Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

Study Guide

Table of Contents Table of Contents ...... 1 Welcome Letters ...... 2 Introduction to DISEC ...... 3 Topic A: Re-negotiation, Expansion and Implementation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) ...... 4 Topic B: Considering Solutions to the Security Risks of De Facto Independent Territories ...... 19

Welcome Letters

Hello! I’m Richard Haslam and I will be your Director of DISEC for this conference. Apparently everyone knows that I am excited to be chairing LIMUN (and I am!) but what is really true is that I look forward to seeing people as excited by MUN as I am. I am in my third year of my degree at the University of Leeds, studying Classical Literature and Philosophy – which I hope demonstrates there is no one “MUN degree”. Outside of MUN I’m a keen member of the Real Ale society – so I’m also looking forward to the socials, inside of MUN I shall be easy to find due to my, ahem, colourful waistcoats you shall be witness to during the conference. To experienced and first-timers alike, from me and my Assistant Directors, I’ll see you soon!

Dear delegates, I’m Yuji Develle and it is my distinct pleasure to be your Assistant Director of DISEC for this prestigious and internationally acclaimed conference. Tap yourselves all on the back because getting through DISEC at LIMUN will be no small feat, especially with the two challenging topics our team have prepared for you. I am a second year War Studies student at King’s College London and have been through my 15th conference (10 of which were in DISEC). Having represented Best Delegate in the UK and being President of KCL UNA, I am ready to answer any of your questions regarding the specificities of the UK scene. Outside MUN, it is my firm belief that life could not be the same without techno & house, champagne bubbles, and skiing. To all delegates… See you soon!

Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears! No but in all honesty, I sincerely greet you all whom are taking the time and effort to go through the fruits of our labour. I am Olaf Soff, the second Assistant Director to this year’s DISEC at LIMUN. An unbelievable honor which has been bestowed upon me and which I hope to fulfill in a noteworthy manner. I am currently a second year Bachelor student of International Studies with a focus on Russia and Eurasia at the Leiden University Campus in The Hague, which also happens to be my current city of residence. I am Dutch and I have lived in The Netherlands all my life, which has lasted for over 20 years so far. I haven’t got as many fancy achievements as my fellow directors, but after participating in 13 MUN conferences and having 1 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

organised two, I believe I can still be called experienced. What else can I say but: A guitar, badminton, poetry and varied alcohol filled life is definitely working for me. I look forward to meet all likeminded people and the not so likeminded equally and I trust we will have unforgettable and forgettable memories the plenty!

Introduction to DISEC

The committee for Disarmament and International Security – DISEC, is the 1st committee of the United Nations General Assembly. All 195 full member and full observer-status States are allowed to attend and participate.

DISEC came into being with the creation of the UN, so first met shortly after the first UNGA session, in January 1946 – with representatives of just 51 nations. To give you an idea of how long DISEC have been confronting certain issues, their first ever resolution, adopted on the 24th January was to form a commission on the issues raised by atomic energy.

DISEC possess a crucial mandate: to consider disarmament and international security issues across the world, in order to ensure peace and the progress of disarmament. They will attempt to form agreements between states on both these issues, in order to form consensus to confront those issues on their mandate.

That they cover both disarmament and international security gives them quite a wide remit, meaning the resolutions they construct can vary quite widely. Here are a few of the topics covered in 2014: African Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone; measures to prevent terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction; preventing an arms-race in outer space and…the convention on certain conventional weapons.

Vital to consider once you start writing resolutions is that of Scope, remember at all times that your resolutions are non-binding on member nations, ensuring you respect their sovereignty at all

2 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

times - so you may demand or require other nations to act in any particular fashion. Instead clauses must be non-binding (e.g. suggests or urges). Most notably concerning scope, you must stay within the mandate of the committee – solving ecological problems is not for DISEC to confront.

This is even more prevalent with regard to the United Nations Security Council, the only UN body that may interfere with a member State’s sovereignty to ensure international security, including the deployment of peace-keepers and sanctions. As DISEC is the body with the most interaction with the UNSC’s mandate, specific care must be taken not to interfere with their actions. If need be, the committee may refer concerns over certain issues to the UNSC for them to consider.

DISEC is a beginner-level committee at LIMUN (though I know there will be many experienced delegates amongst you), so I and my assistant-directors will always be happy to answer any questions you may have for us, both before and during the conference.

With that, the ball is in your court, delegates…Good Luck

3 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

Topic A: Re-negotiation, Expansion and Implementation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Summary of the CCW Below is a one line summary of each protocol and the amended article 1. A State must accept at least two protocols to be counted as a ratifying member.1 (ref treaty)

Protocol I restricts weapons with non-detectable fragments (glass, plastic etc)

Protocol II restricts landmines and booby traps

Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons

Protocol IV restricts blinding laser weapons

Protocol V sets out requirements and guidelines for the clearance of “explosive remnants of war,” Amended Article 1 accepts that the protocols apply to internal, as well as international, conflicts

Timeline The following is a rough timeline for relevant events pertaining to the CCW. When two dates are given, the former indicates the original formation of the treaty or annex, and the latter when the altered form came into force.2 (ref UN CCW timeline page)

1900 – The initial Hague Convention, the first truly global attempt at standardising the laws of war comes into force, including several prohibitions against certain types of weapons, both non- conventional (poison gas) and conventional – such as bullets that expand or tumble on impact (sometimes known casually, more recently, as “dum-dums”)3 (ref see source)

4 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

1991/1983 – The original CCW treaty was formed/created, establishing the first three protocols, of which at least 2 were ratified by each country

1995/1998 – An adaptation of Protocol II (concerning landmines) was altered, and protocol IV, concerning blinding laser weapons was added.

