Central Asia the Caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

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Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

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Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council ISMAILOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 497 12 22; E-mail: [email protected] Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 70 232 16 55; E-mail: [email protected] Jannatkhan Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 596 11 73; E-mail: [email protected] Kalamkas represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Astana) YESSIMOVA Tel./fax: (7 - 701) 7408600; E-mail: [email protected] Ainura represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) ELEBAEVA Tel./fax: (996 - 312) 61 30 36; E-mail: [email protected] Saodat OLIMOVA represents the journal in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Tel.: (992 372) 21 89 95; E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987 - 1) 125 43 22; E-mail: [email protected] Ziya KENGERLI represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) Tel.: (+994 - 50) 3006694; E-mail: [email protected] David represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) PETROSYAN Tel.: (374 - 10) 56 88 10; E-mail: [email protected] Kakhaber ERADZE represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) Tel.: (+995 - 95) 45 82 88; E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in China (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088; E-mail: [email protected] Konrad SCHÄFFLER represents the journal in Germany (Munich) Tel.: (49 - 89) 3003132; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332; E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146; E-mail: [email protected] Robert represents the journal in the U.S. (Buffalo, NY) GUANG TIAN Tel: (716) 880-2104; E-mail: [email protected] Rustem represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) ZHANGUZHIN Tel.: (380 - 44) 524-79-13; E-mail: [email protected] 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE CAUCASUSD I T O R I A L B O A R D Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation) Garnik ASATRIAN Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Ariel COHEN Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergey GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG Doctor of Political Science, professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russian Federation) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), assistant professor, head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Zaynidin KURMANOV Doctor of History, professor, head of the Chair of International Relations, the Kyrgyz-Russian University (Kyrgyzstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO Doctor of History, professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russian Federation) Abbas MALEKI Doctor, Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Akira Doctor, History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace MATSUNAGA Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen (Denmark) Vitaly NAUMKIN Doctor of History, professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russian Federation) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA Doctor of Economics, professor, Rector of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

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CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

IN THIS ISSUE:

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Wang Shuchun, Wan THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND Qingsong. THE EEU—RIVALS OR PARTNERS?...... 7

Farrukh THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: Usmonov. RUSSIA’S VIEW ON IRAN’S CANDIDACY...... 17

Ashot CURRENT CHALLENGES Alexanian. FOR THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN DIMENSIONS...... 28

Murat EURASIAN INTEGRATION: Laumulin. VIEWS AND OPINIONS...... 40

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

Bruno THE ACTIVITIES OF de Cordier. THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK IN SOUTHERN EURASIA: IDENTITY-FRAMED COOPERATION OR CHANNEL FOR ARAB GULF INVESTMENT?...... 55 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Talant Sultanov, Bermet Imanalieva, KYRGYZSTAN Isabek IN THE INTERNATIONAL RATINGS Asanbaev. (Dynamics for 2005-2013)...... 65

GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY

Mahir THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S Khalifazadeh. RUSSIA “RESET” POLICY AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS...... 78

Farkhod CENTRAL ASIA AND Tolipov. AFGHANISTAN: THE SECURITY COMPLEX DILEMMA...... 91

Valeria TURKISH POLICY Gianjumian. IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS...... 103

Guli IRAN Yuldasheva. IN RUSSIA’S CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY...... 111

ENERGY POLICY

Sergei PIPELINES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND Zhiltsov. THE CASPIAN REGION: COMPETITION TAKES A NEW TURN...... 121

NATION-BUILDING

Beka THE PARADIGM OF Chedia. POST-SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN GEORGIA...... 135

Asel ACQUIRING LEGITIMACY: Murzakulova. THE IMPACT OF CIS INTERPARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS ON POST-SOVIET PARLIAMENTARIANISM...... 144

5 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:

 Central Eurasia: Politics Today  Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context  Central Eurasia: Integration Processes

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

THE SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND THE EEU—RIVALS OR PARTNERS?

WANG Shuchun D.Sc. (Law), Professor, Director of the Law School at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (Guangzhou, PRC)

WAN Qingsong Ph.D. Candidate at the Faculty of Russian Language Studies, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (Guangzhou, PRC)

ABSTRACT

urasia is attracting more attention area and are similar in many ways, these around the world than ever before. projects do not compete with each other E The leading powers are offering a va- since China and Russia have come to an riety of different Eurasian integration proj- agreement. Both countries are showing a ects, among which special mention should certain willingness to cooperate, which has be made of Russia’s Eurasian Economic positive prospects. Union and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. China should take gradual and pur- Although they cover a large geographical poseful steps to bring its initiative to fruition.

KEYWORDS: Silk Road Economic Belt, Eurasian Economic Union, Russia, China, promising areas of cooperation.

7 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Introduction

In the fall of 2011, the newspaper Izvestia published an article by Vladimir Putin (who was Russian Prime Minister at the time) about establishing a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) on the basis of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. He noted that this union, which could later become one of the poles in the modern world and play the role of an effective link between Europe and the dynamic Asia Pacific Region (APR), should be built on the basis of equality, sovereignty, and self-determination.1 On 7 May, 2012, the day he became president, Vladimir Putin signed an Order on Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy, which clearly stated the intention “to consider the development of multilateral cooperation and integration processes within the CIS as a key area for Russia’s foreign policy.” In addition to everything else, the decree entrusted the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, along with other federal executive power bodies, “to encourage deeper Eurasian integration within the framework of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan and contribute to creating the Eurasian Economic Union by 1 January, 2015, while assuring that these formats are open to other states, first and foremost members of the Eurasian Economic Community and the Common- wealth of Independent States, and to support the position of these new integration associations in the international fora.”2 The new Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation approved by the Russian President on 12 February, 2013 says: “Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the Eurasian Economic Union aiming not only to make the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space but also to become a model of association open to other states, a model that would determine the future of the Commonwealth states. The new union that is being formed on the basis of universal integration principles is designed to serve as an effective link between Europe and the Asia Pacific Region.”3 In the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of 12 December, 2013, Vladimir Putin noted in particular: “We expect to have agreed on the Treaty’s text by 1 May, 2014 and to have submitted it to the Russian, Belarusian and Kazakhstani parliaments by that time… Let me add that working groups are currently preparing roadmaps governing the accession of Kyrgyzstan and Arme- nia to the Customs Union. I am sure that the real achievements of Eurasian integration will only enhance our other neighbors’ interest in it, including that of our Ukrainian partners.”4 The above makes it possible to conclude that Vladimir Putin will exert every effort during his presidency to advance Eurasian integration and revive the Russian nation in order to turn Russia into an independent center of power and influence, as well as ensure it a worthy and, possibly, leading place in the future new world order and international relations. On 29 May, 2014, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the Agreement on the EEU. On 1 January, 2015, after the document has been ratified by the parliaments of these countries, a free movement regime of goods, capital, labor, and services will gradually be formed, general rules of customs-tariff regulation will go into effect, and equal access to transport and energy

1 See: V. Putin, “Novyy integratsionnyy proekt dlia Evrazii—budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia,” Izvestia, 3 Oc- tober, 2011, available at [http://izvestia.ru/news/502761], 1 July, 2014. 2 “Vladimir Putin Signed Executive Order on Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy,” President of Russia, 7 May, 2012, available at [http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/3764], 1 July, 2014. 3 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, available at [http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168 189ED44257B2E0039B16D], 1 July, 2014. 4 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of 12 December, 2013, available at [http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/ 6402], 1 July, 2014.

8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 infrastructure will be ensured in the territory of the EEU. It is expected that Armenia and Kyrgyzstan will join the new integration union a little later. This historical document will raise the EEU member states to a higher level of integration. It should be noted, however, that the EEU is not the only project of this type. On 7 September, 2013, for example, PRC Chairman Xi Jinping gave a speech at the Kazakhstan Nazarbaev Univer- sity, in which he suggested that China and the Central Asian countries pool their efforts and create a Silk Road Economic Belt. In so doing, he called on all the Eurasian countries to strengthen and intensify economic relations, expand the area of interaction, and adhere to innovative models of cooperation. It can be said that this important statement was a clear signal for the CA countries and the regions located along the Silk Road to activate comprehensive economic cooperation between China and the Eurasian countries. The two above-mentioned initiatives are being widely discussed in the political and expert circles of many countries, and, of course, in China and Russia themselves. Russian experts have not yet come to a unanimous opinion on the establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt. They think that despite the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and PRC, they are still rivals in Eurasia. In their opinion, China intends to use the Silk Road Economic Belt project to strengthen its own position in Central Asia and assume control over all the goods traffic going from Southeast Asia to Europe. So it sees the establishment of the EEU as a threat to its economic and geopolitical interests. Others are quite positive about China’s idea. In their opinion, implementing the Silk Road Eco- nomic Belt project will bring Russia economic dividends, but this will require launching a bilateral dialog with the PRC. In the future, active economic cooperation could be established between the two countries, which will affect not only the Russian regions of the Far East and Siberia, but also the European part of the Russian Federation. The heated debates that have arisen among experts around the two above-mentioned projects are still going on. Discussion usually revolves around the following questions: Why did China put forward the Silk Road Economic Belt project right after Vladimir Putin announced the idea of establishing the EEU? What does this project consist of? How can the PRC put its initiative into practice? Are Russia and China rivals? Can new large-scale projects lead to a clash of their interests in Eurasia? If the answer is no, what are the prospects for cooperation between these countries? We will try to give answers to these questions in this article.

Reasons for the Silk Road Economic Belt Project

China’s leaders have been tirelessly calling for restoration of the old Silk Road for many years. Now PRC Chairman Xi Jinping is raising this initiative at the official level, for which, we believe, there are several reasons.  First, from the viewpoint of economic growth, China primarily wishes to develop regional economic cooperation with all countries, particularly its neighbors. The global crisis that broke out in 2008 dealt a severe blow to the world economy. The Chinese government undertook timely corresponding measures to quickly extricate the country from the crisis. Despite this, the Chinese economy, which had been growing dynamically for 30 years prior to the crisis, began to limp. So China switched its attention to boosting domestic demand in its less developed regions. This primarily applies to the cen-

9 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

tral and western parts of the country (particularly the XUAR, which borders on the CA countries). In so doing, the PRC is trying to find ways to develop industries aimed at the consumer and eliminate its economy’s dependence on export. On the other hand, China today, which is actively looking for new external stimuli for its economic growth, is undergoing economic restructuring. Without any doubt, the PRC’s most important partners are the CIS member states, which have significant natural and economic potential. According to the experts, they account for 16.3% of the world’s territory, almost 5% of the global population, 25% of proven reserves of natural resources (including 7% of world reserves of oil and 40% of natural gas), and 10% of world’s industrial potential.5 Creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt will lead to a significant increase in the potential of the Chinese market and will play an invaluable role in the country’s sustainable economic development.  Second, one of the factors forcing China to turn its sights to Eurasia is a certain amount of destabilization in its relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries relating to the territorial conflict in the South China Sea. The U.S., which began protecting its super power status after the end of the Cold War, has been playing a key role in undermining China’s relations with its neighbors. America sees China as a provisional adversary and is constantly drawing and tightening so-called nooses around this major socialist country, thus creating a direct threat to its security. In November 2011, the Obama administration put forward a concept called Pacific Pivot and announced America’s return to Southeast Asia, as well as its intervention in the problems of the South China Sea. The appearance of this concept was related to the U.S.’s initiatives in the trade and economic and military political spheres. The development of trans-Pacific partnership—free trade and investment areas—became one of the most important priorities of U.S. economic policy in the Asia Pacific Re- gion. What is more, the White House has been making significant effort to step up a dialog with the ASEAN countries in economic and security issues within the U.S. — ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement-E3 program. In the military and political sphere, Pacific Pivot is related to further and more active reequipping of American naval and air forces, deploying an ABM system in the region, and developing different cooperation formats with new and old regional allies (Japan and the Republic of Korea) and partners (the Philippines and Vietnam) in security. The increased opposition between Washington (as well as its allies and partners) and Beijing going on in the context of the higher tension around the disputed regions of the East China and South China seas, as well as the territorial problems in the region have led to the U.S. putting greater political and forceful pressure on China. It appears the situation involving the mentioned seas will continue to intensify. Open- ing a trade route through Eurasia might be a way to reduce China’s dependence on the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.  Third, with balanced foreign trade and cooperation relations, the Silk Road Economic Belt will make it possible for China to open up even more toward the west. However, this does not mean a retreat from its traditional eastern and southeastern vectors or a reduction in the significance of any of them.

5 See: Report of the National Economic Council “Economic Cooperation—An Integration Factor of the CIS Countries, Ekaterinburg, 2004, p. 9 (in Russian).

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The Silk Road Economic Belt will also give a new boost to the development of Chi- na’s economic cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian countries and its integration in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization was founded in 2001 by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. It is the first regional international organization (since the time New China was formed) and bears the name of a Chinese city; its secretariat is in China. As of today, China and the SCO member states have made significant achievements in the struggle against terrorism, separatism, extremism, transnational crime, illicit circulation of drugs, and a few other nontraditional threats in Central Asia. However, the results of regional economic integration leave much to be desired. As early as 2003, China proposed a multilateral trade and economic cooperation program for the SCO member states, which was approved at the second meeting of its prime ministers. It pointed out in particular that “by 2020, the SCO member states would strive to make as efficient use as possible of regional resources on a mutually advantageous basis and assist in creating favorable conditions for trade and investment aimed at gradually bringing about the free movement of goods, capital, services, and technology.”6 However, at present, it is still not entirely clear how the SCO will develop in the future: will there be real multilateral economic integration among the member states, or will the Organization remain an international bilateral cooperation institution? Returning to the aforesaid, it should be noted again that creating the Silk Road Economic Belt will give a new boost to implementing China’s development strategy and accelerate its economic integration within the SCO. China will be able to gain greater access to the CIS markets, which will assist its sustainable economic development and create conditions for forming a free trade area within the borders of the SCO member states. This is precisely the context in which the project for creating the Silk Road Economic Belt was put forward.

The Silk Road and the EEU: How Will They Harmonize Their Interests?

Eurasia is attracting more attention around the world than ever before. As F. Lukianov notes, “in the 21st century, Eurasia will increasingly be in the center of international attention, be it political changes, economic prospects, resource potential, risks and threats, or discussions about nation-building models that present alternatives to the western models … potentially Eurasia is a united region where regional institutions can be established and general rules be in effect, so it can claim a leading role in the world and define the form globalization takes.”7 It is no accident that the leading world nations are beginning to put forward a variety of different Eurasian concepts, among which are America’s New Silk Road, Putin’s EEU, China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, South Korea’s Eurasian Initiative, and so on. This is raising a number of questions: How are these projects related to each other? Do they compete with each other or are they partners? Will implementing Russia’s and China’s projects lead to a clash of these countries’ interests in Eurasia? To name a few.

6 “On the Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation Program of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States,” Regional Economic Cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, available in Russian at [http://www. sco-ec.gov.cn/crweb/scor/info/Article.jsp?a_no=721&col_no=67], 1 July, 2014. 7 F. Lukianov, “Evraziiskaia integratsiia ne po-nashemu,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, No. 6237, 20 November, 2013.

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Let us take a closer look at the gist of the Russian and Chinese projects. There can be no doubt that the Chinese project is largely economic. It is aimed at the accelerated development of China’s western provinces and the formation of close comprehensive relations among the states of the region in the economic, political, and humanitarian spheres. The model for building the Silk Road Economic Belt, which is to encompass the CA, South Asia, West Asia, and Eurasia, fully coincides with the natural relief and real economy of the region, as well as reflects certain strivings of the people who live in the countries belonging to it. It stands to reason that Central Asia, which borders on the PRC, has a special role to play in this project, but it in no way means that Beijing will pursue a special political course in relation to it. Nevertheless, the policy Beijing has been carrying out in other regions sometimes proves the opposite. In this case, the matter specifically concerns the following five sub-regions: 1. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. These countries, which are populated by many nationalities, border on western China and have overland routes joining them. They maintain close economic relations with China and are important suppliers of natural and energy resources for it. What is more, the CA region is the main market for Chinese investments and goods. In turn, the CA countries highly value cooperation with China, on which they place hope for successful development of their own economy. China has plenty of bilateral and multilateral cooperation development potential. Fully developing and combining the comple- mentary economic advantages of the PRC and the five abovementioned countries will help to strengthen it. This is why the CA region has an important role to play in building the Silk Road Eco- nomic Belt. 2. Some West Asian countries. These countries mainly specialize in the production and export of oil and gas resources and have a relatively well-developed energy sector in their economies. Each of them must undergo the transition from a unilateral economic structure to a multifunctional one. They believe that developing cooperation with China will assist them in this. This region is a potential sales market for Chinese goods and an ideal place for industrial movement. 3. The South Caucasian (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) and East European (Ukraine, Be- larus, and Moldova) countries. These countries, situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, have a developed, but somewhat “one-sided” economy. They tend toward economic integration with the EU, while cooperation with East and West Asia continues to be of secondary importance. It is possible that in the future they will be able to raise the status of their economic diplomacy and benefit from cooperating with both the West and the East. 4. Russia. Partially situated on the Silk Road, it is a unique regional center and also has a strong influence on Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia, with which it maintains close ties. Therefore, when building the Silk Road Economic Belt, Russia’s Eurasian integration strategy should be kept in mind. 5. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The level of relations between these countries and the central zone of the Silk Road Economic Belt (meaning the Central Asia region) and their future development mainly depend on resolving the Afghan problem. The more successfully the peace process advances in Afghanistan, the higher the likelihood of strengthening economic cooperation between the above-mentioned countries and Central Asia. Otherwise, it will be relatively difficult for them to become involved in building the Silk Road Eco- nomic Belt. 12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

In general, this concept, which boasts grandiose dimensions, reflects China’s idea of developing mutually advantageous cooperation and strategic partnership with the Eurasian countries aimed at joint socioeconomic development. China intends to strengthen its political contacts, develop transport routes, provide uninterrupted trade, fortify money circulation, and help bring the people living in the region closer together. The main aim of the project is to reinforce economic ties, intensify interaction, and expand cooperation with the Eurasian countries. This cooperation will ultimately become all- encompassing, which will make it possible for the countries of the region to gain significant advantages. The new Russian project for establishing the EEU is also based on objective goals, one of which is reintegration of the former Soviet Union. It should be noted that the striving for development of different countries and regions of the world is generated by the globalization going on at a planetary level. Economic ties among countries cannot be strengthened without them entering into regional integration institutions. In this sense, advancing the EEU project, which should become a new form of economic integration, is in keeping with the global trends. The former Soviet countries had a common infrastructure and comprised a single economic and cultural expanse. It is these factors that promote integration and ensure a firm foundation for long- term sustainable cooperation among countries in all spheres (economic, cultural, humanitarian, security, and so on), which is helping them to avoid marginalization and fortify their international and regional positions. Strengthening regional integration is also promoted by the common striving of countries to oppose all kinds of risks (primarily those that emerge in conditions of financial and economic crises), to overcome difficulties, and to achieve economic prosperity and sustainable development. The EEU is one of those projects aimed at assisting regional economic integration. As Vladimir Putin noted, “The Eurasian Economic Union is an open project. We invite other partners to join it, particularly the Commonwealth countries. In so doing, we have no intention of hurrying or pushing anyone. It should be the sovereign decision of the state, dictated by its own long-term national interests.”8 These words show that the EEU will be established on the basis of equality, sovereignty, and goodwill. This may be why Vladimir Putin’s new integration project is very attractive for the CIS countries; moreover, it provides a unique window of opportunity for Eurasia. Carrying out reintegration in the post-Soviet space is one of Russia’s strategic goals. As for the CIS members, and particularly the CA countries, participation in integration processes meets their national strategic interests (for example, Kazakhstan is actively in favor of Eurasian integration). Summing up the above, it can be concluded that integration cooperation in Eurasia is playing an important role in ensuring sustainable development, strengthening security and stability of the region, and promoting the formation of a common economic and humanitarian space without dividing lines between the countries that belong to it. It is logical to assume that the geographical coincidence and overlapping functions of the Chi- nese and Russian projects could make them competitive. Nevertheless, we think that much depends on whether Russia and China can come to terms with each other. In other words, Chinese-Russian relations, which have always been built on good-neighborly, friendly, and cooperation principles, will play a decisive role in avoiding competition between these two projects.

8 V. Putin, op. cit.

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China’s vision of Russia’s role in CA is absolutely transparent. When declaring the opening of the economic belt, President Xi Jinping assured that China will not strive to dominate in the region or create a zone of its influence there; by calling for cooperation with Moscow, it is giving it a clear signal that Beijing has the best intentions. By putting forward its project, the PRC is in no way aiming to damage the interests of Russia, bilateral relations with which it highly values. The main motivation behind this project is a natural desire for economic cooperation. Since the geographic parameters cannot be changed, the bilateral dialog between China and Russia should have long-term strategic prospects. Cooperation is the best format for meeting the interests of both countries; competition aimed at pushing out the rival will be detrimental to both of them. Beijing and Moscow should see each other as friendly, well-intentioned, and reliable neighbors; only in this event can they pool their efforts and ensure stability, security, and prosperity in the region. It is gratifying that, thanks to the agreement that China and Russia have reached, these two projects are not competing with each other (at least not in the foreseeable future). On the contrary, both Russia and the PRC are showing a certain amount of willingness to cooperate, which should lead to a high level of economic integration in Eurasia. The joint statement between Russia and the PRC about the new stage of relations in universal partnership and strategic interaction of 20 May, 2014, says the following: “Russia believes that China’s initiative to form a Silk Road Economic Belt is very important and highly values the willingness of the Chinese side to keep Russian interests in mind during its development and implementation. The sides will continue to look for ways to combine the Silk Road Economic Belt and Eur- asian Economic Union projects. To this end, they intend to further strengthen cooperation between the competent departments of the two countries, including for implementing joint projects aimed at developing transportation routes and infrastructure in the region.”9 This kind of approach cannot help but please. This statement shows again the willingness of China and Russia to cooperate. Both projects are creating new platforms for strengthening bilateral strategic partnership and interaction between the two countries. In our view, this fully corresponds to the so-called two logics in the development of Chinese-Russian relations. According to internal logic, two great neighboring countries should be friends and not be hostile toward each other, they need each other and so strategic cooperation between them is inevitable. According to external logic, both rising China and reviving Russia are being subjected to the pressure of external forces that still see them as challenges to the Western world. So the PRC and RF should exert joint efforts to reduce the expenditures necessary for their further prosperity. Russia is hoping that the EEU will become an important player on the international stage, and so it needs China’s support of its new ideas and initiatives. At the same time, Russia, which is already promoting a new upward trend, is counting on closer strategic interaction with China. By pooling their efforts, China and Russia will promote the formation of a new international political and economic order. The 21st century will become the century of the Asia Pacific Region; it can be said that it has already turned into a center of world politics and economy. Vladimir Putin intends to lead his country toward the contemporary reality of global socioeconomic development; one of the most important tasks in this direction is building up participation in the regional integration processes. In this respect, it should be noted that Russia’s Far East and East- ern Siberia regions are targets of the Russian government’s particular concern.

9 Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China on the New State in Relations of Universal Partnership and Strategic Interaction, 20 May, 2014, available at [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1642], 1 July, 2014.

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China today is entirely capable of rejuvenating the Russian economy; moreover, it is willing to engage in wide-scale integration within the EEU. The PRC has been able to accumulate beneficial experience in interacting with the EU, ASEAN, and other regional structures, which will be extremely advantageous for everyone concerned. The authors of this article are sure that only mutually beneficial cooperation and the joint efforts of all countries will make it possible for China to occupy a worthy place in the complex world of the 21st century, one of the characteristics of which is deep- reaching transformations of the international landscape accompanied by profound changes in the global economy and politics.

Promising Cooperation Spheres and Chinese Policy for the Near Future

In the foreseeable future, cooperation between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the EEU will mainly occur at the state (in the energy, transport, economic, trade, scientific-technical, cultural, infrastructure, and communication spheres) and regional (in the economic, trade, agricultural, scientific-technical, and hydropower spheres) levels. In addition, the XUAR will also be included in cooperation within the Silk Road Economic Belt, which has many ethnic, cultural, and religious-world outlook similarities with the countries of the region. It should also be noted that the XUAR has a great advantage in the humanitarian cooperation sphere. In order to make its initiative a reality, China must develop gradual targeted measures.  First, it must further maintain strong diplomatic ties with Russia, as well as weed out the caution that exists in its relations with this country. Russia is undoubtedly the most important Eurasian country for China. Relations between Russia and the PRC are developing on the principles of friendship, good-neighborly relations, and mutually advantageous cooperation, which is opening the way to universal partnership and strategic interaction. The situation both in the region and throughout the world largely depends on how effectively Chinese-Russian relations, which are a graphic example of cooperation between large states (at the bilateral regional and global levels), continue to develop. It should also be noted that the development of relations with the Russian Federation will be extremely beneficial for the PRC. As practice has shown, this has played an extremely constructive role in determining the state border in northwest China, establishing the SCO, and in several other issues. Central Asia is acting as a traditional sphere of influence and Russia’s backyard, The RF has always regarded this region as a strategic platform for reinforcing its status as a great power. Eurasia is a priority target of Russia’s foreign policy; by virtue of this, it will not allow external forces to interfere in this region that is so important for it. In recent years, China has strengthened its trade and economic cooperation with the CIS countries, which has put the Russian side on the alert. Therefore, the policy conducted by China should be aimed at creating an international mechanism of coordination and reaching a consensus among the countries encompassed by the Silk Road Economic Belt, as well as at overcoming different problems, eliminating their unfavorable consequences, and continuing to improve mutual trust. The success of this project can be ensured only by engaging in innovative thinking and moving away from old stereotypes. 15 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

 Second, economic cooperation with the Central Asian countries must be strengthened. In his speech at the meeting of the Council of Heads of SCO Member States in Kyr- gyzstan, PRC Chairman Xi Jinping noted that in order to lay a solid national and social foundation for developing cooperation in the Silk Road Economic Belt, humanitarian ex- changes and national ties had to be strengthened. In other words, its joint establishment should be based on economic cooperation and stimulated by national understanding, which is capable of raising the building of the economic belt to a higher level. Thanks to this, mutual understanding and traditional friendship will only intensify and this, in turn, will lead to prosperity of the countries interested in the project. At the moment, the countries of the region are very welcoming of the Chinese initiative, since there is no reason to hinder it. The support the CA countries render the project depends on how economically beneficial its individual components will be. It should be noted that at present China is becoming one of the most important trade partners, investors, and financial sponsors of the CA countries. According to the official statistics, in 1992, when diplomatic relations were established between China and the five CA countries, China’s aggregate trade turnover with this region amounted to only $460 million; 20 years later, this index had reached almost $46 billion, which is an increase of 100-fold.10 Judging by everything, in the future China will occupy an even more important place in the economic development of this region, so it should pay special attention to developing bilateral relations with the CA countries.  Third, the SCO, which is gradually transforming into a powerful regional organization and whose international influence and status is gradually growing, should be used for creating the Silk Road Economic Belt. Having this opportunity, China should make maximum use of and continue to improve multilateral consultation mechanisms. In so doing, rational game rules should be elaborated that make it possible to include both China and Russia in the multilateral mechanisms, as well as promote the strengthening of mutual trust among the member states. Extensive use of the SCO platforms for developing cooperation with countries interested in building the Silk Road Economic Belt will ensure all the sides access to mutual benefits and reduce their psychological wariness of each other. So, at the current stage, the Silk Road Economic Belt should not be created too quickly, otherwise China’s initiative will be doomed to failure. First, the existing economic problems must be dealt with, the national and social factors effectively managed, the multidimensional mechanisms used more extensively, any ill-will on the part of Russia eliminated, and, most important, maximum success achieved with minimum outlays.

10 See: “Experts: The Concept for Creating an Economic Corridor along the Great Silk Road will Serve as a Driving Force behind Comprehensive Cooperation in Eurasia,” According to information from the Xinhua News Agency, 24 October, 2013. x 16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: RUSSIA’S VIEW ON IRAN’S CANDIDACY

Farrukh USMONOV

Doctoral Program Fellow, University of Tsukuba (Tsukuba, Japan)

ABSTRACT

he Shanghai Cooperation Organiza- Iran is one of the five observer states tion (SCO) first came into being as a that applied for full membership during Pres- T result of border negotiations between ident Ahmadinejad’s administration in early Russia and China, but evolved shortly there- 2005. However, even though almost a de- after into more than this. It is a regional or- cade has passed since this intention was ganization comprised of China, Kazakhstan, expressed, Iran continues to cooperate with Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbeki- the SCO. Newly elected President Hassan stan with its mandate now encompassing Rouhani’s pragmatic approach has almost trade and security. Afghanistan, India, Iran, resolved the country’s conflict with the West Mongolia, and Pakistan have been granted after the six plus one meeting achievements observer status, which increased the world’s in November 2013, when Iran agreed to de- attention to the SCO. crease uranium enrichment in return for However, none of the observer states lighter sanctions by the EU and other states. were upgraded to full membership, despite The Iranian president paid his first interna- their willingness to do so. Such circumstanc- tional visit to Bishkek in September 2013, es may cause misunderstanding between where he participated in the annual Shang- existing observer states and other nominat- hai Meeting. Iran still considers this region to ed countries planning to apply to the SCO. be important, and it is no doubt a country In addition to that, the failure of a rational that could strengthen the role of the Organi- decision on expansion of the Organization zation. raises doubts about the concordance and Meanwhile, Iran remains an observer harmony within the SCO. state and this research paper will focus on Although it has six full member states, the expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Organization, more precisely on Iran’s inten- identifies itself as an organization in which tion to join, and the implications of this for decision-making is dominated by China and Russia’s academic and political circles. Russia. These two main actors, with their gi- What do Russians expect of Iran, and what ant markets, make the Shanghai Region at- do they think are the pros and cons of Iran’s tractive, as well as politically independent of accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Or- the West. ganization? 17 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

KEYWORDS: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Iran, Russia, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Shanghai Region, observer state, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Introduction

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the successor of the Shanghai Five, was created in 2001 as the result of successful border negotiations among China, Russia, and four Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The Shanghai Five (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) was a grouping of five countries that signed the Treaty on Deep- ening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Such attainment in the border dilemma inspired the countries to diversify and strengthen cooperation. Thus, with an 18-year history, the SCO has enjoyed countless achievements and faced many challenges. The SCO with its huge market attracts countries with different political ambitions. Coun- tries like Turkey and Sri Lanka, which are partner states, could form a bridge between the SCO and the different regions. Meanwhile, the SCO cooperates with observer states—Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan, each of which may sooner or later plan to join the club as a full member. Enlargement of the Organization depends on the inclination of the member states via the SCO mechanisms. However, it is important to point out the key role of the main actors of the Organization— China and Russia. Both countries, with different concepts (economy and defense), have been exerting efforts to make the Shanghai Cooperation Organization successful. Each of them makes compromises to retain the Organization’s image. China’s cooperation with each of the Central Asia states as an independent country started in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite their common borders, the former Soviet republics did not have any political and economic relations among themselves during the Soviet period, as they did with Russia, which was part of a single country—the U.S.S.R. Russia has specific relations with the region and with the SCO observer states. Being supportive of enlargement of the SCO, Russia invited several countries to join the Organization. Presi- dent Putin calls the SCO an open organization, which aims to expand its relations with various countries and organizations. In his speech, he “welcomed those who aspire to cooperation with the SCO.”1 Expansion of the SCO became a dilemma after Iran applied to join the Shanghai family in 2005. Its candidacy was twice declined due to the U.N. sanctions, and according to Kirill Barskiy, a Russian representative in the SCO, “Tehran may join organization as soon as the sanctions are lifted.”2 Such circumstances divided the opinion of the Iranian experts. Some of them invoked the government to follow a non-aligned orientation, which is written in the Constitution. Others warned Iran to stay away from an “organization that is a collection of conflicts, which is the major reason why it has failed to achieve its goals so far.”3

1 V. Putin, Statement in the SCO Meeting of Head of States, Beijing, 2012. 2 S. Strokan, “Shankhaiskaia organizatsiia razryvaetsia mezhdu organizatorami,” Kommersant, 7 June, 2012, available at [www.kommersant.ru/doc/1952696]. 3 “Iran’s Accession to SCO: Conflicts and Threats,” available at [http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran’s_ Accession_to_SCO_Conflicts_and_Threats.htm], 21 June, 2011.

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Iranian experts advised the government “to wait for an invitation from the SCO because Iran has massive potential to play all kinds of regional games.”4 However, the U.N. sanctions against Iran and the unclear trade cooperation with the EU and other trade partners do not give Tehran much choice but to engage in closer cooperation with China and Russia. Iran feels secure if it has partners in the U.N. Security Council. Thus “China and Russia, with their huge investment capabilities, are very attractive as investors in the Iranian economy, especially at a time when many Western companies and banks have been retreating due to the U.S. and European Union sanctions.”5 However, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization values its relations with other international organizations, including prestigious institutions like the United Nations and the International Atom- ic and Energy Agency (IAEA), and does not want the Iranian issue to cause confrontation with them. In April 2010, the SCO signed a Declaration on Cooperation with the United Nations and, valuing its cooperation with the U.N., it may try to negotiate and call for a dialog, without challenging the UNSC policy against Iran. This is important and such an agreement reflects the Organization’s positive image. The declaration stated: “Noting that SCO has become an essential regional organization for addressing security in the region in all its dimensions, convinced that strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and other organizations of the United Nations system and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization helps to promote the goal and objectives of the United Na- tions—[the U.N. General Assembly] takes note of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Orga- nization aimed at strengthening peace, security and stability in the region, countering terrorism, separatism and extremism, drug trafficking and other types of criminal activity of a transnational character and promoting regional cooperation in various areas such as trade and economic development, energy, transportation, agriculture and agro-industry, the regulation of migration, banking and finances, information and telecommunications, science and new technology, customs, education, public health, environmental protection and reducing the danger of natural disasters, as well as in other related areas.”6 This paper focuses on what Russian experts have to say about Iran’s accession to the SCO. Are they supportive or not, and how do they see future expansion of the SCO, with or without Iran? These countries have a long history of cooperation, including tension and interests in specific areas like Central Asia and the Caspian. In modern history (including the Cold War period), Russia has always considered Iran an important country for securing its southern borders, and the Soviet-Persia Treaty of 1921 is the best example of that. The Soviet Union has disappeared, but Iran remains a country of Russian concern.

The Theoretical Approach

It is rational to look at the importance of the region and the Organization’s position and role internationally from the theoretical approach. Unlike realism, which predicts states will act in their own national interest in defiance of moral consideration, liberalism welcomes cooperation with and within international institutions. Therefore, if two or more states share preferences, their aligned interests may result in “absolute gain” from cooperation. On the other hand, realists do not believe in

4 Ibidem. 5 A. Pikaev, “Enlarging SCO: Is Iran Valuable Member?” PONARS Eurasian Policy Memo, No. 15, 2008. 6 “Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” available at [http://www. sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=257], 2 December, 2010.

19 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the concept of absolute gain, instead viewing the international contest as a zero-sum game, in which one player wins, while the other must lose.7 Neo-liberalism emphasizes cooperative behavior among states. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye stated that the increasing level of interdependence between states forces them to cooperate and integrate.8 For example, Keohane recognized that cooperation is not an easy feat and can lead to tension, but states could potentially benefit from cooperative strategies. Neo-liberals describe regional integration as a move toward maximizing state welfare and interests through cooperation, especially as dictated by the new international order.9 Joseph Griego also supports the idea of cooperation and stated that countries will be better off if they all will cooperate. He also explains regional integration as an increment process through which collective action problems are resolved and formalized within institutions.10 Neo-liberals explain regional integration as a rational response by states to the dynamics of the new reality created by globalization and increased interdependence in the post- Cold War era. The region should not step away from the “new reality,” but take action toward resolving it. David Lake and Patrick Morgan define the region as the geographical closeness of the countries.11 According to Rosenau and Czempiel, regional cooperation in the security sphere can range from stabilization of the regional balance of power to negotiation of a region-wide security regime. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurell defined regionalism as regional cooperation that may entail the creation of formal institutions, but it can often be based on a much looser structure, involving patterns of regular meetings with some rules attached, together with a mechanism for preparation and follow-up. Samir Amin explained regionalization as a “building block for the reconstruction of a different global system.” He also argues that regionalism “is the only efficient response to the challenges of a continuously deepening polarization generated by the capitalist globalization processes.”12 Regional- ism has turned into an umbrella that covers social and economic cooperation, increasing regional awareness, identity, and interstate institutions.

Realities of the Observer States

It seems to me that the situation around the future of the SCO is very critical. It has been 13 years since its first and last expansion and almost 10 years since one or more of the observer states applied to join the Organization. Does the SCO needs to be expanded or not? It is crucial to decide this considering the number of candidate states. This situation makes it even more unclear. How might it affect the Organization’s image, the reaction from outside the region, and further development within the SCO?

7 See: A. Hurell, “The Regionalism Dimension in International Relations Theory,” in: Global Politics of Regionalism Theory and Practice, ed. by M. Farell, B. Hettneand, L.V. Langenhove, Pluto Press, London, 2005, pp. 39-41. 8 See: R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton Univer- sity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2005. 9 See: The Political Economy of Regionalism, ed. by E. Mansfield, H. Milner, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997. 10 See: J.M. Griego, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in: Neorealism and Neoliberalism, ed. by D.A. Baldwin, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993. 11 See: “The New Regionalism Security Affairs,” in: Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, ed. by D.A. Lake, P.M. Morgan, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 1997, pp. 11-12. 12 S. Amin, “Regionalization in Response to Polarizing Globalization,” in: Globalization and the New Regionalism, ed. by B. Hettne, A. Inotai, O. Sunkel, Vol. 1, Macmillan Press, Basingstoke, 1999, p. 54.

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Mongolia was considered an attractive country for the SCO and an ideal potential member. It borders on Russia and China only and has cultural roots in the region. Mongolia was first to apply for full membership and its main trade and security partners are China and Russia. It has a population of less than three million people, and it can neither drastically change the structure of the SCO nor arouse a negative reaction from the outside, rather each side could benefit from the cooperation. Most Russian researchers and officials are in favor of expanding the Organization starting with Mongolia. India is another candidate country. Despite its huge population, India has the potential to strengthen security, defense, and trade within the SCO. India could upgrade the level of the Organi- zation. It belongs to a different part of Asia, but “the integration processes in different parts of the world can be characterized as regional even if participating countries do not necessarily belong to the same geographic region.”13 According to the experts, India’s tension with China is in the past and they are improving their relations with each other. It also suffers from terrorism as others do, which could compel them to join the SCO’s policy to fight it. India reconstructed the Aini military aerodrome in Tajikistan, which could be used for common regional security purposes. Moreover, India’s economy is among the world’s top ten in terms of nominal GDP, and the Organization would then have three countries that are among the world’s ten largest economic states with nuclear capabilities. In addition, India is the most populous democratic country, with its market-based economy. Considering the transition period of the Central Asian states, cooperation with India would be valuable experience. India’s full membership could change the image of the SCO to a liberal-oriented organization. Other candidate states are Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Some Russian experts agree on the instability of these states. Despite their support and contribution to the fight against terrorism, there are still terrorist camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was proved by the U.S. operation to kill al-Qa‘eda leader Osama Ben Laden. The paradox is that the government of Pakistan spends a big portion of its budget on defense, including on the fight against terrorism, but terrorist camps still exist in its territories. Iran’s membership evokes an ambiguous response by member states, including Russia. Most experts point to Iran’s nuclear program as a bone of contention in Iran’s integration.

The Security Controversy

A group of Russian experts considers or wishes to regard the SCO as a counterbalance to NATO, at least to challenge NATO projects in the region. According to Klimenko, Iran wants to use the SCO as a “safety net” against the U.S., Israel, NATO, and other international institutions. In addition, there is mutual commonality between Iran and Russia. “Iran and Russia share commonality on regional stability and security, which is based on opposing dislocation of NATO forces within or around the region.”14 Such circumstances, however, can hardly be considered an argument for counterbalancing NATO, especially considering that in June 2012, Turkey, NATO member state, was granted the status of dialog partner of the SCO and further “Ankara would abandon its quest to join the European Union if it was offered full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”15

13 T. Dadabaev, Towards Post-Soviet Central Asian Regional Integration, Akashi Shoten Co. Ltd, Tokyo, 2004, p. 36. 14 A. Klimenko, Strategiia razvitiia Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva: problema oborony i bezopasnosti, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2009. 15 “Turkey Renews Plea to Join Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 8 December, 2010, available at [http://www. centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1292128920].

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Iran has been under international pressure, especially from the United Nations Security Coun- cil, IAEA, and other influential organizations, including the European Union. Sergey Luzianin stated that Iran has been pushed into a corner by the U.S. and its allies, including the U.N. and IAEA, and that is why Iran wants to be a member of the SCO so badly in order to prevent or secure itself against the possibility of a Western attack. Experts warn that Iran may be out of control and could be the cause of a confrontation with the West.16 However, in this case, the SCO can be a mediator between parties and solve this issue, especially considering that Russia and China have already persuaded Iran to resolve its problems with the mentioned institutions if it wishes to join the SCO. For example, Iran participated in the meeting with the six powers on its nuclear file with successful outcomes in some of the negotiation rounds. Since Russia and China were part of this meeting as separate states, the SCO could also contribute to a better outcome of the situation between EU, U.S., and Iran. However, are sanctions the real reason for halting or delaying Iranian membership in the Orga- nization? Iran belongs to Russia’s strategic and geopolitical dilemma, but what is the real reason behind the rejection? It may be a “prohibitive excuse.”17 Experts claim that Russia and China do not want to take responsibility in the event that the U.S. and Israel attack Iran.18 Most probably this action would show disrespect toward Washington, with which both Russia and China are trying to revamp relations. Rajab Safarov assures that Iran’s sanctions are just an “excuse” and “not being a member state of SCO under the U.N. sanction” is something created by China and Russia only against Iran to please the EU and the U.S.19 However, according to Levan Jagarian, Russian Ambassador to Iran, “Russia does not recognize any of the U.S. or EU sanctions against Iran.”20 The Russian Ambassador stated that “Rus- sia is a sovereign country and has an independent policy.” He stressed that the Russian decision on Iran would be based on the country’s national interests. The decision to increase the number of member states is based on the Organization’s current status. Today, the SCO still continues to draw debate about its function and mechanism. That’s why the member-states want “new countries to ameliorate the Organization and enlarge its potential but not worsen it with their own local problems.”21 Considering Iran’s potential and natural resources are the sanctions against Iran really a “problem” for the SCO? Iran is drawn closer to the SCO precisely due to the existing sanctions against this country. This makes Iran eager to rely on China and Russian support in the U.N. Security Council. In turn, former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev welcomed Iran’s interest in cooperating with the SCO, making him happy to see larger countries of the region joining the SCO. He stated, “expansion of the SCO with larger countries refines the Organization and enhances it.”22 Some Russian experts are concerned about worsening relations with the West only because of Iran. However they suggest that Iran’s issue be resolved rationally and not “under curtain” in- trigues. Meanwhile, Russia is considering expansion of the SCO, but with the priority on India and Pakistan. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the SCO has to be expanded, most

16 See: S. Luzianin, Shankhaiskaia organizatsiia sotrudnichestva: model obraztsa 2008 goda, Moscow, 2008. 17 R. Safarov, “ShOS bez Irana: Shankhaiskaia organizatsiia sotrudnichestva teriaet dinamiku,” 8 December, 2010, available at [http://zavtra.ru/cgi/veil/data/zavtra/10/890/42.html]. 18 See: Ibidem. 19 See: Ibidem. 20 Levan Jagarian, Interview to Kommersant, 3 June, 2010, available at [http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2398503]. 21 Muratbek Imanaliev, Interview to RIA Novosti, 3 June, 2010, available at [http://www.conventions.ru/view_news. php?id=277]. 22 [http://infoshos.ru/ru/print.php?idn=7453].

22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 probably by means of India and Pakistan. He claimed that it is good if states jointly oppose the threat to regional security. In this regard, he stated, “we believe that the time has come.”23 Russia believes that India and Pakistan, which are currently observer states in the SCO, may explore the potential of the SCO and internationalize its image. Each country that is part of the Shang- hai community, no matter what its status, could pump fresh blood into the Organization and promote its modernization. However, Lavrov did not mention Iran when he talked about expansion of the SCO, and this may have been because of the sanction issue regarding Iran. The SCO has not closed its doors to Iran and continues to cooperate with it. Both sides neces- sitate cooperation through the Organization’s mechanism to ensure that Iran’s intentions are taken into consideration. Iran suggested hosting a meeting of the SCO member states’ energy ministers, it has participated in several undertakings of the SCO and expressed its intention to take part in military exercises of the Organization’s members. The role of Iran is important to the region, its location is very strategic, and it is part of several regions, including the Caspian. Russia and Iran share the same Caspian basin, and Russia is always concerned about the countries it shares borders or regions with. Some Russian experts consider Ira- nian sanctions to be a common threat. Thus Russia applied its right to veto against any military operation in Iran. According to Dmitri Babichev, defeat of Iran’s army and military infrastructure would mean changes in the balance of power in such a strategic and important region, which would increase the role of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea.24 The importance of the Caspian region is no doubt part of Russia’s international policy. Russia (the Soviet Union) and Iran (Persia) historically always cooperated regarding the situation around the Caspian. Russia has always considered this region to be an area of its control. The Soviet Union, and now Russia, has tried to avoid any conflict in the Caspian and has always been against any international intervention in Iran. Russian State Duma Vice-Speaker Sergey Baburin at one time suggested designating real power to the SCO, regardless of whether it can or is willing to protect Iran from the West. His parliamentary colleague Vice-Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky stressed that if Iran wants to join SCO, it should be granted membership. Because “it may ameliorate the SCO and secure Iran itself.”25 Iran acknowl- edges the importance of its proximity to Russia and both have commonality in regional policy. Ac- cording to Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, “Iran is Russia’s most significant neighbor and opposes the U.S.’s strategic plan to surround Russia.”26 At the 12th SCO meeting in China in 2012, the SCO stressed the need to adopt a diplomatic resolution against the Western nations’ determination to strike Iran because of its nuclear enrichment program and warned it that any aggression against Iran would have a catastrophic outcome for the world. According to the statement, any attempt to resolve the Iranian problem with force would be unacceptable and could lead to unpredictable circumstances that would threaten stability and security in the region and the entire world. The statement articulated concern about the situation developing in Iran and stressed that Iran was important for “security in the region.”27

23 “Russia Supports India’s Bid to Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—Russian Foreign Minister,” available at [http://indian.ruvr.ru/2013_10_02/Russia-India-SCO/], 2 October, 2013. 24 See: D. Babichev, “Rasshirenie ShOS: pozvolit li vstuplenie v nee Irana izbezhat voiny s Izrailem? [http://azerros.ru/ maintheme/3745-rasshirenie-shos-pozvolit-li-vstuplenie-v-nee-irana-izbezhat-voynu-s-izrailem.html], 5 June, 2012. 25 “Zhirinovskii predlagaet priniat Iran v ShOS,” 11 October, 2007, available at [http://xn--80aa2bkafhg.xn--p1ai/ article.php?nid=22794&sq=19,22,289&crypt]. 26 “Iran—poslednii rubezh Rossii pered NATO,” 28 July, 2011, available at [http://russian.rt.com/inotv/2011-07-28/ Iran---poslednij-rubezh-Rossii]. 27 Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity, 7 June, 2012, available at [http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/show.asp?id=442], 7 June, 2012.

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The Iranian Nuclear Program is causing concern not only in the U.S., Israel, and the EU, but also in China and Russia. During his meeting with President Ahmadinejad, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that Beijing opposes any Middle Eastern nation seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.28 Kirill Tanaev claims that Iran is enriching nuclear fuel not to satisfy its ambitions, but mainly to secure itself. “Of course no one in the region is happy to see Iran’s nuclear improvements, but we have to understand that hypothetical Iranian action toward enriching nuclear weapon is not just for satisfying its ambitions, rather to secure itself.” His suggested that the SCO continue cooperating with Iran to decrease the tension in the region. That could be a reason to “better secure regional interests.”29 The SCO holds a reasonable and well-balanced position on international issues and is pursuing a very cautious policy, never giving analysts reason to treat it as a serious political, let alone military alliance. However, times have changed, and the SCO has changed along with them. The crisis in the Middle East, including that triggered by the Arab Spring, the Syrian conflict, the newly established so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan this year call for a major revision of the SCO’s approaches and prompted the Organization to step up its foreign policy efforts. Afghanistan’s situation remains unstable and may become even worse after withdrawal of the U.S. troops, which may raise many questions about security in the region. Iran, which has enormous experience in fighting regional terrorism, could share it to figure out the Afghan issue and strengthen security and stability in the region, which is an asset for the SCO.

