FRONTIERS OF LAW IN VOL. 15 MARCH 2020 NO. 1 DOI 10.3868/s050-009-020-0004-2

FOCUS

TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION: LAW IN LATE IMPERIAL AND MODERN CHINA

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING: A CASE STUDY OF APPEAL TRIALS

HAI Dan*

Abstract Institutional reform and social changes in northeast China during the late Qing period are usually attributed to the Qing dynasty changing its policy on immigration to northeast China. However, institutional reform because of debt appeals between civilian creditors and the Mongolian princes is often overlooked. Using administrative cases from Fengtian Governor Archives and Kirin Prefecture Archives, this study identifies how the governor officers of northeast China changed Mongolian land rights and official finance institutions through appeal judgments in the late Qing dynasty. Appeals were related to Mongolian land rights reform and promoted the financial institutional reform in northeast China. This study concludes by arguing that the judgments affected the profits of the litigants and changed the local society.

Keywords institutional reform and social changes, land rights, finance, appeals, northeast China, the late Qing dynasty

INTRODUCTION ...... 39 I. APPEALS AND MONGOLIAN LAND OWNERSHIP REFORM ...... 41 A. Why the Qing Dynasty Decided to Change Its Policy...... 41 B. How the Local Officers Established Land Rights...... 45 C. How the Buyers Farmed Mongolian Land and Their Financial Needs ...... 45 II. APPEALS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM...... 46 A. The Function of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau before the Financial Institutional Reform...... 47 B. The Reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau ...... 48 C. The Background to the Institutional Reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote

* HAI Dan (海丹), Ph.D. in Legal History of the East Asian, Law School, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan; Resident Scholar, Institute for the Study of Lingnan Culture, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China. Contact: [email protected] This paper benefited from the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Project No. 1709068-11200-31610148). 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 39

Bureau...... 49 D. Summary ...... 51 III. SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY..... 52 A. The Case of Front Gorlos Banner...... 52 B. The Case of Darhan Banner...... 53 C. Summary ...... 56 CONCLUSION...... 57

INTRODUCTION During the Qing period, there were many differences in system between northeast China and other provinces.1 Studies exist on the legal practices and juridical system reform in northeast China during the Qing period. Mongo Lkhuu (2014) presented how the judgment of cases by generals of northeast China with regard to Mongolians changed in the early Qing period, and then concluded that the legal system of Qalqa also affected the Qing dynasty.2 Khohchahar E. Chuluu (2017) described the legal practices in Mongolian banners.3 LI Qicheng (2004) and ZHANG Qin (2006) examined the juridical system reform and the legal practice of the local courts in northeast China during the late Qing dynasty. 4 However, previous studies have examined county-level trials but neglected appeals, especially those which led to the Mongolian land rights reform in the early twentieth century. Previous studies on the institutional reform and social changes in northeast China during the late Qing period are divided on the influences of the institutional reform in northeast China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, they usually attribute the land rights reform (放垦) to the Qing dynasty changing its immigration policy because of the situation on the frontier zone and conflicts between agriculture and nomad sedentarization, the expansion of the modern country, and the

1 Northeast China included Fengtian, Kirin, Heilongjiang, Rehe, and east Mongolia. See CHEN Yue, 清 代东北地区生态环境变迁研究 (A Study on the Change of Ecological Environment in Northeast China in the Qing Dynasty), China Social Sciences Press (Beijing), at 1–2, 14 (2017). 2 Mongo Lkhuu, 「ハルハ=ジロム」における乾隆 11 年法の再検討: 蒙古例の乾隆 12 年法を手がかりとし て (The 1746 Law of Qalq-a jirum : Through the Analysis of the 1747 Law Enacted by the Qing Government), 29 内陸アジア史研究 (Inner Asian Studies), 65–84 (2014). 3 Khohchahar E. Chuluu, 役所と「地方」の間: 清代モンゴルのオトグ旗における社会構造と裁判実態 (Between the Banner Government Office and the Countryside: Social Structure and Judicial Practices in the of Qing Mongolia), 67 法制史研究: 法制史學會年報 (Legal History Studies: Legal Academic Conference Annual), 103–159 (2017). 4 LI Qicheng, 晚清各级审判厅研究 (A Study on the Court in the Late Qing Dynasty), Peking University Press (Beijing), at Ch. 3 (2004). ZHANG Qin, 清末民初奉天省的司法变革 (On the Judicial Reform of Fengtian Province at the Turn of the Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China), 34(4) 辽宁大学学报 (哲学社 会科学版) (Journal of University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)), 131–138 (2006). 40 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 changes to society and environment from these policies.5 Conversely, previous studies on financial institutional reform in northeast China during the late Qing dynasty usually attribute it to the central government and the province officers aiming to control financial security.6 However, these studies usually neglect the decision of governor officers of northeast China to reform Mongolian land rights because of debt appeals between civilian creditors and foreign creditors and the Mongolian princes. Moreover, they neglect the fact that governor officers aimed to prevent the misappropriation of public funds and other improper behaviors through financial institutional reform. Studies on social changes during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries describe how Chinese institutions and agriculture changed the frontier-zone but neglect responses from the local society.7 The relationship between institutional reform and social changes has not been fully elucidated. An excellent example of this is Burensain Borjigin’s study on the Mongolian

