Dr Victoria Graham Monash South Africa South African Association of Political Studies

No longer ‘proudly South African'? From ‘Rainbow Nation’ to ‘Dissatisfied Customers’: South Africa – 20 years on.

Paper prepared for the British Political Science Association Conference Sheffield, 30 March-1 April 2015

DRAFT

No longer ‘proudly South African'? From ‘Rainbow Nation’ to ‘Dissatisfied Customers’: South Africa – 20 years on.

In 1994, South Africa became a democracy and its population rejoiced in the promise of a better future, understanding that finally the majority’s political and socio-economic needs would be met by a legitimate ANC-led government. Certainly, after only 20 years, South Africa has made considerable progress in institutionalising and consolidating the quality of its democracy. However, several occurrences over the years including increasing incidents of corruption, Nkandla, a lack of efficient service delivery, Eskom’s apparent inability to function successfully, cronyism, the Gauteng e-tolling system, fraudulent academic degree scandals, and ‘robust’ parliamentary dynamics, have angered and frustrated the people and motivated increased protest action through conventional and unconventional channels. This paper explores the link between active citizenship, political participation and government responsiveness over the last two decades with a view to ascertaining how healthy South Africa’s democracy is and in order to answer the question: Should we still be proud to be South African?

1. INTRODUCTION

In April 1994 South Africa’s first non-racial multiparty election took place. It marked an official end to the country’s segregationist and authoritarian past and ushered in a new constitutional and participatory democracy, delivering not only the universal franchise but also formal equality before the law, avenues for citizen participation in governance and statutory institutions buttressing democracy (Muthien, Khosa and Magubane 2000). Moreover, a ‘proudly South African’ population rejoiced in the promise of a better future, understanding that finally the majority’s political and socio-economic needs would be met by a legitimate ANC-led government. Twenty years later, with its fifth democratic elections on the 7th May 2014, South Africa fully consolidated its status as a young democracy and through this demonstrated how much it has achieved in rebuilding the state in a more democratic way.

Yet, worrying problems are threatening this apparently successful democratic progress. Increasingly; corruption in public and corporate life, so-called political favouritism where government members are seen to be above the law; cronyism; intense xenophobic violence directed against immigrants and migrants; oft-bemoaned dysfunctional service delivery; the widening of the gap between black elites and poor blacks; the lack of real progress on land reform and redistribution; the Nkandla scandal, Eskom’s apparent inability to function successfully, the widespread hatred of the Gauteng e-tolling system, fraudulent academic degree scandals, and ‘robust’ parliamentary dynamics have fed increasing public dissatisfaction and have led to a growing perception that South Africa’s quality of democracy is wavering.1

This growing consternation is significant in two ways. Either it is a sign of members of the public exercising their right to question those that govern them and is therefore a healthy expression of active citizenship, or it is indicative of a population increasingly disillusioned and dissatisfied, in which case, it is concerning especially in terms of political legitimacy in South Africa.

Many agree that the opportunity for citizens to participate in the political process is essential for a healthy, participatory democracy; that democracies flourish when citizens are willing to vote, take part in public debate, elect representatives, join political parties and attempt to influence

1 This concern has been noted in scholarly contributions (see, for example, Butler, 2000: 189-205; Mattes, 2002: 22- 36; Friedman, 2004: 235; Cuthbertson, 2008: 293-304; Gumede, 2008: 262; Jeeves and Cuthbertson, 2008: 23; Kagwanja, 2008: xvi; Webb, 2009: 7; and Reddy, 2010: 185-206) and widely expressed in the print media.

political leaders (Schmitter, 2004: 54; Kekic, 2007: 2; Morlino, 2011: 249). Beetham, Byrne, Ngan and Weir (2002: 209) add that a vigorous civil society2 and active citizenship are necessary components of a strong democracy and help make governments work in a more democratic way. Moreover, participation ties in directly with the democratic dimensions of accountability and responsiveness, defined here as “the capacity of government to satisfy the governed by executing its policies in a way that corresponds to their demands” (Morlino, 2011: 208). It relates to the degree to which the public trust their leaders as well as how responsive they believe officials to be to their interests, for example, government’s response to service delivery demands3 (Schmitter, 2004: 54).

The importance of participation in South Africa’s democratic model is informed by decades of apartheid where the majority of the population was excluded from the formal avenues of political participation. The African National Congress (ANC) ensured that the value given to political participation in the new South Africa was emphasised in its 1994 policy document in which it declared:

Democracy for ordinary citizens must not end with formal rights and periodic one-person, one- vote elections. Without undermining the authority and responsibilities of elected representative bodies (Parliament, provincial legislatures, local government) the democratic order we envisage must foster a wide range of institutions of participatory democracy in partnership with civil society on the basis of informed and empowered citizens and facilitate direct democracy … social movements and CBOs are a major asset in the effort to democratise and develop our society… Deepening democracy in our society is not only about various governmental and non- governmental institutions. Effective democracy implies and requires empowered citizens. Formal rights must be given real substance (ANC, 1994: Internet).

Moreover, South Africa’s constitution, adopted in 1996, has been praised as one of the most liberal and comprehensive constitutions in the world for containing a wide array of socio- economic and political rights, including the right to protest peacefully.

After 20 years of democracy and in light of the abovementioned increase in public dissatisfaction, what needs investigation is how substantive this political participation really is. In other words, what is the quality of South Africa’s participatory democracy? Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to ascertaining how well countries are sustaining their democracies by assessing the quality of their democracy (see, for example, Altman and Perez- Linan 2002, 85-100; Morlino 2011). Questions of degree are asked as to the various strengths and weaknesses that exist with the goal of determining how democracies can be improved and deepened (Beetham 2004; Beetham, Carvalho, Landman and Weir 2008). That is, to what degree are state democratic procedures experienced and the essential democratic principles realised? (Baker 1999, 273-274). For example, to what degree is the government committed to democratic values or to what extent do people participate in the politics of the state? This element of ‘degree’ helps to capture the overall quality of democracy within a state.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the degree of political participation in South Africa as well as government’s responsiveness to the people.

2 While the media are an important part of civil society in South Africa, they will not form part of the discussion in this present paper, which confines itself instead to an exploration of other avenues of citizen participation. 3 Eulau and Karps (1977: 233-254) reveal the manifestation of responsiveness through four major components: Policies at the heart of public interest; guaranteed services; the distribution of material goods to constituents; and “the extension of symbolic goods that create, reinforce, or reproduce a sense of loyalty and support towards the government”.

2. THE QUALITY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS

Understanding that the full extent of public participation cannot ever be known; this paper examines the extent to which the opportunities for conventional participation are developed (including, in the event of non-conventional participation, the degree of government suppression) and the extent to which the government is perceived as being effective in serving and responding to the public. The criteria for assessment are derived from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s State of Democracy (SoD) Framework (International IDEA 2010)4 and Leonardo Morlino’s Tool for Empirical Research on Democratic Qualities (Morlino 2011)5. In pursuit of the first consideration the following elements are examined: opportunities for conventional participation at all levels of government and non- conventional forms of political participation. With regard to the second consideration, the aspect examined is government responsiveness and its impact on perceived legitimacy.

