HUMANITARIANISM OR SELF-SERVING HYPOCRISY? THE PROVISION OF AID TO SOUTH AFRICA UNDER THE HAWKE-KEATING AND HOWARD GOVERNMENTS.
Thesis submitted by Rachel Rose Hammersley-Mather
to fulfil the requirements of the Master of Arts (Research) Degree
at
Queensland University of Technology
2010
KEYWORDS
Africa, aid, aid motivations, Australian aid motivations, Australian aid policy, development assistance, Hawke, Howard, Keating, South Africa.
i
ABSTRACT
General perceptions of foreign aid commonly engender images of humanitarianism and altruism, whereby the humanitarian needs of the recipient of development assistance are of the utmost priority of the aid donor. However, the Australian governments led by Hawke, Keating and Howard often gave humanitarianism a low emphasis, frequently placing Australia’s own foreign policy and economic concerns at the forefront of aid allocation – often unashamedly. This self-interest met through aid meant that most was provided to Australia’s regional neighbourhood, neglecting some of the poorest, most struggling states, including South Africa. Other issues and events, including the Cold War, apartheid, terrorism and HIV/AIDS also affected Australia’s aid policy; mostly, they were used as excuses to limit aid to states like South Africa.
ii
CONTENTS
Keywords i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
List of Appendices v
List of Abbreviations vi
Declaration of Originality viii
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 The Literature Review 11
Introduction 11
Criticisms of Aid 13
Aid Conditionality 21
Aid Praise 26
Areas of Australian Foreign Policy that Relate to the Provision of Aid:
Regionalism 29
Political Considerations 32
Government/Foreign Minister of the Day 36
Conclusion 39
Chapter 2 The Hawke-Keating Governments 41
Introduction 41
Jackson Committee Report of 1984 44
Actual Aid Expenditure of Hawke-Keating 53
The Development Import Finance Facility 71 iii
Apartheid 80
Focus on Asia/Regionalism 89
The Cold War 93
Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa 98
Conclusion 103
Chapter 3 The Howard Government 105
Introduction 105
One Clear Objective 105
Actual Aid Expenditure Under Howard 116
Terrorism 122
HIV/AIDS 132
Conclusion 138
Conclusion 141
Appendices 147
List of References 161
iv
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Table: Australia’s Official Development Assistance: 1982-1987
Appendix 2 Table: Australia’s Official Development Assistance: 1988-1994
Appendix 3 Table: Australia’s Official Development Assistance: 1996-2007
Appendix 4 Table: Australia’s ODA/GNI Ratios 1980-2008
Appendix 5 Table: ODA/GNI Ratios of Development Assistance Commission Countries
Appendix 6 Graph: Aid by region under Hawke, 1982-1987
Appendix 7 Graph: Aid by region under Hawke-Keating, 1988-1994
Appendix 8 Graph: Aid by region under Howard Government
Appendix 9 Graph: ODA/GNI Ratios of DAC Countries
v
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACC Asia, Africa and Community Programs
ACFOA Australian Council for Overseas Aid
ADAA Australian Development Assistance Agency
ADAB Australian Development Assistance Bureau
AfDB African Development Bank
AIDAB Australian International Development Assistance Bureau
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC African National Congress
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
CISLAC Committees in Solidarity with Central and Latin America and the Caribbean
DAC Development Assistance Commission
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIFF Development Import Finance Facility
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNI Gross National Income
GNP Gross National Product
Green DIFF Green Technology Fund Development Import Finance Facility
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
MDG Millennium Development Goal
ODA Overall Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SAPSA Special Assistance Program for South Africans
SAPSAN Special Assistance Program for South Africans and Namibians
vi
SANGOP South African Non-Government Organisations Participation Program
UN United Nations
UNETPSA United Nations Education and Training Programmes for Southern Africa
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
vii
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.
Rachel Hammersley-Mather
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am extremely appreciative of my supervisor, Dr Keith Moore, not only for his academic support and in-depth feedback along the way, but for his enthusiasm and encouragement.
I am very grateful to my family and close friends for all of the support they have given me throughout my years of study. Thanks especially to Mum and Dad for showing me at a young age that all around the world people are the same, generally striving for the best for their families.
And to my friends and ‘other family’ who showed me Africa – I would never have found my passion without sharing such amazing adventures with you.
"Like slavery and apartheid, poverty is not natural. It is man-made, and can be overcome and eradicated by the actions of human beings." Nelson Mandela
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INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the 20th century, aid, or development assistance, became the most common avenue for the West to assist the Third World in overcoming poverty. Especially since the 1960s, analysts have widely promoted aid as the best way to alleviate poverty, global inequality and insecurity. However, the Australian government has frequently been criticised – both by Australian political commentators and by foreign and non-government organisations – for not providing enough development assistance to the Third World.1 In
2008, Australia ranked fourteenth out of the twenty-two richest nations for its government’s aid contributions. While fourteen out of twenty-two may not seem abysmal, Australia only scored
3.1 out of 10 for its contributions, while the Center for Global Development deemed 5 an
‘average’ score.2 In 1970, Australia committed itself to the pursuit of an aid target of 0.7% of
Gross National Product (GNP); the closest it has been was 0.65% in 1975 under the Whitlam government, and during the Hawke-Keating and Howard Governments, the closest it came was under Hawke in 1984, when it was 0.55%.3 While Australia may have been able to redeem itself on the quality of its aid, despite providing low amounts, the reasoning for its provision of aid, and the consequent effectiveness of it, are a source of contention. This situation is recognised by organisations such as Make Poverty History, which encourages the
Australian government to not only provide more aid, but to provide better, more effective aid;
1 Coatsworth, J 2004, ‘Globalisation, Growth and Welfare in History’ in Suarez-Orozco, MM & Qin-Hilliard, DB (eds.), Globalisation: Culture and Education in the New Millennium, University of California Press, Berkeley. 2 Center for Global Development 2009, Commitment to Development Index 2008, Center for Global Development, Washington DC. 3 Millennium Project 2006, United Nations Secretary General and United Nations Development Group, New York, viewed April 22 2010,
this would require Australia to reorder its priorities.4 Moreover, Australia frequently provides aid in the pursuit of its own self-interested economically, commercially and strategically motivated objectives.
Glancing over any Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) statistical summary for the past thirty years, it is evident that south-east Asia and the Pacific – being in
Australia’s regional neighbourhood – benefit the most from Australian government aid.
Indeed, during the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments the Australian aid program was
‘firmly based on the reality that Australia is located in the Asia-Pacific region.’5 Many of
Australia’s closest relationships were, and are, with Asian states, and within that region, most states have developing economies. Therefore Australia has a vested interest in how its neighbours in Asia, and particularly south-east Asia, develop politically, economically and socially, and such interest is frequently expressed via the Australian aid program and its policy. However, in its quest for stability and development in its own regional neighbourhood,
Australia neglects other impoverished regions – regions which arguably suffer from the effects of poverty more, such as much of Africa.
Historically, Africa has not interested most Australians or Australian governments; one only has to skim texts on Australia’s foreign policies to draw that conclusion. Africa, and Australian relations with the many states of that continent, are not overly familiar to the average
Australian, or even Australian academia, primarily because relations with Asia and the West are emphasised. So sparse is the knowledge within Australia relating to African studies that in
4 Make Poverty History 2009, Make Poverty History Australia, Melbourne, Victoria, viewed 11 November 2009,
2003 only thirteen Australian universities offered subjects relating to Africa and of those thirteen, only five offered subjects which touched on African politics.6 As Lyons and Dimock state, ‘If Africa is in crisis, African studies in Australia is under siege.’7 However, despite an evident lack of interest, Africa is of vital importance to the world; as journalist Stewart Harris asserted in 1988, ‘ ... Australia can ill afford this neglect [of Africa]. The real Africa is a land of great potential, standing as Asia did 25 years ago, a hungry continent clawing its way to food self-sufficiency, and then to economic independence.’8 Since then Australia has received an influx of African refugees, especially Sudanese, and so it is even more imperative for
Australians to be interested and understanding of Africa.9
This thesis will analyse what political and aid-related events and policies both motivated and affected Australian aid to the Republic of South Africa – hereafter to be referred to as South
Africa – under the Hawke (1982-1991), Keating (1991-1996) and Howard (1996-2007) governments. The foreign ministers for these governments were Bill Hayden, Gareth Evans and Alexander Downer, respectively. The period to be covered includes both Labor and
Liberal, or Coalition, governments both before and after the end of the Cold War, so any shift in policy resulting from that will be evident. The thesis argues that under the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments the granting of Australian government aid to Third World countries was largely motivated by self-serving interest and not by ethical or humanitarian consideration.
This is not to say that Australia’s stated aid goal was not poverty reduction. As Baldock
6Lyons, T & Dimock, E 2003, ‘The State of African Studies in Australia’, paper presented at the 26th annual conference of the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific, Flinders University, p.16. 7 Lyons & Dimock 2003, p.1. 8 Harris, S 1988, ‘Why Australia can’t afford to neglect Africa’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 Jan., p.9. 9 Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2007, Sudanese Community Profile, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra,
states, ‘While the actual implementation of policy has historically been seen as somewhat careless towards the humanitarian goals of the aid program, poverty reduction has always been the stated primary aim for Australian foreign aid.’10 However, and utilising South Africa as a case study focus, this thesis reveals that much less Australian aid was supplied to countries that did not possess attributes that appealed to the Australian government’s self- interested programs or policies, as opposed to countries – such as many of those in south- east Asia – which did appeal to those objectives. Furthermore, the thesis reveals that the self- serving interests evolved over time – as political, but not ethical, priorities changed and evolved.
South Africa was chosen as an African case study because it best showcases the problems that riddle Africa. Even AusAID acknowledged the contradiction and extreme poverty that underpins South Africa when it stated:
The problems in Africa are no more highlighted than in South Africa, a country with around 40 million people, 5 million of whom are whites, the majority of whom have an extraordinary high living standard. But ... going into the black townships takes you into the worst conditions in the whole of Africa. You are dealing with incomes of $US100 to $US150 per person [per annum]. You are dealing with people who do not have an education, a water supply, nor any health services.11
The need that exists in South Africa, the most developed of Southern Africa Development
Community (SADC) countries, is further illustrated by statistics which show that around half- way through the period to be analysed – 1995 – white South Africa ranked 24th in the world in terms of standard of living; meanwhile, black South Africa was listed as 123rd.12 During the
10 Baldock, PJ 1997, ‘Australian attitudes to foreign aid’, Honours thesis, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, p.11. 11 AusAID 1995b, Transcript, 25 August, p. 45, in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, Report No. 72, House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p.103. 12 The Economist, 20 May 1995, p.3, in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.104. 4
governments of Hawke-Keating and Howard, Australia had frequent engagement with South
Africa; certainly more so than any other African state. This was primarily because of
Australia’s disapproval of the South African institution of apartheid, which was only abandoned in 1994. In the same way as the ending of the Cold War, the abolition of apartheid provides an interesting benchmark throughout the period to be examined, and any policy shift resulting from the change will be apparent. As evidenced by recent moves by the current Labor government to enhance ties with Africa, should Australia not cultivate close relations with
Africa as it begins to play a much larger role in world politics over the coming decades, the country will not gain the benefits of those closer ties. In the immediate future, Australia stands to benefit the most from relations with South Africa than other African states. From sporting rivalry to tourism, to the commercial interests offered by South Africa and evidenced by
Australian mining company BHP Billiton’s interests in South Africa, there is enormous potential for strong Australian-South African ties, not dissimilar to the relationship Australia currently enjoys with many south-east Asian states.13 However, and most importantly, Africa is frequently cited as being home to many of the world’s most impoverished people.14 Around
35% of South Africans live on less than US$2 per day, and in 2000 more than 50% of South
Africa’s population was thought to be living below the poverty line.15 For altruistic reasons,
Australia must engage with Africa and endeavour to assist in alleviating grave poverty.
13 BHP Billiton 2010, BHP Billiton Limited, Melbourne, Victoria, viewed 3 March 2010,
As previously mentioned, currently Australia focuses the vast majority of its aid on the Asia-
Pacific region. While this is undoubtedly due to the political and strategic interest Australia holds in this region, the Colombo Plan also played a role. The Plan was built upon an
Australian initiative at a meeting of Commonwealth ministers in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1950.16
The original intention of the Plan was for wealthier Commonwealth states – such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand – to assist poorer Commonwealth members from south-east Asia. However, then Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies lobbied for
American financial involvement to assist in the prevention of the spread of communism in recipient nations.17 Because American funds far exceeded those of other Plan members, other non-Commonwealth nations, such as South Korea, were included as recipient countries.18 The development assistance of the Colombo Plan was provided solely to the
Asia-Pacific region. While ‘some had historical links with Australia, such as Papua New
Guinea’, others were simply ‘close in terms of geographical proximity to Australia.’19 The aid under the Colombo Plan included a diverse range of activities, such as education, technical co-operation, training and staffing assistance. The characteristics of the recipient countries and the proposed activities have been and continue to be relevant in determining the amount and distribution of overseas aid from Australia.20 Thus it is evident that Australia’s aid program under the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments was strongly guided by a historical document – the Colombo Plan – and although some policies evolved, their centricity for Australia’s regional neighbourhood did not. To be considered up-to-date with shifting global priorities, Australia’s own aid priorities needed to shift and incorporate Africa.
16 Palmowski, J (ed.) 2004, Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.137. 17 Palmowski, 2004, p.137. 18 Palmowski, 2004, p.137. 19 Ramli 1999, p.1. 20 Ramli 1999, p.1. 6
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms foreign aid, aid and development assistance will be used interchangeably. Where appropriate, aid may also be referred to as Overall
Development Assistance (ODA). For the scope of this work, aid, or development assistance, is defined as ‘the international transfer of public resources and funds in the form of loans or grants ... directly from one government to another.’21 Even more simply, aid is the transfer of resources from a developed state to a developing state to assist with its development, be it economic or humanitarian assistance. It also encompasses emergency relief, although such aid is not imperative to the argument of this thesis. In this context, the aid to be analysed is bilateral. Only aid provided by the Australian Government aid program, AusAID, will be reviewed, or as it was known from 1976-1987, the Australian Development Assistance Bureau
(ADAB), and from 1987-1995, the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau
(AIDAB).22 Aid will also be acknowledged in the case of the United Nations Education and
Training Programmes for Southern Africa (UNETPSA).23 Although UNETPSA is a third party, and therefore Australian aid streaming through it was multilateral, because for many years it was the sole avenue for Australian aid to South Africa, it will also be recognised. In some instances aid will also be defined in each chapter as it was defined in the AusAID statistical summaries of that time. This will show the government’s own perception of aid and its function, and how it evolved. All monetary figures are in Australian dollars unless otherwise indicated.
21 Cho, G 1995, Trade, Aid and Global Interdependence, Routledge, London, p.12. 22 Brief History of AusAID 2009, The Australian Agency for International Development, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, viewed 9 November 2009,
As noted above, under the Hawke and Keating governments Australia’s national aid agency received two name changes. According to the Minister for Development Cooperation and
Pacific Island Affairs Gordon Bilney, changing the name of AIDAB to AusAID had the aim of garnering more public acceptance and recognition of ‘the value of Australia’s aid program and of its complex and diverse nature.’24
This thesis is organised into three chapters. The first chapter, the literature review, addresses aid theory and defines the three key themes of aid. It also identifies the key foreign policy issues concerning Australian aid to South Africa under the period to be examined, and the literature concerning them. The second chapter examines the aid policy of the Hawke-Keating governments. It examines the aid initiatives created under Hawke and Keating, including the
Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF) and its evolution, and the Special Aid Program for
South Africans and Namibians (SAPSAN, later SAPSA once Namibia was granted independence), as well as the actual aid Australia provided to South Africa, and the foreign policy issues which influenced it. Attention is given to the end of both the Cold War and apartheid and the impact these had on Australian aid policy and the effects on aid to South
Africa. Chapter three examines the aid provided to South Africa under the Howard government, and the foreign policy issues which underpinned it. Such issues include the rise of terrorism as a global issue and the perceived role of Australia as a ‘deputy sheriff’ in the
Asia-Pacific region. Differences between the Labor and Coalition governments are highlighted, as well as the abolition of the DIFF program and the supposed realignment of aid to serve humanitarian interests rather than the strategic, nationalistic reasons the two previous
24 AusAID 1995a, Australia’s Overseas Aid Program 1995-1996, Budget Related Paper No.2, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 8
Labor governments promoted. The conclusion summarises the main points of each chapter and draws a conclusion as to how self-serving Australia’s aid to South Africa was during the
Hawke-Keating and Howard governments. A brief analysis of the current Labor government’s aid attitudes towards Africa, and specifically South Africa, is also provided.
There are a number of ministers who had an impact on Australian aid policy under the Hawke-
Keating and Howard governments. Bob Hawke was Prime Minister from 11 March 1983 until
20 December 1991.25 This period encompassed three re-elections: the first on 13 December
1984; the second on 24 July 1987; and the third on 4 April 1990.26 Hawke’s ministry included several exceptionally influential ministers, perhaps most notably – and of particular relevance to this thesis – Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. However, it was Bill Hayden who was the first
Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Hawke Government, serving from Hawke’s first election until 17 August 1988.27 From 13 December 1984, until he replaced Hayden as Minister for
Foreign Affairs on 2 September 1988, Evans was Minister Assisting the Minister of Foreign
Affairs; a role which was discontinued once Evans left it.28 Evans served as Foreign Minister under the Keating government. From 1 February 1991, there was also a Minister for Trade and Overseas Development, Neal Blewett, who was replaced on 27 December 1991 by John
Kerin.29 Hawke resigned on 20 December 1991 and Paul Keating was sworn in as Prime
Minister.30 He was then elected as Prime Minister on 27 December of that year.31 Kerin’s role was discontinued upon Keating’s re-election on 24 March 1993. Evans remained as Minister
25 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, ‘Part 6: Historical Information on the Australian Parliament’, in ‘Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia: the 42nd Parliament’, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp.547-555. 26 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.547-555. 27 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.549, 553. 28 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.553-556. 29 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p.555. 30 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p.556. 31 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p.558. 9
for Foreign Affairs until the Keating government was replaced by a new Coalition government on 11 March 1996.32
John Howard was Prime Minister from 11 March 1996 until 3 December 2007.33 He was the sole Prime Minister during that Liberal government’s term. This period covered three re- elections: the first on 21 October 1998, the second on 26 November 2001 and the third on 26
October 2004.34 For the duration of the Howard ministry Alexander Downer was the Minister for Foreign Affairs.35 There were no ministerial roles for aid or development.
For the duration of the Hawke-Keating and Howard ministries, the primary focus of Australian aid to Third World countries – including South Africa – were the benefits Australia could derive from development assistance. Although poverty reduction was a stated goal of aid, instead of being the key motivation of assistance, it was frequently a side-effect of it. As this thesis makes apparent, and despite claims of humanitarianism and altruism by the Hawke-Keating governments, and especially the Howard Government, foreign bilateral aid was most commonly an extension of Australian foreign policy, which primarily served to further
Australia’s national interests. This was certainly true in the case of South Africa.
32 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p.560. 33 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, p.497. 34 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.563-571. 35 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.563-571.
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CHAPTER 1: The Literature Review
Since the expansion of modern aid in the 1960s, the effectiveness and morality of development assistance has been fervently debated in aid theory. Literature covers the political context in which aid is given, the conditions and effects it can have on development, the moralistic components of aid, and the motivations which often drives it. Aid to Africa, and the benefits and problems associated with it, is probably the most developed area of aid literature, and statements emphasising ‘the failure of Africa’ are common.1 However literature concerning Australian aid to Africa is sparse. In their paper, ‘The State of African Studies in
Australia’, Australian-Africanists Tanya Lyons and Elizabeth Dimock describe a virtual absence of African studies in Australian academia. They state, ‘if Africa is in crisis, then
African studies in Australia is under siege.’2 While this information in itself only highlights the disregard of Africa in Australian academia, recent comments defending the Australian
Governor General Quentin Bryce’s trip to Africa in 2010 stressed the importance of Australia-
Africa ties in contemporary times. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith, argued, ‘ ... we have neglected a continent of nearly one billion people and we have to engage for very good economic, political, foreign policy and strategic reasons. And there is a lot we have in common with Africa that we can take advantage of.’3 At present, and because of the widespread poverty experienced throughout Africa, the frequently utilised method of fulfilling such engagements is through the donation of Australian aid.
1 McInnes, N 2003, ‘The Failure of Africa’, Quadrant, vol.47, no.4, p.18. 2 Lyons & Dimock 2003, p.1. 3 Insiders, 2009, television program, ABC1, Sydney, March 8.
11
This thesis examines the self-serving nature of the aid Australia gave to South Africa (and other developing countries) under the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments. It accepts the views of numerous studies and contentions of aid commentators that aid most benefits developing countries when the needs of the recipient are of first priority. This thesis argues that the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments embraced a selfish form of aid, however, thus greatly limiting its effectiveness.
This literature review demonstrates how the thesis contributes to the existing literature regarding Australian foreign policy on aid to Africa. As previously stated, African studies are neglected in Australian academia, and so many of the reviewed sources are relevant on a wider context. Furthermore, although the thesis is divided into chapters relating to the governances of Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating and Howard, to avoid repetition the review will be structured according to various aid theories and foreign policy issues, not in chronological order. It should be noted, too, that aid theory will inform the analysis of the key findings. The terms aid and development assistance will be used interchangeably in this review.
The importance and success of aid is frequently contended amongst commentators in literature concerning the politics of aid. Various theories reveal there are many dimensions to aid, and its complexity often arouses questions of its appropriateness in alleviating poverty.
With much of the literature derived from academic journals, there are three key general theories that apply. The first, which contains the most literature, is highly critical or cynical of aid and its outcomes. Such criticism includes the notion that aid is a form of imperialism and, because it is often wrongly focussed, is ineffective in preventing, stopping and alleviating the symptoms of poverty. No literature has been found contending that poverty is not a global
12
issue which needs to be addressed; rather, these commentators argue that the current form of aid is not working.4 The second theory relates to the conditionality of aid, and how it often serves to primarily meet the donor’s agenda. It is frequently cited by commentators – both supportive and critical of aid – that government donors commonly provide aid to benefit their own strategic and economic interests.5 Finally, the third theory contends that aid is necessary in order to alleviate poverty. Theorists supportive of aid generally recognise the shortcomings of contemporary development assistance, but maintain that it has the potential to assist in creating a more just and equal world.6
CRITICISMS OF AID
One of the most widespread criticisms of aid is that government donors frequently cite humanitarian or moral reasons for assistance when, in reality, aid provision primarily benefits the agenda of the contributor. As Davis argues, ‘applying the label of ‘human rights’’ frequently occurred amongst government donors when their programs had no relationship with such rights.7 Hayter, a forceful critic of the provision of aid, and Watson further this argument, stating:
the governments of the rich countries of the West and their ruling class claim, with considerable hypocrisy, that they are providing ‘aid’ to help the Third World to escape from the underdevelopment and poverty which they and their
4 Hayter, T 1971, Aid as Imperialism, Penguin Books Ltd, Middlesex; Padayachee, V 1995, ‘Foreign Capital and Economic Development in South Africa: Recent Trends and Postapartheid Prospects’, World Development, vol.23, no.2, p.163-177; Hattori, T 2003, ‘The moral politics of foreign aid’, Review of International Studies, p.229- 247. 5 Buckley, J 1972, ‘Australia’s Foreign Aid Programs’, Honours thesis, University of Adelaide; Alesina, A & Dollar, D 2000, ‘Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?’, Journal of Ecomomic Growth, vol.5, no.1, pp.33-43; Morrissey, O 2006, ‘Aid or trade, or trade and aid?’, The Australian Economic Review, vol. 39, no.1, pp.78-88. 6 Sachs, J 2008, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin, London; Lumsdaine, DH 1993, Moral Vision in International Politics: the foreign aid regime 1949-1989, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Woods, N 2005, ‘The shifting politics of foreign aid’, International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2, pp.393-409. 7 Davis, TWD 2009, ‘The Politics of Human Rights and Development: The Challenge for Official Development’, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 4, no.1, pp.173-192, pp.188. 13
predecessors created and continue to create. But much of this aid fails to alleviate poverty even in the immediate context in which it is provided; and its overall purpose is the preservation of a system which damages the interests of the poor in the Third World.8
Hayter and Watson, as well as more recent advocates of such views, such as Hattori and
Smith, correctly recognise that not all aid provision is motivated by humanitarian interests.
However, the argument that aid is void of moral vision and keeps the Third World impoverished is both false and an exaggeration.9 To refute Hattori’s suggestion that morals have no place in international relations one only has to consider the immense value of emergency relief provided to Third World states in the event of a natural disaster. The negative arguments would be more compelling if limitations were placed on them; for example, if the aid, provided without consideration of the recipient’s humanitarian needs, was lacking in moral vision.
Aid is frequently criticised as being ineffective in addressing its stated goal – that is, most commonly, to alleviate global poverty and inequality. To summarise the suggestions of many, including Collier, Dollar, Bulíř, Hamman, Buckley and Hattori, ‘The worst forms of poverty are not being dealt with.’10 Aid ineffectiveness was frequently attributed to misdirection, Collier and Dollar contend, adding that assistance was frequently unsuccessful because ‘it allocated inefficiently with respect to poverty reduction.’11 Furthermore, Bulíř and Hamman argue that aid misdirection could have been avoided had donors better tied aid to conditions implicating
8 Hayter, T & Watson, C 1985, Aid: Rhetoric and Reality, Pluto Press, London, p.1. 9 Hattori 2003, p.231; Smith, BH 1990, More than altruism: the politics of private foreign aid, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p.310. 10 Peek, P cited in Madeley, J 1991, When Aid is No Help: How projects fail, and how they could succeed, Intermediate Technology Publications, London, p.1. 11 Collier, P & Dollar, D 2002, ‘Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction’, European Economic Review, vol.46, no. 8, p.1497. 14
its use for humanitarian purposes and followed up on its expenditure.12 The primary fault of such analyses was that aid was evaluated by economic formulations which did not factor in actual policy issues. Therefore, while ineffectiveness and misdirection were determined, the reasons why such faults occurred were not. In addition, such arguments did not take into account the benefits of aid when provided for humanitarian reasons; instead, they only considered the effects of aid provided when a self-serving agenda was attached to it.
Many commentators argue that aid could not be effective at any level. While aid is often perceived as necessary to counter the effects of poverty, some political commentators argued that aid actually inhibited growth and locked countries into poverty for longer periods. As
Padayachee found in countries such as El Salvador and the Philippines, aid ‘was directed to the nonpoor, so that far from reducing inequality in the distribution of income, aid accentuated inequities in developing countries.’ 13 He said that foreign aid actually created problems for the recipients, including increasing the recipient’s indebtedness and generating negative political implications, such as prolonging military rule, increasing the size of the recipient’s government, weakening democratic procedures, and generating conditions which tie recipients to their donors.14 While such effects may have occurred, they were by-products of aid, and were not necessarily apparent in all provisions. Moreover, aid was often supplied to alleviate imminent problems, such as starvation and disease. Mallik identified a negative aid- growth relationship within the six poorest sub-Saharan African countries, but even admitted
12 Bulíř, A & Hamann, AJ 2008, ‘Volatility of Development Aid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire?’, World Development, vol.36, no.10, pp.2048-2066, p.2063. 13 Padayachee, 1995, p.165. 14 Padayachee, 1995, p.165. 15
that the underlying reasons for this relationship were not made clear in his 2008 article.15 A more evidence-based claim was made by German and Randel, who argue that poorly directed aid actually counteracted with development objectives in 1993, when 86% of arms sales to the developing world were made by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council.16 Some of the claims that aid was not effectively alleviating the symptoms of poverty are validated; there is certainly room for aid to improve. However, to state that aid in its entirety does not have the capacity to effectively alleviate poverty is false, because there are numerous cases when aid has been successfully applied. In addition, merely contending that aid is ineffective does not generate solutions to combat such ineffectiveness or the greater problem: poverty.
In 2009, in her highly-publicised book, Dambisa Moyo argues aid was detrimental to the recipient government’s growth. In Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a
Better Way for Africa Moyo asserted that African development was harmed by aid, and proposed that it should be phased out within five years.17 Moyo referred specifically to government aid – not to charity-based or emergency aid. While she made some valid points regarding the challenges of aid, her argument that all government aid to Africa should be severed is largely unjustified, as she did not consider aid successes, and did not establish a causal relationship between aid and increased poverty in Africa. Even so, her book received praise throughout the world, especially from American economist William Easterly, who has written two books addressing development assistance, The Elusive Quest for Growth and
15 Mallik, G 2008, ‘Foreign Aid and Economic Growth: A Cointegration Analysis of the Six Poorest African Countries’, Economic Analysis and Policy, vol.38, no.2, pp.251-260, p.259. 16German, T & Randel, J (eds.) 1996, The Reality of Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid 1996, Earthscan Publications, London, p.xi. 17 Moyo, D 2009, Dead Aid: Destroying the Biggest Global Myth of Our Time, Penguin Books, London. 16
more recently The White Man’s Burden, which were sceptical of aid and largely claim aid amplified the symptoms of poverty rather than minimised them.18 Easterly’s opinions are perhaps less well-known, and may be considered less valid, because they are coming from a
Westerner rather than an African or Third World resident. However, both Moyo’s and
Easterly’s arguments have generated controversy. Kevin Watkins, who is Director of the
United Nations Human Development Report office, likened Moyo’s aid criticisms to ‘blaming the fire engine because it is near the fire.’19 While poorly directed aid can cause some problems to suggest that the concept of aid should be abandoned entirely is reckless, because when development assistance compliments the recipient’s humanitarian interests, it is generally very effective.