5 TAYAMA Shigeru, 清代に於ける蒙古の社会制度 (Social System in Mongol During Qing Dynasty), Bunkyo Press (Tokyo), at 331, 367–368 (1954). HUANG Shijian, 论清末清政府对内蒙古的“移民实边”政策 (On the Immigration Policy to Consolidate the Border toward in the Late Qing Dynasty), 2 内蒙古大学学报 (社会科学版) (Journal of Inner Mongolia University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)), 65–77 (1964). ZHAO Zhongfu, 近代东三省移民问题之研究 (A Study on Immigration in Northeast China since Modern Times), 4(2) 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 (Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica), 613–664 (1974). MA Yongshan & ZHAO Yi, 清朝关于内蒙古地区禁垦放垦政策的演变 (On the Policy Evolution of Banner and Reclamation in Inner Mongolia during the Qing Dynasty), 82 社会科 学辑刊 (Social Science Journal), 86–91 (1992). HIROKAWA Saho, 蒙地奉上: 「満州国」の土地政策 (Mochi hojo: The Land Policy of “Manchukuo”), Kyoko Press (Tokyo), at Ch. 4 (2005). FAN Rusen, 清代民国的汉 人蒙古化与蒙古人汉化 (Mongolianization of Han Chinese and Sinicization of Mongolian during the Qing dynasty and the Republic of China), 111 民俗研究 (Folklore Studies), 56–64 (2013). GAO Yue, 危机处理与 权力渗透: 清末新政时期的蒙地开垦—— 以哲里木盟札萨克图旗为中心 (Crisis Handling and Power Intervention: The Cultivation of Mongol Land during the New Policies Period of the Late Qing Dynasty: A Study based on Zasa Fecteau Flag, Jirem League), 24(3) 中国边疆史地研究 (China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies), 14–22, 178 (2014). WANG Liping, The State, Relational Governance, and Nomad Sedentarization: Land Reform in Inner Mongolia, 1900–1911, 56(3) Comparative Studies in Society and History, 714–744 (2014). See CHEN, fn. 1 at Ch. 6. 6 LIANG Sibao & YAN Hongzhong, 清代边疆开发的经济动因及其影响 (Economic Motivations and Influence in the Frontier Development during Qing Dynasty), 3 中国经济史研究 (Researches in Chinese Economic History), 127–133 (2003). LIU Zenghe, 由脱序到整合——清末外省财政机构的变动 (From Disorder to Conformity: Changes in Provincial Finance in the Late Qing Dynasty), 5 近代史研究 (Modern Chinese History Studies), 56–72 (2008). 7 See TAYAMA, fn. 5. Owen Lattimore, TANG Xiaofeng trans. 中国的亚洲内陆边疆 (Inner Asian Frontiers of China), Jiangsu People’s Publishing House (Nanjing), at 172 (2010). YASUTOMI Ayumi & FUKAO Yuuko eds. 満州の成立―森林の消尽と近代空間の形成 (The Emergence of “Manchuria”: Forest Exhaustion and the Formation of Modern Space), Nagoya University Press (Nagoya), at Chs. 2, 4 (2010). REN Yuxue, 清代吉林将军双城地区的身份制度与旗界、民界 (1815–1911 年)——兼论东北地区的封禁政策 (Banner and Civilian Territories in the Status System of Shuangcheng in Kirin during the Late Qing Dynasty — With an Examination of the Ban on Minren to the Northeast), 28(3) 中国历史地理论丛 (Journal of Chinese Historical Geography), 115–123 (2013). YAO Dali, 拉铁摩尔的“内亚视角” (The “Inner Asian Perspective” of Lattimore), in HUANG Dayuan & YUAN Jian eds. 拉铁摩尔与边疆中国 (Lattimore and Frontier China), SDX Joint Publishing Company (Beijing), at 15, 17 (2017). See FAN, fn. 5. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 41 agricultural village in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Based on the official archives of the Qing dynasty, the research report written by the government of the pseudo-Manchukuo and Manchuria Railway in 1937 and 1943 and his fieldwork in 1998, this study presented a village society in Darhan Banner (also known as Khorchin Left Middle Banner), Lambu-tobu (i.e. Lambu-obo 朗布窝堡, which is mentioned in the research report in 1943).8 This study revealed changes in the local society due to the land rights reform from the late Qing period but neglected the villages in the sixth district of Darhan where more Han Chinese immigrants lived, and did not compare Darhan society with the other Mongolian banners (for example, Front Gorlos Banner, a neighbor of Darhan) after the land rights reform in the late Qing period.9 This study did not use all the juridical archives and memoirs of XU Shichang (1908–1909, the governor-general of the Three Eastern Provinces) in the case of the Caiha new suburb (采哈新甸). It also neglected the Prince of Darhan, Nam ilsurung (1879–1951), who changed his attitude to the land rights reform during the late Qing period and the early period of the Republic of China. The influence of the relationship between the princes of Darhan and the institutional reform and the social changes has not been fully explored. Conversely, previous studies on financial institutional reform during the late Qing dynasty have focused on the financial institutions in the cities and the financial crisis in northeast China during the early period of the twentieth century, but have neglected the influence of financial system reform on country society.10 Using administrative cases from the Fengtian Governor Archives and the Kirin Prefecture Archives, research reports written during the 1930s and 1940s, and the memoirs, this study identifies how the governor officers of northeast China changed land rights and finance institutions, and then explores the relationship between the government and local society during the late Qing period.

I. APPEALS AND MONGOLIAN LAND OWNERSHIP REFORM

A. Why the Qing Dynasty Decided to Change Its Policy During the Qing dynasty, land in Fengtian, Kirin, and Heilongjiang was mostly

8 Burensain Borjigin, 近現代におけるモンゴル人農耕村落社会の形成 (Formation of the Mongolian Farming Village Society from Later 19c to Later 20c), Kazama Press (Tokyo), at Ch. 1 (2003). 9 Manchuria Xing’an Bureau eds. 實態調査資料・興安南省科爾沁左翼中旗調査報告書 (Investigation Report of Khorchin Left Middle Banner), at 2, 134 (1943). See Industry Department of Manchuria Railway eds. 科爾沁左翼中旗第六区調査報告 (Investigation Report of the Sixth District of Khorchin Left Middle Banner), at 2–3 (1937). 10 KURAHASHI Masanao, 「営口の公議会」 (Congress in Yingkou), 481 歴史学研究 (History Studies), 18–32, 50 (1980). YAN Hongzhong, 外国金融资本与地方金融势力的兴起——以奉天官银号的设立为中心 (Foreign Financial Capital and the Rise of Local Financial Power: Analysis Focused on the Establishment of Mukden official Silver Bureau), 3 中国经济史研究 (Researches in Chinese Economic History), 31–45 (2018). See LIU, fn. 6. 42 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 banner land (旗地).11 Although there is some controversy over the definition of banner land, according to SUTOU Yoshiyuki, “banner-land included the land owned by [a] bannerman and the land closed related to the bannerman.” However, the Institute of Qing History of Renmin University of China and the Laboratory of Chinese Political System History in the Department of Documentary History of Renmin University of China defined banner land as the land owned by bannermen. Banner land in northeast China usually included the Emperor’s Estate (皇庄), Officer’s Estate (官庄), Prince’s Estate (王 庄), Banner’s Estate (旗庄), and normal banner land (一般旗地).12 Some land was owned by civilians (民田) and Mongolians (蒙地). The land owned by Mongolians, especially the public land of the Mongolian banners, was frequently mentioned in the administrative cases of land rights reform in the late Qing dynasty as Mongolian Wasteland (蒙荒).13 As noted, studies on the land rights reform in northeast China during the late Qing dynasty usually attribute it to the Qing dynasty changing its policy to prevent a frontier-zone out of China, while some studies argue that Mongolian princes used the reclaim fees to pay off their debts but neglected the relationship between the reclamation decisions and the debt appeals.14 No doubt, a critical moment for the Qing dynasty to keep its dominion in Mongol was the case of Zasa Fecteau Banner (1884–1908) when Prince Zasa Fecteau decided to repay a loan to Russian bankers using the reclamation fees without authorization from the Qing dynasty.15 There was a similar situation in the case of Rear Gorlos Banner (1903–1910). Here, the Russian diplomat in Harbin requested Rear Gorlos Banner land should be used to repay a debt of Russian bankers and pressure the Qing dynasty over the victimization incident of Misarg, a Russian diplomat who was killed by bandits at Rear Gorlos Banner in 1903.16 According to XU Shichang, the Qing dynasty decided to change Mongolian land ownership to prevent a frontier-zone with China rather than acquire the credit (“非争 债权也, 实争土地权也; 非仅保全蒙旗之产业也, 实竞竞保全我中国之领土也”). 17

11 SUTOU Yoshiyuki, 清代満州土地政策の研究 (Land Policy in Manchu during the Qing Dynasty), Kawade Press (Tokyo), at 277 (1944). 12 See SUTOU, Id. at 3. See Institute of Qing History of Renmin University of China & Laboratory of Chinese Political System History in the Department of Documentary History of Renmin University of China, 清代的旗地 (Banner Land in the Qing Dynasty), Zhonghua Book Company (Beijing), at 1–5 (1989). 13 It should be noted that Mongolian Wasteland mentioned in the files is not uncultivated land and its ownership is clear. See FAN, fn. 5. 14 See HUANG, fn. 5; ZHAO. fn. 5; MA & ZHAO, fn. 5; GAO, fn. 5; B. Borjigin, fn. 8 at 41–42. 15 See GAO, fn. 5. 16 照会俄国武廓米萨尔格案存交涉局 (Note of the Files of the Case of Misarg Kept at the Foreign Affairs Bureau), Fengtian Governor Archives (FGA), 9606, at 27–66. 东三省蒙务总局为呈请事 (Submission by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces), FGA, 25419, at 25–30. 17 XU Shichang et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI Shutian, 东三省政略 (Political System of the Three Eastern Provinces), Jilin Literature and History Press (Changchun), at 384–386, 410–417, 430–434 (1989). 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 43

