Courting Danger How the War on Terror Has Sapped the Power of Our Courts to Protect Our Constitutional Liberties Second Edition

Justice at Stake is a nonpartisan national campaign of more than 40 partners working to keep our courts fair, impartial and independent. Justice at Stake Campaign partners educate the public and work for reforms to keep politics and special interests out of the courtroom—so judges can do their job protecting our Constitution, our rights and the rule of law. The positions and policies of Justice at Stake campaign partners are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of other campaign partners. The Campaign’s Sonia Belasco and Yvette Farnsworth provided substantial research support for this report. Publication of this report was supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute. Justice at Stake’s work is also supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Joyce Foundation, and the Public Welfare Foundation.

Written by Bert Brandenburg and Amy Kay

Courting Danger How the War on Terror Has Sapped the Power of Our Courts to Protect Our Constitutional Liberties

I. Introduction: Has the War on Terror Become a War on the Courts? In the months and years since the September  attacks, Americans and their leaders have grappled with a difficult question: what are the implications of a long term war against terror here at home? How do we preserve our constitutional liberties while stepping up efforts to prevent and punish future acts of terror? The renewal of the USA PATRIOT Act¹ has not resolved the national debate over liberty and security. The controversy over the ’s domestic warrantless electronic program, along with new government efforts to deny due process of law to detainees, have shown once again that Americans demand accountability from those to whom they entrust power. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a “state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”²

The focus on any one of these issues should not obscure an even broader question: what has the war on terror done to the powers of our courts to protect our liberties? This is not a technical question. The framers of our Constitution understood that liberties do not enforce themselves. It is our courts that uphold our liberties—pro- vided they are able to exercise the necessary authority to hold their own within our marvelous system of checks and balances. Indeed, for centuries, freedom-loving peoples around the world have sought to emulate America’s heritage of strong and independent courts.

A state of war is not a blank check for the President.

But in the name of protecting us from terror, our courts are being deprived of the authority and independence they need to protect our Constitutional liberties and hold the government accountable. The PATRIOT Act and other post-September  policies dramatically weakened the historic power of the courts to protect our rights and check possible government abuses. These laws have expanded the ability of the federal government to investigate and incarcerate without meaningful review from a judge. In some cases, our judges’ gavels have been replaced with virtual rubber stamps. In others, the government can now skip the courthouse altogether.

Justice at Stake Campaign 1 To be sure, times have changed. Americans want Administration efforts but rejecting them when their leaders to do more to protect them. But they violate the Constitution. It looks at the his- a growing number of citizens and lawmakers, tory of liberty during wartime, which shows that conservatives and liberals alike, are reminding our courts have been quite deferential to national us that Americans believe that safety and liberty security concerns during times of conflict. It are inseparable—indeed, that we are fighting to concludes by looking at how the PATRIOT Act protect the Constitution that has seen us through and other post-September  laws are just part of more than two centuries of peace and war. a series of broader attacks on the independence, Courts are not impediments to the war on terror. authority and legitimacy of our courts. They are an indispensable partner in winning against terror. Americans and their leaders need II. Checks and Balances to ask themselves: in this new era of long-term Under Fire: conflict, what are the consequences of putting How Our Courts Are Losing our Constitutional liberties on emergency status by hobbling the power of the courts to enforce Their Powers to them? Protect Our Rights Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are The USA PATRIOT Act’s given tremendous power over people’s lives. That Attack on the Courts is why their work is reviewed by independent In the aftermath of September , Americans courts. The issue is not whether investigators and wanted the government to step up its fight against prosecutors are bad people; they are not. The terror, abroad and here at home. Congress passed issue is whether we entrust our liberties to the the USA PATRIOT Act, which included impor- Constitution’s checks and balances, or whether we tant reforms designed to help law enforcement give the government new powers when it utters and intelligence agencies keep up with changing times and better coordinate their counterterror- Courts are not impediments to the ism efforts. For example, in response to the era war on terror. They are an of cell phones, high-mobility, and worldwide investigations, the Act expands the ability of law indispensable partner in winning enforcement to conduct certain kinds of electron- against terror. ic surveillance in multiple jurisdictions by getting an order from a single judge. Additionally, to improve the flow of information among govern- the words “trust me.” Just as rights don’t enforce ment officials, the law, for instance, sensibly allows themselves, accountability is meaningless without State Department officials to access FBI criminal independent scrutiny. Congress needs to think records when evaluating visa applications. long and hard every time it is asked to take the courts out of justice. But in the course of rushing the 342–page bill into law, with few hearings and token debate, and This Justice at Stake Issue Brief explains how the renewing it in 2006 largely as drafted, Congress PATRIOT Act and other government actions have crossed a dangerous line. Much of the PATRIOT destabilized our system of checks and balances Act goes far beyond boosting law enforcement’s since September  by unnecessarily weakening the power to investigate and prevent future acts of ter- power of our courts to protect our rights. It shows ror. Many of its provisions upset our Constitution’s how the courts have responded, approving many

2 Courting Danger: Second Edition checks and balances by allowing the government to investigate and incarcerate without any mean- ingful review from a judge. In many cases, thanks to the PATRIOT Act, the government can now bypass the courts altogether. As one analyst put it, “The USA PATRIOT Act misunderstands the role of the judicial branch of government; it treats the courts as an inconvenient obstacle to execu- tive action rather than an essential instrument of accountability. . . . [I]t establishes toothless judi- cial review of [antiterrorism activities] or bypasses judges altogether.”³

In many cases, thanks to the PATRIOT Act, the government can now bypass the courts altogether.

Because Americans are traditionally suspicious of unchecked government power, and of attempts to deny people their day in court, many of these “court-stripping” provisions had been gathering dust on prosecutor wish lists.⁴ But September  opened the door to many PATRIOT Act provi- sions that upended our Constitution’s checks and balances by removing or reducing judicial checks on federal investigators. required that Congress reconsider this provision The PATRIOT Act, as renewed, stops, stalls, or after four years, it is now the permanent law of stunts courts from reviewing law enforcement’s the land.⁸ This may be a useful reform, but it is activities in several ways: not clear that judicial review posed any risk to law First, section 203 of the Act takes away from enforcement. courts the power, in many circumstances, to Second, section 215 turns judges serving on the decide whether sensitive data gathered by grand Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) juries and wiretaps can be handed over to intelli- Court into barely more than rubber stamps. gence agencies.⁵ Previously, when information was Before 200, in order to get permission to seek discovered in a criminal investigation that related information under FISA, the government had to to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, a show probable cause that the target was linked to judge had to sign off before the government could foreign espionage, and explain how the informa- give it to intelligence officials.⁶ Now it can flow tion sought related to foreign intelligence.⁹ But the far more freely among a range of government PATRIOT Act required FISA judges, who already officials without the government ever needing to have a long history of deference to the Justice justify it to a judge.⁷ Although the original Act Department, to approve government demands