Conversely, some commentators argued that it was the actual focus of aid – not the way in which it was directed or the provision of it – which frequently made it ineffective in alleviating poverty. Indeed, McInnes even stated that a widening gap between the developed and under- developed was a ‘perception’. ‘Since the diagnosis [of increased poverty] is wrong, some of the proposed remedies are pure quackery: for example, a massive increase in aid to poor countries.’20 Others are less dramatic in their assessments. While rejecting the notion that increased poverty was a ‘perception’, Lahiri and Michaelowa agree that its frequent solution was often exaggerated, asserting that ‘the importance of foreign aid or development
18 Easterly, W 2001, The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, the MIT Press, Cambridge; Easterly, W 2006, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, Penguin Books, Baltimore. 19 Watkins, K in Wallis, W 2009, ‘Dead Aid: An African Woman Sends the West on a Panick Spree’, The Financial Times, May 23, viewed 14 July 2009,
assistance cannot be overstated.’21 Arguments such as those of McInnes, and to a much lesser extent Lahiri and Michaelowa, diminish the reality of poverty and trivialise the issue.
Oyolola avoids this, simply attributing aid’s ineffectiveness to a misconception surrounding its definition. He states that while aid was widely perceived as free, it was not.22 Correll emphasises the over-attention he believes was given to the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) of the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration.23 His is the only work which draws attention to such goals, giving the impression that such aims are not overvalued at all. Imperative to
Correll’s argument was the belief that the term ‘development’ was an ‘abused’ word because it legitimises any economic, social or cultural shift. 24 However, neither Correll’s nor any of the other aforementioned arguments actually defined effectiveness, and so while programs have been morally wrong, they usually catered for the priorities of their donors. The focus of government aid was strategically calculated, thus ignoring the widely accepted view that aid is most effective when the humanitarian needs of the recipient country are of uppermost importance.
The perception that aid was a form of ‘new’ imperialism is common. While Hayter was not the first to mobilise this argument, she was certainly a vehement supporter of it. In 1971 she published the aptly-named Aid as Imperialism.25 Throughout this text Hayter contends that aid was a foreign policy ‘weapon’ which served to benefit the interests of its donor by maintaining
21Lahiri, S & Michaelowa, K 2006, ‘Editorial: the political economy of aid’, Review of Development Economics, vol. 10, no.2, pp.177-178. 22 Oyolola, M 2007, ‘Poverty Reduction, Aid and Economic Freedom’, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, p.95. 23Correll, D 2008, ‘The politics and poverty of social development’, International Social Work, vol. 51, no. 4, p.456. 24 Correll 2008, p.456. 25 Hayter 1971. 18
a position of ‘control around the world.’26 She said aid could only be explained in terms of attempts to preserve the capitalist system in the undeveloped world.27 Feldman said that although the ‘conquest’ of neo-imperialism would not occur ‘overnight’, while ‘the food grain surpluses continued to reside mainly in the hands of the United States, Canada and Australia’, alternative donors – ones whose aid is unconditional – ‘have but limited charm.’28 To denote all aid as imperialism is to ignore the benefits of well-considered humanitarian aid for developing countries.
Another criticism of aid was that emerging evidence of its effectiveness was not considered by donors. In his article ‘Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda’, Killick argues that aid modalities should change and evolve since evidence had been collected on the various methods and their effectiveness.29 He states that evidence was frequently ignored because it contradicted the political self-interest of the donors.30 Boone describes aid programs as ‘an unprecedented economic experiment’, and argues that ‘foreign aid programs were launched long before there was compelling theory, or compelling evidence that proved they could work.’31 While this is true, evidence now shows that well-directed aid is effective in alleviating poverty – something Boone happens to omit. Boone suggests, however, that too much aid actually slowed down growth, an argument supported by Durbarry, Gemmel and
Greenaway.32 Durbarry et al. found that very high aid-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios slowed growth rates, but that even so, evidence suggested any and all aid stimulated
26 Hayter 1971, p.5. 27 Hayter 1971, pp.151-152. 28 Feldman, H 1967, ‘Aid As Imperialism?’, International Affairs, vol. 43, no.2, p.233. 29 Killick, T 2004, ‘Politics, Evidence and the New Aid Agenda’, Development Policy Review, vol.22, no.1, pp.5- 29. 30 Killick 2004, p.7. 31 Boone, P 1996, ‘Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid’, European Economic Review, vol.40, pp. 289-239, pp.289-290. 32 Boone 1996, p.322; Durbarry, R, Gemmell, N & Greenaway, D 1998, New Evidence on the Impact of Foreign Aid on Economic Growth, no.98/8, University of Nottingham. 19
economic growth.33 Salmonsson analyses aid by comparing the arguments of William
Easterly and Jeffrey Sachs.34 He contends that aid cynicism and uncertainty was highly exaggerated in both public and academic debate, and that evidence suggested that, if aid was given with careful consideration to the recipient’s humanitarian interests, development assistance was successful.35 In contrast, Hout found that aid evidence was factored into aid programs.36 However, rather than considering evidence that supported Third World endeavours, change was instead applied when evidence indicated ‘good governance’ by recipient donors, and benefits to the donor country.37 These arguments support the hypothesis that aid is beneficial to the recipient when their humanitarian interests are fully considered and catered for; however they emphasise that evidence showing how aid could be most effective in achieving humanitarian gains was frequently ignored.
Aid evolution has been frequently criticised in studies of the politics of aid. Smith describes the evolution of aid under the Bush administration, with some of her findings applicable to the
Australian situation, such as increased emphasis on counter-terrorism.38 Particularly insightful were her analyses of politics and ideology, and her likening of aid to ‘political football in partisan battles.’39 In addition, rather than strictly presenting aid politics as an issue in the international arena, Smith analyses the differences in policies between the two major
American political parties, the Republicans and Democrats, examining the very issue focussed
33 Durbarry et al. 1998, pp.17-18. 34 Salmonsson, M 2007, ‘Foreign aid – aid dependency as an argument for policy reform’, Bachelors thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Jönköping, Sweden. 35 Salmonsson 2007, p.34. 36 Hout, W 2004, ‘Political Regimes and Development Assistance: the Political Economy of Aid Selectivity’, Critical Asian Studies, vol.36, no.4, pp.591-613. 37 Hout 2004, pp.607-608. 38 Smith, G 2008, ‘The Politics of Aid’, Human Rights Journal of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, vol.35, no. 1, pp.1-4. 39 Smith 2008, p.2. 20
upon in this thesis regarding Australian politics and foreign policies.40 Conversely, Thorbecke analyses the evolution of aid and development over the second half of the 20th century, and notes a causal relationship between development objectives and the role of aid.41 He argues that development objectives and aid ‘evolved in parallel’, but recognises that these were affected by the issues of the day, noting that ‘in each period, the nature and scope of the prevailing development strategy and role of aid were largely determined by the conceptual state of the art, the available data systems and the prevailing conditions at the time.’42
McGillivray utilised theories of economics to map the progression of aid from the 1970s through to the end of the Cold War.43 He argues that, to the contrary of popular belief, political criteria in aid allocation and conditionality have not significantly shifted since the end of the
Cold War. In general, aid evolution is factual rather than theoretical, because – as with any institution – it has evolved since its creation. However, it can be seen that aid can benefit impoverished countries when its administration and application sympathetically considers the recipients’ needs.
AID CONDITIONALITY
The second theme to emerge from aid theory is the notion of aid conditionality. Following from the notion that development assistance is derived from general goodwill – a concept more connected to non-government aid – examinations of government aid consistently show that the provider generally has a vested interest in benefitting the recipient. Both theorists supportive and critical of development assistance generally contend that conditionality is an
40 Smith 2008, p.2. 41 Thorbecke, E ‘The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid, 1950-2000’, in Tarp, F & Hjertholm, P (eds.) 2000, Foreign Aid and Development, Routledge, London. 42 Thorbecke in Tarp, F & Hjertholm, P (eds.) 2000, pp.72-73. 43 McGillivray, M 2003, ‘Modelling Aid Allocation: Issues, Approaches and Results’, United Nations University: WIDER, no. 2003/49. 21
inevitable element of government aid. The components of aid conditionality most frequently identified include the promotion of self-serving policies, and political, economic and strategic influences. Although most commentators criticise the conditionality of aid, some critics argue that the conditionality tied to aid actually assists in alleviating poverty. As Svensson states, conditionality can help solve the improper disbursement of aid by supplying it in ways which prevent corruption.44
Agenda-pushing by donors has long been an issue of aid conditionality. For example, in his paper ‘Does Australia have an international development policy?’ Davis argues that aid served to ‘advance Australia’s national interest by assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development.’45 Although Davis contends that foreign aid policy generally interpreted national interest, he primarily considers ‘agenda’ in economic terms, not strategically or morally.46 In contrast to arguing that Australian aid may benefit its recipients but that the origins of aid are frequently self-serving, Davis instead contends that an aid agenda frequently prevented Third World recipients from developing – therefore, instead of blaming the aid agenda, Davis blames the aid.47 Remenyi, Bowling and McGillivray agree, stating that the ‘true’ Australian agenda was evident in the trade links Australia shared with the
Third World.48 They argue that in this ‘true’ agenda, humanitarianism was scarce in Australia-
Third World links, and that Australia primarily sought to enhance its own trade and policy
44 Svensson, J 2000, ‘When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality’, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 61, pp.61-84. 45 Davis, TWD 2006, ‘Does Australia have an international development assistance policy?: National interest and foreign aid policy’, Second Oceanic Conference on International Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, pp.1-30, p.2. 46 Davis 2006. 47 Davis 2006, p.11. 48 Remenyi, J, Bowling, J & McGillivray, M 1993, Aid, Trade and Development, Deakin University Press, Geelong. 22
interests through its provision of aid.49 This conditionality of aid is described by Killick as having a ‘he who pays the piper calls the tune’ mentality.50 In this way it becomes evident that aid conditionality affects the context in which aid is provided. If the recipient country’s humanitarian needs are not at the forefront of the donor’s agenda the aid may not be as successful in alleviating the symptoms of poverty.
Politics are commonly affected by aid conditionality and agenda. Alesina and Dollar state aid is generally given for reasons relating to strategic and political interests, such as to prevent the spread of communism, especially during the Cold War, or to ensure security in the donor’s regional neighbourhood. Colonial ties in the form of Australia giving aid preference to other
Commonwealth countries and improving access markets for the donor countries’ exports; and the political institutions of the recipients, are other considerations.51 Aid is frequently awarded to those countries that adopt Western ideas and structures of policy, or democracy; conversely, other studies found that aid was affected by the donor government’s political priorities.52 Chong and Gradstein explain the politics-conditionality relationship in economic terms, and found that the effectiveness of aid related to own-government efficiency.53 They stated that aid effectiveness is heavily reliant on the objectives of donor governments and their agendas which frequently motivate development assistance. This supports an abundance of literature that proves when aid is given without fully considering the recipient’s humanitarian needs, it is less effective in alleviating poverty.54 Buhlin argues that aid was consistently used
49 Remenyi et al. 1993, pp.2-3. 50 Killick, T 1998, Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change, Routledge, London, p.12. 51 Alesina & Dollar 2000, p.34. 52 Alesina & Dollar 2000, p.34. 53 Chong, A & Gradstein, M 2008, ‘What determines foreign aid? The donors’ perspective’, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 87, pp.1-13, p.1. 54 Chong & Gradstein 2008, p.12. 23
as a method of imposing democracy in the Third World, with many donors giving aid on the proviso that democracy was adopted as a political framework.55 In addition, she found that greater quantities of aid did not have a relationship with the democratic processes of developing countries.56 The findings of Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland further support the political influences and conditions aid can have.57 They found that the World Bank’s projects were frequently funnelled to ‘politically important developing countries, such as those serving a term on the United Nations (UN) Security Council.’58 While one would hope donor political agendas would not have an inordinate impact on aid provision, it is easy to see how the political orientation of potential aid-recipients impact on the aid provided to them. During the
Cold War, for example, the United States was unlikely to offer aid to Communist states because communism did not align with stated American values. However, if the true aspiration of aid is to alleviate poverty, political conditionality can affect this goal because the recipient’s humanitarian interests are not always imperative to the aid provided or its direction.
The other area which frequently impacts on the conditions and provision of aid is economics and trade. In his article ‘Aid or Trade, or Aid and Trade?’, Morrissey states that ‘In many cases aid is contingent on purchasing goods from the donor and/or given to countries, such as ex-colonies, with strong trading ties with the donor, and so that engenders trade dependency.’59 Such comments demonstrate the conditionality of aid, and the link between aid and trade, while highlighting that aid is not provided solely for humanitarian or goodwill
55 Buhlin, S 2009, ‘Aid as a Path on the Muddled Road Toward Democratisation?: a quantitative multiple case study on the impact of aid on the democratization process of sub-Saharan Africa’, Masters thesis, Växjö Universitet, Sweden. 56 Buhlin 2009, pp.41-42. 57 Dreher, A, Sturm, JE & Vreeland, JR 2009, ‘Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?’, Journal of Development Economics, vol.88, pp.1-18. 58 Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland 2009, p.14. 59 Morrissey 2006, pp.84-85. 24
reasons. Morrissey also states that donors typically justified the linking of aid and trade on the basis that aid had the possibility of benefiting the recipient, and it definitely benefited donors because their exports increased.60 Werker supports Morrissey’s findings.61 In his thesis chapter, ‘How much is a seat on the Security Council worth?’, Werker finds that developing countries sitting on the Council could expect almost US$50 million in the year. Buckley perceives Australian conditionality as encompassing economic, political and strategic motivations.62 He states, ‘It does not seem to be the neediest countries that receive the most aid, but rather those with particular political and economic significance to Australia.’63 Buckley argues that if alleviating poverty really was the prime agenda of the Australian Government, it would be more generous in providing it to multilateral programmes; those projects the
Australian Government would not have sole control over.64 These analysts all show the link between aid, economics and trade, and demonstrate the causal relationship between these conditions. In addition, their findings all support the hypothesis that the most effective aid is provided when the humanitarian needs of the recipient are of the utmost priority; when conditions infringe on the condition of aid, the benefits of aid are more complex and problematical. Of course, aid conditionality does vary between states, as do the values of the numerous motivations for donations. Some commentators suggest that the fundamental reason for providing all aid relates to humanitarianism and goodwill, and this will be explored further into the literature review
60 Ibid, p.85. 61 Werker, E 2005, ‘Essays on the Political Economy of Development’, PhD thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 62 Buckley 1972. 63 Buckley 1972, p.28. 64 Buckley 1972, p.29. 25
AID PRAISE
The third theme of aid is the praising of development assistance, and is generally optimistic concerning its outcomes. While many aid-supportive commentators recognise that aid is not currently achieving its potential, most contend that some development assistance is better than none, and offer solutions or recommendations as to how it could be bettered. It should also be noted that there is less commentary praising aid than criticising it or critiquing its conditionality. Below, some commentators explain why.
Generally, aid advocates believe that moral vision is at the core of all development assistance, including governmental. However, some pro-aid commentators acknowledge that, while moral vision may be present, it may not be the key reason for aid provision. Thompson argues that while ‘an international aid program that would result in the mutual benefit of both parties with the interest of the recipient country being primary is required’, development assistance necessitated the incorporation of moral vision.65 Lumsdaine states that there was direct and indirect evidence that ‘aid was based on humanitarian principles and commitment to a world community.’66 Woods agrees, stating that scholars have proven ‘there is a genuine moral vision which underpins development assistance.’67 Just as the argument that there is no moral vision employed in the provision of foreign aid is simplistic, so is the contention that all government aid is affected by moral values. Instead, it is a balance between these two contentions – an argument such as Thompson’s, which is infrequent amongst aid theory – that needs to be found when evaluating the place of moral vision in development assistance.
65 Thompson, AC 2000, ‘Ethics in international politics? The contradictions and ethical implications of foreign aid in Africa’, PhD Thesis, Michigan State University, pp.99-100. 66Lumsdaine 1993, p.137. 67Woods 2005, p.394. 26
Even more imperative in furthering the pro-aid argument are the commentators who support aid because they believe that it assists in alleviating poverty. Analysing the influence of aid and external debt on growth in developing countries, Hansen finds that there is ‘quite strong evidence of the positive impact of aid both on the growth rate in GDP per capita and the investment rate.’68 Headey argues that, although the contemporary state of was not perfect, commentators frequently criticised aid effectiveness without analysing it in its proper historical context – for example, the provision of aid during the Cold War when defence considerations could not be ignored.69 He adds that some of the empiric methods economists used to measure aid effectiveness were too simplistic, and frequently allowed room for pessimism which should have been absent.70 Tarp agrees with this perception, stating that aid analysis is primarily dominated by macro-econometric frameworks, which did not allow for the full scope of some of the more critical unresolved issues to be understood in context.71 In his paper ‘Aid and Development’, Tarp added perspective to such issues and found that, often, disagreement over development strategy got ‘in the way of pursuing practical and useful aid.’72 Perhaps one of the more noted commentators was Jeffrey Sachs, an aid advocate recently criticised by Dambisa Moyo. In the paper ‘Geography, Demography, and Economic
Growth in Africa’ Sachs and Bloom also argue that economic policy, and particularly macroeconomics, were given too much focus, and instead found that donors should also
68 Hansen, H 2001, ‘The Impact of Aid and External Debt on Growth and Investment: Insights from Cross- Country Regression Analysis’, Paper Presented at the Wider Conference on Debt Relief, Helsinki, Finland, p.12. 69 Headey, D 2008, ‘Geopolitics and the effect of foreign aid and economic growth’, Journal of International Development’, vol.20, pp.161-180, p.174. 70 Headey 2008, p.175. 71 Tarp, F 2006, ‘Aid and Development’, Swedish Economic Policy Review, vol.13, pp.9-61. 72 Tarp 2006, p.49. 27
examine the physical and social environments of the recipient.73 They identify Africa as the most impoverished world region; however as American scholars they recognise the American neglect of Africa.74 Alam found that, while aid does generally have a positive impact on growth, the impact varied from region to region, and some forms of aid were more effective than others.75 While such comments were true, in essence his findings were fairly simplistic.
However, some commentators seemed to be a bit too idealistic in their views of aid. Baldock’s perception of aid borders on naivety; she argues that large amounts of aid perpetuate the status quo regardless of delivery mechanism or the consultative process before the implementation.76 Even so, Baldock and the other aforementioned commentators identify that aid can be beneficial in alleviating poverty on the condition that the recipient’s humanitarian needs are considered more important than the donor’s needs.
Some of the benefits of aid are apparent on a practical level; for example, studies have shown that aid reduces Third World conflict. A recent study by de Ree and Nillesen on the extent of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa shows that increased aid flows decreased the length of conflict.77 However, they also found that aid did not decrease the risk of conflict in the first place.78 Silver argues that the links between aid and conflict are complicated, but also found that aid decreased the length of the conflict.79 However, she argued that the causal
73 Bloom, DE & Sachs, JD 1998, ‘Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa’, Harvard Institute of International Development, Harvard University, pp.1-67, p.36. 74 Bloom & Sachs 1998, p.2. 75 Alam, A 2009, ‘Does a little help always go a long way: a look at the impact of aid on growth’, Masters thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC, p.36. 76 Baldock 1997, pp.7-8. 77 De Ree, J & Nillesen, E 2009, ‘Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa’, Journal of Development Economics, vol.88, pp.301-313, p308. 78 De Ree & Nillesen 2009, p.312. 79 Silver, J 2008, ‘Aiding conflict: examining the relationship between foreign aid and violent conflict in sub- Saharan Africa’, Masters thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. 28
relationship depended on the donors’ intentions. Silver states, ‘The most important factor is the donor’s will to ensure that aid is effective and does not do damage to the country it is engaging with.’80 This mirrors the hypothesis that aid can be effective in alleviating poverty when the humanitarian needs of the recipient country are the donor’s principal priority. While acknowledging the possibility that aid can lessen the effects of conflict, Cho – an aid advocate
– argues that during conflict aid was usually supplied for political and strategic reasons, rather than for altruism.81 Cho cites the desire to combat communism as motivation for the American
(USA) assistance to South Korea, South Vietnam and countries in Latin America.82
Nonetheless, despite the motivations behind the provision of some aid, if development assistance during conflict helps to decrease the length of such conflict, surely it is a positive contribution to Third World countries.
AREAS OF AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY THAT RELATE TO THE PROVISION OF AID
REGIONALISM
The concept of regionalism plays an important role in Australian foreign policy-making, with some political commentators, including FitzGerald, suggesting that Australia is an Asian state.
The benefits to Australia of close ties with Asia span strategic, political and economic interests, and regional security.83 In Is Australia an Asian country? FitzGerald argues that
Australia was becoming more ‘Asianised’ than other states in the region, such as Japan and
80 Silver 2008, p.101. 81 Cho 1995, p.81. 82 Cho 1995, p.81. 83 Asian Development Bank 2008, Chapter 1: Why Asian Regionalism?, online chapter, Asian Development Bank, Manila, viewed 22 July 2009,
China.84 He asserts that although Australia has familial ties with Britain and Europe, at the
1996 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Europe meeting, it was ASEAN
Australia was determined to join, ‘Europe not being an option for it.’85 However, while academics and politicians generally supported Australia’s emphasis on Asia, mainstream
Australians did not.86 Perhaps this became most evident in the popularity of Pauline Hanson’s
‘anti-Asian’ policies. 87 Gorjão argues that, conceptually, Australia’s relations with Asia ‘have been variously envisioned as integration, enmeshment or engagement.’88 However, he also finds that Australia-Asia relations were stronger during the Hawke-Keating years, and they diminished somewhat during the Howard period of government, as evidenced by the behaviour of Australia after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 – which showed that Asia did not have a permanent or natural influence in Australia, as argued by Keating – alongside the withdrawal of financing for Asian languages in Australian schools.89 Milner reaffirmed Gorjão’s argument that Australia-Asia relations were and will continue to be inevitably ‘troubled’ and that Australia needed to ‘forge’ a relationship with Asia.90 Much of the commentary surrounding Australia-Asia relations asserted that Australia is only reluctantly an Asian state.
Even so, one only has to examine AusAID statistical summaries from the Hawke, Keating or
Howard years to understand the depth and growth of Australian ties with east Asia, and how it and the Pacific shared aid priority over other Third World regions, such as South America and
84 FitzGerald, S 1997, Is Australia and Asian country?: can Australia survive an East Asian future?, Allen & Unwin, St Leonard’s, NSW, p.65. 85 FitzGerald 1997, pp.1-2, 10. 86 FitzGerald 1997, p.65. 87Gorjão, P 2003, ‘Australia’s dilemma between geography and history: how consolidated is engagement with Asia?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol.3, no.2, pp.179-196, p.190. 88 Gorjão 2003, p.180. 89 Gorjão 2003, pp.191-192. 90 Milner, A. 2000, ‘What is Left of Engagement with Asia?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.54, no.2, pp.177-184. 30
Africa. Australia ties most of its aid to Asia to further its own political and economic interests, so alleviating economic distress is of secondary importance.
Australia’s ties with Asia diminished under the Howard government, as its policies began to mirror more closely those of the US. Some commentators, including Tow and Snyder, even suggest that Australia acted as a ‘deputy sheriff’ for the US in the Asia-Pacific region – a suggestion affirmed by both US President Bush and Australian Prime Minister Howard.91 Tow argues that by so ardently supporting the US, Howard ‘assumed the greatest foreign policy risk of any Australian government.’92 He comments, whether or not ‘immeasurable pain caused by a regional backlash’ would occur was yet to be seen, but six years later, there does not appear to be any immediate threat resulting from the Australian-American alliance.93
White argues that Australia’s increased ties with the US was a natural evolution, and resulted primarily through the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, and the renewed threat of terrorism.94 O’connor, in ‘Perspectives of Australian foreign policy,
2003’, argues that ‘relations with the United States dominated Australian foreign affairs in that year.’95 McDonald, who wrote an updated version of the same paper for the Australian
Journal of International Affairs in 2004, commented that, ‘Little changed in 2004 ... again, the central dynamics of Australian foreign policy revolved around the issue of relations with the
91 Tow, TW 2004, ‘Deputy sheriff or independent ally? Evolving Australian-American ties in an ambiguous world order’, The Pacific Review, vol.17, no.2, pp.271-290; Snyder, CA 2006, ‘Southeast Asian Perceptions of Australia’s Foreign Policy’, Contmeporary Southeast Asia, vol.28, no.2. pp.322-340. 92 Tow 2004, p.286. 93 Tow 2004, p.286. 94 White, H 2003, ‘Mr Howard goes to Washington: The US and Australia in the Age of Terror’, Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS, 2nd Quarter, Occasional Analysis: Australia-US Relations, viewed 22 July 2009,
superpower, and the implications of this relationship for other foreign policy imperatives.’96
Such comments reiterate the emerged importance of Australian-American ties under the
Howard government.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Political considerations have impacted on the provision of Australian aid and its direction.
During the second half of the 20th century the most prevalent of these phenomena was the
Cold War. Dunning highlighted the conditions of aid impacting on recipients in his text
‘Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility and Democracy in
Africa’.97 He argues that aid conditions were less applicable to Cold War aid recipients because geopolitical objectives ‘diminished the credibility of donors’ threats to make the disbursement of further aid conditional on the adoption of domestic democratic reforms.’98
Dunning asserts that in the post-Cold War era donors have had greater power to make conditions of aid realised.99 However, his contention that the provision of aid implied the eventual democratisation of a receiving state disregarded the appropriateness of democracy for all developing states. His argument does not consider aid given by non-democratic states but supported the economic formulae of conditional aid, ignoring political or foreign policy motivations. To apply Dunning’s theory to Australian aid to Africa allows the provision of aid to be more self-serving; however, in Australia’s case, such conditions would emphasise democratic reform by the recipients. Meernik, Krueger and Poe examine the post-Cold War
US aid policy to find that security-driven aid has become less customary than during the Cold
96 McDonald, M 2005, ‘Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2004’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.59, no.2, pp.153-168, p.153. 97 Dunning, T 2004, ‘Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility and Democracy in Africa’, International Organization, vol.58, no.2, pp.409-423. 98 Dunning 2004, p.410. 99 Dunning 2004, p.422. 32
War era.100 They argue that ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ style policies – a characteristic of regionalism – would become more popular. This has been realised in Australian aid policy to south-east Asian countries and the south Pacific.101 Kessler Kroft also contends that aid in the post-Cold War era has changed, but found that the motivations were still self-serving.102 She said that there was an increasing trend in promoting democratisation through aid to Africa, but unlike Dunning, considers that democracy may not be the best framework for all or any African states.103 Kessler Kroft also finds that the most effective aid was provided when humanitarian values were at its core.104 Her arguments support the hypothesis that humanitarian aid is most effective in alleviating the symptoms of poverty when the humanitarian interests of the recipient are highest, and that benefits of aid become more complex when the agenda of the donor is tied into the aid.
While apartheid may not seem like an ‘international’ phenomenon so much as a national one of South Africa, the foreign policies of most countries, including Australia, were affected by it.
However, political analysts disagree as to why apartheid received intense scrutiny on an international level. Bell states that there were no major economic or electoral reasons for
Australia to oppose apartheid, and so the reasoning for it reflected the moral and intellectual convictions of the Australian government.105 While such views may have been warranted when Bell published her book in 1988, hindsight has shown that Australia’s interests were
100 Meernik, J, Krueger, EL & Poe, SC 1998, ‘Testing Models of US Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War’, The Journal of Politics, vol.60, no.1, pp.63-85, JSTOR Academic Search Premier, 00223816. 101 Meernik et al. 1998, p.82. 102 Kessler Kroft, AL 2006, ‘Democratization and Foreign Aid towards Africa (1960-2000): Realism/Neo-realism (self interest) vs. Idealism/Neo-idealism (normative interests)’, PhD thesis, Loyola University, Chicago, pp.175- 176. 103 Kessler Kroft 2006, p.176. 104 Kessler Kroft 2006, p.177. 105 Bell, C 1988, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, p.155. 33
more at risk than some commentators acknowledge. Apartheid was abolished only three years after the Cold War ended, and during the Cold War the West was deeply motivated to prevent communism from spreading through South Africa. The Suez Canal was for long periods closed or in danger of closure due to Middle East tensions, and there was a real fear that if South Africa fell within the Communists’ sphere of influence, sea routes around the
Cape of Good Hope would be compromised.106 Apartheid promoted disaffections and provided ideal circumstances for the proliferation of Communist ideals. Australia played a pivotal role in challenging the legitimacy of apartheid, with Firth stating that Australia headed a campaign to force South Africa to adopt non-racial discriminatory national policies, and argued that the Hawke government was instrumental in the collapse of the apartheid system because
‘Australia imposed bans on investment, air links and government procurement during the apartheid era in South Africa.’107 Specific to Australia’s case was the argument that Australia stridently opposed apartheid because of guilt over treatment of the Australian Aborigines. The less cynical views of Australian motivations indicate that Australia generally wished to end the racial segregation. This may be true, but Australia and its Western allies also benefitted more from a secure, democratic South Africa, and democracy was not possible under apartheid.
The international phenomenon to have had the greatest impact on aid and foreign policy in the last decade is undoubtedly terrorism. Especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Centre in New York, and the 2002 Bali Bombings which killed 202 people, including 88 Australians, the Western world – political and social alike – has become transfixed by this seemingly ‘new’ phenomenon. In fact, modern terrorism has been an issue
106 Vale, P 2003, Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa, working paper, New York University, New York, viewed May 20 2009,
for many years, but never before has it threatened Western values and ideologies as it has in the 21st century. Poverty and terrorism are commonly perceived as standing hand-in-hand, and are relevant to this research because aid is the most popular method of combating poverty. However, some recent studies have found that, ‘contrary to the popular belief’ there is no causal connection between poverty and terrorism.108 Analyses by Piazza, Abadie, and
Krueger and Malečková indicate that variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression and the structure of party politics are instead more likely to incur
‘hate crimes’ that motivate terrorists.109 While such problems may contribute to terrorism, arguably those problems are extensions of poverty. Howell and Lind contend that the renewed threat of terrorism and the ‘global war on terror regime’ affects aid policy and practice, increasing the demand for security, regional or otherwise, through aid.110 Their paper ‘Changing Donor Policy and Practice in Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Aid Context’ examines how the global war on terror regime hastens the securitisation of aid and analyses case studies of the various manifestations aid has undertaken since 9/11 in the contexts of the
American, British, Australian and Swedish bilateral aid.111 However, Howard and Lind do not consider that poverty and terrorism may have some links; nor does it note a shift in policy focus under the 2007 elected Australian Rudd Government, while it does note changes in just the few months Barack Obama was President of the United States of America in 2009.112
Thomas and White contend that poverty was ‘the key threat to global peace’, and in turn
108 Krueger, AB & Malečková, J 2003, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, viewed 7 July 2009,
donors were vetting entire national development strategies, meaning the potential for aid conditionality ran deeper than ever before.113 Von Hippel’s findings support this.114 Using
Pakistan as a case study, Von Hippel found that wealthy Pakistanis ‘would rather donate their money than their sons to the cause, and families in poor, rural areas are likely to send their sons to ‘jihad’ under the belief that doing so is the only way to fulfil this spiritual duty.’115
However, some analysts argue that aid actually correlates with terrorism. Azam and Delacroix performed principal-agent model tests and found ‘a positive empirical relationship between the level of foreign aid received by a country and the number of terrorist attacks originating from it’; in essence, they found that the more aid supplied to recipient states, the more likely there was to be terrorist activity within that state.116 Yet their findings are in economic terms, and they do not define the type of aid provided to these countries. Because the links between poverty and terrorism are unclear, the relationship between poverty’s solution – aid – and terrorism is even more ambiguous. However, for aid to eradicate poverty – a possible cause of terrorism – it is clear that the humanitarian interests of the recipient must be prioritised over the interests of the donor.