However, the governor-generals of northeast China and the central government decided to change the land rights for Mongolian banners not only because of international affairs. The first loan, in this case, was to cover litigation costs and successor fees in 1893, the lawsuit of 60 taiji (noble of Mongols) of Rear Gorlos Banner accusing Garmasati, the jasag (head of Mongolian Banner), of tyranny. Rolγar a succeeded to the post of Garmasati. He decided to reclaim the Rear Gorlos Banner land. His son, Buyančoγ, and the general officer of the Heilongjiang Railroad Negotiation Bureau (ZHOU Mian) helped him. Buyančoγ became the new jasag of Rear Gorlos Banner after his father died. Subsequently, San Lama of Aohan Banner, a cousin of Buyančoγ, obtained a loan from Russian bankers in the name of Rear Gorlos Banner without authorization, when he mediated the Misarg victimization incident. The Mongolian officers and people of Rear Gorlos Banner then accused Buyančoγ of cheating them and engaging in tyranny, because he did not share the reclamation fees equally with each family as his father had promised. WANG Yongchang and QU Hanqing et al., being civilians, also accused Buyančoγ and Bao Xing Firm (宝兴公司) of cheating because they paid the reclamation fees but did not acquire the land.18 In summary, there were four disputes in the case: (1) the dispute over Rear Gorlos Banner obtaining a loan from San Lama of Aohan Banner for the litigation costs and successor fees (according to San Lama, the loan was 700,000 taels, but the judgment confirmed it as 70,000 taels later); (2) the dispute over San Lama obtaining a loan from the Russian bankers in the name of Rear Gorlos Banner without authorization (the judgment confirmed the loan as 175,000 Russian rubles later); (3) the dispute between WANG Yongchang and QU Hanqing et al. and Buyančoγ and Bao Xing Firm; and (4) the dispute between the Mongolian officers and the people of Rear Gorlos Banner and Buyančoγ. Only dispute (2) was an international affair, while the other three disputes were domestic. The trial in Fengtian continued even after the general of Heilongjiang decided to reclaim the Rear Gorlos Banner land to pay off the Russian banker’s debt.19 We can see that the governor-general of the Three Eastern Provinces, XU Shichang, ordered the officers of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces and the leader of the Jirim League to investigate the dispute in which Mongolian officers and the people of

18 东三省蒙务总局为呈请事 (Submission by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces), fn. 16. 东三省奉天巡抚徐为照会事 (Dispatch by XU Shichang), FGA, 1070, at 23–28. 试署吉林 分巡西北路兵备道监督滨江关兼☐领衔于为咨覆事 (Official Communication by Circuit Intendant of Binjiang Customs), FGA, 1070, at 202–204. See 照会俄国武廓米萨尔格案存交涉局 (Note of the Files of the Case of Misarg Kept at the Foreign Affairs Bureau), fn. 16. See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, Id. at 430–431. 19 东三省奉天巡抚徐为照会事 (Dispatch by XU Shichang), FGA, 1070, at 17–22, 23–28. 黑龙江行省总督 徐、署巡抚周为咨会事 (Official Communication by XU Shichang & ZHOU Shumo), FGA, 25419, at 2–5. 44 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38

Rear Gorlos Banner accused Buyančoγ on November 17, 1908.20 Although he was concerned that another international affairs incident could occur because it was said that Rear Gorlos Banner obtained a loan from a German firm, XU instructed the officers to “redress the grievance and follow public opinion” (“以伸冤抑而顺舆情”) because he thought Buyančoγ’s admission about the debt with San Lama looked suspicious.21 After the investigation, the officers of the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces reported to XU that they found that the German debt was a lie by San Lama, but Buyančoγ had done wrong as the jasag and advised XU to transfer the case to the Fengtian High Court for a fair judgment.22 There were ten Mongolian banners in the Jirim League, which was the most important Mongolian league in northeast China during the late Qing period. Most reclaimed their land but were not involved in an international affair, except Rear Gorlos Banner and Zasa Fecteau Banner.23 For example, Čimedsampil (1874–1942), the jasag of Front Gorlos Banner, requested the General of Kirin to reclaim the land in his banner and used the reclamation fees as security to obtain a loan from the Official Banknote Bureau of Kirin in 1902, because he aimed to use the government loan to pay off the debt that his predecessor acquired from civilian merchants in the 1860s.24 Prince Darhan agreed to reclaim the land in Darhan, which was named the Caiha new suburb in 1909 because he needed to use the reclaim fees to fulfill the judgment of debt appeals given by the governor-general of northeast China. Some civilian merchants and peasants accused Prince Darhan and his banner of cheating them in the reclamation.25 Therefore, I can infer that the governor-general of northeast China decided to change the land rights in Mongolian banners because of international affairs and to resolve domestic disputes.

20 See 黑龙江行省总督徐、署巡抚周为咨会事 (Official Communication by XU Shichang & ZHOU Shumo), Id. See 东三省奉天巡抚徐为照会事 (Dispatch by XU Shichang), Id. Čimedsampil (1874–1942) was appointed as the leader of Jirim League in 1905. See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 396. 21 See 东三省奉天巡抚徐为照会事 (Dispatch by XU Shichang), Id. 22 东三省蒙务总局为呈请事 (Submission by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces), fn. 16. 23 See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 430. 24 奏办吉林郭尔罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), Kirin Prefecture Archives (KPA), 5-17-1280, at 1. See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, Id. at 396. 25 军督部堂为奉天府上控达尔汉王旗地案内原告王铭现已投到事 (Dispatch by the Governor-General of Fengtian of the Case of Darhan), FGA, 16470. 奉天行省公署为互控冒领达尔汉王荒地抵债事 (Dispatch by Fengtian Province of the Case of Darhan), FGA, 18266. 奏为查覆蒙旗售荒得财抗不拨地一案并审明该蒙旗被 控指荒借欠各款谨酌拟办法请旨遵行恭摺仰祈圣鉴事 (The Memorial of the Case of Darhan), FGA, 23643, at 1–5. 照会 (Note), FGA, 23643, at 6–7. 谨将开放达尔汉王旗彩哈新甸蒙荒拨还佃户债款一案酌拟开垦大略情形 并陈将来展荒办法呈请鉴核 (Submission of the Reclamation of Caiha New Suburb), FGA, 23643, at 19–22. 东三省蒙务局为咨呈事 (Inquiry by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces), FGA, 23643, at 24–29. 东三省总督兼署巡抚徐奉天巡抚唐为照覆事案 (Dispatch by XU Shichang & TANG Shaoyi), FGA, 23643, at 30–35. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 45