The Value of Economic Cooperation with Iran

Iran could attract any organization or states with its natural resources and stable economy, which is not based only on exploiting its natural resources. Despite the economic sanctions, which harshly affected its economy, Iran is still considered one of the biggest economies in the region. However, the sanctions make it difficult for Iran to expand trade and business with many countries, including its traditional trade partners like South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Despite its increased trade with Russia and China, Iran is seeking alternative and larger markets to cooperate with. China, which has the second largest economy in the world, is valued as Iran’s most important trade partner; India is another one. Iran does business with Russia, especially in the atomic power industry, transportation corridors, and military cooperation. Iran and the SCO leaders exalt the importance of their economic cooperation, even after global financial and economic Crisis in 2008. On China’s initiative, the Shanghai Region examined the circumstances of the financial crisis and adopted several programs relating to trade and the economy. This initiative has turned the SCO away from the political vector to embrace the economic sphere. According to A. Yastremskiy, China wants equality on political and economic cooperation, but in the future economic strategy may take priority in the Organization.30 Russia, in turn, found a positive solution to the global financial crisis and, according to Vladimir Putin, this crisis highlighted the loss

28 [http://russian.china.org.cn/news/txt/2012-06/07/content_25586505.htm]. 29 “Doverie mezhdu ShOS i Iranom sposobno gorazdo luchshe snizit gradus napriazhennosti v regione nezheli zhestkie sanktsii,” 16 August, 2007, available at [http://www.toptj.com/m/news/2007/08/16/ekspert_doverie_mezhdu_shos_i_iranom_ sposobno_gorazdo_luchshe_snizit_gradus_napryazhennosti_v_regione_nezheli_zhestkie_sankcii]. 30 See: A. Yastremskiy, “Politika Rossii po obespecheniiu bezopasnosti na postsovetskom prostranstve,” Intelros journal club Mir i politika, No. 6, 2012, available at [http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/mir-i-politika/m6-2012/14918-politika- rossii-po-obespecheniyu-bezopasnosti-na-postsovetskom-prostranstve.html].

24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 of monopoly on the world’s finances and policy of economic egoism.31 According to him, the world has entered into an important transition period in its development, where the main aim is to form multipolar financial and economic systems, which basically means strengthening the multipolar architecture of international relations.32 Considering these factors, Russia and China are ready to continue development and cooperation in the region. None of the SCO observer states are permanent yet, and the question is still open, which country is first and next. Russian experts are also concerned about the relationship among the observer states—Iran, India, and Pakistan. However, despite the tension between the U.S. and Iran, neither India nor Paki- stan have eased cooperation with Tehran. Instead, India and Pakistan are planning to implement a pipeline project with Iran. Pakistan is supporting this project for two reasons:  first, it will help Islamabad to reaffirm its independent foreign policy from the U.S., and  second, it has taken economic responsibility for the project and backing out of the project may cost it fines. Relations between Iran and India are positive and, considering their development projects, they are on the upward trend rather than deteriorating. Such cooperation between observer states is an advantage for the SCO, which may become the biggest market organization in the future. Some experts in Russia prefer the SCO to focus on economic cooperation rather than political. As Head of the Friendship and Cooperation Society of Russia and Iran Alexander Polishchuk stated, “the SCO has been created as the union which is not directed against any third world states, or any other states that are not part of this Organization. The SCO focuses on advancing mutual trust and economic cooperation in order to secure the region.”33 His “secure” refers to securing the economy from recession, which is why the region has to cooperate and back up its business institutions in order to intensify development. Experts believe that Iran has the potential to enhance economic cooperation in the SCO, which is why it is keen to see Iran participating in all of its programs, including cultural, economic, and business forums. On the one hand, the participation of the Iranian delegation in such projects may create a platform, while on the other hand, it provides an opportunity for Russian companies to find various projects to invest in Iran. Russian companies have found it difficult to invest in Iran because of the international sanctions, problems with bank transactions, etc. According to Vlad- imir Onishchenko, many companies are aware of Iran’s rich potential, however they lack detailed investment information about it. Therefore, “most Russian companies and private businessmen con- tact the Embassy or Trade Mission to obtain relevant information, and that is why the SCO is a white spot for resolving this problem.”34 Engaging in trade and business through the SCO can save time for business groups and motivate companies to consolidate their interest in order to benefit from the cooperation. In 2008, at the SCO summit in Astana, Russian experts were expecting President Putin to con- struct Russia’s “new pragmatic line” toward Iran in order to restore Iran’s positions in world politics and begin to draw the Islamic Republic into economic integration through the SCO. A. Kniazev stressed that the SCO’s potential was not being realized nor its policies being implemented. Accord- ing to him, we have seen no real achievements so far. The SCO must start implementing its projects (at least), because it has everything to achieve.35

31 [http://www.ereport.ru/articles/ecunions/sco.htm]. 32 See: “Shankhaiskiy chas,” available at [http://www.rg.ru/2008/10/31/putin.html]. 33 “Rol Irana v ShOS neuklonno vozrastaet,” 12 November, 2011, available at [http://russian.irib.ir/analitika/reportazh/ item/136909]. 34 Vladimir Onishchenko, Interview (see: ibidem). 35 See: A. Kniazev, New World Reality and the SCO as a Geopolitical and Geo-economic Phenomenon: Problems, Functionality and Historical Chance, Kniazev Foundation, Moscow, 2009.

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It is still not clear where the SCO is targeting its regional and global policy. During the George W. Bush Administration, the U.S. profiled its way of cooperating with the SCO, however it did not find support from the Organization itself. American and European experts reacted negatively to this rejection, stating that the SCO has an anti-American and anti-European policy. However, the SCO’s willingness to accept Turkey as a full-member casts doubt on this hypothesis. Nevertheless, there are groups of experts who look skeptically on Turkey as a full member. For example, expert I. Shevyrev is skeptical about Turkey’s intention and urges the Organization not to share “access to some secret materials.” According to him, Turkey is of interest to the region, which is in Russia’s scope of influence. In addition, Turkey may take advantage of the fact that it shares the same religion and traditions with most of Central Asians, which may decrease Russia’s influence on the region. According to Shevyrev, Russia should remember the historical rivalry between Turkey and Iran, which periodically turned into conflict and may in the future cause confrontation in the region. He stressed that, considering the above-mentioned factors, the U.S. could use them to destabilize region and dissolve the Organization.36 Turkey, which has been having difficulty negotiating for EU membership for 30 years, is seeking an alternative market for its exports, and relies on energy from several members of the SCO. The Chinese, Russian, Indian, Iranian, and Central Asian markets attract any country, including Turkey, which could boost its economy. In addition, Turkey has already faced problems on its borders with Syria and Iraq and, considering all the above factors, it might be very difficult and absolutely unnec- essary for Turkey to be in confrontation with the Shanghai region. Turkish-Iranian relations are stable. Despite the sanctions, Turkey continues importing oil from Iran. Iran continues a dialog with Turkey and other NATO allies on the Syria issue, although Iran was not invited to the January 2014 meeting. A Russia-China-India-Iran-Pakistan-Turkey economic trade union might surpass any other trade union. And in this scenario Iran’s membership could help Russia to realize the idea of a so- called Gas OPEC in order to strengthen its position in the global energy market. According to Ira- nian First Vice President Muhammad Reza Rahimi, without Iran’s participation, it will be impossible to implement many of the SCO’s joint projects, including cargo transportation. Iran is seeking opportunities to extend its trade borders, especially after the successful agreement with the Six Pow- ers in Geneva in January 2014, which enabled Iran to partially restore cooperation with several EU states, as well as other former trade partners. Russian expert Rajab Safarov advises Iran not to rely on SCO membership but to engage in bilateral cooperation with each of them. Because “being out of the SCO provides Iran with an opportunity to freely trade with any region and any states,”37 regardless of SCO priorities. Iran is historically linked with the region, and it shares borders with most of the member states. Afghanistan, which may attract international focus on its internal situation after 2014, is an observer state of the SCO and shares very long border with Iran. Afghanistan considers Iran to be an important trade partner. What is more, Iran shelters millions of Afghan refugees and migrants in its territory and plays a key role in peace process in this neighboring country. Many Afghans and Iranians share the same language, which enables refugees and migrants to work and live comfortably and consider Iran their homeland. Apart from Afghanistan, Iran shares close ties with other SCO member states, such as Tajikistan. Iran and Russia both played a key role in bringing peace to Tajikistan. Tajik political expert Dr. Saifullo Safarov considers Iran’s intention to join the Organization very positive. Accord-

36 See: I. Shevyrev, “ShOS: put cherez desiatiletiia,” 15 November, 2011, available at [http://www.proza.ru/2011/11/ 17/194]. 37 R. Safarov, op. cit.

26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 ing to him, Tajikistan must use all its diplomatic support, including its strategic partnership with Russia, in order to ensure Iran becomes a member of the SCO, because it could help to strengthen stability in the region.

Conclusion

The issue of SCO expansion has been discussed since 2005, and the Organization itself was expanded by Uzbekistan in 2001. Unfortunately many countries are on the waiting list, which has a very negative effect on the Organization’s policy. On the one hand, the SCO is interested in extending its borders further to Asia and then the Middle East, where Iran could act as a bridge improving their transportation infrastructure. Besides, along with Iran, the Shanghai region could control almost 30% of the global oil resources. However, despite its impressive years of existence, the conceptual aims of the SCO are still unclear. The Organization could consider various ways to expand, via a direct expansion process, starting with countries like Mongolia, and see how this process proceeds. Other option is to expand the number of observer states and dialog partners. Nevertheless, any of the above options could still postpone the Iran’s issue. However, Iran should continue to cooperate with the SCO and its partner states, such cooperation would be beneficial to the region. It is important for the region to strengthen stability, especially in view of post-2014 Afghanistan. The SCO will face a challenge and has to play a prominent role in sensitive stability issues as mentioned above. Iran, with its traditional influence on Afghanistan, could coordinate with the region via the SCO framework to deal with this issue. Iran could be a mediator in the Afghan issue with its excellent track record (eg. The Tajikistan Peace Process). However, having suffered from different radical religious groups, the region might feel anxious about Iran’s domestic political situation and existing theocracy. Despite such circumstances, Iran continues cooperating and initiating positive and beneficial collaboration with the Organization and its member states. As for the sanctions against Iran, since the new Rouhani administration came to power, Iran has achieved some success in the six plus one talks, at least it has agreed to decrease its uranium enrichment in exchange for lightening of the sanctions, although not their total lifting. As mentioned above, Russia and Iran have more in common, including sanctions, which were launched on Russia due to the events in Ukraine. Both countries are concerned about the situation around Iraq involving the newly growing so-called ISIS. Iran cooperates with Russia in many aspects, and it seems like Russia needs Iran to join the SCO, not only because of its rich natural resources, but also to mediate the never-ending squabbles among the Central Asian states, as well as the threats of spill-over in ethnic violence, including extremism, emanating from Afghanistan. Unlike other observer states, such as India or Pakistan, Iran’s membership will not complicate inter-SCO dynamics, because Iran has good political and trade relations with both China and Russia, which are the Organization’s main actors.

27 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR THE INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN DIMENSIONS

Ashot ALEXANIAN Ph.D. (Political Science), Assistant Professor at the Chair of Theory and History of Political Science, Department of International Relations, Erevan State University (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

he existing political, socioeconomic, legal culture, and social security of the popu- and spiritual-cultural contradictions lation. The obligations the South Caucasian T and conflicts in the Southern Cauca- countries have taken upon themselves with- sus can only be overcome by means of effi- in the framework of international (including cient European integration and Eurasian European) organizations has helped to reintegration of the countries that belong to overcome political instability, ethnic con- this region. The South Caucasian countries flicts, social differentiation, and other de- have been carrying out reforms in all spheres structive processes. The emergence of new of social life within the framework of Euro- dividing lines indicating the huge differences pean integration. These reforms were aimed between the highly incompatible European at ensuring sustainable development and and Eurasian integration projects threatens civiliarchic harmonization based on the Eu- to destabilize the Southern Caucasus. ropean social model and, therefore, promot- It is also important to keep in mind that ed internal and international integration. the Eurasian reintegration project, which This has created prerequisites for establish- embodies a modern development concept, ing democratic institutions and rapidly form- is still coming to fruition. It has yet to under- ing a civil society; it has also raised govern- go the social verification and instrumental- ment and local self-administration effective- ization so necessary in the current reality of ness, as well as the level of public capital, the “knowledge society.”

KEYWORDS: European integration, Eurasian reintegration, Southern Caucasus, civiliarchy, political stability, government effectiveness, integration barriers, integration potential, effective integration relations, integration complementarity, regional civil society, level of social responsibility, social partnership.

28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, systemic changes began in the political, socioeconomic, and cultural-spiritual spheres of social life in the South Caucasian countries. The reform of the So- viet political system that began at the end of the 1980s was carried out under slogans of “perestroika,” “glasnost,” and “new thinking;” it aggravated ethnic relations and gave rise to conflict-prone situations. Legitimization of the new civiliarchic movements, the administrative nature of the reform, and the attempts to introduce the idea of democratic socialism into a Soviet multinational society led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent states. In the 1990s, when national-state institutions began being established in the post-Communist expanse accompanied by acute conflicts, mechanisms of strategic partnership and integration had already been elaborated in the West European countries and Euro-Atlantic organizations. As for the former Soviet states, long-festering political, socioeconomic, and cultural contradictions still exist among them. Later, the institutional development of the EU raised the West European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes to a new level and activated the global hegemony mechanisms. This turned the EU into a kind of integration center both in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as in the former Soviet countries and made the integration processes in the nation-states more efficient. The role the Southern Caucasus has begun playing today in the global governance system has caused the emergence of a certain political plane crisscrossed with lines of rapprochement and/or delimitation of the Eurasian and European integration processes.

The Establishment of Statehood and National Identification

After the South Caucasian republics gained their independence, the socioeconomic and political situation in the region became unstable, which is shown by the problems relating to the establishment of state and national identity. The potential for conflict that engulfed the region at the beginning of the 1990s was manifested in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the armed Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian opposition. For obvious reasons, “the Caucasus became a kind of generator of unrecognized state formations in the post-Soviet expanse.”1 The results of the reforms in state governance in the South Caucasian countries show that democratization of the political system is having a positive influence on sociopolitical stability and government effectiveness, but consistent introduction of civiliarchic mechanisms is needed to build a social state and civil society.2 According to the data of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (WGI), Armenia was the leader among the South Caucasian countries in terms of the Political Stability and Absence of Vio- lence/Terrorism indicator between 1996 and 2012 (see Fig. 1).

1 S.M. Markedonov, “Postsovetsky Iuzhny Kavkaz: traditsionalizm plius modernizatsiia,” Prognozis, No. 1 (9), 2007, pp. 332-348, available at [http://intelros.ru/pdf/Prognozis/01/Markedonov.pdf]. 2 See: A.S. Alexanian, “The Civiliarchic Foundations of Political Democratization in Armenia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 12, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 116-127; idem, “Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo: tsivilitsentrizm i tsivilitet,” in: Politiches- kaia nauka i politicheskie protsessy v RF i Novykh Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh, URO RAS, Ekaterinburg, 2006, pp. 5-11.

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Georgia ranked first in terms of the Government Effectiveness indicator between 2006 and 2012 (see Fig. 2). In a relatively short time, certain achievements were made in establishing state governance, on which raising government effectiveness, the level of development of social capital, sustainable Figure 1 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (1996-2012)

50 Armenia 40 Azerbaijan 30 Georgia Rating 20

0 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

S o u r c e: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, available at [http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/index.aspx#home].

Figure 2 Government Effectiveness (1996-2012)

50 Armenia 40 Azerbaijan 30 Georgia Rating 20

0 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

S o u r c e: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, available at [http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/index.aspx#home].

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 development, transparency and accountability, as well as further strengthening of the rule of law depend. A comparative analysis of the indicators for the South Caucasian countries under the Political Atlas of the Modern World project based on five indicators (stateness, external and internal threats, potential of international influence, quality of life, institutional basis of democracy) makes it possible to judge the forms and ways in which their political systems function (see Table 1).

Table 1

Ratings of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

Institutional External and Potential of Stateness Quality of Life Basis of Internal Threat International Index Index Democracy Country Index Influence Index Index

rank score rank score rank score rank score rank score

Armenia 177 1.85 120 2.97 108 0.06 104 2.13 67 5.86

Azerbaijan 141 3.21 24 6.85 83 0.11 122 1.71 135 3.46

Georgia 183 1.37 38 6.32 110 0.05 114 1.91 160 1.79

S o u r c e: Political Atlas of the Modern World: An Experiment in Multidimensional Statistical Analysis of the Political Systems of Modern States, MGIMO-University Press, Moscow, 2007, 272 pp.

The data of this study show that the South Caucasian countries where sociopolitical stability is still rather tenuous are likely to encounter an aggravation of certain threats. In the rating of 192 countries, Azerbaijan ranks 141st, Armenia 177th, and Georgia 183rd in terms of the stateness index, while according to the external and internal threats indicator, Azerbai- jan ranks 24th, Georgia 38th, and Armenia 120th.

Integration Vectors

At the initial stage of state-building in the South Caucasian countries, their integration vectors were first directed toward Russia and other former Union republics and later reoriented toward the U.S. and West European countries. In keeping with the reality of the current geopolitical situation, the South Caucasian countries began to gradually develop cooperative relations with the U.N., OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO, BSEO, and EU. The efforts of Georgia and Azerbaijan to draw closer to NATO as it enlarged toward the East and the activation of Turkey’s regional policy gave rise to the emergence of new geopolitical risks and problems for the CSTO countries. In this context, the following integration models should be noted: interstate integration, regional integration, geopolitical integration, European integration, and Eurasian reintegration. From the political, socioeconomic, and spiritual-cultural viewpoints, all the integration models have their specific features, while no one really knows how unique their combination might be. In order to retain stability in the South Caucasian countries and the region as a whole, a model must be formed that is built on the basis of complementarity of different vectors and forms of integra-

31 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tion. In so doing, it is worth noting that integration complementarity is still a basic problem for the national interests and security of the South Caucasian countries. Its absence is preventing an increase in their socioeconomic prosperity, spiritual-cultural development, cooperation, and establishment of a dialog among them. The deepening of integration processes is leading to an expansion of integration relations and strengthening of integration contacts, but, on the other hand, it is also leading to a worsening of integration conflicts. There is a certain pattern that says, “Raising the South Caucasian countries’ preference for a particular integration model always leads to an increase in the level and dimensions of integration conflicts.This gives rise to such concepts as “compromise integration,” “forced integration,” or “compulsory integration;” they fit very well into the concept of the “South Caucasian corridor” and the logic of spatial continuums. The dichotomy of integration conflicts and integration potential can lead both to an increase and a decrease in the positive/negative impacts on each of the countries separately and on the entire region as a whole. This is leading to greater contradiction of national integration interests. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that it can only be overcome if the integration potential of the South Cau- casian countries is realized. This, in turn, means that constructive reintegration is required in the post-Soviet expanse that will lead to greater efficiency of the regional, European, and global integration processes. From this it follows that harmonious integration relations are the main guarantee of domestic stability and sustainable regional development. The current integration interaction among the South Caucasian countries, on which the foreign political actors pursuing their strategic goals are having an influence, has generated a huge integration zone. It is characterized by particular functioning conditions that require adhering to a hierarchy of multilevel integration processes. We will note that integration conflicts are leading to disintegration and distancing of the region’s countries from each other.

Strategic European Integration

The first EU meeting with participation of the heads of state of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Geor- gia was held on 22 April, 1996 in Luxembourg. It saw the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) among the European community, EU member states, and South Caucasian countries.3 Implementation of these agreements was supposed to strengthen the democratic institutions and socioeconomic infrastructure of the South Caucasian region by strengthening cooperation and the political dialog among the countries belonging to it. On 22 June, 1999, a Joint Declaration was signed in Luxemburg by the EU and South Caucasian countries. Its main aim was to continue the democratic reforms in all spheres of social life, as well as support the peace process in the Southern Cau- casus.4

3 See: “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia,” available at [http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/ eastern_europe_ and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm]. 4 See: Joint Declaration of the European Union and the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 22 June, 1999, Luxembourg, available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-99-202_en.htm?locale=en].

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The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) developed in 2004 became a strong integrator in implementing the agreements signed with the EU and harmonizing the European and South Cauca- sian regulations and standards. It was called upon to ensure the future enlargement of the EU and its rapprochement with 16 of its closest neighbors aimed at strengthening overall social prosperity, political stability, and regional security on the basis of democratic values, rule of the law, and the protection of human rights and freedoms. In 2003, the communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and Council called “Wider Europe—Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors” noted that the EU will assist regional and interregional cooperation in order to unite partners, reduce the poverty level, promote social prosperity, create a zone of economic integration, and activate political and cultural relations by strengthening transborder cooperation and offering ways to assume joint responsibility for preventing conflicts.5 The dynamics for enlarging the EU and institutional integration of the South Caucasian countries presuppose performing several obligations. In the short and long term, this will ensure their step-by-step and gradual integration into the European community. The dialectics of European enlargement requires establishing closer relations with each of the partner countries on the basis of a high level of political trust keeping in mind the differentiation of their political elites and civil society institutions. In particular, special attention should go to the participation of civil society institutions in political decision-making. Country Reports and Action Plans have helped to strengthen the role of civil society and intensify civil control in the South Caucasian countries.6 Civil society institutions play a central role in the integration processes going on in all spheres of life. Cooperation among the civil society organizations of the South Caucasian countries is opening up new opportunities for raising the sustainability and stability of democracy, as well as reducing the threat of the emergence of sociopolitical risks. The joint measures of civil society organizations in the South Caucasian countries are aimed at widening the civiliarchic dialog at the national and regional levels. This dialog is helping to develop strategic programs for managing social resources. These programs, in turn, will make it possible to develop regional mechanisms of civil control. In this context, it should be noted that as of today, the role of trade unions, international and European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), social media, religious institutions and civil movements in the efficient management of social resources in the Southern Caucasus is underestimated. In time, the activity of the few regional networks of NGOs and nongovernmental actors will increasingly help to raise the level of civil culture and public consciousness. Vivid examples of the civiliarchic discourse are the National Platforms of the Civil Society Forum of Eastern Partnership7 in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the Czech NESEHNUTÍ NGO,8

5 See: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament “Wider Europe—Neighbour- hood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,” COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March, 2003, available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf]. 6 See: “EU-Armenia Relations,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm]; “EU-Azerbaijan Relations,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm]; “EU-Georgia Relations,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm]. 7 See: Civil Society Forum of Eastern Partnership (CSF EP), available at [http://www.eap-csf.eu/ru/home]; The Arme- nian National Platform of CSF EP, available at [http://www.eap-csf.eu/ru/countries/armenia]; The Azerbaijani National Plat- form of CSF EP, available at [http://civilsocietyforum.az/en]; The Georgian National Platform of CSF EP, available at [http:// eapnationalplatform.ge]. 8 See: Path of Initiative—Support Program of Civil Society Development in the Southern Caucasus, 2014-2015 (Czech noncommercial organization NESEHNUTÍ), available in Russian at [http://ru.cestainiciativy.cz].

33 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS joint projects of the Erevan Press Club,9 Open Society Institute, Eurasian Cooperation Fund, Human Rights House Network,10 and so on. The new civiliarchic culture of government bodies and nongovernmental organizations can promote sustainable regional development. In this respect, it is necessary to improve not only the social partnership and dialog mechanisms, but also the tools of civil participation in political decision- making. Active participation of civil society institutions in the implementation of regional projects will help to improve the results achieved. Successful regional projects and the quality of civil initiatives are indicators of cooperation and sustainable development. When promoting different projects and initiatives, the U.N., EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE are keeping in mind the special features of the national contradictions existing in the region, which is necessary for preserving civil stability. Institutionalizing regional civil society and raising the social status of its members are strengthening the position of the nongovernmental sector, although this is not enough to activate partner relations. Corruption and other law violations, excessive powers of the executive power branch, under- developed market mechanisms, growing economic inequality, low level of social responsibility of the state, and weakness of local self-government all have an extremely negative impact on the stability of social society organizations. It must be recognized that “most of the posts in self-government bodies are occupied by representatives of the ruling party, which is still unable to make use of party structures to hold a dialog with the center. They are often unable to oppose even mid-level officials from the central government when the latter interfere in the realization of the exclusive rights of the self-government bodies.”11 This reduces social management effectiveness and participation of citizens in the political processes, and also raises the level of civil mistrust and social alienation, etc. In actual fact, active civil participation is gradually leading to an increase in the social compe- tences of federal government and local self-government bodies, which are beginning to take a more responsible attitude toward executing their powers. It should be noted that Armenia ranks second after Ukraine in the Civil Society Organization Sustain- ability Index 2011 (CSO) in the Russia, Western CIS Countries and the Caucasus region (see Table 2). The Eastern Partnership Program12 aimed at bringing Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the EU has raised relations among the regional countries to a quali- tatively new level. In 2007, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)13 was created, which offered the partner countries a real opportunity for developing their institutional and integration po-

9 See: “South Caucasian Network for Civil Consent (2001-2003)”; “Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: Journalist Initia- tive-2002”; “Armenia-Azerbaijani/Azerbaijani-Armenian Information Center (2002-2003)”; “Quality Coverage in the Media of Events in the South Caucasian Countries as a Way to Overcome Regional Problems (2006)”; “Journalist Support of Stabil- ity and Cooperation in the Caucasus (2010)”; “Assessment of the Partiality of Online Media when Covering Armenian- Azerbaijani Relations (2010-2011)”; “Development of the Dialog between Armenia and Turkey (2010-2011)”; “Assistance to the Settlement of Armenian-Turkish Relations (2010-2012)”; “Monitoring Media Freedom in the Eastern Region of the Euro- pean Neighborhood Policy (2013-2015)”, in: Erevan Press Club, in Russian at [http://www.ypc.am/projects/ln/ru]. 10 See: Human Rights House Network, available at [http://humanrightshouse.org]. 11 D. Losaberidze, “Mestnoe samoupravlenie v Gruzii,” in: D. Tumanian, D. Losaberidze, M. Giulaliev, Mestnnoe samoupravlenie na Iuzhnom Kavkaze: munitsipalnye finansy i uslugi, vzaimootnosheniia mezhdu organami tsentralnogo uprav- leniia i mestnogo samoupravleniia, Erevan, 2009, p. 75, available at [http://cfoa.am/Gorchunejutjun/Hratarakcutjunner/ LSG%20in%20South%20Caucasus_2009.pdf]. 12 See: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 7 May, 2009, Prague, available at [http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/10758.pdf]. 13 See: Eastern Neighborhood: Communication of the European Commission to the European Parliament and European Council, COM (2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December, 2008, available at[http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/com08_823_ru.pdf].

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 3.9 4.7 3.3 3.8 4.5 4.2 5.2 5.5 5.0 3.4 4.6 4.2 2012 Table 2 3.9 4.7 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.1 5.2 5.5 5.0 3.4 4.6 4.3 2011 3.9 4.7 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.1 5.2 5.5 5.2 3.4 4.6 4.3 2010

3.9 4.8 3.3 3.8 4.5 4.2 5.2 5.5 5.3 3.4 4.6 4.4 2009 3.9 4.9 3.2 3.9 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.7 5.3 3.6 4.8 4.4 2008 3.8 5.0 3.2 3.9 4.6 3.9 5.2 5.9 5.1 3.7 4.9 4.2 2007 3.8 5.0 3.3 4.0 4.7 3.9 5.4 5.9 5.0 3.8 5.1 4.1 2006

3.8 5.0 3.3 4.0 4.7 3.8 5.5 5.9 5.0 3.8 5.1 4.0 2005 3.8 5.0 3.5 4.0 4.7 3.8 5.5 5.8 4.8 3.7 4.8 3.7 2004 Advocacy (1998-2012) 3.8 5.0 3.7 3.6 4.8 4.0 5.5 5.8 4.6 3.8 4.8 4.0 Financial Viability Legal Environment 2003 Organizational Capacity Results of Measurements 3.8 5.0 3.9 3.9 5.0 4.0 5.6 6.0 4.9 4.2 5.0 4.3 2002 4.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 2001 4.0 6.0 3.0 5.0 5.2 4.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.5 2.0 2000 4.0 7.0 3.5 5.0 5.8 3.5 6.0 6.0 4.5 5.0 6.0 3.5 1999 the Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index of South Caucasian Countries 5.0 7.0 3.0 5.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 6.0 6.5 4.0 1998 : The 2012 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, available at [http://www.usaid.gov/europe-eurasia-civil-society]. : The 2012 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe Eurasia, available at [http://www.usaid.gov/europe-eurasia-civil-society]. Country/Year Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia S o u r c e

35 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tential. In order to ensure the multi-diversity of the integration processes and support of the civiliarchic dialog with the federal government and local self-government bodies, the European Commission initiated the creation of a Civil Society Forum within the framework of Eastern Partnership.14 A comparative analysis of the indices of European integration of the Eastern Partnership countries was first published in 2011 (see Table 3). According to its data, Georgia leads among the South Caucasian countries in terms of support of the EU initiatives.

Table 3

European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries for 2011-2013

Linkage Approximation Management Country Year Dimension Dimension Dimension

2013 0.49 0.59 0.51

Armenia 2012 0.41 0.59 0.31

2011 0.42 0.57 0.32

2013 0.41 0.42 0.33

Azerbaijan 2012 0.36 0.44 0.31

2011 0.32 0.49 0.28

2013 0.57 0.63 0.58

Georgia 2012 0.51 0.60 0.51

2011 0.53 0.63 0.92

S o u r c e s: European Integration Index 2013 for Eastern Partnership Countries, International Renaissance Foundation in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations and Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, available at [http://www.eap-index.eu/images/Index_2013. pdf]; European Integration Index 2012 for Eastern Partnership Countries, International Renaissance Foundation in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations, available at [http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%20%202012.pdf];European Integration Index 2011 for Eastern Partnership Countries, International Renaissance Foundation in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations, available at [http://www. eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%202011.pdf].

On the one hand, European integration is leading to the development of strategic cooperation, democracy, and market relations, but, on the other, it is giving rise to sociopolitical, economic, spiritual, and cultural problems. The dialectics of integration and dynamics of disintegration show the existence of immense integration potential capable of forming all the necessary resources. The Euro- pean integration evolution and activation of integration processes in the post-Soviet expanse have led to a Eurasian integration revolution.15 As for Georgia, it is the first of the South Caucasian countries to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, which can be divided into three parts: political cooperation, branch cooperation, and a deep, all-encompassing, free trade area.

14 See: Civil Society Forum of Eastern Partnership. 15 See: Novaia Bolshaia Strana. Evraziisky soiuz—edinaia tsivilizatsiia, mnogo gosudarstv, Proektno-analitichesky doklad, Rukovoditel razrabotki—Iu.V. Krupnov, Dushanbe, Moscow, 2012.

36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Armenia did not sign the Association Agreement with the EU, but, as the country’s Prime Min- ister T. Sarkisian said, “relations with the EU remain an important priority of Armenia’s foreign policy.”16 Azerbaijan is not planning to become an associated member of the EU. However, as deputy head of the presidential administration of this country N. Mamedov noted, Baku asked the EU, “keeping in mind the level of cooperation reached, to sign an agreement on partnership.”17 Nevertheless, relations with the EU and further European integration are more important for Azerbaijan and Armenia. The political, socioeconomic, and spiritual-cultural processes going on today in the South Cau- casian region are acquiring an increasingly global nature. Paradoxically, even the fact that the countries belonging to it are isolated from each other cannot prevent them from being incorporated into regional integration. The global community, which is open to new knowledge and ideas, is based on institutions of polyarchic and democratic relations. The opposition between the strategic interests and ambitions of the global actors in the Southern Caucasus can be called quite unusual; its first stage is characterized by self-isolation both on the part of the West European countries and on the part of Russia. In the conditions of a knowledge society, the content of the regional processes is determined by the striving for global supremacy; in so doing, the main criteria is social capital. The existence of integration conflict potential in the Southern Caucasus makes it possible to conclude that the global actors do not have any prerequisite to put up passive resistance (as is implied by the logic of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain format). On the contrary, open competition is seen in the region in all spheres of the post-industrial society, as well as the continuous use of so-called warm war mechanisms, while partnership is slightly conflict-prone.

Eurasian Reintegration or Reintegration of Compatriots

When discussing the expediency of Eurasian reintegration, it would be good to know whether it will become an alternative to European integration, “the next, higher level of integration” and “multilevel and different-rate integration.”18 Today, problems relating to preserving relative stability and the effective management of integration processes are still the most urgent for the South Caucasian countries. The chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union led to the sovereignization of the Union republics belonging to it; on 8 December, 1991, the heads of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed the Agree- ment on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).19 It stated that “The Soviet Union as an entity of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist.” The Agreement also talked of the striving to build democratic law-based states and establish the CIS.20

16 “Signing the Political Part of the Association Agreement with the EU is the Best Route for Armenia: Prime Minister,” 21 March, 2014, available in Russian at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1781457.html]. 17 “Azerbaijan Refuses Association with the European Union,” 25 November, 2013, available in Russian at [http://www. km.ru/world/2013/11/25/ evropeiskii-soyuz-es/726011-azerbaidzhan-otkazalsya-ot-assotsiatsii-s-evrosoyuzom]. 18 V.V. Putin, “Novy integratsionnyy proekt dlia Evrazii—budushchee, kotoroe rozhdaetsia segodnia,” 3 October, 2011, Izvestia, available at [http://izvestia.ru/news/502761]. 19 [http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=176]. 20 “Three states joined the CIS and invited the new states of the former Soviet Union to join the Commonwealth. Why, of the 15 Union republics, was it these three that assumed the right to cancel the 1922 Treaty? They were the only remaining

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On 21 December, 1991, eleven of the former Union republics, including Azerbaijan and Arme- nia, signed a Protocol to the Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS.21 Between 1991 and 1994, the other former Soviet republics, apart from the Baltic countries, joined the CIS. The initial stage of reintegration marked by attempts to restore the infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era was of an inert and informal nature. One of its main tasks was to minimize the threats generated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the “most civilized manner.” As Russian President Vladimir Putin said at one time, “whereas in Europe countries have worked together within the framework of the EU to achieve unity, the CIS was created for the purpose of a civilized divorce.”22 The strategies of national security and sustainable development of the South Caucasian countries encountered unusual threats to security and difficult institutional transformations manifested while the state government bodies executed their powers and during the self-organization of civil society. Unfortunately, the reintegration advantages of the post-Soviet countries were realized very ir- rationally, while the absence of a general development strategy led to destruction of the existing ties and relations. It later became clear that the conceived integration was unlikely to be achieved. The relative stability of the integration processes was largely related to the strategic strivings of the West European countries. They compensated for the vacuum created, ensuring integration from above and from below. Systemic relations among the countries of the post-Soviet reintegration union formed with the appearance of the new political elites, establishment of a civil society, liberalization of the economy, privatization of public property, and the state’s inefficient interference in the economy, which led to its stagnation. In the mid term, reintegration of the post-Soviet countries carried out within the EurAsEC, CU, and CES was aimed at strengthening and combining their socioeconomic advantages. But, in contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are interested in gaining access to the common labor market of the Eurasian space only if they see real positive development dynamics in the new economic relations. At the initial stage, Eurasian integration should be aimed at social consolidation, regulation of labor migration instruments, strategic management of labor resources and social capital, protection of rights and freedoms, and strengthening of the role of the trade union movement, etc. It is very important to keep in mind that due to the increase in number of global threats and emergence of new conflict areas, there can be no talk of demonstrating geopolitical supremacy or domination. On the contrary, in order to create competitive infrastructures capable of ensuring a rise in the quality of life, the positive and negative experiences of the Soviet period and global development trends must be synthesized. The development of post-Soviet integration has found its embodiment in the establishment of the CIS, Union State of Russia and Belarus, the CSTO, and the EurAsEC. But it has not been possible to achieve radical restructuring of the post-Soviet expanse. Eurasian integration was inopportune to a certain extent. The thing is that integration ties with other states and different international organizations were needed to carry it out and intensify it. It is legal founders by that time and, consequently, successors of the former treaty (the fourth party to the agreement, the Zakavka- zskaia S.F.S.R. had long ceased to exist). This is what served as the legal ground the initiators of the Belovezh Agreement decided to take advantage of” (“Collapse of the Soviet Union and Formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States,” available at [http://www.protown.ru/information/hide/3710.html]). 21 [http://www.cismission.mid.ru/ii1_4.html]. 22 “Putin: The CIS was Created for the Purpose of a ‘Divorce,’” 25 March, 2005, available in Russian at [http://news. bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_4382000/4382389.stm].

38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 obvious that the different levels of interest of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in Eurasian integration at this stage will not make it possible to fully implement the concept of the EEU in the Southern Caucasus. It is extremely problematic to satisfy the interests and demands of all the countries of the region. Cooperation among “unequal partners” is only possible if the strategic national priorities of each of them are taken into account. Within the framework of European integration, the South Caucasian countries have drawn up national mechanisms for carrying out joint policy, striving to combine their sovereignty and interests with the European development model. It is a little difficult to develop a supranational policy within the framework of Eurasian reintegration, which is explained by the significant differences in the approaches of the CIS countries. The initial stage of Armenia’s striving on the way to Eurasian integration is even more notewor- thy. For example, during a meeting of the Higher Eurasian Economic Commission, President of Ka- zakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev said that “Armenia should join the EEU without Nagorno-Karabakh.”23 Meanwhile, as early as 2013, Armenia signed the Road Map24 for joining the CU and performed all of its points, while in September of the same year it stated its intention of participation in the formation of the EEU.25 The letter the President of Azerbaijan sent to the heads of the EEU member states (about Armenia’s membership in the CU and EEU) can serve as another example.

Conclusion

Keeping in mind the integration potential and strategic significance of the South Caucasian countries, the global actors should promote the strengthening and development of interregional relations. In so doing, the differences in integration strategies of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia can be smoothed out by expanding regional cooperation among these countries. European integration and Eurasian reintegration are taking place in conditions of forming a multipolar world that is not only of a global, regional, and national nature, but also civiliarchic, an- thropocentric, and sociocratic. The sociocultural dimension of the economic and political processes going on in the South Caucasian countries is of key significance for European integration of the 21st century. The human dimension, social values, national features, active civil society, protection of human rights and freedoms, development of social capital, raising the quality of life, social partnership, and social dialog, etc. are primarily the guarantees of its success. The process of European integration lies in civil centrism and the realization of human capital that ensure “civil rule carried out by citizens for the sake of citizens.” European integration has stra- tegically strengthened the geopolitical status of the region and paved the way for essentially new interstate relations.

23 See: “Nursultan Nazarbaev Believes that Armenia Should Join the EEU without Nagorno-Karabakh,” 2 June, 2014, available in Russian at [http://eurasianews.md/eurasia/nursultan-nazarbaev-schitaet-chto-armeniya-dolzhna-vstupat-eaes-bez- nagornogo-karabaha.htm]. 24 See: “Action Plan Aimed at Implementing the Program of Measures (Road Map) with the Aim of Membership in the Customs Union and Common Economic Space of the Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federa- tion,” available in Russian at [https://www.e-gov.am/u_files/file/decrees/kar/2014/01/ Mar1maqsayin.pdf]. 25 See: “Armenia Performs Essentially All Points of the Road Map for Joining the Customs Union—Nalbandian,” 22 April, 2014, available at [http://novostink.ru/armenia/67354-armeniya-vypolnila-prakticheski-vse-punkty-dorozhnoy-karty-po-vstu- pleniyu-v-tamozhennyy-soyuz-nalbandyan.html].

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The integration processes have encompassed essentially all spheres of public life of the South Caucasian countries. Moreover, they have affected the state power system and local self-government bodies, as well as civil society institutions. Their strengthening can help the countries of the region overcome different crisis situations, strengthen their political stability, and create prerequisites for developing the Caucasian model of social partnership and market relations. Integration processes are creating favorable conditions for forming a common political, socioeconomic, and spiritual-cultural space in the Southern Caucasus.

EURASIAN INTEGRATION: VIEWS AND OPINIONS

Murat LAUMULIN Ph.D. (Political Science), Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

urasian integration and the Eurasian economic space that has their best interests Economic Union have attracted nu- at heart will have to offer. On the other hand, E merous views and opinions and ignited the possible loss of national sovereignties heated discussions: a larger part of the politi- and independence has stirred up apprehen- cal and business community of the CIS coun- sion that keeps politicians in two minds and tries is aware of the advantages a common slows down economic cooperation.

KEYWORDS: the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Union, common economic space, integration in the post-Soviet space.

Introduction

The Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union signed in Astana on 29 May, 2014 made it a reality even though the vacillations on whether Eurasian integration (post-Soviet reintegration) was possible and/or necessary are rooted in the more distant past.1

1 On the pre-history of the subject, see: E.S. Syzdykova, “Evraziyskaia integratsia v otsenkakh nauchno-issledovatel- skogo i ekspertno-analiticheskogo soobshchestva stran TS-EEP,” Kazakhstan-Spektr (KISI), No. 3, 2013, pp. 5-29.

40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

The story goes back to the early 1990s and the attempt to arrive at a new Union Treaty (the so- called Novo-Ogaryovo process); in April 1994, Nursultan Nazarbaev delivered his famous speech at Moscow State University, in which he invited the post-Soviet republics to reunite into a Eurasian Union. The 1990s were dotted by attempts to create regional integration structures—the Central Asian Cooperation (CAC), the EurAsEC, the Customs Union-1, the Common Economic Space (CES of 2004), etc. The new version of the CU, which appeared in 2010, developed into the CES with the prospect of becoming the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015. The idea of Eurasian integration acquired clear international-legal and political-economic outlines. Seventeen agreements commissioned on 1 January, 2012 form the contractual and legal framework of the Common Economic Space and serve as the foundation of its member countries’ relations related to a vast range of problems—from macroeconomic policies and financial markets to technical regulations and protection of intellectual property. The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), a supranational structure, was set up to administer the integration processes of three members so far (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In October and December 2013, they arrived at a decision to sign an agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union on 1 January, 2015. It should be said that there are enough supporters and opponents of integration outside the three countries involved, as well as inside each of them. The sides involved can be divided, with a great degree of approximation, into four groups: (1) supporters and opponents inside the countries belonging to the Customs Union, Common Economic Space, and Eurasian Economic Union; (2) supporters and opponents in the candidate states (Armenia), potential candidates (Kyrgyz- stan) and candidates with reservations (Tajikistan); (3) observers—the other CIS countries affected by the integration process; (4) foreign observers (mainly in the West, as well as in other countries).

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is actively involved in the integration processes and promotes Eurasian integration within the EEU and the CES. There is no agreement, however, on the subject in the republic, where discussions have been going on and on for many years. It can be said that the questions related to Eurasian integration have been carefully elaborated at the fundamental academic and analytical level by the republic’s best think tanks: the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies (KISI), the Institute of World Economy and Politics at the Foundation of the First President of Kazakhstan (IMEP), the Institute of Political Decisions (IPR), the Agency for Studying Profitability of Investments (AIRI), the Institute of Eco- nomics at the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan (MON RK), and several others. In the last few years, KISI has carried out several fundamental studies of various forms of Eur- asian integration,2 while its experts have expressed their own opinions about integration and its

2 See: Tamozhenny soiuz Belarusi, Kazakhstana i Rossii: sostoianie, problemy, perspektivy, KISI, Almaty, 2009, 368 pp.; Tamozhenny soiz Belarusi, Kazakhstana i Rossii: realii i perspektivy, Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii, 25 November, 2009, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI, Almaty, 2010, 128 pp; D.Sh. Mukhamedzhanova, Kazakhstan i mezhdunarodnye integratsionnye protsessy, KISI, Almaty, 2011, 200 pp.; Tamozhenny soiuz i Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo: problemy ekonomicheskoy integratsii, KISI, Almaty, 2013, 176 pp.; Formirovanie EEP: sostoianie, problemy, perspektivy, KISI, Almaty,

41 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS course.3 They agree with the official position and are convinced that Eurasian integration should proceed slowly but surely from EurAsEC to the Customs Union, then to the Common Economic Space and, finally, to the Eurasian Economic Union. It is extremely important to convince the public that Eurasian integration is an important factor of regional stability and higher competitiveness of the CU countries.4 KISI experts summarized the preliminary results of Kazakhstan’s membership in the CU and CES and found them positive. Since 2011, the CU’s first year, Kazakhstan has been demonstrating quantitative and qualitative progress in the main macroeconomic indices, including GDP, investment cooperation with the CU countries, inflow of investments into advanced economic branches, smaller deficit in trade with Russia, slower inflation, and greater inflow of taxes. According to the KISI experts, asynchronous development within the EurAsEC creates two integration spaces: the space formed by the Union State of Russia and Belarus and the space formed by the states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) or, in other words, the “Euro- pean” and “Asian” parts of the common EurAsEC space. On the other hand, there is a threat of disintegration of the EurAsEC economic space (withdrawal of its Asian part, in particular) which can be described as a threat to “Eurasianism.” This means that the political elite of Kazakhstan largely supports integration in the economy, but not in other spheres, and regards President Nazarbaev as one of the leaders and authors of the Eurasian Union idea. Kazakhstan’s analysts point out that the integration process has already produced its first fruits. The idea is supported at the grass-roots level; Senator Anatoly Bashmakov is one of the most active supporters of Eurasian integration.5 Positive assessments of integration do not exclude doubts expressed by different political, economic, and public groups. Those who criticize the CU-CES point to the absence of a clear concept of integration and a national idea shared by Kazakhstan and Russia. Some of the experts believe that the idea of bringing together the potential of both countries in order to use their natural resources to organize their territories and upgrade the standard of living may become a consolidating factor. There are fears in the expert community that supra-national institutions might deprive Kazakh- stan of its sovereignty; there is no agreement either in the expert community or public at large about the usefulness of a Eurasian parliament, which is seen as an instrument of Moscow’s control over

2012, 200 pp.; A.A. Bashmakov, Ot prigranichnogo sotrudnichestva k evraziyskoy economicheskoy integratsii: sbornik nauchnykh trudov, KISI, Almaty, 2013, 216 pp.; K.B. Berentaev, Ekonomika Kazakhstana i vyzovy XXI veka. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI, Almaty, 2013, 244 pp.; Integratsionnye protsessy v evraziyskom prostranstve i sovremenny mir, KISI, Almaty, 2013, 234 pp. 3 See: L. Muzaparova, “Tamozhenny soyuz i Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo: perspektivy razvitia i vozmozhnosti dlia stran-uchastnits,” Analytic (KISI), No. 4, 2011; idem, “Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: novaia realnost v global- noy ekonomike,” Analytic, No. 12, 2012; idem, “Tamozhenny soiuz i Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo: vozmozhnosti i perspektivy,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii (IMEMO), No. III, 2011, pp. 1-7; D.Sh. Mukhamedzhanova, “Novye aspekty ekonomicheskoy politiki v usloviiakh Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva,” Analytic, No. 6, 2009, pp. 76-89; idem, “Problemy postsovetskogo regionalizma,” Kazakhstan-Spektr, No. 2, 2011, pp. 63-67; idem, “Stanovlenie edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva: vzgliad iz Almaty,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. I, 2013, pp. 14-23; idem, “Nat- sionalnaia ekonomicheskaia strategiia v usloviiakh EEP,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2011, pp. 44-56; S. Nugerbekov, “Analiz torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy i sostoiania ekonomik RK, RF i RB v usloviiakh predstoiash- chego vkhozhdeniia v Tamozhenny soiuz,” Analytic, No. 3, 2009, pp. 48-57; G. Rakhmatulina, “Tamozhenny soiuz v ramkakh EvrAzES: perspektivy dlia Kazakhstana,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (IMEMO), No. 11, 2010, pp. 75-81; idem, “Neftegazovy sektor Kazakhstana v usloviiakh EEP,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. I, 2012, pp. 18-31. 4 See: Tamozhenny soiuz i Edinoe ekonomicheskoe prostranstvo: problemy ekonomicheskoy integratsii, pp. 11-12. 5 See: A.A. Bashmankov, “Kazakhstan i Rossia—passionarnoe iadro evraziyskoy integratsii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2013, pp. 18-23.