Justice at Stake Campaign 3 for books, records, or any other tangible items court to challenge it, until a full year has passed.¹⁵ containing information about others—including Even then, the FISA judge must deny the chal- American citizens—as long as the government lenge if the government simply asserts that the merely asserted that the information sought was disclosure could harm national security or inter- needed to protect against terrorism.¹⁰ A FISA fere with diplomatic relations¹⁶—a standard so judge wasn’t even permitted to inquire into the low that the government should have little trouble underlying facts or turn down the request.¹¹ invoking it routinely. Because section 25 orders Moreover, the recipient of the demand couldn’t are often issued to third parties that hold informa- tell anyone about the letter (except, possibly, tion about other individuals, these requirements persons who could help them obey it). The law mean that the individual may never know that provided no right to a day in court to challenge their personal information has been searched, the government’s demand.¹² much less have a chance to contest it, since the recipient of the order has less incentive to go to The renewed version of the PATRIOT Act took the trouble of challenging the government. first steps toward restoring the balance. It now requires a FISA judge to grant section 25 demands Third, section 505 allows the FBI and others to if the government describes reasonable grounds circumvent the courts when they issue “national for its belief that the information requested is security letters” demanding information, includ- relevant to an international terrorism investiga- ing telephone logs and consumer credit records.¹⁷ Before the PATRIOT Act, such letters could be With fewer reviews from used only against people reasonably suspected of independent courts, Americans spying or other serious crimes.¹⁸ Now they can be issued against anyone, even if they’re not suspected have fewer ways to know if of espionage or any crime.¹⁹ And these letters can abuses are even occurring. be issued based solely on law enforcement’s unilat- eral claim that the information would be relevant tion, or shows that the materials pertain to foreign to a terrorism investigation.²⁰ The 200 Act also intelligence information not concerning a U.S. barred recipients from disclosing the receipt of person.¹³ If these minimal requirements aren’t the request to almost anyone, including their met, the FISA judge can modify or decline the attorney, or challenging it in court.²¹ The Act, order.¹⁴ The recipient of a section 25 demand for along with guidelines issued by the Department information still must not tell anyone about the of Justice, led to an exponential increase in the use order (except an attorney and those necessary to of national security letters: a recent estimate sug- comply with the order), and cannot have a day in gested that the FBI now issues more than 30,000

4 Courting Danger: Second Edition per year, compared with only about 300 just a few Fifth, section 218 lets the government skirt years ago.²² judicial checks that ensure adherence to the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. Before the Under the renewed PATRIOT Act, the recipient PATRIOT Act, to obtain evidence in almost all of a national security letter can inform an attorney criminal cases, the government had to get a war- and challenge the letter. But in order to modify or set it aside, a FISA judge must find it unrea- sonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.²³ In At times, some efforts to bypass addition, although recipients can challenge the the courts seem to have less to nondisclosure provision of national security let- do with fighting terror than evading ters, a FISA judge must leave the gag order in place if the government asserts that the disclosure accountability. could endanger national security or hinder diplo- matic relations,²⁴ making it virtually impossible rant by showing probable cause to believe a crime for a recipient to ever successfully challenge the had been committed.²⁹ In a small number of gag order. cases, FISA permitted the government to conduct Fourth, sections 214 and 216 require FISA searches and other surveillance without a probable judges to okay the bugging of someone’s tele- cause warrant—as long as it could show that the phone or the monitoring of their Internet use for sole or primary purpose of the investigation was certain criminal investigations—even without a to collect foreign intelligence.³⁰ (This evidence traditional showing of probable cause that a crime couldn’t be used in most criminal cases because has been committed.²⁵ Before the PATRIOT Act, it had not been collected in accordance with in most criminal investigations the government usual Fourth Amendment requirements.) But had to show probable cause to a court, and the PATRIOT lowered this threshold by requiring the judge could question the underlying facts and FISA court to approve government applications reject the request if it didn’t measure up.²⁶ Now to collect evidence if a “significant purpose” is to judges must okay requests as long as law enforce- obtain intelligence, which makes it easier for the ment merely states that the information likely to government to introduce information gathered be gathered is “relevant to an ongoing investiga- under this lower standard into the courtroom.³¹ tion.”²⁷ When Congress renewed the Act, section By forcing courts to grant FISA requests under 24 became permanent. (Section 26 was already looser standards and then making it easier for permanent.²⁸) the government to inject intelligence data into criminal investigations, the PATRIOT Act throws

Justice at Stake Campaign 5 open a back door to evidence that normally to allegations of potential abuse, Congress created can’t pass muster under the Bill of Rights. The a board within the executive branch to moni- original Act made this provision temporary, but tor possible violations of privacy rights and civil Congress made it permanent when they renewed liberties.⁴¹ But as constructed, the board is no the Act.³² more than a token. It has no real power to check government abuses. It serves at the pleasure of Sixth, section 358 bypasses judicial oversight of the president, and must ask the Attorney General the government’s demands for financial records to intervene whenever an agency doesn’t feel like by giving the government unfettered powers to cooperating. The chairmanship is not required to grab sensitive personal financial information.³³ be a full-time job.⁴² Congress even stopped short Without ever notifying a court or explaining the of requiring that each department conducting the reasons to a judge, law enforcement and intel- war on terror appoint a single person concerned ligence agencies can seize financial records—even with protecting constitutional liberties.⁴³ More those having nothing to do with foreign intel- than four years passed before the board had a chair ligence information.³⁴ Before the PATRIOT Act, and vice chair.⁴⁴ Even if it were given real powers, in most circumstances, the government could no board could or should attempt to replace inde- only get access to such records if it got permission pendent courts and their Constitutional role in from a court first.³⁵ protecting American liberties. The same is true of Seventh, section 412 suspends judicial review Congress: even oversight of the executive branch’s of detentions by permitting the government to expanded powers is no substitute for independent detain immigrants for a full week, without justify- courts designed to protect people’s rights. ing their detention to a court or charging them with a crime, if they are suspected of endangering The PATRIOT AND FISA Sequels: the United States.³⁶ During this scrutiny-free Checks And Balances Under Siege week, the government can deport the detainee For some, the PATRIOT Act wasn’t enough. Since without needing to prove to a court why he or she its passage in 200, the Administration and many is a threat.³⁷ (The Administration’s original pro- of its allies have sought to further undermine the posal would have permitted unlimited detention role of the courts in protecting people’s rights by of anyone the Attorney General claimed was a asking for even more latitude to exercise power threat to national security—a determination that without facing the checks and balances tradition- would not have been reviewable by any court.³⁸) ally provided by the courts. Eighth, sections 507 and 508 command courts In 2003, a draft proposal, the Domestic Security to issue orders for the production of student Enhancement Act, leaked out of the Justice records based on the government’s mere certifica- Department. Quickly dubbed “Patriot II,” it con- tion that the records are relevant to a terrorism tained even more shocking assaults on the power investigation.³⁹ The party holding the records has of judges to protect constitutional liberties. The no statutory right to a day in court to contest the government could obtain anyone’s credit report or order.⁴⁰ even a DNA sample without a court order.⁴⁵ The The PATRIOT Act significantly weakened the Attorney General would be permitted to wiretap power of our courts to check potential government phones without court permission for 5 days after abuse. Indeed, with fewer reviews from indepen- an attack on the United States.⁴⁶ Court over- dent courts, Americans have fewer ways to know sight of wiretaps would be further weakened.⁴⁷ if abuses are even occurring. In 2004, responding Court-ordered limits on police spying imposed