GOVERNMENT/FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE DAY
Another foreign policy issue which can impact on the motivation for and allocation of aid is the donor government ideology – in Australia’s case Labor or the Coalition parties.
Multilateralism, for example, is more closely linked to the foreign policy of Labor governments
113 Thomas, C & Reader, M ‘Development and Inequality’ in White, B, Little, R & Smith, M (eds.) 2005, Issues In World Politics, 3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.90. 114 Von Hippel, K 2002, ‘The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths’, The Political Quarterly, vol.73, no.1, pp.25- 39. 115 Von Hippel 2002, p.27. 116 Azam, JP & Delacroix, A 2005, Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism, University of Toulouse, viewed 7 July 2009,
than that of Coalition governments. Headey finds that multilateral aid had ‘a sizeable impact on growth rates.’117 Milner agrees, arguing that because multilateral aid is untied it is more effective in alleviating poverty.118 She states:
It is much harder for donors to exercise direct influence when using multilateral aid giving. This aid is not tied; it tends to be given to the poorest countries – i.e., those most in need; and it is often as grants, instead of loans. Thus aid may be of higher quality than bilateral aid, but it is surely of less direct political utility to donor governments.119
Instead of analysing the benefits of multilateral aid in comparison to that of a bilateral nature – whereby multilateral aid is provided through the intermediary of an international organisation, while bilateral aid denotes a transaction from one country to another – Abegaz critically examines multilateral aid to Africa and offers alternatives models.120 While he agrees that aid is necessary to serve as a catalyst for sustained development, he finds that institutional failure
– multilateral aid being institutional by essence – was the main cause of Africa’s problems.121
However, to blame Africa’s problems solely on institutional failure would be erroneous. Such allegations imply that all bilateral aid has been useful in alleviating poverty, which is simply untrue. As opposed to multilateralism, bilateralism is more linked to the Liberal, or Coalition, governments. Using economic models, McGillivray and Oczkowski analyse the allocation of
Australian bilateral aid, and consistently found that strategic and political motivations were more important than aid eligibility requirements, meaning that aid frequently went to south- east Asia and the Pacific.122 While McGillivray and Oczkowski do not provide an in-depth
117 Headey 2008, p.175. 118 Milner, HV 2004, Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems,version 5.0, Columbia University, New York, viewed 7 July 2009,
contextual or political explanation for this finding, it shows, simply, that the government in the analysed period was more concerned with their own political priorities than the humanitarian reasons for aid. Thus, while the aid may have been successful in its self-interested goals, its humanitarian effects were not as apparent. The overall implications of the aid were complex.
Gounder confirms that Australia’s bilateral aid mostly assisted south-east Asian and south
Pacific economies, reiterating the above hypothesis.123
This review would be incomplete without analysing Ramli’s thesis, entitled ‘Australian aid policy: a comparative analysis of the Hawke/Keating and the Howard Government approaches’.124 Ramli identifies only two key aid themes: humanitarian aid, and aid given with some humanitarian overtones but for self-interested reasons.125 While there are some similarities between Ramli’s thesis and my own – the most obvious one being a review of the same period – there are more differences. Ramli’s examination of the Howard period ends in
1999, only three years after his government came into power. Howard and his coalition government remained in power until the end of 2007, meaning a comprehensive assessment can only be made in my thesis comparing Hawke, Keating and Howard. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on Africa. Ramli only mentions Africa four times in her entire thesis, and never specifically mentioned South Africa or any other African state; her case studies focus on the
Asia-Pacific. While Ramli’s argument that aid is a relatively low priority in Australian foreign policy is very relevant, she does not focus on any specific case study, and does not consider the foreign policy issues of motivations so much as the sectoral composition of Australian aid.
123 Gounder, R 1995, Overseas Aid Motivations: The Economics of Australia’s Bilateral Aid, Averbury Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, pp.61-63. 124 Ramli 1999. 125 Ramli 1999, pp.2-3. 38
CONCLUSION
The complexities of aid theory and the foreign policy issues impacting on Australia’s aid to
South Africa are evident in this literature review. Theorists not only contest the motivations of aid, but its effectiveness and relevance in poverty alleviation – despite evidence that aid can and has been effective in alleviating that goal. The conditions in which it is supplied have been found to have a profound impact on the effectiveness of aid, most frequently indicating that aid is most valuable when the recipient’s humanitarian needs are placed first. Various issues of foreign policy specifically impact on Australia’s aid to South Africa. Such issues include regionalism, political considerations such as the Cold War, apartheid and terrorism,
Australia’s relations with other states – primarily the USA and countries in south-east Asia – and the ruling Australian government of the day. However, throughout this critical analysis of aid theory and foreign policy issues, a recurring theme has emerged: the most effective aid is provided when the donor’s concerns for the recipient’s humanitarian issues are preceded over the donor’s own self-interested priorities. When the donor’s own interests are overriding, the effectiveness of aid becomes more complicated.
Australian aid, and specifically Australian aid to South Africa, is frequently overlooked both in academic literature and government policy. This thesis seeks to fill this gap and contribute to the limited knowledge of Australian aid to South Africa. It will show that Australian aid is inherently self-serving – neglecting the needs of recipient countries in the pursuit of its own national interests. As recognised in this literature review, the most effective aid is that provided when the humanitarian requirements of the recipient country are paramount, and that when they are not, the effects are less satisfactory. However, the central argument of this thesis is that self-interest largely motivated the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments’ provision of aid to developing countries, with the research particularly focusing on the case of
39
South Africa. By using the framework provided by the existing literature as well as primary sources, such as government documents, AusAID statistical summaries and news articles, this thesis will show how Australian aid can greatly benefit a continent it has long-neglected –
Africa, but that in the 1982-2007 period, it could have done more to alleviate poverty hardship amongst recipient countries by reordering its priorities.
40
CHAPTER 2: the Hawke-Keating Governments
Development assistance from Australia to the Third World, including South Africa, was affected by numerous foreign policy and aid issues under the Hawke and Keating governments. Most of these policies and issues, and indeed the aid shaped by them, were tainted by the self-interest of these governments. A government funded inquiry into Australian development assistance – the Jackson Committee Report of 1984 – largely directed the aid provided under both Hawke and Keating. The report stipulated that aid was actually a tool that could be used to further Australia’s own national interests; Hawke-Keating followed most of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee Report, and being true to their deep- seated policy of self-interest, that recommendation was strictly adhered to. This self-interest was especially apparent in the DIFF program, which was the most significant aid project of the
Hawke-Keating era. Australia’s self-interest was also apparent in the way it favoured development assistance in its own regional neighbourhood, and particularly in the way it used aid to allow Australian companies to build commercial relations with developing states in east
Asia. Because of this leaning towards Asia, and the politics of the Cold War and the hard- lined stance Australia held towards the institution of apartheid, Australian aid to South Africa was negligible. When South Africa did begin to receive Australian aid after the abolition of apartheid, like the vast majority of other Australian aid, the development assistance was underpinned by Australia’s own foreign policy priorities.
To accurately portray the context of the Hawke-Keating Governments it is imperative to include a brief overview of some of the policies concerning aid and South Africa in the governments prior to Hawke-Keating. Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister from 1972 until
41
1975; he was the first Labor Prime Minister since 1949.1 The Whitlam Government keenly pursued Australian participation in international affairs, including more extensive involvement in international agreements and organisations.2 Whitlam and his wife, Margaret, travelled abroad much more frequently than any of the Prime Ministers before him.3 It was under
Whitlam that Australia initially gave support for non-racial voting within the United Nations in
1975, changing Australia’s voting on South Africa in the same year. This led to the banning of
South African sporting teams touring Australia while it was governed by an apartheid regime.4
An even bigger Australian contribution internationally under Whitlam was the creation of
Australia’s first national agency for international development assistance, the Australian
Development Assistance Agency (ADAA), which was established in 1974.5 Prior to that, the provision of aid and its policies were spread over several departments, so it was a mark of efficiency for the Labor Government to establish one organisation. It should be noted, too, that it was under Whitlam that Australia recorded its highest ration of ODA to GNP; from 1974-
75, 0.5% of Australia’s GNP was allocated for development assistance.6 However, Australia’s aid policy under Whitlam was limited. ADAA’s primary focus was on Papua New Guinea and other developing countries in the Pacific region.7 Whitlam did not have the chance to have a
1 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.536-538. 2 National Archives of Australia 2010a, Australia’s Prime Ministers: Gough Whitlam in Office, Australian Government, Canberra, viewed 4 July 2010,
long-term influence on Australia’s aid program as he was dismissed by the Governor General in 1975.8
Whitlam was replaced by Liberal Malcolm Fraser, who was Prime Minister from 1975-1982.9
Malcolm Fraser was noted for shifting the relations from those nations belonging to the British
Commonwealth, and turning Australia’s outlook primarily toward south-east and east Asia.10
Like Whitlam, Fraser was an ‘unwavering opponent of apartheid’, and strongly advocated the reform of South Africa.11 Perhaps, again, following the lead of Whitlam, Fraser placed a strong emphasis on Australia’s international relations. Journalist Paul Kelly stated in 2000 that
‘The unifying theme behind all Fraser’s foreign policy was a pragmatic and independent search for the Australian national interest.’12 This pursuit of national interest extended to
Australia’s aid program, which primarily focused on the Asia-Pacific region. However, in other facets of international relations Australia held significant interest in sub-Saharan Africa, with
Fraser widely acknowledged as contributing to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980.13 In
1977 ADAA was renamed ADAB, and it was brought under the Foreign Affairs portfolio.14
On 11 March 1983 Bob Hawke replaced Malcolm Fraser as Prime Minister of Australia.
Although the Labor party had been described as ‘listless’ and ‘often divided’, and had only held power for three of the thirty-four years prior to 1983, it won seventy-four of the 125-seat
8 National Archives of Australia 2010a. 9 Commonwealth of Australia 2008, pp.538-545. 10 National Archives of Australia 2010b, Australia’s Prime Ministers: Malcolm, Australian Government, Canberra, viewed 4 July 2010,
House of Representatives, and Australians were quick to celebrate the induction of the
‘chummy, charismatic new leader’.15 Journalist Claude Forell cited Hawke’s win as indicative of the Australian public’s desire for change during a period of ‘ugly economic mess’, and stated that Labor’s ‘unity is strength’ slogan and ‘instinct for egalitarianism’ generally ensured it electoral victory during hard times.16 However, if the Australian public thought such egalitarianism would extend to foreign aid policy, they were mistaken; although this was by no means the reason for the ousting of Hawke at the end of 1991. Even if the Australian public was initially enraptured, Hawke’s popularity diminished, and the party sought a new leader who could bail Australia out of its economic troubles.17 On 20 December 1991, after nearly nine years of leadership, Keating replaced Hawke as Labor’s Prime Minister of Australia.18
JACKSON COMMITTEE REPORT OF 1984
Australian aid policy during the Hawke and Keating governments was largely informed by the
1984 Report of the Committee to Review: The Australian Overseas Aid Program, more commonly referred to as the Jackson Committee Report. Evolved from a lengthy enquiry, the
Jackson Committee Report included a ‘comprehensive statement of the objectives behind
Australian aid policy’ and also outlined ‘general principles for the geographical location of aid,
15 Iyer, P & Dunn, J 1983, ‘Australia: Hawke Swoops Into Power’, Time, 14 March, viewed 4 November 2009,
with the main focus on the Asian-Pacific regions.’19 It was compiled by a committee comprised of both individuals and organisations; obviously, all were concerned with development assistance and its avenues. Notably, voluntary aid organisations were excluded from the committee, which an article in The Age in June 1984 deemed a ‘pity’ because ‘it robbed the committee of expertise, and it also probably limited viewpoints’.20 In fact, the exclusion of voluntary aid organisations prevented recommendations prioritised by humanitarian concerns. Such exclusion influenced recommendations so that they primarily reflected Australia’s self-serving motivations.
Even in the first paragraph of the introduction, the Jackson Committee Report emphasised the use of aid as a foreign policy tool, stating that aid ‘complements strategic, economic and foreign policy interests, and by helping developing countries to grow, it provides economic opportunities for Australia.’21 Although the introduction also highlighted the provision of aid for humanitarian reasons, including ‘to alleviate poverty through economic and social development’, it even stipulated the need for Australian aid to promote Australian national interest.22 In turn, this blatant self-service – which, as recommended, was largely implemented – may have impacted on the effectiveness of aid in alleviating the poverty of the recipient. This is supported by the theory of aid conditionality. For example, Davis argues that when aid was tied to the donor’s agenda, the assistance was limited and could actually prevent the Third World recipient from maximising its potential development.23 Thus it is evident that the very document which informed the development assistance provided under
19 Ramli 1999, p.9. 20 Editorial 1984, ‘Spending the Aid Dollar Well and Wisely’, The Age, 8 June, p.13. 21 Jackson Committee 1984, Report of the Committee to Review: The Australian Overseas Aid Program, AGPS, Canberra, p.3. 22 Jackson Committee 1984, p.3. 23 Davis 2006, p.11. 45
the Hawke and Keating governments insisted that aid provision had to advance Australia’s policy interests. The Jackson Committee Report identified three primary objectives which were to inform Australia’s aid policy. The so-called ‘triple mandate’ of Australian aid encompassed the humanitarian, economic and commercial, and diplomatic, strategic and political perspectives. In the executive summary of the report, the Jackson committee stated,
‘To be effective, aid policy should be focused on helping developing countries achieve growth that alleviates poverty and improves income distribution.’24 This was reiterated further in the report in the justification for giving aid. The Jackson Committee Report stated, ‘Australia gives aid principally for humanitarian reasons to assist those who live less ample and fulfilling lives.’25 While the report went on to say that aid is primarily informed by community values and interests, whereby it was natural to be distressed by the existence of poverty and to have desires to eliminate the symptoms of this – such as starvation, malnutrition and disease – in order to create a more just and peaceful world, the promotion of the Australian agenda was a prominent component of the Jackson Committee’s recommendations.26 The humanitarian interpretation of the Jackson Committee Report was reinforced by Ramli, who asserts that ‘the primary objective of Australian aid was the promotion of social and economic advancement of the peoples in developing countries.’27
The Jackson Committee stated that while the purpose of development assistance of most donors was to be derived from humanitarian concern, most aid was also provided to enhance self-serving motivations. According to the Jackson Committee Report, the second reason for providing aid was to benefit Australia’s economic and commercial objectives. Indeed, Ramli
24 Jackson Committee 1984, p.3. 25 Jackson Committee 1984, p.19. 26 Jackson Committee 1984, p.19. 27 Ramli 1999, p.10. 46
states that ‘one of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee was the enhancement of aid effectiveness through Australia’s areas of sectoral expertise.’28 While benefits may have been derived by developing countries through the use of Australian sectoral strengths, there were also economic and commercial benefits for Australia from such donations. The Jackson
Committee argued that Australia would benefit economically from the provision of aid, and that a ‘coincidence’ of aid and commercial interests can be served when aid was focussed on sectors where Australian goods and services have a comparative advantage.29 With self- serving objectives so transparent throughout the Jackson Committee’s recommendations, the question is begged: was aid focussed on targets and sectors which would benefit Australia economically, or where poverty eradication was most needed? Buckley seemingly answered
‘yes’ to the first part of the question, when he argued that the humanitarian explanation for providing aid was simply a means of justifying policy to the Australian public, and that the government’s real motivation lay in the potential benefits for Australia’s economic markets.30
Such self-serving motivations affected the channels in which aid was provided, and if the recipient’s development priorities were not underpinning the aid, the assistance was less successful in eradicating poverty.31
The third pillar of the triple mandate highlighted the diplomatic, strategic and political advantages Australia could derive from development assistance. In particular, closer engagement with Asia in the policy tool of aid was stressed as imperative ‘to improve
Australia’s relations with the countries of the region’.32 The report contended that Australian
28 Ramli 1999, p.11. 29 Jackson Committee Report 1984, p.115. 30 Buckley 1972, p.116. 31 Killick 1998, p.9. 32 Ramli 1999, p.10. 47
aid was best spent in its geographic region because it best served Australia’s strategic, economic and geopolitical interests.33 Aid to Australia’s ‘neighbours’ such as Papua New
Guinea, the small island states of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and south-east Asian and small south Asian states certainly benefitted various sectors of their development, but because the humanitarian concerns of these states were not of utmost importance, the humanitarian development was only partially effective.34 For example, in 1989, AIDAB helped finance a $5,5 million project to construct, supply and deliver a high-speed catamaran service between Shanghai and Nantong in China via the DIFF program. However, rather than giving the money directly to China or a Chinese boat-building company, AIDAB contracted Australian company Austral Ships to complete the work.35 While China benefitted from the ferry service, in effect the Australian ‘aid’ was reinvested into Australian business. Labourers in China did not benefit from employment, nor did Chinese business benefit.36 In fact, the AIDAB report boasted that as a result of the Austral Ships’ contract, it ‘sold an additional twenty vessels worth approximatedly $140 million in China on a fully commercial basis.’37 If this was an attitude Australia held toward one of its bigger aid recipients – situated in a region which, as
Gareth Evans stated, Australia had a direct interest to ‘advance and reinforce political and strategic objectives [in]’ – it is fair to assume that countries outside these regions fared worse.38 Other developing countries – specifically, South Africa, but also other African, Asian,
South and Central American states – were largely neglected (please refer to appendices 1 and 2). For example, in 1987 Australia provided almost 92% of its aid to the Asia-Pacific
33 Jackson Committee Report 1984, p.6. 34 Collier & Dollar 2002, p.1497. 35 AIDAB 1993a, Australian Aid: A Force for Development in the Region – Commercial Benefits from Development Co-operation, AIDAB, Canberra, p.7. 36 AIDAB 1993a, p.7. 37 AIDAB 1993a, p.7. 38 Evans, G & Grant, B 1995, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, 2nd edn, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, p.140. 48
region. Africa and ‘Other Regions’, which encompassed the poorer states in South and
Central America, received just 6.85% of Australian Government bilateral aid. Consequently, many of the ‘poorest of the poor’, who were supposedly the primary targets of Australian aid, did not benefit from Australian aid at all.
The Jackson Committee Report was, in fact, concerned with eradicating the symptoms of poverty and achieving sustainable development. As Ramli stated, the report ‘stressed the importance of economic growth as the long-term means of overcoming poverty in developing countries. This became the basis of the approach to sustainable development pursued in the
Australian aid program.’39 However, while the policy framework ensured that poverty reduction was achieved, this was a side-effect of Australia’s own self-interested pursuits; in an aid program that was less focussed on self-interest it would have been the other way around.
In its submission to the Jackson Committee Report, Community Aid Abroad warned ‘ ... there have been steady and increasing attempts to use the official development assistance program to stimulate the Australian commercial sector and this now represents a major distortion factor in the aid selection process.’40 This highlights that aid provided would benefit an Australian agenda, and so the humanitarian needs of the recipient, and even perhaps the worthiness of the recipient, were not always considered above the interests of the Australian government.
It is important to note how Africa, and particularly South Africa, featured in the Jackson
Committee Report. While Papua New Guinea alone received twenty-one pages of the review, and ‘small island states’ and ‘Asia’ received twenty-one and twelve pages respectively, ‘other
39 Ramli 1999, p.11. 40 Community Aid Abroad in ‘Spending the Aid Dollar Well and Wisely’ 1984, The Age, 8 June, p.13. 49
developing countries’ were reviewed in just seven pages. The entire continent of Africa was covered in less than two pages, and there is no specific mention of South Africa. According to the Jackson Committee Report, although US$51 million of assistance was supplied to sub-
Saharan Africa in 1982, because the aid was spread over a large number of recipient countries ‘Australia [was] not a major donor to any African country.’41 The report argued that
Australian aid was limited, and so Australia could not play a large role in assisting African countries because, as it put simply, ‘Australia cannot do everything and cannot help everyone.’42 Indeed, the Jackson Committee even called assistance outside the Asia-Pacific an imposition, arguing that it entailed ‘an excessive load on Australian administrative resources’.43 Nonetheless, the report stipulated that Australia could make worthwhile contributions to the development effort in Africa, ‘if it concentrates on what it does well ... concentrating on activities in which Australia has a comparative advantage.’44 This example clearly demonstrates the use of Australian aid in Africa to benefit Australian interests – presumably those of an economic, commercial or strategic nature.
There were some commentators who were vocal in protesting Australia’s apparent neglect of
Africa; criticism even came from within the Labor Party. On 3 December 1985 New South
Wales Labor Senator Kerry Sibraa contended that the Hawke government had not taken adequate steps to join the African Development Bank (AfDB) as ‘recommended’ by the
Jackson Committee Report.45 Although the report only suggested membership should be explored, Sibraa’s arguments were valid: without membership to the AfDB, Australian
41 Jackson Committee 1984, p.203. 42 Jackson Committee 1984, p.204. 43 Jackson Committee 1984, p.204. 44 Jackson Committee 1984, p.204. 45 Sibraa, K (Labor Senator)1985, Australian Overseas Aid Program, text of Ministerial Statement, 3 December, ParlInfo, Canberra, viewed 16 November 2009,
companies were less competitive in securing contracts awarded by the Bank.46 While this argument may have been purely for the benefit of Australian companies and industry, if Sibraa had advocated increased Australian-African relations solely for humanitarian-development, his pleas would have been ignored. This is apparent in the decision to decrease aid to greater
Africa from $112.3 million in the 1991-92 financial year to $85.8 million in the 1993-94 period, while in the same period aid to south-east Asia was increased from $285.6 million to $359.8 million.47 Even the Jackson Committee Report noted that Africa contained ‘the largest concentration of the poorest countries in the world.’48 However, as the report also stipulated, and as the Australian government made no secret in shaping its policy to take advantage of, greater commercial benefits for Australia laid in south-east Asia; thus Australian aid was focused there.49 Sibraa’s interest in Africa was evident as he was the Australian High
Commissioner for Zimbabwe from March 1994 until February 1998.50 Meanwhile, the
Australian self-interest was continually reflected in its aid policy.
In addition to those activities – activities in which Australia held an advantage – the report recommended donations of food aid, ‘preferably with developmental objectives ... because
[food aid] is an important expression of the humanitarian concerns of the Australian community.’51 The use of the word ‘preferably’ infers that developmental objectives were ideal, however, not entirely necessary; therefore, it may be surmised that food aid was also
46 Sibraa 1985. 47 Bilney, G (Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs) 1995, Australia’s Aid Program 1995-96, Budget Related Paper No.2, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p.17. 48 Jackson Committee 1984, p.201. 49 Jackson Committee Report 1984, p.9; Bilney 1995, p.17. 50 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 1998, Diplomatic Appointment – High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, media release, 24 February, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, viewed 16 November 2009,
deemed a worthwhile venture if it benefitted Australia. Such allocations may have, in fact, been ineffective in alleviating poverty because they were not mindful of poverty reduction or development.52
While the Australian government was quick to promote its own interests through aid allocation, such reasoning for the provision of aid was not ardently supported by the Australian public. A
1983 survey commissioned by World Vision and conducted by the Roy Morgan Research
Centre (4-5 June 1983) indicated that 65% of Australians believed that their country should assist developing countries, and of these, 69% per cent thought that a duty for the wealthy nations to help the poorer ones was the best reason for Australia to give aid to developing countries.53 In addition, the survey showed that Australians believed that development assistance should go to the world’s poorest countries – bearing in mind that many of those were in Africa – however they also believed that countries in Australia’s regional neighbourhood should benefit from Australian aid.54
Other newspaper articles also reflected the sentiment that aid should be given for humanitarian reasons, and it should support the poorest of the poor. In August 1984 The Age journalist David Elias reported that ‘The Australian Government [was] using its overseas aid program to further its political, strategic and commercial objectives instead of helping countries with the most need.’55 According to the article, a report detailing this was written by ADAB for inclusion in the Jackson Committee Report, but it was rejected. This supports the earlier
52 Collier & Dollar 2002, p.1497. 53 Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) 1983, Overseas Aid: What Australians Think, Development Dossier No. 13, September, ACFOA, Canberra, pp.5-6, 25. 54 ACFOA 1983, p.6. 55 Elias, D 1984 ‘Aid used for political aims: report’, The Age, 31 August, p.6. 52
assertion that recommendations without economic, strategic, political or commercial benefits for Australia were excluded from the report.
The Jackson Committee Report was the first comprehensive review of the Australian aid program, examining the objectives and effectiveness of Australian aid as it functioned in the early 1980s. Its recommendations largely formed the parameters for development assistance provided by the Hawke and Keating governments.56 However, its counsel was a far cry from the supposed core aspiration of aid, which was to alleviate the symptoms of poverty as a humanitarian investment for the world’s poorest. The Jackson Committee Report promoted the concept that Australian aid should benefit the country’s foreign policy objectives. While such objectives included humanitarian concerns, the principal purpose of aid provision was perceived to be in the economic, commercial, political, diplomatic and strategic gains to
Australia. So, rather than these benefits being a by-product of aid, humanitarian development was the side-benefit of the allocation of aid. Consequently, most Australian aid went to its closest neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region. The Jackson Committee Report thus revealed that Australian aid policy to South Africa during the Hawke-Keating governments was largely of a self-serving nature. This self-serving stipulation impeded the effectiveness of aid in alleviating poverty.
ACTUAL AID EXPENDITURE OF HAWKE-KEATING
Traditionally, Australian government aid expenditure and placement has been presented in annual Statistical Summaries. South Africa was notably absent in those summaries during most of the Hawke-Keating era, only being re-introduced in 1995 – the year after the abolition
56 Sherlock, S 1991, A Guide to the Australian overseas aid program and issues in development assistance, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra. 53
of apartheid. The summaries still yield valuable comparative data relevant to the contentions of this thesis. In addition, the Statistical Summaries reveal the multi-lateral aid provided to southern Africa by way of the UNETPSA. While bilateral aid is the major focus of this thesis,
UNETPSA was a prime example of functional aid provided solely for the benefit of its recipient. Finally, bilateral aid provided under the SAPSAN; later known as SAPSA) will also be analysed. Because of the tenuous nature of the relationship between Australia and South
Africa during the apartheid era, SAPSAN was established in 1986. SAPSA/SAPSAN indicated the key sectors on which aid to South Africa was focused, and further demonstrates the self-interest associated with much of Australia’s development assistance. It also demonstrated how aid lost much of its effectiveness in alleviating poverty by being too closely engaged with Australia’s own interests. Australian aid and policy to South Africa was published in SAPSAN and SAPSA reviews, however, these were not annual. The first review, entitled Special Assistance Program for South Africans and Namibians, was published in
March 1991.57
The Jackson Committee Report recommended that Australia focus its development assistance on its regional neighbourhood, not only because it could benefit its own region, but because it would better promote Australia’s interests.58 For example, aid to the Asia-Pacific region was tied to Australia’s economic and commercial interests, and benefitted its strategic, political and diplomatic agendas. Indeed, the Jackson Committee report defined the role of development assistance and its worth to Australia:
Aid is given primarily for humanitarian reasons to alleviate poverty through economic and social development. It is the response of the wealthy industrial
57AIDAB 1991a, Special Assistance Program for South Africans and Namibians, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 58 Jackson Committee 1984, p.6. 54
countries to the needs of hundreds of millions of people who live harsh and materially meagre lives. Aid also complements strategic, economic and foreign policy interests, and by helping developing countries grow, it provides economic opportunities for Australia.59
For the most part, the Hawke and Keating governments followed the Jackson Committee’s recommendations, however – and fortunately for the ‘poorest of the poor’ in Africa – it increased its aid to Africa substantially in 1989, indicating that the Labor party did hold an interest in that region’s security and development.60
Appendix 1 presents Australian bilateral aid to various regions of the world from 1982 until
1987, and is sourced from Statistical Summaries from that period. After 1987, AIDAB changed its presentation format in the Statistical Summaries, probably because the Australian national aid agency’s name changed in that year from ADAB to AIDAB. To avoid confusion and error a different table showing Australia’s bilateral aid thereafter is provided as Appendix
2. Although aid is presented in statistical summaries over a financial year, such as 1983-
1984, because of space limitations only the earlier year has been noted at the top of each list.
For example, aid for 1983-1984 is listed below 1983. It should be noted that in some cases
Statistical Summaries also included the aid provided in the previous year, and in some instances, the figures for the same year differed in consecutive summaries. When this occurs the original figure has been referred to. In addition, the figures given for each region may not total the overall overseas aid allocation; this is because there is also unspecified bilateral aid, and aid which is not linked regionally. The aid figures for Papua New Guinea, although incorporated within the Oceania label of the Statistical Summaries, are presented separately in order to more accurately portray the extremely large percentage of aid provided to that
59 Jackson Committee 1984, p.3. 60 AIDAB 1990b, Statistical Summary 1989-90, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p.19. 55
country. The Oceania figure has been calculated by subtracting the Papua New Guinea figure from the Oceania figure as found in the Statistical Summaries. The All Other Regions figure has been derived from adding the figures from other regions such as Europe, and the North,
South and Central Americas presented in the Statistical Summaries. Aid to South Africa was not featured in these Statistical Summaries.