42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Astana. It seems that this opinion, incessantly broadcast by the media, forced President Nazarbaev to make several outstanding statements. In January 2013, he pointed out: “The country’s political sovereignty is not discussed. Any attempt to put pressure on Kazakhstan to threaten our independence will be seen as a reason to leave the union,” and he also said that Kazakhstan needs economic integration. The critics are concerned about the continued raw-material nature of the country’s economy. The arguments are simple: the leaders’ hasty decision to join the alliances allegedly meets the interests of the raw-material companies, which will move to the duty-free markets. The future of small and medium businesses unable to compete with more or less competitive Russian business is vague. The rising level of bureaucratization inside the integration alliance and the absence of a common system of technical regulation are seen as weak points. Russia’s excessively protectionist policy at the regional level raises even more objections. Its federative structure allows the local parliaments to issue their own regulations, which erect obstacles to goods from Kazakhstan. The critics point to the fact that Kazakhstan’s involvement in the CU-CES inevitably limits its trade with China.6 There are attempts to assess Eurasian integration at the theoretical level. Director of the Institute of World Economy and Politics Sultan Akimbekov believes that ideological issues were pushed aside by the fierce political and economic discussions and, therefore, out of the political space. Today, ideology is closely connected with the following questions: Is Russia determined to restore its old empire? And what do the other former Soviet states and nations think about this? This has inevitably pushed the issue into the sphere of politics.7

Russia

In Russia, the most active driving force behind integration in various forms, the problem is attracting even more attention. There are many supporters as well as opponents in the academic community and political establishment. At the intellectual level, it is discussed at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS), the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI), the Foreign Ministry Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) (MGIMO-U), the Institute of Eco- nomics RAS, and many others. The International Affairs journal, which translates the opinions of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, has been paying a lot of attention to the issue.8 Academician Gen- nadi Chufrin of the IMEMO RAS, the most enthusiastic supporter of Eurasian integration and the author of numerous works on the subject,9 is convinced that Russia should add vigor to its informa-

6 On detailed criticism, see: N. Kassenova, Kazakhstan and Eurasian Economic Integration: Quick Start, Mixed Results and Uncertain Future, IFRI, Paris, 2012, 29 pp.; F. Vielmini, “The Challenges of Eurasian Integration for Kazakhstan,” ISPI — Analysis (Rome), No. 151, 2013, 7 рp.; Zh. Ibrashev, S. Abdugazieva, “Politicheskiy aspekt evraziyskoy integratsii,” Analytic, No. 4, 2012, pp. 198-110. 7 See: S. Akimbekov, “Evraziiskaia teoria dlia integratsii i Kazakhstana,” Kazakhstan v globalnykh protsessakh (IMEP), No. 1, 2013, pp. 6-17. 8 See: “The Architecture of Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Area: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,” International Affairs (MID RF), No. 1, 2012; “Yalta-2012. The Eurasian Development Vector: Problems and Prospects,” International Af- fairs, No. 1, 2013, pp. 112-175. 9 See: G. Chufrin, Ocherki evraziyskoy integratsii, Ves mir Publishers, Moscow, 2013, 128 pp.; idem, “Evraziyskaia integratsia: pervye itogi i novye vyzovy,” in: Dvustoronnie politicheskie i ekonomicheskie otnoshenia Kazakhstana i Rossii, KISI, Almaty, 2013, pp. 20-131; idem, “Tamozhenny soiuz Rossii, Belorussii i Kazakhstana,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. II, 2010, pp. 5-14; idem, “Posle SSSR: ot SNG k Evraziyskomu soiuzu,” Kazakhstan-Spektr, No. 3, 2011, pp. 35-42; idem, “20 let bez SSSR: ot SNG k Evraziyskomu soiuzu,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2011, pp. 5-13.

43 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tional and propaganda efforts to demonstrate that economic cooperation within the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space (since 2012), and the future Eurasian Economic Union is the main cooperation trend and will remain so in the foreseeable future. He has pointed out that Russia and its partners are not only determined to move consistently toward mutually advantageous positions in the integration process, but also seek the best possible solutions to make this rapprochement irreversible. Academician Chufrin is also convinced that the Eurasian Economic Union might develop in the distant future into a confederation (if and when the necessary preconditions have been created), not only consolidated by economic, domestic and foreign policy, and security interests, but also by shared interests in the humanitarian and cultural spheres.10 He has written elsewhere that structural changes and gradually moving away from the present raw-material development model (responsible for their dependent status in global economy) are impossible without breakthroughs in the above-mentioned directions.11 There is no agreement in the Russian academic and expert community on the efficiency of the planned association. Some people believe that the project is doomed, while others see it as an already accomplished reality and are living in the pleasant anticipation of huge advantages. There are those who, while accepting the project as well-timed and useful, warn about the strenuous efforts in store for its builders. They mean that these efforts should be harmonized and that the Union’s supranational character should be accepted and its members act accordingly. There is another, no less challenging task: the members should modernize their economic and, hence, political systems within a very short period of time.12 Vladislav Inozemtsev, a well known political scientist, says in so many words that the claims of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to the role of one of the world’s geo-economic centers are un- founded. Prof. Alexey Portanskiy of the Higher School of Economics is, likewise, very skeptical about the prospects of the new integration structure. He believes that the leaders of Russia are driven by foreign policy considerations—they want a strong economic and territorial structure to be taken into account to a much greater extent; there is another (and rarely proclaimed) aim to keep the post- Soviet states in Russia’s sphere of influence. S. Chernyshev, Director of the Department of Economic Cooperation with CIS Countries, Min- istry of Economic Development, on the other hand, does not question the efficiency of the CU and the CES of the three countries. Alexander Bykov, Senior Research Associate at the Institute of Economics, RAS, has offered a much more balanced opinion: despite the weak starting positions, “good results are possible if work is organized correctly, if the goals selected are optimal and realistic, and if an efficient mechanism is built.” The text, however, betrays that success is not guaranteed. Russian experts pay a lot of attention to what their colleagues from other countries, Kazakhstan in particular, have to say.13 Nikolay Rabotyazhev of IMEMO has pointed out that closer integration among the post-Soviet states meet the national interests of Russia and its CIS partners and that, not infrequently, the foreign policy of the newly independent states does not correspond to their national

10 See: G. Chufrin, “O zadachakh evraziyskoy integratsii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. I, 2013, pp. 5-13. 11 See: G. Chufrin, “Dostizhenia i problemy evraziyskoy integratsii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2013, pp. 8-17. 12 N. Fedulova, “Perspektivy Evraziyskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. III, 2012, pp. 5-20. 13 See: E. Ionova, “Kazakhstan i razvitie ekonomicheskoy integratsii na postsovetskom prostranstve,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. III, 2012, pp. 81-86.

44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 interests, which slows down integration. At the same time, writes the author, integration in the post- Soviet space should not be limited to Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.14 Russian experts write a lot about integration at the global level.15 E. Vinokurov and A. Libman from St. Petersburg have summarized their conceptual approach to the issue in their fundamental work Evraziyskaia kontinentalnaia integratsiia (Eurasian Continental Integration), in which they developed their idea of a new configuration of integration processes on the Eurasian continent. They believe that the integration going on in different parts of the continent is being increasingly comple- mented by continental integration. It should develop in the form of extensive cooperation among the existing integration associations, forums, and all sorts of other structures based on the shared interests of the states involved. They expect that the present disunited associations will be replaced with the incorporation of all the integration entities into several integration structures.16 The authors agree that Eurasian integration is potentially important for all the countries on the Eurasian continent and is very important for Russia and Central Asia, which gain a lot from the combination of two Eurasian integrations—the Eurasian post-Soviet and Eurasian continental.17 Russian academics have been showing immense interest in the civilian dimension of integration.18 A. Portanskiy has pointed out that the obviously unequal distribution of responsibility for the Eurasian integration project between the sides involved should be regarded as its weakness. The state of their economies suggests that each of the sides needs stronger partners with high-tech bases found only outside the borders of the future Eurasian integrated union.19 Prof. Xenia Borishpolets doubts Russia’s position as the integration leader. It is the leading economic entity of integration, the raw-material, population, and industrial potential of which is greater than the aggregate potential of the two other countries, however the movement along the Eurasian trajectory has not made Russia, by default, an absolute leader.20 Andrey Suzdaltsev (Higher School of Economics) asks whether the Eurasian Economic Union will replace the Union State of Belarus and Russia? By way of answering his own question, he points to the unique place of the Union State among the other post-Soviet integration projects as the only attempt to bring about political integration of the CIS members. In 2010, Belarus joined the Customs Union, which deprived the Russian-Belorussian political integration project, the Union State, of its economic dimension. This means that it will remain a very specific social and

14 See: N. Rabotyazhev, “Integratsia na postsovetskom prostranstve: novy start,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2011, pp. 28-43. 15 See: Budushchee Evrazii: BRIKS ili Evraziyskiy soiuz? Voprosy ustoychivosti soiuzov, TsSOP, Moscow, 2012, 28 pp. 16 See: E. Vinokurov, A. Libman, Evraziyskaia kontinentalnaia integratsia, Center of Integration Studies, St. Peters- burg, 2012, 224 pp. 17 See also: E. Vinokurov, “Pragmatic Eurasianism,” Russia in Global Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, 2013; E. Vinokurov, A. Libman, “Trendy regionalnoy integratsii na postsovetskom prostranstve: rezultaty kolichestvennogo analiza,” Voprosy ekonomiki (IE RAS), No. 7, 2010, pp. 94-107; idem, “Post-Soviet Integration Breakthrough. Why the Customs Union has More Chances than Its Predecessors,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2, 2012; A. Libman, “Postsovetskaia integratsia i politicheskie sistemy postsovetskikh gosudarstv,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2012, pp. 5-20; idem, “Optimalnoe prostranstvo evraziyskoy integratsii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. IV, 2010, pp. 5-17; E. Vinokurov, A. Libman, “Dve evraziyskie integratsii,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 2, 2013, pp. 47-72. 18 See: T. Guzenkova, “Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: grazhdanskoe izmerenie,” Problemy natsionalnoy strategii (RISI), No. 6, 2012, pp. 75-89. 19 See: A. Portanskiy, “Poblemy i dilemmy evraziyskogo vybora Rossii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. 1, 2013, pp. 24-31. 20 See: K. Borishpolets, “Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: integratsionny proekt v deystvii,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. II, 2012, pp. 5-15; K. Borishpolets, S. Chernyavsky, “The Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan: Present and Future,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 120-129.

45 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS political bridge between Russia and Belarus, which will preserve the friendly feelings between the two neighbors.21 Stanislav Borisov (IMEMO RAS) has analyzed a novel phenomenon of the post-Soviet period, namely, efforts to promote monetary and financial integration within the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space.22 The author has pointed out that since Eurasian integration has not moved very far yet, it is too early to offer substantiated and objective conclusions about its efficiency, advantages, and shortcomings. He writes that Russia profited from the agreement: it keeps the income produced by the export of crude oil in its budget. It should readjust the payment for energy resources it sells to Belarus: obligatory payments in convertible currencies should be replaced with the possibility to pay in Russian rubles (this has been done in trade in other goods). Kazakhstan should follow Belarus and issue a law that will make the Russian ruble a convertible and reserve currency in its territory. The author concludes that a single currency in the integrated states will probably appear in the distant future; today this is a subject of theoretical supposition and academic discussion.

Belarus

The Belarusian leadership talks of itself as the flagman of Eurasian integration and claims a special role for its country. It proceeds from its active involvement in all the integration projects up to and including the Union State of Russia and Belarus. In many respects, the republic is a privileged member of the integration alliances, President Lukashenko being the main (or even the only) supporter of integration with Russia in the republic’s political elite.23 Integration with Russia causes apprehension in the political and expert community of Belarus. First, that part of the republic’s expert community that supports the government is convinced that the unique Belorussian model of a socially oriented state is incompatible with the Russian political and economic development pattern and that Belarusian sovereignty will be threatened. Those who oppose integration into a future alliance proceed from the familiar arguments related to the choice “between the East and the West.” These people look at integration as gradual ac- ceptance of Russia’s conditions and describe it in terms of subordination and absorption rather than integration. Those who regard Eurasian integration as an imposed process also doubt its future. Some experts interpret integration in the post-Soviet space as a key to the “doors to China” and its rapidly growing economy. Experts of the Center for European Integration Problems at the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus believe that China as a source of high technologies and investments is an alternative to Europe, while Eurasian integration will give the country the opportunity to become one of the main transit corridors for Chinese goods and will add to Belarus’ geopolitical weight. On the other hand, the country is actively invited to join the Mezhdumorie, a Polish integration project expected to join Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in an integrated region. With a population of about 100 million, this association, supported by its allied relations with Washington,

21 See: A. Suzdaltsev, “Smenit li Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz Soiuznoe gosudarstvo Belorussii i Rossii?” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 8, 2013, pp. 71-75 (see also: A. Suzdaltsev, “Politics ahead of the Economy. Risks and Prospects of the EurAsEC Customs Union,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 1, 2010, pp. 89-90; idem, “Formirovanie rossiiskoy politiki v otnoshenii Belorussii (2005-2008),” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 3, 2009, pp. 64-74). 22 S. Borisov, Valiutno-finansovye problemy evraziyskoy integratsii, IMEMO RAS, Moscow, 2014, 92 pp. 23 See: “Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: otnoshenie k proektu v stranakh SNG,” Problemy natsionalnoy strategii, No. 1, 2013, pp. 9-14.

46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 will be able to control the larger part of Russia’s western contacts, be involved in trans-Eurasian trade routes, and be strong enough to defend its interests in Brussels. The Poles proceed from the (false) supposition that the Belarusian regime is fragile; this explains why their plans are not supported either by the country’s political and expert community, or the ordinary people.

The Candidate Countries

The expert community of Kyrgyzstan and its parliament were far from united in their response to the statement made by President Almazbek Atambaev in 2013 that Kyrgyzstan should join the Customs Union and that an interdepartmental commission had been set up to start negotiations on the country’s CU membership. The prospects and possible repercussions were discussed at a series of public meetings; much has been written in specialized publications and much has been said in the media. In Kyrgyzstan, the nationalist or pro-Western politicians and public figures are forced to support in public (even though with much reservation) the ideas of Eurasian integration in general and the Eurasian Economic Union in particular. Kyrgyz labor migrants and their far from enviable situation is one of the most painful issues. The business community is very positive about Eurasian integration; the country’s orientation toward re-export is seen as the main problem, while the opening of internal markets and the probability of new jobs breed hopes. It should be said that despite the gradually shrinking of Russia’s cultural position in the region, the ordinary people are still positively disposed toward Russia and Eurasian integration. Kyrgyz experts point out that the structure of the republic’s trade with the members of the Cus- toms Union shows that the changed trade conditions might have a strong impact on practically all of the economic sectors, the budget, and employment and that a considerable part of the country’s foreign trade relies on re-export.24 A group of independent experts studied the possible economic effects of the country’s CU membership; the project was funded by USAID. They concluded that its membership would inevitably cut down the volumes of import and re-export together with budget revenues. On the other hand, the WTO rules, which allow its members to join free trade areas and customs unions under certain conditions, make it fairly hard for Kyrgyzstan, which is a WTO member, to join the new Customs Union. Kyrgyz society is especially worried about Russia’s absolute economic and political domination in the Customs Union; the country’s economy is small and weak to the extent that it can function only as a part of a large economic association. This means that its CU membership will resolve many problems related to the labor migration of Kyrgyz citizens to the CU member states. The public and expert communities are involved in uncompromising discussions of whether the country should join the Customs Union stirred up by slack or even absent integration within the CIS, contradictions between integration and the desire to preserve national independence, and fragmenta- tion of the integration process. Time has shown, however, that the leaders of Kyrgyzstan are becoming more inclined to join the new integration structure, particularly after President Putin’s visit to Kyrgyzstan in 2013 and the signing of large-scale investment agreements with Russia in the energy sphere. If it joins the CU, the discrepancies between the conditions for CU and WTO membership must be addressed and resolved. Kyrgyzstan will have to double its customs tariffs; Russia’s WTO mem-

24 See: T. Dyykanbaeva, “Tamozhenny soiuz i Kyrgyzstan,” Rossia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. III, 2011, pp. 1-7 . 47 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS bership and the intention of Kazakhstan and Belarus to join might cause readjustments of the Unified Customs Tariff of the Customs Union. The public debates on whether or not the country should join the Customs Union are accompanied by alarmist statements that re-export will die and jobs will disappear. The distribution of income revenues might cause even more complications. Kyrgyz experts insist on the following preferences: the national and the CU regimes should coexist for three to five years; the CU countries should extend Kyrgyzstan technical support to modernize production and improve the quality of locally produced goods; support of and assistance to the business community of Kyrgyzstan should be rendered to enable it to adjust to the international security and quality standards.25 On 19 September, 2013, the Ministry of Economics of Kyrgyzstan and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) approved the final version of the corresponding roadmap. Some of the Kyrgyz experts offered a very unusual opinion: they see the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union as practical implementation of the liberal theory of a market economy in which goods, capital, services, and labor circulate with minimum state limitations and add that Russia risks more than the other members.26 Armenia is already involved in all the integration formats (the CIS and CSTO) and has an observer status in the EurAsEC. At the official level, much is being said about the need to strengthen economic ties in the Eurasian space. In October 2011, Prime Minister T. Sarkisian approved the newly established format of self-organization of states and promised that Armenia would be actively involved in the process. In August 2012, after a meeting of the presidents of Russia and Armenia, the two countries set up a commission to study the opportunities for Erevan’s integration efforts within the framework of the CU and the EEC. It should be said that the main Armenian information resources and progovernment media are very negative about the EEU and Armenia’s involvement in it. For a long time, the official circles insisted that the issue could be discussed only when a document outlining the format, instruments, and mechanisms available to the future members of the Eurasian Economic Union had been signed. A country with no common borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus cannot be fully involved in the CU and CES formats for obvious geopolitical reasons. Early in September 2013, Armenia announced that it wanted CU membership and, later, involvement in building the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia and Kazakhstan agreed immediately, while Minsk remained in two minds: the local leaders viewed Armenia within the CU as a rival of Belarus with respect to Russian subsidies. Seen from Russia, it looked as if Armenia was ready to perform a geopolitical U-turn away from Moscow; in fact, Armenia was acting under the pressure of a blockade that weighed heavily on its economy and was extremely disappointed in the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation. Most of the industrial enterprises that Russia acquired as payment of Armenia’s debt remain idling, while the repeated requests for a $2 billion loan needed to stabilize Armenia’s economy were ignored. It remains to be seen whether Russia will issue a grant to minimize the losses caused by the higher gas prices. There is an even weightier argument: Russia sells weapons to Azerbaijan. It should be said in all justice, that President S. Sargsian planned to initial the Association Agreement at the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partnership Countries in November 2013. The Ar- menian elite see the country’s alliance with Moscow as a temporary measure prompted by the unfavorable geopolitical environment, i.e. Turkey as the closest neighbor and the state of war with Azer- baijan. They, the younger generation in particular, associate the country’s future with the EU and

25 See: Ibidem, No. IV, 2013, pp. 24-32. 26 See: A.L. Saliev, “Kyrgyzstan i integratsionnye protsessy v Tsentralnoy Azii,” in: Integratsionnye protsessy v evraziyskom prostranstve i sovremenny mir, pp. 160-169.

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NATO, rather than with Russia and the CIS integration structures. Armenia should remain Russia’s friend, but not an ally. Russia, in turn, “should not block the road to Europe.” When Armenia reached the final stretch of the road to the Association Agreement with the EU, Vladimir Putin made it abun- dantly clear that economic dividends were no substitute for the national security ensured by Russia. Some Armenian experts are fairly outspoken about the prospects of Eurasian integration. Alex- ander Iskandarian, Director of the Caucasus Institute in Erevan, for example, is convinced that the former relations between the former Union republics cannot be restored because cooperation among the post-Soviet states stands on a basis very different from their coexistence within the same country. “In ten to fifteen years from now, the generation of the elites that grew up in the Soviet Union and that shares the same culture codes and the ability to communicate with each other like people of one country, and not like foreigners, will begin to leave the stage.”27 Since 2005, a wide range of problems caused by Tajikistan’s possible CU membership has come to the fore and remains on the republic’s sociopolitical agenda. Very much in line with the globalization trends, Tajikistan looks at deeper integration as one of its foreign policy priorities; the public shares this conviction with the country’s leaders. In October 2011, in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s program article written as part of his election campaign, all the political parties of Tajikistan approved the idea of integration and the prospect of CU membership for the republic. Later, public discussions of the future of the Eurasian Economic Union were pushed aside by the more urgent prospect of CU membership. On the whole, the idea has been accepted in Tajikistan even though there are fears that at the first stage there might be economic losses. Kozidavlat Koimdodov, Ambassador of Tajikistan to Belarus, shares this apprehension. Until the borders of the Customs Union approached Tajikistan, i.e. Kyrgyzstan joined it, Dushanbe preferred bilateral agreements. According to public opinion polls, most of the political forces and ordinary people support the ideas of Eurasian integration.28

Other CIS Countries

The bloodshed in Maidan in February 2014 predated by Viktor Yanukovich’s foreign policy somersaults we observed in 2013 and in Vilnius made it next to impossible to assess Ukraine’s position on this or any other foreign policy issue. We can talk about trends related to the problem discussed that were more or less obvious in the country’s political and expert communities before 2014. Russian experts have agreed that Ukraine was the weakest European link in the chain of Eur- asian integration.29 Ukraine remained outside the integration field and stubbornly refused to join integration projects because there is no more or less influential right-wing political force or public group willing to join Russia’s integration projects and ready to defend its position in public. The financial and political elites are showing no interest in integration, individual politicians and marginal movements being the only exception. According to the public opinion polls conducted in 2009-2012, about 54% of the country’s population supports integration within the CIS; isolationist feelings were even less popular than in Russia: 23% and 36%, respectively.

27 A. Iskandarian, “Why are We Drifting Apart? The Dialectics of Integration and Disintegration,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4, 2013. 28 See: R. Zairov, “Problemy vstuplenia Respubliki Tajikistan v Tamozhenny Soyuz,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1, 2013, pp. 187-198; M. Olimov, “Konkurentsia globalnykh proektov v prostranstve Evrazii i pozitsia Tajikistana v Azii,” in: Integratsionnye protsessy v evraziyskom prostranstve i sovremenny mir, pp. 170-175. 29 See: “Evrosiyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: otnoshenie k proektu v stranakh SNG,” Problemy natsionalnoy strategii, No. 1, 2013, pp. 37-38.

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On the whole, before 2014, the nation and the elite could not agree on many points—a situation typical of today’s Ukraine. The closely intertwined economic and political elites have their own ideological and business reasons to oppose reunification. Indeed, everything Ukrainian is consistently opposed to everything Russian; there is a lot of talk about the civilizational abyss between the two peoples, which dominates public life and the local media. The integration idea has little chance in a country where pro-Russian views and opinions are banned and where sympathy for Russia is incompatible with Ukrainian patriotism. The structure of business interests of the Ukrainian financial and industrial elite is very important; in fact, the Ukrainian business community is afraid of the Rus- sian “oligarchs” and defense and security structures. Since 2012, the opinion that Russia’s integration proposals are compulsory in nature has been spreading far and wide across the country. The Western lobby in Ukraine stands opposed to the projects of the Eurasian Economic Union and the European Union. Petr Simonenko, First Secretary of the C.C., Communist Party of Ukraine, is the only open supporter of the former. Today, integration of Ukraine and other parts of the post-Soviet space looks improbable in view of the stormy events of 2014, which led to Ukraine losing Crimea and its waging a de facto war in its eastern regions, etc. Writing in 2013, that is a year before the Euro-Maidan in the center of the Ukrainian capital, Yuri Andreev, an expert from Russia, predicted that the West, the United States in particular, would try to keep Ukraine away from the Eurasian Union in order to deprive the integration structure of the lion’s share of its potential consequences and international weight.30 The stormy events of late 2013 and, especially, of 2014, which removed Yanukovich, himself not an enthusiastic supporter of integration, confirmed what Andreev wrote early in 2013 and buried the weakest of hopes that Kiev would agree to be involved, at least marginally, in Eurasian integration. Prompting from the outside is obvious. Moldova and Transnistria disagree over the nature and aims of Russia’s integration initiatives. The ruling and humanitarian elites of the former, which are looking at Europe and Rumania, describe Russia’s initiatives as another bout of its “imperial” policies and suspect Moscow of a desire to “de- tach Moldova from the Rumanian cultural community and European civilization.” In Transnistria, where people regard their republic as part of historical Russia, the motives and aims of Eurasian integration under the aegis of Russia are seen as absolutely justified. Sociological polls register, very much as in Ukraine in 2009-2012, consistent growth of Euro- skepticism among the popular masses attracted by Russia and its integration initiatives. Politicians and experts of the opposite camp are alarmed by the figures and their impact on Moldova’s European integration. Their explanation of the evolution of opinions and preferences are highly one-sided. The local opposition, on the other hand, is exploiting the subject in its own interests. The left-wing parties heavily rely on Eurasian rhetoric in an effort to present themselves to the public as consistent supporters of drawing closer to Russia through integration projects. The South Caucasian countries, each in its own way, are important elements of Eurasian integration, especially in the mid-term and longer perspective. The way Armenia, Azerbaijan, and partly Georgia will relate to the Eurasian subject range will determine the currently developing trends. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two newly independent states in the region, can be described as an integration factor that cannot and will not be ignored in the future. Baku is in two minds about the Eurasian Economic Union, which is easily explained by its relations with Russia; relations with Belarus and Kazakhstan (the latter being a member of the Tur- kic Council, another integration project together with Azerbaijan) are not that important. In Azer- baijan, the ordinary people are, on the whole, inclined to approve integration with Russia for sev-

30 See: Yu.V. Andreev, “Kievskoe uravnenie v evraziyskom proekte,” Puti k miru i bezopasnosti (IMEMO), No. 1, 2013, pp. 120-122.

50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 eral reasons, including the large (or the largest among the post-Soviet) Azeri diaspora in Russia. On the other hand, there are ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan that pin their hope on Russia as a possible guarantor of their rights. The country’s political elite sides with the country’s top leaders: they are seeking a balance between the Western, Russian, and Turkish (pan-Turkic) vectors. Officials have already made it known that their country is not interested in CU membership, territorial integrity being the highest stumbling block. Practically everything that has already been said on the matter is vaguely formulated and can be interpreted as a warning that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity should be respected.31 The business community of Azerbaijan is divided into those related to the oil and gas sector, its economic cornerstone, and others. The former is a natural rival of the oil and gas sector of Russia, which contradicts the idea of integration. A large part of other businesses (trade, agriculture, and industry) is closely associated with Russia and the CIS countries; it is aware of the integration advantages and, therefore, sides with the idea. The specifics of the relations between Russia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia and their unwill- ingness to create problems for Russia on the international scene prompt both republics (which have not yet gained international recognition and cannot, for formal reasons, join the EEU) not to claim EEU membership. Compared with most of the Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan), Uzbekistan is marginally involved in the already functioning post-Soviet integration structures. In 2008, Tashkent suspended its membership in the EurAsEC; four years later it left, for the second time, the CSTO. In June 2012, the same people decided to join the CIS Free Trade Area. In December 2011, in Moscow, President Karimov described the functioning and planned forms of economic integration in the post-Soviet space as logical results of CIS and world development. Tashkent is convinced that disintegration across the post-Soviet space is spreading far and wide; this does not mean that no joint projects can be implemented, especially if they leave the members’ sovereignty and independence intact. Today, Tashkent, obviously unwilling to draw closer to Russia, intends to keep away from the developed forms of Eurasian integration (the Customs Union, Com- mon Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union). Turkmenistan, sticking to its policy of neutrality (an official term for international isolationism), gives no reason to count it among the potential members of the Eurasian Union (at least in the short- term perspective). On the other hand, one should not ignore any interest of Ashghabad in economic cooperation with Russia and its Central Asian and Caspian neighbors. At the official level, however, the country’s leaders decline all invitations to engage in closer integration.

External Assessments

I have already written that everything related to Eurasian integration is scrutinized from different points of view, up to and including foreign experience. Anna Lavut from the Institute of Latin America, RAS has concluded that the Latin American alliances, set up at different periods, invariably accumulated disagreements after the first five to seven years of mutual trade, which caused conflicts or even provoked political clashes and, not infrequently, slowed down integration.32

31 See: “Evraziyskiy ekonomicheskiy soiuz: otnoshenie k proektu v stranakh CNG,” pp. 14-20. 32 See: A. Lavut, “Tamozhennyy soiuz Rossii, Belorussii i Kazakhstana v svete latinoamerikanskogo opyta regionalnoy integratsii,” Latinskaia America (ILA RAS), No. 8, 2013, pp. 97-103.

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Renato Marques, Brazilian Ambassador to Belarus, a diplomat and outstanding scholar with vast experience of working in MERCOSUR and the EU, agrees with the above. He has drawn paral- lels between the pairs of members involved in two integration processes, Russia and Kazakhstan vs. Brazil and Paraguay, to say that the bigger economies (Russian and Brazilian) will inevitably suck the weaker economic entities into their orbits. George Washington University in the United States instituted a research program to study Eur- asian integration.33 Foreign experts have agreed that the project of Eurasian integration in the post- Soviet space rests on Moscow’s desire to become one of the power centers that opposes the United States. Moscow’s intention to keep the CIS republics within its orbit and prevent their drifting away from Russia toward other countries is described as “reunification of the post-Soviet states.” From this it follows that political and strategic goals are seen as more important than economic development proper.34 The Center for Integration Studies at the Eurasian Development Bank is an unquestionable leader in Eurasian research. In 2013, it implemented over ten projects related to Eurasian integration. The Western think tanks concentrated on the geopolitical aspects of the Eurasian integration processes.35 The Heritage Foundation, a conservative American fund, likewise, has concentrated on the geopolitical dimension of the Eurasian project. The Foreign Policy Center (U.K.) describes the Eur- asian Union as an instrument of Russia’s neo-imperialist domination in the near abroad realized through structural economic dependence. In its analytical report, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) (U.K.) concluded that until recently regional integration in the post-Soviet space had been mainly declara- tive, while the Eurasian Union, which offered more promising and much more advanced forms of economic integration, would strongly affect the relations between the EU and Russia as a whole and the EU strategy in the post-Soviet space in particular. This turned Ukraine into a field of normative battles with Russia. This problem forces the EU to revise its approaches to “external management” of its Eastern neighbors from the point of view of short- and long-term potentials and problems. The Round Table Eurasian Economic Integration: Rhetoric and Reality organized by the same institute has pointed out among other things that “the Customs Union faces serious challenges, both transitional and structural in nature. It retains grey areas on complicated legal issues. In addition, each member state has different motives and priorities for economic integration.” It also has pointed out that Russia’s role in economic integration creates certain problems. Public opinion polls and a wave of anti-migrant protests in Moscow have revealed a gap between Russia’s foreign policy geared at the Eurasian Union and the public opinion in Russia, which prefers to keep the former imperial territories outside the country’s borders and outside its sphere of influence. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (the U.S.) published an analytical paper called “Ukraine’s Choice: European Association Agreement or Eurasian Union?”, which said that Ukraine would profit from the Association Agreement, while “conversely, the Customs Union market is smaller, technologically backward, less competitive, and does not offer Ukraine significant institutional benefits.” The authors wrote that Russia should finally admit that in view of its national interests it should not force other countries join the Customs Union, and further: “The United States and the European Union should defend Ukraine against Russian economic aggression in the WTO and through vocal and economic support.”

33 See: A. Libman, D. Ushkalova, “Foreign Trade Effects of the Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia,” Central Asia Economic Paper, No. 8, May 2013, The George Washington University, 6 pp. 34 See: J. Mankoff, “Eurasian Integration: The Next Stage,” Central Asia Policy Brief, No. 13, December 2013, The George Washington University, 8 pp. 35 See: A. Sivitskiy, Evraziyskaia integratsia v issledovaniiakh inostrannykh “fabrik mysli” za 2013 god, Minsk, TsSVI, 2014, 10 pp.

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The Carnegie Endowment has made its own contribution to the discussion. Its experts have pointed out that it is Russia’s first post-Soviet geopolitical alternative to other projects. There are clear economic, strategic, and humanitarian interests that call for serious integration efforts from Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors. This is a real and useful project even if of very modest dimensions so far. To become a power center it should accumulate a critical mass, yet its possible extension into Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia will not make it a strong power center in Eurasia. To become this, it needs Ukraine with its 46-million strong population and Uzbekistan with its 30 million citizens. Today, Ukraine is obviously more important: its economic, demographic, and cultural potential could have added weight to the Eurasian Union. The Brookings Institute (the U.S.) held a Round Table called The Future Course of the U.S.- Russia Relationship, which concentrated on the Eurasian Union, a Russian initiative. The participants concluded that the project stemmed from the idea of establishing a vast market, similar to the Soviet one. So far, the market is too small, while the project itself is senseless without Ukraine. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London looks at a different (security) aspect of the same project. Russia is actively working toward disrupting the EU policy and squashing the European dreams of the region’s population. What is said about Moscow’s intention to draw its neighbors into its sphere of influence and restore its Soviet-type domination is wrong. In fact, Russia is defending itself and merely responding to the moves of others; this means that a mutually acceptable compromise between Moscow and Brussels is impossible. China is also interested in Eurasian integration. Recently, the RISI published a research paper by Wang Shuchun, Director of the Law School, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (written in co-authorship with Wang Qingsong) about possible repercussions for the People’s Republic of China. The authors asked several questions: Why did Putin offer the project of European Integration? What are his real aims? What are the project’s prospects? How should China respond to Putin’s initiative? How will integration efforts in the post-Soviet space coordinate with China’s policies, its economic dimension in particular? What are its advantages and disadvantages as seen from China? The Chinese experts showed no enthusiasm; however they admitted that the EEU will force China to take the new geo-economic and geopolitical reality in Eurasia into account.36 It should be said that according to the experts from Kazakhstan, China received, through the CSO, a legitimate opportunity, approved by Russia and the Central Asian states, to operate in the post- Soviet space according to the rules not officially registered but accepted in the CIS. In other words, it can play on the contradictions among the Eurasian countries and influence the integration process.37 The Valdai International Discussion Club, along with the Center for Russian Studies at the East China Normal University in Shanghai, analyzed four dimensions of Eurasian integration—economic, political, social, and security—from the viewpoints of Russia, Central Asia, China, and the EU/U.S. There is an opinion that Eurasian integration is the first step toward a polycentric world order. Eur- asia, which remained on the margins of international relations after the latter half of the 20th century, is moving to the fore. The process of Eurasian integration created two big problems for Russia:  first, it must learn how to deal with economically and politically smaller and weaker countries as equals;  second, by drawing China and South Korea into integration, Russia might lose its leader status.

36 See: Wang Shuchun, Wan Qingsong, “Perspektivy evraziyskogo integratsionnogo proekta i ego posledstvia dlia Kitaia,” Problemy natsionalnoy strategii, No. 3, 2013, pp. 84-101. 37 See: K. Syroezhkin, “Evraziyskoe prostranstvo i kitaysky factor,” in: Integratsionnye protsessy v evraziyskom prostranstve i sovremenny mir, pp. 156-165.

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The Eurasian countries, potentially involved in integration, have their own fears: they are afraid of losing their sovereignty. China is treading cautiously in Central Asia lest it tramples on Russia’s interests there. Some of the Turkish think tanks are also interested in the Eurasian integration processes; the Turkish Academy of International Politics (Uluslararasi Politika Akademisi) points out in an article called “The Eurasian Union: Russian Hegemony Built Up in the Shadow Economic Integration” that Russia insists on a multipolar world and, together with China, is the main supporter of this idea, which will cast doubt on Euro-Atlantic hegemony. Each of the potential members of the Eurasian Union knows that it is joining an umbrella organization headed by Russia; this speaks volumes about its regional hegemony. The Eurasian Union is best described as an attempt to set up regional hegemony in the post-Soviet space in line with Russia’s global interests. Turkish nationalists from the National Security Council of Turkey (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) plan a Eurasian Union as an alliance with Russia and Iran. The Union’s future is doubtful; it is regarded as an attempt at integration that contradicts the global and regional interests of the EU and the United States in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin, as well as of China in Central Asia. Certain groups would like to see Turkey a member of the Eurasian Union, which is hardly feasible: it will cost Tur- key its EU membership prospects, as well as its involvement in the common EU market and in NATO. Its foreign policy trends will be changed, while the country will find itself in the Russian hegemony zone.

Conclusion

In the post-Soviet space, Eurasian integration is opposed by several very different groups: political groups in power demonstrating their loyalty to the so-called European values; new social groups, the product of the market economy; certain groups in the ruling elite, the product of their countries’ newly acquired independence; and Russia’s geopolitical rivals led by the United States (the latest events in Ukraine graphically show this). So far, there is no critical mass of supporters of the Eurasian Economic Union in the post-Sovi- et states. Our colleagues from the RISI have justly pointed out that, strange as it may seem, the ruling bodies of the new integration structure are partly responsible: the EEC is not transparent enough, while its decisions taken without adequate public discussion remain unexplained and unknown to the public, which makes them hardly legitimate in the eyes of the ordinary people. The Customs Union, which is already functioning, and the Eurasian Economic Union, which is taking shape, can be described as a new type of regional integration that presupposes much stricter financial and executive discipline, transfer of part of economic sovereignty to supranational managing structures, and adherence to common standards and regulations. This means that several of the CIS countries confronted with the need to make a very important choice are gripped by doubts and the need to weigh all the “pros” and “cons.” It should be said that not all the post-Soviet political elites have adequate ideas about the future—not a group or corporate future—but very specific prospects for their countries and nations. Indeed, the ruling circles of certain CIS countries drawn into the rivalry between the European and Eurasian integration projects are be- having like objects of global policy rather than independent actors.

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REGIONAL ECONOMIES

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK IN SOUTHERN EURASIA: IDENTITY-FRAMED COOPERATION OR CHANNEL FOR ARAB GULF INVESTMENT?

Dr. Bruno DE CORDIER Professor, Conflict Research Group and Department of Conflict and Development Studies, Ghent University (Ghent, Belgium)

ABSTRACT

his article examines the activities of Besides offering an analytical overview of the Islamic Development Bank in the regional activities of this rather little T Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the four known development institution, it discusses other Muslim majority states of southern Eur- how it is de facto a channel and way-opener asia, where the institution has been active, in for investment form the Arab and more par- a rather discreet but targeted way, in the ticularly the Arab Gulf sphere, and how its fields of transport, energy and water infra- presence fits into a trend among southern structure, finance and industrial develop- Eurasian governments and economic elites ment since about one and a half decades. to diversify sources of aid and investment.

KEYWORDS: development aid, alternative trade, Islamic Development Bank, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, South-South cooperation, Arab Gulf countries.

55 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Introduction

Unique among international development institutions in the sense that its membership and approaches are defined by faith and religious identity and as such challenge standard international development concepts, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB, al-bank al-islami’i li-t-tanmiya in Arabic) has, rather discreetly, been working in the southern Eurasian region since about one and a half decades now. This paper examines whether there is a pattern and interest base in its activities. It also looks into the question if the bank’s presence in the region fits into the fledgling diversification trend in aid donorship, in which aid actors, other than those from member states of the predominantly Western Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the multilateral institutions dominated by them, gain a growing space and role in southern Eurasia.1

The IDB Group and Southern Eurasia

The Islamic Development Bank was established by the finance ministers of the member states of the then Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, called Organization of Islamic Cooperation since 2011) in the wake of the oil boom in1973. It started its operations one and a half years later and gradually evolved into what the institution itself calls “a South-South multilateral development financing institution,” whose official purpose is to “foster the economic development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly, in accordance with the principles of Islamic law.”2 The IDB is a specialized institution under the OIC and is, together with the Islamic Solidarity Fund, one of the OIC’s subsidiaries, a key institution of the organization. It operates independently, yet its activities reflect the OIC’s development priorities. Member states or prospective member states of the IDB also have to be members or must adhere to the OIC too.3 The IDB has 56 shareholding member states that comprise states with secular as well as proclaimed Is- lamic and with republican as well as monarchic forms of government. It is quite unique in the sense that it is the only international financial institution and development bank whose membership and working principles are in the first place defined on confessional and cultural bases, and not by regional geography or by secular, neoliberal development dictates. Like several other international development banks, the Islamic Development Bank is a group of financial and developmental entities. Besides the Islamic Development Bank itself this group com- prises the Islamic Corporation for Insurance and Export Credit (ICIEC), the Islamic Corporation for Development of Private Sector (ICD), the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) and the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI). The first southern Eurasian countries to join the IDB group were Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, who did so in mid-1992 and late 1993, respectively. Turkmenistan followed in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996 and Uzbekistan in the fall of

1 This article was previously published in a different working form in the online Central Asia Economic Papers series of the Elliott School of International Affairs. 2 See: Islamic Development Bank, The Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief, IDB Economic Research and Policy Department, 1433 H. (2012), p. 1 and the IDB Portal, “About IDB” section, available at [www.isdb.org]. 3 One of the fundamental criteria for OIC membership besides being a recognized state by the U.N. is that if not a majority then or at least a significant portion of the state’s population adheres to the Islamic faith or is at least culturally associated with it. All southern Eurasian countries mentioned in this brief became OIC members in 1992 with the exception of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan which did so in the years 1995 and 1996, respectively.

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2003, seven years after it joined the OIC. In terms of group entity membership, as Table 1 shows, all southern Eurasian states are members of the IDB and the ICD with only Kazakhstan being member of ICIEC too. Besides this, one of the IDB’s four regional offices in the world is in Kazakhstan. This office was set up in 1997 and groups the six majority Muslim southern Eurasian countries plus, oddly perhaps, Albania.4 The IDB also has field representatives in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. This representation structure suggests that the region certainly has importance in the IDB’s long-term strategy.

Table 1 The Southern Eurasian States’ IDB Entity Memberships

IDB ICIEC ICD ITFC

Azerbaijan R R

Kazakhstan R R R

Kyrgyzstan R R

Tajikistan R R

Turkmenistan R R

Uzbekistan R R

S o u r c e: Islamic Development Bank, The Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief, IDB Economic Research and Policy Department, 1433 H. (2012), p. 17.

More Benefits than Input?

If we look at the IDB members’ capital shares in the group as they are shown in Graphic 1, we see that the six southern Eurasian economies’ joint capital share in the IDB totals a mere 0.35 percent, which is slightly more than individual share of Iraq in the IDB.5 As one can see, the whole capital structure of the group is clearly dominated by Saudi Arabia and the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC, a body which also groups other high-income Arab Gulf economies like Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman), who jointly hold more than 40 percent of the capital shares in the IDB group. One of the more determining initial motives of several if not most southern Eurasian governments to adhere to the IDB was the hope to attract economic investment from the Gulf for that matter. Interna- tional development structures, IDB and others, were also perceived as a way to continue the funding and maintenance of public infrastructure which was previously taken charge of by the Soviet state. There were, of course, other motives than practical and financial opportunism too. In some instances, like Azerbaijan, immediately after independence, the national-revivalist government that was in power back then had the genuine ideological will to strengthen ties with the wider Islamic sphere again. What certainly boosted further cooperation with the OIC and the IDB in this case was the OIC’s ex- plicit condemnation of the Armenian aggression and ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh.

4 There is an understandable rationale behind this, though. The six southern Eurasian states and Albania all experienced a form of Socialist-Communist societal transformation project and were largely cut off from the wider Muslim Ummah for decades. As such, they have if not a common then at least a similar development paradigm from the IDB’s point of view. 5 The breakdown per country of these 0.35 percent comes at 0.10 percent for Azerbaijan, 0.11 for Kazakhstan, 0.03 each for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and 0.05 percent for Kyrgyzstan.

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Graphic 1

The Capital Shareholders of the Islamic Development Bank in 2011 and the Position of the Southern Eurasian Member States therein

Saudi Others Arabia 26.31% 23.61%

IDB member states in southern Eurasia 0.35% Iran Egypt 8.28% 7.1%

Libya UAE 9.47% 5.81% Qatar Kuwait 7.21% Turkey 5.48% 6.48%

S o u r c e: Created by the author on the basis of data on the IDB portal [http://www.isdb.org] (membership section) and Islamic Development Bank, The Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief, IDB Economic Research and Policy Department, 1433 H. (2012), p. 4.

Between the start of its activities in the region and mid-2012 the value of IDB’s operations and investments in southern Eurasia officially amounted to $3.34 billion. This comes at 4.28 percent of the group’s total approved and implemented projects for the whole period between 1976 and 2011, which is almost equal to southern Eurasia’s population share in the wider IDB and OIC sphere. This is not a small portion considering the fact that the bank has only been active in southern Eurasia for not more than one and a half decades as compared to over twice that long in certain other parts of the world. It also means that the southern Eurasian states, three of which are classified as middle income and two as low income economies, get considerably more out of the IDB than its joint 0.35 percent in capital shares. In terms of country-level project and investment distribution, Graphic 2 shows that about one third of IDB’s activities and investments are concentrated in Azer- baijan alone. This is, in a way, not surprising since Azerbaijan is the region’s oldest IDB member. More importantly, together with Kazakhstan, which chaired the OIC in 2011, it is for IDB officially a “country of primary focus” whereas the other four are of secondary focus. Both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are emerging petro- and gas-states where important IDB economies have (or perceive to have) interests and opportunities in the energy sector and all sorts of economic activities connected to or derived from it. This also applies to Turkmenistan despite its different IDB focus ranking. As such, these three countries are well-served as compared to other southern Eurasia countries with 58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Graphic 2

Country-Level Distribution of Islamic Development Bank Investment in Southern Eurasia until mid-2012 ($m and % of total)

Uzbekistan 589.7 (17.9%)

Turkmenistan 637.6 (19%)

Tajikistan 212.4 (6%)

Kyrgyzstan 159 (4.7%)

Kazakhstan 695.1 (21%)

Azerbaijan 1.051 (31.4%)

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200

S o u r c e: Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Kazinform briefing, “IDB’s Operations in Central Asia Exceed $3.3 Billion,” 2012, available at [inform.kz].

similar or even considerably larger populations and lower income category.6 This is explainable though, for emerging petro states do not only have more investment opportunities but also theoreti- cally a stronger capability to repay loans. What is the significance of IDB activities as compared to other multilateral donor institutions and development banks that operate in southern Eurasia? Table 2 offers a concise comparative overview of the activities of a large donor institution from the OECD sphere (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the IDB group and a donor structure that is dominated by several oil-exporting key members of the IDB but also funded by a number of non-Islamic oil exporting countries (the OPEC Fund for International Development). The general official aid landscape in southern Eurasia is dominated by OECD donors, yet even if the IDB is not among southern Eurasia’s top development aid donors, one cannot say it is marginal either. It can be classified as a lower medium-sized donor. Its potential working space and scope, however, is likely larger yet politically stunted by several of the regions’ regimes’ active unease toward a perceived Arab-Islamic ideological design behind the IDB’s activities, a factor that partly explains Uzbekistan’s late adherence to the bank. Since the IDB’s headquarters are based in Saudi Arabia, a state which is at once the bank’s largest individual shareholder and donor, the bank is often perceived by officials and opinion makers to be a multilateral channel for Saudi aid and influence. Saudi Arabia, which holds two of the three holy cities of Islam—Mecca and Medina, the third, al-Quds or Jerusalem, being occupied by Israel—has never explicitly claimed the institutional leader-

6 Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, for example, have comparable populations yet while development and rehabilitation needs in Kyrgyzstan are also strong, Turkmenistan received five times more IDB investment. A similar situation exists between Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.