2.1 POWER TO THE PEOPLE! CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Morlino (2011: 202) defines political participation as “the entire set of behaviours, be they conventional or unconventional, legal or borderline vis-à-vis legality, that allows women and men, as individuals or groups to create, revive or strengthen group identification or try to influence the recruitment of, and decisions by, political authorities (the representative and/or governmental ones) in order to maintain or change the allocation of existing values”.

Given this definition, and as noted above, the assessment of political participation below will be split into two indicators: opportunities for more conventional participation and the extent to which these are taken up (examples include: electoral participation; membership inside political organisations and interest associations; and attendance of public forums) and non-conventional forms of participation (such as legal and illegal protests, striking, demonstrations, riots and boycotts).

2.1.1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONVENTIONAL PARTICIPATION AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

One of the primary expressions of public political participation in democratic South Africa has been electoral participation (Booysen, 2009: 10). Registration numbers over the years have increased for each consecutive election with a total of over 25 million for the 2014 election (see Table 1). However, despite the fact that South Africa’s voting age population (VAP) has grown by approximately seven million people since 1994; the number of actual registered voters has declined. Therefore, while 73.5% of all eligible voters who were registered in 2014 cast their vote at the polls (a favourable turnout in international terms), this also meant that 7 million potential voters (of the VAP) remained unregistered.

4 IDEA’s SoD consists of four, core democracy dimensions: 1.) Citizenship, law and rights; 2.) Representative and accountable government; 3.) Civil society and popular participation; and 4.) Democracy beyond the state. Elements of the third dimension are utilised in this paper. 5 Morlino’s TODEM consists of eight democratic qualities: 1) Rule of law; 2) Electoral accountability; 3) Inter- institutional accountability; 4) Political participation; 5) Political competition; 6) Freedom; 7) Solidarity/Equality; 8) Responsiveness, of which this paper draws from features four and eight.

Table 1: Republic of South Africa General Election Results, 1994–2014

Election year 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 Registered No voters’ 18,172,751 20,674,926 23,181,997 25,388,082 voters roll Voter turnout 19,726,610 16,228,462 15,863,558 17,919,966 18,654,771 (86.7%) (89.3%) (76.7%) (77.3%) (73.5%) Valid votes cast 19,533,498 15,977,142 15,612,671 17,680,729 18,402,497

Information obtained from the IEC (2014) website and compiled by the author.

Voter turnout (the percentages of the registered VAP that turned out to vote in elections)6 for national and provincial elections has been quite high (see Table 1) with 86.7% in 1994, 89% in 1999, 76.7% in 2004, 77% in 2009 and a slightly lower 73.5% in 2014. Despite not reaching the 1994 numbers in each election since, these numbers are nevertheless very good, especially when compared to the more established democracies of the USA and those in Western Europe (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001: 31; International IDEA, 2011: Internet). Conversely, voter turnout in local government elections has been traditionally quite poor; although lower rates of participation in local government elections is a global phenomenon. In any event, voter turnout increased considerably in the 2011 (57.6%) local elections from 48.5% in 2000 and 48.4% in 2006 (Stolley and Marrian 2011).

Table 2: Top five parties and corresponding percentage of the vote, 1994–2014

1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 (1) ANC 62.6% (1) ANC 66.4% (1) ANC 69.7% (1) ANC 65.9% (1) ANC 62.1% (2) NP 20.4% (2) DP 9.6% (2) DA 12.4% (2) DA 16.7% (2) DA 22.2% (3) IFP 10.5% (3) IFP 8.6% (3) IFP 7.0% (3) COPE 7.4% (3) EFF 6.4% (4) FF 2.2% (4) NNP 6.9% (4) UDM 2.3% (4) IFP 4.5% (4) IFP 2.4% (5) DP 1.7% (5) UDM 3.4% (5) ID 1.7% (5) ID 0.9% (5) NFP 1.6% Information obtained from the IEC (2014) website and compiled by the author.

The outcome of the 2014 election was of particular interest to the country given increasing public dissatisfaction expressed through the rising service delivery protest action, persistent unemployment and spreading corruption in the public service. For example, in late 2013 protesting residents of the Bekkersdal district in Gauteng declared they would not vote for the ANC in the coming elections due to its failure to provide jobs, services, and for alleged cases of corruption, prompting a response from the provincial premier, Nomvula Mokonyane, that “People can threaten us and say they won’t vote but the ANC doesn’t need their dirty votes” (Daily Maverick, 30 October 2013: Internet). A representative of the Bekkersdal Concerned Residents Association soon retorted: If the ANC does not need our dirty votes anymore, it is fine. We will take them to other political parties that will wash them and once they are clean utilise them effectively, taking care of the voters, unlike the ANC.”

6 Voter turnout refers to the percentages of the registered VAP that turned out to vote in elections. According to Schulz-Herzenberg (2009: Internet) voter turnout speaks volumes about the quality of participatory democracy, particularly as:

high turnout is generally considered to be a display of legitimacy for the country’s political system. Conversely, low turnout is often attributed to disenchantment, or political apathy. However, it may also be a sign of indifference or even contentment with government. Whatever the reasons, turnout remains crucial to the representation of parties after an election and can even shape the political system (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009: Internet).

The Nkandla scandal and the resultant repeated booing that followed Zuma on his campaign trail are further indicators of the ANC’s loss of grandeur. The Nkandla scandal concerning the R246 million upgrade of President Zuma’s Nkandla home (from which the Public Protector found that Zuma and his family benefited unduly and recommended he pay back a portion, particularly because he approved all the upgrades personally), became a pivotal election campaign issue7 (Mail & Guardian Online, 4 April 2014: Internet). Despite these criticisms, or because of them, the ANC won the 2014 elections but did lose some of its support base to the ascendant opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) and the increasingly significant Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). This and other similar examples also demonstrate more troubling occurrences of growing apathy and a loss of faith in parliamentary politics that have concerning implications for participation and political legitimacy in South Africa’s young democracy.

Outside of participation by ballot, various pieces of legislation and policy frameworks also exist to facilitate other ways of participating in political life. Sections 59 and 72 of the Constitution not only guarantee the right to participate but provide that the National Assembly and National Council of Provinces actively take steps to facilitate this involvement.8 Besides constitutional guarantees, key legislation and policy over the years have provided both an opportunity to, as well as encouraged, participation. The Batho Pele (people first) Principles9 (contained in the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery) were introduced in 1997 to transform the Public Service. Of these, the Principle of Consultation builds on the constitutional requirement of public participation by emphasising the need for citizens to be consulted about the level and quality of public services they receive and, wherever possible, should be given a choice about the services that are offered (Public Service Commission, 2008: 14).