1997/1999 – The Ottowa treaty, or anti-personnel mine ban convention is formed, for the specific purpose of eradicating the existence of all anti-personnel mines (it doesn’t mention other forms), as well as the clearing of them from all countries.4 (ref see source)

2001/2004 – Additionally the scope of the treaty as a whole was altered, from purely being an international treaty to also concerning conflicts that happen within the borders of a country.

2003/2006 - Protocol V came into being, concerning the explosive fragments of war, to combat the negative legacies of any armed conflict.

2008/2010 – The convention on cluster munitions is created, heavily by those States displeased with the lack of progress on the topic elsewhere. The USA (amongst many other States) refused to sign, and has also stated a refusal to even consider the topic unless it was considered as part of the CCW.

2014 – An informal meeting on autonomous weapons occurs, to start consideration of additional regulation of them, future annual meetings have also been arranged.

Current Situation

Included within is a consideration of the current status of the convention itself, the current effectiveness of the convention, its problems and any region where the treaty is having a notable effect. 5 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

There are currently 119 State parties to the treaty, which means that they have ratified at least two protocols of the convention. The current signatory level is especially worthy of consideration. Unlike almost every other arms reduction/limitation treaty, the CCW has not grown rapidly. It was only when its first review conference was announced that it finally started to grow (at the time of announcing it had only 29 signatories, and in three years grew to 56 by 1995) . However now, 2 decades on, it has only doubled that – the cluster munitions treaty is doing almost as well after just six years. The Ottowa treaty has 162 parties. 5 (ref see ratified sources)

As such, gaining the support of the numerous non-signatories is a serious concern for the CCW. The primary reasons for this seem to be a mix of reasons: some countries view it as a “defunct” treaty, others have the view that other treaties they have signed (notably the Ottowa treaty) remove the need to ratify the CCW and, more recently, many important NGOs push developing countries to ratify certain treaties, but neglect the CCW. 6 (ref see excellent critique)

The CCW, however, does however possess one notable benefit, concerning signatories over other arms treaties – every P5 member (UK, USA, PRC, Russia and France) has signed every protocol, which is almost unheard of in other weapons treaties. Other military significant countries such as Brazil and India have also signed, the primary non-signatories are smaller or developing countries. As such, the most recent review conference in 2011 instituted a number of methods, with a significant focus on the larger countries promoting the convention via their bi-lateral links. It is to be debated whether this has proved successful, as only 4 members have joined since then.

The other facet of the convention’s nature – that of its actual protocols is more positive. The treaty itself promotes its flexible nature, and it is well-suited to add additional protocols as technology changes. There would appear to be two major changes currently being considered at this time.

The first is whether cluster munitions could be included into the convention – there is clearly general support for the current treaty on it, and it would appear reasonable to include it in the

6 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

CCW. The support would also transfer (as was seen when the protocol V on landmines was bought in), promoting both. Additionally, the USA has also shown a willingness to negotiate on the matter (and encourage its allies) if added to the CCW.7 (ref cluster mines wiki, find true source)

The second is that of autonomous weaponry, an area just starting to be developed. At the moment there is significant use of autonomous robotics in combat, but primarily for reconnaissance and other non-directly hostile uses. Any robot carrying weapons is tele-operated, so does not kill autonomously. However it is not unreasonable that the day where this occurs may come, and perhaps not too far in the future (it is technically possible, though unwise, now). As such the CCW has just started consideration over whether it should bring in additional protocols concerning autonomous weaponry. If it does act, then it will have done so before their deployment in battle, as was the case with blinding laser weapons (protocol IV).

Next to be considered is the effectiveness of the CCW, including breaches and compliance.

There have been and are some significant benefits of the CCW, with certain protocols proving much more successful than others.

The most successful protocol has been protocol IV (on blinding laser weapons) – created before their use in combat this addition has prevented these weapons from ever entering war, and in doing so could be considered completely successful. The suggestion of its addition alone proved valuable – its upcoming consideration at a review conference led to the consideration of a ban in numerous countries. For example, nearly a hundred US congressmen argued for its ban, leading in a complete U-turn in the US policy in the immediate run-up to the review session. With the backing of the countries most capable of creating such weaponry, the ban has remained in force and effective.

Also successful has been protocol I (banning weapons with non-detectable fragments), originally

7 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

added since it was feared that the US had used glass-filled shards in Vietnam, this later turned out to be incorrect. However there seems to have been little violation of this – primarily believed to be due to there being no military benefit of such a system. Some parties would like to see this protocol extended to any fragmenting weapons, however this seems far less likely to gain common approval. 8(ref Flechette book)

Protocols II and V, on landmines and their consequences, have had mixed success, but are generally less considered as part of the success of the CCW, or even its nature. With almost all countries signing the Ottawa treaty aiming to ban the weapons outright, it is harder to measure the more moderate requirements required under the CCW. Additionally, protocols II and V have the least agreement of all States who have signed up to any of the CCW.