59 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 2

The Total Value of the Islamic Development Bank’s Activities in Southern Eurasia since the Start of Operations as Compared to Those of Other Development Banks and Funds ($m)

European Bank for OPEC Fund for Reconstruction and Islamic Development International Development Bank (IDB) Development (OFID) (EBRD)

Azerbaijan 6,600 1,051 44

Kazakhstan 11,000 695.1 —

Kyrgyzstan 886.1 159 23.98

Tajikistan 355.4 212.4 53.75

Turkmenistan 616.4 637.6 15.2

Uzbekistan 1,500 589.7 44.73

Total committed and disbursed since the start 20,957.9 3,344.8 181.66 of in-country operations

S o u r c e: Composed by the author on the basis of data from the Kazinform briefing, “IDB’s Operations in Central Asia Exceed $3.3 Billion” and the respective organizations’ portal sites and country briefings. ship of the Muslim Ummah, so as not to antagonize the Saudi monarchy’s Western patrons who historically helped it into power. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, Saudi Arabia has been playing a pioneering and leading role in different Islamic intergovernmental forums and institutions, like the OIC and the IDB, that act on behalf or for the sake of the Ummah.7 At the same time, stark social changes and the dysfunction of the classical secular ideologies confront the staunchly if not aggressively secular regimes and elites in southern Eurasia with an increasing identification with Islam and increasing religiosity in parts of their subject societies, a trend they either try to repress or accommodate it in a way they can still control. This translates in a strong distrust toward any real or perceived extraneous attempt to encourage or recuperate the new religiosity and, as such, undermine the rulers’ legitimacy. Another reality that weights on the cooperation at times is the sharp contrast between the policies of key IDB members and of the OIC toward Israel and the active diplomatic, economic and security ties that some of the regimes in southern Eurasia (especially Azerbaijan, Uz- bekistan and Kazakhstan) have with that entity.

The Contours of South-South Trade

If we look at the sort of projects the IDB group funded or participated in in southern Eurasia between 1999 and 2011, we see that of the 90 implemented or approved IDB projects in the region

7 See: R. Upadhyay, “The Saudi Monarchy: Against the Revival of the Caliphate?,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 3935, 2010; Kh. al-Yahya, N. Fustier, “Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization,” GPPI Research Paper No. 14, 2011.

60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 during that period, 45 were projects in the field of transport, energy and irrigation infrastructure, 23 were in the development of the financial sector, 13 in social infrastructure of which half are in health care and half in education, 3 in industrial development and more specifically the textile and natural gas sectors, 4 in institutional development and finally 2 of various or overlapping category.8 This came at a total investment or commitment of $2.36 billion for this documented period during which about two-thirds of total IDB investment in southern Eurasia took place. Sector-wise, it was distrib- uted as in Graphic 3. The IDB’s emphasis in southern Eurasia is thus clearly set on, first, transport, energy and irrigation infrastructure and, second, on the financial sector. Both seem to be in line with the IDB’s priority to boost intra-OIC and South-South trade and, in that respect, improve transport links between the Gulf, Iran and the Chinese oil and gas market through southern Eurasia. The IDB’s participation with soft loans and a number of Sharia-compliant financing instruments in the construction of the Caspian railroad between the Kazakh region of Mangistau and Iran, and in the construction

Graphic 3

The Sector-Wide Distribution of IDB Investments and Activities in Southern Eurasia for the Period 1999-2011 ($m and % of total)

46.63 1.07 (2%) (0.04%) 78.11 115.47 (3%) (5%)

260.88 Transport, (11%) energy and water infrastructure

Financial sector Health care Education Industry Others

1,863.97 (78.96%)

S o u r c e: Graphic created by the author on the basis of data provided in the IDB Annual Reports from the year 1420 H. (1999) to 1432 H. (2011), IDB External Relations and Internal Communications Department. of a motorway between Murgab and the Kulma pass on the Tajik-Chinese border, to name but two examples, fit into this design.

8 Detailed project lists can be found in all annual reports of the Islamic Development Bank from the year 1420 to 1432 H. (1999 to 2011). These were used by the author to make this summary.

61 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Likewise, not a few transport projects funded or co-funded by the IDB group are aimed at the rehabilitation of road connections inside the southern Eurasian region itself. This line of activity and investment focus is determined by the nature of intra-IDB trade in the region. As Graphic 4 shows, the respective economies’ share of trade with other IDB and OIC member states ranges from an average of 8.7 to 40.1 percent over the said period and is, as such, considerable. One immediately has to keep in mind though that the bulk of this is trade with the other IDB member countries in southern Eurasia itself and with Turkey. This being said, emerging Eurasian petro-states like Azerbaijan and

Graphic 4

The Evolution of the Share of Trade between Southern Eurasia and the IDB Region between 2000 and 2010 (% of total foreign trade)

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan regional average

S o u r c e: Created by the author on the basis of data in the country profiles of the Islamic Center for the Development of Trade (ICDT) under the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

Kazakhstan increasingly trade with the Gulf countries too in the spheres of energy and banking, yet this trade segment does not as yet characterizes or modifies the dominant regional foreign trade patterns. An important economic and psychological tie between a number of core and peripheral IDB countries is labor migration as is the case, for instance, with Egypt, Pakistan and the Gulf. The southern Eurasian economies and societies are characterized by extensive labor migration and a remittance economy too. In 2009, it involved an average of 12.7 percent of the region’s population and brought in an estimated one-tenth to one-third of the gross national product of the economies concerned.9 The large majority of this economic migration, however, is not oriented toward the Gulf but is headed

9 For a more detailed overview, see: J. Kuddusov, Vliianie mirovogo finansovogo krizisa na trudovykh migrantov iz Tadzhikistana: mnenie migrantov, International Labor Organization Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Moscow, and Ministry of Labor of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 2009, Table 2, p. 5.

62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 toward Russia or happens within the southern Eurasian region itself, more specifically between the provinces and urban growth areas.10 Along with the integration of the southern Eurasian energy sector in the world economy, labor migration and the formation of a remittance economy did create widespread demand for stable financial services. This set the framework for the IDB’s second emphasis: the development and improvement of the banking sector. Besides the delivery of classical “technical assistance,” the bank and its subsidiaries have been promoting Islamic banking methods since 2003 yet increasingly do so since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. The latter historical turning point is seen as an opportunity to promote alternatives to banking practices considered to be at the cause of the crisis and, as such, expand the market for services and expertise from core IDB economies. This activity clearly fits into the priority to enhance intra-OIC trade too. While transport and energy infrastructure does not has an immediate confessional connotation, activities like support to Is- lamic banking and the construction and equipment of a laboratory for halal food certification, for example, do, at least if one defines faith-related development activities as something wider than building mosques, paying the salaries of clerics and sending copies of the Quran and Islamic lit- erature in the regional languages. Such projects are both compatible with the IDB’s ideological basis and goals and respond to a growing niche demand in southern Eurasia’s majority Muslim societies or Muslim communities. In terms of humanitarian aid from either the IDB group itself or from the IDB region, the IDB funded a number of education and health care facilities in settlements of internally displaced persons from Nagorno-Karabakh during the said period. But humanitarian aid is not part of the group’s core business. During and after the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (1988-1994) and the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), which are the largest complex political emergencies that southern Eurasia had so far, IDB member states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran delivered certain quantities of bilateral humanitarian aid, yet this was not done under any IDB mandate. Both conflicts were less on the mental map in the wider IDB sphere than what happened, at about the same time, with the Muslims in the former Yugoslavia or Darfur today, for instance. They did result, however, in the presence up to this day of semi-governmental relief organizations like the Saudi al-Igata—better known as the Interna- tional Islamic Relief Organization—and the Iranian Imdad in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. In Azerbai- jan, the activities of both al-Igata and the Imdad remain rather tuned-down due to official unease with their real and perceived political activities, whereas in Tajikistan, Iran’s Imdad is discreetly yet actively involved in a whole range of charitable and social activities.

Conclusion: The Twist of Aid Conditionality?

The IDB’s approach has its merits in the sense that it focuses on specific projects in vital sectors. In terms of modus operandi and impact of the IDB, critics in the region with whom the author spoke stressed the bank’s weak monitoring mechanisms and the fact that most project identification and implementation is done on the basis of partnerships with government ministries, state agencies and with companies controlled by members of local power elites. There is regionally much less cooperation through Islamic civil society which, in southern Eurasia, is still in a

10 Niche business migration and financial interaction between southern Eurasia and the UAE and especially Dubai has put the latter on the region’s mental and economic map though.

63 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS process of formation, little institutionalized or ideologically not inclined to cooperate with international structures that are seen by part of local opinion to be supportive or co-opted by the regimes. As the case with other multilateral donor structures, the emphasis on activity implementation through official structures is not only a consequence of the IDB group’s intergovernmental character. It also sets the stage for a permanent negotiation process on the space for the donors’ presence in the country. This unavoidably involves elite favors. The IDB’s move to grant $25.67 million in soft loans between 2005 and 2009 for the rehabilitation of the hospital and the irrigation network in the Tajik district of Dangara, for instance, was, shall we say, “likely” as much driven by the infrastructural needs in that area as by its peculiarity of being the place of origin and power base of the country’s president. Such compromises are a necessity for a structure like IDB to ensure continuity in its presence given the suspicions and perceptions that exist in official circles as well as wider secular opinion about an underlying ideological agenda. As mentioned earlier, the six GCC economies hold 40 percent of the IDB’s capital. If we add the shares of Libya, Egypt and the minor Arab IDB shareholders the total share of capital from Arab economies in the IDB group amounts to more that 60 percent, while their population represents 16.8 percent of that of the IDB’s and OIC’s total. As such, the IDB is primarily a channel and a way-opener for Arab and in particular Arab Gulf investment in southern Eurasia, more so than it serves as an ideological vehicle.11 This does not mean however that a number of activities do not come within a clear confessional ideological framework, in the first place the promotion of Islamic banking and halal food production. The latter certainly fit into a regional market niche as a growing part of the population or, at least, certain sectors of society, increasingly identify or re-identify with Islam. Other spheres in which different economic actors from the Arab Gulf manifested themselves include support infrastructure for the oil and gas sector and also solar and other renewable energy. And finally, and not in the least if we recall the sharp increase in food commodity prices during the food crisis of 2007 and 2008, there are the opportunities for land and agro-commodity acquisition by investment holdings and agro-industrial companies from the Arab Gulf, especially but not exclusively in Kazakhstan which has become a grain exporter again.12 Contrary to part of the aid from the predominantly Western OECD sphere, IDB aid and investments come with little to no conditionality in terms of democratic reforms. In that respect, for the southern Eurasian regimes, adherence to and cooperation with the IDB is still less a matter of pan-Islamic solidarity than it is part of a move to diversify sources of aid and investment, not with the purpose to replace those from the OECD sphere but to be more able to challenge the latter’s conditionality.

11 The IDB’s de facto capacity as a channel for Arab investment becomes clearer when one takes into account the reality that large non-Arab IDB states like Turkey and Iran have a substantive economic presence in southern Eurasia outside of the IDB structures. Turkey and Iran also play a central role in another, regionally defined development bank: the Economic Cooperation Organization Trade and Development Bank (ECOTDB). 12 See: E. Woertz, S. Pradhan, N. Biberovic, Ch. Jingzhong, Potential for GCC Agro-investments in Africa and Central Asia, Gulf Research Centre: GRC Report, 2008, pp. 6-7. In spring 2014, the IDB pledged $2 billion of multisectoral support to Kazakhstan for the 2015-2017 period, including to Kazakhstan’s initiative to create the Islamic Organization for Food Se- curity (IOFS) under the OIC. The IOFS is to be headquartered in Astana.

64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 KYRGYZSTAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL RATINGS (Dynamics for 2005-2013)

Talant SULTANOV Director of the National Institute of Strategic Research, Kyrgyzstan (NISR) (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Bermet IMANALIEVA Researcher at NISR (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Isabek ASANBAEV Researcher at NISR (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

ABSTRACT

his article presents an analysis of the Kyrgyzstan’s National Sustainable Develop- changes in Kyrgyzstan’s international ment Strategy for 2013-2017, in which the T ratings between 2005 and 2013. It country should occupy a specific rank by also takes a look at the ratings pegged in 2017.

KEYWORDS: international rating, index, development, indicators, investment climate, Kyrgyzstan.

Introduction

In today’s world, international ratings are used to determine a country’s level of external appeal and development, while also defining its investment potential and reputation. This article examines Kyrgyzstan’s rank in various international ratings in order to assess its ability to achieve sustainable development (in the long and short term), as well as improve its image and external appeal. In so doing, efforts were focused on determining the relationship between the progress reflected in the dynamics of its rankings and the policy carried out by the country’s government. The ratings are calculated and compiled by such international organizations as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, Swiss Economic Institute, The Heritage Foundation, the U.N., UNDP, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), the European Institute of Business and Administration, the International Food Policy Re- search Institute, the Reporters Sans Frontières International Human Rights Organization, the Stock- 65 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS holm International Peace Research Institute, Economist Intelligence Unit, the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Save the Children Fund (Great Britain), the International Telecommunication Union, International Road Federation, and so on. The analysis we conducted was methodologically based on periodic reports by international organizations that publish the research results for each rating. A comprehensive approach, statistical analysis of the data, and correlation method were used to examine Kyrgyzstan’s rank in 43 world ratings in such main areas as the economy, politics, agriculture, education and innovations, health, society, the environment, technology, and so on. Percentiles (measure of sample or distribution data) of the ranks Kyrgyzstan occupies were used for conducting the comparative analysis and compiling the graphs. We will note that the percentile values make it easier to compare the international ratings of countries.

How Ratings are Calculated

Every rating consists of certain indicators, the combined scores of which determine the country’s rank in it. A popular rating is the Happy Planet Index offered by the New Economics Foundation (NEF) in July 2006. It reflects the real prosperity of people and state of the environment in different countries of the world; it can be used to understand how international indexes are calculated. The Happy Planet Index is based on general utilitarian principles implying that most people want to live long and happy lives, while governments try to do everything possible to achieve the maximum prosperity of their citizens, making rational use of the available resources and not causing detriment to the environment. Three indicators are used to calculate this index: experienced well- being, life expectancy, and Ecological Footprint (see the figure).

Figure

Kyrgyzstan’s Rating according to the Happy Planet Index for 2012

Experienced well-being 5.0

Total Happy Planet score 49.1

Life Ecological expectancy Footprint 67.7 1.3

66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Data on experienced well-being is based on the results of a Gallup poll, in which around 1,000 people aged 15 or older from each country included in the Happy Planet Index participated. Ecological Footprint is a standardized measure that graphically illustrates human consumption of the Earth’s resources; it is widely used by NGOs, the U.N., and the governments of several countries. Ecological Footprint represents the amount of biologically productive land and sea area necessary to supply the resources a human population of a given country consumes. When calculating the components of the Happy Planet Index, the analysts of Britain’s NEF research center gave Kyrgyzstan 5 scores out of a possible ten for experienced well-being; this is a little lower than the average world indicators (5.28). According to the data of the center’s analysts, life expectancy in Kyrgyzstan amounts to 67.7 years; in terms of this indicator, it occupies 103rd place among the 151 countries assessed. This figure is lower than all the countries analyzed (69.9), but higher than in India (65.4). Kyrgyzstan’s ranking for the Ecological Footprint indicator of the Happy Planet Index amounted to 1.29 global ha per capita. As the calculators note, if every person on the planet had the Eco- logical Footprint of an average citizen of Kyrgyzstan, the world could develop freely in sustainable ecological limits. Thus, Kyrgyzstan’s average for the three Happy Planet indicators amounted to 49.1 scores, ranking 38th among the 151 countries and placing it among the top 25% of countries with the best indicators.

Kyrgyzstan’s Current Ranking in the International Ratings

An analysis to identify the country’s current ranking in such areas as the economy, politics, agriculture, innovations in education, health, society, the environment, and technology showed that today Kyrgyzstan has good ranks in 14 of the 43 ratings and is among the top 50% of countries with the best indicators: 1. The Global Hunger Index is a multidimensional statistical tool used to describe the state of countries’ hunger situation. It measures progress and failures in the global fight against hunger. In this rating, Kyrgyzstan ranks 9th among 187 countries. 2. Protecting Investors measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against direc- tors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. Kyrgyzstan ranks 13th among 185 countries. 3. The Environmental Performance Index is a method of quantifying and numerically marking the environmental performance of a state’s policies developed by the South Pacific Com- mission and the U.N. Environmental Protection Program, etc. Kyrgyzstan ranks 26th among 234 countries and territories. 4. The Literacy Rate Index reflects the percentage of the population who can read and write. The figures represent a mixture of data collected by the CIA World Factbook, and national self-reported data. Kyrgyzstan ranks 40th among the 176 countries on this list. 5. The Happy Planet Index reflects people’s well-being and the state of the environment in different countries of the world. Kyrgyzstan ranks 38th among 151 countries. 6. The Contract Performance Security Index ranks the efficiency of contract performance and the judicial system by examining the progress of a commercial dispute on commodity quality and following the amount of time, expenses, and number of procedures involved be- 67 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

tween the time a complaint is filed in court and compensation is received. In this rating, Kyrgyzstan is in 47th place among 185 countries. 7. The Inward FDI Performance Index shows the ratio of the country’s share in the global flows of foreign direct investments to its share in global GDP. Kyrgyzstan ranks 36th out of 141 countries. 8. The Ethnic and Cultural Diversity Level calculates the likelihood that two people from the same country are not representatives of the same group of its population (ethnic, religious, or any other). Kyrgyzstan ranks 42nd in terms of level of ethnic diversity among 159 countries. 9. The Education Index is calculated on the basis of the average and anticipated duration of school education. Kyrgyzstan ranks 50th among 181 countries. 10. The Ease of Doing Business Index is developed by the World Bank. High indicators point to the better (usually more simple) regulations for businesses and stronger protection of property rights. Kyrgyzstan ranks 70th among 189 countries. 11. The Sustainable Society Index measures the achievements of the world’s countries and separate regions from the viewpoint of sustainability of social development. Kyrgyzstan ranks 59th among 151 countries. 12. The Global Gender Gap Index was developed by the World Economic Forum to track gender-based disparities in the world’s countries and their progress over time based on generally available statistics in socioeconomic development. In this rating, Kyrgyzstan ranks 54th among 134 countries. 13. The KOF Index of Globalization is positioned as a combined index that makes it possible to assess the degree of a country’s integration into the global arena and compare different countries according to its components. In terms of globalization level, Kyrgyzstan ranks 88th among 208 countries. 14. Rating of Largest Producing Countries of Agricultural Commodities. The production and consumption of agricultural produce have diverse geographical distribution. Along with climate and corresponding types of flora, the level of a country’s economic development has a serious influence on its volumes. Kyrgyzstan ranks 34th among the 69 countries assessed. In the other 29 ratings, Kyrgyzstan has average and poor results and is among the bottom half of countries with corresponding indices: 15. The Index of Economic Freedom’s definition is “the highest form of economic freedom provides an absolute right of property ownership, fully realized freedoms of movement for labor, capital, and goods, and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself.” Kyr- gyzstan ranks 89th among 177 countries. 16. The Child Development Index is an index combining performance measures specific to children—education, health, and nutrition—to produce a score on a scale of 0 to 100. Kyr- gyzstan ranks 69th among 134 countries. 17. The Economic Complexity Index aims to explain an economic system as a whole rather than the sum of its parts. It is based on the knowledge accumulated during the development of social production and is an attempt to synthesize society’s collective knowledge. Kyrgyz- stan ranks 69th among 128 countries. 68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

18. The Worldwide Press Freedom Index reflects the degree of freedom that journalists, news organizations, and netizens enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. In terms of freedom of the press, Kyrgyzstan ranks 109th among 179 countries. 19. The Legatum Prosperity Index measures the achievements of the world’s counties in terms of well-being and prosperity. In this index, Kyrgyzstan ranks 89th among 142 countries. 20. The Democracy Index is based on a rating according to 60 indicators grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. Kyrgyzstan ranks 106th among 167 countries. 21. The Inward FDI Potential Index reflects the capabilities of the receiving country with respect to other countries. Kyrgyzstan ranks 90th among 141 countries. 22. The Child Mortality Rate is based on the child mortality index under the age of 5. Kyrgyz- stan holds 125th place among 193 countries. 23. The Number of Road Motor Vehicles per 1,000 Inhabitants. This index takes account of all commercial cars, land rovers, micro buses, and transportation vehicles (motorcycles and other two-wheeled vehicles are not counted). In terms of number of road motor vehicles, Kyrgyzstan ranks 120th among 183 countries. 24. The Composite Index of National Capability uses the average percentage of six different world indicators reflecting demographic, economic and military might. In terms of these indicators, Kyrgyzstan ranks 128th among 193 countries. 25. The Number of Broadband Internet Subscribers Rating refers to high-speed fixed (wired) access to the public Internet (TCP/IP) at downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. Kyrgyzstan is in 124th place among 186 countries on this list. 26. The Inequality-adjusted Life Expectancy at Birth Index is the average level of human development in society, accounting for inequality. The greater the difference between the Inequality-adjusted Life Expectancy at Birth Index and the Human Development Index, the greater the inequality. This index is a component of the Human Development Index, accounting for inequality; the rating for specific components is not compiled or published. Kyrgyzstan ranks 125th among 187 countries. 27. The Human Development Index is a composite statistic calculated annually for making a country-by-country comparison and measuring the standard of living, literacy, education, and life expectancy as the main characteristics of human development in the territory being studied. It is a standard tool for carrying out an overall comparison of the standard of living in different countries and regions. The index is published under the UNDP in Human De- velopment Reports. Kyrgyzstan ranks 125th among 187 countries. 28. The Global Innovation Index is a composite indicator that ranks a country’s innovation level developed jointly by the Boston Consulting Group, the National Association of Man- ufacturers, and the Manufacturing Institute affiliated with it, which is an independent scientific research center. Kyrgyzstan ranks 81st among 110 countries in terms of this index. 29. The Military Expenditures Index. It is compiled keeping in mind the amounts spent in a year. In terms of military expenditures, Kyrgyzstan ranks 109th among 155 countries. 30. The Gini Coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation’s residents. This is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It is used in countries with a developed market economy and is compiled on the basis of U.N., WB, CIA, and OECD data. Kyrgyzstan ranks 96th among 136 countries. 69 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

31. The Global Innovation Index of the European Institute of Business Administration is an annual publication that contains, in particular, a composite indicator that ranks a country/ economy with respect to favorable conditions for conducting innovation activity. Kyrgyz- stan ranks 131st among 142 countries. 32. The Environmental Performance Index is a global study and its rating of the world’s countries in terms of environmental load and rational use of natural resources. Kyrgyzstan ranks 101th among 132 countries. 33. The Failed States Index assesses a state’s vulnerability to control over territorial integrity, as well as over the demographic, political, and economic situation in the country. Kyrgyz- stan ranks 41st among 177 countries. 34. The Global Terrorism Index is a composite study that benchmarks the level of terrorist activity and shows which countries of the world are encountering a terrorist threat and to what extent. Kyrgyzstan ranks 92nd among 116 countries. 35. R&D Expenditures. These are current and capital expenditures (both state and private) on creative work done to systematically raise the level of knowledge (including human, cultural, and social knowledge), as well as its application in different spheres of human life. Kyrgyzstan ranks 74th among 91 countries in this area. 36. The Global Peace Index measures the level of violence in a state and aggressiveness of its foreign policy. Kyrgyzstan ranks 131st among 158 countries in this index. 37. The Global Enabling Trade Index is used to compile the rating of countries worldwide in terms of their engagement in international trade. Kyrgyzstan holds 111st place among 132 countries. 38. The Global Competitiveness Index is a study and accompanying rating of the world’s countries in terms of their economic competitiveness (i.e. the ability of a country and its institutions to ensure stable economic growth rates that would be sustainable in the mid-term perspective) according to the version of the World Economic Forum. Kyrgyzstan ranks 127th among 144 countries. 39. The Corruption Perceptions Index measures the perceived level of corruption (frequency and/or amount of bribes) in the state and economic sectors of countries. Kyrgyzstan ranks 154th among 174 countries. 40. The Tax Rate Index makes it possible to assess the tax systems of countries worldwide; the study is carried out using a provisional small or medium business company. It examines the tax and mandatory deductions that it must pay or withhold in a given year. In terms of tax payments, Kyrgyzstan ranks 168th among 185 countries. 41. The Quality of Life Index measures the achievements of the world’s countries and separate regions with respect to their ability to provide their residents with a good life. In this rating, Kyrgyzstan ranks 103rd among 197 countries. 42. Trading across Borders examines the procedural requirements for export and import of cargoes of standardized goods. Kyrgyzstan is in 174th place among 185 countries. 43. Program for International Student Assessment is a test that assesses the literacy of school children in different countries of the world and their ability to apply the knowledge they acquire in practice. Here Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the worst ranking, taking 65th place among 65 countries.

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Program for International Student Assessment Student International for Program

Trading across Borders across Trading The Quality of Life Index Life of Quality The

Diagram The Tax Rate Index Rate Tax The

The Corruption Perceptions Index Perceptions Corruption The

The Global Competitiveness Index Competitiveness Global The

The Global Enabling Trade Index Trade Enabling Global The

The Global Peace Index Peace Global The

R&D Expenditures R&D

The Global Terrorism Index Terrorism Global The

The Failed States Index States Failed The

The Environmental Performance Index Performance Environmental The

The Global Innovation Index of the EIBA the of Index Innovation Global The

The Gini Coefficient Gini The

The Military Expenditures Index Index Expenditures Military The

Index BCG Index Innovation Global The

The Human Development Index Development Human The

The Inequality-adjusted Life Expectancy at Birth Index Birth at Expectancy Life Inequality-adjusted The

The Number of Broadband Internet Subscribers Rating Subscribers Internet Broadband of Number The

The Composite Index of National Capability National of Index Composite The

The Number of Road Motor Vehicles per 1,000 Inhabitants 1,000 per Vehicles Motor Road of Number The

The Child Mortality Rate Mortality Child The

The Inward FDI Potential Index Potential FDI Inward The

The Democracy Index Democracy The

The Legatum Prosperity Index Prosperity Legatum The

The Worldwide Press Freedom Index Freedom Press Worldwide The

The Economic Complexity Index Complexity Economic The

The Child Development Index Development Child The

The Index of Economic Freedom Economic of Index The

Rating of Largest Producing Countries of Agricultural Commodities Agricultural of Countries Producing Largest of Rating

The KOF Index of Globalization of Index KOF The

The Global Gender Gap Index Gap Gender Global The The Sustainable Society Index Society Sustainable The

Kyrgyzstan’s Current Ranking in International Ratings

The Ease of Doing Business Index Business Doing of Ease The

The Education Index Education The

The Ethnic and Cultural Diversity Level Diversity Cultural and Ethnic The

The Inward FDI Performance Index Performance FDI Inward The

The Contract Performance Security Index Security Performance Contract The

The Happy Planet Index Planet Happy The

The Literacy Rate Index Rate Literacy The

The Environmental Performance Index Performance Environmental The

Protecting Investors Protecting The Global Hunger Index Hunger Global The 0.00% 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 100.00%

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An analysis of the above ratings showed that Kyrgyzstan achieved the best indicators in the following international ratings: 1. The Global Hunger Index — 9th place among 187 countries (2012) and in the top 5% of countries with the best indicators. 2. Protecting Investors — 13th place among 185 countries (2012) and in the top 7% of countries with the best indicators. 3. The Environmental Performance Index — 26th place among 234 countries and in the top 11% of countries with the best indicators. 4. Literacy Rate Index — 40th place among 176 countries and in the top 23% of countries with the best indicators. 5. The Happy Planet Index — 38th place among 151 countries (2011) and in the top 25% of countries with the best indicators. Now we will give a list of Kyrgyzstan’s five worst indicators: 1. Program for International Student Assessment — last place among 65 countries (2009). 2. The Global Enabling Trade Index — 174th place out of 185 countries and in the bottom 6% of countries with the worst indicators (2012). 3. The Quality of Life Index — 103rd place among 197 countries and in the bottom 7% of countries with the worst indicators. 4. The Global Innovation Index of the European — 131th place out of 142 countries and in Institute of Business Administration the bottom 8% of countries with low indicators. 5. The Tax Rate Index — 168th place among 185 countries and in the bottom 9% of countries with the worst indicators (2012).

Dynamics of Change in Kyrgyzstan’s Rankings between 2005 and 2013

Between 2005 and 2013, the dynamics of change in Kyrgyzstan’s ranking in the international ratings fluctuated. They were influenced by such factors as the reforms conducted in the economic, political, and social spheres, the internal political processes in the form of the March and April revo- lutions (which took place in 2005 and 2010, respectively), and so on. 72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Dynamics for 2005-2010

When identifying the dynamics of Kyrgyzstan’s ranking in the international ratings, the difference between the indicators for 2005 and 2010 was calculated. As already noted above, both of these years were marked by political instability that led to significant changes in the country. Between 2005 and 2010, Kyrgyzstan achieved perceptible improvement of its rank in three ratings, i.e. the FDI, Ease of Doing Business, and Environmental Performance indices. For example, between 2005 and 2010, the Inward FDI Performance Index improved by 42, Ease of Doing Business by 26, and the Environmental Performance Index by 12 percentage points. A perceptible deterioration in Kyrgyzstan’s rankings (for the same period) was observed in three indices: the Happy Planet Index dropped by 28, Freedom of the Press by 27, and Corruption Perceptions by 20 percentage points.

Dynamics between 2010 and 2013

In our view, the changes in the ruling regime and the policy conducted by the authorities in the main social spheres had an effect on the change in Kyrgyzstan’s rankings between 2010 and 2013 (in the same way as between 2005 and 2010). Between 2010 and 2013, there was a perceptible change in three indices: the Child Develop- ment Index increased by 51, the Worldwide Press Freedom Index by 28, and the Happy Planet Index by 15 percentage points. A perceptible drop in this period was seen in three indices: the Global Innovation Index of the Boston Consulting Group by 35, the Global Innovation Index of the European Institute of Business Administration by 35, and the Environmental Performance Index by 28 percentage points.

Goals of Kyrgyzstan’s National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2013-2017

The April events of 2010 that compelled Kyrgyzstan to adopt a new Constitution made it necessary to develop a new vision of the main vectors and priorities of the state’s activity. This led to the approval of a National Sustainable Development Strategy (NSDS) for 2013-2017 by a Kyrgyz presidential decree on 21 January, 2013. This document is to be an indicator of state development and “show how the government and society are moving in unison toward building a new country.”1 One of the main goals of the National Sustainable Development Strategy is for Kyrgyzstan to become a developed country with a high level of education, healthy environment, internal stability, favorable international image, sustainable economic growth, and high investment appeal. The ranks the country occupies in the international ratings can serve as indicators of the degree to which it has achieved the set strategic goals. For example, improving Kyrgyzstan’s rank (by 2017) in the enabling trade, economic freedom, and corruption perceptions indices, as well as in the ease of doing business index, is one of the specific goals designated in the NSDS. Another goal is to achieve a certain level of per capita GDP.

1 National Sustainable Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2013-2017. Approved by Decree No. 11 of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic of 21 January, 2013.

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Let’s take a look at each of the above-mentioned ratings. 1. The Ease of Doing Business Index. According to the NSDS, Kyrgyzstan should become one of the top thirty countries with the best indicators. However, the data published in 2012 show that Kyrgyzstan occupied 70th place among 189 countries in this rating and was among the top 38% of countries. It should be noted that Kyrgyzstan’s indicators have been fluctuating up and down at different times. 2. The Global Enabling Trade Index. In this index, Kyrgyzstan plans to rank no lower than 60th. According to the last studies (2012), Kyrgyzstan occupies 111st place among 132 countries. This shows that it is among the bottom 15% of countries with the worst indicators. Moreover, an analysis of Kyrgyzstan’s position in this index over the past few years shows static dynamics. 3. The Economic Freedom Index. The NSDS aims to ensure that the country ranks no lower than 40th in this index. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan ranked 89th among 177 countries in this rating and was among the bottom 49.7% of countries. The dynamics of Kyrgyzstan’s economic freedom index have remained relatively unchanged. 4. The Corruption Perceptions Index. Kyrgyzstan is planning to be among the first 50 countries in this index by 2017. In 2012, Kyrgyzstan was among the bottom 11.5% of countries with the worst indicators and occupied 154th place among 174 countries. However, the dynamics of the corruption perceptions index are showing some signs of improvement. 5. Per capita GDP. The NSDS aims to achieve a per capita GDP equal to $2,500 by 2017. In turn, the indicators for the previous years make it possible to forecast that in 2017 the per capita GDP will amount to $1,600, that is, $900 lower than the desired level.

Ways to Improve the Ranks in the Main Ratings

After adopting the NSDS, the Kyrgyz government began implementing it, hoping in particular for an increase in the country’s external appeal and improvement in the indicators in the four above- mentioned ratings. In keeping with this, a Program Implementation Plan for Kyrgyzstan’s Transition to Sustainable Development for 2013-2017 was developed and approved. As early as 2013, systemic work on implementing the NSDS produced certain results. For example, that year Kyrgyzstan improved its rating in the following indexes: Ease of Doing Business by 2 ranks, Resolving Insolvency by 23 ranks (from 155 to 132), the Economic Freedom Index by 4 ranks (from 89 to 85), the Worldwide Press Freedom Index by 9 ranks (from 106 to 97), the Corruption Perceptions Index by 4 ranks (from 154 to 150), the Global Competitiveness Index by 6 ranks (from 127 to 121), and the Legatum Prosperity Index by 9 ranks (from 89 to 80). The improvement in Kyrgyzstan’s ranks in the above-mentioned ratings promoted an improvement in the country’s investment climate and business environment. As a result, the amount of investments in basic assets by means of all sources of financing increased by 2.3%. Carrying out reforms aimed at simplifying the procedures for opening businesses and creating favorable conditions for conducting international trade and liberalizing bankruptcy legislation made it possible for Kyrgyzstan to improve its ranks in the Ease of Doing Business Index and move up from 70th to 68th place. According to the research, in terms of ease of doing business, Kyrgyzstan ranks 12th in the world. This result was produced by implementing a project to introduce an automated registration 74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 system for legal entities according to the so-called one stop principle. This made it possible to short- en, simplify, and make less expensive the procedures necessary for registering a legal entity. As for the Corruption Perceptions Index, in our opinion, Kyrgyzstan was able to move up four places in 2013 due to the comprehensive efforts made by the country’s president Almazbek Atambaev to intercept corruption. For example, on 12 November, 2013, he signed a Decree on Measures to Eliminate the Reasons for Political and Systemic Corruption in Government Bodies. In addition, soon after he came to power, Atambaev issued decrees On the Formation of an Anti- corruption Service in the Kyrgyz Republic State National Security Committee (of 14 December, 2011, No. 27) and On the Kyrgyz Republic State Anticorruption Policy Strategy and Measures to Combat Corruption (of 2 February, 2012, No. 26). He also signed a Decision of the KR Defense Council on Measures to Combat Corruption in Society (of 2 February, 2012). The Corruption Perceptions Index formed by Transparency International was used as the reference point for implementing these documents. It should be noted that Kyrgyzstan has already taken the first steps to combat corruption: corresponding organizational measures have been adopted, law-enforcement agencies have become more active, and renewal of the legislation base has begun. In 2012, criminal cases to bring representatives of the highest government and administration bodies to account for corruption were instigated for the first time. The anticorruption struggle has also affected the judicial system; ten judges from local courts, including two court representatives, were removed from their posts.2 According to the assessments of experts from the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economics, the rise in the country’s ranking in the Global Competitiveness Index was promoted by the reforms to stabilize the macroeconomic environment, optimize state institutions, and improve the quality of infrastructure by building new and restoring existing motor roads. Reforms in the social sector also play a significant role in this. Moreover, the reforms being carried out in Kyrgyzstan in bankruptcy legislation envisage ra- tionalization and optimization of demands on administrators and promote a significant improvement in the country’s indicators in the resolving insolvency rating. So, according to the research carried out using the Doing Business methodology, resolving insolvency problems in Kyrgyzstan will take four years and cost 15% of an enterprise’s assets. All the same, despite the low positive dynamics, a deeper analysis of the components of the indices and ratings accompanying them is required to achieve the high goals designated in Kyrgyzstan’s NSDS for 2013-2017. This also requires identifying the reasons for the low indicators and developing comprehensive measures to improve them. Per capita GDP growth rates must also be accelerated.

Recommendations for Improving Kyrgyzstan’s Rankings in the International Ratings

According to the results of the study carried out by experts of the Kyrgyz National Institute of Strategic Research, the following recommendations are offered for improving the country’s rankings in the international ratings:

2 See: “Anticorruption Front of Almazbek Atambaev. Year Two,” Slovo Kyrgyzstana, national newspaper, 29 November, 2013, available in Russian at [http://slovo.kg/?p=27868].

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1. Adopt measures to prevent the degradation of human resources and ensure optimal functioning of the four basic factors of development (a favorable institutional environment, macroeconomic and political stability, developed infrastructure, and support of education and public health). 2. Focus on factors that promote an increase in production efficiency. 3. Intensify efforts to ensure ease of doing business in practice. 4. Develop the country’s own policy aimed at raising competitiveness of the economy and the country’s external appeal.

Recommended Short-Term Measures

1. In order to prevent degradation of human resources and ensure optimal functioning of the four basic factors of development,3the following is required:  Improving the indicators of access to medical services, including by means of such indicators as the tuberculosis and AIDS morbidity rate, child mortality, and life expectancy.  Improving the indicators of school education by raising its quality and ensuring mandatory free education for all school age children.  Ensuring performance of existing legislation, particularly with respect to the protection of investor rights.  Giving absolute priority to the protection of property and creditor rights when drawing up new legal reforms.  Stepping up the fight against corruption in the executive power branch and judicial system.  Paying particular attention to the development of transportation and communication infrastructure.  Ensuring macroeconomic stability by optimizing government spending, reducing the budget deficit, lowering the inflation rate, cutting back the spread of interest rates, accumulating foreign exchange reserves, stimulating export, decreasing the external debt, carrying out an appropriate currency policy, and so on. 2. In order to intensify efforts to ensure the ease of doing business in practice,4 the following is required:  Simplifying the procedures of access to electric power and reducing the corresponding outlays.  Simplifying the procedures for paying taxes, the amount of which should be reduced.  Striving to cut back on outlays relating to carrying out foreign trade (meaning both export and import).

3 For more details, see: Analytical Note “Assessment of Kyrgyzstan’s External Economic Appeal,” National Institute of Strategic Research of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012. 4 See: Ibidem.

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 Introducing additional quality criteria into the system for ensuring quality control of state services (including deadline obligations) and carrying out regular monitoring of their performance.  Developing and introducing efficient mechanisms of creditor protection. 3. The following is implied by developing the country’s own policy for improving economic competitiveness and external appeal:5  Implementing a set of targeted industrial policy measures aimed at improving competitiveness within the strategy of long-term economic development. In so doing, there should be a high degree of coordination among the various spheres of the Kyrgyzstan leadership’s economic and social policy.  Urgently creating a committee at the ministerial level called upon to keep tabs on drawing up policy to improve competitiveness and capable of assessing the efficiency and external appeal of the economy according to its own methodology on a regular basis.

5 See: Ibidem.

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GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S RUSSIA “RESET” POLICY AND THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

Mahir KHALIFAZADEH Ph.D. (Political Science), Member of Canadian Political Science Association, and Professor of Political Science at the International Ecoenergy Academy (Toronto, Canada)

ABSTRACT

his article reviews the key priorities of the “Russia reset” to improve America’s in- President Obama’s “reset” policy with terests, particularly in the Southern Cauca- T Russia. The author analyzes the im- sus. He also evaluates the Putin doctrine pact of the “reset” on the Southern Cauca- priorities and the implications of the Crimean sus. He emphasizes the region’s strategic crisis. The author calls for new U.S. initia- importance for U.S. policy toward both the tives to enforce peace, international bor- Greater Middle East and the post-Soviet ders, and America’s strategic interests in the space. The author discusses the failure of Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.

KEYWORDS: President Obama’s “reset” policy, Russia, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, the Contract of the Century, the Eurasian Union.

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 Introduction

Since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the Southern Caucasus has been an arena for the power struggle between the West and Russia. The Southern Caucasus is acquiring greater importance due to its geostrategic location and access to the Caspian’s energy resources. Geographically, the region is a land bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas. Its proximity to the Middle East increases the Southern Caucasus’ importance for America’s Middle East policy. The Southern Caucasus is also a sensitive region of the former Soviet space. The huge energy resources of the Caspian increase the Southern Caucasus’ role for Europe’s energy security.

Immediate Post-Soviet Period

It is a well-known fact that the Southern Caucasus has always been in the focus of U.S. foreign policy toward the U.S.S.R. However, the first high level contacts with the leaders of all three South- ern Caucasus states since the Soviet Union’s disintegration took place during Secretary of State James Baker III’s historical trip to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Central Asia on 12 February, 1992 and to Georgia on 26 May, 1992. This trip occurred shortly after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991. The visit indicated that the South Caucasian states are of strategic importance for America’s interests in the post-Soviet space. It also generated a clear message that the United States has strong intentions to launch active diplomacy regarding all three newly independent countries of the Southern Caucasus without discrimination. So, despite the strong opposition of the Armenian-American diaspora, the United States opened its embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, without delay in March 1992. Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of the Southern Caucasus had an unbalanced influence on Capitol Hill. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia did not have influential diasporas or bold political experience at the time to deal with the U.S. Congress and Administration. However, thanks to its powerful diaspora, Armenia had a more advanced position in the United States. And Armenia widely explored the diaspora’s network to shift America’s policy toward a more pro-Armenian stance in the Southern Caucasus. In fact, Congress excluded Azerbaijan from receiving U.S. government assistance under Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act (FSA). Despite the strong opposition of the George H.W. Bush administration, the language of Section 907 of FSA prohibited U.S. government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan. Capitalizing on the temporary advantages, the Armenian-America diaspora tried to place Armenia in the center of America’s regional policy, while pushing Armenia to be a key promoter of American interests in the Southern Caucasus. Strong efforts have also been launched to gain U.S. support for Armenia’s position in the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, as further political events proved, the diaspora miscalculated or overestimated Armenia’s power to promote U.S. interests in the region. Later, both the diaspora’s and Armenia’s goals began to contradict America’s strategic interests in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Basin.

Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century and America’s Regional Engagement

On 20 September, 1994, Azerbaijan signed a production sharing contract or Contract of the Century with a consortium of international oil companies (British and American oil giants) to exploit 79 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS oil in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea. The discovery of the Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli oil reserves in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian has significantly energized U.S. policy and diplomacy to transform the region into an important source of non-Middle Eastern energy. The huge Azeri oil and gas reserves have raised the issue of energy transportation routes to bypass Russia. In this light, some experts emphasized three main drivers of U.S. foreign policy at that time: the role of energy production to strengthen the sovereignty of the South Caucasian nations; U.S. corporate interests; and the role of Caspian energy resources for global energy security.1 No doubt the decision of late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev to bring American and British oil giants into South Caucasian/Caspian affairs was a successful step in his strategy to find a delicate balance to enforce Azerbaijan’s security and promote U.S. interests. He and President Shevardnadze of Georgia also attempted to bring Azerbaijan and Georgia into the focus of U.S. policy, while counterbalancing Russia’s influence. Since the Soviet disintegration, Azerbaijan has tried to strengthen its national independence and security, as well as liberate the territories occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijan needed to contain strong pressure from both Iran and Russia, the latter of which has been providing Azerbaijan’s regional rival—Armenia with large-scale assistance. In an attempt to stabilize and strengthen Azerbaijan’s independence, late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev oriented the country’s foreign policy toward the West and Israel. Thus the Contract of the Century was President Heydar Aliev’s strategic step to anchor Azerbaijan to the West. Undoubtedly, the Contract has changed the region’s political landscape. The Contract confirmed Azerbaijan’s strategic characteristics to promote U.S. interests in the region. The Contract also became a long-term tool for projecting U.S. power deep into Central Asia. So the Contract opened the “gates” for the West’s direct engagement in South Caucasian and Caspian Basin affairs. The Contract sent a clear message to Russia: the West is back. After the British withdrawal from Baku in August 1919, which put an end to the West’s presence in the Southern Caucasus, the West is now back as a strong and influential actor. Indeed, the United States and the EU, as well as Turkey and Israel, have started to play an increasing role in South Caucasian affairs, which traditionally have been orchestrated by Iran and Rus- sia. The Clinton Administration launched and the Bush Administration expanded a package of long- term programs (Partnership for Peace, the Silk Road Strategy Act, and later the Caspian Watch and the EU’s Eastern Partnership) oriented toward strengthening the West’s presence and minimizing both Iranian and Russian influence. After the tragic events of 11 September, the United States significantly expanded political, military, and security cooperation with the South Caucasian countries, which were enlisted by the United States in its war on terror. All three countries agreed to allow passage through their airspace. On 16 December, 2001, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited all three capitals of the South Caucasian countries to consolidate U.S. military ties with this vital region. In Baku, Rumsfeld also announced that “the United States Congress appears within days of waiving sanctions imposed in 1992 under the Freedom Support Act.”2 By early 2002, the U.S. started a train-and-equip program for the Georgian military. There were also some indications that the U.S. Defense Department intended to establish a military presence in Azerbaijan. In December 2003, at a meeting with Azerbai-

1 See: S. Cornell, “U.S. Engagement in the South Caucasus: Changing Gears,” Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2005, available at [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0506_hmonitor.pdf]. 2 Th. Shanker, “A Nation Challenged: The Allies; Rumsfeld to Visit Troops Stationed in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 16 December, 2001, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/world/a-nation-challenged-the-allies-rumsfeld-to- visit-troops-stationed-in-afghanistan.html].

80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 jani President Ilham Aliev, Donald Rumsfeld expressed an interest in establishing a U.S. air base on the Absheron peninsula.3 But Azerbaijan rejected this option so as not to anger Iran and Russia. Within a couple of years, Azerbaijan and Georgia started to rank amongst NATO’s most reliable and committed partners involved in providing support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States has also realized that Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Ar- menia, are critical countries for promoting America’s interests in the region and beyond. In this context, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), the main export pipeline for pumping Caspian oil to the world markets via Georgia, was the next strategic step involving Azerbaijan and Georgia to strengthen America’s influence. The BTC also enforced the Contract of the Century strategy: to engage the West, while counterbalancing Russia’s influence. Meanwhile, the huge and long-term international projects to pump and transport Caspian energy without passing through Russia have shifted America’s policy toward the region. The Southern Caucasus has become an increasingly important component of U.S. foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia both aligned themselves with the United States and sought integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, while Armenia strengthened its ties with Moscow. So the United States placed Azerbaijan and Georgia in the focus of its regional policy and increased direct assistance to Baku and Tbilisi.4 Finally, the large energy projects helped Washington to gain strategic momentum in the Caspian Basin, which greatly angered Moscow. Since the BTC started operating in 2005, Russia has realized that the United States is rapidly increasing its operational abilities to limit Russia’s influence. Moscow has come to understand that Washington is becoming a powerful actor that seriously jeopardizes Moscow’s interests in this sensitive part of the world.

Russia’s Response: The War with Georgia

Azerbaijan’s Contract of the Century undoubtedly accelerated American economic and political penetration. Washington became a key player, which was directly engaged in the intense and complex affairs in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian Basin. This gave the United States considerable momentum to expand its influence in the region and beyond, which aroused serious concern in Moscow and Tehran because it meant inevitable erosion of Russia’s and Iran’s historical dominance.5 Indeed, Russia reacted painfully to America’s rapid “advance” into a region that Moscow decision-makers traditionally considered part of Russia’s backyard. Some scholars noted: “...to counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances...”6 In this context, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 possibly originates from this tactics. Sources confirm that the plan for Georgia was prepared by the Russia’s Armed Forces General Staff as early as the end of 2006-beginning of 20077; that was quite soon after the BTC started to operate in 2005. Moscow’s goals were clear: stop Russia’s retreat; reverse strategic momentum; and ensure protection of Russia’s interests.

3 See: B. Graham, “Rumsfeld Discusses Tighter Ties with Azerbaijan,” Washington Post, 4 December, 2003. 4 See: “U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia: Fact Sheets and Remarks,” U.S. Department of State, available at [http:// www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/c11609.htm]. 5 See: M. Khalifa-zadeh, “Iran and the Southern Caucasus: A Struggle for Influence,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 51-62, available at [http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml]. 6 M. de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, 6 January, 2007, available at [http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml]. 7 See: “Russian Generals Accuse Medvedev of Hesitation in Russia-Georgia War,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 8 August, 2012, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-says-russia-had-plans-for-georgian-aggression-in- late-2006/24670673.html].