The layout of Appendix 2 varies slightly from Appendix 1, most notably in the regional groupings. Again, the All Other Regions figure has been calculated by adding the Europe,
Americas and Indian Ocean figures. Only in the 1993-1994 Statistical Summary was aid to
South Africa included under the southern Africa column, and even then it specified that this aid was only provided to black communities. Aid to South Africa is not represented separately in
Appendix 2; this aid totalled $786,000 or 2.01 per cent of Australia’s total aid to southern
Africa.
Imperative information concerning Australia’s aid policy is evident upon examination of both
Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. While aid to Africa expressed as a monetary value did not vary tremendously over the six year period presented in Appendix 1, as a percentage of the total aid budget it decreased over each year. The sole exception is the aid provided to Africa in
1986, when it rose by 0.58% of the 1985 value. However, over the entire period, aid to Africa was cut by 4.7% - which is significant when it is considered that at its peak in 1982, the entire continent of Africa only received 11.35% of Australian bilateral aid.
It is difficult to compare aid provided to Africa between 1987 and 1988 as the geographical presentation of aid in Statistical Summaries changed significantly. While in Appendix 1 aid to
Africa was presented as precisely that – aid to Africa – from 1987, AIDAB Statistical
56
Summaries portrayed aid to Africa by regions: southern Africa, other sub-Saharan Africa, and
North Africa and the Middle East. While the original intention was to add these figures together to form a ‘Total Africa’ figure, the necessary inclusion of the Middle East would have resulted in inaccuracy when comparing figures. However, while such comparisons are not possible, a greater indication of aid to southern Africa is better presented in Appendix 2. As previously stated, in January 1988 Foreign Minister Hayden pushed for Australia’s aid to southern Africa’s frontline states – Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe – to exceed $100 million over a three-year period, which effectively doubled Australian aid to those countries.61 Despite uproar from the federal opposition, aid to southern Africa was significantly increased in 1989.62 Although aid to southern Africa more than doubled between 1988 and 1989, when examined numerically, it was, in fact, only a 2% increase in terms of total Australian aid provision. Aid to southern Africa reached a peak in
1990 when, expressed as percentage of Australia’s total aid expenditure, it was 5.74%.
(Please refer to Appendix 2)
While humanitarian groups encouraged this increased aid to southern Africa, other factions were less supportive of Australia’s newly extended hand. Journalist David Jenkins considered greater contributions to Africa as little more than an ‘indulgence’ to appease southern Africa’s frontline states and ensure Hayden’s welcome when he visited in February
61 Hayden, B (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade) 1988, Questions without Notice: Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference Delegation, House of Representations Question Time, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra; Jenkins, D 1989, ‘Aust aid too little, too far from home’, The Sydney Morning Herald, August 8, p.13. 62 Hayden 1988; Table 2. 57
1988.63 The following extract, albeit lengthy, depicts a journalist’s thoughts on Australian aid to Africa:
The doubling of funds for Southern Africa was an indulgence, made all the more extraordinary by the fact that the Hawke government had earlier damaged our relations with Port Moresby by reducing our aid to PNG on the grounds of budget stringency. At the time, some people argued that Canberra had to up the ante because there was an unacceptable gap between Australian rhetoric and action; Canberra either had to put up or shut up. If that were the case, why not shut up? We are paying a high price for Government grandstanding on South Africa.64
Jenkins acknowledged that many African states desperately required aid, but argued that
Australia, which at that time had a population of 16 million, should not assist with major development in Africa; only with food aid. He asserted that Africa was the responsibility of
Europe and the United States.
At this point it should be noted that – as much of this chapter and indeed, this thesis, has highlighted – much of Australia’s aid, both to Africa and to its major recipients in Asia, was not provided for altruistic motives, but for self-serving purposes. While the increase in aid to the
African frontline states did not yield purely humanitarian gains – indeed, the government probably did want something to present when Hayden met with the frontline states in February
1988 – Jenkins’s article highlights that conservative Australians also favoured aid which benefitted an Australian agenda. Despite the high levels of aid provided to south-east Asia at the time Jenkins tried to justify his anti-African aid sentiment by arguing that Australia had nearer neighbours in greater need.
The $100 million Hayden handout may have benefited countries like Zambia and Zimbabwe, but we had to rob Peter to pay Paul. At the end of the day, there was less money available for Burma, Cambodia and the Philippines – all of which were in desperate need of help.65
63 Jenkins 1989, p.13. 64 Jenkins 1989, p.13. 65 Jenkins 1989, p.13. 58
Jenkins’s use of the analogy ‘ ... we had to rob Peter to pay Paul’ emphasises the notion that
Australian aid to Africa came at the expense of helping countries such as Burma, Cambodia and the Philippines. While there is no dispute that these countries were also in desperate need of aid, Australian policy – and it would seem media, too – frequently blindsided the fact that Africa was the poorest region in the world. (Please refer to appendices 1 and 2) There were frequent and distinct links between government agenda and mainstream news media, as evidenced by Jenkins’s article.
International perceptions of Australia were imperative to Jenkins. He stated, ‘We should concentrate our resources on that region [south-east Asia], as the Jackson Committee recommended. The world would not find fault with us for that.’66 These statements infer
Jenkins believed Australia needed to consider the opinions of other Western states in its allocation of aid funds. Such concepts were definitely valued by the Labor party, and especially by Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, however this will be analysed in greater depth in a following sub-chapter. While foreign perceptions of Australia are, indeed, important,
Jenkins’s phrasing placed Australia on the defensive. Surely the world would not have found fault with Australia for providing more and better aid to Africa, but Jenkins did not address that point. At that time, when newspaper circulation was still high and television and internet media had not overtaken the printed press, newspaper articles were widely recognised as greatly shaping public opinion and perception. It is a shame that Jenkins told only half the story in his article ‘Aid too little, too far from home.’ If he truly believed his own argument, he must have felt some relief when aid to Africa was again cut in 1991, despite Evans’s 1988
66 Jenkins 1989, p.13. 59
promise to provide an extra $110 million in development aid to southern Africa when Hayden’s
$100 million ran out in 1990.67
As both Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 demonstrate, Australian aid almost trebled in dollar value over the twelve years from 1982-1994. Aid to Africa fluctuated during this period, but it was never higher than in 1982, when it comprised 11.35% of the total aid allocation. (Please refer to Appendix 1) This was the year Labor, under Hawke, came to power. Aid allocation for
1982 had been pre-determined by the Fraser government which preceded it. Several patterns can be derived from these tables. First, it is evident that, as a percentage, Australia’s aid largely shifted from Papua New Guinea to Asian states, and principally those located in south-east Asia. As Australia’s economic interests shifted, so did its aid: a fair indication that
Australian aid policy was largely derived from self-interests. The following text highlights some of the inconsistencies with the promoted Australian aid priorities, and the actual delivery of aid.
In his Foreword to the 1986-1987 Development Assistance Budget (Budget Paper No.9), the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, urged the need to curb real government spending and reduce pressures on Australia’s external account. He foreshadowed large cuts, particularly in the multilateral part of the aid program, but emphasised a continued priority on assisting countries in the South Pacific and South East Asia.68
The Australian government struggled to balance its self-promoted image of being a humanitarian donor and its need to further its own interests via the provision of aid. When
Australia was itself economically struggling, it ensured its aid was invested in countries from which it could gain the most economic and strategic benefits. Cutting multilateral aid was especially indicative of the Australian policy of self-interest, because multilateral aid is widely
67 Jenkins 1989, p.13; Table 2. 68 Statistical Summary 1986-1987: Australian Official Development Assistance to Developing Countries 1988, Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, Canberra, p.11. 60
regarded as being more effective in furthering Third World development.69 Australia’s imbalance during the Hawke-Keating period was acknowledged in the Howard government’s equivalent inquiry to the Jackson Committee Report, One Clear Objective: poverty reduction through sustainable development:
Over the past decade, the Australian aid program has struggled to satisfy a triple mandate, emphasising foreign policy and commercial benefits to Australia as well as development benefits to recipient countries. This mandate, or rationale, has been confused with the program’s operational objective, to the detriment of development effectiveness.70
Thus it becomes increasingly evident that Australian aid under the Hawke-Keating governments was largely self-serving, resulting in aid which was less effective in promoting development and alleviating poverty.
The Labor government’s aid stance was fairly consistent over the course of its political term.
Very little had changed in 1993, with AIDAB still endorsing its humanitarianism through aid if it advanced Australian interests and especially focused on its own region’s pitch, as evidenced below:
The principal goal of Australia’s 1.4 billion aid program is to assist developing countries to improve their living standards through social and economic development. At the same time, the aid program advances Australia’s commercial interests through the direct purchase of Australian goods and services, the creation of export opportunities for Australian companies and by contributing to a positive regional environment for trade and economic development. More than this, the aid program through its focus on the countries of our region reinforces the Government’s wider strategy of engagement with Asia and the Pacific, including through close trade and investment links.71
69 Headey 2008, p.175; Balogh, T1967, ‘Multilateral v. Bilateral Aid’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 19, no. 3, p.333. 70 AusAID 1997, One Clear Objective: Poverty reduction through sustainable development, Report of the Committee to Review, AusAID Publishing, Canberra, p.12. 71 AIDAB 1993a. 61
All the while, aid as an expression of GNP continued its decline throughout Labor’s time in power. This is important to note, as the ODA/GNP ratio, which represents the total aid budget, or ODA, as a proportion of GNP, is the international measure of donor performance.72
As Baldock noted, ‘While the Australian government continues to support the ideological principle of the UN 0.7% of GNP aid volume target in public policy statements, continued cuts to the aid budget over the last two decades have consistently refuted the stated government commitment to achieving this goal.’73 In actuality, the closest Australia ever came to achieving its stated UN objective was in 1971/72, when the Australian foreign aid budget totalled $200.5 million or 0.52% of its GNP.74 The decline in Australian aid budget is glaringly obvious in
Appendix 4, which depict the relationship between the Australian aid budget and its percentage of the total Gross National Income (GNI). Hayden foretold the requirement to curb
Australian government spending, and thus aid, in the passage cited earlier, however Appendix
4 particularly highlights the decline in the ratio of aid spending as a proportion of GNI during the Hawke-Keating period.
There was a modest increase evident in Labor’s last year in government, when as a proportion of GNI Australia’s ODA was 0.33%; up 1.8% on the previous aid budget. As
Ramli noted from the AusAID 1995-96 review, ‘while this placed Australia above the average of 0.30 per cent ODA/GNP ratio of Development Assistance Commission
(DAC) donors, it also marks a continuing decline from a 1980s peak of 0.49 per cent in
1983/84 ... allocations of foreign aid have not been in pace with this growth, hence the
72 Ramli 1999, p.18. 73 Baldock 1997, p.9. 74 Jarrett, F 1994, The Evolution of Australia’s Aid Program’, Australian Development Studies Network, Canberra. 62
steady decrease in the percentage of ODA/GNP.’75 While any aid increase is commendable, it is imperative that the reasoning for the increase is examined. In the case of Labor’s 1995/96 increase, it is fair to argue that this may have been an election ploy used to garner public support and international recognition. The Reality of Aid argued vehemently that the decline in aid as a percentage of GNP per capita was
‘morally unacceptable and politically unwarranted’ considering that Australia’s wealth in terms of GNP per capita had increased.76 However, the Minister for Development
Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs, Gordon Bilney, did acknowledge Labor’s shortcomings, stating that, ‘ ... while the demand for international humanitarian relief had increased [over Labor’s term], the share of Australia’s assistance to these programs had not yet kept pace with the increase in demand.’77
It is also important to consider the popularity of Australia’s aid policies in the wider domestic community. The Minister for Trade and Overseas Development, John Kerin, on several occasions made comments concerning a perceived lack of support for the aid program by the general public and cabinet.78 However, public opinion polls conducted in May 1994 by AIDAB indicated that, in fact, the Australian public very much supported the provision of aid to developing countries.79 Of the surveyed population,
72% approved of Australia’s aid program.80 However, while the wider community was
75 AusAID 1995a; Ramli 1999, p.18. 76 Randel, J & German, T (eds.) 1997, The Reality of Aid 1996: An Independent Review of International Aid, Earthscan Publications, London, p.85; Ramli 1999, p.56. 77 Bilney in AusAID 1995a, p.12. 78 AIDAB 1992a, Review of the Effectiveness of Australian Development Cooperation with Indonesia, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 79 Ramli 1999, p.28. 80 German, T & Randel, J (eds.) 1995, The Reality of Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid 1995, Earthscan Publications, London, p.35. 63
generally supportive of aid, they were selective as to where the aid should have been allocated. For example, ‘a nation-wide poll conducted by Saulwick and Associates for
The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald on 30 September 30 and 1 October 1992 showed that 76.7 per cent of respondents felt that Australian government aid should go to the poorest people even if there was no commercial benefit for Australia.’81 This supported Evans’s belief that, first and foremost, ‘Australia’s aid effort is founded on the commitment of the Australian population to basic humanitarian concerns – the desire to help alleviate poverty, hunger and suffering wherever it occurs.’82 Kerin even went so far as to argue that ‘the primary objective of Australian aid was the promotion of social and economic advancement of the peoples in developing countries.’83 However, and as this thesis has continually shown, Australia’s actual aid policy was the opposite of the wider public’s preference and the perception Evans and Kerin would have had the public accept; it was Australian government policy to provide aid to places where it could foresee commercial and economic benefits. Thus it is evident that the Hawke-
Keating Government’s policy of self-interest was not supported by the majority of
Australians.
One of the most indicative methods of determining the effectiveness of aid is analysing the sectors to which it is allocated, and the conditions attached to it. As recommended by the Jackson Committee Report, the Labor government’s aid policy focused
81 Ramli 1999, p.58. 82 Evans & Grant 1995, p.140. 83 Kerin, J (Minister for Trade and Overseas Development) 1992, Changing Aid for a Changing World, Key Issues for Australia’s Aid Program in the 1990s, Ministerial Policy Paper and Third Annual Report to Parliament on Australia’s Overseas Development Cooperation Program, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 64
assistance on tertiary education.84 Assistance was granted in the form of tertiary scholarships which, while benefitting the individual student recipient, primarily benefitted the donor. As Burch noted, not only did tertiary scholarships allow the potential for
‘strong trade spin-offs’, but even the Australian aid program observed that ‘ ... (tertiary) programs ... are directly compatible with the interests of domestic educational institutions and the aspirations of Australia as an exporter of educational services.’85
Ramli stated that these motives were ‘clearly reflected in commercial and foreign policy concerns, which drove the provision of scholarships in Australia.’86 The ‘exportation’ of
Australian tertiary education, indeed, had many benefits for an Australia-centric agenda.
While the foreign scholarship holders resided in Australia they participated in the
Australian economy. While this may seem simple enough, this short-term residency in
Australia generated wealth in a similar manner to tourism. For example, between 1992 and 1993, AIDAB found that the 6,100 scholarship students it supported in Australia contributed $110 million in fees and living costs to the Australian economy.87 In addition, if a student was provided with a tertiary scholarship, they were originally from a country much less developed than Australia. They would enjoy a standard of living in
Australia generally perceived as being better than in their home states, and frequently applied for permanent residency in Australia at the completion of their studies.
84 Ramli 1999, p.49. 85 Burch, D 1996, ‘Aid, Trade and Export: The Commercialisation of Australia’s Aid Program’ in P Kilby (ed.), Australia’s Aid Program: Mixed Messages and Conflicting Agendas, Monash Asia Institute and Community Aid Abroad, Victoria, p.33; AIDAB 1990a, Australia’s Overseas Aid Program: Helping Australian Industry Too, International Development Issues, No.10, p.46. 86 Ramli 1999, p.49. 87 AIDAB 1993a. 65
Consequently Australia gained another skilled worker and the Third World state lost an educated professional.88
The question can be asked, what benefit has the aid recipient state gained from that form of development assistance? Aid provided for earlier education, such as primary and high school instruction and assistance, better assisted poverty reduction in the state receiving the aid. In its studies, the World Bank consistently found that ‘primary education is the largest single contributor to the economic growth rates of high-performing Asian economies’, and it is safe to argue that this finding would have been applicable beyond Asia.89 Although the Labor government frequently cited that sustainable economic growth was the core goal of the
Australian aid program, in actuality, the Australian government was more concerned with furthering its own economic interests. 90 If the economic development of recipient countries had, in fact, been paramount, Australian educational aid would have focused primarily on primary and secondary education, not Australian-based tertiary education.
In the case of South Africans living under apartheid, the provision of tertiary education scholarships was one of just a few avenues for ensuring Western aid reached black South
Africans. Although this thesis focuses on Australian bilateral aid, it is important to note its involvement in the UNETPSA. In December 1967 the UNETPSA was established by the
United Nations General Assembly, integrating earlier programs to assist people from South
Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and those territories under Portuguese
88 World Bank 1995, ‘Priorities and strategies for education: a World Bank review’, World Bank, Washington. 89 World Bank 1995. 90 Ramli 1999, p.11. 66
administration in Africa.91 Initially, the UNETPSA was sponsored primarily by the United
States and the United Kingdom which, while opposed to economic sanctions, were supportive of implementing and operating humanitarian measures in the fight against racial apartheid in
South Africa.92 Australia also financed the UNETPSA for the duration of its operation, as did other states, organisations and individuals. By the early 1990s the program only provided assistance to young South Africans and, for a transitional period, to applicants from Namibia.93
By 1991, the UNETPSA had offered a broad range of training programs outside South Africa,
‘ranging from the upper secondary level to the PhD level of study in a variety of fields.’94 Such training allowed black South Africans access to professional training in fields which had traditionally been closed to them. A 1991 UNETPSA background paper asserted that not only had the program contributed to meeting some of South Africa’s labour requirements, it also helped to train community leaders. The report stated, ‘ ... [the programme] has afforded young South Africans opportunities for a well-rounded education that has given them access to the broad knowledge, critical thinking and creative abilities that should enable them to meet the challenges ahead in their country.’95
The UNETPSA was mindful that South Africans educated outside of South Africa probably experienced a better quality of life outside their home country, and as such may not wish to return to South Africa on the completion of their studies. It referred to the loss of educated
91 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.2. 92 Marof, A (Chairman of UN Special Committee Against Apartheid: 1964-1968) 1966, Call for an International Campaign Against Apartheid: Statement in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, speech, 2 December, African National Congress, Johannesburg, viewed 18 November 2009,
South Africans to other countries as a ‘brain drain’. 96 Therefore, individual awards of tertiary scholarships were dependent upon the recipient’s commitment to return home upon the completion of studies.97 The report stated,
With the changing circumstances in South Africa and the enhanced prospects for a negotiated settlement of the conflict there, it is important that the resources of the Programme are spent in a cost-effective manner that will contribute to meeting South Africa’s short- and medium-term manpower requirements while minimising the adverse effects of the “brain drain”. This may entail introducing, at the appropriate time and in appropriate manner, some flexibility in the mandate of the Programme so that, while continuing its educational and training activities abroad, it may at the same time address educational needs inside South Africa ... [black South Africans will] return home set to energise their communities, help mobilise and allocate resources, increase productivity and assist in addressing the fundamental economic and social inequities in South Africa ... thus buttressing the momentum towards a multi-party democracy.98
This shows that the intent of the programme was to create a relatively large cadre of competent personnel to oversee and lead in the then-impending changes in South Africa. The report stipulated the hope that those educated black South Africans would fill roles in human resources development – such as in high- and middle-level positions in educational and research institutions – to assist in facilitating the transition to a non-racial and democratic
South Africa.99 In 1990, it also expressed a desire to address educational needs within South
Africa, although it is unknown whether the UNETPSA eventually succeeded because at the abolition of apartheid UNETPSA reports ceased publication.100
It is evident that, while in most circumstances aid funding education was best spent developing primary and secondary education in a recipient country, apartheid-governed South
Africa was a different case. The UNETPSA had the foresight to see that South Africa required
96 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.3. 97 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.4. 98 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, pp.3-4. 99 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.4. 100 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.3. 68
tertiary-educated black South Africans in all facets of its development. Certainly the
UNETPSA had the best interests of southern Africa at the core of its program development; the same cannot be said for education programs funded by individual countries, including
Australia. The UNETPSA was aware that foreign-educated South Africans may prefer not to return to their home country, and therefore selected education recipients who were committed to South Africa and its development. In contrast, knowledge of the ‘brain drain’ was part of the reason why Australia preferred to provide tertiary scholarships rather than developing the primary and secondary education of recipient countries; not only was investment in the
Australian economy a surety of scholarship recipients, but because many recipients settled in
Australia, Australian foreign aid essentially supplied the education for a future Australian citizen.
In addition to its participation in the UNETPSA, Australia also contributed aid to South Africa via SAPSAN, later SAPSA. SAPSAN was established in 1986 ‘to provide assistance to South
Africans and Namibians disadvantaged by apartheid, both within and outside of South
Africa.’101 In addition, the South African Non-Government Organisations Participation
Program (SANGOP) provided multi-year funding for community health and agricultural projects.102 SAPSA/SAPSAN was allocated a total of $41 million between 1986 and April
1994 – the month apartheid was abolished.103 With the apartheid era over, Australia committed to a $30 million, three year program for South Africa.104
101 AusAID 1995b, p.107. 102 AusAID 1995b, p.107. 103 Exhibit No.13, p.2 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.106. 104 Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.107. 69
A 1997 report entitled ‘Australia’s relations with Southern Africa’ acknowledged that, even if
Australia did vastly increase aid to Africa, Australia’s contributions would be very small fish in a large pond. From 1995-1996, Australia provided approximately $104.7 million to 30 African countries through direct bilateral assistance, refugee and emergency aid and indirect assistance through various agencies and programs; this was less than 0.5% of Australia’s total bilateral funds.105 In comparison, in 1996 the United States gave US$122 million to
South Africa alone.106 Canada gave nearly 50% of its aid to Africa, and Scandinavian countries between 60 and 70%.107 Those figures reflect the acknowledgement by those countries that Africa’s need was greater than countries elsewhere, including those in the Asia-
Pacific. It can be contended that the large percentages of development assistance provided by these countries are demonstrative of aid provided for greater humanitarian reasons rather than self-serving motivations. If Australia was more concerned with altruism than with its own agenda, a much greater percentage of its aid would be provided to South Africa and other
African states.
The allocation of Australian aid under the Hawke-Keating governments, and the actual aid figures, were indicative of the self-serving policies adopted by these Labor governments. Aid was primarily given to Australia’s own regional neighbourhood, as evidenced by the tables, and analyses of Australian aid policy showed that this was because Australia benefitted most from these transactions. Examinations of the sectoral provisions of aid showed that development assistance was frequently provided to sectors, such as tertiary education, which
105 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1996, Inquiry Into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, Vol. 1, 37th and 38th Parliament, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p.106. 106 'US Foreign Aid Priorities in 1996', in USIS Washington File, 21 August 1996, p. 11 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.106. 107 World Vision Australia, Transcript, 29 September 1995, p. 204 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1997, p.118. 70
were less effective in promoting Third World development but profitable for the Western donor.
However, while this thesis focuses on bilateral aid, it must be noted that Australia also contributed to UNETPSA, a special United Nations run program for South Africa. Aid to South
Africa under the Hawke-Keating governments was mostly in the form of tertiary scholarships but because of the apartheid experience in South Africa, this was actually one of the only methods in which bilateral aid could be provided. As Baldock noted, ‘the Jackson Committee
Report articulated the multiple benefits of an aid program based on the triple mandate of humanitarian aid assistance, international advancement and Australian trade and political promotion.’108 However, the Hawke-Keating government consistently justified the government aid program almost solely in terms of its benefit to Australia. Clearly, Australian aid – both to
South Africa and elsewhere – was provided for fundamentally self-serving reasons, which impacted on the effectiveness that this aid had on development.
THE DEVELOPMENT IMPORT FINANCE FACILITY
Perhaps the greatest example of self-interest in the Hawke-Keating governments’ overseas aid program was embedded in the Development Import Finance Facility, frequently referred to as DIFF. Conceived in 1980 by the Fraser Government, the DIFF program was strengthened by the Labor governments that followed.109 Ramli stated that in 1983, ‘one per cent [of
Australian aid] was being allocated to DIFF when the Hawke Government accepted the recommendation of the Jackson Report on Australia’s Overseas Aid Program that the limit on
DIFF be raised to five per cent of total aid.’110 According to Burch, the DIFF was a ‘special aid/trade mechanism which offset the disadvantages facing Australian industry in developing
108 Baldock 1997, p.9. 109 Ramli 1999, p.23. 110 Ramli 1999, p.23. 71
countries when competing with aid-subsidies finance packages offered by other governments.’111 Indeed, the DIFF program served to support industry policy and increase exports primarily to the Asia-Pacific region; the recommendation for its financing to be increased is unsurprising when considered alongside the Jackson Committee Report, which promoted the enhancement of Australia’s national interests through its aid policy.112 DIFF expanded rapidly over the time Hawke was in government — growing from $16.4 million in
1985-86 to $93 million in 1989-1990.
The Jackson Committee Review pushed three primary objectives for aid to the forefront; relevant to the DIFF, and to this argument, was the commercialisation of aid for Australian benefit. As cited in Evans and Grant, ‘ ... as far as possible, Australian aid activities overseas were to be carried out by Australians, using Australian goods and services.113 Such a policy was certainly mobilised by the DIFF. Jill Hickson, overseas project coordinator for the
Committees in Solidarity with Central and Latin America and the Caribbean (CISLAC), stated that DIFF was ‘a direct subsidy to business masquerading as aid.’114 The reputation of DIFF was perhaps best described by ABC journalist Andrew Dodd, who in 1996 stated, ‘Who’d heard of the DIFF – Development Import Finance Facility – before it was abolished?’115
However, Dodd’s comment regarding the public knowledge of DIFF prior to its abolition was more indicative of the Australian public’s and media’s interest in Australian aid, or lack thereof.
While, undoubtedly, many Australians did care about the plight of the Third World, their concern may not have extended to the allocation and distribution of the Australian
111 Burch 1996, p.39. 112 Burch 1996, p.39. 113 Evans & Grant 1995, p.141. 114 Begg, Z 1993, ‘Australian Aid: Who Benefits?’, Green Left Weekly, 29 September, viewed 24 November 2009,
Government aid agency’s donations; donations which were in fact funded by the tax-payer.
The Australian public was supportive of aid primarily for humanitarian concerns; a 1992 poll showed that 76.7% of respondents believed Australian aid should go to the neediest recipients, even if it meant there were no commercial benefits for Australia.116 However, this belief did not extend to more vocal support for humanitarian and development aspects of aid.
The focus of Dodd’s story is important. He stated that ‘Several foreign governments have complained [about the abolition of DIFF] ... the ones who are most upset [were] Australian businessmen and women, the people who’ve used DIFF to pry open export markets in Asian countries, and who are now having real trouble keeping those markets alive.’117 The conversation between Dodd and the interviewees on the radio program was primarily concerned with how Australian businesses could save relationships with Asian traders after the abolition of DIFF.118 Thus the importance of DIFF to Australian business was stressed; however, what the loss of DIFF meant to the development of Third World recipients was not considered, except that relations with various communities may have been strained. For those reasons, it can be surmised that the abolition of DIFF was perceived to be a greater economic loss, and thus of greater relevance, to Australian business than to those countries being ‘aided’. Clearly, the Australian aid policy was more concerned with pursuing Australia’s economic interests than eradicating the poverty of the DIFF recipients.
116 Ramli 1999, p.58. 117 Background Briefing 1996. 118 Background Briefing 1996. 73
The DIFF program was rarely used outside of the Asia-Pacific region because of the commercial value of the project to Australian business.119 AIDAB acknowledged this in a justification paper of the DIFF: ‘By promoting economic growth and stability in developing countries, particularly those in our region, the aid program improves Australia’s prospects for trade. Expanding our exports to the Asia-Pacific developing countries is vital to our own development.’120 Because Australian economic interests were best furthered by DIFF projects in Asia, projects in southern Africa, including South Africa, were neglected. Researcher for
Community Aid Abroad Jeff Atkinson supported this argument when he contended in 1993 that projects such as the DIFF distorted aid priorities.121 He argued that ‘money which was motivated by humanitarian concern would end up in the poorest countries of Africa, whereas much of Australia's government aid ended up in the more commercially valuable regions like south-east Asia. Eighty-four percent of all DIFF grants in the last three years [since 1993] have gone to Indonesia, China, India and Thailand.’122
The DIFF reinforced the distortion of Australia’s aid program by favouring countries and sectors that ensured the greatest commercial returns rather than favouring programs and projects which were more likely to target poverty eradication.123 Bilney described the DIFF program as ‘a vehicle by which to demonstrate Australia’s expertise and through which
Australian companies can learn how to operate in foreign markets. By assisting developing countries ... the aid program is expanding markets for Australian goods and services.’124 Kerin
119 Burch 1996, p.39. 120 AIDAB 1990a, p.v. 121 Begg 1993. 122 Begg 1993. 123 Burch 1996, pp.32-33; AusAID 1996, A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance Facility, AusAID, Canberra, p.42. 124 Bilney 1995 in Ramli 1999, p.4. 74
agreed, stating that ‘ ... aid will also bring benefits to Australia by providing Australian businesses with opportunity to showcase their goods and services in the region. The aid program has already been doing this and has been instrumental in introducing many
Australian companies to Asian markets.’125 In fact, AIDAB boasted that for every $100 of
Australian aid funds spent in China, an additional $200 was generated for Australian organisations, and in Indonesia, $663 million in follow-on contracts were obtained by
Australian companies as a result of a $413 million DIFF project, with conservative estimates of an additional $300 million in new contracts expected.126 Minister for Development
Cooperation for the Keating Government Gordon Bilney stated that he made ‘no apology for the fact that nearly 90% of Australia’s aid [was] spent on goods and services which [were] sourced in Australia.’127 This is all evidence that the aid allocated to DIFF was fundamentally concerned with generating self-serving commercial benefits. In this way, commercial interests became an explicit objective of Australian aid policy.128
In order to contextualise the self-service of the DIFF, there is no better example than the catamaran ferry project in China cited in the ‘Jackson Committee Report of 1984’ sub-chapter.
