmiies. On the regional level, Ethiopia's role emerged, and day after day Addis Ababa is strengthening its crucial position and powerful influence on vital states in the region. Ethiopia's desire to assume a regional position that is unmatched by anyone has become apparent, and it was one of the first countries to show concern for the crisis. The Ethiopian foreign minister
27 visited South Sudan more than once, in addition to visits by the Ethiopian prime minister. Addis Ababa is also working to foster negotiations between delegations from both sides to reach a political solution to the crisis.
As for Uganda, its involvement in the crisis became stronger after Ugandan forces participated along with those of Kiir. Uganda's strong presence in the crisis is linked to its desire to maintain its interests in South Sudan. Stability in the latter is the main factor guaranteeing the security of these interests, represented by exports from Uganda to South Sudan that amounted to $I .3 billion in 2012. Moreover, many Ugandans work in cross-border trade with their northern neighbor.
Sudan has expressed its support for Kiir against Machar, to maintain the flow of southern oil through its territory, which represents one of the main sources of income for Sudan. This expression of support was also aimed at coping with internal umest resulting from the deterioration of the economic situation. Moreover, President Omar al-Bashir wanted to weaken the Popular Movement-North that is opposed to his rule, and drain its sources of support that come from South Sudan, through rapprochement with Kiir. The latter believes that the stability of the south depends on coming to an agreement with the north, while Machar sees the need to continue his alliance with the Popular Movement-North.
When examining the regional interactions with the crisis, there is a notable Egyptian absence from the scene, which is spearheaded by both Ethiopia and Uganda. The latter both adopt approaches that go against Egyptian interests in the Nile waters issue, and their role in the crisis enhances South Sudan's polarization toward them. Therefore any future settlement of the Nile waters crises will not take place without taking into consideration the two countries' interests, since they have obtained the suppmi of other Nile Basin countries, including South Sudan.
At the international level, the US position on the crisis is confusing. The United States was the main backer of the secession of South Sudan, and has been its largest donor since the split in 20 I 1. In the current crisis, there has been a change in US policy toward South Sudan in terms of supporting members of the insurgency. Washington refrained from describing the primary event that caused the crisis as a "military coup" (as it was described in an announcement by Kiir). Washington also called for the release of political prisoners through the UN Security Council, in
28 which the United States has great influence in suppmi of the demand made by Machar. The latter met with Washington's envoy in South Sudan.
The US position can be explained in light of Washington's desire to keep South Sudan as a thorn in the back of its northern neighbor, and the conflict serves as a means of equalizing the Chinese presence in Juba and its monopolization of the lion's share of oil in the country. This is because US companies often enter into unfair contracts with states afflicted by war, as happened in Iraq. However, Washington's responsibly toward the state of South Sudan and its desire for the secession from the north to succeed will make the United States stand as a barrier preventing the country from sliding into chaos. While Washington's current position on the crisis comes in the context of putting pressure on the regime to achieve US interests, Washington will intervene by force to end the crisis if it continues at a later stage after these interests have been achieved.
Sudan finally began exporting oil in I 999. While the United States was willing to target Sudan's oil industry, other countries embraced it. Heavy investment by China, India, and Malaysia, among others, significantly deflected the costs of U.S. sanctions. Additionally, the consequent boom in oil revenues made U.S. sanctions against the agricultural sector less significant as the NCP gained more and more of its funds from exporting oil. Oil sales already comprised 42% of NCP funds in 200 I, and cash military expenditures (not including spending on domestic security services) rose 45% between 1999 and 2001. With regards to Sudanese agriculture, most of it is subsistence farming in the peripheral regions.
2.11 The Status of Oil Pt·oduction
After the 2012 shutdown, oil production in South Sudan restarted in April 2013, following revenue sharing negotiations between Juba and Khatioum. Exports resumed in June 2013. The country's active oil fields are located in Unity and Upper Nile States, which have been among the areas worst affected by the current fighting. Prior to the 2012 shutdown, South Sudan produced an estimated 350,000 barrels per day (bpd), accounting for 98% of government revenues, although by many accounts oil revenue has been a major source for state corruption. Damage to some of the fields, which had occurred during the shutdown process in January 20 I 2 or during subsequent air strikes, was expected to delay a return to pre-shutdown levels until at
29 least mid-2014. Experts warned that future shutdowns, particularly if they were to last more than six months, might cause lasting damage.
Machar's forces have sought to control the fields in the current fighting, likely to gain leverage for negotiations. The fields in Upper Nile and Unity represent 80% and 20% of production, respectively. Amid the hostilities, Sudanese officials report that production averaging 200,000 bpd has continued in Upper Nile, while fields in Unity, which were producing some 45,000 bpd before the fighting started, were shut down when oil workers evacuated. Sudan, which has denied involvement in the crisis, has offered technical support to the Kiir government to maintain production. Initial reports that Sudan might send troops for a joint force to protect the oil fields have been subsequently denied.
In 2013, President Kiir made major changes to his govermnent in a stated effort to downsize and address governance concerns, but also, it appears, in response to perceived threats to his leadership and international donor pressure to crack down on state coiTUption. He replaced two state governors, both elected in 20 I 0, by presidential decree. In June, he dismissed two senior cabinet ministers over alleged cmTuption charges, and conducted a major cabinet reshuffle in July, removing Vice President Machar and his entire cabinet. Kiir also dismissed ruling party secretary-general Pagan Amum, who had been publicly critical of the dismissals. The SPLM dominated parliament approved a new, leaner cabinet in August (after rejecting one of Kiir's appointees). Among his notable appointments was naming the powerful Dinka governor of the volatile Jonglei state as defense minister; Kiir in turn appointed the previous defense minister, a Nuer seen as loyal to Kiir, to assume the Jonglei governorship. Jonglei, which is believed to have significant untapped oil reserves, has been a historic flashpoint for inter-ethnic fighting, including, at various times, clashes between Nuer and Murle, Murle and Dinka, as well as between Nuer and Dinka. Given its mixed ethnic composition and existing tensions, the Jonglei capital, Bor, was among the first areas where fighting spread during the current crisis.
Neighboring states, such as the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, are concerned as they are witnessing unrest on their own soil. Additionally, the outbreak of a new civil war in South Sudan would have significant effects on its neighbors Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as they each have growing economic interests in the country. Hence, these regional and
30 international parties will exert substantial pressure to restore internal consensus and stability to South Sudan. They will also be keen to maintain the flow of the South's oil since without the production and marketing of oil, the South will become a burden on the international community.
It is clear that South Sudan is facing its most serious crisis since coming into being two years ago; it also seems that the seeds of this crisis were inherent in its very existence. Separation, which was touted as a solution to centuries of dominance by the Arab and Muslim North over the Christian and African South, has not ended the problems of the nascent Southern state, thereby implying that the secessionist solution was not, in fact, the right choice. The solution was, and remains, tied to a state of citizens with equal rights and responsibilities. South Sudan does not need to undergo another long and bitter conflict to realize this fact Drezner, Daniel W.(l999).