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Unfortunately, former Georgian President Saakashvili’s miscalculations gave Russia an opportunity to strengthen Moscow’s security posture in the region. Moreover, the war with Georgia provided a brilliant opportunity for Russia to shift the region’s balance of power and regain strategic momentum to enforce Moscow’s influence in its immediate neighborhood. Russia has demonstrated to the global and regional powers that the Southern Caucasus (like the whole of the CIS) is Russia’s Near Abroad and Moscow has exclusive rights to use force and manage the situation in accordance with its strategic interests. As a result, Georgia and Ukraine’s movement toward NATO membership has been removed from the agenda. And two parts of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhasia, have been recognized by Russia as independent states. Some scholars indicated: “Western actors have in practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia.”8 It can be said that the Georgia war was a message to the West: Russia is reviving its old imperial ambitions, and the Russian military once again is a working tool in Moscow’s strategic calculations. “As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military force has become a major factor in Russian foreign policy.”9 Moreover, Russia’s rapid advance deep into Georgia also confirms that Russia can reach both capitals Baku and Tbilisi (key U.S. partners) easily; and there is no power to stop Russia’s forces. So the war has demonstrated that the Western companies’ oil and pipeline infrastructures in the Caspian could be under threat and the West has no effective tools to stop Russia’s military. As further political development indicates, the Russo-Georgian war became a turning point in Russia’s foreign and security policy toward the former Soviet republics. There are many indications that the Kremlin has adopted a new strategy: to expand Russia’s military presence in the Near Abroad in order to increase Moscow’s power to keep the former Soviet republics in Russia’s orbit. Moscow has launched a double-track policy: to intensify a military buildup in Russia’s immediate neighborhood and to pressure neighboring countries into joining the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union, which is due to start operating in 2015. In parallel, Russia is pushing the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-dominated post-Soviet security block. In fact, in 2009, soon after the Georgia war, Russia pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the U.S. military air base in Manas.10 A year later, Russia extended the lease of the military base in Armenia through 204411 and offered large amounts of military hardware to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, two Central Asian countries that also host Russian military bases.12 Earlier, Russia signed a deal with Kyrgyzstan to allow Moscow to keep a military base in the country until 2032.13 Russia also signed a $4 billion military deal with Azerbaijan in 201014 and negotiated plans to open a military air base

8 K. Strachota, cooperation with W. Gorecki, The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia after the Russian-Georgian War, 24 September, 2008, Center for Eastern Studies, Poland, available at [http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/ Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=92868]. 9 M. Tsereteli, The Impact of the Russo-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 2009, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Full_Mamuka_RussiaGeorgia.pdf]. 10 See: L. Harding, “Kyrgyzstan to Close Key US Military Airbase,” The Guardian, 4 February, 2009, available at [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/04/kyrgyzstan-us-base-afghanistan]. 11 See: “Russia Extends Military Base in Armenia through 2044,” RIA Novosti, 20 August, 2010, available at [http:// en.ria.ru/military_news/20100820/160276128.html]. 12 See: F. Mashrab, “Russian Arms Nudge Central Asia to Edge,” Asia Times, 8 January, 2014, available at [http://www. atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/CEN-01-080114.html]. 13 See: “Russia To Keep Kyrgyzstan Military Base, Forgive Debt,” Defense News, 20 September, 2012, available at [http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120920/DEFREG03/309200007/]. 14 See: Z. Agayev, “Azeri-Russian Arms Trade $4 Billion amid Tension with Armenia,” Bloomberg News, USA, 13 Au- gust, 2013, available at [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-4-billion-amid-tension-with-armenia.html].

82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 in Belarus until 2015.15 Russia increased its military personnel to 5,000 servicemen and added combat helicopters to the fighter unit in Armenia.16 The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was undoubtedly a milestone development in the post-Soviet space. Russia enforced its dominance in the Near Abroad and increased its efforts to launch the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union. But the United States was shocked and pushed to adopt a new strategy.

America’s Response: “Reset” with Russia

When President Obama took office in 2009, he immediately announced a new foreign policy strategy regarding Russia: resetting relations. Relations between the United States and post-Soviet Russia were so bad at the time that some observers characterized them as a new Cold War.17 However, attempts to improve relations with Russia are not unique to the Obama administration. As Paul J. Sanders, Executive Director of the Nixon Center, believes, “...efforts made by previous two administrations included resets that ultimately failed to live up to expectations.”18 But Dr. James M. Goldgeier of Hoover Institution emphasized that the origin of America’s Russia “reset” policy has roots that run deep into the Clinton-Yeltsin period.19 Meanwhile, in 2009, the “reset” policy was prompted by the serious disagreements between Washington and Moscow regarding the Europe-based missile-defense system, Iran’s nuclear program, post-Soviet policy, NATO’s eastward expansion, the Georgian war of 2008, and other issues. In this context, it is thought that the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 was a crucial factor on the South- ern Caucasus “frontline” of opposition between the United States and Russia, which pushed Obama’s administration to reset relations with Russia. Political analysts even emphasized that the war in Georgia was a proxy American-Russian war for the Georgian forces supplied and trained by Washington. It is necessary to note that the Obama administration considered the “reset” an essential step toward improving relations and overcoming distrust. The goal was to replace conflicts with cooperation or “selective cooperation” on issues that were top U.S. priorities. Some commentators, like specialists on Russia Thomas E. Graham of Kissinger Associates and Peter Baker of The New York Times, believed that Obama’s “reset” was a “new partnership.”20 In fact, both President Obama and Russian President Medvedev considered their personal friendship evidence of the reset’s success. At the 2010 APEC summit in Japan’s Yokohama, during

15 See: “Russia Sends First Fighter Jets to Belarus Base,” RIA Novosti, 9 December, 2013, available at [http://en.ria.ru/ military_news/20131209/185396200/Russia-Sends-First-Fighter-Jets-to-Belarus-Base.html]. 16 See: “Russia to Deploy Combat Helicopters at Armenian Base,” RIA Novosti, 18 October, 2013, available at [http:// en.ria.ru/military_news/20131018/184232826/Russia-to-Deploy-Combat-Helicopters-at-Armenian-Base.html]. 17 See: St.F. Cohen, “The New American Cold War,” The Nation, 10 July, 2010, available at [http://www.thenation. com/article/new-american-cold-war]. 18 P. J. Sanders, Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, “The U.S.- Russia Reset: Status and Prospects,” Lecture at Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, 10 January, 2011, available at [http://www. wilsoncenter.org/event/the-us-russia-reset-status-and-prospects]. 19 See: J.M. Goldgeier, “A Realistic Reset with Russia,” Policy Review, No. 156, Hoover Institution, 3 August, 2009, available at [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5474]. 20 St.F. Cohen, “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’: Another Lost Opportunity?” The Nation, 20 June, 2011, available at [http:// www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity#].

83 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS an informal meeting with Russian President Medvedev to discuss a wide range of bilateral and global issues, President Obama made statements such as “my friend Dmitri” and “an excellent partner,” whereas President Medvedev replied with “very pleasant for me” and “we understand each other very well.”21 So within the “reset” policy, as scholars believe, the United States was able to gain Moscow’s cooperation on some U.S. priorities, such as the war in Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear-weapons aspira- tions, the New START, and nuclear proliferation.22

Doubts about Obama’s “Reset” with Russia

At the same time, political analysts on both sides of the Atlantic expressed serious doubts about President Obama’s success in improving Russia-United States relations. Some of them accused President Obama’s reset of being “capitulation” and a “dangerous bargain,” a policy of “see- ing no evil.”23 They directly criticized the Obama administration for its wrong approach or even possibly a “grand bargain” between the United States and Russia as part of the administration’s reset efforts with Russia.24 David J. Kramer, former deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs in the George W. Bush administration, stated in the Washington Post: “...the administration would pursue a ‘Russia first’ policy at the expense of Russia’s neighbors. The problem, it appears, is actually worse: the administration seems to have moved toward a ‘Russia only’ approach, neglecting and even abandoning other countries in the region.”25 Dr. Ariel Cohen from the Washington D.C.-based Heritage Foundation believed that a “Russia first” approach seriously damaged U.S. interests. He strongly argued that Obama’s “reset” failed to improve bilateral relations and conceded too much to Russia at the expense of American interests. He stated: “...the Kremlin is exploiting Obama’s ‘see no evil’ approach in Russia’s expansion into the former Soviet space and cooperation with anti-Western regimes... The Obama administration’s Rus- sia policy will inevitably produce a massive loss of American influence in Eurasia and jeopardize the security of the U.S. and its friends and allies east of the Oder.”26

The Putin Doctrine and Its Practice in the Region

There is a well-known statement by President Putin of Russia that the breakup of the U.S.S.R. was “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Since his election in 2000, President Putin

21 St.F. Cohen, op. cit. 22 See: Sh.G. Stolberg, “Obama Calls Arms Treaty a Priority,” The New York Times, 13 November, 2010 available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/world/europe/14diplo.html].?ref=us]. 23 See: F. Gaffney, Jr., “‘Reset’ Translates as ‘Capitulation’,” Center for Security Policy, 17 September, 2009, available at [http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2009/09/17/reset-translates-as-capitulation-2/]. 24 M. Aristova, “US-Russia Relations of Reset: Results and Perspectives,” Research Institute of European and American Studies (RIEAS), 2 November, 2013, available at [http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/russian-studies/2048-us- russia-relations-of-reset-results-and-perspectives.html]. 25 D.J. Kramer, “U.S. Abandoning Russia’s Neighbors,” The Washington Post, 15 May, 2010, available at [http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/14/AR2010051404496.html]. 26 A. Cohen, “Time to Revise Obama’s Russian ‘Reset’ Policy,” WebMemo, No. 3042, 26 October, 2010, The Heritage Foundation, available at [http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/time-to-revise-obamas-russian-reset-policy].

84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 has been trying to recover Russia’s political and geostrategic assets lost by the U.S.S.R. in 1991. President Putin seeks to renew Russia’s status and influence in both regional and global politics and make the Russian Federation a great power again. He is increasing Russia’s military budget and trying to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives which, as he believes, can seriously damage Russian interests. He is also expanding relations with countries that share anti-American policies and is trying to exploit diplomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. President Putin’s attempt to restore Russia’s sphere of influence and regain its superpower status, as some analysts argue, is Russia’s new foreign policy concept or the Putin Doctrine.27 The first component of Putin’s foreign policy consensus, as Leon Aron stated inForeign Affairs, is to maintain Russia as a nuclear superpower.28 The second pillar is to export nuclear technologies and thus enhance Russia’s position as a global power. The third is to recover Russia’s close relations with former Soviet clients in the Middle East. Next is to ensure Russia’s regional hegemony in the Near Abroad and “...to strive for the political, economic, military, and cultural reintegration of the former Soviet bloc under Russian leadership.” Regarding Russia’s efforts to strengthen the Kremlin’s position in the Near Abroad, Leon Aron also emphasized: “Under the Putin Doctrine, the pursuit of regional hegemony has acquired a new dimension: an attempt at the ‘Finlandization’ of the post- Soviet states, harkening back to the Soviet Union’s control over Finland’s foreign policy during the Cold War. In such an arrangement, Moscow would allow its neighbors to choose their own domestic political and economic systems but maintain final say over their external orientation. Accordingly, Moscow has taken an especially hard line against former Soviet republics that have sought to reorient their foreign policy.”29 In fact, under direct pressure from Moscow, Ukraine’s President Yanukovich did not sign a political association and free trade pact with the European Union, which was scheduled to take place at the Eastern Partnership Summit on 28-29 November, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania.30 Armenia was forced to abandon the process to sign a free trade agreement with the European Union as well.31 Rus- sia also pressured Armenia into joining the Russia-led Customs Union of Belarus, Russia, Kazakh- stan, and Kyrgyzstan, which is set to transform into the Eurasian Union by 2015.32 Meanwhile, Russia is strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and increasing its military presence in these countries, apart from Kazakhstan. It can be emphasized that the unchallenged Russian military superiority in Russia’s Near Abroad is a crucial element of the Putin doctrine to keep former Soviet republics under Moscow’s control and stop NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia is using its military installations as a tool to force the West not to deploy U.S./NATO troops or troops of any NATO member country in the Russia’s immediate neighborhood. In this light, Russia’s military base in Armenia is transforming this country into a so-called Rus- sian “fortress” to ensure Russia’s regional dominance and prevent NATO’s deployments in the Southern Caucasus, which is of geostrategic importance for the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. The base,

27 See: I. Saltzman, “The Putin Doctrine,” Los Angeles Time, 12 September, 2013, available at [http://articles.latimes. com/2013/sep/12/opinion/la-oe-saltzman-syria-putin-doctrine-20130912]. 28 See: L. Aron, “The Putin Doctrine: Russia’s Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State,” Foreign Affairs, 8 March, 2013, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine]. 29 Ibidem. 30 See: N. Buckley, R. Olearchyk, “Ukraine Refuses to Sign Up to Europe Deal,” Financial Times, 29 November, 2013, available at [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a1380b2-58de-11e3-9798-00144feabdc0.html].#axzz2zj0nOWdC]. 31 See: “EU Loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union,” EurActive.com, 4 September, 2013, available at [http://www. euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-customs-news-530224]. 32 See: “Armenia Signs Customs Union Roadmap, Kyrgyzstan Needs More Talks,” Russia Today, 24 December, 2013, available at [http://rt.com/business/kyrgyzstan-armenia-customs-union-749/].

85 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS thanks to newly deployed Fulcrum fighter jets33 and attack helicopters,34 has all strategic characteristics to become a key military installation in the region to project Russia’s military power as far as the Persian Gulf and deep into the Middle East. In this context, Russia is not interested in a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. If this occurs, it will no doubt undermine the need to retain the base in Armenia. Moreover, in the light of Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimea (Ukraine), the Russian military base in Armenia is a real threat to Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. In 2008, as the Russo-Georgia war started, Georgian President Saakashvili was seriously concerned about a possible invasion by Russian troops from Russia’s military base in Armenia. Russia is putting pressure on Azerbaijan and Georgia due to their pro-Western foreign policy. Russia demands a corridor for its military base in Armenia through Georgia. Recently, Russia announced plans to expand its military presence in Abkhazia. Russia is also pushing Tbilisi to accept the new reality and recognize South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence as a precondition to restore the diplomatic ties broken off after the 2008 war. In this way, Russia is trying to kill Georgia’s NATO and EU ambitions. In Azerbaijan, Russia is keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “frozen” and holds the key to unfreeze the conflict at any moment. Russia is prolonging the conflict and retaining Azeri-Armenian hostility as an effective tool for manipulating both Baku and Erevan to secure Russia’s interests and dominance in the Southern Caucasus. Some Russian political analysts do not exclude further cases of territorial “revisions” of both Azerbaijan and Georgia if they escape from Russia’s orbit. In addition, Russia is increasing its efforts to consolidate its influence in the Caspian basin. On 22 April, 2014, during a meeting of the foreign ministers of Caspian Sea littoral states—Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan—in Moscow, Russia, along with Iran, cautioned against the military presence of any non-littoral states in the Caspian Sea.35

Conclusions: Crimea Crisis: The End of the “Reset?”

Despite sound criticism of the Obama administration’s Russia “reset” policy, the key goal of the “reset”—to replace conflicts with cooperation—was a correct and strategic goal to try to restore relations with post-Soviet Russia. Within the “reset,” the United States has gained Russia’s support on some key priorities of American foreign policy like Iran and Afghanistan. However, the United States canceled planned deployment of missile interceptors and radar in Poland and the Czech Re- public. The United States postponed offering Georgia and Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Later, Washington started sending signals to Tbilisi to improve relations with Moscow, which were seriously damaged after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Meanwhile, there are some indications that the Russian political elite interpreted President Obama’s “reset” policy as a sign of American weakness.36 The decade-long American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fully exhausted the U.S. military machine and pushed the Pentagon to abandon

33 See: “Russia Reinforces Armenian Base with Overhauled MiG-29 Fighter Jets,” RIA Novosti, 4 March, 2014, available at [http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140305/188092268/Russia-Reinforces-Armenian-Base-With-Overhauled-MiG- 29-Fighter.html]. 34 See: “Russia Forms Helicopter Squadron for Armenian Base,” RIA Novosti, 17 January, 2014, available at [http:// en.ria.ru/military_news/20140117/186629314.html]. 35 See: “Caspian States Agree to Prevent Foreign Presence: Iran FM,” PressTv, Iran, 23 April, 2014, available at [http:// www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/04/23/359731/no-foreign-presence-in-caspian-sea/]. 36 See: L. Shevtsova, “A Second Act for U.S. Foreign Policy,” The American Interest, 8 April, 2014, available at [http:// www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/04/08/a-second-act-for-u-s-foreign-policy/].

86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 the two-war doctrine requesting America’s military to fight two simultaneous conventional wars.37 The Pentagon’s move to reject the concept of winning two wars has generated serious speculations that America’s global power is on the decline. Thus the significant shift in America’s foreign policy presented by Obama’s “reset” initiative, as well as the fact that the new U.S. military doctrine focused on China rather than Russia,38 sent the wrong message to Moscow, pushing the Kremlin to energize the newly adopted foreign policy concept, otherwise known as the Putin doctrine. In addition, Presi- dent Obama’s policy of non-intervention in Syria, as well as the Pentagon’s plans to shrink the U.S. army to pre-World War II level,39 probably ensured Moscow that the United States is not interested in being a global arbiter. “The Russian elite interpreted the reset as weakness on the part of the Obama administration and as an invitation to be more assertive in the post-Soviet space and beyond.”40 In this context, the Crimean crisis is the Kremlin’s powerful message to the world powers: Russia has a strong intention to restore its non-Red Empire and resume its superpower status. And Russia’s Crime- an ‘Anschluss’ provides an example of the Putin doctrine in practice, which is a clear sign of the threat to the post-Soviet states. In fact, on 11 February, 2014, Russia started large-scale military exercises in Armenia41; and, beginning on 15 March, 2014, a group of Russia’s Caspian Flotilla ships, including landing boats (to drop Russia’s troops in Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan!?), launched two-week-long exercises in the Caspian Sea.42 In February 2014, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Vice-Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), called for Russia to annex five entire countries—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—as Russia’s “Cen- tral Asian Federal Region.”43 He also called for occupying Georgia and used offensive and humiliat- ing words and phrases to refer to Azerbaijan and Ukraine.44 Sergey Fedunyak, an expert at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, believes that “there is an increasing risk of the use of force by Russia against its neighboring countries, particularly, Azerbai- jan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In the first three cases, it may develop into hostilities of different intensity ranging from classical war with armed forces to ‘hybrid wars’ with a high autonomy of soldiers and subversive small units. Georgia has already suffered from, and Ukraine has begun to experience, Russia’s new approaches to war. In the cases of Kazakhstan and Belarus, there may be a ‘mild’ annexation of a part of a territory or complete absorption that may be facilitated with populations’ psychological and military unpreparedness to resist Russian occupation.”45

37 See: A. Spillius, “Pentagon Abandons Two-War Doctrine,” The Telegraph, 2 February, 2010, available at [http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7140418/Pentagon-abandons-two-war-doctrine.html]. 38 See: J. Cherian, “New Military Doctrine: America is ‘Looking for Enemies’: Threatening China,” Centre for Research on Globalization, 29 January, 2012, available at [http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-military-doctrine-america-is-looking-for- enemies-threatening-china/28943]. 39 See: Th. Shanker, H. Cooper, “Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre-World War II Level,” The New York Times, 23 February, 2014, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/us/politics/pentagon-plans-to-shrink-army-to-pre-world- war-ii-level.html].?_r=0]. 40 L. Shevtsova, op. cit. 41 See: “Russian Military Exercises Start in Armenia,” TREND News Agency, 11 February, 2014, available at [http:// en.trend.az/regions/scaucasus/armenia/2240666.html]. 42 See: R. Suleymanov, “Russian Navy Conducting Exercises in Caspian Sea,” APA News Agency, 17 March, 2014, available at [http://en.apa.az/news/208726]. 43 “Kyrgyzstan Asks for Explanation of Zhirinovsky Comments,” Radio Free Europe, 19 March, 2014, available at [http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan-russia-explanation-zhirinovsky/25276649.html]. 44 See: “Russian Politician Offends Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians,” TERT News Agency, 17 March, 2014, available at [http://www.tert.am/en/news/2014/03/17/zhirinovski-azer/]. 45 S. Fedunyak, “‘Putin’s Doctrine’ as a Threat to the International System,” Wilson Center, Kennan Institute, 20 May, 2014, available at [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/%E2%80%9Cputin%E2%80%99s-doctrine%E2%80%9D-threat-to- the-international-system].

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It can be emphasized that Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Ukraine) is a failure of President Obama’s Russia “reset” policy. The failure of the “reset” policy generates long-term implications for U.S. foreign and security policy. Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. secretary of state, emphasizes: “Most important, the United States must restore its standing in the international community, which has been eroded by too many extended hands of friendship to our adversaries, sometimes at the expense of our friends.”46 Indeed, the United States and NATO, we strongly believe, have to reassure their full and unconditional support of the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are America’s allies implementing a pro-Western foreign policy that angers Moscow. No doubt Russia will consistently follow a policy to undermine the West’s influence and put pressure on America’s friends in the Southern Caucasus. Since Putin’s annexation of the Crimea, no one can exclude the idea that Moscow may select Azerbaijan and/or Georgia as its next targets for Russia’s intervention to protect Russians and Russian-speakers. Russia will continue its efforts to incorporate both Azerbaijan and Georgia into the so-called “Russian world.” If Russia regains Azerbaijan and/or Georgia, it will re-establish Russia’s full control over Caspian energy reserves and energy transportation routes, jeopardizing America’s interests and multibillion dollar oil investments. Thus, the collapse of both Azerbai- jan’s and Georgia’s independence will put an end to the West’s plans to expand the Southern Corridor to bring Caspian gas to Europe and, ultimately, to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Meanwhile, European leaders recently agreed to step up moves to cut energy dependency, notably on Russia, after the events in Ukraine. British Foreign Secretary William Hague expressed the idea of increasing gas exports to Europe and supporting projects such as the Southern Corridor pipeline in Baku, Azerbaijan, which will bring Caspian gas to Europe, bypassing Russia and its supplies.47 In this context, Turkmenistan’s involvement in the Southern Corridor is essential for the strategy aimed at reducing Europe’s dependence on Russia’s gas. The project of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea needs to be on the table again to bring Turkmenistan’s gas to the European Union via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects. Pumping Turkmen gas to Europe would be the next logic step in the development of the Southern Corridor. In this light, the first Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in Baku, on 26 May, 2014, is an important step in this direction. “The meeting is expected to address the opportunities for developing cooperation at bilateral and regional levels in matters of common interest to all three countries, especially in the fields of energy and transportation and to enable an exchange of views on international and regional developments.”48 So Ankara already emphasized the importance of TANAP for the EU’s energy security following Russia’s military intervention in Crimea. However, there is a problem: the West does not have an effective political or military tool to balance Russia’s military in Armenia. Since the Crimean crisis, the unbalanced and overwhelming

46 C. Rice, “Will America Heed the Wake-Up Call of Ukraine?,” Washington Post, 7 March, 2014, available at [http:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/condoleezza-rice-will-america-heed-the-wake-up-call-of-ukraine/2014/03/07/cf087f74- a630-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html]. 47 See: N. Winning, “Europe Considering Increasing U.S. Gas Imports, Says U.K.’s Hague,” The Wall Street Journal, 9 March, 2014, available at [http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303795904579428813878337946]. 48 “First Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Held in Baku,” Press Release, No. 163, 25 May, 2014, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-163_-25-may- 2014_-press-release-regarding-the-trilateral-meeting-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-azerbaijan-and- turkmenistan.en.mfa].

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Russian military presence in Armenia creates a serious and direct threat to America’s strategic interests and generates security problems for Western-oriented Azerbaijan and Georgia. It is also a threat to Western oil and gas infrastructures and pipelines. In this context, the triangular cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia has valuable reasons to be transformed into an effective defence tool to enforce peace, stability, and international borders in the Southern Caucasus. Today’s cooperation addresses politics, security, energy, transportation, trade and investment, but it should have a military dimension as well. A defence alliance could be created on the basis of Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia triangle to protect the West’s oil and gas infrastructure and enforce Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. The next possible option is to sign Turkey-Azerbaijan and/or Turkey-Georgia bilateral defence agreements to strengthen both Azerbaijan and Georgia defence capabilities. So these alliances could be NATO-connected and containment alliances. In this light, it is necessary to note that the trilateral cooperation among Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the military sphere was discussed during the Tbilisi meeting of the presidents of Azer- baijan, Georgia, and Turkey held on 6 May 2014. In parallel, the United States needs to support Azerbaijani-Georgian military cooperation, which should be expanded upon and transformed into a defence alliance in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the formation of an Azeri-Georgian or joint Turkish-Azeri-Georgian peacekeeping battalion should be considered as well. However, it may now be the time to consider the option of having Turkish or U.S./NATO boots on the ground. The U.S. troops from Afghanistan could be deployed under a bilateral agreement in Azerbaijan and/or Georgia for a temporary stay. Even in 2010, the Heritage Foundation’s Dr. Ariel Cohen urged: “The Pentagon should explore possibilities of deploying ‘lily pad’ military bases in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asian states.”49 Since the Crimean crisis, the deployment of troops might be the only effective tool to counterbalance Russia’s overwhelming military presence in Armenia, as well as to prevent Russia from taking potentially irreversible and aggressive steps toward Georgia and Azerbaijan. In fact, the people in Azerbaijan and Georgia are very concerned that Russia may move as it did in 1920-1921. At that time, Bolshevik Russia occupied all three countries in the Southern Caucasus and terminated their short-lived independence. Unfortunately, a negative aspect of the “reset” was that the United States decreased its attention on, as well as its involvement in the Southern Caucasus. As a result, the “reset” policy has failed to improve the political atmosphere and solve the “frozen” conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. Thus, there is no peace along the pipelines pumping Caspian energy to Europe. Moreover, there are indications that the region’s political situation is deteriorating and America’s strategic interests are now under threat. Indeed, Russia is strengthening its influence and considering cementing its position in this region of paramount importance, as well as securing its interests at any cost. Russia is pushing Ameri- ca to retreat and increasing its pressure on Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are America’s real friends. On 27 March, 2014, from the list of South Caucasian and Central Asian states, only two countries— Azerbaijan and Georgia—openly supported the U.S. backed U.N. resolution on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and deemed the referendum that led to Russia’ s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula illegal. After Ukraine, what is President Putin’s next target?—is an alarming question. The collapse of both Azerbaijan and Georgia, as independent states, will have irreversible consequences for the entire post-Soviet space. The unstable Central Asian states may also become the next target for Russia.

49 A. Cohen, op. cit.

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Russian hardliners like Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the LDPR Vladi- mir Zhirinovsky have already begun urging for Russians to be protected in Kazakhstan and the Cen- tral Asia states. President Putin’s statement that Russia has the right to protect Russians and Russian-speakers outside Russia’s borders is a critical update of the Putin doctrine. Such an update opens the “door” for a Russian military intervention in the post-Soviet space, as well as in the Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea challenges the post-Cold War order and America’s role as a global arbiter. It also provokes NATO’s defense strategies and challenges the vision that Europe is whole and free. The United States needs to abandon the “reset” policy. It has been exhausted and has failed to protect and advance U.S. interests. Moreover, President Obama’s “reset” made America look weak, likely resulting in President Putin’s miscalculations regarding America’s global responsibility and investment in foreign policy goals. The United States needs to reaffirm its commitments to its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as increase its own engagement in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.50 In this context, the United States should launch a new assistance program to replace the old and outdated Freedom Support Act (FSA) of 1992, which no longer reflects the new reality in the post- Soviet space. Unlike the FSA, which mainly concentrated on Russia, the new strategic program must be focused precisely on Russia’s immediate neighbors to support their independence, territorial integrity, defense, and economic capabilities. Since the Crimean crisis, Russia no longer needs Amer- ica’s assistance. The United States and the European Union have to increase their direct assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union. Regarding the Southern Caucasus, the United States needs to be re- engaged in the region’s affairs and develop a strategy aimed at strengthening the region’s links with the Europe. The European Union also needs to update the Eastern Partnership program. And NATO should update and expand the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Azerbaijan for 2014- 2015. Meanwhile, Georgia should offer a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the September 2014 NATO summit in Wales. There is no doubt that the doors to NATO and the EU must be open for new members. In parallel, Dr. George Friedman (Chairman of Stratfor, U.S.-based geopolitical intelligence firm) argues that containment alliances should be created from Estonia to Azerbaijan to enforce the independence of the former Soviet republics and stop Putin’s Russia.51 Lastly, French President François Hollande’s three-day (11-13 May, 2014) visit to the South- ern Caucasus, as well as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s intention to visit Azerbaijan and Georgia in the coming months52 create the understanding that the West and particularly the United States (unlike Britain, in 1919) will enforce its presence and influence. It also reinforces Washing- ton’s intentions to oppose Russia’s imperial ambitions in this sensitive part of the world. In Decem- ber 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the U.S. was trying to prevent Russia from recreating a new version of the Soviet Union. So now is the time for America to abandon the “reset” policy with Russia and demonstrate America’s global power to enforce peace, stability, and international borders. However, such a policy is probably not for President Obama’s administration,

50 See: A.A. Michta, “A Strategy for Eurasia,” The American Interest, 14 April, 2014, available at [http://www.the- american-interest.com/articles/2014/04/14/a-u-s-strategy-for-eurasia/]. 51 See: G. Fridman, “From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine,” 25 March, 2014, Stratfor, available at [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/estonia-azerbaijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine]. 52 See: “U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to Visit Azerbaijan,” Xinhua, 18 March, 2014, available at [http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-03/19/c_133196212.htm].

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 which has invested a lot of political capital in reset relations with Russia, but is for the next U.S. administration.

CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN: THE SECURITY COMPLEX DILEMMA

Farkhod TOLIPOV Director, Bilim Karvoni Non-State Educational Institution (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

ABSTRACT

he author uses the latest theoretical in Afghanistan should be reviewed to arrive and conceptual approaches to world at more exact interpretations of the “tradi- T politics and international security to tional” and “non-traditional” threats and oth- analyze the Afghan problem. er concepts. He also formulates a concept He suggests that certain commonly of systemic securitization for Afghanistan’s accepted ideas about the strategic situation future.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, traditional and non-traditional threats, terrorism, the Taliban, friction, NATO, ISAF, the regional security complex.

Introduction

The pullout of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan expected late in 2014 dominates the international agenda. Its future, as well as the future of Central Asia and the world as a whole, has moved to the fore in uncompromising political discussions. The range of assessments and expectations, stretching from alarmist (which predominate) to reassuring, is fairly wide. The military operation in Afghanistan has been going on for twelve years now; according to certain sources, it has cost the United States about $1 trillion. The pullout, which has been going on for over two years now (as well as the introduction of ISAF into the country, for that matter), has caused a great number of fundamental geopolitical and military problems, as well as securitization and international legal problems, most of which remain pending in the absence of theoretical and conceptual approaches to their solution. Here I have posed myself the task of reexamining some of the approaches to the Afghan issue from the point of view of the theory of security and contemporary critical geopolitics. 91 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Security Divided and Undivided

The principle of undivided security is one of the most prominent points in international rhetoric with respect to the common nature of contemporary threats (often described as non-traditional). This calls for clarification. Terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, regional conflicts, climate change, etc. are normally classified as non-traditional threats. To correctly assess the nature of contemporary threats, we should bear in mind that the commonly accepted classification into “traditional” and “non-traditional” is fairly conventional and not that important. Interstate confrontation, conflicts, and wars are described as traditional threats; “non-traditional threats” are the product of the post-Cold War period and the end of the global opposition between the two world superpowers. Today, the term is applied to the threats seen as common for all or most states and requiring concerted efforts to oppose. These threats were not born yesterday or the day before yesterday or even the day after the Cold War ended: they have been present in the world at all times. Terrorists, extremists, drug dealers, and other criminal elements active during the global confrontation of the two superpowers knew how to use interstate conflicts in their interests; in fact, they were the product of these conflicting interests. This means that the “new” threats to international security are traditional. What is more important is the fact that certain states refuse to close ranks in the face of non-traditional threats: the situation in Afghanistan and around it is the best example. Not infrequently, the non-traditional nature of terrorism is explained by the asymmetric nature of its threat: in the absence of adequate might, the terrorists who challenge a state never risk direct confrontation with its armed forces. The asymmetry of the terrorist threat makes it very different from the relatively “symmetric” confrontation of states. This asymmetry is often used to explain why a more or less prompt victory over terrorists is impossible, of which Afghanistan is one of the most glaring examples. Strange as it may seem, a stronger side (a state and its military might) cannot subdue a much weaker side (terrorists). I have in mind not so much the threats created by the confrontation of states, but the threats created by terror. On the other hand, one cannot but wonder why we say nothing about the threats to terrorism on the part of individual states or the international community as a whole? I think that the “non-traditional” concept should not only describe the threats to regional and international security, but also the means and methods of struggle against them. Unprecedented cooperation at the global level of states and international organizations in the face of the global nature of the old threats could have become a non-traditional method of antiterrorist struggle. From this point of view, the principle of undivided security remains so far a nicely worded slogan that has nothing in common with international reality. The international security architecture is divided into continental, transcontinental, regional, and national sectors, all of them being highly contradictory What is a security complex? It is a group of states with security interests intertwined to the extent that their national security cannot be separately considered.1 This means that Central Asia and Afghanistan can be treated as a single security complex; this, however, calls for a more systemic approach.

1 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 190.

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At all times, Afghanistan and Central Asia have been and remain connected by numerous threads. Divided by state borders, however, they became a territory of the Great Game with Af- ghanistan serving a buffer zone. The United States spared no effort to isolate it from the Soviet Union. Wishing to pull the country to its side, Moscow waged the so-called Afghan War for ten years (from 1979 to 1989). This explains why Afghanistan remained part of the South Asian security complex with an obvious bias toward Iran and Pakistan. At no time was it a completely independent and fully-fledged state; this means that it never played an important role either in the South Asian, or in the Central Asian security complex. These are not idle deliberations, but an Ariadne’s thread of sorts that will bring us to a correct understanding of reality and probably help us arrive at the most exact strategic assessments and new approaches to the Afghan problem. More likely than not, Afghanistan will sink back into the prewar modus vivendi once the counterterrorist coalition moves its troops out of the country in December 2014. This means that the country will sink back into a perpetual internecine struggle, which keeps and will continue to keep it away from Central Asia and the rest of the world. This does not mean that the Taliban will recapture power and that the 12-year-long efforts of the international coalition will be wasted. It should be said that from the very beginning, the Taliban did not fit the country’s social context. The Afghans will resume their traditional way of life and their mostly archaic laws. The main problem is what will happen? Indeed, numerous international implications will appear that will keep the country away from neighboring regions and will interfere with the implementation of large-scale projects there. According to well-known academic Amin Saikal, Afghanistan “has become a narco-state pre- sided over by a corrupt and in many ways dysfunctional government…As the situation stands, once the U.S. and its allies terminate their combat operations and withdrawal of most of their soldiers the country remains at serious risk of being plunged once again into general internal strife.”2 It is commonly believed that the duration and the contradictory nature of the Afghan conflict are predetermined by external interference, mostly by neighboring countries that use the ethnic and confessional groups inside the country to pursue their own interests. This is partly true, however, the problems are rooted in Afghanistan’s inner structure, which for a long time survived amid internal strife and tribal contradictions. In fact, lack of internal cohesion and the absence of a fully-fledged state allowed neighbors and the great powers to wage a proxy war in its territory.

Afghanistan-2014: Strategic Friction3

No matter what is going on there and what will happen next, it cannot be said that the international community has reached an unprecedented level of “non-traditional” cooperation in its struggle against the “non-traditional” international security threats. We cannot say, so far, that a fully-fledged independent state has appeared in Afghanistan, even though the first more or less clear signs of global cooperation among states have become apparent in the course of the counterterrorist operation. In Afghanistan, NATO relied on the forces of its own members and also on the armed forces of coun-

2 A. Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Attitudes towards the Region,” in: The Regional Dimensions to Security. Other Sides of Afghanistan, ed. by A. Snetkov, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, St. Aris, 2013, p. 50. 3 For more details, see: F. Tolipov, “Strategic Friction in Afghanistan and Geopolitical Reversal in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (56), 2009.

93 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS tries outside the Alliance (over forty countries in all). This means that ISAF can be described as a unique coalition of countries. As the date of pullout draws closer, the international coalition has gradually been losing its original vigor; the public in the NATO member states has been growing more and more irritated by the continued presence of their military contingents in Afghanistan. NATO, in turn, has been talking about “fatigue” as the reason behind the planned withdrawal. This is another manifestation of “non-traditional” nature (or, better, aberration) of military- political and strategic thinking. In other words, a psychological state (fatigue) predetermined the strategic decision. Let us sum up some of military and strategic results of the operation launched in October 2001 as the War on Terror, rather than the war against al-Qa‘eda or Osama bin Laden. Has this aim been achieved? Who won the war and who lost it? Carl von Clausewitz, a classic of the art of warfare, wrote in his fundamental work On War that the nature of war should be identified at the earliest stages. In the first place, he wrote, we should “impose our will on the enemy”; “it follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or disarm him—call it what you will—must always be the aim of warfare.”4 And further: “If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter—though not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.”5 A correct assessment of the situation calls for a clear idea about the war, its tasks, and outcome. The aim of the war/operation waged in Afghanistan has not (yet) been attained: the coalition’s will has not been imposed on the enemy. The Taliban was not disarmed and was not deprived of its opportunity to fight. The war is drawing to an end, but the moral incentives and will power of the fighting sides have not been quenched or even partly suppressed. This means that the strategy used in Afghanistan should be correctly assessed and, if necessary, corrected. What is said about the nature and the meaning of the operation (or war) in Afghanistan is gradually changing: today, less is said about counter-terrorism and increasingly more about counterinsurgency. This suggests a simple question: Are there terrorists in Afghanistan? Al-Qa‘eda rather than the Taliban, which when in power in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin Laden and refused to extradite him, is described as a terrorist organization. The new rhetoric is justified by the absence of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, which is not completely true for two reasons.  First, the NATO countries, the United States in particular, have their own definitions of terrorism. Their invasion of Afghanistan rested on their domestic laws related to military operations outside state borders, in this case retaliation for 9/11.  Second, there are several international conventions related to the struggle against terror, some of them applicable in Afghanistan. It should be said that the lessons of the Afghan campaign offer a chance to start talking about a universal convention on antiterrorist struggle that can provide an acceptable definition of terrorism.

4 C. von Clausewitz, On War, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 31. 5 Ibid., p. 16.

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I am convinced that terrorism is the most dangerous and cruelest type of premeditated and ideologically motivated violence accompanied by spreading fear among the people with the desire to force state power and governance bodies, international organizations, and physical and legal persons to act or refrain from action to gain political, ideological, or personal criminal aims.6 The anti-rebel rhetoric can probably be explained by the desire to talk members of the Taliban into returning to peaceful life (no one, however, should talk to terrorists). Washington and the Karzai government, which for many years (from the moment it came to power) had been trying to start a dialog with the Taliban, failed for the simple reason that the initiative in this and similar cases should belong to the weaker side facing imminent defeat, rather than the stronger one. Those who say that there is no military solution to the Afghan problem and that the country needs a coalition government of all major fighting groups refer to the foreign military presence in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s irreconcilable position. These people are wrong: the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, which came to power in Afghanistan, began long before the international coalition brought its troops into the country, while the 9/11events are directly related to the Taliban’s refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden. The thesis of a coalition government is wrong for the following reasons: (1) No coalition government will be functional enough in a country with a prohibitively high corruption level. (2) None of the fighting factions (the Taliban included) has ever made statements about their programs and aims; the distribution of portfolios according to the principle “the wolves are sated and the sheep intact” will hardly discontinue the perpetual strife. (3) The conflict in Afghanistan has gone beyond its frontiers, yet destructive interference will not bring peace and stability. In other words, certain external forces do not want peace and stability in the country and no coalition government can change this. It seems that those who are working on the concept (or model) of the country’s post-conflict rehabilitation have run into so-called friction (described in detail by Clausewitz). The widely discussed Afghan-led peace process and a coalition government are impossible for the reasons outlined above. The so-called moderate Taliban is another factor that drove the country into the situation of friction. In an effort to stumble across a formula of peace and stabilization and split the ranks of the rebels, the Afghan government and international coalition started talking about the possibility of drawing “moderate” Taliban members into the coalition government by tempting them with security, jobs, and education opportunities. This suggests at least three very logical questions: (1) What are the criteria of “moderate” Taliban members; what does it mean to be moderate and, if there are moderate Taliban members, what are they doing in the ranks of the rebels/ terrorists? (2) Even if there are “moderates” and even if they can be returned to normal life, what will the “radicals” do? (3) Why did the government, which promises the “moderates” protection, support, and even education, fail to offer them this when they were peaceful Afghans? The possible answers to the above are not easy, if at all possible, to find. The same can be said about “moderate” Taliban members. This invites a fourth question: How do the rebels draw new fighters into their ranks?

6 See: F. Tolipov, “Ispytanie geopolitiki terrorizmom i antiterrorizmom,” SShA-Canada, EPK, No. 3, 2002.

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On the one hand, the militants sustain losses in fighting and special operations, while on the other, they replenish the losses with peaceful Afghans. This deserves closer attention and adequate measures—it is not enough to register the fact and call on the rebels to resume a peaceful life. The Afghan government and the coalition forces must be resolved to stem the process, identify the reasons for which peaceful people join the ranks of militants, and look into the mechanisms and sources of conscription, which constitute a very specific problem. An analysis of strategic friction in Afghanistan shows that it has enriched the world community with a unique experience of ups and downs of the counterterrorist struggle. This experience should be treated as a lesson to be learned: the struggle against terror is still going on in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. Failure in Afghanistan will mean defeat in the world—terrorism and antiterrorist efforts will always work against each other; they will flare up in different corners of the world with corresponding geopolitical adjustments.7 Terror and warlordism in Afghanistan must be liquidated. It should be said that the term “post-conflict rehabilitation” normally applied to countries that have emerged from a conflict cannot be applied to Afghanistan where the real situation is very different: suffice it to mention the alarmist expectations of its closest neighbors and the fact that there was no victory in the war on terror unfolding in its territory.

Guns are Talking, and the Muses Should Be Heard Too

Can there be a war with no victor? Can hostilities end without any clear results? “The key element in ending the campaign is the realization that terrorism is a ‘highly problematic means of bringing about change,’ a realization that requires, among other things, inflicting de- moralizing losses on the terrorists through military action and law enforcement activities; it also requires convincing the terrorists themselves that they have been defeated politically or at least they cannot succeed and actively deterring sponsors who support terrorist groups, and eliminating the conditions that gave the terrorists legitimacy in the beginning.”8 The above is in tune with the classical: “The real fruits of victory are won only in pursuit.”9 Over 500 Taliban fighters were freed from prisons in the last 15 months as part of a reconciliation program, the wisdom of which is doubted. According to private Afghan 1TV Channel, 536 people (including Pakistani citizens) were set free, 224 of them had been imprisoned as suicide attack sus- pects. The closest aides of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, were also released from prison on the strength of decrees signed by President Karzai and on the initiative of the High Peace Council. This, however, failed to involve the Taliban in the talks with Kabul. According to the same source, most of those amnestied returned to the rebel ranks.10 The report of RAND Corporation said that “it would be detrimental to U.S. national security to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, as the United States has done in Iraq. The United States should continue to conduct counterterrorist operations and assist the Afghans in conducting

7 See: F. Tolipov, “Strategic Friction in Afghanistan and Geopolitical Reversal in Central Asia.” 8 A.J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror,” in: Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century, ed. by H. Strachan, A. Herberg-Rothe, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 211. 9 C. von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 201. 10 See: “Osvobozhdenie zakliuchennykh talibov ne pomoglo Afghanistanu v dele primireniia s povstantsami,” available at [https://afghanistan.ru/doc/70573.html].

96 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 counterinsurgency after 2014. The reason is straightforward: there are several militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan that threaten U.S. security and its interests overseas, including al-Qae‘da (which still retains its core leadership along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (which has conducted terrorist attacks in the region and had operatives arrested in the United States), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (which was involved in the 2010 Times Square explosion in New York City), and Haqqani Network (which has conducted numerous attacks against U.S. forces and the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan) among others.”11 Today, the situation in Afghanistan is far from stable and it might become even worse. This is a serious problem related to the emergence of a new world order. British scholar Ken Booth, one of the most prominent representatives of the Critical Security Studies (CSS), has pointed out that as distinct from “the dismal ideology of political realism,” (p. viii) which speaks of violence as inevitable in international affairs and is convinced that force should be countered by force, the school of “world order” can supply the most exact and comprehensive formula of progressive change. It defends such values as non-violence, economic fairness, human rights, humane governance, and sustainable development.12 CSS concentrates on the individual rather than a state or any other group of people; much attention is paid to ethics and morality, while it is suggested that security should be achieved through so-called emancipatory politics. The British academic has written: “Emancipation is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and col- lectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions;” this is a discourse of human self-realization and the politics which encourages this. “Security and community are the guiding principles, and at this stage of history the growth of a universal human rights culture is central to emancipatory politics.”13 This approach can be accepted, but we should not ignore the “using force against force” principle.  First, the state has been and remains the central entity of international relations with its monopoly on the use of force;  second, emancipatory politics cannot be applied to terrorists who are unaware of “a universal human rights culture.” I would like to point out here that the “Afghan problem” calls for more differentiated approach. The new theory offers a wider security concept based in systemic securitization of the national prospects of Afghanistan which describes security as military, regulatory, legal, cultural and economic problem. This brings to mind the fairly popular “When guns talk, the Muses fall silent” which can be changed to, “guns are talking, and the Muses should be heard too.” In other words, a systemic approach is needed to pool military and non-military efforts based on systemic securitization of the Afghan perspective. These systemic efforts should consist of the following: (1) Improving the information dimension of the campaign. This should be done to end the domination of alarmist, superficial, simplified, and highly distorted ideas about the situation in Afghanistan and in the region; consistently and insistently repeated they create

11 S. Jones, After the Withdrawal: A Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on 19 March, 2013, available at [www.rand.org]. 12 See: K. Booth, “Beyond Critical Security Studies,” in: Critical Security Studies and World Politics, ed. by K. Booth, Viva Books, New Delhi, Kolkata, 2005, p. 267. 13 K. Booth, “Emancipation,” in: Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 181.

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corresponding expectations. Here is a typical example: “The American withdrawal in 2014 will transform Russia’s southern border into a frontline… To call a spade a spade, the Taliban, now in control of 70 percent of Afghan territory, is winning the war against the U.S. and NATO troops. Having seized power in the mountainous country, the Taliban will pour into the post-Soviet space like a stream of iron. Russia might become a warring state.”14 Similarly absurd, false, or even provocative statements create a strategic “neverland” and might interfere with unbiased decision-making. The time has come to clarify what we know about the alleged re-Talibanization of Afghanistan. There are many more reasons to say that after 2014 the country will become a “Taliban-free zone.” This should not be taken to mean that there will no Taliban members left; this means that their advent to power looks extremely doubtful. Over half of the country’s population describes the Taliban as the most dangerous of forces; a mere 8 percent believe that it will regain power once the counterterrorist mission has been com- pleted.15 Much is said about the civilian deaths caused by ISAF; few people, however, point out that about 80 percent of the civilian deaths are caused by fighters.16 Indeed, if the Tali- ban remain in control of 70 percent of the country’s territory it will mean that the U.S. and ISAF had done nothing during their twelve years in Afghanistan. 2. Active articulation and stronger emphasis on the regulatory and international components of studies, reports, discussions, political rhetoric, and strategic solutions. In all wars there are guilty parties, which means, and this constitutes a central point of the international antiterrorist strategy, that they should be identified. The classical theory related the concept of strategy to the individual state that was implementing it. Today, we can talk about international strategy (or the strategy of the world community): in this respect the current efforts in the international security sphere are non-traditional. We should not forget the special role of the United Nations created by its regulatory authority, which is unavailable to other organizations and states. The U.N. should be firm and principled when dealing with Afghanistan as a whole and the Taliban in particular. For example, it could condemn the terrorists/rebels in specific terms (that is, by name) rather than abstractly; it should refuse to accept the governance of Taliban after the pullout of 2014. It seems, however, that instead of governing the process of rehabilitation and securitization of Afghanistan, the U.N. remains in the shadow of NATO and the United States. Meanwhile, the U.N. leadership could have deprived the rebels of their trump card of anti- Americanism. The U.N. should show the world that the presence of the counterterrorist coalition in Afghanistan is not an American campaign or geopolitics American-style; it is rather inter-

14 M. Albanov, A. Primov, “S boevikami nado umet ne tolko voevat, no i razgovariavt,” Mir novostey, No. 23 (1016), 5 June, 1013, available at [www.mirnov.ru]. 15 See: G. Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” Public Opinion Trends in Af- ghanistan, CSIS, 11 February, 2009. 16 See: A. Cordesman, “The Afghan-Pakistan War: A Status Report: 2009,” Center for Strategic and International Stud- ies, available at [www.csis.org/burke/reports], 18 June, 2009. In his report submitted to the U.N. SC by the United Nations, Special Representative for the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA Ján Kubiš pointed out that opposition groups are responsible for most of the civilian deaths (see: [http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Det ails&mid=15756&ItemID=37557&language=en-US]).