6 Courting Danger: Second Edition after spying abuses would be scrapped.⁴⁸ And for ly or impliedly authorized [these] NSA electronic the first time since the Civil War, habeas corpus surveillance operations.”⁵⁶ Some legal scholars review would be suspended, enabling the Attorney and commentators suggested that the FISA Court General to expel certain immigrants without let- may have been misused in the process.⁵⁷ One of ting courts question whether the government’s the FISA judges even resigned a few days after the actions were legal or not.⁴⁹ program came to light.⁵⁸ Patriot II was widely condemned, and the Since FISA allows three days of electronic surveil- Administration quickly backpedaled, insisting lance without a warrant in emergency situations, that it was not a formal proposal.⁵⁰ But many of the Administration’s large-scale effort to bypass the its elements, and others, were seriously considered courts seems to have less to do with fighting ter- by Congress as it debated extending and expand- ing the PATRIOT Act. Power without accountability is a The failure of Patriot II didn’t stop the execu- recipe for more scandal. tive branch from crafting new ways to bypass the courts that protect Americans’ rights. In ror than with evading accountability. Rather than December, 2005, the Administration acknowl- asking Congress to lengthen the grace period or edged that it authorized the National Security consider other reforms, the Administration chose Agency (“NSA”) to conduct a secret, ongoing to ignore the statute and, as the Congressional program of electronic surveillance without obtain- Research Service noted, provided only limited ing warrants, outside the safeguards set up by the briefings to a few Members of Congress in a man- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.⁵¹ FISA, ner that “would appear to be inconsistent with the which was passed to address the spying abuses of law.”⁵⁹ Indeed, in 2002 the Administration itself the Nixon era, requires the government to seek a rejected, as possibly unconstitutional, a proposal warrant from the FISA Court within 72 hours of to give law enforcement more leeway in seek- beginning surveillance.⁵² ing electronic surveillance by lowering the legal The Administration asserted that their secret threshold for court approval below the traditional efforts were legal under the President’s inher- “probable cause” standard.⁶⁰ And PATRIOT II, ent Constitutional powers, and because of the which the Administration disavowed, contained Congressional resolution authorizing the President several proposals that, in retrospect, may have to use the armed forces against those responsible hinted at the wiretapping that seems to be part of for the September  attacks.⁵³ But some even the NSA program.⁶¹ within the Department of Justice were skeptical.⁵⁴ The Administration has said that abuses are And lawmakers and legal scholars of both parties unlikely because the eavesdropping program is raised concerns about the bypass of judicial review. administered by career professionals and reviewed They argued that FISA established clear rules that by lawyers at the NSA, and because the President no President can ignore, and denied that the 200 reauthorizes the program every 45 days if intel- resolution containing broad language regarding ligence professionals recommend it.⁶² But oth- the use of military force somehow trumped FISA’s ers aren’t so sure. The American Civil Liberties clear prohibition on warrantless spying in the Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, United States.⁵⁵ The nonpartisan Congressional and others (including prominent scholars and Research Service concluded, “It appears unlikely like , a supporter that a court would hold that Congress has express- of the wars in Iraq and ), have filed

Justice at Stake Campaign 7 suit, believing that communications like theirs It also severely limits the courts’ ability to review may have been intercepted.⁶³ Legislators have whether the President’s decisions to designate demanded Congressional inquiries and legislation someone as an enemy combatant, and sentences to bring the program under a framework of laws imposed by military tribunal, have complied with instead of leaving it to the discretion of the execu- American laws and standards of due process.⁶⁸ In tive branch.⁶⁴ effect, it denies detainees the right to go to U.S. Courts to prevent illegal torture.⁶⁹ The debate over the NSA spying program shows how badly the courts are faring in the war on ter- Upon signing the law, the President asserted the ror. Just a few years after winning the Cold War, theory of the “unitary executive,” which claims America’s leaders are using a fresh security threat that the Constitution affords the president a vir- to write the courts out of the Constitution. If tually unfettered power to interpret the laws that courts can’t check government abuses and preserve Congress passes.⁷⁰ Since then, the Administration the rule of law, America is at risk of forfeiting its has argued that the law scuttles cases pending historic role as a global model for protecting free- in the courts before the law was passed.⁷¹ The dom and safety. Graham-Levin amendment was slipped in just days after the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case challenging the constitutionality and procedures Detainees and of the military tribunals set up to try Guantanamo Military Tribunals detainees—a case in which the appeals court sided The Constitutional role of our courts has also with the Administration. been threatened by Administration claims that the President has unilateral authority over the Efforts like these just beg the question: why not let detention and treatment of anyone, including the courts do their job? By systematically under- American citizens, without due process, by simply cutting the accountability that courts are designed declaring the person to be an enemy combatant. to provide, and eviscerating procedural protections The Administration has even argued that these for detainees, the executive branch undermines determinations and detentions should be immune the rule of law and turns the Constitution on its from any review in a U.S. court.⁶⁵ head. Power without accountability is a recipe for more scandal, like Abu Ghraib. The reach of executive branch authority in this context is still being sorted out in the courts (see Section III). But there’s no shortage of attempts Refugees & Immigrants: to cut the courts out of the process, even though No Day In Court? most court decisions have given the administra- The Constitution grants foreign nationals fewer tion great latitude by requiring it to adhere only to rights than American citizens. They have no minimal due process requirements. In late 2005, political clout, making it especially important that Congress passed, and the President signed, a bill courts protect what rights they do have in the face containing the Detainee Treatment Act, with a of government pressure. But since September , provision known as the Graham-Levin amend- courts have been losing their powers to guarantee ment.⁶⁶ The law strips the courts of jurisdiction to refugees and immigrants procedures that are fair hear habeas corpus petitions from detainees being and treatment that is decent. held at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba naval base As mentioned above, section 42 of the PATRIOT who are seeking to prevent and stop due process Act suspends judicial review of detentions by violations in their treatment and confinement.⁶⁷ permitting the government to detain immigrants

8 Courting Danger: Second Edition for a full week, without justifying their detention has passed a measure that would require appli- to a court or charging them with a crime, if they cants for nonimmigrant visas to waive their rights are suspected of endangering the United States. to any judicial review or appeal of an immigra- During this week, the government can deport the tion officer’s decision at the port of entry as to detainee without needing to prove to a court why the alien’s admissibility, and forfeit their rights to he or she is a threat.⁷² contest any action for removal unless the action is based on asylum.⁷⁹ This bill would also pro- In the aftermath of September , as more than hibit judicial review of removal orders for certain ,200 non-citizens were detained, Immigration criminal aliens, and foreclose meaningful judicial and Naturalization Service attorneys were review of many removal orders for other non- instructed to exercise their power to override any criminals.⁸⁰ ruling from an immigration judge granting bond to a detainee—even when there was no evidence suggesting the detainee was connected to terror- III. How the ism.⁷³ Many INS attorneys complained about Courts Have Performed the policy, which was also criticized by the Justice The irony is that when the war on terror has Department’s Inspector General.⁷⁴ landed in the courtroom, the courts have shown Attorney General John Ashcroft also stripped themselves to be a responsible partner in coun- power and capacity from the Justice Department’s terterrorism efforts. Time and again, they have Board of Immigration Appeals, which has the last worked to protect liberty and safety, belying word in most immigration cases. He eliminated the myth that they will endanger national secu- more than half of the judgeships (thereby sweep- rity. Indeed, in cases involving the detainees at ing out the five most “immigrant friendly” jurists), Guantanamo Bay, challenges to the PATRIOT significantly reduced multi-judge reviews of lower Act, and attempts to seek more information about court decisions, dramatically broadened the kinds the government’s activities in investigating terror- of cases that can be affirmed without any opinion, ism, the courts have been largely deferential to the and eliminated the Board’s authority to review arguments of the government. a decision on its own.⁷⁵ The new rules reduced immigrant victories to about  in 0 appeals, com- The courts have shown themselves pared to  in 4 before the Ashcroft reforms. (The to be a responsible partner in regulations also triggered a surge of appeals to the counterterrorism efforts. Time and United States Courts of Appeals.)⁷⁶ again, they have worked to protect Subsequently, the REAL ID Act was enacted into law.⁷⁷ Section 0(e) of the Act prohibits courts liberty and safety. from reversing the decision of an immigration judge throwing out asylum claims for lack of cor- In the most well-known series of cases, involv- roborating evidence unless the court finds itself ing the government’s detention of individuals “compelled to conclude” that such corroborating allegedly involved in hostile activities, the courts evidence is unavailable⁷⁸—a strange and exacting have defended their jurisdiction to protect certain standard for the review of any decision. rights while permitting the government to con- duct investigations, develop hearing procedures, A range of new proposals currently under debate and determine conditions of confinement that could further cut independent courts out of comply only minimally with established law. In immigration cases. The House of Representatives