The DIFF allocated $1.9 million for the project, which contracted the Australian company
Austral Ships to supply high-speed catamarans for travel on the Yangtze River, and boasted that as a result of the project, Austral Ships sold an additional twenty vessels worth approximately $140 million on a fully commercial basis.129 However, this is not the sole example of the DIFF pursuing commercial interests under the auspices of aid. In its first
125 Kerin 1992, p.67 in Ramli 1999, p.13. 126 AIDAB 1993a, p.5. 127 Bilney in Burch 1996, p.30. 128 Ramli 1999, p.17. 129 AIDAB 1993a, p.7. 75
venture in the African market, the DIFF granted $1.002 million for the supply of an abattoir freezer in Botswana by Australian company Acme.130 A Review of the Effectiveness of the
Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF), asserted that:
The project was important in employment terms for Acme as it represented about six months production by 50% of the relevant staff in the Acme organisation ... This project established Acme’s credibility in southern Africa and gave them a foothold in what had been a European-dominated market. They have since won follow-on business in other African countries which has been very useful to the company in a depressed domestic market.131
The benefits that the project gave to Botswana were not addressed; the DIFF was primarily concerned with the commercial benefits the project brought to Australia. Rollason contended that mixed-credit projects such as the DIFF required foreign experts, and did little to generate jobs within the recipient country.132 Ramli stated that ‘another argument against DIFF was that it had the effect of concentrating aid resources on a small number of large-scale projects rather than the wider aid program.’133 She stated that the DIFF focused on countries which had good credit ratings and projects which were capital and technology intensive, meaning that the poorest countries were neglected.134
Programs such as the DIFF significantly curtailed aid in terms of which countries were funded, the sectoral allocation of projects and the type of technology to be transferred. Burch asserted that in this way, there was ‘an impact on the distribution and spread of the benefits from aid, determining who gains and who loses.’135 He argued that such ‘commercial impulse in aid
130 AusAID 1996, pp. 32, 58. 131 AusAID 1996, p.32. 132 Rollason, R 1996, ‘The International Context’ in Kilby, P (ed.), Australia’s Aid Program: Mixed Messages and Conflicting Agendas, Monash Institute and Community Aid Abroad, Melbourne, p.8. 133 Ramli 1999, pp.24-25. 134 Ramli 1999, pp.24-25. 135 Burch 1996, p.44. 76
reduced its effectiveness.’136 This was certainly true in the case of South Africa, where the
DIFF program was not offered.
The DIFF program was not stagnant in its development over the course of the Hawke-Keating governments. Although, as previously stated, the level of aid allocated for the DIFF program dramatically increased, the guidelines for its use also shifted significantly. This was primarily due to the introduction of rules for mixed-credit aid arrangements established by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in February 1992.137 The introduction of these rules, commonly known as the Helsinki Guidelines, impacted upon the
DIFF program significantly.138 The guidelines were ‘aimed at limiting aid distortions and better targeting tied aid to provide for projects in countries with little or no access to market financing.’139 In simple terms, the guidelines were intended to emphasise the developmental aspect of mixed-credit schemes and ‘reduce their attractiveness as a trade instrument.’140
AusAID stated that the implementation of the Helsinki rules changed the DIFF program fundamentally insofar as the number of projects eligible for mixed-credits aid decreased significantly.141 The Australian Council for Overseas Development (ACFOA) agreed that the rules had a positive effect on the DIFF, and influenced the introduction of the Green
Technology Transfer Fund (Green DIFF).142
136 Burch 1996, p.44. 137 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2008, The Export Credits Arrangement 1978-2008, OECD, Paris. 138 AusAID 1996. 139 AusAID 1996, p.20. 140 Ramli 1999, pp. 25-26. 141 AusAID 1996, p.13. 142 ACFOA 1997, Australian Council for Overseas Aid Development Issues, Issue 1, p.121. 77
The Green DIFF further redirected the focus of the DIFF program because it restricted some
DIFF projects to activities considered not to be commercially viable, resulting in the DIFF giving greater priority to problems of urban pollution and public health in recipient countries.
Gordon Bilney called the Green DIFF program an environmental initiative whereby Australia supplied competitive technology with an environmental focus to some DIFF recipients.143 He cited an example in China where the Green DIFF funded a $31 million coal gasification plant.
Bilney stated, ‘The plant will save hundreds of people's lives each year by replacing the burning of coal briquettes in the home with cleaner coal gas. That will reduce sulfur [sic] dioxide emissions by 94 per cent, carbon monoxide emissions by 83 per cent, and particulates and benzines [sic] by over 90 per cent.’144 While the Helsinki Guidelines meant that the DIFF program became more development focused and encouraged programs such as the Green
DIFF, it was not an Australian Government initiative and, being an OECD member, Australia had an obligation to follow the guidelines whether it was in its best interests or not. It should also be noted, and this thesis has continuously shown, that the Australian aid program was seldom influenced by objectives other than those which benefitted Australia commercially or strategically. Even in reference to the Green DIFF, Bilney stated that it would assist in
‘gaining a wider exposure for Australia’s environmental expertise.’145
In 1996 AusAID published a review of the DIFF, aptly titled A Review of the Effectiveness of the Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF).146 It analysed the evolution of the DIFF over
143 Bilney, G (Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs) in Commonwealth of Australia 1995b, Questions Without Notice: House of Representatives, p.1044, World Environment Day. 144 Bilney in Commonwealth of Australia 1995b. 145 Bilney, G (Minister for Development Cooperation and Pacific Island Affairs) in Commonwealth of Australia 1995a, Ministerial Statements: House of Representatives, p.1437, New Directions in Australia’s Overseas Aid Program. 146AusAID 1996, p.19. 78
the period of the Hawke-Keating governments and promoted the development and commercial benefits of the program, concluding that ‘the overwhelming majority of the DIFF projects had been effective in delivering their intended development benefits.’147 The review asserted that the DIFF successfully progressed into a program whereby the central focus of
DIFF’s economic impact was on social infrastructure projects while bringing substantial commercial benefits to Australia.148 Indeed, the OECD Development Assistance Committee praised DIFF for its transformation, stating that the DIFF had ‘ ... changed dramatically over time and [became] almost unrecognisable compared to its original form.’149 Nonetheless,
ACFOA – which is generally considered to strongly emphasise humanitarianism through aid – perceived the DIFF’s development to be moving ‘far too slowly.’150 It argued that 80% of DIFF projects could be called ‘bad aid’ because they did not have a developmental focus. ACFOA representative Janet Hunt cited the provision of an aircraft hanger to Bangladesh as an example of bad aid; ‘ ... there is immense poverty in Bangladesh and I would have thought an aircraft hangar was not a number one priority for aid in Bangladesh.’151
It is clear that the DIFF, a mixed-credits program, was primarily interested in the commercial gains it could bring back to Australia. Operated under the auspices of aid, the DIFF tended to direct funds to its own regional neighbourhood, and particularly to countries which promised high commercial returns, rather than those countries most affected by poverty. Funds were allocated to those states with high credit ratings and which were technologically intensive, which was to the detriment of those countries which did not hold both of these ‘merits’, such as South Africa which, while technologically advanced, did not have a high credit rating. In
147 AusAID 1996, p.48. 148 AusAID 1996, p.48. 149 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 1996, Australia: Development Cooperation Review, Series No. 18, OECD, Paris, p.18. 150 Background Briefing 1996. 151 Background Briefing 1996. 79
this way, the DIFF was essentially self-serving in its premise of allocating aid to countries where it could find considerable economic, strategic and commercial returns. In the early
1990s there were some movements, such as the Helsinki rules and the Green DIFF, to ensure mixed-credit schemes such as the DIFF became more development focused, however these were not instigated by the Australian government; instead they were founded by the international body, the OECD. Although the DIFF program did evolve considerably over the
Hawke-Keating governments, it remained a contentious form of aid until its abolition by the
Howard government in 1996.
APARTHEID
Imagine a country with 1,000 inhabitants, 200 of them of European descent and 800 of non-European descent. The 20 per cent of European descent are also the richest; they collect 70 per cent of the country’s income. The bottom 40 per cent of the population – all non-Europeans – share a mere 5 per cent of national income. One half of the country (500 people) live in poverty, of whom 495 are of non-European descent, making non-Europeans 25 times more likely to be living in poverty than their counterparts of European descent. The life expectancy of the most privileged segment of society, those of European descent, is 14 years greater than the group making up the vast majority of the population. Infant mortality rates for families of European descent are 5-6 times lower than the majority of the population. Adult literacy among the non- European majority group is just 66 per cent, compared with 97 per cent among those of European descent. The country I am describing is South Africa under apartheid.152
The above description, taken from a 2009 Amnesty International publication, illustrates the immense inequality enforced by the white minority during South Africa’s apartheid era. By the early 1980s, and through to the abolition of apartheid in 1994, the international community had established a strong opposition to South African apartheid which was widely reflected in both
152 Khan, I & Petrasek, D 2009, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, pp.66-67. 80
national and international policies. Condemnation of apartheid extended to Australia;
Australia, in fact, was one of the most vocally anti-apartheid Western countries, which was sometimes attributed to its need to distance itself from the White Australia Policy that it had abandoned not all that many years earlier.153 The Hawke and Keating governments challenged apartheid, and its policies toward South Africa, including its aid policies, and the nature of them, were directly influenced by an anti-apartheid stance.
Racial categorisation – and subsequent discrimination – was legal in South Africa from the earliest days of its colonisation; however in the first half of the 20th century there was a steady erosion of rights for the non-whites of South Africa.154 Post-World War II, South Africa’s ‘racial gulf’ experienced even greater expansion, however the emerging new global era saw discrimination attract criticism from abroad.155 The system of apartheid was officially established in 1948, and it dictated racial segregation under the reasoning that each race would best prosper if developed separately.156 Apartheid divided South Africa’s African population into ten ‘tribes’, each with a ‘homeland’ or bantustan, all of which covered only 13% of the country’s land mass.157 The remaining 87% of the country’s land was reserved for white occupation, with Africans holding no right to live outside of their bantustans unless their labour was required by the South African economy.158 Under the Pass Laws, only Africans in gainful employment could enter and remain in white South Africa; Amnesty International
153 Forell 1971. Although Australia’s need to distance itself from its own dark past was a factor in its criticism of South African apartheid, it is such an immense issue that it cannot possibly be covered or even skimmed within the parameters of this thesis. 154Findley, CV & Rothney, JAM 2006, Twentieth Century World, 6th edn, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, pp.186-187. 155 Findley & Rothney 2006, pp.186-187. 156 Palmowski 2004, p.26. 157 Richardson, P & Johnstone, R 1986, Australian trade with South Africa, Development Dossier: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Canberra, p.1. 158 Richardson & Johnstone 1986, p.1. 81
reported that 238,000 blacks were arrested for contravention of these laws in 1984.159
Although apartheid was promoted as a policy for racial development and prosperity, it is evident that, in actuality, apartheid served to allow the white minority to maintain political and economic supremacy. By keeping other races separated, poor and uneducated, apartheid prevented Africans from demanding the rights that the whites enjoyed.160 Such racial injustices led to the isolation of South Africa in world opinion, and South Africa was frequently criticised by Australia for its policy of apartheid.
International protest of apartheid was at its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, under the Fraser and Hawke governments. Prior to 1972, while not actually supporting apartheid, Australia was not vocally against it. For example, Australia was one of the few nations to support South
Africa at the United Nations and other international organisations.161 Under Whitlam, Australia began to vocalise its opposition to apartheid and, as previously stated, international protest began to mount under Fraser. In late 1984 Australia’s policy concerning economic relations with South Africa began to significantly change.162 At that time and throughout Hawke’s time as Prime Minister, Australia headed a campaign to force South Africa to adopt non-racial or non-discriminatory national policies. Firth argued that by ‘imposing bans on investment, air links and government procurement in apartheid South Africa’, the Hawke government was
159 Amnesty International 1986, South Africa: Imprisonment Under the Pass Laws, Amnesty International, London, p.1.1. 160 Amnesty International 1986, p.1.1. 161 ACFOA 1986, Australia’s South African Connection: A Case for Economic Sanctions Against Apartheid?, Development Dossier No. 17, ACFOA, Canberra, p.27. 162 ACFOA 1986, p.27. 82
instrumental in the collapse of the apartheid system.163 Shephard agreed, contending that
‘Australia was at the forefront of attempts to have apartheid laws rescinded by Pretoria.’164
Australia was also more active in the United Nations under the new Labor government led by
Hawke. On 13 December 1984 Australia sponsored General Assembly Resolution 39/72G urging the Security Council to consider the adoption of mandatory sanctions against South
Africa.165 When, in April 1985, the Security Council announced a resolution calling for
‘mandatory sanctions against South Africa’, Foreign Minister Bill Hayden affirmed Australia’s support.166 Then on June 2 1985, Prime Minister Bob Hawke said Australia would initiate a
Commonwealth trade boycott against South Africa, taking a lead role in achieving a world trade ban.167 Later that month, Australia voted in favour of Security Council Resolution 566 which threatened ‘appropriate measures’ if South Africa did not implement the United Nations independence plan for Namibia. Resolution 566 urged member states to consider taking
‘appropriate and voluntary measures’ against South Africa, such as ‘stopping or discouraging new investment, breaking maritime and air links with South Africa and prohibiting the sale of krugerrands.’168 In July Australia supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 569 which advised United Nations members to voluntarily implement sanctions against South
163 Firth 2005, p.67. 164 Shephard, A 1994, A House Divided: The South African Elections of April 1984, Parliamentary Research Service, Current Issues: Brief Number 8, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p.10. 165 United Nations General Assembly 1985, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, A/RES/40/72, 112th Plenary Meeting, United Nations, New York; ACFOA 1986, p.28. 166 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1987, Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia: United Nations Public Hearings, vol.4, Policy Instruments and Statements, United Nations, New York, p.176. 167 ACFOA 1986, p.28. 168 United Nations Security Council 1985, Resolution 566, 19 June, United Nations, New York; ACFOA 1986, p.28. 83
Africa.169 Not only did the Resolution recommend the suspension of new investment in South
Africa and the prohibition of the sales of krugerrands and other coins minted in South Africa, but it also recommended the restriction of sporting and cultural ties, the suspension of guaranteed export loans, the banning of new nuclear contracts and the prohibition of sales of computer equipment which could be used by the South African armed forces or police.170
Thus the difficulties concerning Australian and South African relations became evident.
Sanctions were imperative in demonstrating international condemnation of apartheid. Neal
Blewett, a Labor politician who initially won a Federal Parliament seat for Bonython in the
Australian Capital Territory in 1977, was outspoken in the promotion of sanctions against
South Africa.171 In April 1991, as Minister for Trade and Overseas Development, Blewett argued that sanctions were ‘crucial in bringing about the changes which [had] occurred to date, and [would be] crucial if the destruction of apartheid was to be assured.’172 However, and as this thesis has frequently shown, Australian foreign policy tended to be guided by
Australian economic interests. ACFOA argued that because Australian companies had a stake in the apartheid system, ‘they tended to be strong advocates of the case against economic sanctions.’173 ACFOA noted that this, along with the influence of economics on
Australian foreign policy, had the potential to severely restrict Australia’s foreign policy responses to issues in southern Africa.174 However, according to Prime Minister Bob Hawke,
‘Australia used sanctions against South Africa not to bring South Africa to its knees but to its
169 United Nations Security Council 1985, Resoluton 569, 26 July, United Nations, New York. 170 ACFOA 1986, p.28. 171 Australian National University 2003, Neal Blewett: Citation for Honorary Degree, Australian National University, Canberra, viewed 3 July 2010,
senses.’175 This was later supported by Blewett, who contended that ‘The Australian
Government has made it clear that the purpose of sanctions is not punitive, but to bring the
South African Government to the negotiating table and keep it there until fundamental change is ensured.’176 Opinion polls showed that, gradually, the Australian public supported economic sanctions against apartheid. On 16 July 1985 the Age published the results of a poll which showed that 35% of Australian voters believed that the Australian government should work for an international ban on trade with South Africa and 51% believed the opposite. On 24
September of that year a Morgan Gallup poll published in the Bulletin indicated that in 43% of voters thought that Australia should trade with South Africa, as opposed to 65% in February
1983. These figures are indicative that the Australian public supported the Australian government in its call for economic sanctions against South Africa.177
Even so, it is worth noting that Australian economic links with South Africa were relatively minor; not just in terms of the scale relative to other Western states, but in terms of quantity.
Nevertheless, South Africa was Australia’s largest trading partner in Africa.178 While direct links between the two economies were not particularly strong, ‘indirect links through the medium of international competition ensured, however, that each country retained a strong interest in the economic performance of the other.’179 Australia’s staunch support for economic sanctions on South Africa were also, in part, because of the economic benefits
Australia could gain from them, such as increased exports to countries previously serviced by
South Africa. ACFOA’s contention that Australia neglected economic links with South Africa
175 Shephard 1994, p.11. 176 Blewett 1991. 177 ACFOA 1986, p.36. 178 Commonwealth of Australia 1985, Parliamentary Debates: House of Representatives, Questions for Notice, no.418, Trade: Africa. 179 ACFOA 1986, p.14. 85
while other OECD countries shared broad economic links with the country supports this, insofar that it alludes to the fact that Australia did not necessarily need trade links with South
Africa, presumably because it could source internally many of the exports South Africa offered.
There were several reasons why Australia held such a hardline stance against apartheid. Bell alleges that there were no major economic or electoral reasons for Australia to oppose apartheid, and so the reasoning for it reflected the moral and intellectual convictions of the
Australian government.180 However ACFOA contended that apartheid was ‘one of Australia’s most important foreign policy concerns’.181 ACFOA argued that the Australian government was not only concerned about the potential extent of Australian trade and economic links with
South Africa, but also because it recognised that only through ‘strong, consistent and universal action by the Governments of the world’ could apartheid be abolished, the escalating violence in South Africa could end, and a ‘free, independent, multiracial and majority rule’ in
South Africa could be established.182 McPherson, in the 1996 inquiry into Australia’s relations with southern Africa, expressed concern that the deteriorating domestic situation in South
Africa was causing instability across the frontline states in southern Africa.183 However, as previously stated, the Australian government was keen to remove itself from its own policies of exclusion and racism which had only been abandoned in the 1960s.184
180 Bell 1988, p.155. 181 ACFOA 1986, p.v. 182 ACFOA 1986, p.iv. 183 McPherson, K 1996, ‘Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa’ in Australian Parliament: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, The Committee, Canberra. 184 Forell, C 1971, ‘Hooliganism won’t help the Africans’, The Age, 1 July. 86
As was analysed under the sub-section ‘Aid to South Africa’, Australia’s development assistance to South Africa during the Hawke-Keating years, and while South Africa was still divided by apartheid, was in the form of tertiary scholarships for black South Africans under the SAPSAN/SAPSA initiative. Therefore, while actual aid figures and policies do not require discussion, the impact of apartheid on aid to South Africa does. Australia’s staunch opposition to apartheid and utilisation of sanctions to demonstrate this meant that any Australian investment in South Africa contradicted this stance. As previously stated, it allowed the self- justification of apartheid, and afforded the movement political security. Unfortunately for South
Africa, this limitation of Australian foreign policy extended to the policy on foreign aid.
Australia was severely limited in the avenues of aid it could allocate to South Africa as tertiary scholarships was the only real method of providing assistance to black South Africans marginalised by apartheid. While the World Bank argued that, typically, such scholarships were ineffective in the development of Third World states, in the case of South Africa they were beneficial for development.185 To avoid a ‘brain drain’ conditions were enforced on scholarship recipients, requiring them to return to their communities and utilise their education for its benefit. The Australian Government hoped this would encourage leadership, teamwork and organisational skills so that internal movements against apartheid were of a high quality.186 While there is room for some argument that Australia may have had some self- interest in the marginalisation of South Africa in international economic transactions, because no evidence of this could be found in related literature, the benefit of the doubt must be given.
Yes, apartheid adversely affected Australian development assistance to South Africa, but
185 The World Bank 1995. 186 Centre Against Apartheid 1991, p.3-4. 87
Australia could not reflect self-interest in its aid because of this, and in fact its aid encouraged the development of South Africa.
Theoretically, apartheid ended in 1990, when the ban on Nationalist movements was ended and Nelson Mandela was released from jail after a twenty-seven year incarceration. Its collapse was further cemented in February 1991 with the removal of the Group Areas Act, the
Population Registration Act and the Separate Amenities Act; in many ways, the ‘cornerstones’ of apartheid.187 However, it was the April 1994 elections which formalised the abolition of apartheid and symbolised a new beginning in South African history. For the first time, ‘South
Africa [was to] be governed by a non-racial, democratic government, and the millions of black
South Africans [were to] have a say in the running of their own country.’188
As mentioned, the issue of apartheid in South Africa was one which garnered much international attention and opposition. When the system was abolished in 1994, many foreign policies – including those of Australia and other Western states – changed to assist the new government, led by the African National Congress (ANC). In 2009, the Australian High
Commission to South Africa reported that Australia had provided development assistance since 1994 as part of broader efforts to promote democracy within South Africa.189 The High
Commission also pointed out that such aid was not available to South Africa during the apartheid period, except for limited scholarships offered to South Africans in exile.190 Australia rewarded South Africa with foreign aid once the apartheid system was removed. In 1995 the
187 Shephard 1994, p.ii. 188 Shephard 1994, p.ii. 189 Australian High Commission to South Africa 2009, Development Cooperation in Africa, Australian Commonwealth Government, Canberra,
Australian Government funded an inquiry into relations with a changed southern Africa to establish the best course of action for Australian relations. The findings and recommendations will be analysed in a later sub-chapter, ‘The Inquiry into Australia’s
Relations with Southern Africa’.
The Australian government led by Hawke and Keating was not only vocal in its opposition to apartheid, but demonstrative in its opposition by leading international objection through dialogue and the imposition of sanctions. It developed an aid program that could assist apartheid-marginalised non-white South Africans without in any way supporting the apartheid regime, which would have otherwise offered it moral justification. In this way, the issues of apartheid did not impose Australian self-interest on Australian aid to South Africa under
Hawke-Keating. Apartheid-influenced aid was primarily concerned with humanitarianism and development. After the abolition of apartheid, Australia commenced the provision of bilateral aid to South Africa.
FOCUS ON ASIA/REGIONALISM
During the Hawke-Keating period of governance the relationships Australia held with Asia strengthened. Australia’s strongest relationships were with those founding members of the
ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.191 This was primarily because the Australian Government recognised the value of a strong economic focus on south-east Asia.192 Over the course of the Hawke-Keating period Australia’s relations with
China and India also evolved so that Australia shared some of its most important ties with
191 Palmowski 2004, p.32. 192 Evans & Grant 1995, p.29. 89
those states. According to Evans and Grant, as Prime Minister, Paul Keating was able to build upon an Australian-Asian centric foundation when, ‘in April 1992, he publicly articulated his strong personal commitment to linking Australia’s destiny even more comprehensively with that of the Asia-Pacific region.’193
The concept of regionalism was imperative to Australian foreign policy under the Hawke-
Keating governments, and such foreign policy extended to aid policy, where aid figures clearly show that the Asia-Pacific was favoured. (Please refer to appendices 1, 2, 6 and 7) The importance of regionalism to Australian aid policy was especially evident in the analysis of the
Jackson Committee Report, which stipulated that Asia, and in particular, states in south-east
Asia, should be the greatest recipients of Australian bilateral aid because of the benefits
Australia would derive from such transactions.194 Aid was recognised as instrumental in the promotion of development goals, ‘which coincided with the general objective of Australian foreign policy to advance and reinforce political and strategic objectives, particularly in engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.’195 However, not all of the links between Australian foreign policy goals and aid were coincidental. The Jackson Committee Report promoted the economic and social development of recipient countries as a primary focus of Australia’s aid policy, but a secondary requirement was to ‘advance or reinforce Australian political, strategic and commercial objectives.’196 As Ramli argues, ‘With a major policy consideration of
Australia’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, the effect on aid policy was that the secondary aims began to overtake the primary as the main determinant of assistance.’197
193 Evans & Grant 1995, pp.30-31. 194 Jackson Committee 1984, p.204. 195 Evans & Grant 1995 in Ramli 1999, p.10. 196 AusAID 1995a, p.13. 197 Ramli 1999, p.30. 90
Another example of Australian aid focusing on Asia is the DIFF scheme. The DIFF was utilised almost solely in Asian countries, because ‘commercial interests are the guiding determinant’ of DIFF allocations, and ‘a fundamental element of Government policy is the internationalisation of the Australian economy through vigorous export-led growth and closer engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.’198 From 1989 to 1992 Australia gave 84% of its
DIFF funds to four countries: Indonesia, Thailand, China and India.199 Ramli argued that, at a time when ‘so-called economic miracles’ were occurring in the Asia-Pacific, the DIFF was used as a tool to showcase Australian goods and services; ‘through its focus on developing countries in the region, and especially by enforcing closer economic cooperation, the aid program had an important role in advancing Australia’s trade policies.’200
With this established, the Australian Government, wishing to benefit its own strategic interests, focused its development assistance policies on its own regions, and especially Asia.
However, Africa was in greater need than most Asian states. Perhaps the best citations for this argument were given by World Vision and ACFOA, when they commented in an inquiry into Australia’s relations with southern Africa that while the proportion of Asia’s contribution to the world’s poorest people would likely halve between 1995 and 2000, Africa’s contribution would double.201 This is supported by Getu, who argues,
The comparison made between Africa and Asia on the basis of poverty, aid per capita, cultural ties and availability of expertise works in favour not against Africa.
198 AIDAB 1993b, Development with a DIFFerence, Proceedings from a seminar on Australia’s Development Import Finance Facility in Woolongong, July 1992, Australian Government Printer, Canberra, p.9; AIDAB 1993a, p.1. 199 Begg 1993. 200 Ramli 1999, p.18. 201 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, pp.656, 738-739. 91
In as far as the Australian Government is using them as the basis for increased aid, they suggest Africa is the right destination for Australia’s foreign aid.202
This was good in theory but was not put into practice. For example, in the 1995-96 financial year Australia provided 29% of its bilateral aid to south-east Asia, compared to 14% given to
Africa and the Middle East combined.203
It should be noted that it is not the intention of this thesis to argue that Africa is a more worthy recipient of aid than Asia; to the contrary, it is contended that, based on humanitarianism,
Africa is just as deserving of Australia’s aid as Asia. However, because Australian bilateral aid was not provided solely on humanitarian merits, and was frequently allocated for the benefit of
Australian interests, countries like South Africa were largely neglected by Australia’s aid program. The program favoured countries which could provide an economic return to
Australia, such as those states in Australia’s own regional neighbourhood.
Australia’s focus on Asia during the Hawke-Keating periods of governance was strong. Asia was linked to Australian foreign policy to the extent that Ramli acknowledges, ‘The focus on
Asia and the importance of trade in foreign policy have been the main themes for successive governments since 1983.’204 Unfortunately for non-Asian states, such as South Africa, this meant the focus of aid was compromised to incorporate these values. In 1995, then Minister for Development Cooperation Gordon Bilney argued that issues such as poverty alleviation could not be considered separately from other aid strategies, however he also maintained that the rationale for the provision of development assistance was the establishment of trade
202 Getu, M 1995, “Aid for Growth or Growth for Aid? A Brief Examination of Australian Aid to Africa”, Development Bulletin, March, pp.38-41, p.41. 203 AusAID 2000, Statistical Summary 1998-1999: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. 204 Ramli 1999, p.6. 92
linkages with Australia’s greatest emerging regional neighbour, Asia.205 Obviously, in the allocation of aid, the alleviation of poverty was secondary to the primary focus of the aid, which was to promote Australia’s commercial ties where they could be most beneficial to
Australia. During the period of the Hawke-Keating governments, this was in south-east Asia.
The pragmatism of those governments adversely affected aid to South Africa.
THE COLD WAR
The Cold War was the major focus of international relations and politics during the second half of the 20th century. The world was split into two ‘sides’; to put it simply, the USA and its allies were trying to spread capitalism and democracy, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and its allies were trying to spread communism; each was trying to prevent the spread of the other ideology.206 Development assistance was frequently dictated by the differing agendas of these two ideologies, and in order to maintain alliances with Third World states, aid was given by both the communists and the capitalists to the poorer coalition states. For example, during the Cold War the United States Government gave the majority of their development assistance to those governments – generally with a low GNP – which were nominally democratic, or could be swung to democracy through the provision of aid.207
Furthermore, Meernik, Krueger and Poe found that the USA was more likely to donate to democratic states during the Cold War than after it.208 Thus it is evident that aid was offered to keep democratic governments pro-West and pro-capitalist, ensuring their alliance to the
United States during the Cold War tensions. The Soviet Union also offered aid and moral
205 Bilney in AusAID 1995a, pp.9-10. 206 Baylis, J & Smith, S (eds.) 2005, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, New York, p.770. 207 Meernik et al. 1998, p.64. 208 Meernik et al. 1998, p.78. 93
support to emerging non-communist nations of the Third World such as India, Burma and
Afghanistan in order to wean them away from the USA’s influence.209 In essence, aid given by either the USA or the USSR and their allies to emerging, easily swayed states was largely to guarantee the recipients’ allegiance with the benefactor. Thus aid effectively created client states for both of the hegemonic powers and their allies. In this way, Cold War aid was often conditional on recipients conforming to the dominant ideologies of the donor countries. Aid commentators such as Killick, Remenyi et al. and Davis argued that conditional aid such as that provided during the Cold War ensured aid providers were primarily seeking to enhance their own strategic agendas, thus humanitarianism was not at the forefront of development assistance – self-interested motivations were.210
In terms of Australian aid to South Africa, Cold War politics dictated that aid was primarily given to democratic countries, or those that could easily be swayed to democratic policies.211
Western aid, including Australian, to South Africa was conditional on South Africa’s friendship with the West, and with the aid calculated to diminish the Communist Bloc’s influence in the southern Africa area; in this way South Africa was in the Western sphere of influence, even though its apartheid policy was inherently undemocratic. Bearing in mind that the Suez Canal was for long periods closed or in danger of closure through Middle East tensions, there was a real fear that if South Africa fell within the Communists’ sphere of influence, the sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope would be compromised, with consequent grave effects on
209 Dockrill, ML & Hopkins, MF 2004, The Cold War, 2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire; Evans, G 1992 ‘Australia’s Foreign Policy: Responding to Change’, The 1990 Sir Hermann Black Lecture, Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, The University of Sydney, p.65. 210 Killick 1998, p.12; Remenyi et al. 1993, pp.2-3; Davis 2009, p.173. 211 White et al. 2005, p.122. 94
Western economies.212 As Turnbull noted, ‘there was the issue of Indian Ocean security ... the significance of east and south [sic] African ports and airfields [was] increased. We would want to see them in friendly, or at worst neutral, hands.’213 While Kerin argued that, in normal circumstances, Australia did not directly link levels of aid with the human rights or governance record of recipient countries, policies of Western states during the Cold War, including that of
Australia, were frequently concerned with keeping pro-democratic governments, or governments with such tendencies, on side. 214
The Western states had to balance their disapproval of apartheid – necessary to maintain their statuses of good international citizen – and keeping South Africa pro-West. Apartheid promoted disaffections and provided ideal circumstances for the proliferation of Communist ideals. According to Firth, Australia played a pivotal role in challenging the legitimacy of apartheid in South Africa.215 Indeed, Australia and its Western allies were aware that they would benefit most from a secure, democratic South Africa, and democracy was not possible under apartheid. Even the United States recognised Australia’s criticisms of apartheid, with political commentator Joseph Hanlon quoting Australia’s strong policy stance toward South
Africa in the introduction to his book, Beggar Your Neighbour: apartheid power in South
Africa.216 Hanlon cited Bill Hayden: ‘We want to bring [South Africa] to its senses, and we want to do so before the violence in South Africa spreads beyond its borders.’217 It was certainly imperative for the Western states to prevent instability in the frontline states
212 Vale, P 2003, Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa, working paper, New York University, New York, viewed May 20 2009,
bordering South Africa so as to avert the risk of such states falling into the Communist domain. However, and as Hanlon also highlighted, despite any distaste for apartheid, to an extent South Africa commanded Western support; ‘when the West attacks apartheid it only aids Moscow’.218 The West certainly trod a thin line in expressing its disapproval for the fundamentally undemocratic apartheid system and ensuring South Africa remained satisfied under the Western sphere of influence.