By far the area of most concern of the CCW is that of Protocol III – Incendiary weapons. This is heavily due to the number of loopholes present in the full protocol. The main ones are: the number of incendiary sources not considered so – light and smoke generating sources amongst them; the ban against air-deployed use of weapons against forces amongst civilians (thereby implicitly supporting use by surface means) and that authorizing non-directly hostile use (i.e. not aiming it at the enemy).

These have led to a constant onslaught of acts either considered to be some to be a breach or true breaches of the protocol. Incendiary weapons are known to have been used in Syria (which is not a signatory) but also in Ukraine – where both Ukraine and Russia are full signatories (remember, the signing by Ukraine binds any faction in internal-conflict to the same rules). Even Western forces have come in for complaints over the last decade for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, primarily for claims the US were using it as a weapon rather than for illumination as claimed. 9(ref memo on it and independent newspaper)

The CCW signatories are well aware of the problem, demands by some countries and many NGOs for removal of loopholes in protocol III were made before the 4th review session and since then, but

8 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

little direct improvement seems imminent, as many powerful signatories are against it. 10(ref memo again)

One benefit of the protocol has been to fasten attention on countries that do overtly use incendiary weapons, such as Israel (which has not signed protocol III), which in their most recent attack into Gaza did not use their weapons, due to a mix of public and state disapproval.

Also of note, with the current situation, is that there is progress being made on a cluster munitions protocol, a crucial aspect currently missing from the convention. 11(ref 4th review agenda)

Compliance However, the current state of affairs concerning compliance is thus: in the 3rd review conference in 2006, a system of self-monitoring was set-up, with countries being required to submit reports on the level of compliance within their country and armed forces.

This of course has received multiple complaints from both certain members and numerous other external parties that there is no external compliance and monitoring group (as was suggested in the 1st and 2nd review conferences, but failed to gather sufficient support). (ref CCW compliance)12

Summaries of Past Resolutions Previous resolutions on the CCW have come from the UN General Assembly, usually with no dissenting votes. However these resolutions are quite similar in format, with a desire to expand membership, number of protocols and occasionally a summary of the most recent meeting or review conference. The best example of this would be the 2012 resolution.13 (ref 2012 resolution).

There are also resolutions that link tangentially to specific protocols of the CCW. The most relevant work relating to the CCW (but not part of it) by the UN concerns that of landmines. 14 different organisations work towards removing the risk posed by them towards civilians. There is a comprehensive UN organized plan to help resolve the problem14 (ref mine plan).

9 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

Concerning actual resolutions on the matter, there is an annual GA resolution encouraging the banning of landmines. The most recent resolution (68/30) calls for members to sign the Ottowa treaty [n.b. The Chair does encourage you to read this treaty, it is a vital document to understand the concerns remaining about landmines in the CCW], as well as humanitarian calls to aid those affected by landmines and assistance in removal of landmines after conflict. No state voted against and many who refuse to sign the treaty still vote in favour (in support of the humanitarian clauses).15 (ref Landmine resolution) Of additional interest concerning resolutions is that many Security Council resolutions (which are binding) concerning peace-keeping resolutions set out landmine clearing as a task to be carried out.

There are also annual meetings of the group of governmental experts (GGE) – reports on these are only announced at each review conference, but the Secretary-General does give a summary of what was discussed. 16(ref GGE 2011 meeting) These do vary somewhat more than the resolutions, with there being no specific summary – they change depending on what is deemed to be of consideration to the CCW. They also consider topics that will be discussed at the Review conference, including for possible inclusion in the treaty, including a heavy prevalence on cluster munitions at the moment, as well as, most recently, autonomous weaponry.

Bloc Positions P5 – All permanent Security-Council members have signed every protocol in the CCW, and have at least stated their desire for other members to sign it. The western members have encouraged firmer diplomatic pressure on other States to sign it, as opposed to the PRC and the Russian Federation. The USA, Russian Federation and China have all been accused by human rights groups of using incendiary weapons in breach of either the letter or the spirit of the convention. The USA, UK and France have all condemned their use, including in Syria, as well as general statements about their use in the Crimean region/Ukraine civil war. The P5 would likely be willing to at least consider adding weapons to the prohibited list, but may try and place exemptions into the official wording. The USA, PRC and Russia would likely be against any stronger form of compliance monitoring

10 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

(although the USA has shown signed of softening under the current administration). 17(ref HRW report)

Western Bloc – The other Western nations would generally be willing to consider the addition of additional weapons, including cluster munitions – with one or two exceptions, usually those who replaced the use of landmines with them. Many Western nations have condemned breaches of the CCW, including in Syria, Lebanon, Ukraine and elsewhere – by numerous parties, including signatories.

Eastern Europe – Most Eastern European states have also signed it (likely due to the treaty predating USSR break-up). These members are generally quite happy with the status quo, additionally they have not been especially active concerning consideration of possible breaches (although this may change with the accusations being made in Ukraine). They are also likely to follow their political allies, possibly encouraging a split between East/West power blocs, were one to occur. A few states within the bloc have not signed the convention, but are generally considered likely to do so in time. Often the weapons banned/considered for banning are those which these nations would not have the ability to construct and use in any case (with the notable exception of landmines, and possibly cluster munitions), which makes it easy to consider banning them. Due to this, those members who have signed the convention have almost always signed every protocol.

