Understanding the Local and Global Politics of Gold Mining in Kyrgyzstan

Central Asian Survey

ISSN: 0263-4937 (Print) 1465-3354 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccas20

State as resource, mediator and performer: understanding the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan

Asel Doolot & John Heathershaw

To cite this article: Asel Doolot & John Heathershaw (2015) State as resource, mediator and performer: understanding the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey, 34:1, 93-109, DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2015.1010853 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2015.1010853

Published online: 19 Feb 2015.

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State as resource, mediator and performer: understanding the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan Asel Doolot and John Heathershaw*

Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK

The inability of the state to maintain security and the rule of law for the purposes of foreign direct investment and industrial production is often taken as a sign of its weakness. However, such judgments say little about the actual functions of the state for global extraction industries and local political forces which demand their share of the pie. Whilst coercive state power may have decreased since Kyrgyzstan became independent, more important is the fact that the state itself has been transformed under the ruptures of, on the one hand, economic and political liberalization and, on the other, the effects of so-called ‘revolutions’ of 2005 and 2010 which led to the wholesale restructuring of national structures of clientelism. Based on ethnographic research conducted in Talas province, documentary sources and interviews with gold mining companies and state officials, the paper investigates the state’s shifting roles with respect to Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining sector. Firstly, it explores the state as a source of rents for officials who grant and rescind licences in exchange for formal and informal payments from foreign investors, often via offshore vehicles. Secondly, it considers the role of the state as mediator between foreign investors and their access to sites. Finally, it identifies the state as performer of its status as sovereign power despite its inability to prevent uprisings and actually guarantee the promised access to its territory. Keywords: Kyrgyzstan; state; performance; extraction industry; mining; gold; globalization

Introduction This paper explores the dynamics of the gold sector in order to qualify the functions of the state in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in its relationship with extractive industries. No longer, we propose, is it sufficient to adopt the basic Weberian standards of hierarchy, territoriality and legitimacy as the benchmark of the ideal-type state against which Kyrgyzstan is simply deemed to fall short. Whilst this definition still holds utility for some contexts and research questions, it is of minimal use in understanding the place of the newly independent Central Asian states in global politics and economics. We must consider the networked and offshore characteristics of these states and the per- formative character of their sovereignty as they are emerging in Central Asia barely 20 years after their births. The study of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan allows some of the otherwise hidden workings of the state to be partially revealed. Multinational mining corporations at work in Kyrgyzstan have found themselves the object of local political conflicts before, during and after the national uprisings of 2005 and 2010. Frequent changes in ownership have opened up the industry and its offshore connections for journalistic, policy and academic analysis. The inability of the state to maintain security and the rule of law for the purposes of foreign direct investment is often denoted as an indication of state weakness. However, such judgments say little about the actual functions of the state between global extraction industries and local political forces

*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

© 2015 Southseries Inc 94 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw demanding their share of the pie. Whilst state coercive power may have decreased since Kyrgyz- stan was a full republic of the Soviet Union, the state’s role has also been transformed under the ruptures of, on the one hand, economic and political liberalization and, on the other, the formation and reconfiguration of new national structures of clientelism. Given this difficult environment for research, some greater reflection on data collection and analysis is warranted. The investigation of fraudulent activities and especially of offshore jurisdictions is extremely difficult, especially in the context of the turbulent onshore politics of Kyrgyzstan. It requires time-consuming investigation, including forensic accounting techniques. No state investigation, except of the Kumtor mining crisis, has been made public to this date. The companies that made deals with the Bakievs and continue operating in the country are silent for obvious reasons. The heads of state institutions that were supervising the mining industry are no longer in office and, in some cases, have fled the country. As for the local authorities and informal leaders, the spectral presence of the ancien régime deters some of them from disclosing information. Nevertheless, Kyr- gyzstan is a country where ‘everyone knows everything’: rumours circulate and the press is relatively free.1 This surplus of rumour and dearth of verifiable facts presents its own problems for research. We neither rely on rumour nor undertake our own forensic accounting, but corroborate interviews and field observations with limited public documents to build up a preliminary picture of the on- and offshore affairs of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan. Three months of fieldwork were conducted by Doolotkeldieva in Talas province in 2011, while Heathershaw and Doolotkel- dieva conducted interviews in Bishkek and London between 2012 and 2014. Based on this research, the paper explores the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyr- gyzstan in terms of the place of the state. We argue that three functions of the state are demonstrated in the local and global politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, we portray the state as a source of rents for officials who grant and rescind licences in exchange for formal and informal payments from foreign investors. Secondly, we highlight the role of officials representing the state in mediating access to foreign investors and the engagement of state actors in offshore financial schemes. Finally, we identify the state as performer of its status as a sovereign power still claiming the mon- opoly of legitimate violence despite its inability to prevent uprisings and guarantee the promised access to its territory. This is an analytical framework that we deploy throughout the paper to make sense of the place of the state with regard to extraction industries and offshore vehicles. The first part of the article introduces a basic analytical framework to identify the state’s pos- ition amidst multinational corporations and the offshore financial world. It sketches a practice- based conceptual framework to study the state as resource, mediator and performer. The remain- ing parts of the paper go on to explore gold mining in Kyrgyzstan via empirical research in Bishkek and Talas as well as a review of reports on the transnational relations of the companies involved.2 The second part studies the Kumtor dispute and the current investigations into corruption that took place under previous regimes, highlighting how the state functioned not as regulator but as a mediator of access. The third part considers the licences and exploitation rights granted and rescinded in relation to the Jerooy deposit in Talas as state resources, mediated by state actors. The fourth part moves on to look at perceptions of the state by local activists and foreign companies, considering the limitations of its performance of sovereignty over the territories of the mines. As an uncertain resource, a corrupted system of mediation and an inconsistent performance, it is little wonder that the state has been the object of so much conflict and contention, especially in the gold mining sector.