Justice at Stake Campaign 9 the matter of Rasul et al. v. Bush,⁸¹ for instance, mine if he is a prisoner of war under the Geneva the Supreme Court held that the federal courts Convention.⁹⁰ This hearing, the court ruled, can hear legal challenges to the detention of must provide fair notice of the evidence being foreign nationals incarcerated at Guantanamo.⁸² used against the detainee and a fair opportunity (The court declined to address whether the to contest it—protections not provided by the detainees were being held illegally, or to provide Administration’s tribunals.⁹¹ The court further standards for deciding such a question.) determined that the detainee is entitled to pris- oner of war protections until such a hearing can In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,⁸³ the Supreme Court ruled be held.⁹² But on appeal, a federal appeals court that the President had the authority, under the reversed the lower court’s ruling, concluding Congressional authorization to use military force that the Geneva Convention could not be judi- in relation to the September  attacks, to detain a cially enforced (and that even if it could, Hamdan United States citizen captured abroad and held as would not be entitled to its protections under an enemy combatant.⁸⁴ The Court also held that either the language of the Convention or the enemy combatants must be given a “meaningful President’s interpretation.⁹³) Further, the appeals opportunity to contest the factual basis for his court determined that the military commissions detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”⁸⁵ But set up to try Hamdan (and others like him) were the court left open the possibility that a military subject to few procedural requirements, that tribunal could be substituted for a federal court,⁸⁶ none of these requirements were implicated by providing significant leeway to the Administration Hamdan’s challenge, and that the military com- to create a forum more advantageous to the inter- missions were competent tribunals for purposes ests of the government. of determining his status.⁹⁴ The Supreme Court Subsequently, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,⁸⁷ a federal has agreed to hear the case; since the question of district court addressed the question of whether whether the federal courts can address such issues war crimes trials could be conducted in special at all under the Graham-Levin Amendment has military commissions fashioned after September intervened, the high court will have to decide if  rather than before a court-martial convened it can even do its job of addressing important due under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.⁸⁸ process issues raised by cases like Hamdan.⁹⁵ In part to protect Americans captured in fighting In a ruling pertaining to many of the Guantanamo abroad,⁸⁹ the court ruled that a Guantanamo Bay detainees’ cases, a federal district court held that detainee captured during hostilities in Afghanistan due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to and designated an “enemy combatant” by the the U.S. Constitution apply to detainees who are Administration is entitled to a hearing to deter- being held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo

10 Courting Danger: Second Edition whether or not they have been charged with In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,¹⁰⁴ the Supreme Court war crimes that would result in their appearance sided with the government in requiring lawyers before military commissions.⁹⁶ The court ruled for Jose Padilla to bring his petition—for a habe- that the procedures of tribunals that review the as corpus review challenging his detention—in President’s decision to designate a detainee as an the jurisdiction where Padilla was then being enemy combatant fail to comply with due process held.¹⁰⁵ Subsequently, in Padilla v. Hanft,¹⁰⁶ a if they don’t provide the detainees with access to Republican-appointed district court judge found the evidence used to make the determination, that the Constitution required that Padilla, a U.S. don’t allow assistance of counsel, and with respect citizen arrested in the United States and held as to at least some detainees, allow the reliance on an enemy combatant, be charged with a crime or evidence allegedly obtained through torture.⁹⁷ But released.¹⁰⁷ But the U. S. Court of Appeals for the court also ruled that the Geneva Conventions the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision, ruling do not apply to all detainees at Guantanamo.⁹⁸ that the President had the power to hold Padilla as Another federal district court disagreed with these an enemy combatant pursuant to the President’s rulings and sided with the government, and all power under the 200 Congressional authorization the related cases have been appealed.⁹⁹ Of course, to use military force.¹⁰⁸ After Padilla appealed to if the Graham-Levin Amendment is interpreted the Supreme Court, the Administration moved to to bar courts from even hearing cases like these charge Padilla with crimes, transfer him from mil- in which detainees seek to prevent or stop due itary to criminal custody, and vacate the Court of process violations, then even those rulings that Appeals opinion.¹⁰⁹ The Court of Appeals denied favor the government won’t matter. the government’s requests, pointedly noting that the government’s insistence over the three and a In U.S. v. Moussaoui,¹⁰⁰ the U.S. Court of half year period of Padilla’s confinement that his Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the detention was imperative for national security Administration that it need not turn over prison- purposes, and the court’s decision that he could ers in military custody outside the United States be held on the basis of those representations, did when they are called as witnesses.¹⁰¹ Deferring not square with the government’s sudden choice to national security concerns, the Court allowed to release Padilla and charge him with actions far the government to provide written summaries of less serious than those for which he was ostensibly witness statements instead.¹⁰² On the other hand, being held in military custody.¹¹⁰ Citing the need the Court rejected arguments that the executive’s for the Supreme Court to decide the important war making powers preclude any judicial role in issues in the case, as well as the need to protect such matters.¹⁰³ the appearance of regularity in the judicial pro-

Justice at Stake Campaign 11 cess,¹¹¹ the court said that, if granted, the gov- in violation of the Constitution’s First and Fourth ernment’s requests “would compound what is, in Amendments.¹²⁰ The court noted that “times like the absence of explanation, at least an appearance these demand heightened vigilance.”¹²¹ In balanc- that the government may be attempting to avoid ing liberty concerns, however, the court ruled that consideration of our decision by the Supreme to deny the judiciary a role in reviewing the issu- Court . . . .”¹¹² The Supreme Court granted ance of such letters would violate the Constitution’s the government’s request to transfer Padilla into protections against unreasonable searches.¹²² The criminal custody, but has promised to review the court further struck down broad prohibitions legality of his military detention.¹¹³ Regardless of on disclosing the receipt of such a letter as in the ultimate outcome, the Padilla decisions show impermissible content-based prior restraint on how only courts can provide the kind of impartial speech.¹²³ In Doe v. Gonzales,¹²⁴ another federal review that our Constitution’s framers desired. district court, similarly, emphasized it is often appropriate to defer to the government’s expertise In cases pertaining to the government’s powers in the area of counter-terrorism, but in balancing under the PATRIOT Act, the courts have bal- that with the need for judicial review, determined anced liberty and security interests. In In re Sealed that a permanent gag order on disclosing the Case Nos. 02-011 and 02-002,¹¹⁴ the U.S. Foreign existence of a particular national security letter Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (the constituted a broad content-based, prior restraint appeals body for the FISA Court), convening for of speech in violation of the First Amendment.¹²⁵ the first time in its history, sided with the govern- Both cases have been appealed to the U.S. Court ment by reversing the lower FISA Court’s refusal of Appeals for the Second Circuit.¹²⁶ to grant applications for surveillance under section 28 of the PATRIOT Act.¹¹⁵ The court ruled that The courts have shown considerable deference to evidence gained under FISA standards could be government refusals to provide more information used to prosecute ordinary crimes as long as some about its conduct of the war on terror. When the purpose of the investigation was to gather foreign ACLU sued under the Freedom of Information intelligence information, and as long as the crimes Act to see records sought by the FBI in a terror- to be prosecuted were inextricably linked with ism investigation, a federal district court held that foreign intelligence crimes.¹¹⁶ (The FISA Appeals the government could withhold the information Court found for the government despite evidence under the Act’s national security exemption.¹²⁷ It that the FBI had submitted more than 75 applica- added, however, that there was a compelling need tions containing misstatements and omissions of to expedite processing of such requests, given materials facts to the FISA court since January concerns that the PATRIOT Act might be used 2000, when new Justice Department rules eased to violate civil liberties.¹²⁸ Similarly, in Center the standard for using intelligence information for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department in criminal cases.¹¹⁷) The court also determined, of Justice,¹²⁹ the U.S. Court of Appeals for the however, that it would not be proper for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that the government to use the FISA process to gather names of people detained for investigation of information exclusively for a criminal investiga- major terrorist attacks, and the names of their tion—even one linked to foreign intelligence.¹¹⁸ attorneys, can be withheld under the law enforce- ment exemption of the Freedom of Information In Doe v. Ashcroft,¹¹⁹ a federal district court ruled Act.¹³⁰ that the government overstated its authority in issuing “national security letters” under section 505 of the PATRIOT Act (and other authorities)