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national peacekeeping cooperation, which presupposes, among other things, an anti-terrorist struggle. The reports of the UNAMA (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Af- ghanistan) demonstrate that this organization has not yet completely revealed its potential and remains content with monitoring and diplomatic missions. So far, the U.N. has failed to demonstrate determination; this has been amply confirmed by the deaths of members of several international organizations (including the U.N.) killed on 17 January, 2014 in a Taliban attack at a Lebanon restaurant in Kabul. U.N. Sec- retary General Pan Ki Moon condemned the act, but failed to accuse the Taliban, which assumed responsibility. The OIC should become more active: it should express its opinion about what is going on in Afghanistan as corresponding or not corresponding to Islam. Amin Rashid, a prominent expert on Afghanistan, has pointed out that the West wrongly associates Islam with terrorism à la bin Laden and the Taliban: “Many Western commentators do not particularize the Taliban, but condemn Islam wholesale for being intolerant and anti-modern.”17 We should not forget that the Taliban is moved by religion; this means that the OIC should not remain indifferent to the fact that “Chief of the Pakistan Ulema Council Allama Tahir Ashrafi issued a fatwa which justified jihad and suicide bombers in Afghanistan”18 (for more on Pakistan’s role see below). There is a growing understanding that to remove the Taliban the world community should put an end to Islamic extremism in the region, a mission impossible in the near or medium-term future.19 3. The military campaign, sustainable governance, and economic development should be regarded as the cornerstones of Afghan settlement: “everything is geared toward security, everything affects security, and everything depends on security” should become the systemic approach to Afghanistan 2014. Security, on the other hand, depends on the continued presence of the peacekeepers. The future agreement between Kabul and Washington will help create a “security umbrella” for still weak and far from stable Afghanistan. Under a decree of President Obama, “the Department of State will set up a temporary organization to be known as the Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office (APSPO), a strategic partnership between the U.S. Government and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, promoting further security and stabilization, and transitioning to a normalized [U.S.] diplomatic presence in both countries.”20 This security agreement looks like a logical part of the U.S. Silk Road Strategy, according to many, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) being its prototype. This is what Frederick Starr has to say about the economic future of Afghanistan: he points out that security in Afghanistan will be determined by the level of its political stability and that its economic status should be improved as soon as possible. “The economy

17 A. Rashid, Taliban. Militant Islam, Oil & Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press, Nota Bene, 2000, pp. 211, 215. 18 K. Iskandarov, “The Pakistani Factor in the Afghan Conflict,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2013, p. 91. 19 See: M. Darkhor, S. Kafi, S. Sadati, “United States Strategy and Afghan National Security,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, Issue 3, 2013, p. 38. 20 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/executive-order-establishment-afghanistan-and-pakistan- strategic-partner].

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cannot wait… Given the extreme poverty in which most Afghans live, signs of economic progress have become the essential condition for political progress and social peace.”21 No matter how attractive, this approach leaves out the fact that the forces engaged in the struggle against the state and the international coalition, that is, rebels and terrorists, are not very concerned about the country’s economic status: they regularly attack humanitarian echelons carrying aid to the country’s population. The same authors have also pointed out: “The U.S. Geodetic Survey, on the basis of careful study, has announced the presence there of more than $1trillion in natural resources—fifty times Afghanistan’s current GDP. These riches include gas, oil, copper, iron, other minerals, and rare earths… This means opening internal, regional and continent-wide channels of transport and trade.”22 To achieve this and realize the country’s considerable economic potential, the destructive and anti-modernist forces must be defeated. Economic rehabilitation will require large foreign investments; this is absolutely correct, but that axiom should not disorient strategic considerations: neither investments, nor other forms of economic aid should detract the world community from the task of strategic importance, viz. liquidation of seats of terror in Afghanistan. Investors are invariably guided by their interests and specify the conditions they expect to find in the receiving country. Can Afghanistan be described as an attractive recipi- ent? The answer is obvious; it should be said that foreign investors demonstrate a lot of caution when dealing with stable and developed regions (Central Asia being one of them) because of the high corruption level, the “formal” democratic institutions, etc. 4. The military campaign should go on with a clearly defined aim. The absolute majority (71 percent) of Afghans believe that the talks with the Taliban should be conducted if and when it discontinues its armed struggle. Slightly more than one-third of the country’s population believes that the Afghan National Army will be able to defeat the anti-government forces on its own.23 It seems that the Taliban, no matter how strange, would have preferred the international forces remaining indefinitely in the country as the “raison d’être of the Taliban’s project:” withdrawal will deprive it of a “dear enemy.” Contrary to expectations, the Taliban did not trim its militant activities and did not rejoice at being heeded. Fighting and attacks on civilians and members of international organizations involved in the country’s rehabilitation are going on unabated. No wonder: the planned pullout with deprive the Taliban and other rebels of their business; their continued belligerence should be interpreted as a message: Do not leave because we will continue fighting even when you get out. The current operation is intended to preserve and defend the territories and win “the hearts and minds” of the local people. According to STRATFOR analysts, this strategy is indispensable for intelligence, which may decide how the war will end. “With a degree of security comes loyalty. With loyalty comes intelligence. If intelligence is the insurgent’s strategic advantage, this is the way to counter it. It strikes at the center of gravity of the insurgent. Intelligence is his strong suit, and if the insurgent loses it, he loses the war.”24

21 F. Starr, A. Farhadi, “Finish the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy. A Handbook of Projects,” Silk Road Paper, November 2012, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2012, p. 10, available at [www.silkroadstudies. org]. 22 Ibid., pp. 11-12, 7. 23 See: A. Cordesman, op. cit., pp. 79, 142. 24 G. Friedman, “Strategic Calculus and the Afghan War,” available at [http://www.stratfor.com/], 13 July, 2009.

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Strangely enough, STRATFOR insists that al-Qa‘eda should remain the main target, otherwise the strategic aim of the war becomes doubtful and the equation might change. These analysts prefer to ignore the totally proven fact of the Taliban’s responsibility for 9/11 and its close cooperation with al-Qa‘eda and other armed groups.25 “The High Peace Council (HPC) said that recent efforts undertaken by the U.S., Pak- istan and Saudi Arabia could mark critical steps toward the restoration of longstanding peace in Afghanistan.”26 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Pakistan recognized the Taliban regime; it is commonly believed that these countries have preserved their contacts with Tali- ban members. Until the failure of the talks in Doha, their influence in Afghanistan was regarded as an attempt to pacify the rebels. It seems that the convincing military victories of the coalition forces remain the key to final pacification. 5. Interaction between the CSTO and NATO in any form. This interaction would have been too premature at the height of the ISAF operations when NATO could not be detracted from the theater of war. Today, the time has come to talk about cooperation. Where might, resources, and political weight are concerned, the CSTO is inferior to NATO; yet the lower level and profile of the Western military presence in Central and South Asia after 2014 should be compensated for by certain collective and joint measures designed to preserve the security of all the countries in the macro-region. Today, the Central Asian countries that cooperate with NATO and CSTO put them between the “two fires”—the Euro-Asian and Euro-Atlantic security architectures; this creates a dilemma: the countries of the region cannot be members of the Western alliance, yet their cooperation, including the operation in Afghanistan, was efficient enough. Being marginally involved, the CSTO had no opportunity to prove its effectiveness; on the other hand, it remains the only collective security system in Eurasia that the countries of the region can join. In the context of NATO’s global outreach mission and its enlargement, any delay in a dialog with the CSTO will preserve the traces of the Cold War geopolitical tension and mutual mistrust between the sides. At the same time, the region’s countries should finally make their geopolitical choice: they have vacillated for over twenty years now. This requires an unbiased and reliable analysis of what is going on and of the essence and nature of all the security challenges; they should find their niche on the international arena. Meanwhile, any form of interaction between the CSTO and NATO will serve as a litmus-paper of sorts, a test for the modality of this choice and, on the whole, for the new architecture of international security. 6. Pakistan has concentrated all the problems of the South Asian security complex in its territory. To quote Professor Saikal, “for now, the priority must be the stabilization of Af- ghanistan and Pakistan. This cannot come soon enough.”27 Contacts between Pakistan and the Afghan militants is old news: in the 1980s, the ISI supported the Afghan mojaheddin; “in the 1990s, the ISI helped support the Taliban. Ac- cording to declassified U.S. documents, U.S. State Department officials understood that ‘ISI is deeply involved in the Taliban takeover in Kandahar and Qalat.’ ISI officers were deployed to such Afghan cities as Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad—and stationed in Pakistani consulates—to provide assistance and advice. Another U.S. intelligence assessment con-

25 S. Jones, op. cit. 26 “HPC Lauds U.S., Pakistani, Saudi Peace Efforts,” available at [http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/13357- hpc-lauds-us-pakistani-saudi-peace-efforts]. 27 A. Saikal, op. cit., p. 54.

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tended that the ISI was ‘supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food,’ and ‘using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces’.”28 Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid have written that until the Pakistani decision- makers attach more importance to stabilization of the Afghan government rather than concentrating on the Indian threat, the riot that stems from the bases in the territory of Pakistan will go on and on. Islamabad’s strategic aims fan its contradictions not only with Afghani- stan and India, but also with the United States (which has its interests in the region) and the international community.29

Conclusion

Carl von Clausewitz offers an instructive comment: “Conquering Moscow and half of Russia in 1812 was of no avail to Bonaparte unless it brought him the peace he had in view. But these suc- cesses were only a part of his plan of campaign: what was still missing was the destruction of the Russian army. If that achievement had been added to the rest, peace would have been as sure as things of that sort ever can be. But it was too late to achieve the second part of his plan; his chance had gone. Thus the successful stage was not only wasted but led to disaster.”30 The lesson is: peace can be reached only if the enemy is completely routed. Here is another example of the same: during World War II, the Soviet Union did not limit itself to driving away the German fascist troops from the Soviet territory, but defeated them in their own territory and forced the enemy to capitulate. At first glance, the anti-terrorist struggle looks non-traditional, yet its asymmetric nature and relative novelty should not dupe anyone into believing that terrorism cannot be eliminated, otherwise we could find ourselves in the grips of a strategic and mental paradox that says we can “win the battle but lose the war.” Today, state/international forces are waging a limited war in Afghanistan to draw the Taliban into a dialog. The Taliban, much weaker in the military respect, is engaged in a total war to expel or to liquidate the coalition troops. This asymmetry is not the result of a special, non-traditional threat, but of a completely traditional approach to it. German academic Wulf Lapins has analyzed the war in Afghanistan to arrive at the following conclusion: “The war in Afghanistan has been waged since 2001 very much in line with Carl von Clausewitz’ formula ‘the war is a mere continuation of politics by other means.’ This explains the talks with the Taliban… To the Taliban of Mullah Omar the talks with the U.S./Karzai (politics) look like continuation of the war.”31 This is the most sober and strategic opinion about the situation in Afghanistan. The strategy of international presence in Afghanistan should be readjusted on the basis of a systemic approach and the securitization process. I would like to point out that not only the future of Afghanistan, but the future of a new world order is being resolved today, which will define the political and moral status of the United States, Russia, and other Great Powers.

28 S. Jones, op. cit. 29 See: Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008. 30 C. von Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 226. 31 W. Lapins, “Kontsa voyny v Afghanistane ne vidno,” in: Afghanistan: nastoiashchee i budushchee. Stabilnost i bezopanost v Tsentralnoy Azii. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii, F. Ebert Fund, Almaty, 2011, p. 33.

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The main international actors will pay much more attention to the Central Asian countries as the closest neighbors of Afghanistan, which are unlikely to remain on the periphery of world processes; this has invigorated and will further invigorate their regional activity.

TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

Valeria GIANJUMIAN Post-Graduate Student, Chair of World Politics and International Relations, Russian-Armenian (Slavic) University (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

oday, the Southern Caucasus is best Zero Problems with Our Neighbors policy described as a scene of geopolitical formulated by the republic’s former Foreign T battles among Russia, Turkey, and Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, which make Tur- Iran, as well as between the United States and key’s more active involvement in all spheres the European Union. Each of the actors is pur- of its foreign political activities, building the suing its own political interests and nurturing Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku geopolitical axis as part its own ideas about the routes leading to the of the Zero Problems with Our Neighbors region’s stability and its incorporation into the policy, and establishing relations with Arme- world community. To achieve this and to ar- nia a far from simple process. The first steps rive at pragmatic political decisions fully tuned along this road have been taken: Turkey has to the geopolitical realities, political scientists formulated a Caucasus Stability and Coop- and other experts in international relations eration Platform; Armenia and Turkey have must study and identify the geopolitical trends signed a roadmap and the Zurich Protocols prevailing in the Southern Caucasus in the (the ratification of which was suspended by context of Turkish geostrategy in the region. the National Assembly of Armenia), while The author analyzes the transforma- Ankara has been seeking brokerage in the tions in Turkey’s foreign policy based on the Karabakh conflict.

KEYWORDS: Turkey, the Southern Caucasus, geopolitical interests, foreign policy course, the Zero Problems with Our Neighbors policy, the Justice and Development Party, the Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku axis, Armenian-Turkish normalization.

103 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Introduction

For different reasons and for a long time, the Southern Caucasus remained outside the scope of Turkey’s strategic interests. Everything changed when the Soviet Union fell apart, opening up new horizons for Ankara’s political impacts. Today, its rising determination to become the key regional power is accompanied by its reduced role as a guarantor of NATO’s borders and the slower pace of the talks on its EU membership. Turkey’s foreign policy course in the Southern Caucasus rests on three major issues.  First, its regional ambitions demand more impressive economic and political might.  Second, disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed Turkey to drop its main foreign policy principle, i.e. non-interference in regional processes and conflicts. This readjustment involved Turkey, directly and indirectly, in the developments in the Balkans and the Northern and Southern Caucasus. Its Zero Problems with Our Neighbors doctrine presupposes, among other things, support of the region’s Muslim and Turkic peoples, which contradicts, to a certain extent, the EU policies. Moreover, within the North Atlantic Alliance, Ankara is following its own strategic course: in 2003, its parliament refused the coalition use of its territory for launching attacks on Iraq.  Third, some think that stronger Turkic and Islamic factors in the country’s new foreign policy course have already stirred up nationalist sentiments in some population groups.1 The Ukrainian developments suggested that “separated by the Black Sea, the fate of Ukraine and the countries of the South Caucasus is intimately connected and that the South Caucasus is a most likely area for … further geopolitical mayhem,”2 an opinion shared by many; this means that the situation in the region will change dramatically. It is expected that Turkey, carried away by its ambitions, will find itself involved in the opposition between two extra-regional power centers and will remain devoted to its pragmatic foreign policy fully adjusted to its geostrategic interests in the region. Today, Turkey has been showing its more active foreign policy involvement by contributing to the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia geopolitical alliance that is taking shape; it has already formulated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and made an attempt to normalize its relations with Armenia in the form of the two signed Protocols mentioned above; it claims one of the key roles in settling the Karabakh conflict and the status of an energy hub.

Turkey Readjusts Its Foreign Policy Course

The events that have been unfolding in the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus forced Ankara to revise its foreign policy course to claim the role of a regional power in its own right. It has succeeded thanks to its faster economic growth and the fundamentally new political situation inside the country: since 2002 the country has been dominated by the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party.

1 See: M. Aydin, “Twenty Years Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Threshold of the 21st Century,” in: Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. A Changing Role in World Politics, ed. by T. Ismael, M. Aydin, Ashgate, Burlington, 2003, pp. 16-17. 2 See, for example: S.E. Cornell, “Checking Putin’s Eurasian Ambitions,” available at [online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB10001424052702303532704579476972067682740].

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Disintegration of the Soviet Union allowed the country to abandon its fairly simple foreign policy ideas: Turkey as part of the Western world, loyalty to NATO, and involvement in the East- West confrontation. In a fairly narrow foreign policy framework, this course has allowed Turkey to reap political and economic dividends and enjoy guaranteed security. Everything changed when the Soviet Union left the scene: Ankara had to revise its relationship with its neighbors. Ahmet Davutoğlu, professor at Istanbul University, formulated a new foreign policy concept and developed it in his Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey’s International Position). The author based this new concept on a new foreign policy course suggested by the new balance of power and Turkey’s central role in international relations justified by its unique geographic location at the crossroads of important sea, land, and air routes that tie together Europe, Asia, and Africa. The author has also written that “it shifts Turkey’s self-perception as being on the periphery to the understanding that the country is in the very center of important historical developments” and that it was not merely a member of secondary importance either of the EU or of NATO, or simply a part of Asia.3 When appointed foreign minister, he transformed his ideas into the Zero Problems with Our Neighbors doctrine, which presupposed that Turkey consolidate its regional position by pursuing a more constructive foreign policy. Guided by the Justice and Development Party, Turkey is pursuing the following six foreign policy goals formulated by Davutoğlu: (1) achieving a new level of balance between security of the state and individual freedom; (2) achieving settlement of all disagreements with neighbors; (3) engaging in active diplomacy designed to avoid crises; (4) consistently strengthening relations with all states; (5) achieving the country’s more active involvement in international organizations; (6) establishing the country’s new image as a center of power at the regional and global levels.4 This means that under the guidance of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey has abandoned its previous and fairly unbalanced foreign policy course and its strong bias toward the West and the U.S.  First, it has become aware of itself as a Muslim country and,  second, it has claimed the role of a broker in the key geopolitical territory stretching from the Balkans and Palestine to Iran and Afghanistan: the country is leaning toward the Mus- lim world rather than toward the West. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry has been demonstrating much more independence, which has inevitably cooled Turkey’s relations with the EU and America. Disappointed by the lack of progress and the fairly slack talks on Turkey’s EU membership, the country’s leaders have chosen the following: (1) Strategic relations with Russia; (2) Revised relations with Iran and Syria; (3) Involvement in the conflicts with Israel;

3 See: A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu), Istanbul, 2001. 4 See: “Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors,” available at [www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-problems-with-our- neighbors.en.mfa].

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(4) An active policy in the Black Sea-Caspian area; (5) Wider cooperation with most of the Soviet successor-states in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia; (6) After a ten-year “lull,” implementation of a plan to establish a so-called Turkic belt, which will allow Turkey to gain serious political and economic dividends in Eurasia despite its fifty-year role as an outpost of NATO. It should be said that soft power also plays a certain role: secular Turkey is a Eurasian country in the full sense of the word, which invariably confirms its devotion to the Western institutions and maintains cultural, religious, and ethnic contacts (rooted in the distant past) with the peoples living between the EU and India. Historical experience and poly-mentality allow the Turks to negotiate barriers that the West is unable to surmount. The somewhat cooler relations between the U.S. and Turkey do not speak of contradictions between the two countries; they show that Turkey is working on a pragmatic policy in tune with the world processes and adequate to its long-term forecasts of regional and global developments. It turned out, however, that the doctrine could not be implemented because of the insurmountable difficulties, while Ankara’s hectic activities failed to bring the desired results. The Arab Spring, for example, revealed that Turkey could not harmonize its own interests, which belong to different spheres. The failed reconciliation with Armenia can be described as another fiasco of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy course. At first glance, the Sothern Caucasus and Central Asia are still lingering on the periphery of Turkey’s foreign policy interests to be remembered when Ankara runs into disagreements with Wash- ington and Brussels. On the other hand, bilateral relations with the South Caucasian and Central Asian countries are accompanied by Ankara’s obvious attempts to dominate in these regions. So far, Turkey is not the main actor in the Southern Caucasus, while its claims contradict, to a certain extent, the strategic interests of Russia, Iran, and the United States there. Russia’s and Turkey’s interests in the Southern Caucasus change frequently, which means that conflicts are not far away and that relations among the region’s states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) might also be endangered. At the same time, Turkish interests there correspond to the interests of the United States and the EU. Brussels is ready to give Ankara a carte blanche to be actively involved in the region, establish and maintain bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, and create a more favorable economic climate in the region. On the whole, the Turkey-EU-Southern Caucasus axis is not conflict-prone. The United States, which is pursuing its own strategic interests in the region, wants to control everything going on there to prevent “reanimation” of Russia’s position and keep Iran away from the Muslim areas of the South- ern Caucasus. This explains why the U.S. is opposed to Turkey’s strong and growing influence there and tries to control all attempts at integration.

Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku Geopolitical Axis

The axis that is taking shape before our eyes is based on the geopolitical interests shared by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan engaged in joint energy and transportation projects and military- 106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 political cooperation. Each of them concentrates on its own interests; on the whole, however, these interests correspond to the policy pursued by the U.S. and the EU in the region, which have already made ambitious energy and transportation projects possible. The oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and gas pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) projects were designed with the active involvement of the United States; today it is actively lobbying the so-called Southern Gas Corridor project designed to bring Caspian gas to Europe and leave Rus- sia out in the cold. Speaking at the Caspian Oil & Gas 2013, Amos J Hochstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary for En- ergy Diplomacy, officially supported the project.5 In the past, Washington was also an active supporter of the Nabucco project, which proved to be forbiddingly expensive and, therefore, unrealizable. The Nabucco-West gas pipeline, another pet project expected to bring gas from the Turkish- Bulgarian border to the borders of Austria, was also abandoned. On 26 June, 2013, a consortium of companies supported the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline—TAP project which will bring Azeri gas to Europe.6 The axis formation is accompanied by tripartite summits as a way to coordinate the foreign policy moves and economic activities of the countries involved. On 19 February, 2014, Ganja hosted a third meeting of the foreign ministers of the three countries (the first was held in 2012 in Trabzon; the second, in 2013 in Batumi), which confirmed that their determination to build a triple alliance of sorts or a “union of the countries on the banks of River Kura”7 remained unshakable. On 6 May, 2014, the presidents of these countries took part in the 2014 Tbilisi Summit.8 It should be said that these countries coordinate their actions in international forums and organizations and harmonize their positions on regional conflicts. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey demonstrated a coordinated approach and voted together with the countries that supported Resolution A/68/L.39 on Territorial Integrity of Ukraine at the U.N. General Assembly.9 The economy is another important part of their strategic cooperation. The share of Turkic capital in the non-energy sectors of Georgia and Azerbaijan is rising. However, Turkey remains as determined as ever to become an energy hub, where the routes of Caspian energy resources meet, which will increase its geopolitical weight in the Southern Caucasus; it hopes to move the larger part of energy resources intended for several European states across its territory.10 The recent events in Ukraine rekindled an interest in bringing energy to Europe bypassing Rus- sia, a target of American and EU sanctions. The Caspian Forum Brussels 2014 discussed how the Southern Gas Corridor would be implemented and how natural gas from Azerbaijan would be brought to Europe by TAP in 2018.11 Mean- while, it remains unclear whether the pipeline will be profitable enough and whether there is enough gas in Azerbaijan to meet the fairly substantial European demands.

5 See: “Cumhurbaşkanı Aliyev ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yetkilisini Kabul Etti,” available at [www.1news.com.tr/ azerbaycan/siyaset/20130605102354059.html]. 6 See: “Bay bay Nabucco!,” available at [hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=23594472]. 7 “Türkiye, Azerbaycan ve Gürcistan Kura’da Buluşacak,” available at [http://www.ardahanhaberleri.com/haber/3862/ turkiye-azerbaycan-ve-gurcistan-kurada-bulusacak]. 8 See: “Türkiye-Gürcistan-Azerbaycan Üçlü Zirvesi Başladıw,” available at [ww.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/89419/ turkiyegurcistan azerbaycan-uclu-zirvesi-basladi.html]. 9 See: “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling Upon States Not To Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region,” available at [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/ga11493.doc.htm]. 10 See: T.D. Adams, “Caspian Oil and Gas Development and the Black Sea Region: An Overview,” in: Europe’s Black Sea Dimension, CEPS, Brussels, 2002, pp. 47-52, 60-68. 11 See: “Caspian Forum Brussels 2014,” available at [www.caspianforum.org/news/caspian_forum_brussels_2014_563. aspx].

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The planned Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB) railway is another important project; in the future this route, which is expected to connect Turkey and Georgia by railway, will be linked to the railway network already functioning in Azerbaijan. If the Marmarai underwater railway tunnel under the Bosporus is built, it will be connected in the east with the planned railway-sea route between Baku and Aktau in Kazakhstan and will go on to China. This will make KATB part of a railway route between Asia and Europe, shorter than the one used today.12 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are also interested; their presidents have pointed out that the Navoi-Turkmenbashi-Baku-Tbilisi-Kars transportation project will be even more important, since it will give the Central Asian countries access to international markets. Seen from Ankara, the KATB is an important instrument to be used to promote its geopolitical and geo-economic interests and to stay connected to the Turkic states. The Kars-Gumri-Tbilisi road is already functioning in the Southern Caucasus, but so far it has been impossible to involve Armenia in the project: the Armenian-Turkish border remains closed because Ankara sides with Baku on the Karabakh issue. The military component is an important part of relations among Azerbaijan, Turkey and Geor- gia. Turkey is one of the main weapon suppliers to Georgia and Azerbaijan; it also owns military facilities there. The three countries’ military-technical cooperation is part of the region’s ongoing militarization. Turkey, a NATO member, is not only leading Azerbaijan and Georgia toward the Al- liance, but is also extending military assistance. Joint military exercises of the three countries have become a regular feature of this cooperation: between 26 November and 3 December, 2012, special groups from the three countries conducted training exercises in Ankara. In April 2013, Defense Minister of Georgia Irakli Alasania announced at a conference that Turkey and Azerbaijan would join the Georgian-American military exercises planned for 2014.13 There is an opinion that very soon we will see a new military bloc in the Southern Caucasus that will unite Ankara, Tbilisi, and Baku—the reasons for this supposition are ample. There are talks, at the expert level, of setting up a single Azeri-Turkish army; Zahid Oruc, a member of the security and defense committee in the Azerbaijan parliament, who revealed these plans, said that the new formula “One nation, one army” is more preferable than the old one “One nation, two states.”14 Some think that the two countries are working on a military agreement with very specific mutual obligations in the event of aggression against one of them.15 The Trabzon Declaration registered the new relations among Ankara, Tbilisi, and Baku, the first ever official document signed by the three countries that can be described as strategic. It pays particular attention to territorial integrity and the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan and Georgia; it also touches upon resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, settlement of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues, the Eurasian Transport Corridor, new tripartite projects, completion of the KATB, etc.16

12 See: “S tseliu stroitelstva zh/d Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi budet ob’iavlen mezhdunarodny tender,” available at [www. regnum.ru /news/602097.html]. 13 See: “Turtsia i Azerbaijan vozmozhno prisoediniatsia k sovmestnym gruzino-amerikanskim voennym ucheniiam,” available at [mca.su/v-mire/blizhnij-vostok/turciya-blizhnij-vostok/turciya-i-azerbajdzhan-vozmozhno-prisoedinyatsya-k- sovmestnym-gruzino-amerikanskim-voennym-ucheniyam/]. 14 “‘Odna natsia, edinaia armiia’: Baku i Ankara formiruiut edinuiu armiiu,” available at [www.regnum.ru/news/ polit/1691679.html]; [https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=623806141010105&id=558590324198354]. 15 See: “NATO podtalkivaet Azerbaijan i Turtsiiu k zakliucheniiu voennogo soglashenia?,” available at [news.am/rus/ news/202069.html]. 16 See: “Trabzon Declaration,” Trabzon, 8 June, 2012, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.az, http://www.mfa.gov.tr, http://www.mfa.gov.ge].

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The pace at which economic and military-political integration among Ankara, Baku, and Tbili- si is going and the frequent summits suggest that there is a trend toward a strategic alliance among Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

Turkish-Armenian Relations through the Prism of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Southern Caucasus

Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is a linchpin of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s foreign policy doctrine Zero Problems with Our Neighbors. Turkey was one of the first to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Armenia. In 1993, however, a U-turn in Ankara’s foreign policy priorities ruptured diplomatic relations with Armenia and their common border was closed. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a stumbling block in its own right, revealed a vast number of unsettled problems. Today, border opening is associated with a Karabakh settlement according to the scenario written in Baku. Today, relations between Ankara and Erevan are better described as a dilemma. On the one hand, an open border would create a strong stimulus for their normalization and development. Armenia could acquire access to Turkish territory and the sea and further on to Europe, a great advantage for a landlocked country. On the other hand, Turkey is ready to normalize its relations with Armenia on certain conditions. Armenia is ready for unconditional normalization; Turkey is ready to open borders if Erevan abandons its attempts to achieve international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and accept a Karabakh settlement on Azerbaijan’s terms. It should be said that Turkey knows that the blockade of Armenia will not force Erevan to drop its efforts related to the genocide issue; indeed, while the borders remain closed, the attempts to gain international recognition of the Armenian Genocide will continue. The Turkish leaders know that open borders and mutually advantageous economic relations will push the international recognition issue into the background. The Armenian political community, the public and, to a certain extent, the Armenian diaspora will retreat from their present intransient positions when the shortest land route to Europe becomes accessible, when transborder trade improves the standard of living, when the state coffers fill with money earned by more active trade with Turkey and other countries, and when capital accumulation by big and medium local businesses becomes a reality. An open border will strengthen Turkey’s economic and political position in the Southern Cau- casus and open new avenues toward Karabakh settlement. Armenia will become less dependent on the Russian Federation; the Russian military base in Gumri will lose its present importance (this has already happened to the Russian bases in Ajaria and Javakheti). Open borders will confirm Turkey’s European choice with corresponding political and economic dividends; its readiness to talk to its neighbors and settle disagreements with improve Turkey’s image in the United States and Europe. The above suggests a question: Why is Turkey not hastening to restore diplomatic relations with Armenia? The answer is rooted in its relationship with Azerbaijan. Indeed, economic relations between Turkey and Armenia established before the Karabakh settlement will reduce to naught everything Azerbaijan has been doing to keep Armenia isolated and will raise a wave of indignation in 109 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Azerbaijan. Here is a telltale fact: as soon as the Zurich Protocols were signed the Turkish officials hastened to assure their partners in Baku that the protocols would not be ratified before the Karabakh issue was settled. In this context, we should bear in mind that Turkey regards the Armenian factor as part of its relationship with the West; as the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide approaches, Ankara will probably rely on the entire range of its foreign policy instruments to alleviate the very probable international pressure. On 24 April, 2014, Recep Erdoğan issued a statement in which he said that the events of 1915 were “inhumane” and “we wish that the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the early twentieth century rest in peace, and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.” He also described the incidents of that time as “our shared pain.” Speaking on the same occasion, the Turkish Foreign Minister said that the current situation created common historical ground on which the two sides could discuss ways to establish a new future. The Turkish leaders tried to improve their country’s international image or, at least, among their Western colleagues; they demonstrated their determination to soften the fairly firm international position on the recognition of the 1915 events as Armenian Genocide. It seems that “Erdoğan’s surprising statement on the Armenian issue came just one day before 24 April, when the Armenians commemorate the events they describe as a genocide that took place under Ottoman rule. The statement was issued by the Prime Minister on 23 April in nine languages—Turkish, German, French, English, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Western Armenian and Eastern Armenian—in a move to make sure that the statement was heard and understood by a wide audi- ence.” I have written above that Turkey is exerting immense efforts to stem the process of recognition of these events as Armenian Genocide. According to Osman Bengur (an American expert with Turkish roots), “by some accounts, approximately 70 percent of the Turkish Embassy’s time in Washington is spent trying to persuade leading Americans to support the Turkish position on the Armenian question.”17 Turkey’s political move described above was supported in the West. The U.S. Department of State perceived it as evidence of better relations between the Turkish and Armenian peoples. What is more, some analysts think that “Erdoğan’s statement was cooked up in collaboration with the U.S. government.”18 Armenia, in turn, interpreted this address as another attempt to deny and conceal the fact of the Armenian Genocide.19 This means that relations between the two countries remain unregulated probably because the sides are not equally interested in their normalization. The chances are few in the short- or even mid- term perspective—we are pinning our hopes on the more distant future.

Conclusion

The above can be summed up in the following way. The Soviet Union’s disintegration opened up new horizons for Turkey in the Southern Cauca- sus, which transformed it into one of the key regional countries. Its efforts to achieve geopolitical domination there were largely prompted by the fact that both the U.S. and the EU regarded it as a force capable of bringing together the Turkic-speakers of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

17 O. Bengur, “Turkey’s Image and the Armenian Question,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2009, p. 45. 18 “Erdoğan Pledges New Reforms Amid Mounting Western Criticism on Rights,” available at [http://www.todayszaman. com/news-346809-erdogan-pledges-new-reforms-amid-mounting-western-criticism-on-rights.html]. 19 See: “Prezident Armenii otvetil Erdoganu,” available at [www.voskanapat.info/?p=7419].

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This is explained by the West’s desire to prevent possible reanimation of Russia’s position in the Caucasus and Iran’s stronger position in the Muslim areas. The scenario written in the West included the Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku axis based on their common economic and political interests. For obvious reasons, each of the countries concentrates on its own geopolitical interests, but, on the whole, they correspond to American and EU policy in the Southern Caucasus. This has already made possible wide-scale energy and transportation projects. Turkey is striving to use its involvement in the Southern Caucasus to become an energy hub. Turkey’s foreign policy course within the Zero Problems with Our Neighbors doctrine ran into insurmountable complications. Its active foreign policy never brought the expected and desired results; the Arab Spring showed that Turkey could not harmonize its widespread and variegated interests. Ahmet Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy course failed with respect to Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. It should be said that being politically involved in the Southern Caucasus, Turkey has to take the interests of many players into account, all of them seeking their own advantages in the region. Turkey is actively cooperating with the extra-regional power centers: supported by the United States, it is building a geopolitical Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku axis that is basically anti-Russian. At the same time, it is developing its relations with Russia, especially in the energy and trade spheres.

IRAN IN RUSSIA’S CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY

Guli YULDASHEVA Ph.D. (Political Science), Member of the Expert Council for the Central Eurasia Analytical Project (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the role and place cow and Brussels to bring the Ukrainian cri- of Iran in Russia’s Central Asian poli- sis to an acceptable settlement. T cy and the impacts of the main foreign The above suggests the conclusion policy factors of the Middle East and the CIS. that Russia’s Iranian strategy is primarily This brings to the forefront Moscow’s based on interaction with the U.S. and the approach to its relations with Iran, the United EU as part of their common struggle against States, and the European Union, as well as Islamic extremism. They are working toward their development trends, discussed in the settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem context of the Ukrainian crisis and the pos- and Ukrainian stabilization. sible completion of talks on the Iranian nu- Today, the mounting threat of Islamic clear file. The author concentrates on Amer- extremism (emanating from Iraq), the geo- ica’s Middle East policy, the talks on Iran’s graphic proximity of Europe and Russia, and nuclear policy, and the joint efforts of Mos- the shared economic interests of the United 111 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

States, the EU, and Russia caused by the In fact, the situation in the Central global nature of common security mean that Asian countries that are seeking political we can expect their gradual drawing closer and economic security largely depends on together, the scope and the nature of which whether the main players involved in the Ira- will depend on the level of future compro- nian developments will reach an acceptable mises on the Ukrainian crisis and Iran. balance of interests.

KEYWORDS: Russia, Iran, the U.S., the EU, geopolitics, geo-economics, interest, extremism, security, strategy.

Introduction

Geographic proximity, security interests, and economic and geopolitical developments tie together the Iranian and Central Asian sectors of Russia’s foreign policy; the possible lifting of international sanctions from the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has imparted more priority to these factors and moved them to the forefront. If the EU and the U.S. gain even more influence in Iran and Central Asia, the level of Russia’s presence there will be significantly lower, which will do nothing for its geopolitical status. The possible completion of the talks of the Six (or P5+1 Group) with Iran has made it even more important for Moscow to get unhampered access to energy resources and control of the Central Asian transportation and communication corridors in order to continue developing a unified economic zone (which should include Central Asia) and help the Russian government to reach key positions on the Caspian. These plans, if realized, will make Russia one of the main power centers of Eurasia, very much against Washington’s interests in the region. Coupled with the already existing disagreements, this factor will add to the geopolitical tension. Evgeny Lukyanov, Deputy Secretary of the RF Security Council, has pointed out in this connection: “The hegemony of the U.S.A. on the world stage has come to an end … we need to sit down and negotiate the end of the cold war. No other organization apart from the U.N. and the UN Secu- rity Council can cope with the task.”1 The developments in the Middle East and Ukraine, as well as the rapidly approaching pullout of NATO forces from Afghanistan are supplemented with the spread of extremism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration: taken together they threaten the stability of Russia’s southern borders and its territorial integrity. Amid the never-ending geopolitical disagreements with Washington (exacerbated by the Ukrai- nian crisis) one of Moscow’s foreign policy priorities is to consolidate its partnership with Tehran in the most promising, including Central Asian, directions. Indeed, Iran might take on the task of ensuring continued stability in the RF Muslim regions and in the CIS countries to the south of Russia. This is possible because in the past there have been no more or less significant Sunni-Shi‘a disagreements between Iran and Central Asia. Indeed, their confessional disagreements never marred the peaceful relations these countries have been maintaining with Iran throughout history. Today, as in the past for that matter, their common cultural and civilizational Islamic identity was and remains important. The post-Soviet Muslims are attracted by Iran’s enlightened Islamic de-

1 [https://crazyivanreport.wordpress.com/category/cold-war/].

112 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 mocracy, which relies on the achievements of the West and the Islamic East. This is shown by the high level of the nation’s political culture and the fairly strong influence of the pro-Western elite and the youth on the domestic stage. Outside its borders, Iran plays a leading role in the Islamic world and is one of the OIC leaders, a fact recognized by other Islamic heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in particular. In the economic sphere, Iran offers the CA countries good opportunities to be involved in profitable energy, transportation, and transit projects and to reintegrate the region into the Silk Road project. In the military-political sphere, it can help oppose terrorist attacks and radical movements; today, it extends this type of assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Muslims of Russia and Central Asia appreciate these factors and opportunities and welcome constructive partnership with Iran. Iran believes that its relations with Russia are of key importance in the Greater Central East basin2 (the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean). In this context, Tehran does not exclude cooperation with Russia in the oil and gas sphere. It, however, has its own interests in the Middle East unrelated to Moscow: it has foreign policy and economic relations with the EU, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, etc. Continued disagreements between Iran and America, the still unregulated status of the Caspian, and the mounting instability in the CIS, the Middle East, and South Asia are forcing Iran to add flex- ibility to what it is doing in the region. This means that its cooperation with Russia might counterbalance America’s moves in the region. Russia and Iran have been pooling their efforts to draw the Central Asian countries into their cooperation sphere; on the whole, this correlates with implementation of the transportation and pipeline strategy, which both countries find geopolitically advantageous. The following factors will make Russia’s Iranian strategy successful: — U.S. policy in the Middle East; — The results of the talks on the Iranian nuclear file; — The results of partnership between Moscow and Brussels in settling the Ukrainian conflict.

U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Iraq

America’s policy in the Middle East figures prominently as one of the factors in Russian-Irani- an relations. Washington’s geopolitical and geo-economic designs in the form of the Greater Middle East project (later the Greater Central Asia strategy) and the New Silk Road Concept, which betrayed the intention to join the Middle East, Central and South Asia into a single whole, contradict Russia’s Eurasian integration projects with Iranian participation. This clash of interests explains the present confrontation between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. The Iraqi crisis has clarified the level and potential development trends of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran; its outcome will change the geopolitical balance of power. We all know that the fairly unexpected outburst of activity of the local Sunni organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in June 2014 in Iraq pushed the country to the brink of disintegration and, according to the concerted opinion of the Muslim community, might have caused global jihad and clashes between the Sunnis and Shias.

2 See: S.A. Naser, “Politika bezopasnosti Rossii,” Amu Darya, Tehran, No. 6, Fall 2000, pp. 17-18.

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The present crisis in Iraq has given birth to the following explanations of its origins: (1) Conspirological: America’s short-sighted policy is keeping the process going through the radical Sunni states, Saudi Arabia being one of them, to rearrange the Middle East according to its geopolitical interests. (2) Incompetent and inefficient policy of the Iraqi government headed by Nouri al-Maliki. (3) Nonconformity of state and ethnic borders. Conspirological theories look doubtful in the globalized world: the United States is hardly interested in fanning disagreements between Shi‘a Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia; likewise, it hardly needs new seats of tension and instability in the region.  First, Iran’s geographic location between the Near and Middle East adds to its geostrategic weight; continued instability and the “managed chaos” situation will threaten not only Washington’s Greater Central Asia strategy, but will potentially threaten the United States: the Muslim population of the United States has been steadily growing from 2.6 million in 2010 to reach the forecasted 6.2 million in 2030.3  Second, in the course of time it has become clear that Iran, which does not want disintegration of Central and South Asia and the Greater Middle East, is an important partner of the United States when it comes to ensuring security there. If the tension continues to climb, Iran’s military potential can be strengthened by armed contingents of the CSTO and SCO.  Third, Iran’s geo-economic potential should not be underestimated: it is no coincidence that the first American oil monopolies that came to the country in 1921 still find its resources attractive. It should be said that the New Silk Road project (which most regional states approve as profitable) cannot be implemented without the constructive involvement of Ira- nian companies: this is not only strategy, the issue is related to America’s image.  Fourth, the Obama Administration’s foreign policy shows that the American decision-makers are fully aware of the difference between Saudi Arabia pestered by problems and dynamically developing industrial Iran. This is the rationale of the efforts to find the best possible solution to the regional security problems that might lead to a compromise of sorts between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We should never forget that economically Riyadh depends on the United States and is tied to it by strategic agreements. Some American experts4 call for achieving a balance of interests between Saudi Arabia and Iran and constructive relations based on mutually advantageous deals. We all know that the Nouri al-Maliki government is incompetent and corrupt, yet many of Iraq’s problems have been caused by domestic factors. Most of the current conflicts are rooted in the countries’ past: colonial powers and their allies shifted borders at will with no thought for the local people. Not infrequently, changes of this type trigger civil wars and international conflicts: the borders between the Soviet Central Asian Republics can serve as a pertinent example.

3 See: V. Maltsev, “Soedinennye shariaty Ameriki. Okruzhenie Obamy podozrevaiut v sviaziakh s arabskimi radikalami?,” 1 July, 2014, available at [http://antiterrortoday.com/ru/glavnoe-segodnya/vybor-moderatora/4632-soedinennye-shariaty-ameriki-okruzhenie-obamy-podozrevayut-v-svyazyakh-s-arabskimi-radikalami], 5 July 2014. 4 See: E. Geranmayeh, “An Alliance of Convenience with Iran? Baghdad as ‘Exhibit A’,” 27 June, 2014, available at [http://www.payvand.com/news/14/jun/1184.html], 30 June, 2014; “Syria, Iran Join Fight against Iraq’s Militants, 27 June, 2014, available at [http://www.payvand.com/news/14/jun/1183.html], 27 June, 2014.

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This brings to mind the errors the Obama Administration made in the Middle East (in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere),5 which allows radicals to trickle from one territory to another. An objective approach to the Iraqi crisis demands correct identification of the two interrelated factors behind it: America’s inefficient Middle Eastern strategy and the incompetence of the Nouri al-Maliki government provided the radical movements with a chance first to consolidate and, in 2013, to unite into the ISIL. Some Russian experts think that the Iraqi developments may bring Iran and the U.S. closer. Indeed, on the eve of the final stage of the nuclear talks, Tehran would prefer stability in the neighboring territories with a large Shi‘a community, which plays a significant role in ensuring Iran’s interests in Syria. In an effort to settle the Iraqi crisis, Washington might find Iran’s military-political and other resources handy. In view of the possible displeasure of its traditional allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others), American experts are very cautious in their assessments of the future of American-Iranian relations. They are convinced, however, that the United States will be drawn into the Iraqi crisis, which will open the channels of communication between Tehran and Washington at the minimum level needed to stabilize the situation. The ideological conflict and rivaling interests, however, will not disappear.6 In the last few decades, it has become clear that in the interdependent world (in which the developments in any country might challenge mankind) any geopolitical rivalry should take into account all possible threats, the ISIL being one of them. Gilles de Kerchove, EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, said that it is “very likely that the ISIS ... maybe is preparing, training, directing some of the foreign fighters to mount attacks in Europe, or outside Europe.”7 American experts expect ISIL attacks on the United States.8 It seems that the threats emanating from Iraq and other Islamic states may lead to constructive partnership being restored between the U.S. and Russia: they may organize cooperation with Shi‘a Iran, an ally of both countries in this context. America’s approach to Moscow stems from its awareness of the threat of international terrorism emanating from the Greater Middle East. In turn, American experts stressed that the U.S., Europe, Japan, and even China want to see a prospering and stable Russia, a full-fledged partner in dealing with very serious world problems: nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy, and global warming.9 It is equally important to draw Moscow into constructive cooperation with the United States: this might stem Russia’s attempts to build a multipolar anti-American coalition. On the other hand, against the background created by the possible instability caused by the pullout from Afghanistan and the Iraqi crisis, continued American military presence in Central Asia suits Russia’s interests: it will

5 See: G.I. Yuldasheva, “K nekotorym aspektam politiki SShA na sovremennom etape: mnenie zarubezhnykh eksper- tov,” ANO, Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecasts, Moscow, 2 May, 2012; I. Konstantinov, “Istoki vozvysheniia Islamskogo gosudarstva Iraka i Levanta na Blizhnem Vostoke,” 7 July, 2014, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.ru/analyses/istoki-vozvysheniya-islamskogo-gosudarstva-iraka-i-levanta-na-blizhnem-vostoke/], 7 July, 2014. 6 See: Iran Nuclear Deal in Sight? / Interviewee: Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution / Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, 26 June, 2014, available at [http://www.cfr.org/ iran/iran-nuclear-deal-sight/p33190?cid=rss-analysisbriefbackgroundersexp-iran_nuclear_deal_in_sight?-062614], 30 June, 2014. 7 R. Simcox, “ISIS’ Western Ambitions. Why Europe and the United States Could Be the Militant Group’s Next Tar- get,” 30 June, 2014, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141611/robin-simcox/isis-western-ambitions], 4 July, 2014. 8 See: D. Byman, “Five Myths about the Islamic State,” 3 July, 2014, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/five-myths-about-the-islamic-state/2014/07/03/f6081672-0132-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html], 3 July, 2014. 9 See: Washington ProFile, 7 February, 2007-23 June, 2007 (see also: Washington ProFile, 14 June, 2007).

115 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS keep extremist Islam from the region and counterbalance China’s growing might. This suggests that Washington is unlikely to introduce more anti-Russian sanctions, this possibility testified by Ameri- ca’s fairly balanced approach to Moscow. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia (probably the main enemy of Iran) does not want to aggravate its relations with Tehran still further. Riyadh, which has made the struggle against Islamic extremism its official policy, is moving closer to Tehran: a recent bilateral summit discussed the problems of regional security created by the ISIL radicals and the situation in Gaza.10 Iran is not alien to long-term planning in the region, and its plans are not always related to Moscow. This is confirmed by the steadily increasing diversification of its foreign policy and economic preferences and means that much will depend on Russia and Iran’s skills to build their mutually advantageous political relations and coordinate their actions with other external actors (the U.S. in particular) in the sphere of security and the economy.