In addition, section 16 of the Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 prescribes the development of a culture of community participation where formal representative government acts in combination with a system of participatory governance. For this purpose municipalities must: encourage, and create conditions for the local community to participate in, inter alia, the affairs of the municipality, including in its integrated development plan; the performance management system; the budget; and strategic decisions relating to services (section 16, Municipal Systems Act).

Over the years various government strategies and mechanisms to strengthen public participation and facilitate dialogue between citizens and their representatives have been initiated. These have included the following: Public hearings and public awareness workshops10, EXCO Meets the People11, ward committees12, community development workers (CDWs)13, Izimbizo14, Integrated Development Planning (IDP)15, and Citizen Satisfaction Surveys16.

7 The ANC claimed it was a media and middle-class "preoccupation" and that Zuma's integrity or fitness for office were not in question, whilst the opposition declared the opposite. 8 Section 59(1) states that the “National Assembly must (a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its committees” and “conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings, and those of its committees, in public”. Section 118 makes similar requirements for the provinces. Local government is also instructed to “encourage the involvement of community organisation in the matters of local government” (section 152 of the Constitution). 9 The eight principles are: consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money (Department of Public Service and Administration, 2011: Internet). 10 Different types of public hearings and public awareness workshops are organised by different organs of the state, including the National Council of Provinces to engage with the general public on issues about which legislation is currently subject to debate, in the first instance, and to inform members of the public about proposed bills and how they can make inputs and submissions in the second. In early 2012, for example, the National Council of Provinces’ ad hoc Committee charged with scrutinising the Protection of Information Bill, held public hearings in all nine provinces to ensure that “everybody from the youth to the religious sector and the media” in rural and urban areas would have an opportunity to comment on it (Raseriti Tau, Chairman of the Committee, quoted in Mail & Guardian Online, 17 January 2012). 11 The ‘EXCO Meets the People’ programme is undertaken by the Premier and Members of the Executive Council to meet with communities to discuss government policy and service delivery issues. Some provinces, such as the

In practice, however, criticism has been levelled at public consultation for being haphazard and not meaningful. Advertising for public hearings. For example, appear only in print (‘Have Your Say’) and electronically which would seem to indicate that this form of participation is catered only towards the elite of society (Buccus Hemson, Hicks and Piper, 2008: 304). Even then, such advertisements inviting comments and/or participation in public hearings on certain bills, appear to be selective and are inconsistent, a point Parliament itself draws attention to on its website: “from time to time, certain committee hearings are advertised in newspapers” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2012: Internet). Moreover, there is no coordinated effort to publicise this information on a consistent basis and the Public Participation Units of Parliament (and the respective provincial legislatures) lack sufficient and well-trained staff to function optimally in this regard (Scott, 2009: 73). There have also been instances where insufficient time has been allocated to allow organisations and the general public to comment on proposed legislation (AMB, 2010: 23). Ward committees have also not fulfilled their expectations. According to a 2009 report by the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, there are claims that ward councillors do not attend ward committee meetings and that ward committee issues often are not raised in council meetings. National and provincial government are not blameless in this area. Findings of the above-mentioned report indicate that, in practice, provincial and national departments “hardly ever consult or involve ward councillors in plans and projects” thus minimising the function of ward committees to serve as a link between the ward and the rest of government (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009: 15).

Izimbizo have been a preferred route of government over the years, although they have been criticised for resembling ‘political rallies’; ‘party events’ and fanfare occasions in which food, free t-shirts and entertainment entice participants rather than forums for real interest articulation (Pretorius, 2006: 754; Buccus Hemson, Hicks and Piper, 2007: 20; Booysen, 2009: 14). A 2008 public participation survey and a 2010 citizen satisfaction survey found general

Northern Cape, have used this programme effectively by interacting directly with community members, and engaging commercial and emerging farmers and school governing bodies (Premier of the Northern Cape Province, Hazel Jenkins, 2011: Internet). 12 The Municipal Structures Act No. 117 of 1998, established ward committees which comprise members of the community representing the needs of the people in areas where they live. Section 72(3) of the Act prescribes that the purpose of ward committees “is to enhance participatory democracy in local government”. Ward committees are intended to afford community members an opportunity to have their needs and opinions on matters directly affecting them heard at municipal level by ward councillors (DPLG, 2005: 20). 13 CDWs are community-based people who help fellow community members to obtain information and resources from government departments (Public Service Commission, 2008: 15). The aim of CDWs is to facilitate community participation in government initiatives. Expectations that the CDW initiative would bridge communication gaps have fallen short in several ways over the years due mainly to confusion over the precise role played by CDWs and their relationship to local role-players (Buccus et al., 2008: 304). Nevertheless, even with these problems the perceptions of government officials and ward councillors on the role of CDWs are quite positive. This is especially the case with regard to helping community members to access services; communicate needs and aspirations; and facilitate more effective participation in local governance (Public Service Commission, 2010: 43). 14 Izimbizo refer to the public meetings that a range of government leaders from the President, the Deputy President and members of the cabinet to mayors and councillors accompanied by senior government officials, hold to engage with communities on issues of government policies and service delivery. 15 IDP is an approach to planning in local communities to overcome the poor planning that occurred during apartheid and which left many communities backward especially regarding access to services. IDP is intended to facilitate involvement by the entire municipality and its citizens in finding the best solutions to achieve good long-term development (Local Government in South Africa, 2011: Internet). To bring this about and to monitor the implementation of plans, IDP forums are supposed to be established with participants drawn from council executive committee members, councillors, traditional leaders, ward committee representatives, heads of departments, senior officials from municipal and government departments, representatives from organised stakeholder groups, activists and community representatives (Local Government in South Africa, 2011: Internet). IDP has been criticised for underperforming in terms of it participation mandate with “the development of top-down autocratic processes eclipsing the attention on mechanisms for bottom-up grassroots participation” (Booysen, 2009: 13). 16 Citizen Satisfaction Surveys are undertaken by the Public Service Commission as a way to engage with citizens and obtain feedback on the quality and adequacy of public services.

citizen satisfaction at national and provincial levels of government service, but neither of these included an assessment of citizens’ satisfaction of participatory processes at local government level (APRM Monitoring Project, 2011: 50). Moreover, increasing boycotts and riots at local level suggest a lack of satisfaction with local government’s performance (see also discussion below). The number of calls received by the Presidential Hotline (see below) would also appear to indicate a degree of unhappiness over government performance.

Additional participatory strategies have included: various public information programmes including websites, newsletters and other publications and school visits; the deployment of MPs to constituencies; calls for oral and written submissions from the public on legislation; the establishment of Parliamentary Democracy Offices; and public events such as the ‘Taking Parliament to the People’ programme and Youth Parliaments (AfriMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2006: 13-14; Selebalo, 2011: Internet).