2.12 The impact of the role played by United States in South Sudan conflict
US struggles to pull South Sudan back from the brink of civil war; South Sudan owes its existence to the US. Years of diplomacy and development aid by successive administrations helped create the world's newest nation three years ago. South Sudan was supposed to break the sad, familiar African model of petty rivalries, corruption and oppression. The country has ample oil resources and eager international investors. But as a conflict fuelled by ethnic and personal power struggles tears the country apa1i, the US has been unable to pull South Sudan from the brink of civil war.
The tensions between Kiir and Machar have been visible for more than a year. Last summer, Kiir fired Machar and the entire cabinet. By December, tensions had boiled over. Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, accused Machar, an ethnic Nuer, of trying to overthrow him. Machar denied the allegations and launched a rebellion that has split the nation's army along ethnic lines. The two sides have fought fiercely since then, largely over oil-producing areas, despite a ceasefire signed in January.
The United States was a key player in South Sudan's bid for independence from Sudan. A small coterie of American government officials, think-tank workers and NGO staffers, some of whom had formed associations with John Garang, leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) beginning in the late 1970s, worked with the rebel fighter until his death in a helicopter
31 crash in 2005. The group then worked with Garang's successor, future President Kiir, with help from American evangelicals (South Sudan is majority Christian, while Sudan is majority Muslim) and human rights organizations. The rebels' most active U.S. advocates included John Prendergrast, who co-founded the advocacy group Enough Project in 2007; Ted Dagne, an Ethiopian-American who worked for the Congressional Research Service and the United Nations; and, at times, cunent U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice. They lobbied for a tough stance on Khartoum and eased the path to South Sudan's independence referendum in Jan. 2011.
"There was definitely something about the liberation struggle that captured people's imaginations," said Akshaya Kumar, a South Sudan analyst with Prendergast's Enough Project. "John and a number of others, whether they were church groups or other parts of the American public, were galvanized around the two-decades-long civil war that was destroying southern Sudan. It was the people suffering and their struggle that really brought Jolm to that issue, and he stayed committed to it for two decades."
Immediately following the referendum, the U.S. assumed a lead role in South Sudan's development, pledging hundreds of million of dollars in aid and sending military advisers to help the country resist combatants from the Uganda-based Lord's Resistance Army. In January 2012, the Obama administration made South Sudan eligible to buy weapons and receive defense assistance from the U.S., just as the SPLA was being criticized for its lackluster response to a bloody conflict between two ethnic groups in Jonglei State. Benson says the relationship between South Sudan's military and U.S. forces is "still in the early stages," adding that "the assistance we have been providing has been in demining, health, engineering and information sharing." According to the latest data from USAID, American assistance to South Sudan has totaled more than $264 million in 2013 alone. But now the very administration the United States has supported stands accused of involvement in mass atrocities, with Dinka militants Joyal to President Kiir targeting Nuers, and vice-versa, in an escalating pattern of tit-for-tat murder, rape and pillaging.
American involvement is impo1iant because the U.S. does have a special history with South Sudan; it's been a strong supporter of South Sudan's right to self-determination, South Sudan
32 expert at the U.S. Institute for Peace. But recent statements from President Obama suggest that some U.S. assistance is on the line, and the entire community is looking for points of leverage right now in order to affect the outcome of this conflict.
The Obama administration released its Sudan policy on October 19, 2009. It offers the Sudanese government guarantees that the removal of sanctions and improvement of bilateral relations will be selectively applied based on the government's efforts to stop violence and implement its commitments to peace. It also links the conflicts in the South and Darfur together as a single issue, meaning that policy will not change in response to developments in just one area or the other. However, the current administration is in a tough position: any further negative sanctions are unlikely to change the NCP's behavior, and any improvement of relations before progress is made on the ground would be seen as too soft.
What then can the United States do to reduce the violence currently taking place and prevent mass killings that could occur in the future? The question is still relevant, despite the relative peace in Sudan over the last four-plus years. Peace agreement or not, more civilians died from fighting in South Sudan during a 6-month period in 2008-2009 than during a 15-month period in Darfur (Jan I, 2008 to March 3 I, 2009, about 700 civilian deaths). In fact, spring 2009 saw the largest spike in violent deaths in South Sudan since the signing of the CPA. With serious political hurdles just around the corner, including the April 20 I 0 elections and 20 II referendum, mass killing and genocide could once again flare up in Sudan in the near future.
What the United States cannot do is impose any more unilateral economic sanctions because it has nearly exhausted all of them already. The focus now has to be on finding ways to engage the NCP elites while communicating to them that they must improve their behavior regarding genocide. U.S. sanctions have lost nearly all their traction over the years, and it is now time to reestablish some economic links with the Sudanese that America can use as leverage when it needs to later Coalition for International Justice, (Feb, 2009).
If the United States does want to continue pursuing coercion, it has to get other important members of the international community on board. Sudan's major export markets are: Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Its major
33 suppliers of imports are: European Union, China, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and India. Without getting most these actors especially China to cooperate with a U.S.-led sanctions policy, economic coercion to prevent genocide in Sudan will not work. What it would take to get these countries to cooperate, and whether or not the political costs are worth it to U.S. policymakers, is a topic for a different discussion. Clearly, though, the United States alone does not have the economic and diplomatic leverage to coerce the NCP governing council, (Anonymous, 2000).
Should engagement and/or multilateral diplomatic and economic coercion fail to prevent the NCP from pursuing genocide in the future, military intervention may be the only possible solution. The Sudanese air force, which has been a major component of genocide in both the South and Darfur, is small and could be destroyed relatively easily. Precision air strikes could accomplish the task. Also, all Sudanese oil revenues go through Pmi Sudan, and blockading the city would bring exp01is to a screeching halt. Military intervention carries its own costs to the United States, and those costs may very well be more than Americans are willing to pay (as noted in the Introduction). That, too, is the topic for another discussion. Simply put, though, if significant engagement cannot be achieved, and if a strong multilateral effort does not development, then the only way to stop genocide in Sudan may very well be a military intervention. If it refuses to take that step, the United States has to accept the reality that it is not willing to do what it takes to end genocide in Sudan Ahmed, Waleed. (2008).
U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, who is heading the U.S. delegation to the independence celebrations, called the historic occasion "first and foremost a testament to the Southern Sudanese people" as well as to leaders in both Sudan and South Sudan. She added that, in terms of the international community, "the U.S. has been as active as anyone." U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, who is heading the U.S. delegation to the independence celebrations, called the historic occasion "first and foremost a testament to the Southern Sudanese people" as well as to leaders in both Sudan and South Sudan.
According to a U.S. official who is not authorized to speak to the media but has worked on these issues for decades, U.S. attention on Sudan has not been by chance. "Behind all this was [and]
34 still is, a small group of people who have been working behind the scenes for almost 20 years" said the official.