The Central Asian state, the global economy and offshore finance The basic Weberian definition of the state emphasizes territoriality, namely the fixed spatial extent of the state. But, where do the boundaries of the state lie? To accept that all that lies within official Central Asian Survey 95 national boundaries is within the state, whilst all that lies beyond them is not, is to fall victim to ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002) and the dichotomy of inside/ outside. This is the foundational myth of International Relations – the so-called ‘myth of 1648’ (Teschke 2003). Ending the Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) is often described as distinguishing inside from outside, hierarchy from anarchy, peace from war. The national/international came to be understood as the inside/outside of politics (Walker 1990). The myth itself helps to constitute the state in practice, but it may obscure key aspects of its emergence, formation and mutability. ‘Failed states that fail to fit this nationalist image are often dismissed as anarchical and war-torn spaces where external actors compete for influence in order to maximize their own security. However, states that are neither fully sovereign nor contained within their territorial boundaries are very much a part of global politics and only rarely succumb to the failure that is often forecast. In fact, it is the very universality of the state form in global politics that has produced the inexorable emergence of so-called ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson 1990), despite significant opposition to the formal recognition of statehood, in the informal polities (unrecognized states) of Kosovo, Palestine, Somaliland and Transdniestr Moldovan Republic – to name but a few (Isa- chenko 2012). In Central Asia, territorially land-locked states enjoy offshore spaces particularly through the export of their mineral and hydrocarbon resources (Cooley 2012). The present paper explores the possibility that such states survive in part because they are, legally and illegally, ensnared in global political and economic networks. This process has been characterized as ‘denationalization’ (Sassen 2006, 2). This term should be equated neither with privatization nor with the subjugation of the state to regional or global organizations. Although both private and global actors play a greater role, the state remains a powerful medium of global politics and economics. The state is not formally replaced or subor- dinated but is transformed via its increased adoption of private and global technologies, policies and ethics, and its utilization of global spaces outside the reaches of national government (and, to a certain extent, international oversight). These assemblages are not the relatively stable and hier- archical relationships of a command economy but are the product of networks which are very much subject to the uncertainty and innovation of the market and the diffusion of international legal norms. Through these global financial assemblages, the state becomes drawn into global legal and technical processes which in turn have political effects. Weak states with large mineral or energy industries are particularly ill-equipped to adjust to these new network flows. Tajikistan’s aluminium sector and Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining industry are comparable in this regard. In Tajikistan, a struggle between factions over a state resource – in this case the republic’s single biggest industrial asset, the smelter at Tursunzade, west of Dush- anbe – led in 2004 to state actors asserting their right to dispossess the previous managers in favour of a new pro-government regime. The government then sought to perform state sovereignty by working through international financial organizations to replace United Company RUSAL with Norway’s Hydro Aluminum and seeking the confirmation of their new ownership rights via a case heard before the London Court of International Arbitration (Heathershaw 2011, 2014).3 The performance of sovereignty was necessary for the attempt to conceal the inter-fac- tional struggles for resources and the partial role of the state in mediating these disputes. But this performance was challenged in offshore jurisdictions where such rights evaporate legally and politically. A complex, multinational legal process has effectively determined that the Gov- ernment of Tajikistan acted illegally in 2004, yet the nature of the process keeps the truth of this matter hidden.4 In weak states such as Tajikistan, resources are minimal, mediation is contingent and performance is virtual. Other qualitative case studies of energy and mineral industries in Central Asia also bear witness to these three roles of the weak state. These include the Kazakhstani state copper 96 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw mining company Kazakhmys (Global Witness 2010), the role of James Giffen with the Govern- ment of Kazakhstan during the 1990s (Levine 2007) and the corruption surrounding Manas jet fuel contracts in Kyrgyzstan (Cooley 2012; Toktomushev, 2015, in this issue) and a lengthening list of other cases covered by papers in this issue and elsewhere. Each of these cases demonstrates that accessing state resources via hidden offshore financial arrangements requires mediating public institutions and the performance of sovereignty. The illegal and hidden is therefore parasitic upon the legal and public. Whilst one can explore the role of international actors, brokers and offshore agents in all this, the state is itself a vital part of the assemblages that emerge to foster kleptocracies in Central Asia. As Palan et al. note in explaining tax havens, ‘they exist not in opposition to the state, but in accord with it’ (Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux 2009, 4). This paper posits a tripartite conceptual framework, elaborated below, which qualifies the role of the state in extractive industries. In our approach, the state is an object of political economy that becomes objectified in political and economic practice. It is made so by investors who buy and officials who sell its licences, by the officials who sell these resources and mediate access, and by the officials, investors and international public policy actors. These agents conspire in performing the state’s sovereignty. While the state is constructed in this process, it makes little sense to talk about the state as a single collective actor in a context of state fragility such as Kyrgyzstan. As an objectified entity, the state can be understood in terms of its functions not in terms of its actions. The purpose of the paper is to explore further these functions of the Central Asian state in relation to energy and mineral industries, and in the global and offshore economies. The gold sector in Kyrgyzstan provides fertile ground for such comparative analysis and assessment of our conceptual framework. There are three postulated functions of the state which we wish to investigate. Firstly, the state is a resource for the elite to plunder, in terms of both its ownership of or rights over natural resources and in the distribution of posts in state agencies for the management of said resources. In Kyrgyzstan, Engvall (2011) explores this feature in terms of the state as ‘an investment market’ for members of the elite who have access via network ties and/or who can buy access through capital. Here the informal economy of the state has wholly supplanted its ostensible and formal role as impartial regulator of public goods. In Uzbekistan, Rasanayagam (2011) makes a similar argument from a very different theoretical grounding, noting that the use of the term ‘informal economy’ is moot as the state itself is seen as organized crime. He notes, ‘informalisa- tion has become the rule, with no formal counterpart except in moral ideals of community and state expressed by many I encountered during field research’ (p. 683). This informal economy should not, however, be mistaken for the anarchic environment of an absolute market or a political economy of armed conflict which function only through violence (Keen 2000). State functions of granting and revoking licences remain authoritative and allow officials to play the role of mediator between factions even when they themselves are tied to one faction or another. Such mediation is essential for foreign investors who require krysha (informal ties to authoritative figures who provide protection) to enter the market. Mediation here is two-way. Brokers like Giffen in Kazakhstan (Levine 2007) and Nazarov in Tajikistan (Heather- shaw 2011) mediate access to the global market. Even in the weakest cases of statehood such as Tajikistan in the 1990s, such access takes place through the state in that the brokers must still arrange official approval. For states with greater capacity and which have undertaken neoliberal reforms, state law and regulations eases both flows of inward investment and offshore capital movement. Kazakhstan’s investment code, for example, includes a five-year waiver of taxes, sub- sidies, special economic zones and exemptions from some duties (Weitz 2013). Both the functions of resource provision and mediation require that a right to control and regulate the market is asserted. In short, sustaining such a system of rent-seeking requires the Central Asian Survey 97 performance of state sovereignty. The two faces of the sovereign, both internal and external, must be performed in order for a strong state to emerge and be sustained. In strong states with an established norm of non-interference in their affairs the ideal-type of these performances differs mark- edly from internal (e.g. legislation, bureaucratic practice) to the external (diplomacy, war). In weak, aid-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the distinction is less marked and the attempt to achieve recognized performance is laid bare as even the legislative process serves both audiences. In Tajikistan, for example, a new and improved law on local government was passed for an international audience of donors and diplomats. These agents were able to cite the enactment of the law and the participation of state actors in donor-funded conferences despite the fact there is little reason to believe that the law will actually lead to the intended devolution of powers (Heathershaw 2014). Central Asian cases of corruption, as Cooley and Sharman (2015,in this issue) note, feature actors who maintain ‘a façade of compliance with international anticor- ruption standards while often being passively or actively complicit in the very practices these standards seek to prevent’. Whilst well-informed actors in extraction industries must see the conceit in this claim to sovereignty, it nevertheless is in their interests to act as if the state is sovereign. That is, they collectively organize hypocrisy (cf. Krasner 1999).