B. How the Local Officers Established Land Rights As noted, land ownership regarding the Mongolian Wasteland was clear. In the administrative cases from Fengtian, land buyers received a land license after payment. Meanwhile, some Mongolian banners, such as Darhan Banner, kept the right of taxation to the land after it was reclaimed.26 Therefore, the buyers were tenants, while the Mongolian banners were landlords. Moreover, the reclamation of Mongolian Wasteland was a decision to transfer possession and the right to use. In the early twentieth century, disputes over the encroachment of reclaimed Mongolian land and disputes over reclamation fees frequently occurred because the buyers usually pooled their resources to buy the reclaimed land and recruit tenants through managers, while some buyers resold the land to other people.27 In the case of XIAO Cefan, an officer of the Negotiation Bureau in northeast China who was accused of cheating in the name of reclamation (指荒招摇), he appealed that he bought reclaimed land of Zasa Fecteau Banner at the invitation of LIU Dongwu (an alternate officer in Fengtian), but LIU and his brother cheated him. The officers of the Fengtian Mongolian Affairs Bureau supported his claim following an investigation. On March 6 and April 21, 1903, the officers advised the governor-general of Fengtian to pronounce that LIU should return the reclamation fees to XIAO.28 Another good example of such disputes is when Prince Zasa Fecteau accused SUN Haichuan and ZHAO Younian, civilian tenants of the reclaimed land of Zasa Fecteau Banner, of farming and selling adjacent land without authorization in 1906. ZHAO Erxun, the general of Shengjing (1905–1907), ordered the officers of the local Mongolian Wasteland Affairs Bureau to transfer the case to the Taonan Prefecture and ordered the prefect to try the case.29 In such cases, the courts confirmed the land boundaries and guaranteed a new land rights system. Moreover, the governor officers of northeast China frequently issued official notices forbidding cheating in reclamation cases and recovering the victims’ losses. Therefore, it can be concluded that the governor officers of northeast China promoted Mongolian land rights reform through appeal trials.

C. How the Buyers Farmed Mongolian Land and Their Financial Needs Several buyers did not go to the land and farm it by themselves. They bought the land

26 奉天府知府为呈请事 (Submission by the Prefect of Fengtian), FGA, 16470, at 2–3. 禀 (Report), FGA, 16470, at 56–58. 丈放土地文书 (Documents of Land Measuring), FGA, 16470, at 40–299. See 奏办吉林郭尔 罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), fn. 24. 27 See 奏办吉林郭尔罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), Id. 具呈人高清五, 王东乙、王明元、田成聚、王子明、徐向午、徐鼎九等为恳恩追究事 (Compliant by GAO Qingwu, WANG Dongyi, WANG Mingyuan, et al.), FGA, 16470, at 8. 28 奏办奉天蒙荒行局为移行事案 (Official Communication of Transfer a Case by the Fengtian Mongolian Affairs Bureau), FGA, 16970, at 9–13, 35–36. 29 奏办续放札萨克图王旗蒙荒行局总办张翼廷为呈请事 (Submission by the Officer of Zasa Fecteau Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), FGA, 16851, at 2–4. 46 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 as an investment. For example, consider the case of the Caiha new suburb in Darhan Banner. Here, the first plaintiff, WU Yuxiang, was a Money merchant from Beijing. Moreover, there were several lawsuits with managers accused of encroaching reclamation fees where the plaintiffs were civilian merchants or the families of Manchu officers living in Fengtian.30 It seems that the buyers thought it was a good investment when they made their decision, and they were very likely to resell the land or recruit some tenants and farm workers (bangqing 榜青) to farm it. Even the buyers who farmed the land themselves probably recruited tenants and farmworkers to help them. Employers and employees needed financial services. According to the administrative cases from the Fengtian Governor Archives and the Kirin Prefecture Archives, the governor officers of northeast China decided to reform the official financial institutions while they changed Mongolian land rights in the late Qing period. What was the point of the reform plan, and how did the governor officers of northeast China reform the official financial institutions? Did the official financial institutions established after the financial institution’s reform meet the demands of the people living in the reclaimed lands? In the next part, I will explore the first question.

II. APPEALS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM A series of studies on the financial system’s reform in northeast China during the late Qing period have focused mostly on currency and banknotes issued by the financial institutions in northeast China, while some studies have revealed how the governor of northeast China established the official financial institutions of Fengtian but neglected those of Kirin.31 Using the administrative cases from the Kirin Prefecture Archives, I will

30 金吴氏具呈 (Compliant by JIN Wushi), FGA, 16470, at 13–16. 奉天提法使司提法使为呈请事 (Submission by the Judicial Commissioner of Fengtian), FGA, 16470, at 277–278. 民人朱治安呈控韦升云、王 铭、张守田等贿串霸留银地无着由 (Compliant by ZHU Zhi’an against WEI Shengyun, WANG Ming and ZHANG Shoutian et al.), FGA, 23643, at 300. 31 LIN Maochun, 浅谈吉林永衡官银钱号及其发行的纸币 (The Yong Heng Official Bank at Kirin and Its Notes), 1 中国钱币 (China Numismatics), 33–34, 78 (1985). WANG Gesheng, 清代东北货币金融述略 (Monetary Finance in Northeast China during the Qing), 7 中国社会经济史研究 (The Journal of Chinese Social and Economic History), 84–93 (1986). HU Xueyuan, 吉林永衡官帖 (Kirin Yong Heng Official Banknotes), 47 中国钱币 (China Numismatics), 44–45 (1994). SUN Min, 清达桂将军批文及永衡官帖始衰之 因浅述 (The Approval by General Dagui of the Qing Dynasty and the Cause of the Decadence of the Yong Heng Official Banknotes), 74 中国钱币 (China Numismatics), 12–13 (2001). LI Xia, 东三省官银号的建立与 货币发行 (The Establishment of the Three Eastern Provinces Official Bank and Its Notes), 4 江苏钱币 (Jiangsu Numismatics), 11–19 (2005). WANG Fengjie & QU Xiaofan, 清末民初东北私帖述论 (Private Banknotes in Northeast China during the Late Qing and the Early Republic of China), 181 社会科学辑刊 (Social Science Journal), 156–160 (2009). TIAN Junfeng, 东三省官银号主要特征之探析 (Main Features of the Three Eastern Provinces Official Bank), 19 全国商情 (经济理论研究) (China Business (Economical Theory)), 125–128 (2009). YAN Hongzhong & GAO Yu, 清末时期的过炉银危机与制度调整 (Crisis of Guoluyin and Institutional Adjustment in the Late Qing Dynasty), 2 中国经济史研究 (Researches in Chinese Economic History), 93–112 (2017). See LIU, fn. 6; YAN, fn. 10. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 47 explore the management of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau (永衡官帖局) in Kirin before its institutional reform in 1909 and analyze why and how the governor-general of northeast China decided to reform the official financial institutions, such as the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau.