Partnership with the EU on the Ukrainian Crisis

The future of Iranian-Russian relations will be shaped, among other things, by the nature and dynamics of cooperation between Russia and the EU on the settlement in Ukraine. So far, their relations remain frozen: the harsh anti-Russian sanctions introduced by the EU and the U.S. are still in place. This and the international pressure on Iran because of its nuclear file have brought Iran and Russia somewhat closer. The sides have already signed a memorandum on more active economic cooperation and are discussing a multi-billion contract on Iranian oil. Iran’s future SCO and BRICS membership is also being discussed: this will allow the member countries to defend their interests in the current highly competitive globalization context. It is obvious, however, that Russia (which is in a crisis) does not have enough resources to satisfy dynamic economic growth in Iran, while the problems faced by the SCO and BRICS during their transitional development will make it impossible for them to be competitive in the near future.11 On the other hand, there is an objective economic interdependence between Russia and the EU. This means that as the disagreements over Ukraine subside, the sides will arrive at balanced and constructive cooperation in which Iran will also be involved. Russia is the European Union’s third largest trade partner: in 2013, it accounted for 9.5% of external trade, about 7% of export, and 12% of import.12 “Russia meets one-third of the EU’s need for oil and natural gas and almost one-quarter of its need for coal and oil products.”13 It comes as no surprise that the EU Council, which met recently in Brussels to discuss the “third degree” trade and economic sanctions, postponed the final decision. The present fairly harsh anti- Russia sanctions, the result of a far from straightforward process, required prolonged negotiations to overcome the disagreements inside the EU.

10 See: “Iran i Saudovskaia Aravia govoriat ob otkrytii “novoi stranitsy” v politicheskikh otnosheniiakh,” available at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/archive/New/20140827/3282/3282.html?id=26552637, 27.08.2014], 20 September, 2014. 11 See: G. Yuldasheva, “Iranian-Chinese Relationship in the Central-Asian Policy Context,” available at [http://liia.lv/ en/blogs/iranian-chinese-relationship-in-the-central-asian-/], 20 September, 2014. 12 See: “Summit ES-Rossia: statistika po torgovle tovarami mezhdu EC28 i Rossiey,” 24 January, 2014, available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/press_corner/all_news/news/2014/20140124_ru.htm], 10 July, 2014. 13 V. Chizhov, “Russia and the European Union: 20 Years On”, International Affairs, No. 6, 2014.

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The following is the main point for Russia: “to preserve its economic and political relationships with Europe and not to alienate other countries.”14 Against this background, the current problems in relations between the EU and Russia pale into insignificance: the results of their rupture will be catastrophic. The expert community has pointed out that the EU does not want a seat of instability on its borders; it does not want the Slavic al-Qa‘eda that the U.S. is raising in Ukraine. We should bear in mind that the far from identical approaches of Brussels and Washington to the Iranian nuclear file are reflected, at least partially, in the far from logical or even dual Iranian strategy of the West. The EU and U.S. positions on Iran bifurcated in the late 1990s when the Euro- pean countries supported the Iranian reformers and a “constructive dialog” with Tehran.15 In fact, the European Union, which has its own geo-economic and geopolitical interests in Iran, does not need Tehran’s better relations with the United States16; while on the other hand, the potential nuclear threat (and the failures of the Iranian reformers, for that matter) has pushed the EU closer to the United States. Until recently, a peaceful solution to the Iranian settlement sought for “through diplomacy led by Britain, France and Germany” suggested that “it would be in the best interests of Iran as well as the international community” if a military conflict between Iran and the U.S. was avoided.17 These are the limits within which the EU can develop its economic cooperation with Iran; the pipelines from Central Asia mainly to the EU markets (which do not exclude Russia) are another argument in favor of cooperation with Iran. The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) presupposes six corridors, three of which will tie the economic centers of Europe and Rus- sia to Eastern Europe, while the other three, East Asia, Europe and Russia, to South Asia and the Middle East. The visit of EU High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton to Iran on 8-10 March, 2014 was more evidence of the mutual interests of Iran and the EU; during one of his meetings with the EU foreign policy chief, President Hassan Rouhani said that his government was “interested in establishing a new relationship with the European Union.”18 The sides probably discussed closer strategic relations in the near future and trade on a wider scale. These plans include closer relations between the EU and Central Asia within the frameworks of their cooperation with Iran. The Central Asian countries are fully aware of what it means for their future. Moreover, the fact that Federica Mogherini, former foreign minister of Italy, was recently appointed the new EU foreign policy chief19 probably means that Brussels is looking for an agreement of sorts among all the interested sides. And this comes as no surprise, since, potentially, in 2014-1015 the anti-Russian sanctions will cost the EU €90 billion.20 This explains why the Russian resolution of

14 “Rossia, Evropa, SShA—kto razrubit Ukrainsky usel?,” oko planet.su, 1 July, 2014, available at [http://antiterrortoday. com/ru/analitika-doklady/analitika/4643-rossiya-evropa-ssha-kto-razrubit-ukrainskij-uzel], 1 July, 2014. 15 See: BBC, 2 December, 2003; Financial Times, 14 February, 2003; Reuter, 13 February, 2003; “UK Pressed to Clarify Differences with US Policy towards Iran,” IRNA, 26 April, 2003. 16 See, for example: F. Vielmini, “Novaia iuzhnaia strategia. Evropa pered litsom anglo-amerikanskoy ‘bolshoy igry’ v Evrazii,” Kontinent, Astana, 23 May-5 June, 2001, pp. 32-35. 17 See: “Britain Refuses to Sing to the Same Tune as US Against Iran,” Payvand’s Iran News..., 24 January, 2005; Iran Tops Straw’s Talks with Rice, Say UK Dailies;” “Fischer to Focus on Greater US Role in Iran Talks with Rice,” IRNA, 24 Janu- ary, 2005. 18 [http://tehrantimes.com/politics/114592-rouhani-tells-ashton-iran-seeks-new-ties-with-eu-based-on-common- interests]. 19 See: Mamedov E. “EU’s Mogherini Could Usher in Better Relations with Iran,” available at [http://www.payvand. com/news/14/sep/1019.html], 21 September, 2014. 20 See: “Lavrov: vazhno, chtoby v ES zdravy smyls vzial verkh nad “yastrebinymi” nastroeniiami,” available at [http:// itar-tass.com/politika/1447390], 17 September, 2014.

117 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the European Parliament suggests that the European Commission study the modalities of cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union.21 This means that restored relations are not excluded. The West is ready to cooperate; otherwise Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov would have not been invited to a conference on Iraq held in Paris on 15 September. Moscow, in turn, is demonstrating its readiness to talk to Washington on the key security issues. The Russian delegation at the nuclear talks with Iran issued a statement that “together with partners it is tilling the soil of future compromises.”22 Today, the future of the sanctions and progress in the relations between Russia and the Euro- pean Union largely depends on whether Moscow is ready to stick to the Minsk agreements on ceasefire in Ukraine signed in September. The suspended talks on the Iranian nuclear program are slowing down the development of Russian-Iranian relations, which depend on big investments and high technologies.

Talks on the Iranian Nuclear File

Successful negotiations between Iran and P5+1 on the Iranian nuclear file may play a key role in changing the relations between Russia and Iran. The fifth round, which took place in Vienna in July, did not, contrary to the expectations, bring the desired results (it was hoped that the final document would be signed on 20 July). Today, it is expected that the final document will be signed on 24 November. There is a concerted expert opinion that “the final compromise agreement on the capacity and future growth of Iran’s program hinges on the definition of Iran’s ‘practical needs’ with respect to domestic uranium enrichment. Unfortunately, the P5+1 (U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran have drastically different interpretations of just how much uranium Iran ‘needs’ to enrich.” Success will largely depend on whether a compromise on smaller numbers, smaller sizes of the centrifuges used for uranium enrichment, and the scope of its nuclear program will prove realistic. The amount of time needed to produce a weapon remains the only hurdle. “From the P5+1’s perspective, Iran’s enrichment needs are smaller than its current capacity, enough only to supply its small research reactor and to conduct research into more advanced centri- fuge designs.” The Iranian side believes that the country “requires an enrichment capacity far beyond what it currently possesses. The ACA’s compromise proposal calls for limits on Iran’s enrichment capacity that would increase over time as Iran meets benchmarks under the terms of the comprehensive deal. In the long term, Iran could follow the emerging pattern in Europe and the United States in turning its enrichment processes entirely over to a multinational consortium. Meanwhile, Iran’s desire to continue modernizing its centrifuges could be met by allowing it to swap out older, less efficient models for more advanced versions, provided that Iran’s overall enrichment capacity remains constant, ideally at a level slightly below where it stands today. This compromise would not leave Iran with enough capacity to fuel its Bushehr reactor, but ‘firm foreign supply assurances’ could be made to assuage Iranian concerns.”23

21 See: “Chizhov: rezoliutsiia Evroparlamenta kritichna po otnosheniiu k Rossii,” available at [http://itar-tass.com/ politika/1452099], 18 September, 2014. 22 “Peregovorny round Irana i ‘shesterki’ startuet v New Yorke,” available at [http://itar-tass.com/mezhdunarodnaya- panorama/1452232], 19 September, 2014. 23 D. Davison, “Reaching a Compromise on Iran’s Enrichment Program,” available at [http://www.payvand.com/ news/14/jun/1181.html], 30 June, 2014.

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“Success in the negotiations will require compromise on both sides that includes a reduction of the number of centrifuges Iran is using to enrich uranium. Currently Iran has about 19,000 centrifuges installed and about 10,000 operating. Non-proliferation experts have suggested reducing that number to between 2,000 and 6,000 to ensure that Iran cannot quickly amass sufficient material for a nuclear weapon. One possibility, put forward recently by a former Iranian official and a group of physicists at Princeton University, would gradually phase out Iran’s first generation centrifuges and substitute a smaller number of more sophisticated machines, with strict limits on the amount of low enriched uranium Iran could stockpile. Iran has reportedly already agreed to concessions on several other key issues, such as modifying a heavy water reactor that will yield plutonium … and agreeing to stop enriching uranium on a major scale in an underground facility.”24 After reaching an agreement with the P5 + 1 nations, Iran will be able to produce nuclear fuel if it remains within the non-proliferation treaty and confirms the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. “The P5+1 nations and Iran agreed to resume negotiations in New York with a new deadline of November 24. Arms control expert Daryl G. Kimball says that while disagreements over some major issues like enrichment capacity and verification measures remain, ‘a comprehensive agreement is within reach.’ Kimball says that progress over the next few weeks will be critical as both President Barack Obama and President Hassan Rouhani have dwindling political space to conclude an agreement.”25 Today, the talks are strongly affected by the United States and the EU strategy firmly opposed to any Russia-promoted integration projects of the Eurasian Economic Union, on the one hand, and the mounting wave of extremist movements in Iraq, on the other. Moscow is convinced26 that the West might lift the sanctions imposed on Iran as soon as possible to halt rapprochement between Russia and Iran; it is concentrating its resources on exacerbating relations between Russia and Ukraine to undermine the Kremlin’s integration projects. Seen from Washington, the crisis in Iraq looks like a chance for Tehran to promote its interests at the negotiation table, which explains why the U.S. is trying to separate the two issues.27 The July Vienna talks demonstrated that Washington is geared toward geopolitical and geo- economic considerations to the detriment of the struggle against the global threat of extremism. In fact, the different economic interests of the United States and the EU in relation to Russia and Iran deprive the West of a common platform and coordinated approaches. They merely respond to what Moscow and its potential allies are doing. The Obama Administration finds it much wiser to delay the signing of the final document with Iran until the Ukrainian crisis is resolved in the interests of the U.S. and EU. At the same time, procrastination is fraught with political and economic problems of a much wider scale: the ISIL is spreading far and wide, while the political struggle in Iran and the United States is growing fiercer. The above and the leading powers’ determination to fight religious extremism and promote their own integration plans amid the rapidly aggravating economic rivalry will force the sides, running against time and acting within a narrow political space, to sign the final document on the Iranian nuclear problem.

24 B. Slavin,” Column: ‘Valiant’ in Soccer, Can Iran Achieve Diplomatic Goals?” VOA, 27 June, 2014, available at [http://www.payvand.com/news/14/jun/1182.html], 30 June, 2014. 25 [http://www.cfr.org/iran/clock-ticking-iran-nuclear-deal/p33457]. 26 See: “Rajab Safarov: Sanktsii mogut byt sniaty s Irana uskorennymi tempami,” Vestnik Kavkaza, 17 June, 2014. 27 See: “Iran and World Powers Begin Nuclear Talks in Vienna,” 3 July, 2014, available at [http://www.payvand.com/ news/14/jul/1016.html], 4 July, 2014.

119 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Conclusion

Russia’s Iranian strategy will be determined by the results of its cooperation with the U.S. and the EU in the foreseeable future. Partnership with the West, possible only if the nuclear talks prove successful, will give Iran investments in its high-tech fields, allow it to improve its infrastructure, address the regional security problems, and overcome the current global threats. At the regional level, the money Western companies are prepared to pour into the transport and transit projects in Central and South Asia and the Middle East will accelerate Iran’s reintegration with its culturally and religiously close neighbors. The sides involved should be ready for mutually advantageous concessions and compromises, without which partnership is obviously impossible (Afghani- stan can serve as a pertinent example). The U.S. and the EU will concentrate on Iran for the sake of their geopolitical development and political and economic security in Central and South Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, the undivided nature of global security associated today with the rising threat of Islamic extremism (emanating from Iraq), the geographic proximity between Russia and Europe, and economic considerations will force the EU and the U.S. in the future to gradually improve their relations with Russia. On the other hand, in Iran the EU and the U.S. are still geo-economic rivals; we cannot exclude the possibility of Iranian, Russian, and, probably, Chinese opposition to the United States, something which does not suit Washington. Taken together, these factors will probably alleviate the present American-Russian disagreements and push the U.S. and RF toward seeking comprehensive ways to cooperate, the volume and nature of which will depend on the level of the compromises on Ukraine and Iran. In view of the geopolitical disagreements described above, we can expect that the road toward cooperation will not be smooth. It seems that the sides will have to work hard to harmonize their interests in order to arrive at a compromise between Russia and the West. “Retreats” and flare-ups of local conflicts cannot be avoided, which will inevitably affect the relations between Russia and Iran. The Central Asian countries, seeking political and economic security for themselves, are interested in the balance of interests of the main world actors around Iran. Lower geopolitical tension and stability in Central Asia will allow the local states to concentrate on the key problems of their political development at home.

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ENERGY POLICY

PIPELINES IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CASPIAN REGION: COMPETITION TAKES A NEW TURN

Sergei ZHILTSOV D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor at the Chair of Political Sciences, Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (PFUR) (Moscow, the Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

uring their more than twenty-year his- munication domination. The Caspian and tory, the countries of the Caspian Re- Central Asian countries that pin their hopes D gion and Central Asia have achieved on oil and gas as a way to confirm their inde- remarkable success in crude hydrocarbon pendence and expand their cooperation with production. The appearance of additional Western states are focusing priority atten- volumes of oil and gas in the Caspian and tion on overcoming their dependence on Central Asian countries has made it impor- Russia and diversifying pipeline routes. This tant to find ways to deliver them to the for- has caused a shift in accents toward hydro- eign markets, turning energy and transpor- carbon resources in foreign policy, including tation-communication factors into one of the in pipeline transportation. top priorities in regional development. In addition to the plans for building gas The history of current pipeline projects and oil pipelines, geographical consider- in the Caspian Region and Central Asia is ations are making significant corrections to compelling the regional states to exert ef- the implementation of pipeline projects. In forts to reduce Russia’s transportation-com- the 1990s, large-scale pipeline projects

121 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS could only be carried out in the Caspian Re- two regions in implementing pipeline proj- gion with the active participation of the Black ects. Sea countries, which acted as an energy In recent years, pipeline projects in the bridge for delivering hydrocarbon resources Caspian and Central Asia countries have from the Caspian fields. The pipeline proj- been acquiring increasing importance. As ects eventually gave rise to the Black Sea- new data about oil and gas reserves appear Caspian link, which became a backbone for and industrial production begins, interest in the new international relations forming and export pipelines is increasing, attracting the served as a foundation for joining the two attention not only of the Caspian and Central regions into a unified geopolitical area.1As Asian countries, but also of foreign states new projects for delivering hydrocarbon re- and leading oil and gas companies. This sources from the Central Asian countries situation means that the competition among through the Caspian Sea appeared, the export routes will remain intense. term “Caspian-Central Asian region” came This article examines the results of into scientific circulation, reflecting the grow- implementing pipeline projects in the Cas- ing interconnection and interaction of the pian Region and Central Asia and analyzes the factors hindering the building of export 1 See: S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, Kaspiiskaia trubopro- routes. It focuses particular attention on the vodnaia geopolitika: sostoianie i realizatsiia, Vostok-Zapad, geopolitical struggle that is largely generat- Moscow, 2011, p. 8. ed by pipeline competition.

KEYWORDS: pipelines, Caspian Region, Central Asia, energy policy, oil, gas.

Introduction

The change in the geopolitical situation in the territory of the former Soviet Union, when newly independent states appeared on the shores of the Caspian and throughout Central Asia, generated competition over pipelines, into which many extra-regional states and leading oil and gas companies found themselves drawn. Interest in the Caspian and Central Asian countries has been piqued by their hydrocarbon resources, the reserves of which initially acquired a political hue. Correspondingly, the building of Caspian and Central Asian pipelines largely became a political issue, rather than a technical or economic problem. Every oil- and gas-producing state saw what it called the Pipe to be a conductor of its foreign regional policy. It was pipelines that began to determine stability and conflict- proneness on the transit routes. The pipelines of the Caspian Region and Central Asia are not a unified system, although there have been several attempts to integrate and join them into such by building trans-Caspian pipelines. The pipelines of the Caspian Region and Central Asia ultimately run in different geographical directions and are still perceived as separate pipeline structures. The Central Asian and Caspian countries use the pipeline system created in Soviet times as the starting point. And the Caspian Sea is also the starting point for exporting energy resources via the new pipelines in the European (western) direction, while the Central Asian pipeline infrastructure is broken down into the northern (Russian), southern (Iranian), and eastern (Chinese) directions. In the past twenty years, the Caspian and Central Asian countries have succeeded in building new pipelines and delivering their energy resources to the foreign market. However, many export 122 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 pipeline projects in the Caspian Region and Central Asia are highly premature, remaining on paper or stalling at the discussion stage. American and European oil and gas companies that have set their sights on the hydrocarbon fields of the Caspian and Central Asian states have been showing immense interest in the new pipeline projects. The greatest attention has been riveted on Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which possess large gas reserves, and on Kazakhstan, which has the largest oil fields. The numerous international consortiums created for producing crude hydrocarbons have been hastening to carve out a niche for themselves in the potentially oil- and gas-rich fields. The energy policy of the Caspian and Central Asian countries interested in Western petrodollars has helped West- ern oil and gas companies to gain a foothold in the region. They are hoping to use them to engage in the exploration of hydrocarbon deposits and, in the future, carry out production and export of oil and gas to the foreign markets. At least at the first stage, the investments of oil and gas companies played a key role in hydrocarbon field development, making it possible for the Caspian and Central Asian countries to raise their economy and stabilize their domestic political situation.

The Key Players

At the beginning of the 1990s, hydrocarbon resources from the new Caspian states and Central Asian countries could be exported only through Russian territory. For example, Kazakhstan did not have its own pipeline network and rented Russian pipelines to export the oil it produced. It also re- sorted to expensive road and rail transportation. In this respect, creating a widespread network of oil pipelines became a priority task, which required efficient functioning of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry. The government studied different ways to build new pipelines offered by various groups of large foreign investors showing a more than passing interest in Kazakhstan’s fields. Turkmenistan, whose gas complex was part of a unified pipeline system during Soviet times, ran into certain difficulties in its attempts to gain access to the foreign market. The republic has immense gas-production and gas-transportation potential. In the second half of the 1980s (1986-1991), Turkmenistan produced up to 90 bcm of gas annually with a domestic demand of 10-11 bcm. When 1991 dawned, Turkmenistan was the second largest gas producer and exporter after Rus- sia in the post-Soviet space. However, in subsequent years, the country had trouble delivering its gas to the sales markets. One of the main reasons for this was the high cost of transportation through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia, which made Turkmen gas uncompetitive. As a result, the sales volumes of Turkmen gas during the first years of independence dropped several-fold. The task of building new pipelines was closely intertwined with developing high-potential gas fields. This was particularly important in light of the fact that many branches of the Turkmen economy were tied to Turkmenistan’s gas industry. Azerbaijan was in a slightly better position than Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The oil and gas pipelines built as early as Soviet times were geographically closer to the European consumers and to Turkey, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, showed increased interest in pipeline projects that could bring Azerbaijani hydrocarbons to the foreign market. This is explained by the fact that when it gained its independence, Azerbaijan placed the stakes on the production and transportation of hydrocarbon resources in its economic development. At the beginning of the 1990s, Russia’s interest in the Caspian Region was focused on existing and potential oil pipeline projects that carried the resources of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turk- menistan through its territory. In so doing, Russia believed that while it held the export key the former Soviet republics had no other choice but to remain under its control.

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The competition over Caspian oil and ways to transport it started at the beginning of the 1990s when, after gaining their independence, the Caspian countries, along with international oil companies, began to develop new pipeline routes for delivering Caspian oil. And whereas the oil reserves in the Russian part of the Caspian Sea paled in comparison to the reserves of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, Russia boasted a well-established network of oil pipelines, which put it at a great advantage. Pipelines became an acute foreign political problem for Russia, as well as one of the main tools in the fight to retain a dominating position in the region. This primarily applied to the U.S., which, as Russian experts noted, was trying to move the former Soviet republics politically and economically away from Russia as quickly as possible.2 The transportation of Caspian oil became a major problem for the countries located in the territory from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Far East. The Caspian countries, as well as a large number of extra-regional states, were involved in resolving it at the beginning of the 1990s.

Delivery Range

The new directions for delivering crude hydrocarbons from Central Asia and the Caspian Re- gion began to form at the beginning of the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is no accident that, when examining a large number of Caspian oil transportation routes, J. Roberts, author of the book Caspian Pipelines,3 classified them into three main directions: northern, or Russian; central, or Caucasian; and southern, or Iranian-Pakistani. Since the end of the 1990s, the eastern, or Asian, direction can also be added to this classification. This range of routes reflects the direction in which oil flows go, although the Caucasian direction is also a source (supplier) of oil. Subsequently, many authors began adhering to this classification.  The northern, or European (Russian), direction is related to the transportation of oil from Kazakhstan, mainly from the Tengiz field, through Russia to Novorossiysk, as well as from Azerbaijan to Novorossiysk.  The central, or Caucasian (sometimes western), direction includes the transportation of oil from Azerbaijan to the shores of the Black Sea through Georgia and Turkey and from there to the Turkish terminals on the Mediterranean Sea. The oil pipeline route from Kazakhstan can also be included here.  The southern, or Iranian-Pakistani, direction encompasses the transportation of oil from Azerbaijan to Iran and from there to Turkey. What is more, Kazakh oil can be sent through Turkmenistan to the Iranian terminals in the Persian Gulf or to the Pakistani terminals of the Indian Ocean.  The eastern, or Asian, or Chinese-Japanese, direction is related to the transportation of Kazakh oil toward China and on to Japan. This classification is legitimate if oil transportation is examined from the viewpoint of the location of the pipelines with respect to the sources of crude hydrocarbons and the Caspian Sea. A similar

2 See: G. Voitolovskiy, N. Kosolapov, “Osobennosti geopoliticheskoi situatsii v Kaspiiskom regione,” in: Evropa i Rossia: problema iuzhnogo napravlenia. Sredizemnomorie-Chernomorie-Kaspii, Moscow, 1999, pp. 307-323. 3 See: J. Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996, p. 84.

124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 classification can also be used for the gas pipelines. Some of the pipelines have already been built, while other projects are at the discussion stage. The final choice of future pipeline routes depended on the following factors: financing; route security; competition among the oil-refining countries; and the geopolitical interests of the countries. In so doing, each of the factors listed came to the forefront at specific times. It is enough to mention the instability in the Northern Caucasus for the Russian route, the problem of Mediterranean spills for the Russian and Caucasian routes, and the problem of Kurds for the Turkish route. In this respect, the choice and implementation of final alternatives was a compromise of political bargaining keeping in mind the positions of all the interested sides both in the economic, and in the geopolitical and military-strategic respects.4 In other words, the opposing commercial and political interests had to be brought into harmony.

The European Vector

Discussion of delivering hydrocarbon resources in the western (European) direction began in the 1990s when the EU started to formulate its energy strategy with respect to the Caspian Region and Central Asia. The strivings of the European countries, the U.S., and the leading oil and gas companies coincided with the plans of the newly independent states, for which the new export routes opened up new political horizons, strengthened regional positions, and created prerequisites for economic independence. Azerbaijan, as a country in the focus of attention of the Western countries due to its geographical location, was one of the initiators of accelerated oil field development in the Caspian and the construction of new export pipelines. In turn, the pipeline projects brought the European countries to the shores of the Caspian and, most important, to the Caspian oil and gas fields, which were seen as an additional source of crude hydrocarbons and a factor of geopolitical influence. Turkey’s insistence and Azerbaijan’s concern led to signing an agreement in 1998 on building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, around which intense geopolitical competition between Russia, which was offering its territory for exporting Azeri hydrocarbon resources, and Western countries, which were insisting on creating alternative routes, went on for an entire decade. Nevertheless, in 2005, the oil pipeline, with a capacity of 50 million tons of oil a year and the potential to raise it to 60 million tons, was built.5 Implementation of this project led to undermining Russia’s monopoly on the oil pipelines through which Caspian oil was exported, while the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which allowed Russia to put pressure on Azerbaijan’s oil policy, lost its strategic value.6 The policy of delivering Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe was continued when an agreement was signed in Baku between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on strategic partnership and alliance relations. The president of Kazakhstan spoke in favor of building a pipeline from Aktau to Baku with a capacity of 20 million tons a year.7

4 See: A.L. Valesian, “Neft i geopolitika: alternativnye marshruty transportirovki kaspiiskoi nefti na mirovom rynke,” in: Collection of Papers of the International Conference on “The Caspian Region: Economy, Environment, Mineral Re- sources,” Moscow, 1995, p. 87. 5 See: Kh. Iusifzade, “Prirodny gaz glubokovodia Kaspiia—bolshie perspektivy i bogatstvo Azerbaidzhana,” Caspian Energy, No. 4, 2014, pp. 56-57. 6 See: M.A. Kaimarazova, “Prikaspiiskie territorii Rossii i sopredelnykh gosudarstv v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviiakh,” in: Collection of Papers of the International Scientific Conference on “The Russian Neighborhood Policy, Moscow, 12-13 October, 2007,” Moscow, 2008, p. 434. 7 See: M. Zaslavskiy, Delo truba, Evropa, Moscow, 2005, p. 84.

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In 2007, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline with a projected capacity of 16 bcm a year went into operation. Implementation of this project increased Azerbaijan’s involvement in gas deliveries to the European market and led to the European countries developing various projects that would make it possible to raise the number of sources for obtaining gas. At the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, the EU promoted wide-scale projects for building gas pipelines from the Caspian Region and Central Asia. For example, in 2002, the Na- bucco gas pipeline project was offered. However, despite the EU’s efforts, the project was not crowned with success since it could not bring the varying political and economic interests into harmony, or regulate the problems relating to filling the future pipe. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan took advantage of the idea, which, as the Shah-Deniz field underwent development, was counting on carrying out further diversification of delivery routes of Azeri gas to the European market. Implementing a truncated version of the European Nabucco West gas pipeline project, which was to run from the Turkish-Bulgarian border to Austria, depended on how well the Shah-Deniz field was developed. In 2012-2014, Azerbaijan consistently stepped up its efforts to create a pipeline system for its gas, which was to be produced within the framework of the second stage of development of the Shah- Deniz field. The TANAP gas pipeline project with a capacity of 16 bcm, intended for transporting Azeri oil from the Shah-Deniz field, was used to solve this task. The gas pipeline was to run from the Georgian-Turkish border to the western border of Turkey. TANAP and Nabucco West essentially revitalized the idea of the Nabucco project. In addition, a decision was made to deliver the gas produced within the framework of the second stage of development of the Shah-Deniz field via the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. At the first stage, its capacity was to amount to 10 bcm. In this way, Azer- baijan’s efforts were aimed at further developing a pipeline system that would give Baku a greater part to play in delivering raw hydrocarbons to Europe and increase the possibilities for exporting the oil and gas it produced. The high risks associated with hydrocarbon production are forcing Azerbaijan to look for additional sources of gas capable of filling the future pipelines. Preference goes to Turkmen, Kazakh, and Uzbek gas. In this context, Baku is examining the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project along the bed of the Caspian from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan.

The Southern Direction

The southern direction for transporting hydrocarbons is defined by the geographic coordinates of the Caspian Sea—its southern shores belong entirely to Iran and this direction is fairly often called the Iranian. The advantages of this direction include Iran’s proximity to the fields of Azerbai- jan and Turkmenistan. But active use of this direction has been and continues to be prevented by the difficult relations between Iran and the U.S., which does not support implementation of the Iranian nuclear file. After the new independent states appeared on the Caspian shores, various oil transportation projects in the southern direction emerged. For example, at the beginning of the 1990s, the project of a main oil pipeline from Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan to Iran was developed.8 This pipeline of around 2,500 km in length could be economically feasible only if it could pump large volumes of oil on the order of 25 million tons and more a year.9 The pipeline could transport oil from Tengiz to Uzen

8 See: Oil&Gas Journal, Vol. 93, No. 15, 10 April, 1995, p. 98. 9 See: F. Ashoory, A Master Plan for Caspian Region Crude Oil Evacuation, Second International Conference in Cas- pian Oil and Gas Resources, N.I.O.S., Tehran, 1998.

126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 and on southward to the border with Turkmenistan. Iran also proposed building a Baku-Tabriz oil pipeline of 1,000 km with a capacity of 40 million tons a year that would continue on to the terminal on Kharg Island. In keeping with the agreement signed in 1996, Kazakhstan intended to deliver from 2 to 6 million tons of oil to the north of Iran over the span of 10 years, receiving an equable amount in the Persian Gulf in return. The project was not implemented, although in January 1997, Tengiz oil was delivered on Az- eri tankers to North Iran for refining, which imported crude oil under the swap scheme. As for Turk- men oil, it came in small quantities by road from the Caspian shores all the way to Bandar-i-Kho- meini.10 In July 1998, Iran officially presented a project at an open international tender in London for building an oil pipeline of 392 km in length for pumping oil from the Caspian port of Neka to Tehran. The cost of the project was estimated at $400 million. This was Tehran’s first step in implementing plans to create the southern route for exporting oil from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and possibly also Kazakhstan. It was expected that Iran would be able to pump up to 380,000 barrels of oil a day. In exchange for providing transportation of Caspian oil, Iran counted on obtaining the right to bring crude oil produced in the Persian Gulf to the export markets. Laying an oil pipeline in Iranian territory would have allowed Azerbaijan to advance in the southern direction and reach the oil terminals near Abadan and on Kharg Island. But this route was blocked by the U.S., which was against implementing oil projects in Iran. The U.S. closed the southern door to Caspian hydrocarbons, in so doing complicating the search for their delivery routes. In turn, the new Caspian states, fearing a deterioration in relations with the U.S. and so being deprived of its political support, as well as losing oil and gas contracts, reconciled themselves to this situation and began supporting the pipeline projects it proposed. The problem with Iran lay in the fact that although the route through its territory was the cheap- est and most logical, the American administration thought that giving Iran control over the transportation of oil might have negative consequences. The U.S. was ready to support any pipeline projects apart from those that would pass through Iran. Washington consistently stuck to this policy for many years. At the initial stage, the U.S. also wanted to limit Russia’s influence, but this approach proved impossible to implement, and the American administration backed off. At the beginning of the 1990s, when discussing the route of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan-India gas pipeline, the idea emerged to build an oil pipeline in the same direction. An agreement on building a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan oil pipeline was signed in 1995. The idea was actively lobbied by Kazakhstan, which counted on delivering oil to the foreign market not only through Russian territory. But the oil pipeline was not built. There were several reasons for this. The main one was the unstable political situation in Afghanistan, through the territory of which the oil pipeline was supposed to pass, as well as the lack of free volumes of gas and the high cost of the entire pipeline project. The situation with gas pipelines developed more favorably. In the second half of the 1990s, Turkmenistan concentrated on two export pipelines. One through Afghanistan to Pakistan and the other to Turkey through Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and then to Europe. Turkmenistan made its first attempt to deliver its gas to the foreign market in the southern direction in 1992 when the Iranian-Turkmen agreement on building the Turkmenistan-Iran gas pipeline was signed. The idea of building this pipeline was proposed by American experts. Construction of the gas pipeline was seen as part of the U.S.’s long-term policy in Central Asia aimed at increasing its influence and reducing Russia’s sway on Ashghabad. The gas pipeline of 2,300 km in length and

10 See: I. Zonn, Kaspii: illiuzii i realnost, Moscow, 1999, 467 pp.

127 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS costing around $4-5 billion was to pass through Iran to Turkey and on to Europe bypassing Russia. Insufficient financing prevented implementation of the project. In 1993, the idea of exporting Turkmen gas to Europe through Iran and Turkey was discussed again, Turkey playing a key role in Turkmenistan’s gas export strategy. Turkmenistan was interested in delivering gas to Turkey without going through Russia. What is more, dynamic development of the gas market in Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s increased Ashghabad’s interest in delivering its gas to this Black Sea country. However, the project was not implemented. At the end of 1997, the first Korpeje (Turkmenistan)—Kurt-Kui (Iran) gas export pipeline of 200 km in length was opened. Turkmen gas began entering the distribution system in Iran’s industri- ally developed north. It was to transport up to 30 bcm of gas a year for 25 years providing that Iran export the same amount of gas from the Persian Gulf region.11 In building this pipeline, Turkmenistan was pursuing far-reaching goals since Ashghabad was still hoping to reach the European gas market without going through Russia. This pipeline was seen as the first stage in the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe super gas pipeline. The feasibility report for the project was drawn up by France’s Sofregas Company. The pipeline was supposed to be 3,219 km in length. The Turkmenistan government guaranteed deliveries of 28-30 bcm of natural gas via it for 30 years from the fields of Yashlar and Dovletabad near Serakhs located in the west of the country on the border with Iran. In January 2010, the Dovletabad-Serakhs-Khangeran gas pipeline was launched in Iran. This brought Turkmenistan’s gas deliveries to Iran up to 20 bcm a year. Pipeline routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan with access to the port of Karachi were advantageous for Turkmenistan. Russian expert V. Tarlinskiy wrote that the plans for the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) project were developed as early as 1994 by the little-known Bridas Company from distant Argentina, a country with very little oil and gas potential. The length of the first branch of TAPI (from Turkmenistan’s Dovletabad through Afghanistan’s Kandahar to Pakistan’s Multan) was to be 1,500 km, 764 km of which was to pass through the territory of Af- ghanistan with a throughput capacity of 15-30 bcm a year. The estimated cost amounted to $2.5 billion. Niyazov, the then president of Turkmenistan, managed to find an American company, Texas Unocal, willing to enter a consortium providing it obtained 54% of the shares.12 In 1995, Unocal (U.S.) and Delta Oil (Saudi Arabia) came to an agreement on building the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (Trans-Afghan gas pipeline) with a branch to India. In 1996, a consortium of oil and gas companies was established: Unocal, Mobil, Amoco, and Exxon for developing gas fields in the south of Turkmenistan and exporting gas by transit through Afghanistan to Pakistan. The planned gas pipeline was to run almost parallel to the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan oil pipeline. According to the project, the route of the 1,462-km-long gas pipeline was to run from the gas field of Dovletabad (its gas reserves were estimated at 1,300 bcm and it was developed by Unocal), situated in the south of Turkmenistan, through Western Afghanistan to the terminal of Multan on the coast of the Indian Ocean in Pakistan. It was expected that up to 20 bcm of gas a year would initially be delivered. In the future, the pipeline could be extended to the Indian capital. The cost of the project was estimated at $1.9 billion. The idea of building TAPI has been discussed more than once in the last decade, although there continue to be political disagreements between Pakistan and India and the situation in Afghanistan is far from stable. However, the project is being constantly postponed.

11 See: G.I. Starchenkov, “Iran—novaia gazoeksportiruiushchaia derzhava XXI veka”,” in: Islamskaia revoliutsiia v Irane: proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 1999, pp. 156-165. 12 See: V. TarlinskIy, Truboprovody—instrument geopolitiki? MIK, Moscow, 2009, p. 254.

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So far, the TAPI project remains wishful thinking. Most of the problems that have prevented its implementation since the very beginning have still not been resolved. Instability in Afghanistan continues, the situation in Pakistan remains complicated, and Pakistani-Indian relations require work. And most important, something that practically all projects come up against, there are no data confirming that Turkmenistan has sufficient volumes of gas.

The Eastern Vector of Hydrocarbon Flows

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan looked at different ways to increase oil deliveries, including in the eastern direction. However, the difficulties that existed during the establishment of the new Kazakh-Chinese and Turkmen-Chinese relations, as well as the high cost of the projects, have constantly postponed their construction. As a result, many pipeline projects remain on paper. Nevertheless, the discovery of large reserves of hydrocarbon resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has initiated the development of pipeline projects for carrying oil and gas to the east (toward China). The prehistory of building the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China begins in 1996 when the Chinese side acquired control sets of shares in two enterprises responsible for oil production and transportation—Aktobemunaigaz and Uzenmunaigaz. This began a discussion of a future oil pipeline project, which became a rival of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. China and Kazakhstan were interested in building the Western Kazakhstan—Western China oil pipeline, via which there were plans to eventually deliver up to 50 million tons of oil. The Atasu (Karaganda region, Kazakhstan)-Alashankou (a large oil terminal in the PRC) project was implemented as the first part of the pipeline, which was put into operation in 2006. A total of $800 million was invested in building the 965-km-long pipeline with a capacity of 10 million tons a year.13 This was the first Kazakh oil pipeline that did not pass through Russian territory. Since the second half of the first decade of the 21st century, changes have been noted in China’s energy policy.  First, China’s relations with Kazakhstan are reaching a new level, acquiring the nature of a strategic partnership.  Second, Kazakhstan is becoming a raw material appendage of the Chinese economy.  Third, China is actively joining the oil and gas game being played among the geopolitical players in Central Asia.  Fourth, China is actively lending money to the economy of the Central Asian countries and beginning to implement large projects by Chinese companies in the oil and gas industry and infrastructural sphere.14 As a result, in 2009, the Western Kazakhstan-Western China oil pipeline was built. This made it possible to talk about China creating a new export route via which Kazakh oil could reach the foreign market bypassing Russian territory. At the same time, to ensure full loading of the oil pipeline, China needed shelf oil, access to which Beijing was to gain.15

13 See: K. Syroezhkin, “Kazakhstan i Kitai: torgovo-ekonomicheskoe sotrudinchestvo,” Analytic (Kazakhstan), No. 1, 2009, pp. 42-48. 14 See: Tsentralnaia Azia segodnia: vyzovy i ugrozy, ed. by K.L. Syroezhkin, Almaty, 2011, pp. 290-298. 15 See: E.M. Kuzmina, Geopolitika Tsentralnoi Azii, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2007, pp. 90-98.

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China acquired the following advantages from the new Kazakh oil transportation route: a beneficial expenditure ratio on transportation and sales volume in the oil consumer markets, the possibility of direct deliveries to the consumer, a not very long route on which the amount and time of revenue receipt depends, and no economic and political obstacles during transit through a third country. Along with building new oil pipelines, since the beginning of the 1990s, China has been studying the possibility of building new gas pipelines. Its complicated relations with Russia prompted Turkmenistan to turn its attention to new pipeline projects. However, the high cost of the projects hindered their practical implementation. Nevertheless, the research carried out at the beginning of 2000 on the right-hand bank of the Amu Darya confirmed the high prospects of this territory for gas production. This factor accelerated development of the gas pipeline project from Turkmenistan to China. The subsequent agreements between China and Turkmenistan made it possible to launch the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline in December 2009. The gas pipeline is not supposed to reach its projected capacity of 40 bcm until 2015. As a result, in the last decade, the scope of Turkmenistan’s gas deliveries has moved from the northern (Russian) direction to the southern, to which the eastern direction was later added.16 This has made it possible for Ashghabad to significantly increase its influence in the Caspian Region and Central Asia, since along with the Russian and Iranian directions, the role of the Chinese route also rose. In turn, by laying a pipeline through Central Asia, China undermined Russia’s long-standing monopoly on the export of natural gas and strengthened its position in this Caspian country. China took control over developing Galkynysh, the largest field in Turkmenistan.17 The gas pipeline of the century, as specialists called it, from Turkmenistan to China was to satisfy the growing demand of the Chinese economy for crude hydrocarbons. The pipeline was not given such a pompous name by chance. It runs through those places where the Great Silk Road once passed. In recent years, China has retained its interest in the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Re- gion. The main topic discussed during PRC Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to the Central Asian countries held in September 2013 was further expansion of energy cooperation, which Beijing views through the prism of its current economic development and realization of long-term interests. During the PRC chairman’s visit to Kazakhstan, the Chinese side underpinned its strivings with agreements totaling $30 billion.18 Beijing is exerting efforts to form a new pipeline infrastructure in the region. The new loan issued by China to build a gas pipeline branch from Turkmenistan was used to further increase its presence in the energy sector of the Central Asian countries. This pipeline enforces the delivery of Central Asia’s gas resources in the Chinese direction. The new gas pipeline branch should increase the export of gas to China by 25 bcm. This will make it possible to raise the capacity of the Turkmen- istan-China gas pipeline to 65 bcm. Large-scale hydrocarbon production and transportation projects are a good way for China to realize its long-term interests. Beijing is counting on establishing control over the natural resources of the region’s countries aimed at their intensive use in the future. The Chinese direction is still a priority for Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in hydrocarbon delivery. The latter was able to begin implementation of the Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline project, the first branch of which with a capacity of 4.5 bcm of gas a year was put into operation in 2009. This has

16 See: S.S. Zhiltsov, “Sostoianie i perspektivy politiki stran Tsentralnoi Azii v gazovoi sfere,” in: Central Asian Gas Forum Papers, 25-26 June, 2014, Almaty, Almaty, 2014, pp. 14-15. 17 See: V.P. Motiashov, Gaz i geopolitika: shans Rossii, Kniga i biznes, Moscow, 2011, pp. 188-189. 18 See: Yu. Nagorniy, “KNR vkladyvaet v kazakhstanskuiu neft,” Delovoi Kazakhstan, 13 September, 2013.

130 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 allowed Kazakhstan to create a new pipeline infrastructure for delivering both oil and gas to the foreign market. While expanding the sphere of its influence in the region, China is not only pursuing commercial, but also geopolitical aims, trying to prevent Astana and Ashghabad from turning toward the West and also limiting the influence of Western oil companies. Beijing is closely following the dialog between the Caspian and Central Asian countries and the West, which through pipeline projects intends not only to reduce Russia’s influence on the Caspian countries, but also restrain the Chinese factor. In turn, Chinese policy is concentrating on the eastern shore of the Caspian and, with respect to resolving long-term tasks, is aimed at building Kazakh-Chinese and Turkmen-Chinese relations with respect to crude hydrocarbon deliveries. Implementation of the Chinese energy strategy, which is being carried out recently in the Cas- pian countries, is characterized by an increase in China’s presence in promising fields. China is not limiting itself to signing contracts on raw material delivery. Beijing is striving to enter agreements on cooperation in the development, exploitation and joint ownership of fields, trying to insure itself against abrupt jumps in price on the world market and carrying out diversification of sources for obtaining energy resources.19 On the whole, it can be said that in the next decade Central Asia’s hydrocarbon resources will remain in the focus of China’s attention. Beijing will act as a strategic rear in many respects—security, energy, creating new sales markets, gaining access to sources of raw materials, and their transit to the foreign markets.20

Energy Bridge between the Caspian Shores

The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project has been in the focus of attention of the Caspian and Central Asian countries for almost twenty years. In 1992, this route was proposed by Turkey’s Botaş Company. It proposed building a pipeline along the bed of the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and on to Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which became actively involved in forming the new pipeline structure, were to be the main suppliers of hydrocarbon resources. This met the interests of the Western countries, which strove to occupy leading positions in developing the Caspian’s resources and reduce Russia’s influence to naught in building new export pipelines. The Western countries rendered political support to the Caspian countries, encouraging their activity in advancing pipelines that circumvented Russia. In 2014, the EU stepped up its efforts in implementing pipeline projects that passed along the bed of the Caspian Sea. Earlier, such plans were discussed in December 2013 at the talks in Ash- ghabad within the Turkmenistan-EU committee. At the same time, Ashghabad had long expressed only political support of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, without giving the Western countries any guarantees regarding filling it. But without this, there is no point in building the pipeline, since the

19 See: I.Yu. Frolova, “Tsentralnaia Azia v energeticheskoi strategii Kitaia,” in: Tsentralnaia Azia: problemy i perspektivy (vzgliad iz Rossii i Kitaia), Collection of articles, Russian Institute of Strategic Research; Chinese Academy of Contem- porary International Relations, RISI, Moscow, pp. 125-141. 20 See: Tsentralnaia Aziia i Kaspiisky region: riski, vyzovy, ugrozy: kollectivnaia monografiia, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, Almaty, 2012, pp. 68-69.

131 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS gas production rates in Azerbaijan proved much lower than forecast. In the end, Baku concentrated all its attention on production and building pipelines for exporting its own gas. The Trans-Caspian pipeline still poses many questions.  First, no one knows how the future gas pipeline is going to be filled.  Second, the tense relations between Baku and Ashghabad, which go back to the 1990s, are curbing implementation of the Trans-Caspian pipe.  Third, there is a problem of high seismic activity in those very areas of the Caspian Sea through which the gas pipeline is to pass.  Fourth, wide-scale technical research must be carried out. Another fact that must be kept in mind when developing the Trans-Caspian project is the plans of the Black Sea states to increase gas production on the Black Sea shelf. This might make delivering Turkmen resources to the European market senseless, particularly since in contrast to the Chinese direction, where Turkmen hydrocarbons are delivered at low prices, Ashghabad would want to deliver resources to Europe at world prices. Despite its long history, however, the project is still arousing great interest. Baku and Ash- ghabad are viewing it through the prism of diversification of delivery routes to the foreign markets. For the EU and U.S., the Trans-Caspian pipeline is primarily a solution to geopolitical tasks. A new stage in discussing the building of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline could begin in a few years when Turkmenistan completes construction of the East-West gas pipeline, which would link its main fields of Dovletabad and South Iolotan (in 2011, Turkmenistan renamed it Galkynysh) with the Caspian coast. The project, which began being implemented in May 2010, is estimated at $2 billion and calculated for five years. The pipeline’s capacity should amount to 30 bcm a year. At the initial stage, around 6 bcm of gas are planned to be pumped along it, with this volume rising to 30 billion between 2015 and 2030. In the future, this pipeline may play a significant role in the export of Turk- men gas, both through the Caspian gas pipeline, which has still not been implemented, and through the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which is still seen as a starting point for Nabucco. And even though the unsettled nature of the Caspian Sea’s international legal status and the tough position of Iran and Russia which are against building the Trans-Caspian pipe are restraining factors, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan can ignore these issues. The idea of building the Aktau-Baku Trans-Caspian oil pipeline appeared in the mid 1990s and is directly related to advancing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. The project initiators think that in- corporating Kazakh oil will make it possible to fill the export oil pipeline to the max and increase Kazakhstan’s involvement in transporting Caspian hydrocarbons. The initial plans were to finish building the pipeline by 2003-2004. The difficulties with field development in Kazakhstan and the constant reexamination of oil production forecasts have not decreased the interest of the Kazakh side in transporting oil via the Trans-Caspian pipeline. This is confirmed by the numerous statements by Kazakhstan representatives and the signed agreements. Moreover, at different times, an average of 2-3 million tons of Kazakh oil have been transported annually through Azerbaijan, which was delivered across the Caspian on tankers. It is expected that the volumes will grow to 5 million tons, while in the future they will be raised to 20-25 million tons. It was presumed that the Aktau-Baku pipe would become an independent route for transporting Kazakh oil. Kazakhstan’s continued interest in the Trans-Caspian oil pipeline project is determined by the oil production indicators. In 2013, oil production in Kazakhstan rose to 81.8 million tons and, according to the forecasts, which are based on the expectations of successful development of promising fields, will continue to rise. However, the difficulties Kazakhstan is encountering in oil production 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 mean that additional volumes of hydrocarbon resources will not appear until after 2020-2025. Until that time, the existing pipelines are capable of ensuring the transportation of Kazakh hydrocarbons (primarily through the pipeline system of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the capacity of which should rise to 67 million tons after 2015). For example, the Russian route will be the main one for exporting Kazakh hydrocarbons. The importance of the Chinese export route will also rise. Kazakh- stan will only need additional export capacities in the future, which will increase its interest in new pipeline projects, including those that go through the Caspian Sea. Incidentally, the oil field development rates in Kazakhstan are preliminary. Nevertheless, without waiting for new fields to reach their maximum production capacity, Ka- zakhstan will strive to diversify its oil delivery routes. At the end of 2013, Kazakhstan made a decision to transport 4 million tons of oil through the Caspian. Of this volume, 3 million tons will be pumped via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, while 1 million tons will be transported by rail to the Georgian terminal of Kulevi on the Black Sea.