Gold mining and state mediation: the Kumtor case Gold is the centrepiece of Kyrgyzstan’s domestic economy, being its primary export commodity and amounting to 30% of total exports in 2011. Kyrgyzstan is rich in gold; it is the Common- wealth of Independent States’ (CIS) third largest gold producer, after Russia and Uzbekistan. More than 60 gold deposits have been discovered with some 448 tons of gold, as of November 2012. Recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data demonstrate that Kyrgyz economic growth is closely tied to the production of gold with a slowdown (1% gross domestic product (GDP) growth) in 2012 linked to delays in production. The economy is also vulnerable to political instability with recessions in 2005 and 2010 linked clearly to the ‘revolutionsthat took place in those two years (IMF 2013, 7). The Kumtor mine remains the key asset in Kyrgyzstan’s economy and an ongoing object of controversy over its ownership and the alleged use of offshore vehicles to launder corrupt payments.5 The combination of gold and politics raises further questions of the relationship between the two (Eurasianet 2013a; Eurasianet 2013b; Gullette and Kalybekova 2014). This section will introduce the gold mining industry as a source of state resources for plunder by both national and international elites. During the so-called ‘Bakiev era’ (2005–10) the national economy was exposed to the most significant cases of large-scale corruption. The removal of this regime provided the conditions for new evidence to emerge of the extent of this corruption while also providing methodological challenges to the assessment of the representativeness of the new data. As an audit of the transactions in 2003–04 to float Centerra Gold as a joint stock company managing the Kumtor mine alleges, members of the Akaev regime were also involved in the laundering of up to US$15 million of corrupt payments using offshore vehicles (Satke and Galdini 2014).6 Our analysis below draws continuities between the Akaev and Bakiev periods, not least to explore the origins of ‘schemesthat have become public since 2010. Much of the politics surrounding the gold industry in Kyrgyzstan refers to exploration not mining itself. Currently only five mines are under production: Kumtor, Makmal, Solton-Sary, Terek and Terekkan. Additionally, six mining sites are ready for commercial development, including Jerooy, Taldybulak Levoberejny, Andash, Bozymchak, Ishtamberdy and Kuru-Tegerek (State Agency of Geology, National Strategy 2013b). Altogether there are currently 118 state exploration licences being allocated (State Agency of Geology 2013a), which actually represent a signifi- cantly reduced number in comparison with some 1150 licences allocated before the April 98 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw

Revolution of 2010 (National Institute for Strategic Studies 2013). The drastic reduction was first initiated by the Interim Government of Rosa Otunbaeva as a suspension of existing dubious arrangements that passed between the previous regimes and foreign miners and as an effort to stabilize the industry. The cancellation of suspicious licences was a first step to stop the corrupt schemes which had benefitted allies of the former presidents. Corruption has indeed been notorious in gold extraction. In 2011, a specialized study carried out by the Canadian Fraser Research Institute assessed corruption in extractive industries around the world, including in Bakiev-era Kyrgyzstan. They reported that corruption in Kyrgyz- stan is purportedly a ‘mild’ deterrent to investment for 32% of the 802 companies that participated in the survey and a ‘strong’ deterrent to investment for 41% of them. A total of 18% of companies claimed they would not pursue investment due to this factor. The report further opens a discussion of specific corruption practices that run in this business. Reporting on his company’s experiences of working in Kyrgyzstan, the Vice-President of an exploration company noted, for example, ‘Once a feasibility study is completed, the licence is revoked. Another stressed, ‘In Kyrgyzstan, a large private payment seems to have been expected to proceed to grant of concession.’‘In Kyrgyzstan,’ another VP stated, ‘there are delays in permit approvals without substantial cash payments, then any decision is challenged in the courts, then the authorities expropriate permits for non-performance based on the non-fulfill- ment of permit obligations, which can then be challenged and re-challenged’ (Fraser Research Institute 2011–12, 57). These voices point to specific ways in which the state mediates licences and permissions for gold mining. Such mediation appears to take place both nationally and internationally. This diversion of state capital took place in offshore jurisdictions that were successfully employed by regime members. This is evidenced in the Kumtor case, as demonstrated by the audit cited above and a highly politicized state commission. This state commission was formed to examine various aspects of the agreement that was concluded between the joint stock Centerra Company and the Kyrgyz state. In their recent report, among other judicial, economic and ecological shortcom- ings, they make notable conclusions on the utilization of offshore jurisdictions by Kyrgyz officials. The report thus states that in 2003–04: All the companies that controlled exploration and extraction of the Kameko project, except Kumtor, and whose actives were consequently included with Centerra were registered in offshore zones. This means that the final beneficiaries of these companies (individuals behind them, the ways they pur- chased and sold their shares in the projects) are unknown. (Kyrgyz Government 2013) The investigation carried out by Muszkat Consultants law firm and Barlev Investigative Auditing was more specific about the mechanisms of corruption during a restructuring of the agreement with the Kyrgyz government. Submitted to Kyrgyz authorities in 2013, the report alleges that a US$4 million bribe was paid to Kyrgyz officials in 2002, one year prior to the restructuring. The report also identifies the offshore vehicle that received the payment as Eckerd Ltd, registered in the British Virgin Islands, ‘whose real owners were presumably linked to former President Akayev’ (Satke and Galdini 2014). Muszkat Consultants found that Eckerd Ltd was later used to divert some US$11 million from the state-owned holding company Kyrgyzaltyn. The restructuring led to a reduction in the share of the Kyrgyz state in the Kumtor venture from 67% to 28.8%.7 Whilst the first government report is a judgment by the new regime on the old regimes, the fact that the restructuring of the Kumtor project disadvantaged the public purse whilst enriching certain individuals is indisputable. Other recent research carried out by an OSCE Academy team also suggests that ‘Kumtor has been the main focus of corruption’ (Gullete 2013, 34). These allegations concern not only the biggest gold project Kumtor but also other important Central Asian Survey 99 mining sites such as Jerooy, which will be discussed in the following section. This story demonstrates that rent-seeking by regime members is enabled by offshore connections. What is identified as a local problem has a global dimension.

State licences as resources: the Jerooy conflict of ownership While the state mediates access for foreign investors to Kyrgyz territory, state licences are themselves resources to be sold on this market. These licences are the primary commodities for sale in a country in which few licences have yet been turned into active gold deposits. The State Geology Agency had issued a total of 164 licences by 2012, but only three of these were being mined at that time (Trilling 2013). In August 2012 an auction of licences live on television was cancelled after a protest, apparently by resource nationalists. The director of the agency, Uchkunbek Tash- bayev, dismissed the protestors as being sent by ‘those who want to sell licences under the carpet,’ before he himself was arrested for just such a crime four months later (Trilling 2013). The licensing and re-licensing of the Jerooy deposit serves as an illuminating example to add the ‘global link’ to the onshore practices described above. It further exemplifies the new complex- ity of resource extraction that requires actors to perform the state to be able to act as a mediator of state–public resources. The Jerooy project is the second largest gold deposit in Kyrgyzstan. It is located in the northern part of the country, in Talas oblast, at between 3000 and 3600 m above sea level. Having a 3.1 million ounce resource, the project has never turned into real gold production. The project has passed through the hands of numerous investors and has been an object of several litigations. The intricate dealings and international arrangements, drawn and redrawn since the first investor entry in 1993, are complex. The most troubled experience was endured by the British mining company Oxus Resource Corporation (hereafter Oxus). The company entered the Kyrgyz gold market in 1997 and formed a joint venture between its subsidiary Norox Mining and a state-owned company Kyrgyzaltyn, called Jerooy Gold Company. On the insistence of Kyrgyzaltyn, Oxus also had to attract a major investor, Australia’s largest gold miner Nor- mandy Mining Ltd. In this arrangement, the state owned a 33% stake (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). After having invested approximately US$55 million, and having almost completed infrastruc- tural works, Oxus’s licence was terminated in August 2004 (Mineweb 2007). The exact grounds on which Oxus was forced to leave are unclear; the widely believed story relates Oxus’s demise to the Bakievs’ desire to appoint a loyal or ‘pocket’ (karmannyi) company to develop Jerooy. However, the suspension of the licence had already occurred prior to its final annulation in 2004, i.e. prior to the ‘Tulip Revolution’ and the rise of Bakievs to power. The main factors that were cited by the state to support its decision at that time were the drop of the gold price in the global market and the withdrawal of the Normandy Mining Ltd from the project due to the delays in approving the agreement by the Kyrgyz government (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). But earlier in 2002, the Australian mining company ceased to exist when it was taken over by Newmont Mining Corporation. As a consequence, this withdrawal left Oxus as the sole investor with no external financing and thus allegedly unable to complete the creation of the mine and its infrastructure by the middle of 2005 (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). In contrast, international commentators are in agreement that the events of 2006 can be con- sidered as an ‘effective expropriation of the Oxus Gold stake in the Jerooy gold mine’ (Mineweb 2007). Suspension of the licence was followed by ‘a mysterious incident on July 7 when Oxus’s representative in Kyrgyzstan, Sean Daley, was shot and wounded by gunmen near his home in the capital, Bishkek. His attackers have not been identified’ (Sunday Times 2006). After the April 2010 revolution, Bishkek’s district court accused in absentia the former President Bakiev, his sons and his brother for ordering the murder (Kyrtag 2014). Mineweb notes that Oxus’s alleged failure to meet its production schedule, which has apparently caused a loss of around 100 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw

US$145 million in taxes to the Kyrgyz government, was nothing else than an ‘excuse that the Kyrgyz government used for the termination of the company’s license’ (Mineweb 2007). In their well-researched book The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment Without Public Com- mitment, Hogan et al. included Oxus’s experience in Kyrgyzstan as one of the ‘expropriation cases’ among others that took place around the world in 2006–07 (Hogan, Sturzenegger, and Tai 2010, 18). By October 2006, Oxus was expelled from the site. The company itself defined the incident as ‘the government-sponsored illegal occupation last Thursday [19 October 2006] of premises owned by Talas Gold Mining Company, Oxus’ joint venture company at Jerooy’ (Oxus 2006).8 Following the termination of Oxus’s licence, the Bakiev government offered a more attractive production schedule when tendering for new investors than that which the state company Kyrgyzaltyn had insisted Oxus maintain. Thus, in May 2006, the Kyrgyz government conferred the licence to develop the Jerooy site to the Austrian company Global Gold Holding (hereafter Global Gold). One month later in June 2006, a joint venture Jerooyaltyn CJSC JV was already established in which the state owned a 40% share, compared with a 33% hold under the Oxus contract. Such licensing processes indicate how the state serves as both a resource and a mediator of gold mining licences.9 The rapid succession of owners at Jerooy raised suspicions regarding the ownership of Global Gold and the nature of their business. The official website of the state company Kyrgy- zaltyn opaquely noted that Global Gold was represented by a ‘certain Russian business’ without naming the investors (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). Others were much more open about Global Gold’s origins. Mineweb, for example, states that Global Gold was ‘put in place in late 2005 to deal with the Kyrgyz government over the effective expropriation of the Oxus stake in the Jerooy gold mining’ (Mineweb 2007). Another view, provided by a Bishkek-based expert who wished to remain anonymous because of his continuing presence in Kyrgyzstan, supports this claim: These developments show that this company [Global Gold] was created just for that purpose [ … ]it was recently registered, it didn’t have any prior mining expertise and had a weak capital. In short it’s not clear for us how this company could be at all eligible to acquire a license.10 The allocation of the Jerooy licence again demonstrated the compromised nature of the mediation of licences. As Western investors were pushed out, well-connected Russian companies moved in, despite lacking a track record in the sector. In addition to revealing something about the onshore dynamics of the political economy, the Jerooy case highlights that these actors used complex financial schemes to hide final beneficiaries via the structuring of their shareholding companies. Caution is advised, however, as there are very few public resources to shed light on Global Gold’s finances. According to the Russian investigative website Compromat.ru, known for its journalistic investigations, Global Gold was registered on 17 March 2006 in Austria. From Austria, one can follow a long list of offshore jurisdictions that effectively conceal the share-holding beneficiaries. Compromat.ru states that the company is wholly owned by another company Vitiano Holding Ltd, which was registered in Cyprus. In turn, this company is by 50% owned by Lagun Investment (‘Лагун Инвестмент’) and Iman Financial (‘Иман Файненшнл’), both registered in the British Virgin Islands. Compro- mat.ru claims that the owner of these two companies is Alexander Turkot of the company Salford Capital Partners. Turkot is known as a manager of two other investment funds, New World Value Fund and Bary Discovered Partners, that operate various interests across the post-Soviet space. Finally, Compromat.ru alleges both funds belonged to the since deceased Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky (Compromat.ru 2006). Further detail on the company’s ownership comes from a Forbes’ investigation. According to this information, Global Gold was registered in Austria in the name of Raphael Philinov, President of Triumph Fund and representative of Central Asian Survey 101

Berezovsky and his partner Mr Patarkacishvili. Raphael Philinov arrived and stayed in the Kyrgyz Republic for one-and-a-half years with the objective of arranging the Jerooy deal. In an interview with Forbes, Philinov observed: I made it nice, invested $12 mln for it. Found good buyers and since I did all ‘in white’ [clean], they gave a good price. In 2007, the stake in Jerooy was sold – and $130 million were transferred on Patar- kacishvili’s account, as Berezovsky’s manager. (Forbes 2013) These claims about the offshore structures of Turkot and Berezovsky were echoed by national and local actors in Kyrgyzstan. In Talas province, workers whose employment at Jerooy was sus- pended after Oxus’s removal remember Turkot’s visits to Bishkek and Jerooy: One day I received a call from a Talas atkaminer [big man] that a new investor is seeking to meet local activists. Shortly after this call, we were invited to come over to the capital. Turkot received us at the luxurious hotel Hyatt. He treated us nicely and wanted us to work for his side.11 The Kyrgyz opposition also criticized the Bakiev regime for alleged connections with Bere- zovsky. According to Kyrgyz opposition Members of Parliament, on 26 July 2006 Berezovsky paid an unofficial visit to Kyrgyzstan and was introduced to President Bakiev via his youngest son, Maxim (News.ru 2006).12 The opposition claimed at that time that Berezovsky’s visit was specifically linked to Kyrgyz gold mining. Later, during a raid of Berezovsky’soffices, Russian police alleged that they had found documents containing information about preparations for a forceful capture of the Ak-Tuz gold deposit and the fund allocation necessary for that capture.13 After Berezovsky’s death, the Forbes investigation into his business further claimed that he supported the Tulip Revolution, after being involved in the Orange Revolution, for which the Bakievs ‘rewarded’ him with the Jerooy project (Forbes 2013). Of course, none of the above statements comes from impartial sources. Nevertheless, it has become widely accepted amongst business journalists of the region that Global Gold belonged to Berezovsky (Azattyk 2013). If this is the case, it might explain how such a small and inexperi- enced company could obtain the licence for the second largest gold deposit in Kyrgyzstan. What- ever the exact truth about Global Gold, it is clearly a case of how transnational networks connect the states of the former Soviet region to one another and also to offshore jurisdictions beyond. This chain of offshore connections is illustrative of a complex multilayered and multi-structured scheme, yet one that is typical of the transnational business networks (Turner 2011).14 After Berezovsky’s brief entry into the Kyrgyz economy, there was a series of other licences granted for Jerooy until Autumn 2009 when the Bakievs created a Central Agency for Develop- ment, Investment and Innovation under the Kyrgyz government (known as the Development Fund). The joint venture that was running the Jerooy licence at that time was allegedly transferred to this newly established governmental entity that took on an obligation to finance the project until the end of 2010 (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). Officially, the Development Fund was formed in order to consolidate and multiply foreign investment in the country. Maxim Bakiev chaired this important fund which had an enormous remit across state pensions and property. Some foreign investors accepted the public account of state reform. This narrative is reflected in a 2009 US Embassy cable discussing its establishment: ‘Bakiev considers himself an economic reformer and is inter- ested in diversifying the economy to provide long-term economic and social stability’ (Wikileaks 2011). Young professionals with a Western education and experience were hired for their knowledge of international business and for the image of modernization and technocracy that this evoked. Aleksei Eliseev, Maxim’s close friend, was appointed to direct the organization. Later, he featured in other corruption and money laundering scandals in the telecommunications and banking sectors (Global Witness 2012). It is likely that the creation of the Development Fund was an attempt to centralize control over major economic assets and funnel their rents more effi- ciently through the Aziya Universal Bank (Global Witness 2012). However, the Development 102 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw

Fund functioned for only a few months. After the ‘April Revolution’ of 2010, the Development Fund was abolished and the equity in the joint venture ‘Jerooyaltyn’ was transferred back to Kyr- gyzaltyn JSC and CEH (Kyrgyzaltyn 2011). From the Jerooy case we learn that members of the Bakiev regime were skilled at selling ‘renewable’ state resources via post-Soviet networks and utilizing their facilities of common language, political practices, shared knowledge, manipulation of ‘porous’ legislations and others. From this perspective, it is convenient both conceptually and practically to assume that central government is the arbiter (not the mediator) of access to its territorial resources. However, this is not an accurate summation of Jerooy and other concessions. The government’s attempt to establish its dominance over these public goods was ultimately unsuccessful and its self-presentation as the reforming state was ultimately unconvincing to both national and international observers. Rather, the state was the classical source of rents in a neo-patrimonial system, an inconsistent mediator of access for foreign companies, and a sclerotic performer of sovereignty. The ﬁnal part of this article reﬂects on how the performance of state sovereignty is instrumental to the production of state resources and their mediation for investors.

Contested state performance: the perspective of local activists and foreign mining companies From this analysis of the on- and offshore politics of gold mining in Kyrgyzstan, it might be concluded that the embeddedness of this small land-locked country into transnational capitalism occurs only at the national level where the primary rent-seeking opportunities are found. However, local and provincial elites have also participated in these developments. This section investigates the reach of the above-discussed transnational financial assemblages to one locality in Talas, which is host to three large gold projects. It also considers the performance of the state amidst political crisis and the limits to its strength as a mediator in local contexts. In its annual report of 2012, the State Agency of Geology and Mineral resources stressed that local resistance features among other serious recurrent problems in almost every gold project. The blockades of traffic, unlawful raids, captures of equipment and attacks on company personnel lead to the suspension or complete cessation of mining operations in the majority of sites developed by foreign investors (State Agency of Geology 2013a). In his recent public interview given to the television channel Mir, the current president Almazbek Atambaev also made references to the involvement of local populations in corrupt activities. Atambaev specifically cited the above-studied Jerooy project and highlighted the engagement of both Talas residents and organized crime with the Bakiev regime and its investors. Consider this long but instructive quote, which is interesting because it brings up a local connection to transnational flows of corruption: I just think that there are people out there who have a goal to sabotage the auction [a new auction launched for Jerooy in March 2013], to cause a delay in the development of the Jerooy project. They hope that the government will be replaced and the gold deposit will be returned to those who owned it prior to the April revolution. We are all aware that Maxim Bakiev, Bakiev’s family and others were involved; Berezovsky’s name was implicated too. One of the investors, we know, is a Kazakh. But we also know, and the Talas residents know, that Talas guys were involved in this case. They are not simple guys, they are not ordinary businessmen; they currently work in Kazakh- stan. We know and Talas residents know who were behind these acts. (Kabar 2013) Whilst, as one would expect from a Central Asian president, there is a hint of conspiracy theory and a large dollop of unsubstantiated allegation in these remarks, they do speak to a wider truth: that the assemblages of resource extraction which run through the state connect the local to the global, and vice versa. Moreover, herein is an important claim regarding direct local–international Central Asian Survey 103 linkages that seek to offer alternatives to national state mediation. Recall the Jerooy activists’ claims of meeting Turkot in 2006, and the mediating role of local factions become clear. One interpretation of the local politics of gold mining is that it represents an increasingly nationalistic civil society. Ernst & Young, the multinational consultancy firm that advises the current Kyrgyz government on mining (Kyrgyz Government, 2013), argues that the rise of local resistance to foreign miners in Kyrgyzstan could be interpreted as ‘resource nationalism’, a global trend currently observable in many parts of the developing world.15 There is some truth to this claim as seen in Talas residents’ fears that companies’ operations may affect their breeding and farming activities, thus disrupting their traditional way of life.16 However, some of the violence, rather than being driven by nationalism or ecological concerns,17 seems to be influenced by local activists, and even criminal bosses for particular interests.18 Whilst these figures are linked to officials in Bishkek who pursue rent-seeking goals of extracting a bigger share in future agreements, observations and interviews from fieldwork indicate that they also act on behalf of their own ‘local’ interests which exist independently of central politics.19 Observations from multinationals themselves concur that this local politics addresses both national and global audiences. A representative of Kentor Gold who has been operating until recently in Andash deposit at Kopuro-Bazar village (Talas oblast) argued that ‘the elite is very skilled in using the group mentality’, at galvanizing locals versus the foreigners who came to steal their gold. He noted in an interview with Reuters in June 2011, that Three quarters of the 846 households in the village had signed documents in support of a development that also had the backing of central government. But within two weeks of Kentor opening an office in the village this January, parliament sent two deputies on what they called a ‘fact-finding mission’. ‘This member of parliament got up, and said: ‘Right! Let’s go down and close the Kentor office.’ (Reuters 2011) Another firm, Talas Copper and Gold, a joint venture between South Africa’s Gold Fields Ltd and Britain’s Orsu Metals Corp., went through a similar experience when a mob on horseback looted its geological camp and set the buildings and equipment on fire (Reuters 2011). Given the effects of the unstable political context discussed earlier, much of the work of foreign mining companies in Kyrgyzstan takes the form of a constant struggle to ensure that the central state apparatus continues to affirm the company’s right to explore and exploit a given deposit. The local staff of one of the companies that was attacked by a mob describes this vividly: We have trotted through the corridors of parliament and knocked on the doors of officials. Nobody wants to take responsibility. We don’t know who has an influence over these matters – Temir Sariev, the minister of economy? Djoomart Otorbaev, Deputy Prime Minister? The Prime Minister? They all seem sympathetic to our company but what can they realistically do to help us?20 This observation is very informative in two respects. First of all, it indicates that the situation for miners has changed since the Bakiev era, when a small clique had used the state effectively to capture the gold mining sector for the sale and mediation of licences. Today no such control exists. Second, it shows that companies are still unable to act independently of local politics, unlike in the case of resource extraction industries of Africa where foreign miners are able to operate by deploying private security systems. In Kyrgyzstan, despite uncertainty, the state continues to be an appealing institution for mediation in such conflicts, even if it constantly fails to deliver. The quote above demonstrates that both international and local actors still seek the state even in its effective absence. Without a consistent mediator of licences, and a convincing state performance, gold mining remains an environment characterized by uncertain investments in licences and assets. Some companies are willing to affirm the legitimacy of state mediation. One foreign miner operating in Talas 104 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw reported a more positive picture of the state under the Atambaev government based on the adoption of a new Law on Mining, which, he noted, ‘was elaborated in coordination with foreign companies and experts’. Rather optimistically, he took this as a ‘sign that authorities are willing to shift their approach from administrative command towards economic management’.21 In contrast, another director of a company exploring in southern Jalal-Abad oblast was more sceptical about current political developments: To my taste, to work under previous regimes was much more straightforward – there was one person you had to deal with and there were clear instructions. Nowadays corruption didn’t disappear, [rather] you have to bribe many people instead of one and even that doesn’t guarantee your immunity. To be honest, Kyrgyzstan needs a strong, let’s say an enlightened, authoritarianism like in Kazakhstan. Only this way can the government restore order in all its regions.22 This demand for strong state performance perhaps highlights investors’ despair. It shows that what companies are asking for is not even a stable legal framework any longer but a hierarchically ordered system in which one could operate at least by integrating into corrupt practices. From this perspective, an authoritarian system operating under a single-pyramid system of corrupt payments is at least more stable in respect to the provision of clear and predictable patterns of behaviour into which state actors and miners may integrate. This evidence also indicates that foreign mining companies, rather than fleeing due to corruption, try to adapt to new patterns of rent-seeking. For foreign companies these connections have become more costly given that they must occur at multiple levels, from national to local. One representative of a joint venture operating in Jalal-Abad thus notes the fluidity of the Kyrgyz political economy in recent years: What’s the point of krysha nowadays? No point really. The government’s protection doesn’t mean much – the locals are on their own. A company needs to achieve an informal deal with a political hierarchy in order to get the hold of a license. Passing from the exploration stage to production is a central point for any investor and it seems to be a perfect kormushka [feeder] for elites. But apart from secur- ing a license, the central government distances itself from problems with the local population. Com- panies are left alone in front of angry mobs. So, you need to secure not only the ‘political license’ but also a ‘social license’.23 This citation highlights, once again, the merely partial functionality of the state. On receiving the state licence, miners also face social resistances due to weaknesses in state mediation and performance. Moreover, foreign companies end up calling again on the state to provide them with assistance to resolve social problems – which the state obviously cannot give, but without which companies cannot really work. The diffusion of political–economic power continues to complicate its patronage system and prevent the emergence of a single pyramid. While ‘the state’, as putative collective actor, continues to be the seller of licences on the global market and the formal mediator of international access, it simply fails to assert its will at the local level. Put another way, while the state’s sovereignty is performed globally via international law and organizations, its agency locally is contingent on agents who may or may not impersonate the state (Heathershaw 2014; Reeves 2014).

