Social Education 68(7), pp. 484-489 © 2004 National Council for the Social Studies Islamist Movements in Social Education staff

When the of national crisis for people to look to their objectives, however, Islamist movements invaded Iraq in March 2003, one of its religious faith for sustenance. The invasion in Iraq are not a monolithic force, and have stated intentions was to inaugurate an era of and the occupation of Iraq by more than different interpretations of the implications Iraqi politics in which new kinds of demo- 100,000 foreign troops speaking a differ- of Islamic precepts and principles for con- cratic parties would emerge. However, one ent language and believing in a different temporary states and societies. There is a of the most dramatic effects of the U.S. inva- religion from the population provoked diversity of views among Islamists about sion has been the boost it has given to the a renewed sense among of their the nature of political freedom and civil Islamist parties and movements that were own religious identity, beliefs, and values. rights, the appropriate balance of powers banned under . Mosques are well attended, portraits of in government, cooperation with secular Recent surveys have shown greater religious leaders bedeck public places, and political movements, the role of women in support among Iraqis for the establishment women have come under great pressure to society and desirable foreign policies.2 of Islamic law (i.e., the sharia) and much observe Islamic dress codes. Some Iraqi Islamist movements more backing for religious parties than Apart from the increased Islamic ethos, have followed a pragmatic path since the was the case in opinion polls conducted there are also practical organizational rea- invasion and have worked within the in the months following the U.S. invasion. sons why Islamist movements have done framework established by the U.S. to rally It is clear that Islamist parties will play an so well in the period since the U.S. invasion. support and advance their interests. Two important role in Iraq’s new political era. The most determined Arab opposition examples are the Shia movements that con- An election planned for Iraq at the end movements to Saddam Hussein’s secular- stituted the principal Islamist opposition of January 2005 will choose an assembly ist Baath Party regime had been Islamist, to Saddam Hussein, the Dawa movement responsible for drafting a constitution. To and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Supreme Council for the Islamic establish sharia law as the basis of the con- created a free political environment in Revolution in Iraq. The Sunni Iraqi Islamic stitution, the Islamist parties would need which they could reorganize. Because of Party, established half a century ago as the to win a significant majority of Iraq’s Arab their past experience and their ability to Iraqi branch of the pan-Islamic Muslim population. About 20 percent of the Iraqi revive their political networks, they had Brotherhood, has also followed the same population consists of and other a head start over their secular rivals. In path. All three participated in the U.S.- minorities, including Christians, who addition, the extremely insecure condi- appointed and overwhelmingly support a secular system. tions in Iraq have favored movements that have supported the government of Prime About 80 percent are , so that 60 to can organize people who go to mosques, Minister Iyad Alawi. They have also dis- 70 percent of the Arab population would which continue to be open and attract the tanced themselves from U.S. policy on a need to support Islamist parties for sharia faithful despite the insecurity. In contrast, number of occasions, especially when the law to be enacted (the exact proportion Iraqis wishing to establish or participate U.S. has conducted major military opera- depends on how many Arabs vote in an in newer secular political movements have tions in Iraqi towns. election that some Sunni Arab groups have had less favorable conditions for doing so, As members of the Iraqi Governing threatened to boycott). as people stay home, avoid public squares Council, the three movements endorsed an This special section provides Social and meeting places, and do not engage in interim constitution that provided for free- Education readers with the background to the kinds of activities that are essential to dom of religious belief, speech and politi- the recent rise of religious political move- a flourishing civic life. cal organization; prohibited discrimination ments in Iraq, as well as details about the on the basis of gender, religion and nation- diverse Islamist organizations that now Pragmatic Islamist Movements ality; and endorsed the aim that women play a significant role in the country.1 All Islamist movements have as their com- should constitute at least one quarter of mon denominator the belief that govern- the members of the national assembly to The Islamist Resurgence in Iraq ment should be based on the precepts be elected in January. The U.S. invasion of Iraq produced an and principles of . Their distinc- Newer Islamist movements that environment very favorable for Islamist tive demand is for the implementation have sprung up since the U.S. invasion are, movements, because it is common in times of Islamic law. Despite common general however, more militant and implacably