Conclusion

Many pipeline projects appeared in the 1990s-beginning of the 2000s. But their discussion, feasibility substantiation, and moreover implementation have not reached fruition until recently. As the more than twenty years of current development of the Caspian Region and Central Asia show, the path from agreements to practical implementation is long and slow. Nevertheless, implementing even a small number of the pipeline projects discussed has affected major changes in the balance of power in the Caspian Region and Central Asia. The advance of pipeline projects in the Caspian Region and Central Asia is still hindered by the availability of crude hydrocarbons. At the moment, most of the planned pipelines do not have the guarantee that the Caspian and Central Asian countries can produce enough oil and gas to fill them. Despite this, active discussion of new projects continues. Separate note should be made of the situation developing around Iran. This country has a key geographic location, being the most advantageous route for exporting Caspian and Central Asian resources. Since the Caspian and Central Asia countries are not permitted to cooperate with Tehran, they have been forced to look for more expensive and less efficient routes for transporting their hydrocarbons to the foreign markets. Removal of this Caspian country from the discussion and implementation of new pipeline projects has made the pipeline system being formed artificial. Iran’s isolation was of principal importance for the U.S. This enabled the American administration to have a direct and targeted influence on the choice of new pipeline routes for the Caspian and Central Asian countries. Second, in the last twenty years, Turkey’s position has become much stronger, which is playing a key role in essentially all the projects in the western direction. China’s policy is helping to diversify oil and gas export routes from the region, which is linking regional interests with the prospects for its own economic development. China has been conducting its pipeline policy in this vein, which is aimed at using the hydrocarbon resources of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as well as of the entire Central Asian region in the future, for developing the Chinese economy.21 This is a key factor in forming energy policy priorities of the Central Asian countries. Keeping in mind China’s growing shortage of energy resources, there is no doubt that this country’s presence in Central Asia will only grow.22

21 See: S. Zhiltsov, “Aziatskiy intergratsionny treugolnik,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 December, 2013. 22 See: K. Syroezhkin, “Bolshaia kitaiskaia Evraziia?” in: Yu.M. Kirinitsiianov, Evraziyskoe partnerstvo. Idei. Mneniia. Predlozhenia, KISI, Almaty, 2014, p. 69.

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In the next decade, the pipeline situation in Central Asia and the Caspian Region might undergo serious changes. The industrial development of new fields will have a key influence on the development of these vast territories, which will invite a new assessment of the prospects of the pipeline projects being offered today. The matter concerns oil production in Kazakhstan, in particular in Kashagan, and in Turkmenistan on the development of prospective gas fields such as Dovletabad and Galkynysh. In addition, there might be new incentive to discuss and possibly even implement the TAPI, Nabucco, and Trans-Caspian pipeline projects. Filling the existing oil and gas pipelines depends on successful development of the Caspian and Central Asian fields, as well as on the implementation of promising pipeline projects that diversify export from the Central Asian countries. For Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, diversification of hydrocarbon export remains the key task.

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NATION-BUILDING

THE PARADIGM OF POST-SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN GEORGIA

Beka CHEDIA Ph.D. (Political Science), Head of Publishing Projects at the Tbilisi School of Political Studies (Tbilisi, Georgia)

ABSTRACT he author analyzes the specifics of po- pares the prominent features of the presiden- litical leadership in Georgia and what cies between 1991 and 2014 to explain the T people think about them, as well as the subtleties of political leadership in Georgia. new trends that came to the fore after the He also tries to examine why the Con- 2013 presidential election, the leadership’s stitution is regularly amended to redistribute resources, and the ways the political commu- legal powers between the president and nity “recruits” new members. The author com- prime minister.

KEYWORDS: leader, president, elections, rule, parties, charisma, manager, Georgia.

Introduction

The paradigm of political leadership distinguishes Georgia from most of the other Soviet successor-states: it is a symbiosis of post-Soviet and European traditions of governance. 135 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The country inherited certain features of political leadership from the Soviet Union, while also being resolved to move away from the Soviet and post-Soviet styles of government.1 Today, it seems that Georgian political rhetoric has developed a taste for the term “European- type leader.” No one is sure of its exact meaning, however the political elites and society are convinced that it means something positive. Nevertheless, there are problems that demand amendment of the Constitution of Georgia to redistribute power among the branches of power. So far, the political elites, to say nothing of the public at large, do not know where the president’s powers end. This is best illustrated by the signing of the EU Association Agreement on 27 June, 2014. For several months, the country could not agree on who (the president or the prime minister) should travel to Vilnius to sign the document. The president was prepared to grant the right to the prime minister on this particular occasion, while the prime minister insisted that it was his prerogative as prime minister and that, therefore, the president’s condescension was out of place. After the 2013 presidential election, political leadership in Georgia was divided between the president and the prime minister with no clear delimitation reached so far. From the very first days of independence, the Georgian political class has been pondering on the best mechanism of political leadership. In 1990, prominent Georgian philosopher Merab Mamar- dashvili wrote in one of the newspapers: “What components do we have to create a new way of thinking and produce new leaders who will call us to a new future? The old ideas will lead us once again to illusions of castles in the air and the reality of new prisons. We will copy the totalitarian structures and the blind will lead the blind, bowing to equality in obedience.”2 This was one of the first attempts to identify the type of leadership rather than the form of governance or political system in Georgia. It became clear that in its efforts to arrive at new concepts of political leadership, Georgia would deliberately and consistently move away from the Soviet paradigm.

Leader Georgian-Style

At the earliest stages of Georgian independence, political leadership was associated with the names of Brezhnev, Andropov, and other Soviet leaders and was, therefore, negatively perceived by the nation. On the other hand, historical memory preserved vague ideas about kings and “fathers of the nation.” In 1801, the Georgian kingdom was liquidated and the country was annexed to Russia by force; in these conditions, the so-called fathers of the nation replaced the monarchs in the people’s minds. Ilya Chavchavadze, a prominent public figure who never ruled the country and yet was perceived and is still honored as one the nation’s leaders with his portraits displayed in practically every function- ary’s office, is a good case in point. The concept of kings and fathers of the nation perfectly fits the messianic doctrine of political leadership that can be applied, at least partly, to the current situation in Georgia.

1 See: V.J. Bunce, Sh.L. Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries, Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2011, p. 156, available at [http://books.google.ge/books?id=7KIY4MF6HaEC&pg=PA166&lpg=PA166&dq=Geo rgian+political+leaders&source=bl&ots=O48B8KFjCX&sig=YabZY3XBX-yRjY1B_bYACEFiPmM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=__ V4U4CpBqro7AaC0IGYAw&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Georgian%20political%20leaders&f=false]. 2 Tbilisi, September 1990, available at [http://www.mamardashvili.com/archive/interviews/charmed_by_death.html] (in Georgian).

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Russia and certain other post-Soviet countries remain devoted to the “strong hand” tradition, while in Georgia people want a “virtuous” leader who knows the way out of the impasse: a “father of the nation” vested with official powers. Georgia abounds in potentially charismatic political leaders who need adequate circumstances to fully reveal their abilities. The opportunities were and are numerous: the country has been moving from one extreme situation to another; political instability, Georgian society living in a state of permanent transition, events of historic dimensions, etc. have become part of the republic’s everyday life. At the turn of the 1990s, a time when the national-liberation movement gradually unfolded, the phenomenon of a charismatic leader conquered the hearts and minds of Georgians, allowing the so- called informal leaders to create a broad following. Merab Kostava and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, two Georgian political leaders, or rather dissidents of Soviet times, united the people around the idea of independence (after seventy years of communist rule) by the sheer force of their charisma. Charismatic leaders do not need laws and other legal instruments to achieve their political aims. This should not be taken to mean that leaders in power are not charismatic: Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia had strong charisma. Leaders of this type are very much needed at times of upheaval when society must be awakened to the coming changes. What happened to Gamsakhurdia is the best confirmation of the above: it is impossible to hold onto power by the sheer strength of charisma alone; time transforms charismatic leaders into common and dull officials. Georgia’s political history teaches us that the country has needed charismatic leaders at all times: suffice it to mention Eduard Shevardnadze, who replaced Gamsakhurdia as president. At first, his chances of a public political career looked slim. In March 1992, however, the nation believed that he was the right man to cope with the terror, political instability, economic crisis, civilian confrontation, and lost territorial integrity the country was encountering. Upon his return from Moscow (where he occupied the post of Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union), Shevardnadze was accepted as a charismatic leader. During the first years of his presidency, he went as far as feigning resignation to resolve the conflict with the leader of Mkhedrioni, a milita- rized movement. This stirred up a spontaneous (or organized) rally of thousands of his supporters who knelt to implore him to regain power for the sake of the country’s future: an indulgence on the part of the nation, on the one hand, and a convincing confirmation of his charisma, on the other. It should be said that charismatic leaders are rarely bothered about economic issues (not infrequently they are referred to as “enemies of the economy”) and remain unconcerned about the everyday needs of the common people.

Is the Leader a Messiah, Politician, or Manager?

As the nation gradually accumulated political experience, it gained a clearer idea about leadership. Leaders were no longer perceived as “fathers of the nation” but managers hired by the people to govern the state. This trend became even more pronounced when the Georgian Dream coalition emerged into the political limelight on the eve of the October 2012 parliamentary elections. It was led by Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who was determined to end the epoch of political messiahs and prove that a “good businessman can become a good politician.” At the early stage of his political career, 137 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Ivanishvili said in an interview that despite his scanty political experience he, as a good manager, would put together a reliable team.3 It should be said, however, that the approach to the state as a big corporation administered by a hired manager might warp the political transformations in Georgia. In fact, the image of an economist who, while filling the top posts in the state hierarchy, prefers to keep away from politics (this fully applies to all of Georgia’s prime ministers) was inherited from the Soviet past. Between 1991 and 2014, prime ministers changed hands fifteen times in Georgia; the absolute majority of them stayed away from politics and were engrossed in economic matters. The frequently changing official name of the post (from prime minister to chairman of the government, chairman of the cabinet of ministers, state minister) followed the Constitutional meandering. Ir- respective of the title, however, the man who filled the post was Number Two in the country’s political pyramid. Table 1 offers some information about all the prime ministers of Georgia; information about Irakly Garibashvili and Bidzina Ivanishvili is found in Table 2 that provides information about the Number One leaders. In Georgia, the president is Number One with wide powers and wide ambitions to remain the country’s only political leader. After regaining its independence, Georgia went to the polls six times to elect its president: (1) On 26 May, 1991, Zviad Gamsakhurdia won with 87.6% of the votes; (2) On 5 November, 1995, Eduard Shevardnadze won with 77% of the votes; (3) On 9 April, 2000, Eduard Shevardnadze won again with 82.0% of the votes; (4) On 4 January, 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili won with 96.0% of the votes; (5) On 5 January, 2008, Mikhail Saakashvili was victor again with 53.47% of the votes; (6) On 27 October, 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili became president with 62.18% of the votes.4 All the Georgian leaders, apart from Giorgi Margvelashvili, were drawn toward big politics; the first president of Georgia, for example, went as far as aspiring to become the leader of the Caucasian region. The second president (former foreign minister of one of the two superpowers—the U.S.S.R.) was determined to remain in world politics and become a world leader; he did not seem bothered that very few knew where to look for his country on the political map of the world. He never missed a chance (both inside and outside Georgia) to remind everyone that he “had helped to end the Cold War and dismantle the Berlin Wall.” As the third president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili used the country’s growing geopolitical significance to boost his own importance, and succeeded. A pet of the West and a key figure in world politics, he travelled far and wide across the world and paid more official and unofficial visits than any head of state before him. The first three presidents (Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, and Saakashvili) were convinced of their mission to bring prosperity to their country. “Georgia: choose the path of Christ!” Gamsakhurdia would scream at rallies in 1990, “and let those who take the path of Barabas be damned!”5

3 TV Interview of B. Ivanishvili to the First Channel of Public TV of Georgia, available at [http://1tv.ge/news- view/42224]. 4 [https://www.president.gov.ge/ge/President/Biography]. 5 [https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/peter-pomerantsev/polyphonic-president]

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Table 1

Personal Information about the Leaders of the Georgian Government

Time in Date of Name Occupation Educated in Academic Degree Office Birth

Vano July-October Mining Georgia 1968 Merabishvili 2012 engineer

Economist, Georgia, Nika Gilauri 2009-2012 1976 financier Ireland, the U.S.

Grigol Orientalist, Georgia, 2008-2009 1973 Mgaloblishvili diplomat Turkey, Italy

Vladimer Business Georgia, 2007-2008 1970 Gurgenidze administrator the U.S.

Zurab Nogaideli 2005-2007 Physicist Russia 1964

Zurab Zhvania 2003*-2005 Biologist Georgia 1963

Avtandil 2001-2003 Doctor Georgia 1951 Jorbenadze

Giorgi D.Sc. 2000-2001 Mathematician Georgia 1942 Arsenishvili (Technology)

Vazha D.Sc. 1998-2000 Mathematician Georgia, Russia 1949 Lortkipanidze (Demography)

Niko Lekishvili 1995-1998 Engineer Georgia 1947

Otar Patsatsia 1993-1995 Engineer Georgia 1929 Ph.D. (Economics)

Besarion Orientalist, 1991-1992 Georgia 1945 Ph.D. (Economics) Gugushvili economist

Engineer, D.Sc. Tengiz Sigua** 1990-1991 Georgia 1934 metallurgist (Technology)

* In 2003, Zhvania was appointed state minister; in 2004, his post was transformed to that of prime minister in accordance with the amended Constitution. ** Sigua was appointed for the second time in 1992, as soon as Gamsakhurdia was deposed.

Saakashvili turned to Shota Rustaveli, world-famous Georgian poet, to describe his mission as “Give beggars property, free the slaves.”6 Elected prime minister on 1 October, 2012, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili left the post in No- vember 2013 of his own free will. He formulated the new paradigm of political leadership as uproot- ing all shoots of political messianism in Georgia. People with very different political pasts covered different roads before reaching the Georgian political Olympus. The 2013 election deserves our attention for several reasons.

6 The Annual Report of Georgian President M. Saakashvili in the Parliament of the Country, 14 February, 2006 [http:// www.radiotavisupleba.ge/content/article/1545584.html] (in Georgian).

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In 2010, President Saakashvili initiated several Constitutional amendments (which pushed the president into the shadow of the prime minister) to be enforced after 2013, which changed the country’s political structure. Before the 2013 election, the president was figure Number One, while the prime minister (or, sometimes, the speaker of the parliament) was Number Two in the country’s political hierarchy. After the election, it became clear that the president elect was a symbol rather than a real leader. Real power belonged to Prime Minister Irakly Garibashvili confirmed by the parliament. (I would like to point out that the source of legitimacy of both institutions of power remained the same.) At the parliamentary elections, people voted for the Georgian Dream coalition and, consequently, for Bidzina Ivanishvili (who was closely associated with it in the peoples’ minds), who became prime minister. He retired after the presidential election leaving the post to Garibashvili, who had no votes behind him and, therefore, much weaker legitimacy. This made another bout of Constitutional amendments inevitable: in future, the president, like the prime minister today, was to be elected by the parliament rather than by popular vote. Indeed, a clash between the president’s weaker powers and stronger legitimacy might cause tension between him and the prime minister and hence political instability. The ruling party harmonized its choice of presidential candidate with the new Constitution; the functions and powers demanded a non-political figure to avoid disagreements over the division of power between him and the prime minister. Giorgi Margvelashvili, the founding father and rector of a small yet prestigious university in Georgia,7 for many years remained an expert frequently seen on the TV screens and one of the favor- ites of the press who was very critical about President Saakashvili. He has no political ambitions, nor has he ever demonstrated the qualities of a leader, even though he was one of those who shaped public opinion through the media. After the 2012 parliamentary elections, he was appointed Minister for Science and Education. It was his “non-political background” that earned him nomination as presidential candidate. Fully aware that his chances of winning the race on his own were slim, he leaned on the popular support of the new ruling party, a novelty in the Georgian political tradition within which charismatic leaders rallied people around their parties and not vice versa. It should be said in all justice that the Georgian Dream coalition and Giorgi Margvelashvili relied on the money and prestige of Bidzina Ivanishvili. An analysis of the 2013 presidential election suggests that Georgia has acquired an institution of informal political leadership. In the 1980s, there were informal leaders who could lead the masses; today, informal leadership means state governance. To sum up: the 2013 presidential election created two parallel axes of state governance: informal represented by Ivanishvili and bureaucratic represented by Garibashvili and Margvelashvili.

Resources of Political Leadership

Eduard Shevardnadze was the only professional politician; all the other presidents had practically no political experience, with the exception of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose experience of political communication proved inadequate, which explains his fairly shaky power. It can be said that he was a truly national leader with no time to adjust to the presidency.

7 [https://www.president.gov.ge/ge/President/Biography].

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Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze, and Saakashvili came to power by different routes, yet all of them were “political animals” to borrow the term from Aristotle. The political force that came to power after the October 2013 election has no political leaders. The Constitutional amendments that made Georgia a parliamentary republic have probably di- minished the political importance of the Number One leader. The people and the media lost their bearings in the face of the “two leaders” model. Political leadership Georgian-style was very much affected by the dramatic change of genera- tions in power. Mikhail Saakashvili, who became president at 35, preferred the younger generation in the highest posts and was frequently accused of relying on inexperienced people. He, however, remained convinced that the state should rid itself of the bureaucracy of the old regime. Speaking about the Maidan in Kiev, he pointed out: “Ukraine should trust the new generation. The old state machine should be pushed aside to make room for new people aged 25-30 in all the state structures. Young people should be given a chance to build their state.”8 Fifty-six-year old Ivanishvili was brought to power by the October 2012 election; for a while he ruled the country alongside Saakashvili, who remained president and head of state until the 2013 presidential election when the post of prime minister went to 31-year-old Garibashvili. In so doing, he upstaged Saakashvili, who for a long time boasted that he was the world’s youngest head of state. The institution of political leadership had to undergo abrupt modernization after Shevardnadze’s departure, when an entire generation was eradicated from the political scene, a situation unknown in other post-Soviet countries. The young generation brought their values to the summits of power; these people changed the post-Soviet style of leadership, the ethics of governance, and even the way the new political leaders looked and behaved. These young men had no previous organizational and bureaucratic experience; in Georgia, bureaucracy, an important element of state governance, was associated with the Soviet Union and should, therefore, be avoided in the new state. The new people at the top, who replaced Saakashvili, accepted his tradition of appointing young people to the highest posts. It seems that the nation is convinced that inexperienced leaders make effective state governors. For many years, it was and still is preferred that the Georgian political leaders have a so-called Western education (going back to the time before the Rose Revolution): Eduard Shevardnadze with his Soviet bureaucratic experience preferred people educated in the West. Irakly Garibashvili and Giorgi Margvelashvili are no exception: the former graduated from the International Relations Department of Pantheon-Sorbonne University also known as Paris I9; the latter studied sociology at Central European University (CEU); both know foreign languages. The first President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia knew several foreign languages, while Shevardnadze spoke only Georgian and Russian. Mikhail Saakashvili is fluent in several foreign languages (English, French, Russian, and Ukrainian). Bidzina Ivanishvili’s very limited knowledge of foreign languages made it much harder for him to establish informal contacts with foreign colleagues. The president’s party affiliation is another pain in the neck for the Georgian political establishment: the initial (1995) version of the Constitution of Georgia said: “The President of Georgia shall not have the right to hold any other position” (Art 72). The term “other” remained unspecified, which caused violent disagreements among the parties.

8 [http://podrobnosti.ua/podrobnosti/2014/06/01/978624.html], 1 June, 2014. 9 [http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=202].

141 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS — — — D.Sc. D.Sc. D.Sc. Ph.D. Ph.D. Degree Table 2 Academic Academic

(Philology)

Ph.D. (Law) (Economics) (Philosophy) (Philosophy) Languages French French French Russian Russian Russian Russian English, English, English, English, English, English, German, German, Spanish, Spanish, Russian, Russian, Russian, Russian, Ukrainian, Ukrainian,

Affiliation

Party Dream Dream United United Table” “Round “Round National National Union of Union of Georgian Georgian Georgian Non-party president) president) Movement of Georgia Democrats Democrats the Citizens the Citizens (when acting (when acting Social Social Vague Vague Vague Vague Vague Liberal (former (former Political Political Opinions Democrat communist) Conservative Opinions Christian Christian Christian Christian Christian Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox Religious Religious

Atheist (Christian Atheist (Christian Atheist (Christian Atheist (Orthodox Atheist (Orthodox Christian by birth) Orthodox by birth) Orthodox by birth)

Birth Place of of Place Capital Capital Capital Provinces Provinces Provinces Provinces Provinces *

52 67 39 35 56 44 31

Age

in Educated Educated Czech Czech Russia Russia France the U.S. Georgia Georgia Ukraine, Ukraine, Georgia, Georgia, Georgia, Georgia, Georgia, Republic Formal Information about the Leaders of Georgian Government critic expert Lawyer Lawyer Literary Literary Teacher relations relations Engineer-

economist

Occupation Occupation Philosopher International International

in Power Power in

Period ent ent 1992 2004 2013 2013 pres- pres- 1991- 1995- 2003- 2004- 2012- 2013- 2013- 2003 5 * Age at the moment of coming into office. * Age at the moment of coming into office. ** In 1995, Shevardnadze was elected president; before that he held the post of head state, introduced by State Council when President duties of president as parliament chairman. *** Between 23 November, 2003 and 25 January, 2004, temporarily performed the Name Gamsakhurdia was deposed. Gamsakhurdia was deposed. Z. Gamsakhurdia E. Shevardnadze*** N. Burjanadze M. Saakashvili B. Ivanishvili G. Margvelashvili I. Garibashvili

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In the past, the opposition used this Constitutional provision to demand President Shevard- nadze’s retirement from the post of chairman of the Union of Citizens of Georgia. The same happened to Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution when his right to remain the leader of his United National Movement was doubted. Finally, on 6 February, 2004, Art 72 was specified (amendment No. 3272) with “except for a party position” to legalize the previous practice. On 15 May, 2010, the Constitution was amended once more: after the 2013 election, the president elect was expected to leave all party posts. There is no similar restriction relating to the prime minister, therefore, what is not banned is permitted. This means that the amended Constitution that came into force after the 2013 election pushed the country into a previously unknown situation: a non-party president and the chairman of a political party as prime minister. It should be said that throughout its independent development, the fact that the head of state was the leader of the ruling party caused a lot of political problems. The election campaigns serve as the best confirmation. For example, the Central Election Commission fined the people working in the office of Prime Minister Garibashvili because the building was used to hold a meeting of the political council of the ruling party.10 In Georgia, each newly elected political leader opens a new page in the country’s history, which begins on the date he comes to power; this is confirmed by the fact that each of them finds a new office for his administration. Zviad Gamsakhurdia shared the building with the parliament; Eduard Shevardnadze used the building earlier occupied by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, while Mikhail Saakashvili built a new palace. Even before his election, Giorgi Margvelashvili announced that he would not move into the palace. After several months in office, he changed his mind and moved into the palace despite the opposition of the Georgian Dream. One more thing: as soon as the president elect comes to power, the biographies, reports, and other materials related to his predecessor are removed from the official website of the president of Georgia. Table 2 above offers basic information about some of the Georgian political leaders.

Conclusion

As soon as the Georgians elected their first president in 1991, their concerns about his unlim- ited power grew and became more pronounced. Post-Soviet Georgia has tried all forms of governance: it has been a presidential, parliamentary-presidential, and parliamentary republic; the president being Number One leader in the first two republics. After the 2013 presidential election, the republic tried on the parliamentary model. The few months that have elapsed since its introduction have shown that the people find it hard to accept a president with no real powers and no leadership talents. According to a public opinion poll carried out by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in No- vember 2013, the new president’s approval rating was 72%; several months later it dropped to 46%.11 On 14-17 April, 2014, the Kviris palitra newspaper organized a sociological poll on the subject “An Ambitious Politician.” One of the questions that gathered 485 responses was: Who is the most ambitious Georgian politician? The readers pointed to Saakashvili as the most ambitious and to Mar- gvelashvili as the least ambitious politician.

10 [http://www.electionsportal.ge/geo/incident/3839]. 11 [http://www.apsny.ge/2014/pol/1399916608.php?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook].

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Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist when seen from abroad, was a national leader for the Geor- gians. Quite a few of them are still proud to be called Zviadists. Eduard Shevardnadze, a cunning and inventive politician, was “the Fox” for his compatriots. To emphasize his sacral mission as president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili took his oath as president elect at the burial site of David IV the Builder (Georgian: Davit Agmashenebeli), the might- iest of the Georgian kings of the 12th century. Throughout his presidency, he copied Gamsakhurdia and Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the contemporary Turkish state. His Georgian supporters are still called “Mishists” (when president he was affectionately called Misho). Giorgi Margvelashvili has not yet demonstrated any specific habits. The very specific paradigm of political leadership in Georgia and the disagreements over its essence and nature show that, as distinct from many other Soviet successor-states, Georgia has never been afraid of experimenting when looking for the best efficient model of governance. None of the presidents has been like any other; each of them has had his own style of state governance. All of them—either with a large enthusiastic following or passively (as the present president of Georgia)— have their places in the country’s political history. The above suggests that in Georgia no, even the strongest, political leader can remain in power indefinitely: people easily tire of the old and want to see new faces.12 This means that sooner or later, every Georgian leaders loses his political capital; it can be said that after 1991 Georgia has accumulated enough experience of a true understanding of political leadership. In Georgia, society is forcing the government to move away from the post-Soviet and embrace the European paradigm of political leadership.

12 See: V.J. Bunce, Sh.L. Wolchik, op. cit.

ACQUIRING LEGITIMACY: THE IMPACT OF CIS INTERPARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS ON POST-SOVIET PARLIAMENTARIANISM

Asel MURZAKULOVA Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor at the Chair of International Relations of the Karasaev Bishkek Humanitarian University (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

ABSTRACT

his article analyzes the institutional transformation. It examines the collective specifics of CIS interparliamentary in- benefits from Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation with T stitutions in the context of regime the Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS 144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

Member States (IA CIS). According to the assessment among its member states, author, the IA CIS directs its efforts toward whereby it has managed to create the im- upholding the standards of adaptive parlia- pression that it is a structure subordinated mentarianism in its member states. It ini- to the legitimization of authoritative re- tially aimed to coordinate a unified election gimes.

KEYWORDS: parliamentary democracy, authoritarianism, Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS Member States (IA CIS), Russian interests, foreign policy, soft power, Kyrgyzstan, parliamentarianism, election assessment standards, international observers, legitimization of elections.

Introduction The IA CIS has been functioning for 22 years now. Analyses of the changes going on in the regimes and state institutions of the CIS often gloss over the role this organization plays. However, we believe it is a key channel for spreading the values of adaptive parliamentarianism and technology of political control. This gives rise to several questions: How does this happen? How are the changes impacting Kyrgyzstan’s political development? What does this impact consist of, and what is the main result? This article aims to look for answers to these questions. Analyses of the political regime changes in the post-Soviet countries place particular emphasis on internal factors. Little attention is given to the external impact that promotes the reproduction of particular political regimes. The international environment beyond the CIS borders is usually considered an external factor. However, post-Soviet international organizations (and their bodies) rarely become a target of this kind of research, for which there are reasons. For example, popular opinion has it that the development of international institutions in the post-Soviet countries depends exclusively on the position of the head of state. At the same time, institutional support has been playing a growing role lately, laying the foundation of long-term stability of the ruling regimes. International institutions have begun taking an active part in this vector. It is also worth noting that almost all important post-Soviet organizations have an interparliamentary component of cooperation (for example, the CSTO Parliamentary Assembly and the Inter- parliamentary Assembly of the EurAsEC). In this context, special mention should be made of the IA CIS, which stood at the fountainhead of the “parade of sovereignties” and the formation of the political systems of the post-Soviet states. The impact of the interparliamentary institutions on the political regimes is rather difficult to trace, since we are dealing here with building a political discourse, forming an external environment, and the socialization of parliamentary deputies. At the same time, analyzing the functionality of interparliamentary institutions from this viewpoint provides a new perspective for assessing their activity.

Institutional Specifics of the CIS’s Interparliamentary Institutions The IA CIS, which was created in 1992, is a statutory body. In contrast to other CIS institutions, the IA has the right to enter international agreements in the name of its member states (when ratifying 145 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS the Convention on the IA CIS, only the parliament of Azerbaijan did not recognize this right). Most of the world’s interparliamentary organizations (the PA OSCE and PACE) do not have the special function that the IA CIS possesses, i.e. adopting model laws for its member states. Throughout the history of its activity, the IA CIS has adopted more than 300 model laws that regulate practically all spheres—from defense and security to the foundations of library services.1 They are drawn up by deputies who represent the IA CIS member states. After model laws are adopted at Assembly ses- sions, the deputies lobby them in the national parliaments. We will note that interparliamentary institutions are a relatively young form of interstate cooperation. Acting as an instrument of interaction among member states, interparliamentary organizations perform several very important functions: regulation-creating (forming the organization’s legislative base and unified legal space), control (parliamentary control over the executive power bodies and the decisions adopted), consultative (preparing and carrying out consultative work for the states and institutions concerned), operative (independent implementation by interparliamentary institutions of their assignments with the help of the available organizational, human, and financial means), and information (organizations acting as the receivers, transmitters, and channels for spreading information). So, these institutions could well be viewed as the main channels of parliamentary diplomacy. Nevertheless, an interparliamentary organization cannot be seen as the simple sum of parliamentary deputies of the member states or a collective authorized body. Ideally, interparliamentary organizations should possess a certain level of autonomy with respect to their members. However, this could give rise to risks, since the decisions adopted by interparliamentary organizations do not always correspond to the will of the member states. As was noted above, despite the fact that the CIS is an international organization, the countries belonging to it have a low level of decision-making autonomy. Moreover, throughout its entire history, the IA CIS has always been chaired by a Russian representative. The development of interparliamentary cooperation in the CIS is closely tied to the idea of liberal democracy that dominated in the 1990s and the establishment of institutions called upon to support it. Along with division of power, rule of law, and elections, a political system’s level of parliamentarianism is also a sign of how successfully it is moving toward democratic rule. Parliamentary representation is essentially the central element of present-day democracy. By virtue of being elected, parliamentary deputies act as the key link between society and government bodies. For this reason, they can be seen as a vital channel via which society realizes itself on the institutional arena of democracy. However, as the practical development of political systems in the post-Soviet states shows, the methods and principles for forming parliamentary representation has turned the legislature into a “weak link” that often acts in tandem with the institution of president. In most post-Soviet states, it has become an institution that supports the reproduction of an authoritative political regime and en- sures legislative support of its functioning.

Collective Benefits and Russian Interests in the CIS

Russia dominates in all the CIS institutions, the IA being no exception. It acts as a veto player that forms the agenda and sets the course of development. In order to retain its supremacy, Russia strives to make sure that these institutions produce at least the minimum amount of collective benefits for their members.

1 See: A. Murzakulova, Mezhparlamentskie instituty SNG: problemy ustoichivosti i integratsii na postsovetskom prostranstve, Bishkek Humanitarian University Publishers, Bishkek, 2012.

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These collective benefits are mainly formed by means of the international recognition of elections by observer missions from the IA CIS. It is worth noting that observers from the CIS and representatives of European institutions usually give opposing assessments of all the election processes in the post- Soviet area. This has produced two standards of external assessment of the national processes. The regime transformation going on in this vein defines national preferences. At the end of the 1990s, the OSCE standards were considered to be the main reference point with respect to electoral rights for most of the post-Soviet countries; after the Convention on Democratic Elections was adopted in 2002, a new mechanism of election monitoring and assessment appeared. Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission Vladimir Churov addressed the election monitoring and assessment standards in one of his speeches. In so doing, he noted that the observer mission from the CIS “largely keeps in mind local and national specifics and customs and acts on the basis of respect of the principle of sovereign democracy;”2 this was basically the opposite of the OSCE representatives’ approach. The institution of international election monitoring (the activity of which is regulated by international law) came into being relatively recently. Its growing popularity is related to the fundamental changes in world practice launched by the Helsinki Final Act adopted in 1975 at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Like parliamentary diplomacy, this institution is closely related to the conceptual transfer from hard to soft security that presupposes the predominance of humanitarian criteria of cooperation in international relations. However, it should be noted that the law of several European countries (including those with the status of political neutrality) prohibits the participation of international observers in the national election process. Nevertheless, for most developing and post-Soviet countries, international observation has become a characteristic element of the election process in two areas—ideological and regulatory. The first makes it possible for the state institutions responsible for holding elections to declare their adherence to democratic values and willingness to receive an international assessment. The second promotes bringing national election legislation into harmony with international standards. On the whole, international observation is called upon to perform the following main functions: 1. Information function. Observers provide the world community with information on election results that makes it possible to determine their correspondence to the international legal system of coordinates. In turn, the transparency of the election process makes it possible to determine the level of corruption of political institutions and can serve as an indicator of economic risks for potential investors. 2. Coordination function. International observers are usually representatives of international political and economic institutions. For developing countries, the assessments of observers can serve as a signal to coordinate international programs and projects aimed at developing civil society, a legal culture of voters, and support of the reform of institutions involved in the election process. 3. Modernization function. The assessments of international observers almost always contain practical recommendations for improving national election legislation. The institution of international election monitoring began functioning in the post-Soviet space in conditions of growing geopolitical competition among world and regional powers for leadership in the former Soviet republics. We will note that analyses of the changes going on in the CIS have

2 V. Churov, “Suverennaia demokratiia i vybory,” available at [www.iacis.ru], 9 July, 2013.

147 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS been making increasing use of the far from new paradigm of the Great Game. This is having a significant effect on cooperation of the CIS countries in security, the economy, and the advance of “sovereign” democracy. After the events in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, elections to the higher institutions of power were viewed in close connection with the problems of security and sustainability of the political regimes. In 2004, when addressing his American colleague Colin Powell, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov said: “We must avoid the destructive practice of double standards when evaluating the electoral processes.”3 The matter concerned the status of Ukraine after the Or- ange Revolution. In practice, however, everything turned out the exact opposite; this was essentially when the institutional foundations of the double standards practice began to emerge. This made the question of elections as a key element of democracy the central one on the IA CIS agenda. So we can say that at the current stage, the IA’s activity is being carried out in two overlapping contexts. The first context is understood as the reciprocal influence of the electoral processes and problems of ensuring security, while the second infers election assessment that acts as a kind of resource. It makes it possible to include the IA in the system of institutions of international election legitimacy and in the discussion about election assessment standards. Seen from this viewpoint, cooperation with the IA is appealing in that election assessment and the corresponding recommendations are given by the state bodies of the country in which the elections are held. From this it follows that the assessments of the observer mission will always coincide with the opinion of the authorities; this creates the impression that the elections are internationally recognized. This international legitimacy forms the backbone of the collective benefits produced by the CIS’s interparliamentary institutions; most countries take advantage of it and it correlates with the interests of the main player.

Interparliamentary Cooperation: Kyrgyzstan’s Experience

Kyrgyzstan marked the beginning of its sovereignty by declaring that it was a democratic country; at that time it was called “an island of democracy” in Central Asia (CA). During the first half of the 1990s, the republic’s leaders took active steps toward developing parliamentary diplomacy and peacekeeping. A significant event during this period was the first sitting of the IA CIS held in Bishkek in Sep- tember 1992. It is worth noting the contribution Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary deputies made to the peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh and the efforts that they exerted to sign the Bishkek Protocol (in May 1994) on reconciliation and a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This document paved the way to peaceful settlement of the conflict. In addition, Kyrgyzstan joined the Agreement on Joint Peacekeeping Forces signed by CIS participants in September 1993. The country’s armed forces became part of the joint peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan where a civil war had been going on since 1992. During the first decade of Kyrgyzstan’s independence, interparliamentary relations developed evenly and smoothly (both in the post-Soviet organizations and in the European structures); active

3 A. Taylor, “Sergey Lavrov: The Russian Foreign Minister the U.S Loves to Hate,” The Washington Post, 14 March, 2014.

148 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 cooperation with the PA OSCE and PACE was carried out within the framework of state programs and civil society institutions. However, movement of President Askar Akaev’s political regime toward intensification of authoritarian rule led to the country’s leadership turning away from the European parliamentary organizations toward the IA CIS. The reason for this change in course was criticism of the electoral processes in Kyrgyzstan by the European institutions, particularly the OSCE ODIHR. The 2005 (parliamentary) and 2009 (presidential) elections became key aspects of post-Soviet state-building in Kyrgyzstan. During the 2005 parliamentary elections, significant violations were identified, which caused the opposition to reject their results. Observers from both the IA CIS and the OSCE ODIHR were invited to monitor these elections; as was to be expected, their evaluations proved to be directly opposite.4 Non-recognition of the results of the 2005 parliamentary elections gave the opposition a chance to garner wide social support of its demands. Despite this, no long-awaited reforms were forthcoming; on the contrary, the country’s political system became increasingly authoritarian. Another vivid example of the difference in observer assessments is the 2009 presidential election held while changes in the political regime were going on. For example, the IA CIS observers deemed them legitimate and in full keeping with international election standards. The report of the OSCE ODIHR and OSCE PA observers, on the other hand, contained information about mass violations of election legislation, which could potentially serve as grounds for contesting the election results and their legitimacy as a whole. This makes us wonder why the assessments were so opposite. Several factors should be kept in mind when addressing this quandary.  First, the inclination of the CIS institutions to support post-Soviet regimes loyal to the Rus- sian Federation. One such regime was Kurmanbek Bakiev’s, who was elected to a second presidential term in 2009.  Second, methodological problems. Long-term election monitoring by the IA CIS and OSCE ODIHR is built on different methodological approaches. The IA CIS focuses attention on direct inclusion of observers in the monitoring process by talking to the participants in the election process and visiting polling stations on voting day. How transparent and legitimate the elections are is essentially based on the assessments of a group of 7-30 parliamentary deputies who understand the special features of the political culture of the CIS countries. In turn, the election monitoring practice of the OSCE ODIHR is based on principles that presume the mandatory inclusion of national institutions of civil society in it. These efforts also include holding meetings, seminars, etc. with the main actors in the election process, as well as long-term media monitoring. However, it is hard to say that the OSCE ODIHR observers, who hold a diametrically opposite position, are entirely objective either. Despite the rather wide range of methodological principles used by the OSCE ODIHR, it is “guilty” of stereotypes regarding the CIS states. The legitimacy of every election held in them is automatically subjected to doubt, while the level of political culture and law awareness of the citizens is not taken into account at all. In our opinion, it is extremely inexpedient to apply principles to the “new” states that have stood the test of time in countries with a developed democracy. The CIS countries will always be striving

4 It is worth noting that 2005 parliamentary elections never did receive a final assessment from the IA CIS observer mission. The report on observer monitoring and assessment was removed from the Organization’s website shortly after the state coup on 24 March.

149 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS to “catch up,” and they will have to develop their own understanding of the basic rights and freedoms expressed during citizen declaration of will based on reactive logic. The history of holding elections in Kyrgyzstan has undoubtedly shown the wisdom of turning to international experience. However, keeping pace with the best world achievements in election legislation in no way guarantees modernized changes. The selectorate is still a critically important element. Unfortunately, we cannot yet talk about a wide and mass civil movement in the country (despite the experience of overcoming political crises and creating the first parliamentary-presidential republic). Contemporary civil activism within the framework of NGO activity, the opposition, or members of unofficial organizations continues to be concentrated exclusively on politics; problems of security, social development, and the economy remain in the background. The principles of civil education are being introduced at an extremely slow pace into curricu- lums of all levels. So far it concentrates on history and the meaning of the official state symbols, without attempting to instill skills of independent political choice or cultivate civil responsibility. It is entirely obvious that widespread awareness campaigns must be carried out and civil education development programs introduced in the “new” states. Ideally, the selectorate should be replen- ished with people whose competence is formed along with efforts aimed to develop civil culture as a whole. After the Tulip Revolution in 2005, the problem of election legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan began to be viewed as a key issue for ensuring internal stability. This gave rise to the political choice of official Bishkek, which increasingly tends toward Russia-centric organizations that are a kind of platform for creating regional branches of the IA CIS. For example, in 2008, the IA CIS opened the first branch of its structural subdivision in Bish- kek—the International Institute for Monitoring the Development of Democracy, Parliamentarianism, and Observation of the Election Rights of Citizens of the IA CIS Member States. Later another branch was opened in Baku. One of the tasks of the regional IA CIS structures is monitoring the political processes going on in the Central Asian and Caucasian regions, as well as efforts to reform the election legislation of the countries that belong to them. The Bishkek branch particularly focuses on assisting to draw up national programs for raising the legal culture of voters, election organizers, local observers, and representatives of political parties and the media. However, the awareness efforts of the IA CIS Bishkek branch has still not reached a level that places it in the ranks of the OSCE and civil society institutions. It should be noted that trust is a key obstacle to cooperation between the interstate CIS structures and civil society institutions financed largely by Western countries. The impact of the IA CIS on the development of parliamentarianism in Kyrgyzstan is also related to its socialization function. It is extremely significant that joint parliamentary sittings are held in the Tauride Palace where the State Duma of the Russian Empire was once housed. This symboli- cally emphasizes the status of Russian parliamentarianism as an example of the “proper combination” of its components—a strong president and obedient parliament. The fact that in post-Soviet times, Russia has ceased to be the main reference point for other CIS countries in terms of successful economic reforms and efficient state governance draws attention to itself. Nevertheless, the post-Soviet political regimes are still very interested in Russian political control techniques. In this context, we must mention the mutual cooperation among the ruling parties that have formed in most CIS countries; the numerous agreements they have entered with the United Russia party presume joint exchange of information and carrying out of measures aimed at training parliamentary deputies. 150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 3 2014

At the same time, the attitude toward the institution of the IA CIS in the post-Soviet countries is far from unequivocal. For Kyrgyzstan, the IA CIS is a main partner when the ruling regime needs electoral support. On the other hand, some reticence is seen, which is manifested in lack of political trust in the IA as a prototype of Russian dominance. In the end, this significantly reduces the effectiveness of the IA CIS as a multilateral organization. Despite the fact that the IA CIS parliamentary control functions are extremely weak, this does not lessen its impact with respect to soft power. It is obvious that the IA is producing a symbolic space for forming and confirming the adaptive values of parliamentarianism in conditions of authoritative political regimes. It goes without saying that the Assembly is not so much providing ways to bypass the liberal-democratic procedures as strengthening the sovereign interpretations of democracy, debates about which are still going on in the post-Soviet countries.

Conclusion

Major changes occurred after the Belovezh Agreement was signed on 8 December, 1991 in the former Soviet Union. The situation in Abkhazia, Ossetia, and the Crimea has shown that the contours of the CIS are dynamically changing, and that this is being affected by both external and internal players. Institutional support of the new era of international relations in the post-Soviet countries will be accompanied by a strengthening of the role and expansion of the functions of the CIS institutions. This regional interstate organization and its founding bodies are quite often criticized for their low level of efficiency. However, we think the functional activity of the CIS institutions lies more in the area of soft rather than hard power. As this article has shown, the IA CIS is an example of upholding the standards of adaptive parliamentarianism in most CIS states, the authoritative governments of which are imitating elections. The main function of the IA CIS lies in coordinating the formation a unified election assessment by the member states; it has already managed to create the image of being a structure subordinated to authoritative processes and incapable of criticizing the action of the executive power. At the same time, we must not lose sight of several internal factors, which, as we know, are always primary. For example, the activity of the IA CIS in Kyrgyzstan shows that the politicians of this country are still harboring certain expectations (possibly inherited from the past) relating to Rus- sia’s support and assistance, as well the institutions it dominated in, with respect to solving the problems of the regime’s sustainability. In our opinion, these expectations are residual in nature, since they are look back to the past and are not directed toward the future. However, despite this, it is absolutely clear that the impact of the IA CIS on the post-Soviet countries with respect to soft power has long-term potential. This impact rests on the structure of the state power bodies of Kyrgyzstan and the other “new” states. Interparliamentary assemblies in the post-Soviet countries are positioning themselves as elite structures of civil society, which is largely preventing a dialog with a wide range of participants, information exchange, and building alternative approaches to solving development problems. One of the main vectors of cooperation is forming communication platforms, including with the participation of European organizations. At the same time, there is very limited horizontal communication among the civil society organizations of the CIS member states. In this context, it is difficult to expect an increase in interparliamentary efforts from CIS member states whose legislature is not efficient enough due to its powers being sapped by including the head of state among the legislators. It is also difficult to find institutions endowed with greater powers 151 Volume 15 Issue 3 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS than parliaments (or organizations of parliamentary deputies) capable of more fully identifying the requirements of society and serving as a link between citizens and the key figures of state governance. Keeping in mind the role of the legislative bodies in developing and strengthening regional cooperation, their political significance must be raised. More efficient use must be made of parliamentary diplomacy. This requires establishing strong ties among the corresponding organizations, which should strive for more intensive cooperation within the region and beyond it. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan can position itself as a center of parliamentarianism and parliamentary diplomacy in the region. The priority position the country assumed as early as the beginning of the 1990s must be retained; this will allow it to obtain several advantages. The main one is enhancing the development of civil society and accumulating the experience of joint law-making efforts of parliamentary deputies and public institutions. The wide practice of parliamentary hearings with the participation of civil society institutions, as well as joint educational and social projects implemented in partnership with public institutions and international organizations can pave the way to developing interparliamentary cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and other CIS countries. It would be a very good idea to form an information hub in Kyrgyzstan that specializes in the research of parliamentarianism and the development of parliamentary diplomacy, or a center for ex- changing information with the parliamentary deputies of both neighboring and other countries, spear- headed by the current problems in international relations. The activity of such a center (or information hub) might include offering services to conduct monitoring studies and provide information storage and collation (at the Central Asian level for starters). This will gradually involve Kyrgyzstan in resolving the regional problems of the post-Soviet countries. When addressing the current problems existing in relations among the regional states, first mention should go to regulating CA’s hydropower resources, the key to resolving which is held by the executive power branch. In our opinion, it is critically important to include the parliamentary component when discussing this question. The participation of parliamentary deputies will make negotiations to settle the crisis situation more positive, open, and confidential (the experience of developing parliamentary democracy in the world and in the CIS has already repeatedly shown its effectiveness). Small states can participate in regional political cooperation by offering international services performed through mediation, making use of the results produced by information hubs, carrying out value interpretation, and organizing international communication platforms on contemporary development problems. In this respect, Kyrgyzstan has made significant progress: practically all the international organizations have offices in its territory. Moreover, the Near and Far Abroad think of Kyrgyzstan as a country that is friendly toward many different international organizations. We will note that the participation of small countries in interparliamentary organizations is promoting the establishment of their full-fledged and equal interaction with the largest players on the world arena. This is giving them access to global communication platforms and the possibility of positioning themselves in a positive light in the eyes of the international community. All of these prospects will only come to fruition in Kyrgyzstan if national parliamentarianism can survive the vicissitudes of state transformation. Kyrgyzstan’s participation in interparliamentary institutions has already had a positive impact on the functioning of the parliamentary-presidential form of rule, which is something new for the republic and region.

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