Development assistance was one of the avenues the West used to maintain a positive and stable relationship with South Africa during the Cold War. Appendix 2 shows that from 1990 to 1991 – bearing in mind that the Cold War symbolically ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990 – Australian aid to southern Africa decreased by 2.39%. This decrease in aid was mirrored in other regions, including Asia. While South Africa was not receiving bilateral aid at that time, the decrease in aid to other southern Africa countries – including those bordering
South Africa: the frontline states – was indicative of a changed circumstance because the possibility of Communist influence had diminished dramatically. Aid conditions, and the reasons for such conditioning, were considered in Chapter 1: the Literature Review. Meernik et al. examines the post-Cold War US aid policy to find that security-driven aid became less customary than during the Cold War era.219 They argue that ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ style policies – a characteristic of regionalism – would become more popular. In the years following the end of the Cold War, this was certainly realised in Australian aid policy to south-east Asian countries and the south Pacific, which have continued to receive the vast majority of
Australian development assistance because there was a ‘reduced use of aid as a strategic
218 Hanlon 1986, p.8. 219 Meernik et al. 1998, pp.63-85. 96
weapon following the end of the Cold War’.220 This demonstrates that Australian aid under the
Keating government was essentially self-serving, with the Australian government preferring to provide aid to those regions where it could guarantee economic returns. It also shows that aid was strategic; when Communism no longer posed a risk in southern Africa, aid was decreased significantly. This is despite the fact that commentators such as Riddell argue in 1996, ‘it is difficult to see why external moral obligations should be set and restricted to geography.
Rather they should be linked to the scale and extent of existing poverty.’221 As has been continually shown throughout this thesis, Africa was in the greatest need of aid, with South
Africa best showcasing all of the problems that plagued the continent.222
The Cold War was the defining political consideration in the second half of the 20th century.
All aspects of international relations, including aid, were affected by the ever-present threat of global obliteration, and the careful lines of balance both pro-capitalists and pro-communists had to walk in order to prevent mutually assured destruction. This need extended to aid policies worldwide, including Australia’s policy, and all policies to South Africa. South Africa held the keys to a major trading route – the only viable alternative for world commerce other than the Suez Canal. The West considered the maintenance of South Africa’s position as a nation friendly to Western interests imperative.
220 Meernik et al. 1998, p.82; Table 2; Simons Committee Report 1997, p.63. 221 Riddell, RC 1996, ‘The moral case for post-Cold War development aid’, International Journal, vol.51, pp.191- 210, p.208. 222 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, pp.656, 738-739; Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.45. 97
INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA’S RELATIONS WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA
Between 1995 and 1996 the Australian government funded an investigation and report –
Inquiry into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa – on Australia’s political, security and trade interests in southern Africa, in areas such as the role of Africa in Australia’s global interests, Australia’s bilateral interests in key African countries, and how Australia was in a position to contribute to the improving regional security of southern Africa. Although the report was not published until near the end of the Hawke-Keating period of governance, the very fact that it was commissioned at all indicates that the Australian Labor government was beginning to recognise the importance of Africa in global affairs and was concerned for the region’s development in the post-apartheid era. Some of the key findings of this inquiry and, of more relevance to the arguments presented in this thesis, Australian perceptions of Australian aid to
South Africa, will be outlined in this sub-chapter. The examination will determine whether the recommendations made throughout the inquiry were for humanitarian or self-interested purposes.
In its published form, ‘Inquiry into Australia’s relations with Southern Africa’ spanned three volumes and included submissions from over 73 contributors, including the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID, Community Aid Abroad, World Vision Australia and the
Australian Council for Overseas Aid. The first two volumes in the series presented the individual submissions, while the third volume was a transcript of the public hearings which were held to discuss the findings and put forward the recommendations. The inquiry focused on the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) that consisted of Angola, Zambia,
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Malawi, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Mauritius and South Africa.223
The very first submission in Volume One, made by the Indian Ocean Centre for Peace
Studies, stated that, ‘Of all the countries included in the Inquiry’s terms of reference, South
Africa is undoubtedly the most important in terms of Australia’s global and regional interests.’224 The Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies stated that altruism should play a role in Australia’s relations with southern Africa, but acknowledged that there had to be a
‘healthy degree of self-interest.’225 It recommended more generous aid allocations to southern
Africa, with more imaginative programs. This was supported by Community Aid Abroad, which argued that the Australian aid program in South Africa should focus on institutional strengthening and the subsidising of investments for infrastructure such as schools and water supply.226 The submission argued that the extension of the DIFF program to South Africa would assist in meeting these goals. Consultancy firm TrAIDing for Access and Development agreed, stating that there was ‘NO contradiction combining AID and TRADE.’227 It contended mining was of particular interest to Australian companies; ringing true today as BHP Billiton operates several sites in South Africa.228
Most of the submissions to the inquiry identified the need for stronger trade links with Africa, primarily for reasons serving Australia’s economic and strategic agendas; however
223 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 11996, ‘Terms of Reference’ page. 224 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 1 1996, p.1. 225 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 1 1996, p.2. 226 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1996, Inquiry Into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, Vol. 2, 37th and 38th Parliament, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p.625. 227 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 1 1996, p.17; capitalised as emphasised in the text. 228 BHP Billiton 2010. 99
organisations such as World Vision also campaigned passionately for Australia to provide additional and better aid to southern Africa. In one of the lengthier non-government submissions, World Vision noted that since the Jackson Committee Report recommended
Australia focus its aid on its own region, Africa’s proportion of the world’s most needy people had doubled.229 This was supported by the ACFOA, which noted that the number of poor in
Asia was expected to be almost halved between 1995 and 2000; however Africa’s share of the world’s poor would double in the same period.230 ACFOA cited that through long-term development assistance a stronger relationship with southern Africa could be developed.231 It noted that commercial benefits would follow Australia’s humanitarianism, and that this sequence should not be reversed because stronger relationships would not be achieved
‘without addressing the development needs of some of the poorest countries.’232 In addition,
World Vision rejected the government-promoted idea that Australian aid could make a bigger difference in the Asia-Pacific region than Africa, arguing that because so many European states were re-directing their aid to Eastern Europe and disinvesting in Africa, Australia could in fact make a significant impact on African development.233 The submission in fact argued that ‘any additional aid would make a big difference to even one of those people [living in absolute poverty].’234
Nonetheless, and as would appear standard, in terms of regional focus the Australian
Government supported the arguments that favoured its own self-serving motivations. As the
First Assistant Secretary for the south Pacific, Africa and Middle East division for Department
229 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, p.656. 230 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, pp.738-739. 231 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, p.738. 232 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, p.740. 233 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, pp.650-651. 234 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 2 1996, pp.650-651. 100
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Rob Laurie, stated, Australia’s highest priority would
‘obviously’ remain in the Asia-Pacific region.235 This was despite recommendations by humanitarian organisations for a shift of focus. Laurie also argued that in the context of looking West across the Indian Ocean, ‘and exploring where we might go and what we might hold – particularly in terms of economic cooperation, trade facilitation and liberalisation’, southern Africa and, in particular, South Africa, were imperative to Australia’s future relations with Africa.236 Even so, Laurie stated that while South Africa was of a higher priority than most other African states, Australia saw more opportunities and potential for growth in the
Australian-South African relationship because ‘the linkages [were] already there.’237 Laurie stated:
Turning briefly to our interest in southern Africa ... in view of the improving conditions that I have touched on [post-apartheid], we reassessed in the department our principal policy interests in southern Africa. We reached certain conclusions which I would like to highlight. These are: to promote economic reform and capacity building, both to improve material conditions of Africans and to encourage the development of viable export and investment markets for Australia; to encourage efforts to foster regional security in Africa by contributing to processes of preventative diplomacy and peace building; to secure vital African support for Australian objectives in multilateral and international organisations; and, as a good international citizen, to support democratic reform and good governance and provide humanitarian relief in times of need. In terms of the scope of this inquiry, South Africa and Zimbabwe I think will inevitably remain our key bilateral relationships.238
Laurie also outlined the economic benefits privy of a closer South African tie, including greater opportunities for Australian business. However, while he stipulated the advantages for
Australia of a closer connection to Africa, there is a healthy mix of altruism and self-service in his comments. Realistically, outside of an emergency relief context, the government would
235 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 1996, Inquiry Into Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, Vol. 3, 37th and 38th Parliament, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p.8. 236 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.9. 237 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.9. 238 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, pp.5-6. 101
not have adopted policies that served a purely humanitarian rationale, so it was only natural that an element of self-interest was evident in the policies derived from the submissions.239
Nonetheless – and as continually contested throughout this thesis – it is not enough for
Australia to justify the pursuit of relations, or the provision of aid, solely because they benefit an Australian agenda. In terms of aid, problems occur when self-serving advantages influence aid, instead of being a by-product of it.240
The Joint Standing Committee held its review of the inquiry findings and the plan of action concerning Australia’s aid program to southern Africa on August 25 1995; the complete transcript is published in Volume 3 of the Inquiry into Australia’s relations with Southern Africa from pages 43 to 55. All three respondents to the chair were AusAID representatives.
AusAID announced a renewed focus on Africa and, in particular, close engagement with
South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, however South Africa was especially highlighted throughout the review.241 AusAID’s then Acting Deputy Director General for Asia, Africa and
Community Programs (ACC), Colin Lonergan, stipulated that South Africa showcased the problems that riddled all of Africa, and that Australian aid to South Africa was more important than that to some of the countries which had been dropped from the aid program.242 He said that this was because of the unique relationship Australia held with South Africa due to sharing a similar climate and geography, the moral support Australia offered the ANC toward the end of the apartheid era, and the high regard in which Australia was held in South
Africa.243 Lonergan argued that AusAID was in the business of humanitarianism and
239 Svensson 2000, p.76. 240 Chong & Gradstein 2008, p.11. 241 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.44. 242 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.45. 243 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.47. 102
development, and any links between trade and aid were coincidences.244 Clearly the DIFF program indicated otherwise, which Senator Baden Chapman Teague argued justified criticism of the Australian aid program, and in fact Lonergan even contradicted himself when he claimed that it was a ‘good news story’ that, on average, 90% of Australia’s aid was returned to Australia.245 He used the example that when wheat was sent to Mozambique,
AusAID bought from Australian producers.246 Throughout the deliberations held in the
Inquiry’s aid review, the respondents made frequent reference to the benefits Australia stood to gain through aid to South Africa and the consequent closer relationship with that country.
While the inquiry into Australia’s relations with southern Africa did emphasise the need for more and better aid, and promoted policies which would lead to that stated goal, it frequently sought to justify these in terms of the advantages development assistance could bring to the
Australian national interests.
However, the government which requested the inquiry into Australia’s relations with southern
Africa – the Labor government led by Keating – did not get the opportunity to prove whether it would adhere to its own policies concerning South Africa because in March 1996 it was replaced by a Coalition-led government. How closely the new policies were followed by the
Howard led government will be analysed in the following chapter.
CONCLUSION
The Governments of Hawke-Keating witnessed and responded to many international changes and events. Largely influenced by the recommendations of the Jackson Committee Report of
244 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.46. 245 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.46. 246 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Vol. 3 1996, p.52. 103
1984, Australian aid was largely self-centred, pursuing economic and commercial objectives that could benefit Australian national interests. The prime example of this self-service through aid was the DIFF program, whereby AusAID would fund Australian companies to complete
‘development’ projects overseas; such projects frequently lacked any humanitarian objectives or sustainability, and even more frequently garnered further international business for
Australian companies. Development assistance was often used as a tool to ensure regional stability, thus serving Australian security objectives for the Asia-Pacific region. This experience was enhanced by the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, Australia was more selective in its funding for good governance, although this did not benefit South Africa.
Apartheid offered a similar experience. Although it greatly infringed on aid during its use in
South Africa, and the abolition of apartheid did mean Australia could begin to provide bilateral assistance to that country, the aid given was by no means significant, especially when considered alongside the aid provided to south-east Asia. Foreign policy conditions under the
Hawke-Keating governments were not conducive for the development of Australian aid, even when the situation suggested that it ought to have been. Australian aid under the Hawke-
Keating governments, including aid to South Africa, was self-interested.
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CHAPTER 3: the Howard Government
In 1996, after exactly thirteen years of Labor in Federal power, the Liberal party led by John
Howard assumed Government. Australia’s aid during the Howard period was largely shaped by the Simons Report; Howard’s answer to the Jackson Committee Report. The Simons
Committee recommended Australian aid shift towards more humanitarian values, however aid funds were cut to an all time low as a percentage of GNP in the post-Whitlam period, and events of international concern – most notably a renewed threat of terrorism – impacted upon aid motivations. The Howard period emphasises what would become Australia’s most important relationship at the beginning of the new millennium: the relationship with the USA.
Australia’s allegiance with the USA was only strengthened by the renewed emergence of terrorism as the major issue in the international political arena, however, because of what would become known as ‘the Howard doctrine’, relations with Asia evolved and became somewhat strained as Asian leaders grew suspicious of Australia’s policing role of ‘deputy sheriff’ in the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, Asia continued to be the primary focus of
Australian aid due to the increased need for Australia to ensure regional security at a time when the threat of terrorism was ever present. Unfortunately, these foreign policy issues once again ensured that aid was motivated by self-interested needs, impacting on the development assistance provided to South Africa under the Hawke government.
ONE CLEAR OBJECTIVE
Shortly after the Howard led government came to power in 1996, the new Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Alexander Downer, initiated the Coalition’s answer to the Jackson Committee Report.
One Clear Objective: poverty reduction through sustainable development had one explicit objective which it repeated throughout the report; that was determining how the ‘Australian overseas aid program could best contribute to lasting poverty reduction, while also serving
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Australia’s interests.’1 In the same way that the Jackson Committee Report set the aid agenda for the Hawke-Keating governments, the Simons Report – as it was more commonly known – ensured that development assistance under the Howard government would achieve the above stated objective. The Committee was included the former Executive Chairman of
Woolworths, Paul Simons, and the Director of the Hunter Institute of Technology and
Executive Director of the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, Professor Cliff
Walsh.2 It was assisted by a small Secretariat of officers from AusAID.3 The Simons Report was extensive in its research and recommendations. The Committee received 250 submissions from individuals, academics, representatives of State and Commonwealth
Governments, Australian firms, tertiary and research institutions and multilateral and non- government organisations.4 Through such submissions, the Simons Report contextualised
Australian aid on both national and global levels, offered aid recommendations relative to those contexts, and reported on programming and policy issues such as tied aid, mixed- credits, good governance and the environment, as well as aid management issues and the structure of AusAID.
The Simons Report was quick to criticise the aid program of the Hawke-Keating governments, arguing that the triple mandate promoted by the Jackson Committee Report meant that the program lacked a clear focus. It stated, ‘At present, the managers of the aid program struggle to satisfy multiple objectives driven by a combination of humanitarian, foreign policy and commercial interests. The intrusion of short-term commercial and foreign policy imperatives
1 The Committee of Review 1997, One Clear Objective: poverty reduction through sustainable development, AusAID, Canberra, p.1. 2 The Committee of Review 1997, p.v. 3 The Committee of Review 1997, p.vi. 4 Ramli 1999, p.38. 106
has hampered AusAID’s capability to be an effective development agency.’5 It found that the
Jackson Committee’s recommendations had grown stale and that amendments were required,
‘not just to accommodate the rapid changing international environment, but also to shake out the habitual, to inject greater vitality and rigour and to sharpen the focus on the pursuit of excellence.’6 The Simons Report was not critical of the Hawke-Keating program solely for the sake of it. The Committee acknowledged that the basic arrangement of the program was sound and the AusAID-centric design and management was of benefit to development direction. However, and most importantly, the Committee recognised that humanitarianism was not at the forefront of the Hawke-Keating aid program, thus impeding aid effectiveness.
The recommendations of the Simons Report were designed to combat this.
The Simons Report made four primary recommendations for the delivery of aid under the
Howard government – recommendations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The first objective, and indeed the primary objective, was developed through the recognition that the Australian aid program had ‘struggled to satisfy a triple mandate, emphasising foreign policy and commercial benefits to Australia as well as development benefits to recipient countries.’7 The report stipulated that the rationale for aid had been confused with an operational objective, which had adversely affected the effectiveness of Australian aid. ‘A clear and unambiguous objective is required: the objective of the Australian aid program is to assist developing countries to reduce poverty through sustainable economic and social development.’8 This rationale for development assistance would certainly have indicated that aid provided under the Howard government would be of a humanitarian and developmental focus. Indeed, the report even recognised that
5 Ramli 1999, p.3. 6 The Committee of Review 1997, p.1. 7 The Committee of Review 1997, p.69. 8 The Committee of Review 1997, p.69. 107
chasing self-serving objectives through its own aid program would ‘compromise the effectiveness’ of Australian development assistance.9 The Committee cited the principal motivation for the aid program as humanitarian compassion. 10 The Report stated that
‘Australia is a relatively wealthy country and we have a moral obligation to assist those with significantly less opportunity than ourselves.’ 11 In this way, the proposed aid program was underpinned by the moralistic values promoted by Thompson, Lumsdaine and Woods.12 Thus it is evident that the Committee sought an aid program for Australia that was focused on humanitarianism in order for the full potential for developmental effectiveness to be realised.
The second recommendation of the Simons Report was concerned with ‘programming priorities’ relating to AusAID’s cooperation with developing countries. It contended that in order to achieve the primary recommendation – as previously stated, to ‘assist developing countries to reduce poverty through sustainable economic and social development’ – three management ideals needed to be adopted so that aid was more strategic and more targeted.13 These were the establishment of a framework for broad-based economic growth, increasing the productivity of the poor and overcoming structural disadvantage and discrimination against the poor.14 These programming priorities were aimed at focusing the impact of aid on the poor, ‘often in communities or regions where poverty is most prevalent.’15
9 The Committee of Review 1997, p.12. 10 The Committee of Review 1997, p.2. 11 The Committee of Review 1997, p.2. 12 Thompson 2000; Lumsdaine 1993; Woods 2005. 13 The Committee of Review 1997, p.12. 14 The Committee of Review 1997, p.12. 15 The Committee of Review 1997, p.79. 108
Thirdly, the Simons Report argued that ‘AusAID should devise a new poverty-reduction policy framework and a plan for implementing it.’16 A follow on from the second recommendation, recommendation 4.3 suggested the new framework would be informed by the programming priorities outlined in 4.2 and would basically result in more rigorous analysis in the allocation of aid – both in sectoral and geographic aspects. The Simons Report suggested that economic and distribution impact analyses should be undertaken whenever practicable so that project investment was well informed and ‘in order to maximise impact on poverty reduction.’17 In order to cut costs for such inquiries, the Committee suggested that AusAID use the research of major multilateral organisations when possible, such as those assessments made by the
World Bank.18 By using current knowledge of individual country needs, the Committee contended that an effective strategy could be developed which would render aid more likely to succeed in addressing the poverty-based issues most imperative to individual recipients.19 It would seem that recommendation 4.3 had the development needs of recipient countries at its core because it promoted consultation so that the needs of the recipient countries were addressed before anything else.
The fourth and final objective was simple: the Simons Committee rejected the internationally- promoted ideal for aid volume as 0.7% of GNP. The Committee claimed the 0.7% target was
‘no longer credible’ and recommended that an ‘achievable’ short-term target should be set instead.20 This was despite the fact that it was widely considered that the 0.7% target was originally set in a 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution, and had the support of 22 donor
16 The Committee of Review 1997, p.12. 17 The Committee of Review 1997, p.81. 18 The Committee of Review 1997, p.81. 19 The Committee of Review 1997, p.81. 20 The Committee of Review 1997, p.12. 109
countries, most of which had higher donor rates than Australia.21 The Committee justified this recommendation by saying the 0.7% target was ‘no longer realistic’ and that many other donor countries had also abandoned the target.22 While it is fair to say that the Committee was encouraging a target that would quickly be achieved, it was not mindful of long-term poverty reduction or the development needs of Third World aid recipients; instead it was founded on the image and economic policy concerns of the Australian Government. By stating that the
0.7% target was unrealistic the Simons Report was providing the Australian Government with justification for its low aid level, and in fact even giving it an excuse to decrease the percentage further. In a response to the recommendations of the Simons Report in 1997
Janet Hunt of ACFOA stated, ‘We remain concerned about the low level of Australian aid ... we must not abandon the 0.7% international benchmark.’23 It is evident that independent aid organisations, which are noted for having altruism and humanitarianism at their core, did not support any cuts in aid.
While the Simons Report actually made 79 recommendations, it was the four outlined above, and especially recommendation 4.1, that were deemed to be most important; the rest of the recommendations were invariably underpinned by one or more of the first four. It must be noted that these were just recommendations – whether or not the Howard government accepted all of them and to what extent will be analysed in the following sub-chapter, ‘The
Actual Aid Expenditure of the Howard Government’.
21 United Nations General Assembly 1970, International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, Resolution 2626, Paragraph 43; Millennium Project 2006, United Nations Secretary General and United Nations Development Group, New York, viewed April 22 2010,
The abolition of the DIFF program was the greatest immediate change to be undertaken by the Howard Government. Indeed, the Simons Report was not at all complimentary of the
DIFF program, calling it ‘the most damaging way in which direct commercial objectives were pursued under the aid program, since not only Australian aid, but the recipient’s scarce capital were tied to Australian supply, thereby multiplying any cost penalty.’24 The Simons Report skewed some representations of the DIFF; for example, the Committee reported that the DIFF program was developed by the Hawke Government in 1982 when in actuality it was developed by the Fraser Government in 1980.25 Perhaps it was just an error on the Committee’s part, but more likely it was an attempt to blame the DIFF solely on a Labor Government. The
Simons Report did acknowledge that the DIFF did make some contributions to development.
However, and as is the major contention of this thesis, the Simons Committee argued aid that does not support the achievement of maximum development impact does not have a place in
Australia’s bilateral aid program. The DIFF project was a major example of such aid as it was not weighted upon the development priorities of the recipient country.26
Imperative to the effects on aid to Africa is the stance the Simons Committee took on the geographic allocations of aid. Unlike the Jackson Committee Review which analysed aid to specific geographic locations into sub-chapters, the Simons Report looked at aid from a geographic perspective in a general sense. Aid to Africa was grouped with that to south
Asia.27 The recommendations for Africa were general: aid should be re-focussed so that the twenty-plus countries that were receiving aid at the time of the report were cut to less than
24 Hunt 1997b, p.74. 25 Hunt 1997b, p.200; AusAID 1996, p.2. 26 The Committee of Review 1997, p.204. 27 The Committee of Review 1997, p.91. 111
ten.28 Like the Jackson Committee, the Simons Committee contended that the Australian aid program was spread too widely and that the number of recipient countries should be cut.29
The Simons Report Committee recommended that the countries of east Asia and the Pacific should continue to be the primary geographic focus of Australian aid, and that the total number of countries supported by AusAID be reduced both regionally and beyond.30 Aid to
Africa was not a high priority of the Simons Committee; South Africa did not even warrant a mention in the report. This was despite the fact that regions of Africa, including sub-Saharan
Africa where South Africa is located, have long been considered to be some of the neediest in the world.31 With this in mind, the Simons Committee actually contradicted its own proclaimed primary recommendation of reducing poverty via the provision of aid to developing countries motivated by humanitarian considerations with the abandonment of self-interest. Downer stated that aid served a ‘core development role ... to emphasise poverty through sustainable development. Aid efforts cannot and should not be a vehicle for other purposes, such as short-term commercial gains.’32 However, and as will be shown in the following sub-chapter, the recommendations of the Simons Committee and the proclamations of the Howard
Government often conflicted with the course of action undertaken by that Government.
The Simons Report offered the results of polls which claimed to indicate the public’s sentiments towards tied aid; that is, aid that was connected to Australian goods or services – aid which served self-interested objectives. The report noted that 81% of Australians thought
28 The Committee of Review 1997, p.92. 29 Jackson Committee 1984, pp.203-204; The Committee of Review 1997, p.83. 30 The Committee of Review 1997, p.83. 31 Anderson, LM & Taylor, HF 2006, Sociology: Understanding A Diverse Society, 4th edn, Cengage Learning, Wadsworth, p.264. 32 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 1997, Better Aid for a Better Future, Seventh Annual Report to Parliament on Australia’s Development Cooperation Program and the Government’s Response to the Committee of Review of Australia’s Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra, p.5. 112
it was important that ‘Australian foreign aid should promote the employment of Australians and the use of Australian made goods.’33 Interestingly, the report did not mention the results of any polls considering the humanitarian focus of Australian aid, however the 81% statistic was imperative in establishing a clear role for the tying of development assistance so that it was distinctly Australian. Following publication of these statistics, the Simons Committee distanced itself from the findings, stating that ‘Tying our aid undermines the achievement of this goal [for aid to be as effective as possible]. It represents a focus on inputs rather than outcomes.’34 Nonetheless, in reporting the survey the Simons Report stressed the perceived importance of tying aid. Had it included the findings of polls concerning the humanitarian focus of aid it would have merely been even coverage of the report, and not a subtle attempt to promote commercialism through Australian development assistance.
The Simons Report admitted that the ‘essential challenge’ for AusAID was through the re- orientation of the program ‘to focus more consistently on outcomes.’35 It acknowledged that, relative to most of the world, Australia was an extremely wealthy country which had ‘a moral obligation to assist those with significantly less opportunity than ourselves.’36 However, the
Committee also admitted that the Australian aid program it recommended would not be solely altruistic. The report stated that Australia’s long-term foreign policy and commercial interests would need to be served through the program:
There is also a large degree of shared interest – and perhaps for none more than Australia. Unlike most other countries, we live in a developing part of the world. Our standard of living is much higher than our neighbours in the Asia and Pacific islands. The prosperity of the developing world is clearly in Australia’s national
33 AIDAB 1994a, What do Australians Think About Aid? The Key Findings of the Survey of Public Attitudes to Overseas Aid, AIDAB, Canberra, p.14; in The Committee of Review 1997, pp.184-185. 34 The Committee of Review 1997, p.185. 35 The Committee of Review 1997, p.2. 36 The Committee of Review 1997, p.2. 113
interest – not only for regional stability and security but also for our own economic future. In an increasingly interdependent world, the people of the developing countries are our future partners in business and trade.37
Again, the Simons Committee’s subtle suggestion of self-interest should be noted. While the report acknowledged the need for Australia to assist its developing neighbours, it did not extend the need to other areas, such as Africa. It justified aid to the region by listing the benefits it would yield for Australia.
The Simons Report generated praise from representatives of aid organisations. Janet Hunt of
ACFOA stressed at a public forum entitled ‘Recommendations for Australia’s Aid Program’ that the Simons Report’s focus on poverty and reducing political pressures on the aid budget from commercial interest groups was imperative in sustaining public support for aid.38 Baldock found that the Simons Report ‘recognised the importance of increasing the level of accountability of Australia as an aid donor’; such accountability would have enhanced the effectiveness of aid because it meant that the wider public and media could be more confident the Australian aid program was meeting its stated goals by means of transparency.39 To forgo any unnecessary embarrassment, a more transparent AusAID would have to go to greater lengths to ensure programs effectively met goals, and if projects did fail, the foreign development agency would then have the opportunity to publicly acknowledge why and ensure how such mistakes would not be repeated. Indeed, the Simons Report acknowledged the importance of aid accountability and transparency when it stated that ‘In the absence of
37 The Committee of Review 1997, p.2. 38 Hunt, J 1997a, Address to a Public Forum on “Recommendations For Australia’s Aid Program”, 26 July, Adelaide; Hunt 1997b, in Baldock 1997, p.16. 39 Baldock 1997, p.173. 114
freely available, independent and rigorous assessments of aid activities, the public is unable to judge whether it receives value for money from its aid program.’40
As the Jackson Committee Report shaped aid policy under the Hawke-Keating governments, to an extent, the Simons Report guided AusAID under the Howard government. To its credit, the Simons Report prioritised humanitarianism at the forefront of aid, and argued that precedence of such altruism would ensure aid was delivered in its most effective capacity.