Petitions are another form of participatory action that citizens can and do undertake regularly.17 Sections 56(d) and 69(d) of the Constitution provide for the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces to “receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions”. However, the presentation of petitions is governed by the rules of Parliament and therefore certain procedures have to be adhered to when individuals and/or groups petition Parliament (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2012: Internet). Petitions can take the form of either a request for assistance with a specific issue or for the redress of a grievance and range from local to nationwide petitions such as the Right2Know’s18 petition to stop the passage of the so-called ‘secrecy’ Bill (the Protection of State Information Bill) in 2012 as well the Film and Publications Board (FPB)’s proposals to censor the Internet in South Africa through the draft online regulation policy in 201519 (Right2Know, 2015: Internet).

Moreover, a toll-free Presidential Hotline, established by President Zuma in September 2009, is intended to give people “easier access to the Presidency and to promote citizen care and a government that is responsive, interactive and effective” (quoted in City Press, 14 September 2010: Internet). Between 2009 and 2013 more than 180 000 cases had been logged with the resolution rate increasing from 39%, when the hotline was established, to 94% in 2013. In 2014, then Presidential spokesperson, Mac Maharaj noted that the hotline did not only want to achieve high resolution rates, but also strived to “provide a good quality service to citizens” (Maharaj, quoted in News24, 3 February 2014: Internet). Of 11 000 citizens surveyed, on average 65% rated the hotline service ‘good-to-fair’ suggesting that the government is achieving its goal in this area.

Reports indicate that public participation processes mandated by the government have reinforced awareness of participation as a governance imperative (APRM Monitoring Project, 2011: 50). However, despite the significant number of initiatives referred to above, the effectiveness of many of these processes has been questioned. An assessment of Parliament in 2008, for example, noted that “[i]n recent years Parliament and Provincial Legislatures have been reprimanded by the courts and the press for not adequately allowing for public participation in legislative processes”. A lack of feedback on public submissions to Parliament was emphasised as was the insufficient information on the parliamentary website (Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament, 2009: 55; 65-66). Moreover, political tensions and acrimonious relationships have often underscored IDP, ward committees and CDWs,

17 As of June 2012, there were over 240 active petitions in South Africa (GoPetition, 2012: Internet). 18 The Right2Know Campaign is an umbrella group of organizations and activists campaigning to advance the free flow of information in South Africa. 19 The draft policy would allow the FPB broadly defined powers to police everything published on the Internet – including blogs, personal websites and Facebook pages (Right2Know, 2015: Internet).

undermining service delivery and suppressing the potential value these structures have for effective participation (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009; APRM Monitoring Project, 2011: 50).

Among the most serious of problems however, are the socio-economic problems experienced by disadvantaged communities, including time constraints and limited access to the media, a lack of education and a lack of understanding of how politics and government in particular work, all of which act as deterrents to participation in decision-making processes. The 2006, 2008 and 2011 Afrobarometer surveys found that more than half the respondents were interested in public affairs and discussed politics with friends and family frequently (see Table 3). However, it was also evident that 65% of respondents felt that politics and government seemed “too complicated” (Afrobarometer, 2011: 14). In addition, at local government level, 75% either did not know the name of their elected local government councillor or guessed incorrectly (Afrobarometer, 2006: 22), which as Lefko-Everett (2010: 160) contends is a particular cause for concern given that local officials “should represent a direct point of contact between citizens and government”.

Table 3: Political citizenship

2006 2008 2011 % % % How interested would you say you are in 61 56 57 public affairs? ( “somewhat/very interested”) When you get together with your friends 65 69 71 or family, would you say you discuss political matters ( frequently/occasionally) Afrobarometer survey results: 2006; 2008; 2011

An apparent lack of education on political matters does not however seem to dampen the desire among citizens to be active. Almost 75% of respondents in the 2006 survey and 59% of those in 2008 agreed that ‘citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of their leaders’. However, this desire has not necessarily translated into action. According to Afrobarometer results from 2004; 2006; 2008 and 2011, while over half of respondents have attended a community meeting in the past, an average of only 42% have ‘got together with others to raise an issue’ and an average of only 19% have participated in a protest or march.20 Moreover, less than a quarter has contacted a local government councillor to give them their view on an issue; although this is considerably higher than the average 7% of people who have contacted a representative to the National Assembly or a government official (see Table 4).

20 Paul Graham, Executive Director of IDASA, warns that the de facto figure is likely to be much higher and that a ‘social desirability effect’ may have taken hold where respondents may not have necessarily admitted to an interviewer that they would engage in protest action due to wanting to be seen as socially responsible (Graham, seminar: 2012).

Table 4: Participation in political life

For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year (‘Yes’ response). 2004 2006 2008 2011 % % % % Attended a community meeting 51 60 51 58 Got together with others to raise 39 45 39 43 an issue Attended a demonstration or 23 24 19 10 protest march During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your view? (‘once or more than once’) 2004 2006 2008 2011 % % % % A local government councillor 17 23 27 26 A representative to the National 6 5 12 5 Assembly An official of a government 6 6 13 7 ministry/agency? A political party official 15 12 A religious leader 32 25 A traditional ruler 9 16 13 Some other influential person 11 12 13 Afrobarometer survey results: 2004; 2006; 2008; 2011

As noted above, the low levels of contact between people and their local councillor is very concerning especially as local government is the sphere of government perceived as ‘closest to the people’ and therefore potentially more capable of facilitating participation. However, local government has been and continues to be plagued by problems. A 2009 government report found that “a culture of patronage and nepotism is now so widespread in many municipalities that the formal municipal accountability system is ineffective and inaccessible to many citizens” (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009: 11). Similar results were found in an independent report published in 2010, as well as the disturbing fact that many councillors:

… lacked basic core skills to enable them to perform their functions effectively. These included basic literacy and numeracy. They were therefore unable to read Council documents, policies and plans in preparation for Council meetings and some were even forced to rely on municipal administrators to assist them, in so doing compromising their ability to exercise effective oversight (Paradza, Mokwena and Richards, 2010: 91).

This poor performance is reflected in the widespread public dissatisfaction with many local municipalities. For example, in 2006 the then Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, reported to Parliament that there had been 5 085 protests against local government nationwide over issues such as poor service delivery that year (Buccus et al., 2007: 4). See further discussion on this below. Dissatisfaction may also be as a result of a general belief that citizens cannot have an impact on collective decision-making. Only 51% of respondents in a 2008 Afrobarometer survey thought they could make their elected local councillors listen to their concerns ‘about a matter of importance to the community’ (Afrobarometer, 2008: 14). This figure dropped even further in the 2011 Afrobarometer survey when only 21% of respondents thought that they could make their ‘local government councillors listen’ (Afrobarometer, 2011: 59).