Social Education 484 IRAQ AT A GLANCE hostile to the United States. They include the led by the Shia cleric Population Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sunni Council of 26 million Islamic Scholars, and mosque-based insurgencies in many localities in the Sunni Nationalities Triangle. In addition, pan-Islamic jihadists Arab 78 percent linked to Al Qaeda have entered Iraq and Kurds 18 percent made it a base for anti-U.S. operations. Others (Turkomen, Assyrians, Whether pragmatic or militant, the Armenians) 4 percent composition of each of the Islamist move- ments is overwhelmingly either Sunni or Religious Beliefs Shia. The movements have not served as Shia Muslim 60 percent, almost all Arabs unifying organizations for both Sunni and Sunnis 38 percent, divided fairly evenly between Kurds and Shia Muslims, though most have stated Arabs, with a small minority of Turkomen that Muslims of both branches of Islam Christians 2 percent are welcome to join. The movements con- nected to Al Qaeda are an exception, and Government have a strongly anti-Shia orientation. An interim government headed by Iyad Alawi, a secular Shia Muslim who heads the Party, took over from the U.S.-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority at the end of June 2004. Alawi’s government is charged with re-establishing security and organiz- The most widely supported political party ing elections in January 2005 for an assembly that will write Iraq’s permanent constitution. in Iraq is the Islamic Dawa Party (Call to Islam Party), which is predominantly a Major Challenges Shia party. Its leader is a layman, Ibrahim 1. Insurgency. There is a widespread rebellion in the Sunni Triangle, an area extending Jaafari, who is a doctor by profession and north and west of . The rebellion has been stimulated by opposition to the U.S. who is currently in invasion that ended a period in which Sunni Arabs ruled Iraq. The overthrow of Saddam the coalition government led by Prime Hussein’s regime caused significant social and economic disruption in the Sunni Triangle Minister Iyad Allawi. Opinion polls have after the U.S. disbanded the Iraqi army, the Republican Guard, and other institutions of shown it to be the most popular party in the Baath Party and government. Iraq, though still with limited support 2. Insecurity. Iraq is the scene of acute insecurity resulting both from political and criminal (almost 18 percent in a poll conducted by violence. Alawi, with U.S. support, is trying to build up Iraq’s police and security forces and the International Republican Institute in to create a new army in the place of the old Iraqi armed forces, which the U.S. disbanded September and October 2004). (and from which thousands of officers and men have joined the insurgency). This has been The Dawa Party was founded in hard going, partly because a number of the new police and security forces are sympathetic the late 1950s, and was a major source to rebels, and partly because of a lack of equipment and training. of opposition to Saddam Hussein in the 3. Maintain the unity of Iraq. In addition to ending the Sunni Triangle rebellion, the Iraqi 1970s.3 It urges a democratic state based on government needs to find an effective formula for keeping Shia and Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Islam, but does not support Iranian-style Turkomen and other minorities together in a single politically unified country. Apart from rule by Islamic clerics. Sunni and Shia divisions, Kurds would like more autonomy than Arab political movements Following the Islamic revolution in will accept, and Turkomen and Kurds have incompatible claims in the oil-producing Kirkuk in 1978-79, the Dawa Party strongly region and some other areas of northern Iraq, where both minorities are concentrated. advocated the establishment of an Islamic 4. Economic reconstruction. There is an acute problem of unemployment and widespread state in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein sup- poverty, which has not been alleviated by U.S. aid, because most of the $18.4 billion allocated pressed it ruthlessly. The party claims by Congress for Iraq’s reconstruction has not been spent because of insecurity there. In that tens of thousands of its supporters addition, Iraq’s infrastructure is in poor condition, and under threat from insurgents, and were killed by Hussein’s regime. After a the electricity supply is still erratic in Baghdad and other areas. However, Iraq is a major period of fragmentation, the party’s for- oil producing country and the rising price of oil has helped the government, Iraq’s major tunes revived after the U.S. invasion, and employer, to keep the economy afloat. The salaries of government employees have been it has since worked within the political raised, and some sectors of the economy have flourished, such as those engaged in foreign framework established by the U.S. in Iraq. trade across Iraq’s newly opened borders, and businesses that contract to supply the needs Jaafari has, however, criticized the U.S. for of the U.S. armed forces. the lack of security in Iraq, and stated that it used excessive force in clashes with the Sadrists.