A. The Function of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau before the Financial Institutional Reform Studies on the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau usually focus on the Yong Heng Official Banknote (永衡官帖).32 According to XU Shichang, the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau was established at Kirin in 1898 and began to issue the Yong Heng Official Banknotes in four ranks in 1900 due to shortage of the silver dollar (“银圆来路不 畅, 该局遂改出四等官帖”) after the Siege of the International Legations. The banknotes could be offered to merchants as a loan with a monthly 0.7 percent interest (“交商行使, 定借用章程, 按月七厘纳息”). XU suggested that the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau should take responsibility for the currency confusion in northeast China during the late Qing period because it “spammed money” (“纸币滥发无节”).33 Therefore, studies on the Yong Heng Official Banknote usually define it as a form of currency. However, the Yong Heng Official Banknotes were not issued as a currency symbol initially. According to XU Shichang, the Yong Heng Official Banknotes could be loaned to people with interest and could also be used as currency in the market. Interestingly, a Yong Heng Official Banknote was issued and used by the litigants as a receipt of a loan in the case of Yuliang v. XU Wenkui (1903–1907).34 Although I have not seen an original Yong Heng Official Banknote that was issued by the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau before its institutional reform,35 two features of

32 See LIN, Id.; HU, Id.; SUN, Id. 33 See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 1297–1298. 34 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正堂的批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 1. 35 According to the collection of cultural relics edited by Chinese State Administration of Cultural Heritage, available at http://old.chnmuseum.cn/portals/0/web/zt/cangpin/index2.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2019), and available at http://gl.sach.gov.cn/collection-of-cultural-relics/index.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2019), National Museum of China, Jilin Provincial Museum and Museum of Heilongjiang Province have several Yong Heng Official Banknotes issued by the Kirin Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau before 1909. However, I cannot see the collections to determine the details. From the images of the two collections of the National Museum of China, I can see the sum (2,000 coins and 10,000 coins) but I cannot know the details because the images are not clear. The numbers of the collections of these three museums are: (1) National Museum of China: 1101012180003610648496, 1101012180003610648503; (2) Jilin Provincial Museum: 2201022180000210064331, 2201022180000210064334, 2201022180000210064335, 2201022180000210064336, 2201022180000210064337, 2201022180000210064388; and (3) Museum of Heilongjiang Province: 2301032180000100007898, 2301032180000100008561, 2301032180000100008691, 2301032180000100008743. There are some clear images on the collection and auction websites. However, I do not know their collectors and locations and whether they are genuine or not. 48 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 the banknotes that were issued in the period of the Republic of China could be observed: (1) Withdrawals could be made with the banknote (凭帖取钱), and (2) refusal to pay could be made if the banknote was damaged or blurred (揉烂模糊不付).36 Therefore, the bearer of the Yong Heng Banknotes could request to change the banknotes to silver dollars or copper coins at the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau. The bearer of the Yong Heng Official Banknotes was discounting bills instead of paying for something by currency. Moreover, according to the charter enacted by the Ministry of Finance in 1910, a bill (钞票) was defined as “a printed or written paper note with an integer amount and without a payer, pay date and pay place…which is known as a general banknote (通用银钱票) according to the regulation of the Bank (银行则例).”37 So, the Yong Heng Official

Banknote was a kind of bill such as a check, promissory note, and bank draft instead of currency. In contrast to the official banknotes (官帖), there were private banknotes (私帖) issued by merchants in northeast China at that time.38 Therefore, the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau in Kirin was an official institution with permission to loan and issue bills. Indeed, that was the difference between the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau and the other official financial institutions in Kirin, such as the Bao Ji Bureau (宝吉局) and the Official Coins Bureau (官钱局).39

B. The Reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau In 1909, the Kirin Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau was reformed into the Yong Heng Official Bank ( 永衡官银钱号). In an official communication, Xiliang, the governor-general of the Three Eastern Provinces at that time (1909–1911), accused the deputy of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau (Ruilin) of “buying silver to balance prices” (买银以平市价) as a means to misappropriate public funds and advised for reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau into a modern bank. He presented three reasons for this: (1) There were vulnerabilities in the management system of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau and misappropriation of public funds frequently occurred; (2) the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau was a commercial institution issuing many kinds of bills not limited to the official banknote; and (3) a modern bank could better resist the threat presented by Japanese bills and Russian bills which were entering

36 ZHAO Hong & LI Chengfei, 民国十七年吉林永衡官帖研究 (Research on the Kirin Yong Heng Official Banknote in Seventeen Years of the Republic of China), 134 长春金融高等专科学校学报 (Journal of Changchun Finance College), 55–71 (2017). See LIN, fn. 31. 37 度支部奏厘订专章限制官商银钱行号滥发票纸摺 (Memorial of Control the Official Banks Issuing Notes by the Ministry of Finance), in Politics Academic Conference eds. 大清法规大全・财政部 (Regulations of Qing, The Ministry of Finance), Vol. 8, Kaozheng Press (Taipei), at 2668–2670 (1972). 38 See SUN, fn. 31; WANG & QU, fn. 31. 39 See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 1298. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 49 northeast China at that time.40 After the financial institutional reform, the Yong Heng Official Bank attained permission not only to loan and deposit and issue bills and currency but also to establish industries.41 However, according to Article 5 of the Charter of the Yong Heng Official Bank, the manager should submit monthly reports on issues of the official banknote and the silver dollar note to the Provincial Governor Office (省长公署) and the currency bureau of the Ministry of Finance (transferred by the supervision officer).42 The Yong Heng Official Bank opened branches in Shanghai, Tianjin, Yingkou, Changchun, and Harbin immediately. In 1910, the manager requested to open a branch in Beijing, but the Ministry of Finance rejected the application because it violated Article 14 of the charter of the Bank. The Ministry of Finance ordered that the Yong Heng Official Bank should not issue more banknotes in the areas where it had established branches.43 Thus, it can be inferred that the provincial governor office and the Ministry of Finance strengthened control of the official institutions after the financial institutional reform, although the official financial institutions attained more permissions.

C. The Background to the Institutional Reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau In the official communications about the institutional reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau, it can be seen that Xiliang requested to appoint a Beiyang officer as the manager because he thought that there was no one equal to this job at Kirin.44 Furthermore, XU Shichang made a similar decision in the case of the Three Eastern Provinces Official Bank between 1907 and 1909, while a few officers coming from Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, and Fengtian were appointed as manager.45 It can be inferred that the governor-generals of northeast China intentionally reduced the influence of the local society via the financial institutional reform.

40 咨为奏参永衡官帖局帮办瑞霖渔利革职另委饶昌龄接充由 (Official Communication for Impeach the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau (Ruilin) and Appoint RAO Changling as the Manager of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau by Xiliang), FGA, 9606, at 2–5. 41 See 「永衡官银銭号総分支号章程」(The Charter of the Yong Heng Official Bank), in the Department of Investigation of Manchuia Railway eds. 支那銀行関系規定集 (The Regulations of Chinese Bank), Manchuria Railway Co. (Dalian), at 73 (1931). 42 Id. at 72–73. 43 度支部为咨行事 (Official Communication by the Ministry of Finance), FGA, 9606, at 22–23. See 度支 部奏厘订专章限制官商银钱行号滥发票纸摺 (Memorial of Control the Official Banks Issuing Notes by the Ministry of Finance), fn. 37. 44 See 咨为奏参永衡官帖局帮办瑞霖渔利革职另委饶昌龄接充由 (Official Communication for Impeach the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau (Ruilin) and Appoint RAO Changling as the Manager of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau by Xiliang), fn. 40. 45 See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 1295. 50 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38