A lack of confidence or trust21 in local government ability is also apparent. Results of the 2008 Afrobarometer survey revealed that less than a third believed that their local council did well in terms of: making the council’s programme of work known to ordinary people (32%); providing citizens with information about the council’s budget (26%); allowing citizens to participate in the council’s decisions (27%); consulting others (including traditional, civic and community leaders) before making decisions (27%); providing effective ways to handle complaints about local councillors or officials (26%) and guaranteeing that local government revenues are used for public services and not for private gain (27%). In addition, more people had discussed a problem with how local government is run in their community with other members of the community then had actually made a complaint to local government officials, for example, by going in person or by writing a letter – a trend that continued in the 2011 survey  see Table 5.

Table 5: Quality of local government

When there are problems with how local government is run in your 2008 2011 community, how often, if at all, did you do any of the following? (‘once % % or more than once’) Discuss the problem with other people in your community 34 37 Join with others in your community to address the problem 28 31 Discuss the problems with other community, religious, or traditional 24 20 leaders? Write a letter to a newspaper or call a radio show 11 7 Make a complaint to local government officials, for example, by going in 15 12 person or by writing a letter Make a complaint to other government officials, for example, by going in 14 10 person or by writing a letter Afrobarometer, 2008; 2011

These results may be poor, but the report by Paradza et al. (referred to above) found that residents did appear to have more trust in the ability of local government to address their needs where there was an effectively functioning public participation system in place. In an environment where residents were able to express their needs and then have these needs and concerns heard and acted upon by the municipal administration, residents felt satisfied and were less inclined to be frustrated with existing service delivery shortcomings (Paradza et al., 2010: 90).

2.1.1.1. THE RANGE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, GROUPS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT

Strong political engagement (both organised and not organised) has been a tradition in South Africa for many decades and shows no sign of diminishing. If anything, the past 20 years of democracy have shown that South African civil society is becoming more vibrant and more extensive.

Several legal, political and financial mechanisms or structures have been put in place to facilitate and sustain civil society, including the Non-Profit Organisations Act No. 71 of 1997, which formally recognised civil society; established a system of voluntary registration for its constituents and “provided benefits and allowances in exchange for NGOs and community based organisations undertaking proper accounting and providing audited statements to government” (Habib, 2005: 678). The Constitution also provides for the establishment of a Directorate for Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), which was situated in the then Department of Social Welfare

21 Political theorists identify trust as a crucial element and indicator of democratic political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993).

(now the Department of Social Development) to manage the abovementioned processes. In terms of financial support, the previously existing 1978 Fundraising Act which limited the capacity of NGOs to raise funds was repealed. Instead, the National Development Agency, the Lottery Commission and other institutions were established with a mandate to fund legitimate non-profit activity. Moreover, tax regulations were reformed to grant registered civil society organisation’s tax-exemption status, and to encourage philanthropy (Habib, 2005: 678).

During apartheid, the relationship between civil society and the state was adversarial and therefore, since democratisation, a new balance has been sought between supporting the new government while maintaining sufficient independence from it. Independence is especially important, as Jagwanth (2003: 13) notes, because a “strong democracy also needs a vibrant civil society to act independently of and as a watchdog over government – especially in relation to delivery of constitutional goals”.

In response to this challenge, over the years three distinct categories of civil society have emerged. The first comprises the informal community based organisations (CBOs), also known as survivalist organisations, which are based largely in marginalised communities. 22 Traditionally, these organisations have had no relationship with the state and are focused solely on assisting people to survive in the face of socio-economic adversity, hence the name (Habib, 2005: 682-683). However, according to Friedman (2010: 125), it is becoming more common for these organisations to be more active at grassroots level through the mobilisation of the masses in a clear challenge to government policies.

The second bloc consists of more formal CBOs which have been described by some as social movements (Desai, 2002). The mandate of these groups is mostly to actively challenge the adverse effects of economic policy implemented by the state. Examples include: the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee which organises against electricity cut-offs in Soweto and the Concerned Citizens Group which mobilises around rates evictions and water terminations in Chatsworth and surrounding townships in Durban. However, social movements have also been known to engage with the state, such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) which has displayed adversarial relations with the state on one issue and more collegiate relations on another (Habib, 2005: 685). This category of CBO is distinguishable from survivalist organisations in that its constituents are more ‘political animals’ – established with the explicit political aim of organising and mobilising the poor and marginalised.

The last category comprises more formal service related NGOs, which, either partnered with the state and/or sub-contracted to the state, have collegiate rather than adversarial relationships with the state (Habib, 2005: 685).

According to the Department of Social Development’s 2012/2013 State of South African NPO Register, there were 102 297 registered organisations23 in South Africa in 2013 (Department of Social Development, 2013: 3). NGOs are not entirely independent in that the NPO Act requires organisations registered with the NPO Directorate to submit annual accounts and narrative report to it. Failure to do so results in deregistration. Section 21 companies are required to submit accounts and reports to the Companies Registrar and Public Benefit Organisations are

22 As of 2002 data, these associations comprised 53% of the existing NPOs at the time (Swilling and Russel, 2002). 23 NGOs can register as voluntary associations (constitute 95% of organisations registered under the NPO Act); Section 21 companies (in terms of the Registered under the Companies Act (1973) or trusts. These three types of organisations can then also register as a NPO, in terms of the aforementioned 1997 NPO Act, with the NPO Directorate. The Register of NPOs is a voluntary registration facility that enhances the credibility of the registered NPO as it reports to a public office in the form of the NPO Directorate. The NPO holds information about registered NPOs for the public to access (Department of Social Development, 2011: Internet).

required to submit accounts and reports to the revenue department for tax exemption purposes (NGO Regulation Network, 2011: Internet).

No specific government policy exists to address its relationship with NGOs; however, the Impact Assessment of the NPO Act, published in January 2005 by the Department of Social Development, gives a good overall assessment of the legal framework. As a result of recommendations in this assessment, a technical committee was appointed in 2009 to, in consultation with the NGO sector, develop a new NPO law (NGO Regulation Network, 2011: Internet).

World Value Survey data of the proportion of people who were members of voluntary associations in South Africa between 1995 and 2006 indicates that South Africa compares well with other middle/emerging income countries, such as Chile and Poland. If the strength of civil society is measured by belonging to some voluntary organisation then South Africa is doing well, and from these results seems to “exhibit a strong sense of belonging” (The Presidency, 2010a: 52).

Trade unions are an important force in South Africa, with 3.1 million members representing 25% of the formal work force. As of March 2015, there were 181 registered trade unions in South Africa (Department of Labour, 2015: Internet). COSATU is the largest with a membership of 2.2 million grouped into 20 affiliated trade unions; as part of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist Party, COSATU is politically close to the government. The second largest trade union is the Federation of Unions of South Africa, with 560 000 members, followed by the National Council of Trade Unions, with almost 400 000 members.