Conclusions The state in Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining sector is a source of rents and a mediator of (uncertain) rights to extract and monetize public goods, often via offshore vehicles. The case is instructive with respect to our understanding of political order and the functions of a fragmented political system in a weak state. The contestation, fragmentation and performance of the state indicate that it does not merely exist a priori but is shaped through its functions as a resource, mediator and performer. It is a material and symbolic order that is produced as it is practised. Kyrgyzstan’s Central Asian Survey 105 weak state in particular is not a coherent and consistent actor-group. It is structurally unable and unprepared to regulate contentions between local and foreign business actors and, by consequence, with the networks of international transactions in which it previously got involved. The opening of the state following the removal of the Bakiev regime in 2010 did not automatically bring about more transparency in decision-making and has uncertain implications for cooperation with multinational corporations. The state ceased to be a steady resource and its mediation efforts became more frequently contested by local actors. The mediation of mining agreements via state permission and joint ventures shifted from an authoritarian ‘political licence’ towards a vague ‘social licence’. The state, as the repository of political power, retains its attractiveness both as an affective and normative good and as a mechanism for dividing the spoils. It is materialized in the performance of sovereignty – and this performance is necessarily recognized by foreign actors – both on- and offshore. However, these performances are belied by the weakness of the state as a regulatory actor. Therefore, the state’s sovereignty must be reasserted constantly and shrilly, sometimes coercively, by those actors, national and local, who have the social standing and political authority to act in its name (Gullette and Heathershaw 2015). This tripartite framework of functions of the state captures something of the ostensible paradox of unity amidst factionalism that has been pinpointed by so many authors, whether it be generated by regionalism (Jones-Luong 2002), clans (Schatz 2004; Collins 2006), warlords and criminal networks (Marat 2006; Nourzhanov 2005) or coalitions of disaffected elites (Radnitz 2010). Reeves et al., in an important and timely volume, probe how the fractured state of Central Asia is unified in such performances. ‘[A] multitude of voices,’ they point out, ‘can be heard, talking about “the state”’ (Reeves, Rasanayagam, and Beyer 2014, 13). However, ‘there is,’ they go on, ‘a dialogue of form only and not a dialectic of argument when it comes to performing “the state” in the public realm’–what Mitchell (1991/1999) denotes as the ‘state effect’. The state form, Reeves, Rasanayagam, and Beyer (2014) note, ‘while consti- tuted by a plurality of forces, does not lead to a plurality of opinion but rather seems to (re-) create “the state” as a unified, solitary, and personified object’ (15). It is the contention of this article that this phenomenon is found as much in extractive industries as in everyday economies, as much in the offshore world as well as the onshore one. Indeed, neglect of this offshore world may lead us to misunderstand the full scope of state resources, mediation and performance.