Middle East – Almost no country within the Middle East has signed the CCW. Those that have, have not signed key protocols. Were these States to have signed the CCW, they would have been guilty of multiple breaches, concerning both landmines and incendiary weapons. Most of these nations are unlikely to sign the convention (though some may support the goals included, and would be happy to see it expanded for other nations). It may be possible for certain states that have partially signed to expand their agreement. Any additional compliance agreement would, however, almost certainly prevent signing by these members.

Central Asia – These countries have a curious nature, with most signing, but excluding certain

11 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

protocols. There is no particular consistency in which protocols each country exempts itself from either. There is a general trend of many nations accepting the minimum two protocols over a decade ago, then slowly accepting more protocols (usually in the run-up to each review conference). As such, these States may well agree to additional protocols. Agreement to additional protocols/alteration of current ones is likely to be neither be heavily for or against, with willingness to negotiate with a mind to future ratification. There is likely to be at least some disagreement with compliance, with some significant negotiation needed on its exact nature to encourage support.

South-East Asia – Very few countries in this region have signed the Convention and one who has, Vietnam, has not ratified it. These countries are not generally fundamentally against the CCW, and would likely take up at least partial signing if more encouraged too. Incendiary weapons have a heavy history of use in the region, most notably in Vietnam with the USA deploying them – it is hard to tell whether this would encourage or discourage ratification of protocol 3. Many of these countries have a poor human rights record, but no worse than some who have signed the Convention. Discussing what is needed to bring such a big power bloc into agreement could be of key discussion. These countries possess some of the largest military forces not subject to the convention, with Indonesia perhaps the greatest globally.

Central America – The continental countries within Central America have mostly signed the CCW, with countries generally signing 4 out of 5 protocols (again, with no one particular protocol not being signed). These nations are likely to be willing to negotiate with the west on both ratification and additional protocols possible topics. Compliance is a harder issue to consider, with some not wanting it while others would like some form of check against the larger powers in the region.

South America – Almost every country within South America has signed the CCW (Guyana and Suriname the two exceptions) to at least some degree. As a continent it shows strong support for the Convention – 5 years ago only one country accepted the CCW without reservation. Now the majority does and almost every country has accepted additional protocols. Complete support for the CCW within a decade seems likely within South America. Support for additional protocols on

12 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

cluster munitions and autonomous weapons is also likely to be strong here, with consideration of compliance mechanisms the only remaining issue – as a group they weren’t that supportive when the idea of independent monitoring was originally suggested 20 years ago, but it is possible that the region may be convinced of the benefits now.

Africa – Africa is the area of greatest concern for the CCW. It is both scarcely supported and there would be numerous breaches were it to be accepted. It should be noted that almost all of Africa has accepted the Ottawa treaty (some with reservations) – landmines are clearly the greatest concern to the region, and so signing the CCW may not seem of additional benefit to many. Improvement on protocols on landmines would have to be made for many to agree to signing. Additionally some of the most powerful countries in Africa have not fully accepted the CCW, Nigeria has signed but not ratified and South Africa has not fully accepted the Convention. Without the most powerful local nations agreeing it may prove difficult to get more developing countries to spend their time on it. Support for various proposals may be rather ad hoc, with each country doing what seems best to it or its trade partners.

Developing/Island Nations – As with Africa, most small island nations have not signed, considering the treaty to have little relevance to them, as well as possibly incurring additional costs. Without these concerns being allayed, the treaty is unlikely to spread to them, but if they can, there is no reason for these nations not to sign. They are also likely to support compliance, as it is unlikely to incur additional problems for them.

Israel – Israel is worthy of special mention, as it has signed the treaty but has not signed the protocol on incendiary weapons. It has used them in the past and was condemned for it, and it was this condemnation that led to them not deploying them in the most recent Gaza invasion18 (ref report on incendiary weapons). Israel also used cluster weapons in the Lebanon conflict, and so would only support such a protocol if they felt that they would not have use of them again in the future. Also of note is that they have not signed Amended Article 1 – which makes the protocols in force in non-international conflicts. If Israel deems combat against Hezbollah (for instance) not to

13 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

be international, then it can deem itself not bound by any restrictions.

Issues to be Resolved There are several key aspects that must be resolved for the CCW to truly come into its own and be globally respected. You must consider how to best to ascertain country’s concerns and desires, how to find an acceptable middle ground and how to place these methods in an effective and viable resolution. Within each overriding issue are some aspects to consider and some suggested questions about each one – it isn’t required to try and answer every single question – perhaps pick one or two as the issues that you are going to resolve – remember, one delegate cannot make a resolution.

Expansion of Treaty Signatories A great starting issue of the treaty is that so few (relatively) States have signed up to it, and so few in the areas where the weapons are most likely to be used in the first place. The following aspects of this issue should be looked before making your suggested solutions. It also makes a good underpinning for any resolution – since if no-one agrees to sign up to the protocols, there is no point in creating them.

- Conflict Zone signatories – crucially, Africa and the Middle East. -Why have these countries not signed? -Is/are there any specific reasons why? -Why (or why not) have they signed up to other similar treaties? -What would it take to have these countries sign up? -Have any other similar countries signed up, and what did it take them to do so?

- Inactive Regions – Island nations and South-East Asia -What are the reasons for the Island nations not signing? -If it is not just insufficient attention, what can be provided to help? -Is there any firm reason to prevent South-East Asia from signing?