COSATU is closely aligned to the ANC and, as such, senior COSATU leaders have been drafted into ANC and government structures. However, this political affiliation has not deterred COSATU from challenging the government, an indication that South Africa’s democracy has matured. For example, in September 2010 over one million public sector employees went on a strike that lasted over three weeks and only ended after a direct intervention by President Zuma who promised significant salary increases that exceeded initial budgetary allocations (Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI., 2012: 16). In another example, COSATU played a prominent role in mobilising action against government plans to introduce a tolling system in Gauteng and regarding the government’s stance on labour brokers. In March 2012, for example, protests took place in 32 areas across South Africa with numbers of participants protesting against the e-tolls and labour brokers estimated at between 30 000 and 100 000 (South Africa Survey 2012, 2012: 840). COSATU also launched the non-profit organisation Corruption Watch in 2012 in an effort to fight the increasing corruption in South Africa by recording reports of petty and serious corruption and making the information public (Business Day, 2012: Internet).

2.1.2. NON-CONVENTIONAL FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

Everyone has the constitutionally protected right to, peacefully and unarmed, assemble, demonstrate and picket (section 17 of the Bill of Rights - the second chapter of the Constitution). South Africans have certainly not been afraid to exercise this right – however, the substantial rise in protests, occurring outside of formal or government provided channels, has increasingly descended into violent, acrimonious and destructive behaviour. The question arises as to what degree of suppression of such non-conventional participation, if any, is undertaken by the authorities?

Since 2004 the number of violent protests has increased with the majority of incidents occurring between 2009 and May 2012 (see Figure 1), although a new record was set in 2014

with 176 protests. That 2014 was an election year could reasonably be said to account for this rise as potential voters made the most of politicians canvassing on the campaign trail.

Figure 1: Major service delivery protests against local government, by year (2004– 2014).

200 173 176 155 150 107 111 100 82

50 34 32 27 10 2 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: Municipal IQ Municipal Hotspots Monitor. 2014. Available at: http://www.municipaliq.co.za/index.php?site_page=press.php

The majority of the unhappiness which has fanned the flame of protest has its roots, apparently, in inefficient public service delivery with grievances usually emerging in response to the rising cost of living and over issues with regard to previously state-provided services such as water and electricity. Even the President has expressed dissatisfaction stating:

I have seen the coalface of service delivery. The report from officials sometimes may not give the same feeling that you get when you come into contact with the real conditions people live in. I can now understand why some communities protest. A lot has been done to deliver services, but clearly there are serious challenges and backlogs (President Zuma, quoted in News24, 14 May 2011).

Since 1994, significant improvements have taken place in terms of equal access to and quality of service delivery for all. However, problems with the quality and continued implementation of these services result in continued public dissatisfaction.

It is evident that many areas still lack access to basic services resulting in protest action. For example, in June 2012, residents of the informal settlement of Zandspruit, Johannesburg, protested against a lack of service delivery by burning tyres and throwing stones (Eye Witness News, 13 June 2012: Internet). In another example, again in June 2012, five protests broke out in one weekend in the informal settlement of Siyahlala in Cape Town with residents demanding that electricity be installed in their shacks (Business Day, 6 June 2012). However, the argument exists that a distinction should be drawn between access to services in general which have improved dramatically and the increased aspirations and expectations of people as a result of improved access.

Other reasons behind increasing protests have their roots in dissatisfaction over the quality of the services provided in terms of maintenance, that is, lack of repairs, problems with billing, power and water outages and other issues (Atkinson, 2007: 58); as well as corruption and a lack of accountability by local councillors (Alexander, 2010: 37). Still more reasons include accumulated frustrations around governance; and being ignored or lied to by local officials. It has been suggested that the majority of the so-called service delivery protests are metaphors for citizens “looking for a voice”; that is “efforts of the people to find voice, to find space (for

articulation) and to find choice … it’s a way for them to access their citizenship again and again …” (Zondi, interview: 2012). This is in view of the fact that many of the protestors are trying the formal channels of participation but are not succeeding. Booysen (2009: 22) refers to this incomplete policy realisation as the ‘black hole of public participation’ in South Africa, which has led to many communities reclaiming the right to participate by exploring the only remaining option available to them: the less-conventional avenue of protest action. As such, protest “is now the primary form of political expression for many poor communities in South Africa” (Cronje, quoted in The Citizen, 18 April 2011).

A 2010 TNS Survey found that only 41% of people were satisfied with the service delivery they received from their local authority or municipality compared to the 51% who were not satisfied (TNS Research Surveys, 2011: Internet). Moreover, amongst those in squatter camps and informal settlements, the unhappiness level rose to 77% in November 2010 from 65% in February 2010, prompting commentators and political analysts to refer to the protest environment as “a powder keg” and warning that South Africa “could face Tunisia-style uprisings a decade from now because of widespread poverty” (political analyst, Moeletsi Mbeki, quoted in Business Day, 6 July 2011). When asked if they were happy with the delivery of basic services by the government, the figures over the years are telling with a large decline from 77% in 2004 to 51% in 2012 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Public opinion on delivery of basic services, 2004-2012.

100% 77% 80% 73% 72% 62% 58% 57% 60% 54% 51% 51%

40%

20%

0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: The Presidency, Development Indicators 2012, August 2013.

It must be noted that while the majority of protests over the years have occurred over service delivery issues, protest action is not limited to this type of concern. Other areas of protest, for example, have centred on corruption (particularly at local level); unequal access to land; unemployment; police brutality; increases in transport prices; crime and students dissatisfied with fees and student accommodation. Unhappiness over salaries and working conditions has also prompted protest action, as was the case when 3000 soldiers from the South African National Defence Force took part in an illegal protest in front of the Union buildings in Pretoria in August 2009 (Mail & Guardian Online, 26 August 2009: Internet).

Most notable protest campaigns that have had national impact, irrespective of success or failure in prompting change in government policy, include the following:  At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), 25 000 people from social movements and international organisations, under the banner of the Social Movements Indaba, marched from the township of Alexandra to the Summit convention centre in Sandton in defiance of the neo-liberal hijacking of sustainable development through the WSSD (Greenberg, 2004: 18; Death, 2010: 559);  The TAC has been predominantly successful in its struggle for antiretroviral treatment to be made available to people living with HIV/AIDS;

 The Poor People’s Alliance, a popular nationwide protest/social movement launched a ‘No Land! No House! No Vote! Campaign’ in 2004 advocating the boycotting of elections in the fight for secure tenure;  The aforementioned Right2Know Campaign is a nationwide NGO-led campaign in defence of media freedom, most notably its fight to have the Protection of State Information Bill scrapped. Following the adoption of the revised Bill by the National Assembly in November 2013 Right2Know announced its intention to take the would-be Act to the Constitutional Court should the President sign it into law; and  The civil society coalition, Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (Outa) launched a protest campaign in 2012 against the implementation of a controversial new e-tolling system on Gauteng highways. Despite these protests, the e-tolls became active towards the end of 2013 although Outa’s continued pressure has resulted in a review of the tolling system. Since the roll out, a widespread civil disobedience campaign has taken place with many refusing to pay e-tolls - actions that the review panel regard as unjustified and “set[ing] unsustainable precedents and threaten[ing] democracy and social cohesion” even whilst acknowledging “the underlying sentiments of the campaign, including the anger and frustration about perceived and real lack of consultation, the complexity of the system, billing problems, conflicting information and pressure on household incomes” (Independent Online, 19 January 2015: Internet).