Notes 1. For this paper, we gathered relevant journalistic investigations and interviews from local experts, local and foreign staff working for various mining companies. The examples and data provided here are a result of the cross-referencing of these sources of information. 2. This includes fieldwork conducted by Doolotkeldieva in Talas province in summer 2011 and summer 2012 and is based on direct observation and qualitative interviews with both local participants and sta- keholders in the capital, Bishkek. 3. The TALCO case is worth reviewing and updating. Its smelter in Tursunzade produces 40% of Tajiki- stan’s exports but TALCO itself contributes very little to state revenues. Its tolling arrangements were established during the 1990s and have continued since that time. ‘Each year,’ as The Economist stated in July 2013, ‘TALCO produces hundreds of millions of dollars in profits that are routed to a shell company in the British Virgin Islands’ (The Economist 2013). In October 2013, a Swiss court found in favour of a subsidiary of the United Company Rusal and handed down a total of US$275 million in fines, interest and costs to be paid by TALCO’s offshore vehicle, the British Virgin Islands-registered CDH (RAPSI 2013). This ruling effectively refutes the Government of Tajikistan’s claims that alumina supply and tolling arrangements established before 2004 were illegal. In turn, this claim was the justification for the government’s seizure of TALCO from its previous owners in 2004, which led to the inconclusive London arbitration from 2004 to 2008. Rusal has subsequently threatened to force open CDH’s books and is apparently working through the Kremlin to ensure payment by TALCO or concessions from the Rahmon government. 106 A. Doolot and J. Heathershaw

4. For a discussion of recent developments see Helmer (2013). 5. Located in Issyk-Kul province, the Kumtor gold deposit is the biggest mining project currently developed by the Canadian company Centerra. The deposit has been surrounded by controversies since its conception in the early 1990s. One of the allegations put forward by the Kyrgyz side concerns the fact that Kyrgyzstan’s ownership in the venture was downgraded because of the corruption of previous governments. Starting in October 2012, Kumtor was subject to violent strikes and manipulations by the opposition, which subsequently led the government to renegotiate the country’s stake with Centerra. The crisis is still ongoing since many parliamentarians insist on a complete revocation of Centerra’s licence and the nationalization of Kumtor. 6. The Canadian investor Cameco and the joint company Centerra deny all allegations that they were aware of any corrupt payments. The allegation are made by two Israel-based investigative firms – Muszkat Consultants and Barlev Investigative Auditing – appointed by the Government of Kyrgyzstan in a 2012 report, as reported by Satke and Galdini (2014), and seen by the authors. 7. At the time of publication the investigation has not been made public, but journalists at the Asia Times, Ryskeldi Satke and Franco Galdini, who obtained copies of the study, provided it to the authors. 8. Later, Oxus Resource Corporation received compensation from a succeeding investor, Visor Holding, and the dispute between Oxus and the Kyrgyz government was settled by an amicable agreement. 9. Examples of companies that survived the Bakiev era highlight the conditional nature of state licences. Against Oxus’s case, a representative of another foreign mining company said his business ‘was too small for the Bakiev family to attack. Furthermore, President Bakiev himself had secured investment for the company which has probably been the greatest factor in helping the company to continue working’. The representative goes on to state that the company received a direct investment from the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (Gullete 2013, 47). 10. Author interview with a national expert, Bishkek, summer 2012. 11. Author interview with a local activist and member of the village council, Bishkek, summer 2012. 12. A recent report by a large media outlet, Russia-24, dedicated to the death of Boris Berezovsky, also makes allegations about Berezovsky’s interests in Kyrgyz gold mining sector (News-Asia.ru 2013). 13. “Berezovsky planiroval napravit $7,4 mln na reidersky zahvat zolotogo mestorojdenia Jerooy v Kyrgyz- stane” (Berezovsky planned to direct US$7.4 mln to a raid occupation of the Jerooy gold deposit in Kyr- gyzstan). Accessed March 25, 2013. http://www.newsfiber.com/p/s/h?v=EvKtfKN0dJYo%3D +G8JUtqCdI0A%3D 14. In Azerbaijan, for example, partial adoption of and weaknesses in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative have enabled such corruption (Global Witness 2013). 15. “Business Risks Facing Mining and Metals 2011–2012.” Accessed March 26, 2013. http://www.ey.com/ GL/en/Industries/Mining—Metals/Business-risks-facing-mining-and-metals-2011-2012—1–Resource- nationalism 16. Author interviews with residents in Aral village, Talas province. 17. See Amanda Wooden’s account of ecological concerns (Wooden 2013). 18. This finding is not necessarily generalizable. The Taldybulak site, also located in Talas province close to the Andash site, manifests different reasons of local resistance to foreign mining companies. Resistance to mining seems to be rather bottom-up than an elitist manifestation. These different ethnographic observations indicate that every mining site is different as they reflect divergent historical contexts and corruption legacy. 19. The analysis of local resistance is part of a larger project and is beyond the scope of this paper. 20. Author interview with an employee of a foreign exploring company, Bishkek, 23 July 2012. 21. Author interview with a director of an exploration company, Bishkek, 3 May 2013. 22. Author interview with a director of an exploration company, Bishkek, 4 August 2013. 23. Author interview with a representative of a foreign mining company, Bishkek, 5 May 2013.

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