12 Courting Danger: Second Edition IV. The Historic Deference man whose crime was stating that “anyone who of Courts During Wartime enlists is a God Damn fool”¹³⁶ ). When President A broader review of American history supports Lincoln suspended the constitutional right of the same conclusion: that the courts, carrying habeas corpus—the right to challenge a detention out their job defending the Constitution, have in court—the Supreme Court ruled that only not undercut national security during times of Congress possessed such powers.¹³⁷ conflict. Throughout history, courts have typi- During World War I, the Court upheld the gov- cally been quite deferential to the President and ernment’s power to draft men into the army;¹³⁸ Congress during wartime. For example, the 798 seize control of railroads,¹³⁹ telegraphs and tele- Alien and Sedition Acts, giving the President phones;¹⁴⁰ and even to prohibit the making and wider authorities to jail aliens and criminalize selling of alcohol during wartime.¹⁴¹ When the criticism, survived repeated challenges under the Wilson administration used the 98 Espionage Constitution’s First Amendment.¹³¹ “The courts,” and Sedition Acts to jail more than a thousand observed Chief Justice William Rehnquist, “have dissenters, including former presidential candi- largely reserved the decisions favoring civil liber- date Eugene Debs, the courts did not protest.¹⁴² ties in wartime to be handed down after the war Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has written a book was over.”¹³² on American liberties during times of war, is more During the Civil War, the Supreme Court refused charitable: “Though the courts during this period to review the Army’s jailing of a former congress- gave little relief to civil liberties claimants, the man for urging Lincoln’s electoral defeat and very fact that the claims were being reviewed by for criticizing a military edict against “declar- the judiciary was a step in the right direction for ing sympathies for the enemy” in Ohio, where proponents of civil liberties during wartime.”¹⁴³ martial law had been declared.¹³³ It upheld the Indeed, shortly after the war ended, a federal government’s power to blockade Confederate court ordered the Justice Department to release ports without a Congressional authorization.¹³⁴ aliens it sought to deport because they were mem- In two cases, however, the Court tried to curb bers of the Communist Party.¹⁴⁴ government attempts to ignore the rules set out During World War II, federal courts upheld the in the Constitution. In Ex Parte Milligan,¹³⁵ federal government’s power to set wartime price the Court ruled that military tribunals could controls,¹⁴⁵ the jailing of fascist critics of the not try civilians for disloyalty when civil courts government¹⁴⁶ and socialist strike instigators at were available to hear the case (like the Illinois defense plants,¹⁴⁷ and a state’s power to refuse to

Justice at Stake Campaign 13 deny conscientious objectors a license to practice law.¹⁴⁸ The Supreme Court famously permitted the President to set curfews for¹⁴⁹ and imprison more than 0,000 Japanese-Americans and their Japanese-national parents.¹⁵⁰ And at the urging of the Justice Department, the Court also ignored the Civil War precedent it had established in Ex Parte Milligan and refused to grant Nazi saboteurs an opportunity for a civil trial.¹⁵¹ On other occasions, the Court was better able to protect civil liberties despite the political pressures of the “Good War.” It stopped some government efforts to jail war critics¹⁵² and to denaturalize fascist sympathizers and Communist party mem- bers.¹⁵³ It reversed itself and held that Jehovah’s Witnesses need not salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance in schools if it violated their religious conscience. “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights,” wrote the majority, “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”¹⁵⁴ On several occasions, the Court invoked Nazi Germany’s suppression of basic human rights as it upheld liberties here at home.¹⁵⁵ During the Vietnam War, the Court ducked repeated requests to declare military action unconstitutional (in part because Congress never formally declared war).¹⁵⁶ It refused to rule on army surveillance of civilian protestors,¹⁵⁷ and it upheld the army’s right to discipline dissidents within its ranks.¹⁵⁸ Although it broadened the definition of legal conscientious objection to the draft,¹⁵⁹ it refused to grant such a status to those who objected only to fighting in Vietnam. Even the famous 97 “Pentagon Papers” decision, per- mitting to publish a classified government history of the Vietnam War, was a close case: the two deciding votes, Justices Stewart and White, would have ruled to suppress publica- tion if Congress had only authorized the President to do so beforehand.¹⁶⁰

14 Courting Danger: Second Edition V. Conclusion: federal judges to craft remedies when those condi- The Growing War on the Courts tions actually break the law.¹⁶⁶

“Federal courts have no army or navy. . . . A new round of efforts began after the 2002 elec- At the end of the day, we’re saying the court tions. The 2003 “Feeney Amendment”—protested can’t enforce its opinions.” strongly by Chief Justice William Rehnquist— sharply limited the ability of federal judges to —U.S. Rep. John Hostettler.¹⁶¹ issue sentences below federal guidelines in order The assault on our courts did not begin on to set punishments that fit the crime.¹⁶⁷ In 2004, September 2, 200. For more than a decade, the House of Representatives passed a measure an increasingly aggressive band of lawmakers, to strip federal court jurisdiction to rule on chal- pundits and special interest groups have been lenges to the Pledge of Allegiance.¹⁶⁸ The House working to weaken the power of our courts and also passed the “Marriage Protection Act”, which the legitimacy of our judges. singles out one law (the Defense of Marriage Act) for special treatment, exempting it from any Congress periodically engages in waves of “court- review by the federal courts.¹⁶⁹ stripping,” often to punish the courts for par- ticular rulings on hot-button social issues. After the Supreme Court’s 954 Brown v. Board of Congress periodically engages in Education decision that school segregation vio- waves of “court-stripping,” often to lated the Constitution, furious lawmakers sought punish the courts for particular to exempt federal courts from ruling on public education laws.¹⁶² During the 960s and 970s, rulings on hot-button social issues. issues like the draft, Miranda warnings, busing, school prayer and abortion sparked efforts to cut the courts’ power to hold laws up to the standards With the 09th Congress, 2005 and 2006 are of our Constitution.¹⁶³ ushering in yet more court-stripping measures. One measure passed in 2005 gives the Secretary The Big Bang for the latest round of assaults of Homeland Security unilateral power to waive came in 996, a presidential election year that any law on the books that might interfere with saw three major court-stripping laws and a politi- the building of border fences—including civil- cal assault on a sitting judge. In the wake of the rights and minimum-wage protections, and even Oklahoma City bombing, Congress passed an criminal laws.¹⁷⁰ Government wrongdoing could anti-terrorism bill that dramatically restricted only be redressed if it rose to the level of a federal judicial review for death row inmates Constitutional violation, and a contrary court and for many immigrants facing deportation.64 decision could only be appealed to the Supreme The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Court, which hears far fewer appeals than tradi- Responsibility Act eliminated or severely restrict- tional appeals courts.¹⁷¹ Of course, the effort to ed the ability of immigrants to seek a federal court rig the Terri Schiavo case by sending it to federal review as they seek asylum from persecution or court was so politically transparent that it gener- fight deportation efforts.¹⁶⁵ The Prison Litigation ated a national backlash.¹⁷² Reform Act drastically diminished the ability of prisoners to get a day in court to object to abusive Congress is now considering a fresh round of court prison conditions, and weakened the authority of stripping efforts, many of which seem designed to energize activists who have been spoiling for a