Government has responded as most governments worldwide do to illegal protest activities; by banning and in some cases forcibly removing protestors from demonstration sites. Over the years social movements such as the aforementioned Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, Landless Peoples Movement, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction campaign, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Abahlali Basemjondlo (a Durban shack dwellers’ movement) have had marches banned (see Desai, 2002; Bond, 2004: 21; Lier and Stokke, 2006). A concern is that the government has painted critical mobilisation against its policies as anti-democratic. Those who do mobilise are dispossessed, in the government’s analysis, of any free will and have been described as being under the spell of a ‘foreigner’ (Greenstein, 2003: 31) or a ‘third force’ “outside the bounds of democracy” (Chance, 2006: 7). This kind of reaction by government used does not inspire confidence that mobilisation which seeks to articulate interests and engage government critically is encouraged.

Protestors in general are often faced with forceful repression through the use of baton charges, rubber bullets, tear-gassings, and arrests. For example, police fired rubber bullets at protestors who had pelted them with stones in Thembelihle, Johannesburg in September 2011 (Saturday Star, 10 September 2011); in March 2012, police arrested 50 protestors for engaging in public violence during service delivery protests in Ratanda, Heidelberg; and in Plettenburg Bay (Western Cape) protests, police used tear gas to disperse the crowds (City Press, 25 March 2012). One of the most prominent examples of excessive police force occurred when police shot and killed unarmed protestor Andries Tatane in April 2011 prompting an international outcry. This incident, in particular, highlighted the trend in recent years for police to use excessive force, notably rubber bullets, to disperse protestors. As a result, from late December 2011 police were no longer allowed to use rubber bullets against protestors. Lieutenant General Elias Mawela from the police’s reaction unit asserted that the goal would be to defuse conflict “with minimum force”, therefore, “negotiation [would] remain the first option, then pyrotechnics, water cannons or tear gas” (quoted in Beeld, 14 January 2012). Despite this order, police persist in using rubber bullets against protestors.

Another highly publicised example of excessive force occurred in mid-August 2012 when a group of miners undertook unauthorised ‘wildcat’ strike action, at Lonmin’s platinum mine in Marikana outside of Rustenburg. Although accounts of the incident vary, it is generally acknowledged that members of an elite special unit of the South African Police Service opened

fire on a group of strikers killing 34 people and wounding at least 78. The gravity of these and other occurrences prompted Human Rights Watch to state in its 2015 report that: “serious concerns remain about the conduct and capacity of the South African Police Services (SAPS), both in terms of the use of force in general, as well as the ability to deal with riots in a rights- respecting manner” (Human Rights Watch, 2015: Internet).

2.2. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: TRUST AND CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS

Some of the issues around service delivery have already been discussed above. As such, these aspects of the indicator will not be discussed in detail here. Rather, as Morlino (2011: 209) suggests, “the most effective method for assessing responsiveness is to examine the legitimacy of government, that is, citizens’ perception of responsiveness rather than the reality”; therefore the people’s perception of government delivery will form the core focus of this section.

Also under assessment are the possible constraints that may exist to limit government’s responsiveness. Morlino (2011: 210-211) draws attention to two potential limits to government’s responsiveness. Firstly, it can be argued that elected leaders do not always seek to understand and respond to the perceptions of the public, and at times rather work to maximise their own autonomy while attempting to influence citizens’ understanding of what the important issues are. Often politicians take advantage of the shifts that occur in political priorities between elections. Secondly, limited economic resources can constrain public spending and consequently affect the responsiveness of the government to citizen demands. The reasonable assumption behind responsiveness is that the more accessible government officials make themselves to individual citizens and representatives of civil society, the higher the level of information that they assimilate and use when making decisions and consequently the greater the likelihood that their final decisions will be responsive to the needs of citizens.

Afrobarometer reports suggest that since 1994 the ‘public agenda’ has centred on five key issues uppermost in the minds of South Africans. The first is unemployment which has consistently featured as the most important problem facing the country - in 2011, the majority (70%) again responded that the provision of jobs was the most important problem that government ought to address. Crime (30%) and housing (29%) are the second and third major issues of concern for the public respectively and have remained so consistently over the years. In the 2011 survey, corruption (26%) appeared in the top five major issues for the first time, at number four, with 65% of respondents believing that government was handling the fight against corruption ‘very badly’ or ‘fairly badly’ (Afrobarometer, 2011: 67) and public concern over poverty (21%) is at number five on the list (Afrobarometer, 2012: 3).

Political corruption24 has appeared consistently in the public discourse over the years as one scandal after another has plagued the public sector ranging from President Zuma’s shady dealings with people like convicted fraudster Shabir Shaik and the aforementioned Nkandla debacle to public officials’ misrepresenting their academic qualifications. Notable examples of this are: senior member of the ANC and former MP, Pallo Jordan, who lied about having received a PhD; and the former South African Broadcasting Corporation chairwoman, Ellen Tshabalala, who resigned after she was unable to provide proof of her qualifications following an inquiry by a parliamentary committee. Such actions are especially damaging to the success of a good quality democracy as it weakens the relationship of trust between the people and their elected government and therefore has implications for legitimacy and the future health of the democracy. In terms of international scaling, South Africa’s corruption levels appear to be increasing. The 2014 Corruption Perception Index reflects that South Africa has dropped over

24 In this study only political corruption will be discussed, that is, “the abuse of public office for private, personal or party gain, on behalf of the officeholder or their family or associates” (Beetham et al., 2002: 171).

ten places in four years (from 54th in 2010 to 67th in 2014) (Transparency International, 2014: Internet).