N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 485 Supreme Council for the Islamic Ayatollah Sistani Revolution in Iraq Born near the town of Mashhad in Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani went to Iraq in 1952 to Another leading Shia Muslim party rep- study in the Shia holy city of , Iraq, one of the great traditional centers of Shia Islamic thought, resented in the Alawi government is the and subsequently made his home there. Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution Although his Iranian origin has caused some Iraqis to view him with suspicion, he is the most in Iraq. This group was formed in the 1980s revered religious leader of Iraq’s Shia population. by Iraqi Shia clerics (a number of whom Ayatollah Sistani rose through the Shia hierarchy in the usual way, which is to attract a following had been members of the Dawa Party), among the devout, and to be recognized as a peer by senior clergy. He became Grand Ayatollah of who supported the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iraq after his predecessor, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, the father of radical Islamist leader Muqtada Islamic revolution in Iran and took refuge al-Sadr, was assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1999. there after Saddam Hussein launched the Sistani belongs to the quietist tradition of , which maintains that the clergy should Iran- of 1980-88. The Supreme keep out of politics and leave governance to lay rulers, provided that these rulers are committed Council, whose leadership was recognized to governing according to by Ayatollah Khomeini as the rightful Islamic principles. He has leadership of Iraq, advocates an Islamic also issued some important state in Iraq, and is more strongly clerical declarations on the desirable than the Dawa Party. Like the Dawa Party, political system of the future it participated in the Iraqi Governing Iraq, which he has stated Council set up by the United States in July should be based on demo- 2003, though maintained that it stood in cratic elections and respect “peaceful opposition” to the U.S. occupa- for the rights of minorities. tion. It has declared its willingness to work Sistani has refrained toward a democratic Iraq. Its current leader from calling for resistance is Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, brother of its long- to U.S. forces, and has, as term leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr a result, been regarded as al-Hakim, who was assassinated in 2003. Tens of thousands of Shiite Muslims march in Baghdad carrying portraits having a positive influence Muheisen Photo/Muhammed AP of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani and other Shiite clerics, by the United States. At the Monday, January 19, 2004. same time, he has maintained A third Islamist party that has partici- a nationalist stance by refusing to meet directly with U.S. officials and by calling on Iraqis, when they pated in the government of Iyad Alawi meet Americans, to ask them when U.S. troops are leaving. and was previously a member of the U.S.- During the period when Iraq was under direct U.S. rule by the Coalition Provisional Authority appointed Iraqi Governing Council is headed by Paul Bremer, Sistani intervened to challenge U.S. positions on a number of occasions, the Iraqi Islamic Party, first established in criticizing the United States for trying to appoint Iraqi leaders through hand-picked caucuses rather 1960 as an Iraqi affiliate of the pan-Islamic than elections in which the Iraqi people would choose their leaders. He also criticized U.S. attempts . Led by Muhsin to organize the drafting of a new Iraqi constitution, maintaining that only an elected Iraqi assembly Abdul-Hamid, this is a predominantly should draw up a constitution. Because Shia Muslims constitute about 60 percent of Iraq’s population, Arab and Sunni Muslim party, most of Sistani expects that elections will empower the Shia majority of which he is the religious leader. whose activists are middle-class laymen. In August 2004, Sistani played a critical mediating role in the standoff between U.S. forces and It has advocated that Sunnis participate Muqtada Sadr in Najaf. Sistani has disapproved of Sadr’s radicalism and confrontationalism. When in the new Iraqi political system to ensure clashes broke out in Najaf between U.S. forces backing the Alawi government and Muqtada Sadr’s that they can still have an influential role in supporters, who based themselves in the renowned Shrine of Ali, Sistani was undergoing medical Iraq. Despite working within the political treatment in London, but returned to negotiate a settlement in which Sadr’s supporters left Najaf system established for Iraq by the United and U.S. forces withdrew from the holy city. States, it has criticized the U.S. for the use of He has been an emphatic supporter of holding elections, even in less than ideal circumstances, excessive force against Iraqi targets, notably and views the elections scheduled for January 2005 as crucial to Iraq’s future because they will elect against in the Sunni Triangle. the assembly that will write Iraq’s permanent constitution.

Militant Islamist Movements The three Islamist movements just men- Islamic movements that have arisen since and the Alawi government will end with tioned were longstanding opponents of the U.S. invasion have been more militant. the pragmatists losing political legitimacy Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, and have They have maintained an implacable oppo- in favor of the militants as the U.S. pres- worked pragmatically to build up politi- sition to the presence of U.S. forces, in the ence becomes more and more unpopular cal support within the framework estab- belief that the willingness of the pragmatist and the government fails to solve Iraq’s lished by the United States. However, other Islamist movements to work with the U.S. problems.