However, and in the same breath, the report also stipulated the importance of the Asia-Pacific to Australia and suggested that other regions, including Africa, receive less development assistance. It is apparent that the Simons Report also promoted the pursuit of Australia’s own national interests through its foreign aid program – insofar as humanitarianism would suggest that the neediest countries of the world, many of which were found in Africa, were assisted more – however it was more subtle in this suggestion than the Jackson Committee Report.
Perhaps the most significant indication of the true objective of the aid program under Howard was evident in recommendation 4.4; the report’s suggestion that the internationally recognised and agreed target 0.7% of GNP for aid be dropped to a lesser figure because, according to the Simons Report, the 0.7% target was ‘no longer credible’.41 Like music to the new government’s ears, recommendation 4.4 provided the Howard government with a reason to dramatically decrease aid funding, and decrease aid it did, as will be seen in the following sub- chapter.
40 The Committee of Review 1997, p.173. 41 The Committee for Review 1997, p.13. 115
ACTUAL AID EXPENDITURE UNDER HOWARD
As just stated in the ‘One Clear Objective’ conclusion, the Simons Committee made three important recommendations relative to the contention of this thesis, with two of them contradicting each other. The first recommendation was that humanitarianism shift so it was central to all of Australia’s development assistance and aid policies. Although this was certainly laudable, the Simons Report also recommended that Australian aid remain focused on the Asia-Pacific region; however if Australian aid was to truly shift towards humanitarianism, aid would have extended to other regions – such as Africa – instead of remaining in the region where it could most enhance Australia’s own self-serving interests.
The Committee also recommended that AusAID commit to a lesser, ‘more achievable’ figure than 0.7% for the ODA/GNP ratio. The Australian Government, national interests in mind, did commit to the later two recommendations in terms of development assistance: the Asia-Pacific remained its primary focus for aid, and the Government allowed aid to drop, and stay, to less than 0.3% of GNP – a more than twenty year low. 42 (Please refer to Appendix 4)
Unfortunately, and partly due to international considerations, Australian aid did not often have a purely humanitarian focus and, as under the Hawke-Keating governments, aid remained a fundamentally political phenomenon.
Especially in the few years following its election, the Howard Government frequently promoted humanitarianism as being at the core of its development program. In 1997 Downer stated that, following policies under Hawke and Keating, aid policy should be redirected to its ‘core developmental role ... to emphasise poverty reduction through sustainable development. Aid efforts cannot and should not be a vehicle for other purposes, such as short-term commercial
42 Firth 2005, p.291. 116
goals.’43 It would almost seem that Downer’s statement was a direct attempt to remove the
Howard Government’s aid program from the influences of the Hawke-Keating governments, which shamelessly used Australian development assistance to satisfy commercial and economic pursuits. However, the expenditure of actual aid funds did not really differ between the two ideologies; it was simply a case of the Hawke-Keating Governments being transparent about their motivations, while the Howard Government primarily used a facade. From 1997 to
2000, Australian aid for education was still primarily channelled into post-secondary education; a total of $472,729,000 was spent on post-secondary education while only $145,003,000 was spent on primary education and $89,286 was spent on secondary education.44 As was noted in the Hawke-Keating chapter, it is primary and secondary education that most benefit development and it is likely that the allocations for post-secondary education were in the form of scholarships to institutions; humanitarianism was not at the core of the education funding during the first few years of the Howard Government. Furthermore, humanitarianism did not extend to other sectors and thus not the program as a whole. From 1997 to 2000, while funds for water supply and education stood at just $110,657,000 and the health sector received only
$296,871,000, funding for the governance of ‘fragile states’ in Australia’s regional neighbourhood, and thus enhancing Australia’s own security, more than doubled from the
1997-1998 financial year to the 1999-2000 year; the total amount for that period inclusive was
$378,644,000.45 Ergo it is clear that while the Howard Government preached ideals of humanitarianism, the sectoral allocation of its aid shows that self-service still reigned supreme in terms of the prioritisation of funding. Indeed, Trood noted that the primary task for the
Howard Government was ‘to design and conduct a foreign policy with a clearer focus on
43 Downer 1997. 44 AusAID 2001, p.15. 45 AusAID 2001, pp.15-16. 117
Australia’s immediate national interests and to place them at the forefront of its international agenda.’46
The Howard Government did not solely pay lip service to the Simons Committee’s recommendations. Australian aid continued to focus in the Asia-Pacific region. (Please refer to Appendix 3) During the Howard period, a total of 63% of development assistance went to the Asia-Pacific, with Asia receiving 34.23% of AusAID and countries of the Pacific, including
Papua New Guinea, receiving 28.77%. ‘The Rest of the World’ received unallocated aid of
29.23%, meaning that over 93% of aid went to the Asia-Pacific or was not allocated to a specific country or region. Sub-Saharan Africa received a meagre 3.28% of total funds, while
South Africa received just 0.45%. As demonstrated by Appendix 8, regions of the Asia-Pacific consistently received the majority of allocations from the Howard government, while Africa and the Americas barely break the 0% axis. As noted by Baldock, the Howard Government, justified by the Simons Committee’s recommendations, reinforced ‘the role of aid in creating an Australian presence in the Asian region, rather than focussing on the needs of those experiencing the greatest poverty, a consideration which would surely result in increased funding to Africa’, including South Africa.47 It is evident that, despite the promotion of humanitarianism and the recommendations of the Simons Report, self-serving interests were still being met in the aid program of the Howard government.
Once again true to the Simons Committee’s recommendations, the Howard Government most definitely abandoned the 1970s UN General Assembly Resolution target of 0.7%. During the
46 Trood, R 1998, ‘Perspective on Australian Foreign Policy – 1997’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.52, no.2. 47 Baldock 1997, p.18. 118
1996-1997 financial year – the first full year where the Government had control of AusAID – for the first time ever aid fell below 0.3% to 0.28%. (Please refer to Appendix 4) Aid continued to drop or remain stagnant during the Howard government, not again reaching the
0.3% level until the 2006-07 financial year. Downer justified the reduction of Australia’s aid funds as a reflection of ‘Australia’s reduced capacity to provide assistance due to the urgent need to curb the level of government spending, and reduced Australia’s budget deficit.’48
Indeed, shortly after becoming Treasurer of the newly elected Howard government, Peter
Costello ‘announced the need to reduce the looming budget deficit by $4 billion in 1996-97, and to return the budget to an underlying balance in 1997-98 with a further $4 billion cut.’49 As this extended to Australia’s aid program, AusAID’s most significant cuts occurred in Africa.
From 1996-1997 sub-Saharan Africa as a whole had funds slashed from 5.43% to 4.32% of
Australia’s total bilateral aid budget, which amounted to over $15 million. (Please refer to
Appendix 3) However, despite the ‘necessary’ budget cuts to AusAID, other states – particularly those in northern Europe – consistently provided more than the recommended target of 0.7%. (Please refer to Appendix 5 and Appendix 9) Countries like Denmark,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway always provided more than 0.7% of their
GNI for development assistance. Meanwhile Australia never moved from the lower-half of the
0.2-0.4 bracket.
Although this thesis has not generally acknowledged aid for disaster relief, the outstanding assistance provided by the Australian Government in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami which affected many nations bordering the Indian Ocean was praise-worthy. The
48 Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Australia’s Overseas Aid Program: 1997-1998, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. 49 The Australian 1996, 22 April in Ramli 1999, p.6. 119
tsunami killed approximately two hundred thousand people, displaced another million and left at least five million people without basic services.50 The Australian Government responded to the disaster swiftly. The day after the tsunami, Australian planes loaded with emergency stores headed to the areas of greatest need. One of these areas was Aceh in Indonesia, where the Australian Government’s long-term commitment was evident in the quick supply of
$60 million for restoration which built upon an existing five year program of $800 million.51
Soon after, it committed a further $1 billion for the long-term reconstruction and development of Indonesia – Australia’s largest single aid allocation in its history.52 Without intending to lessen the achievements of the Australian aid program in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the question must be asked: would the Australian Government have responded in the same way if the disaster had been in a different region of the world?
Despite the aid motivations of the Howard Government, according to a 2001 poll commissioned by AusAID and ACFOA, 85% of Australians supported the overseas aid program.53 The survey found that the three key reasons why Australians believed that their country should contribute to development efforts overseas were ‘to look after those who are less fortunate, for humanitarian and moral reasons, and because Australia is wealthy and can afford it.’54 Absent from that list of reasons was the pursuit of Australian national interest under the premise of goodwill – which, as this thesis has shown, played a large part in the
Government’s use of aid. Public support for overseas aid was also evident in that 50% of
50 AusAID 2007, Indian Ocean Disaster, AusAID, Canberra, viewed 1 August 2010,
Australians claimed to have donated either time or money to an overseas aid agency in the year prior to being surveyed.55 Then Executive Director of ACFOA, Graham Tupper argued that the moral responsibility cited by many of the surveyed Australians was also reflected ‘in a
30% increase in the voluntary giving of Australians to overseas aid agencies since the last survey was undertaken in 1998.’56 However, the average Australian’s actual knowledge of
AusAID’s activities, policies or direction could not have been common knowledge; therefore, while most Australians supported AusAID, many did not have had a very clear understanding of its role in overseas development. If recent comments by the current Parliamentary
Secretary for International Development Assistance Bob McMullan, or public perceptions of aid as evidenced by reader comments of articles in the Courier-Mail, are anything to go by, even in 2001 the average Australian did not have an understanding.57 Referring to a recent outcry by the Liberal Party, media and general public concerning the current Labor
Government’s plans to increase aid to Africa, McMullan stated that, ‘I welcome the increased media attention on the overseas aid budget. Even ill-informed comments raise awareness and give those of us committed to the fight against global poverty the opportunity to make our case.’58 Of course it is important for the Australian public to support AusAID and to be satisfied that it is providing aid based upon policies that the average Australian endorses.
However, very frequently opinions of the aid program are based upon propaganda from the media, the government or the federal opposition or other ill-informed Australians.
55 Downer 2001. 56 Downer 2001. 57 McMullan, B (Parliamentary Secretary for International Development Assistance) 2010, ‘Poverty Knows No Borders’, The Age, 26 May, viewed 3 July 2010,
The Howard Government regularly reflected the contentions of the Simons Committee, and argued that aid should be based upon the principles of humanitarianism and altruism. While the government may have fooled a high proportion of the Australian public, upon closer inspection of Australian aid under Howard, it is evident that self-interests were often pursued via the aid program, especially in terms of protecting Australia’s own regional neighbourhood and thus security. In addition, aid under the Howard Government was significantly cut, justifying Ramli’s comment that ‘foreign aid remained a relatively low priority for the government.’59 The aid program did mirror the policies of the Simons Committee: it preached humanitarianism while providing less development assistance which was decidedly self- interested. Aid under the Howard Government was largely self-serving, and this impacted on both the quantity and quality of aid provided to South Africa.
TERRORISM
The biggest consideration of international relations in the 21st century has undoubtedly been terrorism. After September 11 (9/11) 2001, when Muslim insurgents led attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon in the USA which killed thousands of people, Western leaders became increasingly concerned with international security and developed policies specifically relating to security and terrorism. Many Western countries, including Australia, developed counter-terrorism policies in order to protect their borders. Such policies extended to development assistance, where funding for good governance increased significantly.60
Following 9/11 aid was used as a tool in the fight against terrorism, with Australian aid increasing to neighbouring ‘fragile states’ such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New
59 Ramli 1999, pp.6-7. 60 AusAID 2003b, Statistical Summary 2002-2003: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra, p.14. 122
Guinea and the Solomon Islands in order to ensure security for Australia’s own region. In this way aid was self-serving, and this was to the detriment of South Africa in terms of receiving funding for aid.
Since the events of 9/11 much of the West has perceived the world to be polarised into two main groups; as then-US President Bush said on Saturday 3 November in the year of the attacks, ‘You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror.’61 Because Australia had particularly cultivated ties with the US during the Howard period of governance, and was even perceived to be its ‘deputy sheriff’ within the Asia-Pacific region, the Australian
Government was enthusiastic to join the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ and sent troops to both
Afghanistan and Iraq despite public opposition, as evidenced by massive protests throughout the country.62 For Australia, the threat of terrorism was brought home after the nightclub bombing in Bali that killed 202 people, including 88 Australian tourists, in 2002.63 This was perceived by many as a direct attack on Australia, and so Australia became even more enmeshed in the War on Terror.
In their article assessing the changes a renewed threat of terrorism had on international development assistance, Howell and Lind define the ‘the global war on terror regime’ as being:
a complex weaving of discourse, political alliances, policy and legislative shifts, institutional arrangements and practices. The trope of the global war on terror
61 CNN 2001, ‘You are either with us or against us’, 6 November, viewed 3 July 2010,
serves as mobilising discourse, used by political leaders in pursuit of military and political objectives.64
In the context of Australian aid and its self-serving policies, it becomes apparent that the discourse of ‘the global war on terror regime’ allowed Australian leaders – specifically those involved in foreign policy under the Howard government – to justify Australian aid being spent on national and regional security objectives. Indeed, Howell and Lind support this when they argue that the threat of terrorism ‘has contributed in diverse and complex ways to the increasing securitisation of development and aid policy’ by encapsulating ‘global and national security interests into the framing structuring and implementation of development and aid.’65
In terms of international relations, terrorism was the ‘flavour of the month’ for the years following 9/11, and indeed it is a hot topic even now, almost nine years later. Much analysis central to the study of terrorism has been conducted in the years following 9/11, and within these investigations came the inevitable link between poverty and terrorism. The events of
9/11 reiterated to the global community, and especially to the West, that poverty was a very real threat to national security. Indeed, Thomas and Reader find that ‘Poverty is now seen as a key threat to global peace.’66 Howell and Lind contend that ‘At the macro level political leaders articulate a view that poverty, deprivation and terrorism are related, with the crudest versions claiming a direct causality.’67 Piazza, Abadie, and Krueger and Malečková also denied that there was a fundamental link between poverty and terrorism.68 Nonetheless, post
9/11 conflict and terrorism have been perceived as problems of underdevelopment caused by
64 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1280. 65 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1280. 66 Thomas & Reader in White et al. 2005, p.90. 67 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1281. 68 Piazza 2006, p.173; Krueger & Malečková 2003, p.2; Abadie 2004, p.9. 124
poverty and hopelessness.69 In turn, this has had an effect on the primary form of poverty relief – aid. It is worth mentioning that, as stated in the literature review, some commentators
– including Azam and Delacroix – actually found that states receiving aid were more likely to produce terrorists.70 However, their findings were inconclusive and such arguments were not widespread across the literature.
The Australian response to terrorism through aid was predictable – as with most other development assistance provided under the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments, aid was used to further Australian interests. That being said, the Australian government more than doubled its development assistance between 2000 and 2003.71 In the argument against terrorism, the Australian Government used aid as a foreign policy instrument ‘to pursue its security interests against a backdrop of the 9/11 attacks and the nightclub bombing in Bali in
October 2002 that killed scores of Australian tourists.’72 In 2002, following the Bali Bombings, the Australian Government issued a report titled Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid.73
Throughout the report poverty and terrorism are inextricably linked, with sentences like ‘while poverty provides no justification for acts of terror, entrenched poverty can create an environment in which terrorist networks may be fostered.’74 In addition, the report firmly emplaced aid as having an important role in the eradication of poverty. It stated that, ‘The aid program helps developing countries manage the threat of terrorism by strengthening counter- terrorism capacity, particularly in the areas of: terrorist financing and money laundering,
69 Duffield, M 2001, Global Governance and the New War: The Merging of Development and Security, Zed Books, London. 70 Azam & Delacroix 2005. 71 OECD 2005a, p.20. 72 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1282. 73 AusAID 2002, Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid, Government of Australia, Canberra. 74 AusAID 2002, p.4. 125
counter-terrorism aspects of policing and border security.’75 Indeed, Howell and Lind found that:
The nature of the threat was conceptualised in such a way as to establish a clear role for fighting terrorism. Specifically, the report explained that aid could be used to build the capacity of partner countries to respond to terrorist threats and reduce poverty, thereby minimising the opportunity for terrorists to exploit feelings of hopelessness.76
Australian aid was shaped in such a way as to ‘combat’ the problem of terrorism and issues associated with it. In this way, Australian aid was, yet again, used by the government to pursue self-serving interests; it was used to overcome threats to Australia’s own security. This was evident in its promotion of extending development projects in Indonesia, the Philippines and the poorest Pacific countries which were considered a threat to regional security.77 In a
2003 speech, Alexander Downer further supported this when he said, ‘Conflict and instability, including the threat of terrorism, impact directly on the development prospects of countries in our region, and therefore Australia's national interest.’78
While the governments of Hawke and Keating frequently sought to gain commercial and economic interests through aid, under the Howard government aid was used more as a tool for achieving strategic objectives. In a 2005 speech, the AusAID Director General, Bruce
Davis, stressed the importance of pursuing strategy through aid.79 Davis argued that ‘fragile states’, such as those countries in Australia’s own regional neighbourhood, threatened
Australia’s security because they are frequently ‘unable or unwilling to provide basic services
75 AusAID 2002, p.5. 76 AusAID 2002, p.5; Howell & Lind 2009, p.1282. 77 AusAID 2002, pp.6-8. 78 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 2003b, Australia’s Aid Budget: Promoting Regional Stability, Security and Economic Growth, media release, 13 May, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. 79 Davis, B (AusAID Director General) 2005, Aid and Security After the Tsunami, speech, delivered on 27 October, AusAID, Canberra. 126
to their citizens.’80 As the Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid paper asserted, Davis found an imperative role to play in ensuring regional security:
It was not too long ago that aid and development lay firmly on the periphery of serious considerations of Australia’s security and strategic interests. Aid was often regarded as a somewhat ill-defined process of ‘doing good’, a process which had little tangible impact on the strategic environment faced by Australia and its policy makers. These times are now over.81
Davis affirmed that aid was to play ‘one part of an integrated Australian approach to the complex security challenges of our region.’ 82 Indeed, development assistance for issues of policing and border control began to constitute ODA, joining the more traditional sectoral aid allocations such as health, education and infrastructure.83 Most of the allocation for issues of governance and security went to law and justice (47%); public sector effectiveness received
21% and civil society and human rights 13%.84 This emphasis on governance alludes to the concerns of perceived threats by those ‘fragile’ neighbours of Australia; those were viewed as challenges to Australia’s own security.85 This was of concern to the 2005 OECD Peer Review, who were worried that ‘the emphasis on law and order aspects of governance compared to civil society and democracy or public service effectiveness could undermine the stated poverty reduction focus of Australian aid.’86
As previously stated, when terrorism became imperative to foreign policy, Australian aid became more strategy focused. This was evident in the sectoral allocations of aid; post 9/11
80 Davis 2005. 81 Davis 2005. 82 Davis 2005. 83 Tomar, R (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Section) 2004, The Changing Focus of Australia’s Aid Program: Budget 2004-05, Research Note No. 59 2003-2004, 31 May, Department of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra, viewed 6 July 2009,
the primary change of direction of Australian aid was the re-focusing of aid at promoting good governance in the Asia-Pacific region – a shift intended to ensure stability in Australia’s regional neighbourhood.87 In the same way that aid during the Cold War period was used as a tool dependent on the ideological swaying of a recipient state, aid provided in the wake of
9/11 became conditional. Alexander Downer listed the sectors affected by aid for governance in 2003: ‘Aside from law and justice, key areas of focus are the development of effective, transparent and accountable institutions of government and public administration, improving the accessibility and quality of basic education services and the development of robust civil societies.’88 It was perceived that if a nation state had a strong government, terrorist networks would find it difficult to find a foothold in that region. Thomas and Reader noted, ‘In an increasingly co-ordinated fashion, donors line up behind the [neo-liberal development] model, and the possibility of alternative sources of funding for different development paths is virtually non-existent.’89 The West connected poverty and insecurity, and seeing as there was no other major ideology with adequate funds development assistance, the West was able to impose its ideology for ‘freedom’ and democracy as a condition for its aid. This was supported by Von Hippel, who, using Pakistan as a case study, found that the impoverished were more likely to be connected to terrorist groups than the wealthy.90 The direction of bilateral aid refocused onto the frontline states in the global War on Terror.91
As with any self-interested objective pursued through aid, Australia’s focus on regional security and its own strategic benefits came at a cost for the actual effectiveness of aid. As
87 Firth 2005, p.291. 88 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 2003c, Building Regional Security and Combating Terrorism, speech, 26 November, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. 89 Thomas & Reader in White et al. 2005, p.90. 90 Von Hippel 2002, p.27. 91 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1281. 128
the OECD noted, ‘These growing concerns with security and the sectoral shifts in funding towards governance have overshadowed the poverty focus of development policy in
Australia.’92 Although the Australian Government has always provided assistance for counter- terrorism and illegal migration such as policing and border control, only in the wake of 9/11 has this been categorised as aid.93 While the OECD acknowledges the risk of terrorism, it contends that although counter-terrorism is important, it must not ‘override the development agenda’ and Howell and Lind noted that ‘short-term national interests should not overshadow those of its partner countries.94
Even though the focus of the aid may have changed, the levels at which it was given remained stagnant. Cotton and Ravenhill cite the aid to GDP ratio as being 0.25 per cent; a ‘low level’.95
Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer seemingly thought the opposite, boasting that at
0.25%, it was ‘again placing Australia above the donor average which, in the latest year available (2002), is 0.23%.’96 In fact, throughout the 2003-04 aid budget Downer boasted increases throughout the Asia-Pacific, including a $30 million increase in funding to Indonesia to assist in counter-terrorism and governance, bringing the total for Indonesia to $152 million.
The $30 million increase for Indonesia comprised almost half of the $79 million increase over the 2003-2003 aid budget. Other funding included increases for counter-terrorism initiatives in east Asia, and ongoing support for the reconstruction of Iraq.97 Downer also promised
92 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005a, DAC Peer Review: Australia, OECD, Paris, p. 12, at www.oecd.org/dac, accessed 4 July 2010,
continued food aid for severely drought stricken Africa; a dollar figure was not provided, nor was any specific country named. This was the sole mention of Africa in his speech. The
OECD warned against Australia’s regional focus in its development assistance as it ‘could compromise a needs-based approach and the principles of neutrality and impartiality.’98
Clearly this was not of concern for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade or its influence on AusAID, as throughout the Howard Period, aid continued to focus on Australia’s regional neighbourhood. (Please refer to Appendix 3)
The funding allocated to the Pacific amounted to 40% of the total aid budget; an increase from
30% in 1995-1996.99 The primary focus of this aid was on the Solomon Islands and Papua
New Guinea; the South Pacific’s most unstable, ‘fragile states’. Howell and Lind noted that in
2003, 47% of Australia’s ODA went to the Pacific and 42% went to Asia; meaning that a paltry
11% went to other regions, including Africa.100 More telling, however, of Australia’s security concerns in the Pacific was the quadrupling of the budget for the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which from 2003 to 2004 increased from $37.4 million to
$168.5 million.101 Australia’s security concerns were not limited to the Pacific region. In 2005
Alexander Downer noted, ‘We have doubled our assistance to Indonesia and the Philippines to help manage terrorist threats.’102 Even more noteworthy was that Iraq featured ninth of the top ten recipients of AusAID, receiving $21 million; all other top ten recipients of bilateral
AusAID were in the Asia-Pacific.103 The sudden surge of aid to the Middle East is made
98 OECD 2005a, p.20. 99 O’Connor et al. 2006, p.2. 100 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1294. 101 O’Connor et al. 2006, pp.180-184. 102 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 2005, Ministerial Statement to Parliament on Australia’s Aid Program, speech, 10 March, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. 103 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1283. 130
obvious in Appendix 8; between 2003 and 2004, aid sharply increased to that region. This is a clear indication of the refocus Australian aid had in terms of governance, terrorism and security. It is also indicative of the self-serving nature of aid; if humanitarianism was more imperative than strategic interest, the aid would have been more focused on sectors such as food, education, health and infrastructure. Because the aid focus had shifted to include states deemed to be high-risk bases for terrorism, states which did not pose such an obvious risk – such as South Africa – once again missed out on higher levels of Australian aid.
Of course, Australia was not alone in its changing aid focus. Howell and Lind’s article,
Changing Donor Policy and Practice in Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Aid Context, case studied not only the reshaping of Australian aid after 9/11, but also that of the USA, the UK and
Sweden. Like Australia, the development assistance of the USA and UK was refocused to have a much stronger emphasis on governance; ‘tying development and security more firmly together.’104 However, while Sweden did increase aid to Iraq – as all four examined states did
– ‘the priorities and geographic allocation of Sweden’s development co-operation [were] more clearly guided by poverty reduction criteria.’105 It was noted that in 2005-06, the African states of ‘Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda and Ethiopia were ranked in the top five recipients of
Swedish ODA.’106 These are considered to be some of the least-developed countries worldwide, and around 75% of Sweden’s bilateral development assistance went to such states.107 Therefore it is apparent that, even in the face of terrorism, not all aid was refocused
104 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1292. 105 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1290. 106 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2006, ‘Sweden: gross bilateral ODA, 2005-06’ in Howell, J & Lind, J 2009, ‘Changing Donor Policy and Practice in Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Aid Context’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.30, No.7, pp.1279-1296, p.1290. 107 OECD 2005b. 131
to consider a donor’s own strategic objectives. Unfortunately, this was not true of Australian aid.
It is evident that many Western states, including Australia, assumed causal links between poverty and terrorism. As a result, post 9/11 the Australian government ‘brought development more firmly into line with foreign policy and national security objectives.’108 As has been continually shown throughout this thesis, Australia’s foreign policy under Hawke-Keating and
Howard essentially served the country’s own interests, especially in the form of securing stability in its own regional neighbourhood, as this would best benefit Australia’s fundamentally self-interested policies.
HIV/AIDS
Although the emergence of The Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) was significant during the 1980s and early 1990s, it was not until the mid-1990s that the grave seriousness and the widespread impact it would have on a global level became clear. More commonly known as HIV/AIDS, the illness is caused by the
HIV virus which gradually destroys a victim’s immune system until he or she develops
AIDS.109 HIV/AIDS had such an influence on global society in the latter years of the 20th century that it earned a definition in the Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History under ‘AIDS’.110 It stated that AIDS became widespread in the early 1980s, and by 2000 had raised issues of equity because ‘almost all research on the disease was devoted to strands of
108 Howell & Lind 2009, p.1292. 109 Avert 2010, AIDS, Avert: Averting HIV and AIDS, West Sussex, viewed 1 March 2010,
HIV most common in the United States and Europe.’111 The origins of the illness are still unclear and there is no cure for it, however recent developments in drugs have dramatically decelerated the reproduction of the HIV virus within the body, thus extending the life expectancy of sufferers considerably.112
HIV/AIDS has always been common in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it was not until the
1990s that the virus became a serious problem in South Africa. South Africa only recorded the first black South African diagnosed with AIDS in 1987; until then, in South Africa the virus had solely affected Caucasian homosexuals, and so it was generally perceived that the disease was an issue for the gay community.113 As it spread in South Africa, the HIV virus was often found amongst mine workers and close to major trucking routes near Swaziland and
Mozambique because the South African epidemic was ‘very much linked to the wider continental epidemic’.114 In 1990, less than 1% of South Africans had AIDS. It was in 1995 that AIDS was officially reaching pandemic proportions in South Africa, and by 1996 the figure stood at 3%.115 Women were almost three times more likely to be infected than men; in 1996
73% of all reported cases were female.116 By 1999, 10% of South Africans were infected, and in 2006, 18.3% of South African adults aged 15 to 49 carried HIV/AIDS. 117
111 Palmowski 2004, p.10. 112 Avert 2010. 113 Van der Vliet, V, ‘South Africa Divided Against AIDS: a Crisis of Leadership’ in Kaufman, KD and Lindauer, DL (eds.) 2004, AIDS and South Africa: The Social Expression of a Pandemic, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 114 Avert 2010. 115 Govender, T 2008, Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, power point presentation, 8 December, KwaZulu Natal Department of Health, Pietermaritburg, KwaZulu Natal, viewed March 1 2010,
Despite the fact that HIV/AIDS was most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, including South
Africa, Australia focused its sectoral aid for HIV/AIDS on other regions. In a 2005 World AIDS
Day speech New South Wales Senator Marise Payne identified sub-Saharan Africa as being
‘the most affected area globally’ of HIV/AIDS.118 Payne cited that 64% of new infections occurred in that region; in 2004, that was over three million people.119 Nonetheless, her speech highlighted the importance of Australian assistance for its own regional neighbourhood
– the Asia-Pacific – completely bypassing her own comments that Africa was the most affected region.120 Payne was not the only minister who acknowledged Africa’s needs only to advocate for Australia’s focus on its immediate neighbours. Alexander Downer was quick to promote Australia’s fight against HIV/AIDS ‘achievements’ in the Asia-Pacific region, and he said that he feared Asia’s plight would soon rival Africa.121 Had he checked HIV/AIDS statistics he would have realised that he had no reason to worry; in 2003, sub-Saharan Africa had an estimated 24.9 million people suffering from HIV or AIDS, with an estimated 3 million new infections that year.122 Downer reported that Asia, on the other hand, had 7.2 million people suffering from the illness, with around 3000 new infections daily.123 That is not to cheapen Asia’s tragedy, because it was certainly real, but when placed in a global context it was nothing like as the widespread effects of HIV/AIDS in Africa.