Justice at Stake Campaign 15 fight with the courts. Proposed marriage amend- the judiciary of endangering national security.¹⁸³ ments to the Constitution seek to take powers During the Schiavo case, House Majority Leader from state judges to rule on family law issues they DeLay warned that “no little judge sitting in a have handled for centuries.¹⁷³ The “Constitution state district court in Florida is going to usurp the Restoration Act” would deny federal courts the authority of Congress.”¹⁸⁴ Congressional leaders power to hear any suit involving a governmental have bragged that they will “take no prisoners” in official’s “acknowledgment of God as the sover- dealing with the courts¹⁸⁵ and that “judges need eign source of law, liberty, or government.”¹⁷⁴ to be intimidated.”¹⁸⁶ (For good measure, any judge caught exceeding This intimidation campaign is now well under his or her jurisdiction could be impeached.¹⁷⁵) A way. A Reagan-appointed judge was recently separate House measure would allow Congress to hauled before a congressional committee to reverse any Supreme Court decision that struck explain comments that weren’t, in the eyes of down a law on constitutional grounds, lowering congressional investigators, properly supportive of the curtain on two centuries of judicial review.¹⁷⁶ sentencing guidelines.¹⁸⁷ There’s a new effort to Other pending legislation would encourage defen- make impeachment into a respectable, permissible dants to renege on promises they made in consent punishment for federal judges who make con- decrees—such as pledges to clean up pollution troversial decisions, exceed their jurisdiction, or and dilapidated schools—by forcing judges to let consult foreign law in their deliberations.¹⁸⁸ State certain defendants reopen the agreements every judges have also seen a spike in impeachment few years, or when a new governor or mayor is threats: 48 from 2002 to 2005, almost double the elected.¹⁷⁷ previous four years. The last decade has also witnessed an escalating Courts shouldn’t be immune from criticism and political intimidation campaign against judges. In controversy. But our founders gave judges a spe- 996, presidential candidate Bob Dole called for cial job—to protect the Constitution, and decide the impeachment of federal judge Harold Baer cases based on the facts and the law, not pressure after he disallowed certain evidence in a drug and politics. Tearing down the courts that protect case.¹⁷⁸ President Clinton’s spokesman, eager to our rights can only weaken the American judicial deflect Dole’s attack, suggested the Administration system that Chief Justice Rehnquist called the would consider asking the judge to resign unless “crown jewel” of our democracy. he reversed his ruling.¹⁷⁹ In 997, Congressman Tom DeLay announced that impeachment was If our long war against terrors results in a piece- a “proper solution” for “particularly egregious” meal weakening of the power of our courts, and a rulings.¹⁸⁰ Congressional hearings on “judicial permanent weakening of the checks and balances activism” and more impeachment threats soon that protect our freedoms, Americans will be right followed.¹⁸¹ “We have a whole big file cabinet to wonder what exactly they’re fighting for. That’s full” of names, said DeLay. “We are receiv- why the PATRIOT Act debate offers Congress ing nominations from all across the country of and all Americans an excellent opportunity to judges that could be prime candidates for the first deliberate carefully and consider the cumulative impeachment.”¹⁸² effects of these measures. In the end, no matter how slowly one slides down a slippery slope, one Tactics like these flow from a view of our courts as still ends up at the bottom. little more than enemy combatants. After court rul- ings that certain antiterrorism tactics violated the Bill of Rights, Attorney General Ashcroft accused

16 Courting Danger: Second Edition Appendix: The Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org Finding Out More Human Rights First (Formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) Justice At Stake Partners http://humanrightsfirst.org American Bar Association Section of Individual Patriots to Restore Checks and Balances Rights & Responsibilities http://www.checksbalances.org http://www.abanet.org/irr/home.html Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press Appleseed Foundation http://www.rcfp.org/behindthehomefront http://www.appleseeds.net/index.cfm The Constitution Project / U.S. Government Liberty & Security Initiative http://constitutionproject.org/ls/ The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9- Commission) The League of Women Voters– http://www.9-commission.gov Civil Liberties Project http://www.lwv.org/AM/Template. Department of Justice cfm?Section=Civil_Liberties USA PATRIOT Act resource page http://www.lifeandliberty.gov

Other Organizations Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, United States Department of the Treasury American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) http://www.fincen.gov/pa_main.html http://www.aclu.org/safefree/index.html

American Immigration Lawyers Association http://aila.org Amnesty International USA http://www.amnestyusa.org Bill of Rights Defense Committee http://www.bordc.org The http://www.cato.org/current/terrorism

Center for Constitutional Rights http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp Center for Democracy and Technology http://www.cdt.org Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org Electronic Privacy Information Center http://www.epic.org

Justice at Stake Campaign 17 5 U.S. Senate. 09th Congress, 2nd Session. S. 2271, USA Endnotes PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act.  “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing GPO. see § 3. Terrorism Act of 200.” (P. L. 07-56), United States Statutes At 6 Ibid. The assertion could be rejected only if the FISA judge Large. 5 Stat. 272.; U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. found that it was made in bad faith. H.R. 362, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 7 Lynch. “Threats To Civil Liberties,” 202. (USA PATRIOT)Act of 2001. GPO. < http://frwebgate.access. 8 Gerald M. Carbone. “Inside the USA Patriot Act: Day 5 gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=07_cong_bills&docid=f: - Your Financial Information is Available on Demand.” projo. h362enr.txt.pdf>. com/The Providence Journal, 8 Jul. 2004. . 3 Ronald Weich. Upsetting Checks and Balances: Congressional 9 Dahlia Lithwick and Julia Turner. “Jurisprudence: A Guide Hostility Towards the Courts in Times of Crisis. (New York, to the Patriot Act, Part 4.” Slate,  Sept. 2003. . 0 Nov. 200). 5. . 2 Lynch. “Threats to Civil Liberties,” 202. 4 American Civil Liberties Union. “Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act.” ACLU Safe and Free. American 22 . “The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny.” The Civil Liberties Union.  Jul. 2005. . 23 U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3199, see § 5 Weich. Upsetting Checks, 5. 5. 6 Electronic Privacy Information Center. “The USA 24 Ibid. The assertion could be rejected only if the FISA judge PATRIOT Act.” Electronic Privacy Information Center. 24 found that it was made in bad faith. May 2005. . PATRIOT Act.” 7 Ibid.; Podesta, John. “USA PATRIOT Act: The Good, The 26 Dalia Lithwick and Julia Turner. “Jurisprudence: A Guide Human Rights Magazine Bad, and The Sunset.” American Bar to the Patriot Act, Part 3.” Slate 0 Sept. 2003. ; Electronic Privacy Information Center. Winter 2002. . Center. 24 May 2005. . PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 . 27 Lithwick and Turner. “Jurisprudence: A Guide to the GPO. see § 02. 28 U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3199, see § 02. 9 Dahlia Lithwick and Julia Turner. “Jurisprudence: A Guide to the Patriot Act, Part .” Slate, 8 Sept. 2003. . to the Patriot Act, Part 2.” Slate, 9 Sept. 2003. ; Electronic Privacy Information H.R. 3162, see 0 U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. § Center. “The USA PATRIOT Act.”. 25; Timothy Lynch. “Threats To Civil Liberties: The Patriot Act.” Cato Handbook on Policy, 6th ed. Ed. Edward H. Crane 30 Ibid.; Electronic Privacy Information Center. “The USA and David Boaz. (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2004). PATRIOT Act.”. 202. . 32 U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3199, see §  Lithwick and Turner. “Jurisprudence: A Guide to the Patriot 02. Act, Part .” 33 U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3162, see § 2 U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3162, see § 358. 25. 34 Weich. Upsetting Checks, 5; American Civil Liberties Union. 3 U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3199, see § “How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Puts Financial Privacy At Risk.” 06. ACLU National Security 23 Oct. 200. .