South Sudan's independence follows a January referendum in which 98.8 percent of voters chose to secede from Sudan. The referendum had been promised in a peace agreement that ended the war between the Sudanese government based in the largely Arab and Muslim north and rebels in the mainly Christian and animist south of Sudan. The longest-running conflict in Africa, an estimated two million southern Sudanese lives were lost by the time the war ended in 2005.
The South's secession had a major impact on the North's economy, with the loss of more than 70 percent of its oil revenues. To meet the resulting annual budget deficit, Sudan relied on transit fees imposed on the South's oil, estimated at two US billion dollars. The importance of this revenue was confirmed when President al-Bashir stopped the flow of the South's oil across the North's tenitory in retaliation for the South's support for the rebel movements in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile state. An economic crisis ensued wherein the value of the Sudanese pound fell sharply against the US dollar, reaching only 13 percent of its former value. The economic downturn and budget deficit pushed the Sudanese government to remove fuel subsidies, leading to the outbreak of wide-scale protests m September 2013, which the authorities put down after the deaths of hundreds of people.
Sudan was the most likely experience fmiher economic difficulties as the South's conflict could halt the flow of oil. It will be difficult for the government to take any economic measures to meet the deficit, such as imposing additional taxes, after the latest protests. Additionally, the Sudanese government cannot seek Arab financial aid as a result of its controversial foreign policy and alignments.
Furthermore, the conflict over the oil fields in the Unity and Upper Nile states, both of which have long borders with Sudan, could lead to the flow of large number of refugees into Sudan. This will create financial, logistical, and security burdens on the Sudanese government that it will be unable to cope with. Instability in the border regions will also have a negative effect on border trade, which benefits both countries.
The border regions have witnessed considerable tension between the North and the South over the past year, with armed clashes occurring in the Abyei region, in addition to the South
35 Sudanese Army's attack on Sudanese oil facilities at Heglig. The Sudanese government also accused South Sudan of backing the revolutionary front fighting the Khatioum government in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which also led to a serious economic downturn in the North and South. However, the South was more affected because of its economic vulnerability. After several rounds of talks, however, the two came to an agreement and the flow of oil resumed. After this crisis, President Kiir developed a more realistic and understanding position regarding the North; his opponents, Pagan Amum and Deng Alor in particular, however, have adopted a more hardline stance.
U.S. attempts to support the southern Sudanese struggle have been wide-ranging. A report released by the Congressional Research Service last week lists actions going back to the Clinton era, including the provision of more than $20 million surplus U.S. military equipment to frontline states of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, which the report says "helped reverse military gains made by the [Sudanese] government" against the southern rebels. Further pressure on the Sudanese government came with the 1993 designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terror, and the 1997 imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions, which prevented U.S. companies from operating in Sudan.
On the eve ofSouth Sudan independence, former National Security Council Aji·ica Director John Prendergast, who today leads much of the US. activism on Sudan, told me he felt "major regret that we couldn't help get this done in the mid to late 1990s when I worked for the Clinton administration."
Instead, U.S. suppmi for southern Sudanese self-determination gained momentum under the presidency of George W. Bush. His aides said the former president, pressed by evangelical activists, viewed ending the civil war in Sudan as a "legacy item" for his foreign policy. Bush appointed a special envoy to focus on peace negotiations, which finally bore fruit in 2005.
Celebrations of the 2005 peace agreement were dampened, however, by ongoing conflict in Sudan's western region of Darfur. In 2003, the Sudanese government launched a brutal military campaign to crush an insurgency by Darfuri rebels, mostly non-Arab and Muslim. In the summer of 2004, the same group of Congressional representatives who had long supported southern Sudan passed a resolution condemning the Darfur violence as genocide.
36 Supported once again by an improbable coalition of religious and secular activists, this time under the banner of the Save Darfur movement, these same members of Congress eventually passed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act. The legislation prevented the White House from rewarding the Sudanese government for signing the agreement with the southern rebels until the situation in Darfur was resolved.
The Sudan Caucus, in partnership with their new Save Darfur allies, also secured over $6 billion in humanitarian aid, between 2005 and 2010, to the war-affected areas in Sudan. According to statistics from the U.S. Official Development Assistance database, Sudan has been the third largest recipient of U.S. aid since 2005, trailing only Iraq and Afghanistan.
Military security: the terrorist threat makes US; from a regional perspective, US' official aim to secure South Sudan for stabilizing the region, and in particular for enforcing a crackdown against LRA. Juba in fact is contributing to the hunt for Kony by joining African Union (AU) troops and by offering a base in its territory. The AU's 5,000-strong brigade, is backed by US intelligence, while Washington has also deployed in the region I 00 agents. Nevertheless, Lord's Resistance Army number of soldiers is too small to offer a satisfying justification to a military intervention of these proportions, to the development of South Sudan's system of defence and to the militarization occurred over the last years in neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Rwanda, US' regional allies.
AFRICOM is the agency in charge of leading the efforts for building South Sudan's security apparatus, by forming South Sudanese military corps, and making the country immune to terrorism, despite the latter has never been an issue in South Sudan. In addition, to the provision of military expertise and intelligence, on January 06, 2012 United States' President Barack Obama allowed South Sudan to buy US' arms, even though in many say that this is just a pro forma however in the conclusion of this article is argued that South Sudan is developing a defence apparatus for supporting US in realizing regional goals, by following the same path of US' allies such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda.
Territorial and human security through the deployment of US-sponsored UN missions; Through the use of hegemonic institutions in order to maintain a postmodern form of control over distant territories contrary to what was happening in Roman and British empires US has been able to
37 establish its influence over South Sudan in the name of human rights and regional stability. The UN missions currently deployed are the US-sponsored UNMISS and UNISF A. The former is committed in patrolling South Sudan's tetTitory, while it is interesting to note that China, despite being damaged by South Sudan bi1ih Juba took 75% of Sudan reserves it actively takes part to the mission. UNISFA is composed of 4.200 Ethiopian troops and its tasks are to monitor Abyei's demilitarization from Sudan Armed Force (SAF) and Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and to provide security for oil infrastructures. However, despite being considered neutral state in Sudan/South Sudan dispute, Ethiopia represents a US' strategic ally, to the extent that in the recent past Addis Abeba was able to receive arms from North Korea without any opposition from Washington, DC.
Economic and social security through the employment of hegemonic agencies and institutions; USAID commitment in South Sudan focuses on improving security by guaranteeing a safe and organized economic environment for attracting foreign capital. The US' agency for development is building "the first paved highway outside urban area", and coordinating the development of a country of the size of France with 90% of its land arable. Moreover USAID supports "the oil sector and oil revenue management". This strengths the argument made in this article, regarding the fact that Juba government will not be independent in dealing with oil policies and strategic decisions. US will affect Juba decisions and Juba will follow US directions in order for Washington to win China's or other states geopolitical competition
Also the admission of South Sudan in IMF is part of that process of incorporating states under the US hegemonic umbrella, while South Sudan's inclusion in the Generalized System of Preferences (GPS) a US instrument which allows South Sudan to ship oil and other goods to the United States free of import duties is a fact that strengths the argument of an American rush to Juba's black gold, a new scramble which can put under question China leadership in the region, as explained in the next paragraph of this article.