118 Payne, M (Liberal Senator for New South Wales) 2005, The Senate: Matters of Public Interest – HIV/AIDS, speech, 7 December, Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 119 Payne 2005. 120 Payne 2005. 121 Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 2003d, Responding to HIV/AIDS: Charting the Way Forward, statement at the United Nations General Assembly Plenary on HIV/AIDS, New York, 22 September; Downer, A (Minister for Foreign Affairs) 2003a, Australia Continues to Lead Fight Against HIV/AIDS, Media Release, 22 September, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra. 122 United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS) 2005, AIDS Epidemic Update: Sub-Saharan Africa, December, UNAIDS, Geneva, viewed 4 July 2010,
Kenneth McPherson of Curtin University in Perth recognised the severity of HIV/AIDS in South
Africa, relating it to a ‘time bomb ticking away’.124 He stated that, ‘The figures of South Africa now are as horrific as the figures in [all of] South-East Asia ... I cannot see that there is going to be any sustained economic development, change or ongoing peace in South Africa if fundamental issues like health and education are not addressed.’125 This certainly raises the case for more effective aid to South Africa by means of sectoral allocation. From 1996-2007, nearly three quarters of Australian aid to South Africa was given to projects for governance or higher education (the development merits of primary and secondary education have already been noted).126 If McPherson’s beliefs were well considered – surely they would have been of a more altruistic nature than those of the Australian Government – aid would have been better spent on community infrastructure. In 1997 World Vision supported this contention, arguing that while HIV/AIDS in Africa accounts for 35.5% of reported cases worldwide, because testing is much less prevalent in Africa, it was estimated that it suffered 67% of the incidence of the disease.127
In 2003, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the number of people dying from
AIDS in Africa, which he estimated at two million per year, ‘a national and international tragedy.’128 In 2005, the life expectancy of a South African was 50.7 years; a considerable
124 McPherson, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p.261 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.117. 125 McPherson, Transcript, 4 October 1995, p.261 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.117. 126 AusAID 1998, Australia’s Overseas Aid Program Official Expenditure 1995-96 to 1997-98, AusAID, Canberra. 127 World Vision Australia, Submission, p. S674 in Joint Standing Committee on the Department of Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 1997, p.118. 128 Annan, K (UN Secretary General) in Kirk, L (Senator) 2003, World AIDS Day Speech, speech, the Senate, Parliamentary Debates, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 135
decline from the 1990 figure of 63.3 years.129 This was primarily due to HIV/AIDS and other disease, such as tuberculosis. South Australian Labor Senator Linda Kirk agreed that the plight of Africans deserved more attention in Australia, stating that:
Literally, the number of people dying from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa and the number of health professionals dying from the disease are severely restricting these nations' capacity to provide treatment for HIV and AIDS, with their already stretched and inadequate domestic budgets and the price of drugs.130
Kirk stated that in the most affected Africa countries, HIV prevalence was a staggering 40%.131
However, and more importantly, she recognised the capacity of Australia to do more in the global fight against HIV/AIDS. She noted that countries such as the UK, the USA and New
Zealand all contributed ‘significant funds’ to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria – with the USA committing US$15 billion over five years – yet Australia remained uncommitted. Meanwhile, non-government humanitarian organisation Oxfam Community Aid
Abroad urged Australia to commit at least $110 million to the Global Fund.132
The Asia-Pacific received the vast majority of Australian aid funds in the fight against
HIV/AIDS. In November 1995, the Australian Government announced a $10 million aid program over four years for issues of HIV/AIDS in Africa, to go alongside $7.8 million spent on ten individual HIV/AIDS projects in southern and eastern Africa.133 In stark contrast, in 2000 the Australian Government announced a $600 million ten year commitment to battle against
129 Statistics South Africa 2005, Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa, 1997-2003, Stats SA, Pretoria, viewed 4 March 2010,
HIV/AIDS, ‘most particularly in [the Asia-Pacific] region.’134 From 2001-2002, Australia gave a total of $35,808,000 for Population Policies/Programs and Reproductive Health, which includes funding for HIV/AIDS. Of the $35,808,000, sub-Saharan Africa received $3,949,000
– just over 11% of the total allocation for that sector – of which South Africa received
$920,000.135 Despite the infection figures, which show sub-Saharan Africa’s vulnerability to the disease, Australia’s regional neighbours received the vast majority of development assistance specifically for HIV/AIDS. While undoubtedly there was a humanitarian element to this aid, it was also strategic, and thus self-serving, because it was desirable for the Australian
Government to ensure its closest neighbours were not unstable due to a disease which could be largely prevented.
A diagnosis of HIV/AIDS is essentially a death sentence, especially in Third World countries where treatment is less available and more expensive relative to the average person’s earnings. Sub-Saharan Africa was, and is, especially affected by HIV/AIDS, and the social implications are enormous. Although the following statement was not delivered during the time of the Howard government, South African Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi best summarised his countries plight when he said, ‘Life expectancy in South Africa at forty-seven years is like Afghanistan, which is at forty-four years, and we know that they are at war. That means that we are like a country that is at war.’136 However, with well directed development assistance, developed countries such as Australia can greatly assist South Africa’s fight against HIV/AIDS, and reverse the current circumstance. Unfortunately, the Howard
134 Payne 2005. 135 AusAID 2003a, Statistical Summary 2001-2002: Australian Government’s Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra, p.36. 136 Ncana, N 2009, ‘AIDS makes SA “like war zone”’, The ZA Times, 10 November, viewed 11 November 2009,
137
government – although quick to promote the value of leadership in the response to HIV/AIDS
– largely looked at Africa from the sidelines, only seeing the depth of the problem there as a warning for the Asia-Pacific, not as an invitation to assist. While Australia did supply aid to
Africa specifically for HIV/AIDS, it was miniscule compared to the amounts supplied to the
Asia-Pacific region, despite the fact that the problem in its own region was far less than the experience of Africa. In this way the issue of HIV/AIDS did not compel Australia to direct much aid to Africa for reasons of humanitarianism; the Australian Government paid lip service to the problems there, but chiefly focused its aid on its own neighbourhood for reasons of regional security and stability. Thus, to a large extent, aid funds under the Howard government for the issue of HIV/AIDS were largely self-serving.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of its period of governance, the Howard Government commissioned the
Simons Report in order to realign aid motives after thirteen years of aid being actively used as a foreign policy tool. Although the Simons Committee recommended humanitarianism be shifted to the core of Australia’s development assistance, it also suggested the majority of aid stay in the Asia-Pacific region – a recommendation driven by Australian security interests – and also advised a more ‘achievable’ ODA/GNI target be set than the internationally recognised target of 0.7%. These recommendations set the tone of aid under the Howard years; the vast majority of allocated aid stayed in the region. Aid was largely spent on sectors which served Australian interests, such as post-secondary education and governance rather than primary and secondary education, water and sanitation or health, and aid levels were immediately slashed to an all time low in terms of ODA/GNI, and stayed at those low levels for the length of Howard’s term. Many aid policies were reactions to crises, such as the renewed threat of terrorism, or were policies in relation to alliances, such as Australia’s strengthened
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ties with the USA. While the Howard Government must be commended for its response to natural disasters, such as the Boxing Day tsunami which devastated south-east Asia in 2004, it did not significantly respond to an everyday disaster for many Africans, including South
Africans – AIDS.137 Even though sub-Saharan Africa held, and continues to hold, the greatest suffering of HIV/AIDS in the world, Australia’s aid response was primarily directed towards the still tragic, but much less severe incidence of HIV/AIDS in the Asia-Pacific. For humanitarianism to be at the forefront of the provision of development assistance by the
Howard Government, aid needed to have a global expression, not just a means of protecting
Australian security by assisting in the immediate region. Australian bilateral aid and its policies under the Howard Government were deeply self-serving, and this self-service ensured that development assistance to South Africa remained negligible.
137 AusAID 2007. 139
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CONCLUSION
This thesis set out to establish the motivations of Australian aid under the Hawke-Keating and
Howard Governments as affected by political and aid-related events and policies. Australia’s need to cultivate a stronger relationship with Africa was established in the introduction, and
South Africa was utilised as a case study as it exemplified the dire state most of Africa is in.
The experience of apartheid in South Africa and Australia’s staunch opposition of it acted as an interesting foreign policy consideration when examining Australian aid to South Africa, both during its application and after its abolition. The primary discussion and contention of this thesis was how Australian national interest and objectives impacted on the direction and shape of its bilateral aid, and how these affected assistance to South Africa.
During the period of Hawke-Keating there was no secret made of the government’s desire for
Australian commercial and economic interests to be fulfilled through the aid program. An inquiry into aid at the beginning of Hawke’s term – the Jackson Committee Report – promoted the fulfilment of national interests by means of the aid program, and although it did note that humanitarianism should be a part of aid, it was made to seem like a side effect of aid, rather than the primary aim of it. The Hawke-Keating Governments largely followed the recommendations of the report, and so aid was frequently used as a foreign policy tool in the advancement of Australian political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Especially in the Asia-Pacific, assistance was also used to generate commercial benefits for
Australia by means of the DIFF program. In reviews of the DIFF, the Labor governments often boasted about the immense business generated for Australian companies under the auspices of DIFF development assistance.
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South-east Asia grew to be the primary focus of Australian foreign policy under Hawke-
Keating, and this was also reflected in the high level of aid provided to it. Nonetheless,
Australia did hold some interest in Africa, especially in promoting itself as a key humanitarian leader in its vocal opposition to South Africa’s racist policies of apartheid and ensuring southern Africa was pro-West during the Cold War. Australian development assistance was available to South Africa once apartheid was abandoned; however, given how outspoken
Australia had been in its disapproval of the apartheid system, it did little to support South
Africa’s new government or enhance its development. In fact, South Africa largely fell from
Australia’s political concerns until near the end of Keating’s term, when an inquiry into
Australia’s relations with Africa suggested Australia needed to engage with Africa for both its own benefit and that of Africa if Australia was to be a key global citizen. Not long after Labor was ousted, and once again South Africa and its neighbours were fundamentally overlooked.
The Howard Government, ever keen to remove itself from its predecessors, quickly commissioned a new inquiry into Australian aid: the Simons Report. Both the Coalition and the Simons Report widely argued that humanitarianism should be at the core of aid; however in the same breath, the Simons Report recommended Australia focus its aid on its own regional neighbourhood, and find a more ‘realistic’ target for ODA/GNI than the internationally agreed, UN lauded target of 0.7%. For the most part – and certainly the parts that benefited
Australia’s own national agenda – the Howard Government followed the recommendations of the report and built upon the relations Australia held with the Asia-Pacific and, more keenly, with the USA. Australia’s strengthened relationship with the USA meant it was quick to respond to a renewed threat of terrorism following 9/11, and especially after the Bali Bombings which killed eighty-eight Australian tourists in 2002. As did many Western states, Australia linked poverty and terrorism which led to an increase in aid provision for the sector of good
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governance and policing. Such aid was especially targeted at Australia’s neighbours in order to secure Australian regional security. During the period of Howard’s governance another threat also transpired, but this one was faceless. Although it had first emerged in the early
1980s, by the mid-1990s and into the new millennium, the cureless HIV/AIDS threatened global security. HIV/AIDS was, and continues to be, especially prevalent in sub-Saharan
Africa, including South Africa; however, ever true to its own national interests and security,
Australia focused its aid for the disease in its own regional neighbourhood.
There were differences between the Labor and Coalition governments in terms of global issues and foreign policy considerations, and there were most decidedly differences in the transparency of their aid rationale, but actual development assistance was driven by the same motivation: Australia’s national interests. More aid was focused on post-secondary education scholarships in Australia than basic education in recipient countries. More aid was spent on governance than on water, sanitation and health projects in recipient countries. Under the
DIFF scheme, more aid was spent on projects that had foreseeable economic and commercial returns for Australian businesses than on projects which solely benefited the recipient community, and during Howard’s time in government, more money was spent on ensuring
Australia’s security than assisting the poorest of the poor. This meant that the vast majority of aid under both the Labor and Coalition governments was provided to the Asia-Pacific region.
Both Hawke-Keating and Howard paid lip service to the immense issues that plague South
Africa: extreme poverty, inequality, a once racist government, now an incompetent government that can’t help the millions of people in its country affected by HIV/AIDS. But neither the Labor nor Coalition governments were willing to strongly commit to South Africa’s development because Australia’s aid policy was one of self-interest, and Australia’s best interests would not be served in South Africa. Fortunately for South Africa and other African
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countries, Australia’s current Labor government that was elected in 2007 is keen to commit to
Africa. Earlier in 2010 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australian aid to Africa would be doubled to total more than $400 million by 2015.
Nonetheless, the Labor government’s announcement of increases of aid and its recognition of the importance of Africa has been widely criticised by both the Federal Opposition and the media; reportage of the aid increase mirrored that of David Jenkins when Bill Hayden announced similar aid increases in 1989. If the media is to be believed, Australian self-service through aid is a new phenomenon only revealed by the Courier-Mail in May 2010. It took
‘extensive investigation’ to uncover ‘revelations’ concerning Australia’s ‘aid shame’, in what the Courier-Mail called an embarrassing review for the current Labor Government, led by
Kevin Rudd.1 The Rudd-Gillard Labor Government is striving to meet the 0.7% of GNP target that Australia agreed to meet forty years ago, announcing that it plans to double annual spending to more than $8 billion. However, in what can only be described as typical, the media is doing its best to get the public offside. On 25 May 2010 the Courier-Mail reported that Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was providing the additional funds in order to secure ‘a seat on the United Nations Security Council’. This supported the shadow foreign affairs spokesperson, Julie Bishop, who claimed AusAID was being ‘undermined by Kevin Rudd’s ego trip for a seat on the UN Security Council.’2 Due to the wording of the actual article, it was alarming how many readers expressed their concern that Kevin Rudd was pursuing personal diplomatic ventures through AusAID, taking the Courier-Mail’s ‘Kevin Rudd chases seat on the
1 Lewis, S & Christensen, N 2010a, ‘Aid Shame’, Courier-Mail, 24 May, p.1. 2 Lewis, S & Christensen, N 2010b, ‘Charity Black Hole: $400 million poured into Africa as Rudd chases UN seat’, Courier-Mail, 25 May, p.9. 144
United Nations Security Council’ to be literal.3 However in the changing face of public commentary, amongst the expected ignorance on the Courier-Mail website’s ‘Readers’
Comments’ section there was some educated opinion on the newspaper’s scathing review of
Australia’s promise to Africa. Reader ‘tjohnson’ of Ipswich contended:
400 million over 5 years; that is pathetic we should be giving way more to Africa and to foreign aid in general! What is the problem with Australia helping to foster economic development, combat disease and help those in the bottom billion, in one of the poorest continents in the world? Since when has history mattered when it comes to combating global poverty? This is really grasping at straws now. Please show me the proof that AusAID is helping Africa all so that Rudd can score a seat at the UN. Exactly, there is no proof, its [sic] just party politics getting desperate to appeal to a few misinformed voters, Bishops [sic] accusations need to be analysed for what they are, fraudulent. For the record I hope that the aid budget surpasses 8 billion and we get to the 0.7% of GNP that the UN has stated is needed to address poverty and development issues around the world.4
This reader’s argument implies a sentiment undoubtedly shared by many Australians: that the Australian Government and the Opposition need to stop opposing the goodwill of the other as a matter of policy, forget about political histories and even Australia’s national agenda, and commit to the eradication of global poverty.
How Australian aid will be shaped in the future is yet to be seen – if Coalition leader Tony
Abbott wins the upcoming Federal election, to be held in August, he has promised to refocus the aid program to Australia’s near neighbours. 5 In the short term, the current government’s efforts to substantially increase aid, encourage engagement with Africa including by means of
3 fedupwithlabour, Sick of B. Lie and the Dudd, Frank, Veteran, Tony H, ken of brisbane, bubbles of sunshine coast, Ray of Brisbane, TC of Brisbane, Snow White of Brisbane & John S of Burleigh 2010, Courier-Mail, Readers’ Comments, viewed 26 May 2010,
development assistance and open public dialogue deserve nothing but praise. Parliamentary
Secretary for International Development Assistance Bob McMullan expressed concern over the Opposition’s criticism to commit to Africa, stating that the engagement was in the best interests of both global humanitarianism and the Australian national interest.6 He stated that,
‘Even though much of the criticism of the aid program this week has been frustratingly ill- informed, superficial, and downright wrong-headed, the debate is important.’ McMullan noted that the Australian public voted for Australian aid to Africa ‘with their wallets and purses – 30 per cent of the money raised by non-government organisations to fight global poverty is for
Africa.’7 In the short-term the current Labor Government’s proposes that, in increasing aid to
Africa to $400 million, around 5% of Australia’s aid should go to that continent. Of course
Australia has a special responsibility to the Asia-Pacific region, and by no means is it foreseeable that that responsibility would be neglected. However, in a world which is increasingly globalised, for Australia to be an active and responsible global citizen, it must address poverty as the global problem that it is and extend a hand to Africa by assisting to alleviate the appalling conditions that exist there.
6 McMullan 2010. 7 McMullan 2010. 146
APPENDIX 1
Table: AUSTRALIA’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 1982-1987
Value given in $’000
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 AFRICA 57,775 52,950 43,844 53,561 57,139 48,728 % total aid budget 11.35% 9.58% 7.28% 7.06% 7.64% 6.65% MIDDLE EAST 837 4,893 2,053 1,670 1,480 1,257 % total aid budget 0.16% 0.89% 0.34% 0.22% 0.20% 0.17% SOUTH ASIA 63,196 55,190 43,931 48,026 36,926 32,528 % total aid budget 12.41% 9.99% 7.29% 6.33% 4.94% 4.44% EAST ASIA 86,890 98,013 127,520 238,712 231,516 226,024 % total aid budget 17.07% 17.74% 21.17% 31.47% 30.97% 30.86% PAPUA NEW GUINEA 252,897 274,947 302,280 320,199 325,973 333,399 % total aid budget 49.67% 49.77% 50.19% 42.21% 43.61% 45.52% OCEANIA 38,748 48,727 43,450 58,259 71,626 81,371 % total aid budget 7.61% 8.80% 7.21% 7.68% 9.58% 11.11% ALL OTHER REGIONS 7001 8715 1714 2116 4276 1470 % total aid budget 1.38% 1.58% 0.29% 0.28% 0.57% 0.20% TOTAL OVERSEAS AID 509,105 552,440 602,258 758,558 747,506 732,459
SOURCES
ADAB 1983, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1982-83, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1984, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1983-84, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1985, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1984-85, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1986, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1985-86, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
AIDAB 1988, Statistical Summary: 1986-87 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra.
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APPENDIX 2
Table: AUSTRALIA’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 1988-1994
Value given in $’000
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 SOUTHERN AFRICA 25,005 50,777 67,369 42,218 55,377 55,863 37,689 % total aid budget 2.45% 4.25% 5.74% 3.35% 4.28% 4.03% 2.67% OTHER SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA 32,776 26,892 29,069 30,034 40,421 42,757 85,854 % total aid budget 3.20% 2.25% 2.48% 2.38% 3.12% 3.08% 6.09% TOTAL SUB- SAHARAN AFRICA 57,781 77,669 96,438 72,252 95,798 98,620 123,543 % total aid budget 5.67% 6.50% 8.22% 5.73% 7.40% 7.11% 8.76%
NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 24,145 21,637 22,880 22,657 20,759 11,454 18,349 % total aid budget 2.37% 1.80% 1.94% 1.80% 1.60% 0.83% 1.30% SOUTH ASIA 30,191 68,613 88,248 82,432 71,452 62,324 68,859 % total aid budget 2.96% 5.70% 7.52% 6.54% 5.52% 4.50% 4.88% EAST ASIA 43,275 39,151 48,897 45,269 63,447 79,007 89,016 % total aid budget 4.25% 3.30% 4.17% 3.59% 4.90% 5.70% 6.31% SOUTH-EAST ASIA 250,476 255,340 262,054 269,903 279,616 339,173 359,460 % total aid budget 24.00% 21.40% 22.33% 21.40% 21.61% 22.47% 25.48% PAPUA NEW GUINEA 305,980 314,149 337,767 333,085 335,011 333,767 338,957 % total aid budget 30.00% 26.30% 28.76% 26.41% 25.89% 24.08% 24.03% SOUTH PACIFIC 86,620 107,759 107,923 109,976 118,686 117,795 125,568 % total aid budget 8.50% 9.00% 9.20% 8.72% 9.37% 8.50% 8.90% ALL OTHER REGIONS 7,769 13,634 16,315 14,694 11,937 12,782 10,544 % total aid budget 0.76% 1.14% 1.39% 1.17% 0.92% 0.92% 0.75% TOTAL OVERSEAS AID 1,019,561 1,194,627 1,173,806 1,261,040 1,293,766 1,386,126 1,410,815
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SOURCES: APPENDIX 2 AIDAB 1989, Statistical Summary: 1987-88 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra.
AIDAB 1990c, Statistical Summary: 1988-89 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra.
AIDAB 1991b, Statistical Summary: 1989-90 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1992b, Australian Official Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1990/91, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1993c, Australian Official Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1991/92, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1994b, Australian Overseas Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1993-94, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
149
APPENDIX 3 Table: AUSTRALIA’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: 1996-2007 Value given in $’000
1996^ 1997^ 1998^ 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 TOTAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA 320,130 339,725 321,743 321,307 338,176 327,952 331,492 321,319 349,727 319,099 338,337 375,421 4,004,428 % total aid budget 22.37% 23.56% 20.67% 18.33% 20.63% 18.57% 18.00% 16.17% 15.81% 12.01% 11.23% 11.86% 16.37% PACIFIC ISLAND STATES 123,456 125,095 127,605 137,308 150,468 176,233 193,100 301,907 358,714 409,439 438,259 491,955 3,033,539 % total aid budget 8.62% 8.67% 8.19% 7.83% 9.18% 9.98% 10.49% 15.19% 16.22% 15.42% 14.55% 15.54% 12.40% EAST ASIA 372,982 369,215 437,392 590,510 504,531 470,430 485,835 483,458 580,866 610,922 763,460 953,211 6,682,812 % total aid budget 26.06% 25.60% 28.10% 33.69% 30.78% 26.64% 26.39% 24.33% 26.27% 23.01% 25.35% 30.11% 27.32% SOUTH ASIA 73,250 82,064 74,537 80,279 90,525 105,753 103,192 110,161 144,215 143,411 180,236 286,991 1,474,614 % total aid budget 5.11% 5.69% 4.78% 4.58% 5.52% 5.98% 5.60% 5.54% 6.52% 5.40% 5.98% 9.06% 6.02% OTHER ASIA 585 7,800 18 303 152 461 87 176 3,186 14,013 21,225 18,015 217,869 % total aid budget 0.04% 0.54% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 0.52% 0.70% 0.56% 0.89% SOUTH AFRICA 9,713 9,169 10,783 11,158 10,947 9,908 12,174 10,768 10,371 8,738 4,690 3,850 112,269 % total aid budget 0.67% 0.63% 0.69% 0.63% 0.66% 0.56% 0.66% 0.54% 0.46% 0.32% 0.15% 0.12% 0.45% TOTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 77,793 62,319 54,412 58,037 56,038 50,540 58,127 72,607 82,921 76,853 65,605 88,349 803,601 % total aid budget 5.43% 4.32% 3.49% 3.31% 3.41% 2.86% 3.15% 3.65% 3.75% 2.89% 2.17% 2.79% 3.28% NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 18,537 19,641 22,715 21,533 29,612 23,194 82,924 67,690 46,318 379,679 438,775 75,923 1,226,541 % total aid budget 1.29% 1.36% 1.45% 1.22% 1.80% 1.31% 4.50% 3.40% 2.09% 14.30% 14.57% 2.39% 5.01% OTHER AFRICA TOTAL 85 5,823 4,034 9942 % total aid budget 0.00% 0.19% 0.12% 0.11%^^
NORTH, CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA 1184 6,728 1,814 1,551 1,225 1,811 2,572 3,066 8,550 5,107 3,121 3,001 40,730 % total aid budget 0.08% 0.46% 0.11% 0.08% 0.07% 0.10% 0.13% 0.15% 0.38% 0.19% 0.10% 0.09% 0.01% REST OF THE WORLD 443,093 429,364 490,271 541,515 468,168 609,441 583,368 626,063 636,581 696,340 755,938 868,516 7,148,658 % total aid budget 30.96% 29.77% 31.49% 30.90% 28.56% 34.51% 31.69% 31.51% 28.79% 26.22% 25.10% 27.43% 29.23% TOTAL OVERSEAS AID 1,431,010 1,441,951 1,556,509 1,752,343 1,638,894 1,765,814 1,840,697 1,986,447 2,211,078 2,654,948 3,010,868 3,165,417 24,455,976
150
SOURCES: APPENDIX 3 AusAID 2000, Statistical Summary 1998-1999: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2001, Statistical Summary 1999-2000: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2002, Statistical Summary 2000-2001: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2001-2002: Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2002-2003: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2005, Statistical Summary 2003-2004: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2006, Statistical Summary 2004-2005: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2010, Statistical Summary 2005-2006, 2006-2007 & 2007-2008: Australia's International Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
151
APPENDIX 4
Table: AUSTRALIA’S ODA/GNI RATIONS 1980-2008
All values expressed are percentages
YEAR ODA/GNI 1980-81 0.4 1981-82 0.4 1982-83 0.42 1983-84 0.47 1984-85 0.46 1985-86 0.43 1986-87 0.37 1987-88 0.34 1988-89 0.35 1989-90 0.32 1990-91 0.33 1991-92 0.34 1992-93 0.34 1993-94 0.33 1994-95 0.33 1995-96 0.32 1996-97 0.28 1997-98 0.27 1998-99 0.27 1999-2000 0.29 2000-01 0.25 2001-02 0.25 2002-03 0.25 2003-04 0.25 2004-05 0.26 2005-06 0.29 2006-07 0.3 2007-08 0.3
SOURCES
AusAID 2010, Statistical Summary 2005-2006, 2006-2007 & 2007-2008: Australia's International Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
152
APPENDIX 5
Table: ODA/GNI RATIOS OF DAC COUNTRIES
Values expressed are percentages of 100 Please note: data unavailable 2005-2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2007 2008 AUSTRALIA 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32 AUSTRIA 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.23 0.5 0.43 BELGIUM 0.3 0.36 0.42 0.61 0.6 0.41 0.43 0.48 CANADA 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.32 DENMARK 1.01 1.06 0.96 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.82 FINLAND 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.44 FRANCE 0.39 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.39 GERMANY 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.38 GREECE 0.15 0.2 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.21 IRELAND 0.31 0.3 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.55 0.59 ITALY 0.15 0.13 0.2 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.22 JAPAN 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.19 0.17 0.19 LUXEMBOURG 0.66 0.71 0.78 0.8 0.81 0.83 0.92 0.97 NETHERLANDS 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.8 0.73 0.81 0.8 NEW ZEALAND 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.3 NORWAY 0.91 0.8 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.95 0.88 PORTUGAL 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.63 0.22 0.27 SPAIN 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.37 0.45 SWEDEN 0.7 0.8 0.74 0.7 0.79 0.78 0.93 0.98 SWITZERLAND 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.42 UNITED KINGDOM 0.23 0.32 0.3 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.43 UNITED STATES 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.19
SOURCES AusAID 2001, Statistical Summary 1999-2000: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2002, Statistical Summary 2000-2001: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2001-2002: Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
153
AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2002-2003: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2005, Statistical Summary 2003-2004: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2006, Statistical Summary 2004-2005: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2010, Statistical Summary 2005-2006, 2006-2007 & 2007-2008: Australia's International Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
154
APPENDIX 6: Graph Graph 1: AID BY REGION UNDER HAWKE, 1982-1987 0.6
0.5
0.4 AFRICA MIDDLE EAST SOUTH ASIA % 0.3 EAST ASIA PAPUA NEW GUINEA OCEANIA 0.2 ALL OTHER REGIONS
0.1
0 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
155
APPENDIX 7: Graph Graph 2: AID BY REGION UNDER HAWKE-KEATING, 1988-1994 0.35
0.3
0.25 SOUTHERN AFRICA OTHER SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 0.2 NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST SOUTH ASIA % EAST ASIA 0.15 SOUTH-EAST ASIA PAPUA NEW GUINEA
0.1 SOUTH PACIFIC ALL OTHER REGIONS
0.05
0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
156
APPENDIX 8: Graph Graph 3: AID BY REGION UNDER HOWARD GOVERNMENT 40.00%
35.00%
30.00% PNG PACIFIC ISLAND STATES 25.00% EAST ASIA SOUTH ASIA OTHER ASIA % 20.00% SOUTH AFRICA TOTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 15.00% OTHER AFRICA NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST 10.00% NORTH, CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA REST OF THE WORLD
5.00%
0.00% 1996^ 1997^ 1998^ 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
157
APPENDIX 9: Graph Graph 4: ODA/GNI Ratios of DAC Countries 1.2 AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA BELGIUM 1 CANADA DENMARK FINLAND 0.8 FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND % 0.6 ITALY JAPAN LUXEMBOURG NETHERLANDS 0.4 NEW ZEALAND NORWAY PORTUGAL SPAIN 0.2 SWEDEN SWITZERLAND UNITED KINGDOM 0 UNITED STATES 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2007 2008
158
SOURCES: FOR APPENDIX
ADAB 1983, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1982-83, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1984, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1983-84, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1985, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1984-85, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
ADAB 1986, Statistical Summary: Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries 1985-86, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra.
AIDAB 1988, Statistical Summary: 1986-87 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra.
SOURCES: APPENDIX 7
AIDAB 1989, Statistical Summary: 1987-88 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra. AIDAB 1990c, Statistical Summary: 1988-89 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, AIDAB, Canberra.
AIDAB 1991b, Statistical Summary: 1989-90 Australian Official Development Assistance To Developing Countries, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1992b, Australian Official Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1990/91, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1993c, Australian Official Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1991/92, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
AIDAB 1994b, Australian Overseas Development Cooperation Statistical Summary 1993-94, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.
SOURCES: APPENDIX 8 AusAID 2000, Statistical Summary 1998-1999: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2001, Statistical Summary 1999-2000: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2002, Statistical Summary 2000-2001: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
159
AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2001-2002: Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2002-2003: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2005, Statistical Summary 2003-2004: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2006, Statistical Summary 2004-2005: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2010, Statistical Summary 2005-2006, 2006-2007 & 2007-2008: Australia's International Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
SOURCES: APPENDIX 9 AusAID 2001, Statistical Summary 1999-2000: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2002, Statistical Summary 2000-2001: Australia's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2001-2002: Australian Government's Overseas Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2003, Statistical Summary 2002-2003: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2005, Statistical Summary 2003-2004: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2006, Statistical Summary 2004-2005: Australia's International Development Cooperation, AusAID, Canberra. AusAID 2010, Statistical Summary 2005-2006, 2006-2007 & 2007-2008: Australia's International Aid Program, AusAID, Canberra.
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