14 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

-Why did Vietnam sign but never ratify, is this discouraging neighbours?

- Partial Signatories -Are there any particular protocols not being signed as frequently? -Why is this the case? Is it use or just not signing later protocols? -Why do some regions have such a scattered mix of unsigned protocols? -How can South America’s example of increased signing be spread?

Re-Negotiating the Convention Here is where the true negotiation will come into play, with even those who fully agree with the spirit of the Convention disagree over the future course of action. There is more room to find a middle path, and several different ideas can be added at once. For every change to the treaty, look at the world as it is and see where your changes would be applicable – this might be multiple conflicts (with cluster weapons) or none (with autonomous weaponry), there is precedent for both. Would anyone sign the changes? Would the signatories comply?

- Additional Protocols -Cluster Weapons has been on the agenda as a suggested additional protocol for years now, for a starting place, this is where to look. - Take a look at the pre-existing cluster-munitions treaty, can parts of it be adapted and moved to the CCW? - Look at the countries who signed and did not? Why? What can be done? -Autonomous weaponry is not currently in place (but could quickly be) – as was the case with blinding laser weapons. Could a grave problem be avoided, or is it moving too fast? -Don’t feel limited to these two, look at past ideas and other weapons coming into their own, fuel-air bombs, flechette weapons, see if you can find other possibilities

- Amended Protocols -Landmines. Ottawa treaty. Did they go far enough?

15 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

-Who signed the CCW protocols but not the Ottawa treaty? Why? -Can the protocols be further extended without losing major signatories? -Can anything be done to attract the Ottawa signatories to sign the CCW (either unchanged or altered?)? -Is there any actual middle ground left? Or is it time to go all the way? -Do any of the other protocols need fundamental changes?

- Closing Loopholes/Specific Amending -Each protocol has a number of details and exemptions, should any be changed? -Protocol III has the most controversial loopholes, how can they be resolved? -Would any support be lost by closing these loopholes? -How can any problems the loopholes were created to avoid be alleviated?

Compliance By far and away the hardest part of any negotiations, yet perhaps the most crucial – the convention is often deemed ineffective as it has no formal compliance method. Worth a critical look again is the independent experts’ panel mooted in the first 2 review conferences. Deciding to what degree compliance is critical for any resolution and how to bridge any divides will be a tricky decision for all parties. A compliance body is also tricky as it would alter the base convention itself (so any incoming State would have to accept it) and there is also a heavy risk of the convention being split between states accepting a compliance body and those who don’t.

- Compliance Body -Should anything at all replace the current self-checking system? -Should the replacement be the suggested panel or is there another method? -What would be the exact make-up of any compliance panel? -The hardest question, how to bring parties on board? -What thought should be given to the divide between signatories who ratify an altered compliance system and those who don’t?

16 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

So, there are a lot of questions to be answered, pick what you think is the most important, and look to it. Remember you are representing your country, not yourself, so what would your country want from each issue to be resolved?

References and Bibliography I would read up on the CCW full treaty text (at a minimum, the parts of the controversial protocols, such as III). Additionally, parts, or summaries, of the Ottawa and Cluster Munitions treaties would be advisable if you plan on arguing for their inclusion. The International Red Cross text, while a little out of date, is an excellent basis, and represents a common outlook on the CCW – excellent in concept, but with several notable flaws (indeed, it is this outlook that has led to this topic being selected).

1 United Nations. “CCW Treaty Text”. Accessed Dec 2014, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/BE5FA935703D981BC12571DE0 062261C?OpenDocument&unid=4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30 2 United Nations. “CCW Timeline”. Accessed Dec 2014. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?Op enDocument 3 International Red Cross. “Hague Treaty Text”. Accessed Dec 2014. https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument 4 United Nations. “’Ottowa’ Treaty Text”. Accessed Jan 2015. http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm 5 International Red Cross. “CCW, a useful framework”. Modified 2008. Accessed Dec 2014. P1011. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-844-mathews.pdf

6 P1005 (see footnote 5) 7 US State Department. “US Position on Cluster Munitions”. Modified 2011. Accessed Jan 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm 8 Eitan Barak. Deadly Metal Rain. (2011. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). Online. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm . Pp91-94 9 Peter Poper. “US Forces “Use Chemical Weapons” in Fallujah”. Independent. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm 17 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

10 P 996 (see footnote 5) 11 United Nations. “4th Review Conference Documents”. http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/43fd798e7707ce5ac12578b20032b63 0?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=2%2C3#_Section2 (see draft protocols on cluster munitions) 12 United Nations. “CCW Compliance Mechanism”. Accessed Dec 2014. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/23D654504C840A07C125726C0061BAAF?Op enDocument 13 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 67/74. http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/483/04/PDF/N1248304.pdf?OpenElement 14 United Nations Inter-Agency Co-ordination group on Mine Action. “The Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action”. 2012. http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_strategy_mar15.pdf 15 United Nations General Assembly. 68/30. “Ottowa” Treaty Resolution. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/30 16 United Nations Secretary-General. “GGE Report 2011”. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6AA76081E589E2A6C12578370073475E?Op enDocument 17 Human Rights Watch. “Report on Incendiary Weapons and Opposition to them”. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Incendiary%20Weapons_Recent%20Use %20and%20Growing%20Opposition_Nov2014_final.pdf . pp15-16 18 P1 (see endnote 17)

18 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

Topic B: Considering Solutions to the Security Risks of De Facto Independent Territories

Introduction to the topic De Facto is a Latin expression and is literally translates into “in fact, whether by right or not”1 This means that it is used as an adjective construction stating the subject is what it is in practice, but not according to law, or not officially established. It is in this context we see the territories that are deemed De Facto Independent territories. The remainder of this study guide will therefore also follow this specific meaning. What is further important to note, is that De Facto territories are not necessarily a bad thing, they can function well as they are and even be beneficial as opposed to completely recognized states.