38 CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.0 Introduction
The chapter described the methodology that was used in addressing the set objectives of the study. The chapter was organized under the following subsections: research design, research population, and sample size, sampling procedure, research instruments, validity and reliability of research instruments, data gathering procedures, data analysis, ethical considerations and limitations of the study.
3.1 Research design
The study used descriptive case study research design which used both the quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. Descriptive study enabled the researcher to collect information from a cross-section of a given population. The study design was used because it was the most commonly used research method in social research. This is because results from such a survey are easily extrapolated to the entire population.
3.2 Tat·get Population
The study contained a sample size of 106 respondents in total of the ground population of 145 by using a soloven's formula to identifying sample and questionnaire item. The total was determined by the prevailing numbers of the people in area. The researcher intended to select data from the different categories of respondents.
3.3 Sample Size
Sloven's formula used to compute the sample size. The formula employed so as to sample fairly a large number of people Slovene's formula states that, for any given population (N), the sample size (n)is given by;
N n= 1 + N(e 2)
39 Where N is the known Population
e is the level of significant which is fixed at 0.05, basing in the formula the m1mmum sample size will be,
145 7 7 n = 1-+-:1:--:45 c'O':o-=.0:-::5= 2 )
145 n = ---::-.,.,..-,....--,~ 1 + 145(0.0025)
145 n= 1.36 n = 106 Respondents
Following the formula, the established sample size was I 06 respondents from population of 145 and this was enough guide in effective data collection on the topic under study.
3.4 Research methods (a) Quantitative methods.
Quantitative research involved information or data in the form of numbers. Data derived from quantitative research was numerical in nature.
(b) Qualitative methods.
Qualitative data included any information that can be captured that is not numerical in nature. The aim of qualitative research was to deepen our understanding about the topic under study, and usually it goes beyond the numbers and the statistics.
3.5 Data Collection Instruments
3.4.1 Interviews
The researcher gathered information through semi-structured interviewed on key informants. The method allowed for in-depth generation of data.
40 3.4.2 Questionnaires
A written set of closed-ended questions was given to respondents to record their answers as far as the topic is concerned. Questionnaires are paramount because the respondents are positioned to answer according to what they think about the particular issue of concern. These questionnaires were used in order to gain more creative ideas as far as the research was concerned.
3.4.3 Document analysis
This is a desk method that involved study of various documents on children education. Some of the documents included: policy government documents; donor documents; newspaper reports
3.4.4 Observations
In this method, the researcher observed what really happens on the scene. In this method, direct information was obtained and the researcher keenly observation of what takes place and draw clear recommendations. This method was helpful in a way that "what you see is what you get".
3.5 Validity and Reliability of the instrument
Validity: To ensure the validity of the questionnaire, the research supervisor acted as an expert to assess the validity of the research instruments, in this regard. After constructing the questionnaires; they submitted to him to ensure their validity through their duties basis.
Reliability: reliability was tested using Cronbach's coefficient alpha (a).Specifically, coefficient alpha was typically used during scale development with items that have several response options (i.e. I =strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree and responding in Yes or No).
3.6 Data processing
The processing of data done was after the collection of data for verification of the information gathered and for attainment of completeness, accuracy and uniformity. Data editing involved checking the information for errors which was advantageous because it enabled the researcher to
41 delete and eliminate possible errors traced that can manipulate the results of the study. Data was analyzed concurrently to avoid duplication thereby guiding the entire study for balanced and critical analysis. The researcher used research question based on the questionnaire and for other items, tabulation pie-charts and percentage methods were used for data presentation, analysis and qualification.
3. 7 Data Analysis
The study explained, describe and present the study findings basing on the specific objectives of the study, and research questions where data analysis was first done through sketchy and generalized summaries of the findings such as observation and conclusions in the process of data collection. Data analysis was done using solven's formula and presented in table or charts.
The Pearson's linear correlation coefficient was used. Qualitative data was analyzed by developing different themes generated from research objectives and direct quotation.
3.8 Ethical considerations.
To ensure moral justification of the study, the following strategies was adopted.
The researcher carried out the study with full knowledge and authorisation of the electronic banking and service delivery
The researcher first obtained a letter of introduction from the university, assigning her to the field which she used to erase suspicion by the respondents.
The researcher thereafter shall go ahead to book respondents, after which she delivered/pick the questionnaires or conduct interviews on agreed upon dates.
The researcher had the task of assuring the respondents of utmost confidentiality in the process of coding data.
42 3.10 Limitations of the study
Lack of co-operation by some respondents had a possible constraint to this study. It's common under conflict situations for research to be are viewed in a negative way. The study however emphasized to the respondents that the study purely for academic purposes. Also where people still feel reluctant to participate in spite of the assurances the study resorted to willing and available respondents.
Limited time was already foreseen in the study. To overcome this constraint, a sample of 100 people was chosen to participate in the study. Attempts made to stick to the deadlines that were pre-set before the study was done.
Language was a barrier in some areas which necessitated the use of translators in which case, it was difficult to exhaustively probe or follow through some notions to their logical conclusion especially during qualitative data collection sessions which included focus group discussions and individual interviews.
The primary school where at times hard to access the infmmation since most schools where having inadequate information and close as a result of the conflict that erupted since December 15, 2013. The scope of the study limiting to primary education may also have served to leave out a number of other possible beneficiaries such as out-of-school youth whom some studies put at 68 percent of the school-age children in Southern Sudan. However, because the survey was done in 1195 households where most of these out-of-school youth might be coming from, most of the bmTiers for them may have been captured by their parents. It is however the view of the researchers that further study be commissioned to look specifically at this crucial component of the school-age children who may be excluded for reasons other than those highlighted in this report.
Most of the child soldiers are hard in their responses which limited me to access the full information in review to fulfill my research objectives and research question.
43 CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF STUDY FINDINGS
4.0 Introduction
This chapter of the research report presents the findings on "the role played by united state of America in South Sudan Conflict with the research objective to find out the to examine United States responses to SS conflict, to identifY United States interests in the SS conflict, to analyze the impact of the role played by United States in South Sudan Conflict.
4.1.1 Findings on Gender of respondents
The researcher was interested in getting findings about the gender of respondents and its influence on armed conflict. The information was presented in the table below 4.1 below
Table 1: Shows Gender by respondent distribution
Response Frequency Percentage (%)
Male 62 38.75
Female 44 28.75
Total 106 100
Sout·ce: Primary Data 2015
Table above I shows the gender demographics of the study. Total of I 06 respondents, 62(38.75%) of the pmticipants were males and 44(28.75%) of the respondents were females respectively. This implied that almost equal number of males a11d females was attributed to the fact that organization employs both males and females in equal number.