18 Courting Danger: Second Edition 35 Electronic Privacy Information Center. “The Right to 53 U.S. Department of Justice. Legal Authorities Supporting Financial Privacy Act.” Electronic Privacy Information Center. the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the 5 Sept. 2003. . President. Findlaw 9 Jan. 2006 36 U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3162, see § 42. 54 and . “Justice Deputy Resisted Parts of Spy Program.” The New York Times,  Jan. 2006, A; 37 Ibid. Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus. “Ex-Justice Lawyer Rips Case 38 Human Rights First. “Human Rights First on Counter- for Spying.” , 9 Mar. 2006, A3. Terror Bill.” Human Rights First. 26 Oct. 200. . Program.” The Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2006, A0; Eric 39 U.S. House. 07th Congress, st Session. H.R. 3162, see §§ Lichtblau and James Risen. “U.S. Officials Cite Legal 507, 508; Weich. Upsetting Checks, 5. Rationale on Spying Effort.” The New York Times, 20 Jan. 2006, A. 40 Ibid. 56 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service.. 4 “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of Presidential Authority to Conduct Wireless Electronic Surveillance 2004.” (P. L. 08-458), United States Statutes At Large. 88 to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information by Elizabeth B. Stat. 3638; U.S. Senate. 08th Congress, 2nd Session. S. 2845, Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea. Washington, DC: Congressional Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. GPO. Research Service, 5 Jan, 2006. 62.40.64.2&filename=s2845enr.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/ data/08_cong_bills> see § 06. 57 Ted Bridis. “Experts Say Wiretap Fight May Taint Cases.” Associated Press. SFGate.com, 2 Dec. 2005 ; Carol D. Leonnig and Dafna Linzer. “Spy 43 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Court Judge Quits In Protest.” The Washington Post, 2 Dec. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board: 109th Congress 2005; A0. Proposed Refinements by Harold C. Relyea. Washington, DC: 58 Ibid. Congressional Research Service, 2005. . 59 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of 44 Richard B. Schmitt. “Privacy Guardian is Still a Paper U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions by Alfred Tiger.” , 20 Feb. 2006, A. Cumming. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 45 Adam Clymer. “Threats and Responses: Domestic Security; 8 Jan. 2006. . New York Times, 8 Feb. 2003, A0; “Patriot Act II” Domestic 60 Dan Eggen. “White House Dismissed ’02 Surveillance Security Enhancement Act of 2003. §§26, 30-306. NOW Proposal.” The Washington Post, 26 Jan. 2006, A04. with Bill Moyers, PBS. 7 Feb. 2003. . 6 Dan Eggen. “2003 Draft Legislation Covered Eavesdropping.” The Washington Post, 28 Jan. 2006, A02. 46 “Patriot Act II” Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 03. NOW with Bill Moyers. PBS. 7 Feb. 2003. 62 Alberto Gonzales, “Statement to Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority.” The Washington Post / CQ 47 Ibid., §§ 03-04, 22. transcript, 6 Feb. 2006 . 49 Ibid., § 504. 63 Peter Baker. “White House Disputes Gore on NSA Spying.” The Washington Post, 8 Jan. 2006, A06. 50 Clymer. “Threats and Responses,” A0. 64 Dan Eggen and Charles Lane. “On Hill, Anger and 5 Peter Baker. “President Acknowledges Approving Secret Calls for Hearings Greet News of Stateside Surveillance.” Eavesdropping.” The Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2005, A0; James The Washington Post, 7 Dec. 2005, A0; Eric Lichtblau. Risen and Eric Lichtblau. “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers “Republican Who Oversees N.S.A. Calls for Wiretap Inquiry.” Without Courts.” The New York Times, 6 Dec. 2005, A. The New York Times, 8 Feb. 2006, A2; Charles Babington. 52 Carol D. Leonnig and Dafna Linzer. “Judges on “Specter Proposes NSA Surveillance Rules.” The Washington Surveillance Court to Be Briefed on Spy Program.” The Post, 26 Feb. 2006, A; Katherine Shrader. “Bill Tackles Washington Post, 22 Dec. 2005, A0. Eavesdropping Admissibility.” Associated Press. The Washington Post, 9 Mar 2006. 65 Kerrita McClaughlyn. “The Rights of Enemy Combatants.” Washington Lawyer Nov. 2004: p. 2.

Justice at Stake Campaign 19 66 Ari Shapiro. “Government Asks for Dismissal of 85 Hamdi 24 S.Ct. 2633 at 2635, 2650-5. Guantanamo Cases,” Morning Edition (NPR) transcript, 5 Jan 86 Hamdi 24 S.Ct. 2633 at 265. 2006. 87 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.D.C 2004). 67 Michael C. Dorf. “The Senate Votes to Curb Habeas Corpus Petitions by Guantanamo Detainees: How the Bill 88 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 55 Threatens the ‘Unwritten Constitution.’ Findlaw’s Writ, 2 Nov. 2005. . 90 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 6. 68 Ibid. 9 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 72. 69 Ibid. 92 Hamdan, 344 F.Supp.2d at 65. 70 . “Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban; 93 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 45 F.3d 33, 39-42, (DC Cir. 2005). Waiver Right is Reserved.” , 4 Jan. 2006, A. 94 Hamdan, 45 F.3d at 42-43. 7 Dan Eggen and Josh White. “U.S. Seeks to Avoid Detainee Ruling.” The Washington Post, 3 Jan. 2006, A07; Terry 95 Eggen and White. “U.S. Seeks to Avoid Detainee Ruling.” Frieden. “Feds Push Dismissal of Detainee Cases.” CNN.com, A07. 8 Jan. 2006. . 464 (D.D.C. 2005). 72 See note 36. 97 Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp 2d at 468, 473-74. 73 Eleanor Acer et al. Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and 98 Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F.Supp.2d at 479. Security for the Post-September 11 United States (New York, NY and Washington, DC: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 99 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 3, 320-327 (D.D.C. 2005). 2003) 35-36. 00 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004) 74 Ibid. 0 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 476. 75 American Immigration Lawyers Association. “The Civil 02 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 479-480. Liberties Restoration Act: A Response To Counterproductive Post-9/ Policies.” American Immigration Lawyers Association 03 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 468. Issue Paper. American Immigration Lawyers Association. 04 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, et al., 542 U.S. 426, 24 S.Ct. 27 25 May 2005 . 05 Padilla, 24 S.Ct. at 2727. 76 Ibid. 06 Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F.Supp.2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005). 77 “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.” (P.L. 07 Padilla, 389 F.Supp.2d at 692. 09-3), United States Statutes At Large, 9 Stat. 23. 08 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 39 (4th Cir. 2005). 78 Ibid.; U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 09 Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th Cir. 2005). Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005. GPO. .  Padilla, 432 F.3d at 586. 79 U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 4437, Border 2 Padilla, 432 F.3d at 583-584. Protection Antiterrorism, and Illeigal Immigration Control Act of 3 Padilla v. Hanft, 26 S.Ct. 978 (2006). 2005. GPO. see § 4 In Re Sealed Case, 30 F.3d 77 (For.Intel.Surv.Rev., 2002). 806. 5 In Re Sealed Case, 30 F.3d at 746. 80 Ibid.; see §§ 805, 807. 6 In Re Sealed Case, 30 F.3d at 730-735; Human Rights 8 Rasul et al. v. Bush, et al., 542 U.S. 466, 24 S.Ct. 2686 First. “Intelligence and Privacy: Expansion Powers Under the (2004). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).” Human Rights First,  Jul. 2005 . 83 Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld, et al., 542 U.S. 507, 24 S.Ct. 2633 7 In Re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence (2004). Surveillance Court, 28 F.Supp.2d 6, 620 (Foreign Intel.Surv. 84 Hamdi, 24 S.Ct. 2633 at 2640. The ruling was limited to Ct., 2002). the circumstances present in that case.