There was a debt appeal in which Yuliang (a man of the Manchu Red Banner taking his cousin Mingxiang as litigation agent) accused XU Wenkui (a civilian who lived in Kirin) of overdue payment to the Prefect of Kirin.46 The dispute occurred in the second half of 1903. Yuliang introduced a logger, named LIANG Jing, and his friends to obtain a loan from the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau. According to Yuliang, he did not know LIANG Jing, but his friend HOU Guanglin (also known as HOU Sheng) told him that LIANG was a friend of XU Wenkui (his father XU Zhensheng, also known as XU Jiujing, was a clerk of the Kirin Prefecture) and HE Guangcheng (also known as HE Guangde), and HOU promised him that he could use the guarantee for LIANG provided by HUA Zhongfu to obtain a loan for himself. So, Yuliang agreed to the introduction and went to the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau with HOU. The teller of the Bureau checked the guarantee and agreed to loan 3,500,000 coins to them.47 At the end of 1903, LIANG Jing appealed to the general of Kirin for Yuliang, and his father Yuelin cheated him. According to XU Wenkui, LIANG Jing only agreed to pay Yuliang 500,000 coins, but Yuliang kept 1,500,000 coins for himself while HOU and HE kept some coins for themselves, so LIANG and his friend got only 700,000 coins. After the trial, the general ordered the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau to withdraw the full loan. Yuliang tried to request XU Wenkui to recover the loan, but XU said he was not the debtor and he could not contact LIANG Jing because LIANG was not a resident of Kirin and was fleeing to the mountain at the border (逃往外山). Therefore, Yuelin paid off the full loan to the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau by himself and requested XU to issue a document for repayment on March 17, 1904, with a guarantee from the FU Cheng wood factory.48 XU repaid 100,000 coins but was unable to pay the full loan.49 On May 14, 1904, Yuliang appealed to the Prefect of Kirin.50 Subsequently, he and his father Yuelin, XU Wenkui and his father XU Zhensheng, HE Guangcheng (as the introducer of the debt), XU Wenkui’s wife XU Changshi and her father CHANG Wenxue (XU Zhensheng accused them of inciting his son to get the loan and used the money) started a lengthy

46 See 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正堂的批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), fn. 34. 47 徐文魁具诉呈 (Compliant by XU Wenkui), 徐文魁喊供 (Confession by XU Wenkui), KPA, 5-14-1007. See 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正堂的批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), Id. 48 See 徐文魁具诉呈 (Compliant by XU Wenkui), Id. 49 See 徐文魁具诉呈 (Compliant by XU Wenkui), Id.; 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正堂的 批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), fn. 34. 50 See 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正堂的批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), Id. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 51 lawsuit.51 Although XU Zhensheng repaid 400,000 coins to Yuliang, the trial closed without the full debt being paid off in 1907 because the other debtors had fled.52 In this case, Yuliang obtained the loan by HUA Zhongfu’s guarantee, although he had no consent. If the guarantee wrote LIANG Jing’s name clearly, it was inferred that Yuliang was not indicated on the guarantee, and HUA was not promised to offer a guarantee for his loan. If there was no clear indication about the warrantee’s name and the sum of the loan, it was inferred that the guarantee was defective. Regardless of which of the two cases was correct, it is stated that the teller of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau did not strictly review the guarantee. However, from the fact that Yuliang was a clerk of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau and his father was a gūsai da (协领) who was able to pay off the full loan immediately, it can be inferred that the teller of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau agreed to the loan because of Yuliang’s credit rather than HUA’s guarantee.53 In other words, it was easier to obtain a loan from the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau if you knew a clerk or officer of Kirin, although it seemed to be necessary to provide a merchant’s guarantee with your application. Of course, that may have led to rent-seeking and risk-taking. Therefore, Xiliang sought to prevent such an incident happening again in the financial institutional reform plan that appointed a manager who came from another officer system, reducing the influence of local society. However, he did not cite the lawsuit of Yuliang v. XU Wenkui as a reason for financial institutional reform.

D. Summary Therefore, it can be inferred that the central government and the governor-general of the Three Eastern Provinces strengthened control of the market in the financial institutional reform during the late Qing period from the institutional reform of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau in Kirin. However, did the institutional reform meet the

51 准收徐振声为宽宥徐文奎以免累及无辜的禀 (Compliant by XU Zhensheng, for Forgiving XU Wenkui), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 19. 徐唱氏为不知债款一事写状式一份 (Compliant by XU Changshi, for Not Knowing the Debt), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 21. 唱文学为徐文奎所欠私债一事所写状式一份 (Compliant by CHANG Wenxue, for XU Wenkui’s Personal Debt), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 31. 徐春喜为查找唱、何二人欠债偿还一事的呈及吉林府正 堂的批 (Compliant by XU Chunxi, for the Debt of CHANG and HE, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 73. 具禀工房经承徐振声, 为禀恳恩准查案究追, 以免株累事 (Compliant by XU Zhensheng, for Investigating the Case), KPA, 5-14-1007. 52 明祥为共领钱四百吊所欠款由徐振声追交到的呈及批 (Compliant by Mingxiang, for Received 400,000 Coins Paid by XU Zhensheng, and Approval), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 56. 收到岳林为徐文奎交钱一百吊欠钱一千 九百吊一案的函 (Letter by Yuelin, for XU Wenkui Paid 100,000 Coins but Owed 1,900,000 Coins Yet), KPA, 5-14-1007, at 83. 53 See 徐文魁具诉呈 (Compliant by XU Wenkui), fn. 47; 玉量为骗财不偿应追究赶还一事的呈及吉林府正 堂的批 (Compliant by Yuliang, for Cheat and Not Repaying, and Approval by the Prefect of Kirin), fn. 34. 52 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 demands of the people living in the reclaimed lands? This question is explored in the following part.

III. SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY From the above, it is clear that the land rights and financial institutional reforms in northeast China during the late Qing period were due to appeal trials. The judgments in which civilian creditors appealed for the Mongolian princes and the judgments of the misappropriation of public funds by the staffs of the Yong Heng Official Banknote Bureau in Kirin affected the profits of the litigants and changed local society by the institutional reform. During the 1930s and 1940s, the staff of the pseudo-Manchukuo government and the Industry Department of Manchuria Railway investigated in some Mongolian banners in northeast China and described a history of the banner, government, finance, mode of production, social structure, and customs.54 Also, some families and insiders of the Mongolian princes wrote and published memoirs in the 1980s and mentioned the social changes during the early twentieth century, under the Literature and History Research Council of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. 55 Borjigin’s fieldwork in Lambu-tobu of Darhan Banner presented the social changes after the land rights reform in the late Qing period.56 Despite some nonobjective descriptions in the reports written in the 1930s and 1940s and the memoirs written in the 1980s, some descriptions in the reports and the memoirs, such as the prestige of the Mongolian princes in the banners and the social conflicts in the local society, are similar, even coming from different standpoints. Thus, this study uses and compares these reports and memoirs and the report written by Burensain Borjigin in the 1990s, and explores the social changes in northeast China caused by the land rights and financial institutional reform during the late Qing period.