44 4.1.2 Findings on Age gt·oup of the respondents
The researcher was interested in getting findings about the age of respondents and their influence on armed conflict. The information was presented in the table below 4.2 below
Table 2: Age of the respondents
Responses Frequency Percentage (%)
18-25 26 24.5
26-35 41 38.67
36-45 15 14.15
46+ 24 22.64
Total 106 100
Source: primary data
Table above 4.2 shows the age group of respondents who participated in the study. Total of I 06 respondents, 15(14.15%) of the participants that belonged to the age group of 36-45, 41 (38.67%) of the participants belonged in the age group between 26-30, 26(24.5%) of the participants followed in the age group of 18-25 and 24(22.64%) of the participants followed in the age group of 46+.
The higher percentage of respondents in the age bracket of 46+ was attributed to the fact that the participants are aged and understand the basic for the peace and control in South Sudanese who fall in this age bracket energetic like those under 26-35yrs yet they have some level of experience on the situation.
4.1.3 Findings of Education levels of t·espondents
The researcher was interested in getting findings about the education of respondents and their influence on armed conflict. The information was presented in the table below 4.3 below
45 Table 3: Shows educational level of Respondents
Education levels Frequency Percentage(%) Primary level 19 17.9 High school level 21 19.8 Diploma 63 59.43 Graduate I 0.9 Ph.D graduate 2 1.8 Total 106 100
Source: primary data 2015
The Table above 4.3 shows education levels of respondents who participated in the study. Total 106 participants, I (0.9%) of the respondents were degree holders, 63(59.43%) of the respondents were diploma grandaunts, 2(1.8%) of the participants were Ph.D graduate, 21(!9.8%) of the participants were high school graduates and 19(!7.9%) of the pmiicipants were primary graduates respectively. This implied that the majority of the respondents were educated enough to competently handle the peace situation.
4.1.4 Findings on Marital Status of the Respondents
The resem·cher was interested in getting findings about the marital status of respondents and their influence on armed conflict. The information was presented in the table below 4.4 below
Table 4: Shows Marital Status of Respondents
Marital statns Frequency Percentage(%)
Married 73 68.8
Single 53 50
Total 106 100
Source: Primary Data 2015
46 Table above 4.4 shows the marital status of the respondents who participated in the study. Total of 106 participants, 73(68.8%) of the participants were married and 53(50%) of the respondents were single.
This meant that findings of the study were attributed to the fact that the majority of respondents were adults that is why majority of them are married.
4.2 Response on Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts
Regarding response on whether they Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts, the responses were as follows.
Table 5: Shows Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts
Response Frequency Percentage(%)
Strongly Agree 42 39.62
Agree 20 19.8
Not Sure - 0
Disagree 21 19.8
Strongly Disagree 22 20.10
Total 106 100
Source: Primary data 2015
From the findings the peace keeping to be resolved requires more appropriate means like resources to use however in regards to the situation, there were not available at the time therefore the table above indicate that most respondents 20(19.8%) agree that Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts, this makes the situation to worsen 21 (19.8%) Disagree with it and 42(39.6%) Strongly agree with the statement. This implied that respondents feel that Resource scarcity and competition as a cause of conflicts.
One of the respondent said "of any nation, the US has the most leverage to bring to bear in South Sudan, but that leverage has been greatly depleted since independence in 2011," said
47 Cameron Hudson, former director for African affairs at the National Security Council, who worked extensively on South Sudan"
Some critics say that in its optimism after South Sudan won its independence from Sudan after 22 years ofcivil war, Washington overlooked the new country's divisions_
4.4 Resource scarcity and competition for resources as cause of conflicts
Regarding the response on whether Poverty as a cause of conflicts, the extent of agreement was as follows
Figure 1: The bar graph showing response on Resource scarcity and completion as cause of conflic
FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE. 35 -, 30 I 25 20 15 10 5 0 ME FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE_
Som·ce: Pdmary data 2015
The above results indicate that most respondents 21(19,8%) disagree with the belief about Resource scarcity and competition for the peace keeping in regards to the conflicts where as I 0 (33.3%) agree, 42(39.6%) strongly agree and finally 22(20.10%) strongly disagree. This implied that resource scarcity and competition are a cause of conflicts.
4.5 Response on whether P1·o!ifemtion of arms in the society in South Sudan situation
Concerning response on whether Proliferation of anns in the society in South Sudan situation. reply was as follows.
Figure 2: Showing the bar graph showing frequency of respondent on whether Prolife1·ation of arms in the society in South Sudan situation.
48 -~-~~--~~---~~-~ I FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE ! 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 oo FREQUENCY OF 0 , iiiZiiL RESPONSE
Source: Primary Data 2015
The result above indicate that equal respondents 42(39.6%) strongly agree, agree and disagree with the fact that Proliferation of arms in the society in South Sudan situation, while 22(20.1 0%) strongly Disagrees and lastly others were not sure. This implied that Proliferation of arms in the society in South Sudan situation. As one respondents added;
"a kind ofpersonal violence, a personal anger between two leaders, should never be permitted to take an entire nation in the direction that South Sudan is currently spiralling toward," Ken)l said. "Both President Kiir and Riek Machar need to each of them condemn the brutal attacks that are taking place against innocent people, and they need to condemn the perpetrators of this violence. Leadership is needed."
Critics said Kerry's visit to South Sudan was overdue. He has a strong personal relationship with Kiir, having travelled to South Sudan several times when he was in the Senate, and might have used that pull earlier, administration critics said. Kerry spoke to Kiir many times by phone over the past four months but was unable to persuade him to pull back forces.
4.7 Response on whether at·med movements interfere with civil matters
Concerning response on whether Armed movements interfere with civil matters, reply was as follows.
49 Figure 3: The bar graph showing f1·equency of respondent on A1·med movements interfere with civil matters
FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE
~ 35 = 30 "0" 25 0= Q., 20 ~ 15 ..... 10 0 5
Source: Primary data 2015
The result above indicate that equal respondents 8 (26.7%) strongly agree, agree and disagree with the fact armed movements interfere with civil matters, while 4 (13.3%) strongly Disagrees and lastly 2 (6.7%) were not sure. This implied that armed movements interfere with civil matters.
4.8 Findings on whether Weak/lack of good Governance in South Sudan is affecting peace and stability situation Figure 4: The Bar Graph showing reply by respondents on whether Weak/lack of good governance in South Sudan situation
FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE 35 30 "'~ 25 = 20 "'0 15 0= 10 Q., 5 82 FREQUENCY OF "'... 0 RESPONSE ~ ...0 Qs" !':;= Source: Primary Data 2015
so The results in the table above shows that most respondents 17 (56.7%) agree with whether Weak/lack of good governance In South Sudan situation, where as 13 (43.3%) disagree with the above statement. This implied that whether Weak/lack of good governance In South Sudan situation. In reference to the good governance on informant said that;
"It is a shame Kiir didn't engage in this way earlier in the conflict, given the well-understood likelihood that this kind of security crisis could have catastrophic humanitarian consequences, " said Hudson, who is now acting director of the Centre for Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum. "I believe it could have helped to avoid a lot of the atrocities we have seen in the past few months had he gone earlier. That said, it is important that he is there now."