Over the years, South Africans have praised government in some policy areas and criticised it in others. Kotzé and Steenekamp’s 2007 Elite Values Survey, which draws on the 2006 World Values Survey and compares elite and public values, found that respondents believed government to be delivering on the following five services: addressing educational needs (23.2% of public respondents indicated that government was doing ‘very well’); improvement of basic health services (22.0%); the delivery of household water (20.3%); managing the economy (18.3%) and combating HIV/AIDS (16.6%) (Kotzé and Steenekamp, 2008: 16-17). The 2011 Afrobarometer findings concur with some of the results in this survey in that government has received strong approval ratings on its handling of HIV/AIDs (71%) and addressing educational needs (67%). However, the Afrobarometer survey findings add that government has also found approval for its distribution of welfare payments (where 76% of respondents indicated approval) and in its uniting of South Africans into one nation (65%) (Afrobarometer, 2012: 2; 8). Moreover, findings of another survey revealed that between 2000 and 2012 the percentage of people who believed that government was ‘performing well’ dropped considerably from 72% to 54% (South Africa Survey 2013, 2013: 881).

The 2007 Opinion Leader Survey found that the public regard the government as not delivering in areas of crime reduction; reducing unemployment and keeping prices stable (Kotzé and Steenekamp, 2008: 16-17). The 2011 Afrobarometer survey found similar results. Public evaluations of government performance in 2011 over two of the most pressing problems facing the country, that is creating jobs and crime reduction (noted above), remain negative with 77% of respondents believing that government is doing badly with regards to employment and 61% of respondents regarding government’s handling of crime as poor (Afrobarometer, 2011: 65).

In South Africa, as elsewhere in the world, the state cannot afford to supply the unlimited needs of the community and therefore has to prioritise its allocation of financial resources to areas where it thinks these resources are most required. It is possible that this pragmatism is not fully appreciated by a vast section of the public who, as evidenced by dramatic upsurges in public protest action as a way of expressing frustration with poor service delivery, equate this lack of delivery with lack of responsiveness (see Figure 2). Financial constraints may not, however, be the primary reason for the state’s apparent incapacity to respond to public needs. Former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan has argued that, “money is not the problem. It is how we spend the money … In several sectors, budgets have grown exponentially but outputs have not increased” (quoted in Fast Facts, May 2010: 5).

Challenges include: corruption, insufficient skills and too few professionals; incompetence in managing complex systems and ultimately delivering on mandates efficiently, effectively and economically; issues of corruption and fraud centring on self-enrichment and conspicuous consumption among officials and leaders; and frivolous expenditure (Hemson, Carter and Karuri-Sebina, 2009: 151; Mail & Guardian Online, 7 April 2010). Moreover, the need for transformation has resulted in state capacity being stretched by the imperatives of achieving racial and gender equity while also trying to modernise in the global community (Hemson et al., 2009: 151).

Between 2006 and 2013 the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation found that the public’s confidence in institutions has dropped across the board with confidence in the Presidency dropping from 77% to 55% (see Figure 3). Confidence in parliament, national government and provincial government have all registered significant dips since 2006 with only confidence in local government increasing and then only slightly. Generally, confidence in this tier of government has remained consistently low.

Figure 3: Public confidence in institutions

100% 77% 80% 69.40% 73.10% 64.50% 55.10% 60% 54.50% 54.50% 51.80% 50.30%54.50%

40%

20%

0% The Presidency Parliament National Provincial Local government government government

2006 2013

Source: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Reconciliation Barometer, 2014.

This negative perception of local government is continued in questions over trustworthiness. As noted previously, trust in local government has been consistently low, especially when compared to trust in other levels of government. The 2011 Afrobarometer results reflect that this is a continuing trend with only 43% saying they trust their ‘elected local government council’ as opposed to the 55% that trust provincial government; the 56% trusting the National Assembly; and the 62% that regard the President as trustworthy (Afrobarometer, 2011: 48-50). Trust in the ruling ANC is also high (with 61% of respondents indicating that they trust the ruling party ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’). Similarly, a 2011 survey on ‘The State of Local Governance from a Citizen Perspective’ undertaken by IDASA found that only one in ten citizens were satisfied with ‘the quality of service delivery provided by their district and municipal council’. This constituted “a dramatic decline from its previous survey conducted in 2006 which showed four in ten citizens (39.5%) were still satisfied with service delivery by their local government” (IDASA, 2011: Internet). The lack of trust and confidence in local government has negative implications for legitimacy in South Africa.

Finally, democracy continues to be the most popular form of government although public perceptions of how well it is working appear to have declined somewhat in recent years. In the 2007 Opinion Leader Survey, 85.7% indicated that ‘having a democratic political system’ was the best way of governing the country (Kotzé and Steenekamp, 2008: 13-17). However, the 2011 Afrobarometer survey found that only 60% were ‘satisfied’ with democracy in South Africa (Afrobarometer, 2011: 33).

3. CONCLUSION

In assessing the quality of South Africa’s participatory democracy, two criteria were examined: the extent to which the opportunities for conventional participation are developed (including, in the event of non-conventional participation, the degree of government suppression) and the extent to which the government is perceived as being effective in serving and responding to the public.

Constitutionally, everyone has the right to protest (peacefully). Moreover, constitutional provisions make it the responsibility of government at national, provincial and local level to facilitate public participation. Apart from voting, there are many other formal avenues for conventional participation through mechanisms and programmes in place. While many problems exist to impair the ability of many of these programmes to perform optimally, there are, nevertheless, consistent efforts by government to improve on opportunities for participation. Despite this, socio-economic barriers to formal participation persist. While

national and provincial participatory programmes are generally performing well, this does not appear to be the case at local level, where corruption and ineptitude are rife, resulting in a lack of trust between officials and their municipalities. Nevertheless, a robust and diverse civil society exists offering another route for participation, constantly challenging government and articulating wide-ranging interests. Where formal participation fails, protest action is widely utilised with various grassroots organisations as well as the general public campaigning regularly to have their demands heard. These increasing levels of less conventional participation through often illegal protest action, while indicative of public unhappiness over not being heard by those in power, is nevertheless a positive sign of participatory democracy. However, the increasing use of violence and destructive behaviour is problematic, particularly as it is used as a justification for government’s mostly hostile response to social movements. While this descent into violence and destruction is not ideal, the widespread protests nevertheless indicate a mobilised people attempting to participate on their own terms.

With regard to government responsiveness and perceived legitimacy, survey data, reflected above, indicate that the public perceive government’s response to service delivery to be less than adequate. Additional data reflects a general decline in public levels of confidence in government but average to good levels of trust in government at provincial and national level. Where trust and approval are both markedly low is at local government level, where despite government efforts to respond to increasing public expectations, these are not always translating into effective action or, indeed, into public satisfaction with these efforts. Therefore, it might be more correct to say that the public perceive local government’s response to public demands to be less than adequate. Several constraints exist to limit effective government responsiveness including: corruption; skills shortages; financial impediments and a lack of capacity to ensure good financial management.

Finally, if news of the day is anything to go by, then we South Africans should be hiding our heads in shame at the apparent lack of quality democracy. However, an examination of substantive participatory democracy reveals, at the very least, a constitutionally protected right to protest and a vibrant and active citizenry willing to show their displeasure with perceived government inefficiencies. For these alone we should continue to be proud to be South African.

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