A. The Case of Front Gorlos Banner The land rights reform or the reclamation with the authorization (官垦) of the Qing dynasty in Front Gorlos Banner happened earlier than in the other banners of the Jirim

54 Investigation Department of Manchuria General Affairs Office eds. 郭爾羅斯前旗調査報告書 (Investigation Report of Front Gorlos Banner), at Chs. 1, 3 & 4 (1934). See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, fn. 9. See Industry Department of Manchuria Railway, fn. 9. 55 Suhebaru, 郭尔罗斯前旗扎萨克齐默特色木丕勒史略 (Biography of Čimedsampil), in Literature and History Research Council of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference eds. 35 内蒙古文史资料 (Inner Mongolia Literature and History Materials), Inner Mongolia Literature and History Book Company (Huhhot), at 110–141 (1989). 56 See B. Borjigin, fn. 8 at 279–334. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 53

League.57 Under the jasag, Čimedsampil, Front Gorlos Banner experienced reclamation three times, in 1903–1904, 1907, and 1927–1932, respectively.58 However, there were few violent protests, except the Togtakhu Taiji uprising in 1905. Čimedsampil requested the Qing dynasty to appoint one of his uncles as the jasag Lama of his banner and held regular religious rituals such as the fair at Ala street temple (阿拉街庙会) where the uncle was stationed, oboo sacrifice (祭敖包), blessing (招福) and the ceremony of starting work (开印仪式) yearly.59 Until he died, Čimedsampil enjoyed a certain prestige among the people of Front Gorlos Banner. Although the city was established at Changlingzi and the governor-general’s officers had been dispatched since the land rights reform decision was made in the late Qing period, the Mongolian princes still retained their ruling power as the jasag of Front Gorlos Banner until 1934.60 Under the jasag, several Mongolian officers were selected from taiji to be in charge of the general affairs of the banner. The jasag governed his banner through the banner office (旗公署), sum, taiji, and the executive conference.61 The banner office judged the lawsuits between Mongolians and the minor cases between Mongolians and civilians, while the major cases between Mongolians and civilians were entrusted to the county office (县公署).62 In summary, there were two governments and two trial systems in Front Gorlos Banner since the land rights reform during the late Qing period, but the jasag still governed the banner with the Mongolian officers and enjoyed prestige among the people. However, the influence of financial institutional reform on the social life in Front Gorlos Banner is still unclear because of the lack of historical materials.

B. The Case of Darhan Banner According to the reports written in 1937 and 1943, there was the same administrative system in Darhan Banner and Front Gorlos Banner. Namely, a jasag governed the banner

57 See 奏办吉林郭尔罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), fn. 24. See XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 396. 58 See Suhebaru, fn. 55. 59 Undurnev Borjigin, 达尔罕王生平事略 (Biography of the Prince Darhan), in Literature and History Research Council of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference eds. 32 内蒙古文史资料 (Inner Mongolia Literature and History Materials), Inner Mongolia Literature and History Book Company (Huhhot), at 34–35, 37–38 (1988). See Suhebaru, fn. 55 at 116, 118; Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, fn. 9 at Ch. 4. 60 See 奏办吉林郭尔罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), fn. 24. See Investigation Department of Manchuria General Affairs Office, fn. 54 at Ch. 3. 61 See 奏办吉林郭尔罗斯前旗蒙荒行局为出示晓谕事 (Notice by the Front Gorlos Banner Mongolian Affairs Bureau), Id. See Investigation Department of Manchuria General Affairs Office, Id. at Chs. 1, 3. 62 See Investigation Department of Manchuria General Affairs Office, Id. at Sec. 5 of Ch. 3. 54 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 through the banner office (印务处) with the assistance of the Mongolian officers.63 However, it should be noted that Prince Darhan was not living in his banner during the early period of the twentieth century, and there were other Mongolian princes such as Prince Undur, Prince oricteau, and the Second Beise in Darhan Banner.64 Each had territories and people. Prince Darhan did not enjoy prestige among the people of Darhan Banner,65 and Prince Undur and the Second Beise served as the executive head of Darhan Banner during the 1930s and 1940s.66 There was a complex relationship between the Mongolian princes of Darhan Banner. For example, consider the case of the Caiha new suburb in which Prince Undur was the landowner, while the Prince oricteau at that time, igdenwangür (1861–1891), decided to reclaim the land in Darhan Banner without authorization from the Qing dynasty and the Prince Darhan, Nam ilsurung, agreed to reclaim the Caiha new suburb to pay the civilian creditors.67 As GENG Xiaoming stated, the complex relationship and disputes between the Mongolian princes negatively impacted land rights reform in Darhan Banner.68 However, it should be noted that Prince Darhan changed his attitude in the reclamation cases during the late Qing and the early Republic of China. He took an uncompromising stand and made repeated requests to impose heavy penalties on the plaintiffs because they “intentionally falsely accused” his father (the former Prince Darhan) of debt in the case of the Caiha new suburb. Moreover, he held on to keep the right to tax the land. The governor-general’s officers in Fengtian criticized him as “conservative and unreasonable” (“深闭固拒, 难以理喻,” “封闭主义”) because of his attitude. 69 However, Prince Darhan became a vigorous cooperating partner of

63 See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, fn. 9 at 8. 64 Prince Darhan lived in Beijing during the late Qing period, from the report written by the governor officers of Fengtian who were dispatched to persuade Darhan Khan to agree to reclaim the Caiha new suburb. According to the memoir written in the 1980s, he was living in Shenyang for a long time in the early period of the Republic of China. He then moved to Beijing after the Mukden Incident. He moved to Taiwan and then to Hong Kong at the end of 1948. Until his death, Prince Darhan did not return to Darhan Banner. See 禀 (Report), fn. 26. See U. Borjigin, fn. 59 at 41–43. 65 See U. Borjigin, Id. 66 See B. Borjigin, fn. 8 at 35, 318; HIROKAWA, fn. 5 at Attached Table. 67 See B. Borjigin, Id. at 41–42. See 奏为查覆蒙旗售荒得财抗不拨地一案并审明该蒙旗被控指荒借欠各款 谨酌拟办法请旨遵行恭摺仰祈圣鉴事 (The Memorial of the Case of Darhan), fn. 25. 68 GENG Xiaoming, 1902–1931 年间达尔罕旗放垦中的贵族纠纷 (Disputes between the Nobles in the Reclamation of Darhan Banner during 1902 and 1931), 47(1) 郑州大学学报(哲学社会科学版) (Journal of Zhengzhou University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)), 151–157 (2014). 69 奉天提法使司提法使为呈覆事 (Submission by the Judicial Commissioner of Fengtian), FGA, 18266, at 36–41. See 奉天府知府为呈请事 (Submission by the Prefect of Fengtian), fn. 26. See 奏为查覆蒙旗售荒得财 抗不拨地一案并审明该蒙旗被控指荒借欠各款谨酌拟办法请旨遵行恭摺仰祈圣鉴事 (The Memorial of the Case of Darhan), fn. 25; 东三省蒙务局为咨呈事 (Inquiry by the Mongolian Affairs Bureau of the Three Eastern Provinces), fn. 25; XU et al. eds. punctuated and collated by LI, fn. 17 at 405–406. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 55 reclamation in the early period of the Republic of China. He not only promoted the reclamation of West Middle Wasteland (西夹荒) owned by Prince Undur but also decided to reclaim Liaobei Wasteland (辽北荒) owned by Prince oricteau, which led to the Gada Meiren uprising in 1929.70 Prince Darhan did not establish a close relationship with the people of Darhan Banner because he did not often live there, although it is said that he was a devout believer of Lamaism, and he advocated for religion and encouraged the people to be educated.71 However, he did not appoint someone from his family to be the religious leader in Darhan Banner or hold religious and political events to create a duality between religion and politics in his banner, as Čimedsampil and the other tribal leaders of the frontier zones did during the Qing dynasty.72 According to his nephew, the son of the Second Beise, Nam ilsurung told the Second Beise and the staff of the pseudo-Manchukuo government in the 1930s that he was not suitable to serve as the jasag of Darhan Banner because he was losing his prestige yearly.73 According to the reports written in 1937 and 1943, there was not official financial institution in Darhan until 1938, the branch of the financial cooperative of Liaoyuan, located in Wangfu (the government of Darhan Banner) opened.74 The people of Darhan usually acquired loans from the merchants living in or Liaoyuan. In famine years, the tenants and the farmworkers usually appealed to landowners and their employers to borrow cash or goods.75 Farming customs such as bangqing formed in Darhan, and the population structure changed since the land rights reform in the late Qing period. Especially in the area bordering Tongliao, civilian immigrants in the village increased to 37.2%, and the leadership in the village was changing.76 The immigrants, not only civilian people but also Mongolians, were discriminated against in society until the 1930s.77 In contrast, civilian immigrants were fewer than the Mongolian people who moved from the other areas of Darhan, and the civilian people moved to Darhan as the servants