Another respondent aired out and said;
"the senior state department official said sanctions would target the travel and overseas assets ofpeople who could include Kiir and Machar. The US sanctions are already authorised by an executive order signed by President Barack Obama. But economic and travel sanctions applied only by the US would have little more than symbolic effect, since few senior South Sudanese of either ethnicity hold large assets in the US or travel there frequently".
In addition "the UN is also considering sanctions, and the Obama administration is trying to persuade neighbouring nations such as Kenya and Uganda to apply their own. Those could have a significant effect because large banks and institutions are based there. But despite the efforts ol Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia to foster peace talks, there appears to be little appetite among those nations for economic sanctions".
4.9 Challenges faced by USA's in trying to resolve the conflict
The second specific objective of the study was to find out the Challenges faced m curbing conflicts. Findings on the legacy of black hawk down as a challenge to curbing conflicts, Regarding the Legacy of black hawk down as a challenge to curbing conflicts, the findings are as below.
51 Table 6: Showing the Legacy of Black Haw!' Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts
Response Frequency Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree 52 49.0
Agree 21 19.81
Not Sure 2 1.8
Disagree 10 9.4
Strongly Disagree 21 19.8
Total 106 100
Sou1·ce: Primary Data 2015
On response as to whether the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts, most respondents 21(19.8%) agree while 52(49%) strongly agree too that the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts. I 0(9.4%) disagree and 21 (19.8%) strongly disagree unlike 2(1.8%) of the respondents who were not sure. This implied that the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts. As regards to the conflict resolutions on key respondents said that;
"None ofus is nai've; this is a real and profound crisis, "said Gayle Smith, the senior director for global development and humanitarian issues at the National Security Council, ·who is helping direct the response. "But we've got a long history, and we've got some leverage. "
Another respondent portrayed that; within the action case of conflict in South Sudan, the fighting rages areon, prompting the State Department to withdraw more personnel fi·om its embas~>y in Juba. It has already evacuated hundreds ofAmericans and ringed the embassy with 45 American soldiers to protect it from an attack like that on the diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in September 2012.
52 4.10 Findings on Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing conflicts
Regarding the question on Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing conflicts, respondents replied as follows in the table
Table 7: Shows Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing Conflicts
Response Frequency Percentage(%) Strongly Agree 20 18.8 Agree 46 43.3 Not Sure - 0 Disagree 21 19.8 Strongly Disagree 19 17.9 Total 106 100 Som·ce: Pt•tmary data.
The results in the table above shows that most respondents 20(18.8%) strongly agree with the Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing conflicts, 46(43.3%) Agree, 21(19.8%) disagree and 19(17.9%) strongly Disagree with it. This implied that Displacement/famine as a challenge in curbing conflicts
4.11 Response of Random killings, revenge ldllings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts in South Sudan
Respondents having been asked whether Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts, they answered as follows.
Table 8: Shows response on whether Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts in South Sudan
Response Frequency Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 73 45.6 Agree 14 8.75 Not Sure - - Disagree 15 9.37 Strongly Disagree 4 2.5 Total 106 100
53 Source: Primary Data 2015
According to response as seen from the table above, most of the respondents 15(9.37%) disagree with the fact that Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts. Only 73(45.6%) and 14(8.75%) strongly agree and agree respectively with the statement. This implied that Random killings, revenge killings as a hindrance to curbing conflicts. Much more needed to be addressed to presence of the humans suffering from the case of the conflict, on respondent said that;
"We can't allow the carnage to go on; we can't allow the capital to be overrun; we can't allo-w humans to suffer from their land of belonging, " said Tom McDonald, who worked on Sudan issues as the American ambassador to Zimbabwe during the administration of Bill Clinton. "We have too much to lose; we've put too much into this. "
4.12 Findings on whether Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper efforts to curb conflicts by USA in South Sudan.
Respondents on whether Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper effmis to curb conflicts in South Sudan, they replied as follows in the table.
Figure 5: Shows f1·equency of whether Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper efforts to cm·b conflicts in South Sudan
FREQUENCY OF AGREEMENT 35 30 25 20 15 10 ill FREQUENCY OF 5 AGREEME 0 +---,--J
Source: Primary Data 2015
54 According to the results as in the table above, it shows that most respondents 14(8.7%) agree that Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper efforts to curb conflicts. Whereas 15(9.7%) of the respondents disagree and 4(2.53%) strongly disagree with it. This implied that Human rights abuses, lawlessness hamper efforts to curb conflicts in South Sudan.
Mr. McDonald said "While the United States is highly unlikely to commit its own troops, " it could provide planes to transport Ugandan soldiers or share intelligence on rebel positions with Ethiopia's air force. American officials said that they hoped that Uganda's warning would be enough ofa deterrent and that intervention would not be needed.
However Grant T. Harris argue, the senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council, "the United States is pushing to expand the size and mission of the United Nations' peacekeeping force, which currently numbers more than 7, 600 and is struggling to protect an estimated 45,000 refugees who have swarmed its compounds".
The U.N. Secretary-General warned on December 24 2013, "the world is watching all sides in South Sudan," announcing that the UN was bolstering efforts to investigate reports of human rights violations and crimes against humanity and declaring that "those responsible at the senior level will be held personally accountable and face the consequences even if they claim they had no knowledge of the attacks. "4 I He stated, "Now is the time for South Sudan's leaders to show their people and the world that they are, above all, committed to preserving the unity of the nation. "
4.13 Findings on whether Losing hope and faith in leaders and USA hamper efforts to resolve conflicts in South Sudan
Regarding the issue on whether losing hope and faith in leaders hamper and USA efforts to curb conflicts, respondents replied as follows as presented in the table below.
55 Figure G: Shows frequency on whether losing hope and faith in leaders hamper and USA efforts to curb conflicts
FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE
35 "I 30 i 25 20 15 10 5 [ll FREQUENCY OF 0 RESPONSE
I I~" I Source: Primary Data 2015
Results from the figure shows that most of the respondents 73(457%) disagree with the statement that losing hope and faith in leaders hamper efforts to curb conflicts in South Sudan. 14(8. 7%) participants strongly agree with the statement that losing hope and faith in leaders hamper the efforts to curb conflict while 15(2.5%) agree. This implied that losing hope and faith in leaders hamper efforts to curb conflicts.
The problem, analysts say, "is that the United States does not have the influence it had before 2011. Then, the South Sudanese needed American aid and support for a referendum. Now they have independence and more than $1 billion a year in oil revenue that used to go to the North".
4.14 Solutions to the conflict in South Sudan by USA Peace Keeping
4.14.1 Response on the General or targeted development assistance in South Sudan situation
Regarding response on General or targeted development assistance helps stop conflicts through USA, the response was as follows.
56 Table 9: Showing the General or· targeted development assistance for South Sudan Situation
Response Frequency Percentage(%) Strongly Agree 56 52.8 Agree 21 19.8 Not Sure - - Disagree 17 16 Strongly Disagree 12 11.3 Total 106 100 Source: Primary Data 2015
Many of the respondents 17(16%) do not accept General or targeted development assistance helps stop conflicts while 56(52.8%) agree with the statement. This implied that General or targeted development assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan.