De Facto states typically arise from political instability in their nation. Most often, this instability leads to a revolution which, whether violent or non-violent, results in the creation of an alternative governing entity. Various De Facto states can be created in these situations. Either the entire nation in distress can become a De Facto state, or a small region within the previous border can become one. The issues that arise with these type of states are different in every case. In modern history, there are many cases out of which De Facto states originated. One of these cases will be discussed in later in this guide.

Current situation Throughout history, the format of international territory has changed considerably. As it is in the world of today, territory on an international scale, is a Nation State. These Nation States all have an established governing entity, whether deemed legitimate or not. The prime characteristic of a De Facto state in the current international society is the lack of international recognition of said state. This lack of recognition results in fewer economic opportunities and thus holds back development of a De Facto state. The reason the recognition is so lacking, is that the De Facto state has been established in a time and or a manner of chaos. Thus, the proper code of conduct for establishing a new state or governing entity was non-existent. De Facto States have a significant impact, though

19 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

mostly in their respective regions, its effects can spread further when their conflicts and political economic interests are larger than just the region of which they are a part. The results can come in the form of refugees, fatalities, wounded and disabled victims. Even those who have not physically been touched or have had to move their lives away, the economic repercussions can be dire. All these issues also affect the governments of the region and thus their respective people. Their ability to trade internationally as before will not be present and hence a De Facto state can eventually cause a demeanor of global economic growth due to the increasing level of globalisation.

As previously mentioned, there are multiple cases of De Facto states in the present international community. The examples include Somaliland, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam. However, since every case is its own, there is no possibility to fully include every single one of these cases. Even two case studies will already decrease the level of depth that could be achieved. Therefore, the choice has been made to focus on one case that is particularly interesting since it is a very enlightening one when touching upon this subject. Thus, in the following sections, the case of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, or Transnistria, will be discussed.

Case study: The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) At the end of the twentieth century, the phenomenon that was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) came to an end. This left the then former members of the Union in a state of distress and resulted in many a conflict. No different was the situation in the small Nation State of Moldova. In the end of 1988, the seed for the Transnistria War was planted. The Moldovan SSR was deciding on making Romanian the official language of its territory and usage of the Latin script. A movement called "Interdvizheniye" (Inter-movement) was established to counter the implementation of this and protect the interests of Russians and Ukrainians living in Moldova. According to Roper, the population of Transnistria consisted of 55% ethnic Russians and Ukrainians. “The Transnistrians refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 1989 language law, and in January 1990, a referendum on territorial autonomy was held in Tiraspol and passed by 96% of the population.”2 After the dice had been cast, there have been a number of conflicts between pro- Transnistria forces, including the Transnistrian Republican Guard, militia and Cossack units, and

20 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

supported by elements of the Russian 14th Army, and pro-Moldovan forces, including Moldovan troops and police. On 1 March 1992 the violence intensified and, with temporary ceasefires, did not stop until a ceasefire was declared on 21 July 1992. This ceasefire has not been broken until this day. It seems rather extreme for such a conflict to start over a language issue. It is naturally a more historical issue. During the Soviet era, Russian was the lingua franca in all respective countries that were a part of the USSR. For multiple purposes, there were many Russians that moved throughout the separate nations, however due to this lingua franca, they had no need to learn the language of the regions they migrated to. After the dissolution, it became clear that they could not function in their positions and locations as they could before, therefore a significant number of ethnic Russians repatriated or moved to nations that still used Russian as a major language, like Ukraine or Belarus. Since 1989 the demographics of Transnistria have only changed in favour of the separatist movement. Nowadays Transnistria has roughly 550.000 inhabitants.3 When looking at the conflict in a geopolitical setting, one can argue that the conflict regarding Transnistria is in fact not at an end. There are only a handful of nations that acknowledge its status as an autonomous nation and these nations are mostly in a similar position of having no recognition. The European Union has taken it upon itself to try and resolve the issue through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however many forums, talks, and much more effort later, there is no clear sign of change visible. In this respect, the self-proclaimed nation of Transnistria looks to be keeping its independence for the foreseeable future. For this very reason, this case and others need to be further discussed by the United Nations (UN) and a solution needs to be found to deal with situations already in existence as well as the possibility of more arising. In the next section, the past dealings of the UN in the case of Transnistria to give an example of what can be done to solve such an issue. However, one must keep in mind that these solutions have not necessarily been effective.

Summaries of Past Resolutions Taking the Transnistrian region as the case-study for the much wider-ranging issue of the existence of De-facto and other types of diplomatically unrecognized states, the relative lack of international action, especially from the United Nations General Assembly since the 1992 Transnistrian War,

21 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

sheds light on the difficulty the international community has had in removing all the strings attached to this complicated and interest-filled issue.

Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the end of the Cold War, the conceptual shift of the UN, which had been occurring over the last three decades, from privileging the order and stability of states to a clear commitment to its “Responsibility To Protect” the rights of individuals within states, has given the United Nations an increased ability to deny states legal recognition, should the latter fail to abide by some basic principles of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council has traditionally taken the role of exercising this activity, and has denied recognition in a number of notable instances.4 5

The first instance of this occurred relatively early in the UNSC’s history, when Resolution 216 & 217 were voted upon (10 in favor, 1 abstention from France) to condemn and refuse the unilateral declaration of independence of Southern Rhodesia (run by the UDI). This decision was made on the basis of the UDI regime’s apparently “racist” or discriminatory habits and on the declaration’s proclaimed lack of support amongst the majority of the local population.6 7

In Resolution 541 (1983), the Security Council resolved that Northern Cyprus’s declaration of independence was legally invalid and condemned the latter’s decision to do so.8 Similarly in November 1992, the creation of an Ethnic Serbian state called Republika Srpska (literally the Serbian Republic) in the geographic region of the Northern Balkans was condemned and denied by UNSC resolution 787.9 In this instance however, the condemnation was justified within the logic of regional stability; following the ethnic violence of the Yugoslavian war, it was vital to create a stable and multiethnic state in the Northern Balkans that would be called Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In an interesting turn of events however, the International Court of Justice’s decision to decriminalize the act of declaring independence with regards to Kosovo in 2010 created a precedent in international law for the survival and sustainability of de-facto and diplomatically unrecognized states today.10

The recent recognition of the state of Kosovo has created major shockwaves, particularly with regards to Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, all de-facto states that are predominantly Russo-phone and with large Russian minorities. The Russian military interventions against Georgia in 2008 and more influentially the present annexation of Crimea and situation in Eastern Ukraine, have all been justified by recalling the ICJ and NATO’s actions vis-a-vis Kosovo.11

Concerning the Transnistrian crisis itself, two agreements are of note. The Russia-NATO Agreements of 2002 in Rome, where the Russian government indicated a commitment to “observe in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.”12, These commitments have yet to be fulfilled by Russia in Transnistria as Russia’s specific commitment to establish “Arms Control and Confidence Measures” has been thwarted by rumors of arms production and trade in SALW (Small Arms and Light Weaponry) between Russia and the Transnistria authority13. The second key agreement is the role of the OSCE Conventional Arms in Europe Treaty in promoting the disarmament of the Transnistrian region. What used to be a key Soviet weapons depot for the Soviet 14th Army during the Cold War, Cobasna and other weapons depots in Transnistria were often seen (especially in Europe) as a fundamental cause for the status quo, funding and supplying the Transnistrian forces and preventing Moldova from fully acceding in the European Union. The OSCE Conventional Arms in Europe Treaty has, however, had a difficulty in terms of its implementation due to the fact that many of the important composite issues surrounding the De Facto regime in Transnistria have not been addressed.

Bloc Positions

Russia and members of the “EEU” While it may be perceived by the international community that the so-called “EEU countries” and especially Russia would be favorable to a reintegration of Transnistria in Russia, this is quite far from its current position. On the contrary to the rhetoric coming out of the Transnistria de facto

government, Russia is primordially interested in maintaining a strong geopolitical influence over the region as a whole. Russia, driven by a need to stimulate its down turning tertiary sector, is also interested by the prospect of the economic integration of Moldova into its so-called “Eurasian Economic Union”. The Russian authorities see Transnistria, a piece of land de jure part of Moldova, as a bargaining chip in the struggle against Moldova’s integration into the European Union. Another issue, perhaps more compelling in the current situation vis-à-vis the Ukrainian Crisis, is the strategic value of the 2,000 Russian troops were never taken away since the break up of the USSR. At Ukraine’s flank, it serves to not only apply pressure to its neighbors (Ukraine, Moldova, Romania) but also to protect the large Russophone minority in the region. Russia will more likely work with the OSCE and the UN, than with NATO and the European Union directly.14

European Union and the Western Bloc – This bloc composed of the sponsors and signatories of the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP15: Members of the European Economic Area, Turkey, Georgia, Macedonia, Croatia, Liechtenstein, and Norway has expressed its commitment to “renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”. In majority interested by the prospect of Moldovan EU membership and the disarmament of one of the last Soviet weapons stockpiles in Europe (Cobasna), this bloc’s priority is still to render the region peaceful. Furthermore, as the United States has also mentioned, many of the authorities within the De Facto state have been accused of denying fundamental human rights to their people and of engaging in corruption.