20 Courting Danger: Second Edition 8 In Re Sealed Case, 30 F.3d at 735-36. 40 Dakota Central Telephone v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 63 (99). 9 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 4 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 25 U.S. 20 Doe, 334 F.Supp.2d at 526-527. 46 (99). 2 Doe, 334 F.Supp.2d at 478. 42 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (99), Frohwerk v. 22 Doe, 334 F.Supp.2d at 506. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (99), Debs. v. United States, 249 U.S. 2 (99) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 66 (99). Wilson 23 Doe, 334 F.Supp.2d at 5-53, 524. ended or reduced the sentences of 200 of these prisoners in 24 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.Conn. 2005). 99; Debs and 24 others were pardoned by President Harding in 92, and the remainder were ordered released by President 25 Doe, 386 F.Supp.2d at 74-76, 79-82. Coolidge in 923. 26 Mark Hamblett. “FBI Demands for Internet Data 43 Rehnquist, “Civil Liberty in Wartime.” Faulted in 2nd Circuit.” New York Law Journal, 3 Nov. 2005, . 45 Yakus v. U.S. 32 U.S. 44 (944). 27 A.C.L.U. et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 32 F.Supp.2d 24, 38 46 U.S. v. Pelley, 32 F2d 70 (7th Cir. 942). (D.D.C. 2004). 47 Dunne v. U.S. 58 F2d 37 (8th Cir. 943). 28 A.C.L.U. 32 F.Supp.2d at 33. 48 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 56 (945). After the war ended, 29 Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, the Court overruled three earlier decisions holding that the 33 F.3d 98 (D.C.Cir. 2003). government could refuse to naturalize conscientious objectors. 30 Center for National Security Studies, 33 F.3d at 932-33. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 6 (946). More recently, in Associated Press v. U.S. Department of Defense, 49 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 8 (943). 2006 WL 3042 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4 2006), a federal district court ruled that the Defense Department was required to release 50 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 24 (944). In 988, the unredacted hearing records and documents containing the United States formally apologized and offered compensation to names of Guantanamo Bay detainees, but the court specifically ex-prisoners. However, the Court has never formally overruled recognized that the Defense Department’s objections were not the decision. based on national security concerns. 5 Ex Parte Quirin, 37 U.S.  (942). 3 See Michael Klarman. “Civil Liberties: How the Courts 52 See Taylor v. Mississippi, 39 US 624 (943) and Hartzel v. Will Respond.” History News Network 2 Dec. 200 . 53 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 US 8 (943) and 32 William H. Rehnquist. “Civil Liberty In Wartime: Baumgartner v. United States, 322 US 665 (944). Remarks of Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.” Director’s Forum, Woodrow Wilson International 54 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 39 U.S. Center for Scholars. 7 Nov. 999. 624, 638 (943). A price was paid: hundreds of Jehovah’s wit- nesses were beaten, tortured or killed during World War II. 33 Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (863). Lincoln com- See Stone, Geoffrey R. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime muted the sentence, and banished the former Congressman, from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism. New York: Clement Vallandigham, to the Confederacy—where he was W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2005. p. 279. not welcome because he still considered himself a loyal citizen of the Union. Stone, Geoffrey R. Perilous Times: Free Speech 55 Klarman. “Civil Liberties: How the Courts Will Respond.” in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism. 56 See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (967), Mitchell New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2005. p. 8. v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (967), and Massachusetts v. 34 The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (862). Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (970). 35 Ex Parte Milligan, 7 U.S. 2 (866). 57 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.  (972). 36 Geoffrey R. Stone. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 58 Parker v. Levy, 47 U.S. 733 (974). from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism. (New 59 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 63 (965) and Welsh v. York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2005). 26. United States 398 U.S. 333 (970). 37 Ex Parte Merryman 7 F.Cas. 44 (86). Lincoln ignored 60 Sanford Levinson. “What Is The Constitution’s Role In the ruling, and Congress passed a law ratifying his actions. Wartime? Why Free Speech And Other Rights Are Not As Safe 38 Arver v. U.S., 245 U.S. 366 (98). As You Might Think.” FindLaw’s Writ., 7 Oct. 200 . 39 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 35 (99).

Justice at Stake Campaign 21 6 George McEvoy. “Courts First To Go in Right-Wing 77 U.S. Senate. 09th Congress, st Session. S. 489, Consent Revolution.” Palm Beach Post, 27 Nov. 2004. Decree Fairness Act. GPO. ; U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 1229 (Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 968). 3. Consent Decree Fairness Act. GPO. . 64 Ibid., 24, 3. 78 Associated Press. “Judge Who Reversed His Decision in 65 Ibid., 3-33. Drug Case Withdraws.” The Boston Globe 8 May 996. 66 Ibid., 39-4. 79 Ibid. 67 “Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 80 Todd Gillman. “GOP Group Plans to Turn Up Scrutiny Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003” or “PROTECT on Federal Judges.” The Dallas Morning News, 27 July 2003. Act.” (P.L. 08-2), United States Statutes At Large. 7 Stat. 650; U.S. Senate. 08th Congress, st Session. S. 151, PROTECT 8 See, e.g. U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Act. GPO. . Rights. Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact. Hearing,  June 997. 05th Congress. st Session. 68 U.S. House. 08th Congress. 2nd Session. H.R. 2028, Washington: GPO 997. Pledge Protection Act of 2004. GPO. . American Prospect Online,  May 999 . 69 U.S. House. 08th Congress. 2nd Session. H.R. 3313, Marriage Protection Act of 2004. GPO. . 84 Susan Brinkmann. “Schiavo Clings to Life While Battle 70 “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Continues.” Catholic Standard & Times, 24 Mar. 2005. . (P.L. 09-3); U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 85 “DeLay: House Action Team to Hold Judges Accountable; 1268, see §02. Working Group Addresses Problem of Judicial Activism.” 7 Ibid. Website of U.S. House of Representatives Majority Leader Tom DeLay. 2003. Tom DeLay. 23 Jul. 2003. . Schiavo Case – Federal Intervention in Schiavo Case Prompts Broad Public Disapproval.” ABC News, 2 Mar. 2005 Conservatives Block Nominee, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits.” The Washington Post, 4 Sept. 997. A. 73 See, e.g. U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.J. Res. 39, Proposing An Amendment to the Constitution Relating to 87 Douglas A. Kelley. “Constitutional Crossfire: Federal Judge Marriage. GPO. . . 74 U.S. Senate. 09th Congress, st Session. S. 520, Constitution Restoration Act. GPO. ; U.S. House. 09th Congress, st Session. H.R. 1070, Constitution Restoration Act. GPO. . 75 Ibid. 76 U.S. House. 09th Congress. st Session. H.R. 3073, Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2005. GPO. .

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