Young men in rural areas are the primary perpetrators of violence in South Sudan, whether they act for economic gain, revenge, self-defence, out of political persuasion, cultural expectations or simply boredom and frustration. (Hans Joachim., 2009) More emphasis needs to be placed on engaging these disenfranchised youths in longer-term peace building and development activities, including in research and dialogue to establish their interests, aspirations and motivations. Sustainable market-based livelihood opportunities also need to be developed. Youth leaders from outside the educated activist realm, for example cattle camp leaders, should be involved in peace committee type dialogues and confidence building activities. (Schwartz, Alan., 2009) Support could also be provided to the youth wings of political patiies, to allow them to be peaceful activists within and outside their patiies for young people's needs and perspectives, and to nuriure a post-war generation of political leaders. (Katzenstein, 20 I3)
According to Martha, 20 II the role of women in building peace remains quite marginal, despite the existence of widespread women's networks and a large body of female parliamentarians. A greater and more independent role for women in peace dialogue freeing them from ancillary suppori roles to male elder negotiators is often desirable, recognising that women may as often be the inciters or rewarders of violent behaviour as peace advocates. A greater focus on meeting the specific needs of women and girls is also necessary, starting with improving access to justice
57 and better awareness of women's security needs among police and customary security and justice providers. (Jervis 2011) This means working with the police and traditional leaders to sensitise them, as well as reforming and disseminating specific protection legislation. Support also needs to be provided to women in political parties, to promote their active involvement and the promotion of women's needs and perspectives. Underlying all of this is a need for greater attention to women's needs in economic reconsttuction and development, supporting girl's education and sustainable livelihoods for women. (Robert 0., and JosephS., 2011)
4.15 Response on whether USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan
Regarding response on whether USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan helps stop conflicts, the response was as follows.
Table 10: Showing always whether USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan helps stop conflicts.
Response Frequency_ Percentage (%) Strongly Agree 79 74.5 Agree 13 12.2 Not Sure 05 4.7 Disagree 2 1.8 Strongly Disagree 5 4.7 Total 106 100 Source: Primary Data 2015
Many of the respondents 79(74.5%) strongly agree that USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan helps stop conflicts while 2(1.8%) disagree with the statement. This implied that to a greater extent USA assistance helps stop conflicts in South Sudan.
4.16 Response on whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan
Regarding response on whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan, the response was as follows.
58 Table 11: showing whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan
Response Frequency Percenta2e (%) Strongly Agree 67 63.2 Agree 14 13.2 Not Sure 7 6.6 Disagree - - Strongly Disagree 18 16.9 Total 106 100 Source: Primary Data 2015
Many of the respondents 67(63.2%) strongly agree whether Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan while 14(13.2%) agree with the statement. However some respondents after looking at education as a colonial aspect 18(16.9%) strongly disagreed upon it therefore this implied that Education and training can stop conflicts in South Sudan.
Figure 7: The bar graph showing r-esponse on whether civil society development can help curb conflicts
Role of Education and Training
• Strongly Agree
• Agree
not Sure
• Disagree
• Strongly Disagree
Source: Primary Data 2015
59 4.17 Response on whether Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts
Regarding response on whether Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts in South Sudan by USA, the responses were as follows.
Table 12: Shows whether Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts in South Sudan
Response Frequency Percentage(%) Strongly Agree 83 78.3 Agree 12 11.3 Not Sure - - Disagree 2 1.8 Strongly Disagree 09 8.4 Total 106 100 Source: Primary Data 2015
From the findings most respondents discussed and observed that human right promotion as a tool to resolve the problem of conflicts in South Sudan is a great opportunity this was stressed out by respondents, 12(11.3%) agree that Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts in South Sudan, 21.(8%) Disagree with it and 83(78.3%) Strongly Agree with the statement therefore Human rights promotion is a tool for curbing conflicts in South Sudan beside USA peace keeping body.
60 CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND DISCUSION OF THE FINDINGS
5.0 Introduction
Under this chapter, the researcher summarizes the study findings on "the role played by the United State of America in the current South Sudan conflict that can inform peace building processes around the world" in accordance with study objectives.
5.1. Summary and discussion of findings
5.1.1 The mandate of USA
From the table above most respondents were able to view out the role and function of USA mandate in the operations of the peace keeping in South Sudan. For the function of the mandate 27.5% looked at provision within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support as one factor for peace keeping. As regards to assist the FGS in establishing conditions 22.5% responded positively since the role of it was so much functioning. Therefore much is done by the mandate of USA in Somali in peace keeping situation.
5.1.2 Challenges faced by USA's in trying to resolve the conflict
Findings on the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts; Regarding the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts, the findings are as below. On response as to whether the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts, most respondents implied that the Legacy of Black Hawk Down as a challenge to curbing conflicts.
Ethiopia's 2006 campaign was the latest in a long series of military at (46%) incursions aimed at degrading Islamist bases in South Sudan, initially focused on al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, and more recently elements within the coalition of local Shari'a courts known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The main sticking point was that the regime Ethiopia was trying to install was deeply unpopular with many Somalis and once installed, made little effort to build its political legitimacy or reach out to its opponents. USA was thus mandated to support a weak, divided, and (in the view of many Somalis) illegitimate government which was widely seen as being one
61 faction in the country's ongoing civil war. It didn't help that the TFG was unable to control many of its security forces and demonstrated virtually no capacity to govern effectively.
5.1.3 Stl'ides Made by USA in South Sudan
From the findings an important element to mention is that the international-led approaches to peace building to 57% which have so far neglected local Somali traditions and experiences of controlling and managing security, which have demonstrated a time tested capacity to be effective in the absence of the state. USA has in several cases failed to understand local dynamics and governing methods (40%), provoking confusion and producing limited or non existent outcomes in their interventions. It is important that USA understands the local initiatives in dealing with security in order to support the building of a legitimate and effective security strategy.
The USA Police have the mandate to engage in the capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible body that can provide security for the population. As USA soldiers have moved from Mogadishu to other "liberated areas", the first Formed Police Unit (FPU) arrived from Uganda in August to support Somali Police Force (SPF) in providing security in the capital. On 16 September 2012 USA Received its second Formed Police Unit (FPU) from Nigeria. So far, USA has assisted the SPF in vetting 600 former Somali police officers with the purpose of increasing the number of operational police officers in the country. With the need to combat public disorder, the FPU's actions have been based on rapid reaction movements with a limited efficacy. Hence, more FPU members and equipment are required to effectively guarantee the mle of law in the city. The Civilian Component is mandated to assist in the rebuilding of Somalia's legitimate and effective political institutions. Its role is fundamental in the process since it is unlikely that USA's Military-oriented strategy will succeed without an effective and strong civilian component.