Moldova & Ukraine– Very similar to that of the “Western Bloc”, Moldova and to a lesser extent Ukraine’s position comes from the urgent need to politically reintegrate Transnistria into the Moldovan fold while assuring the safety of all the cultural minorities present. The wording used by Moldova is of course much stronger, and calls for the persecution of Transnistrian officials that are “illegal”. However, Moldova is treading on thin ice, as its second largest political faction is Communist (favoring a union between Transnistria and Moldova under the Soviet bastion), and must assure a majority in parliament when

the decision to step up European Integration comes. Also, the Russian military station and the presence of some alleged branches of the Russian intelligence agency, the “FSB”, is deeply troubling to these two countries who would like to see it replaced by an international civil security force that would keep the peace while Moldova and possibly Ukraine oversee Transnistria’s transition. 16

Romania– While Romania’s stance is marked by a commitment to stay within the European Union’s common position, it is important to note that Transnistria and Moldova are subject to strong Romanian influence both politically and culturally. Some political fringes calling for the reunification of Moldova/Transnistria with Romania, Romanians see this region as part of historic Romania and much of its people as part of their common historical narrative. Denouncing the “Russofication” of Transnistria, Romania pays special attention to the ethnic and cultural divides present between the Latin (Moldovans and Romanians) and the Slavic (Russians and Ukraines). Moldova, working with the Latin alphabet and speaking Romanian, is certainly closer in this regard to Romania than with Transnistria, which decided to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet and have Russian as the official language.

China – Not dissimilar to China’s diplomatic situation with regards to Ukraine, China is placed in a particularly difficult position. While diplomatically aligned with Russia and denouncing the allegedly expansionist policies of the European and American bloc, China historically frowns upon the existence of such De Facto and Autonomous states. The Republic of China (Taiwan), being in their eyes a De Facto state, and the Tibetan and Xinjiang autonomous regions posing occasional problems to China, China seeks a swift end to the status quo and a political transition of Transnistria either with Russia or with Moldova. Furthermore, China stresses the need for this political transition so as to assure stability and order in a region that has already seen violence.

Other bloc delineations – While the case study for this topic may be Transnistria, the need to address the issue of De Facto and Autonomous states of course spans much further afield. When researching your country’s position, keep in mind your state’s geopolitical priorities and what De Facto states in your neighborhood need to be addressed most urgently. This may be for instance: The Republic of Abkhazia, The Republic of Kosovo, Palestine, Western Sahara, Somaliland, etc.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

Any approach to resolving the question of de facto states must be broad and creative. As one observes each case study, it is clear that each side is often unwilling to make many concessions. It is thus of prime importance to pay close attention to why certain countries have certain positions and how their vested interests can be replaced with a viable alternative in concordance with international law. Furthermore, it is important for delegates to remember the scope of DISEC and address issues solely in the framework of Disarmament and International Security. Nevertheless, this does not preclude one for using more creative approaches to assuring security such as seeing the issue(s) in an economic, social, or political perspective.

The following are a set of Questions a Resolution Must seek to Answer:

- Should Transnistria be given de juro status?

- What criteria must a state have before acquiring de facto and/or de juro status?

- What is the scope of the Transnistrian issue? Is it local, national, or regional?

- How does one address the disarmament of Transnistria’s armed forces and weapons stockpiles?

- Who should be responsible of such an endeavor?

- How does one find and disarm the rumored “dirty bombs” found in Transnistria?

- How do we address the political transition (if any) of Transnistria’s politics?

- What actions does DISEC want to call for with regards to Transnistrian heads of state and the presence of an autocratic regime?

- What are we to do with the Russian military and intelligence presence/infiltration in the region?

- How (if ever) do we create a viable alternative to the stabilizing force (at least locally) of the Russian military in Transnistria?

- What Regional solutions can one create to avoid the reemergence of such De Facto states?

- What can be done with the 100,000 refugees from the Transnistria War of 1992?

- How do we address the language divide present between Moldova and Transnistria and protect cultural minorities in both areas?

References and Bibliography In the interest of getting a more rounded view on De Facto states and their place in the international community and law, please read the following piece: http://www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf

For more general information on the current obstacles faced by the OSCE in the Transnistrian region make sure to take a look at this document: http://www.osce.org/moldova/42308?download=true

Also at this following link for a certain European position on the issue. The article is relatively biased but gives a great outlook on the ideological position from which the “Western Bloc” is coming from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/transnistria-soviet-leftover-or-russian-foothold-in- europe-a-965801.html

1 Oxford University Press, The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

2 Steven D. Roper, The politicization of education: Identity Formation in Moldova and Transnistria (Charleston: Elsevier, 2005) pages 501-514

3 Migration Policy Centre, Moldova: Migration Profile. (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, 2013)

4 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) pages 1-4

5 Tohzun Bahcheli, The Quest for Sovereignty (London & New York: Routledge, 2004) https://www.questia.com/read/108515019/de-facto-states-the-quest-for-sovereignty

6 UNSC Resolution 216 (1965) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/216(1965)

7 UNSC Resolution 217 (1965) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/217(1965)

8 UNSC Resolution 541 (1983) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983)

9 UNSC Resolution 787 (1992) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/787(1992)

10 Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010. Reports on Judgments , Advisory Opinions and Orders: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence with Regards to Kosovo (International Court of Justice, 2010) http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf

11 ibid.

12 NATO-European Summit, Rome 2002 Outcome Document: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf

14 (In Russian) http://www.unian.net/politics/1000039-ne-suschestvuet-gosudarstva-pmr-suschestvuet-lish- pridnestrovskiy-uchastok-granitsyi-poroshenko.html

15 Russia defies Moldova’s EU Pact by Boosting Transnistria Trade (Web: Euractiv.com, Accessed on Jan 8th 2015) http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/russia-defies-moldovas-eu-pact-boosting- transnistria-trade-

16 Council of the European Union Press 59. Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (Brussels 13 March 2009) p. 31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106648.pdf