70 See GENG, fn. 68. See U. Borjigin, fn. 59 at 38–40. 71 See U. Borjigin, Id. at 30–49. 72 See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, fn. 9 at Ch. 4. Concerning the duality between religion and politics, see ZHENG Shaoxiong, 汉藏之间的康定土司——清末民初末代明正土司人生史 (Kangding Native Chieftains between the Han Chinese and Tibetans: A Life History of the Last Mingzheng Tusi (1902–1922)), SDX Joint Publishing Company (Beijing), at 10–11 (2016). 73 See U. Borjigin, fn. 59 at 41–43. 74 See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, fn. 9 at 177. 75 See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, Id; see Industry Department of Manchuria Railway, fn. 9 at 8. 76 See Manchuria Xing’an Bureau, Id. at 2, 134. See Industry Department of Manchuria Railway, Id. at 2–3. 77 See Industry Department of Manchuria Railway, Id. at 2. 56 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 of a Qing princess who married the Mongolian Prince in the early Qing period. Several Mongolian immigrants moved from the other Banners and Manchu immigrants in the other villages such as Lambu-tobu before 1945.78 According to Burensain Borjigin, the cohesion in Lambu-tobu was strong because most villagers were relatives, while the Mongolian villagers who were Han Chinese were more aware of ethnic identity than the other Mongolian villagers.79 Therefore, it can be inferred that the disparity in Darhan, which was indicated in the reports of 1937, was accurate. Moreover, the land rights reform changed the population structure, social life, and farming customs immediately, while the modern financial institutions did not enter local society to meet the demands of the people living in Darhan. There were several communities and authorities in the local society. The decisions made by the authorities caused frequent conflicts between the interests of different groups, although good relationships between the members of different groups played a role in easing social contradictions. Splits between groups became more serious as authorities lost prestige, and the social conflict intensified more easily.

C. Summary Local society changed from the land rights reform and financial institutional reform during the late Qing period. Population structure, social life, industry, and farming customs changed immediately because of the land rights reform, and there were severe disparities in some areas. However, the modern financial institutions did not enter local society immediately, and the traditional farming and financial customs still functioned. There were different policies between the land rights reform and the financial institutional reform which the central government and the governor-generals of northeast China adopted. As mentioned, the province governments strengthened control of the official financial institutions by appointing officers from other systems as managers and requiring them to submit reports regularly. Moreover, the central government restricted the official financial institutions in opening branches and issuing banknotes. In the case of the chamber of commerce of Changtu, which asked to establish a bank by raising stock in 1907, the officers of Fengtian Province adopted a similar policy. The application was rejected because “it would lead to the financial system being unified.”80 It can be inferred that the central government and the governor-generals of northeast China aimed to wipe out the pitfalls of the financial system, such as inappropriate loans or misappropriation, which occurred frequently. However, the policies hindered the peasants and the herdsmen

78 See B. Borjigin, fn. 8 at 244–248. 79 Id. at 253. 80 昌图府呈府城商会集股设立银号恳请拨借铜圆试办由 (Submission by the Prefect of Changtu, for the Chamber of Commerce of Changtu Applying for Establishing a Bank by Raising Stocks), FGA, 24508, at 2–6. 2020] INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGES IN NORTHEAST CHINA DURING THE LATE QING 57 who had few possessions and could not guarantee their loans from the official financial institutions; while they maintained financial market order, the modern banks could not take the place of the traditional financial means in local society. Conversely, neither the central government nor the governor officers of northeast China took tough measures to promote the reclamations, although it was an important motivating force to prevent a frontier-zone with China by the Mongolian land rights reform. In the case of Darhan, the governor officers of northeast China did most of the work, including investigation and trial, and persuaded Prince Darhan to agree to reclaim the Caiha new suburb although the memorial about the reclamation submitted to the Emperor was signed by the governor-general of the Three Eastern Provinces (XU Shichang) and the governor of Fengtian (TANG Shaoyi) and the Ministry of the Court of Colonial Affairs.81 In other words, the central government did not directly intervene in this case. Moreover, the governor officers of northeast China continued to balance the profits of the litigants. They worked in the trials as staff officers who helped the Prince Darhan by giving advice and suggestions to solve his problems.82 Of course, the policies were significant in establishing a fair trial but not conducive to making the central government and the governor-generals of northeast China authorities and taking the place of the Mongolian princes in local society, while not all Mongolian princes enjoyed unique political authority in their banners or established a duality between religion and politics. It can be inferred that there was an intense division in society in that the traditional authority (the Mongolian princes) were losing their prestige, while a new authority had not appeared.

CONCLUSION According to Lattimore, northeast China, including Mongolia and Manchu, was a dynamic frontier zone where Chinese culture transferred to Inner Asia. In Mongolia, Chinese merchants were united with Mongolian princes and exploited the property of Mongolian people by asking people to be collectively responsible for the debt and to do voluntary labor. Temples and monks led to economic degradation and social slavery, while Mongolian society became peaceful.83 Moreover, there was a series of studies based on Lattimore’s conclusion discussing how Chinese institutions infiltrated the frontier zone and influenced its culture. However, the debt appeals were the direct cause of the institutional reform in

81 See 奏为查覆蒙旗售荒得财抗不拨地一案并审明该蒙旗被控指荒借欠各款谨酌拟办法请旨遵行恭摺仰祈圣 鉴事 (The Memorial of the Case of Darhan), fn. 25. 82 See 禀 (Report), fn. 26. 83 See Lattimore, TANG trans. fn. 7 at 66–68. 58 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA [Vol. 15: 38 northeast China during the late Qing period, although political consideration was an important motive. Even if the debtor was a Chinese merchant, the cause of debt was usually unrelated to trade but was related to political affairs such as succession and war. Some of these debt appeals, for example, the case of the Caiha new suburb, lasted for decades and involved hundreds of parties in the lawsuits. Until the judgment was given, some plaintiffs went bankrupt because they could not receive loans and had to pay for the lawsuits, and some died and left substantial debts to their families (for example, the first plaintiff of the Caiha new suburb, WU Yuxiang). Conversely, it can be inferred that the financial institutional reforms aimed to achieve financial security because the governor of northeast China found there were several pitfalls in the management system of the official financial institutions. Thus, I can say that the institutional reform in northeast China during the late Qing period was because the governor aimed to resolve the appeals immediately. The governor officers of northeast China promoted the institutional reform by the judgment of debt appeals, and then guaranteed the new land rights order and established modern financial institutions. However, the financial system reform did not change local society immediately, as the land rights reform did, because the governor-generals of northeast China adopted different policies in the institutional reforms. There was a traditional and a modern side to local society since the institutional reform during the late Qing period, although there were fewer variations in different societies, for example, Front Gorlos Banner and Darhan Banner. It was inferred that the relationship between the local society and the government was a delicate one that adjusted their distance rather than tested one’s strength. Thus, the debt appeals in northeast China during the late Qing period were an important cause of the institutional reform, and the judgments affected the profits of the litigants and changed local society.