5.2 Conclusion
From the above findings, the researcher concludes that; Peace building is primarily the work of indigenous South Sudan. In certain circumstances, where USA have established a credible presence and effective programmes, they can be effective in facilitating and supporting
62 indigenous peace activities. It has become increasingly apparent that single projects or programmes cannot bring sustained peace and reconciliation South Sudan. Peace building is a long-term process that takes many years to achieve lasting results. Many local and international organizations are now involved in conflict management activities in South Sudan. The amount of excellent and solid peace work is commendable and should not be underestimated.
External actors' recent engagement in South Sudan has in some ways contributed positively to peace. For example, there clearly has been effective co-ordinated diplomacy to support the emergence of a fragile peace from decades of war. However, the emerging lessons from the CPA period suggest much that could be done to respond better to conflict in Sudan and South Sudan. This could be achieved through: better contextual understanding; more coherence around a collective strategy to respond flexibly and effectively to conflict dynamics, including the political aspects of the post-conflict transition; more effective support for rollout of service delivery outside main towns, rapid economic growth and economic diversification; and greater conflict-sensitivity in how assistance is designed and delivered.
USA's engagement in Sudan and South Sudan forms a strong contrast with that of Western actors. Each element examined in the case study political, military, aid and economic illustrates both positive and negative aspects of USA engagement. Thus USA has influenced the parties to pursue peace, but could have done so more strongly, and will need to consider whether its courting of elites could prove divisive and short-sighted, given its long term interest in stability. USA has also contributed personnel vital to keeping the peace in Sudan and South Sudan and assisted in building local demining capacities but paradoxically, has retained an irresponsible arms transfer control policy that has embittered Southern stakeholders and fuelled violence against civilian populations. USA has also made huge investments in Sudanese infrastructure, but should consider how to ensure that some clear negative impacts on local communities are avoided in future such projects and address the strong local perception in South Sudan that USA's assistance has disproportionately benefited the North and not the communities worst affected by the conflict. In the energy sector, USA companies pioneered profitable oil extraction and processing in Sudan but in doing so they were, along with several Western companies, complicit in causing tremendous human suffering. USA oil companies will continue to face hostility from local stakeholders until they are able to enjoy tangible compensation for what many feel have been strongly negative impacts of oil exploration.
63 5.3 Recommendations
Overcoming the legacy of decades of conflict in South Sudan will mean working over decades to meet needs and fulfil rights in every sector across the humanitarian and development spectrum. It will also require development of a culture of peace in a society deeply traumatised by the experience of war and accustomed to living in conflict.
The task of setting up a new state and government is underpinned by significant will to succeed and manage difficulties. However, as in the North, governance challenges, centre periphery tensions and bloody rebellions that are already visible in South Sudan, outline the scale of the challenges ahead.
Basing on the findings of the study, the researcher has come up with the following limitations:
Support reconciliation and confidence-building at the community level: bring people together out of common interest include teachers, chiefs, youth, women, traders and members of peace committees.
Ensure that peace building activities are linked to, and complement programmes that are directed toward the basic means of survival: food security, water, shelter and health services
Promote sustainable community development and economic revitalization: where progress 111 conflict management is evident and where peace agreements remain intact, provide more resources for participatory community development, create peace situations and provide food for-work and food-for-training assistance.
Address the needs of displaced and vulnerable groups (including ex-combatants): support provision of basic needs (food, water and shelter), provide health, education and training services and support the integration of displaced people within their new communities
Strengthen local authorities so that they can fulfill key tasks: train local officials (commissioners. chiefs, local leaders) to better fulfill their roles and responsibilities including participatory decision-making methodologies and conflict management practices, improve capacity of local offices by providing additional staff and equipment, establish effective bonds between officials and the people through community-based projects
Promote peace education and awareness: peace education, awareness and respect for human rights should be emphasized at the school, youth, community and leadership levels.
64 Strengthen civil society: The challenge for the people of Somalia is to promote, support and maintain a new strategic alliance between their leaders and civil society - one of the aims of this strategic alliance must be to ensure good governance
Create or strengthen mechanisms for resolving disputes and strengthening the rule of law: advancing judicial and legal reform, civilian police force, human rights protection is required
Provide civilian security: restructure and train police forces so that they serve civilians rather than serve the army and/or local commanders, end impunity and create effective, non-political security forces.
5.4 Suggested Areas of further research
There is a need for further research to explore this same topic fully. Other areas recommended for further study include:
• Political Solutions on Somalia conflict
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70 APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
TRANSMITTAL LETTER FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Dear Sir/ Madam, Greetings! I am a Masters in International Relations and Diplomacy a candidate of Kampala International University. Part of the requirements for the award a thesis. My study is entitled, "The role played by the United States ofAmerica in South Sudan conflict" Within this context, may I request you to participate in this study by answering the questionnaires? Kindly do not leave any option unanswered. Any data you will provide shall be for academic purposes only and no information of such kind shall be disclosed to others. Thanking you in advance for your cooperation.
Yours faithfully, Chol Gatkek Tut
71 APPENDIX I:
QUESTIONNAIRE I am Chol Gatkek Tut a student of Kampala International University pursing Bachelors in International Relations and Diplomacy. I am conducting an academic study on the topic; the role played by the United States of America in South Sudan conflict. The information collected will be used for purely academic purposes, your responses will be treated with utmost confidentiality and your name will not be indicated in the findings.
Please tick your selected option
Section A: Background Information I. Sex? a) Male D b) Female D 2. Age: ...... 3. Educational Background D a. Not educated D b. Less than primary seven D c. Completed primary seven D d. O'Level D e. A'Level D f. Diploma D g. Degree h. Any other (please specify) ...... 4. Current marital status? (Please tick one option) a. Single D b. Married D c. Divorced D d. Other (specify) ......
72 SECTIONB
NATURE OF CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN
What is South Sudan?
Are you by affected by the conflict in South Sudan? Yes 0 No 0 If yes, how are you affected?
Why are people in South Sudan killing each other?
How is the conflicts in South Sudan affecting? a) Environmental Impacts Deforestation D Draught Environmental degradation D Loss of bio-diversity D Floods D b) Human impacts Loss of lives D Diseases D - Displacement D - Loss of properties D Food shortage
73 I thought giving South Sudan independence was supposed to stop ethnic fighting.
Yes
No
Why didn't it?
How did South Sudan become independent, anyway?
What led to the recent outbreak of violence?
Who are the parties to the conflict and what are their goals?
How has the crisis evolved?
What's the basis of the conflict? Is it based on ethnic tension, oil money,just a need for power between two men and parties, or something else?
74 What is the role of religion to security in South Sudan?
What is the role and influence of tribe leaders to security and international cooperation?
How can the UNMISS' United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate be adapted to the current situation in order to achieve Development/Good Governance?
What is the current role of UN agencies to establish Rule of Law/Good Governance /Development and how can their impact being improved?
75 THE UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO SOUTH SUDAN
How does the fighting affect civilians and foreign nationals?
How is the international community responding?
How has the United States responded to date?
Is USIP still working in South Sudan?
Yes
No
If so, what is it doing?
What are the main humanitarian needs?
76