Social Education 486 The Sadrists Al-Sadr has been frowned on as minority. Additionally, the dissolution On April 9, 2003, U.S. forces signaled a hothead by senior ayatollahs (whose of the Iraqi army and Baath party insti- the end of the era of Saddam Hussein’s views he is supposed to respect as a mem- tutions has had a severe social and eco- dictatorship by pulling down his statue ber of the Shia clergy). In the clashes that nomic impact on the Arab Sunni regions. in Baghdad. Within a week, a movement took place in Najaf between al-Sadr’s Mosques throughout the Sunni Triangle led by the young cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, militia and U.S. troops after the Sadrists have become centers for organization announced that it had taken control of took over the Shrine of Ali, a well-known by opponents of and insurgents against the area of Baghdad formerly known as holy place, the senior ayatollahs refused the new U.S.-sponsored Iraqi political Saddam City, and had renamed it Al- to offer al-Sadr their support. Al-Sadr’s order. The Council of Islamic Scholars Sadr City to commemorate his father, men eventually left Najaf after a truce has emerged as a national organization Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, as well as brokered by Grand Ayatollah Sistani. held in high esteem by the opponents of Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr, another Grand Al-Sadr is too junior a cleric to have the new Iraqi order, who—whether they Ayatollah executed by the Baath govern- significant religious authority, and has be Baathists, fundamentalists, or follow- ment. Al-Sadr’s father, who was revered attempted to bypass the senior clergy ers of tribal leaders—often express their among the Iraqi Shia community, built in Najaf by declaring his allegiance to opposition in religious terms as a fight up a strong network that provided social Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri, a militant against foreign infidels and their local support to needy people when Iraq was senior Iraqi cleric who lives in Qum, Iraqi puppets. The Council has served as suffering under international sanctions. Iran, and supports the Iranian clerical an intermediary with Islamist movements An astute organizer, Muqtada al-Sadr regime. However, al-Haeri, reluctant to holding hostages, a number of whom have developed this network clandestinely into break with his Iraqi clerical colleagues, been released following its efforts. one that he could build into a mass politi- has recently distanced himself from the Although the Council has announced cal movement after the fall of Saddam Sadrist movement. its belief that elections held while U.S. Hussein, while succeeding in keeping Because of his unremitting hostility troops are in the country will be illegiti- his plans off the radar screen of Hussein’s to the U.S. during a period when the U.S. mate, the Alawi government is attempting secret police. has become increasingly unpopular in to persuade it not to boycott the planned Immediately after the United States Iraq, al-Sadr now has a very high political elections in January, but to urge its follow- invaded Iraq, al-Sadr moved into action, profile. Recent opinion polls show him ers to use the elections as an opportunity mobilizing supporters first in Najaf and to be one of the most popular Iraqi Shia to have their political beliefs represented later in Baghdad. In Najaf, a few days after leaders. The Alawi government contin- in the new Iraq. the U.S. invasion, a Sadrist mob attacked ues to negotiate to have him disarm his and killed Abdul-Majid al-Khoi, a pro- militia, renounce armed opposition, and Jihadist Organizations with Ties to Western Shia cleric from a well-known involve his movement in the political Al Qaeda religious family who had been living in framework. Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad/Al Qaeda in Iraq London, and who had been transported The instability that followed the over- to Najaf by the U.S. armed forces in an Council of Islamic Scholars throw of Saddam Hussein has paved the attempt to get the support of leading cler- The Council of Islamic Scholars is a group way for groups affiliated with Al Qaeda ics there for the U.S. invasion. During the of Sunni Muslim clerics led by Sheikh to enter Iraq and try to mobilize the dis- rule of the U.S.-dominated Provisional Harith al-Dari that has become influen- contented Sunni Arab population. The Coalition Authority, an Iraqi judge tial in the period since the overthrow of best known is al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad appointed by the U.S. issued a warrant Saddam Hussein. It has expressed strong (One God and Holy War), established for the arrest of al-Sadr for the murder of opposition to the presence of U.S. troops by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian al-Khoi. Whether or not to execute the in Iraq and has voiced support for the who fought in Afghanistan and has ties to warrant became a central issue for the U.S. insurgents. Its members are allowed to . The group advocates during its period of direct rule. operate legally because they maintain a militant puritanical interpretation of Al-Sadr has taken a militantly anti- that they are simply exercising the right Islam, and includes both foreign and Iraqi U.S. stance, and advocates Khomeini- of freedom of speech, and are not actively Islamists. It recently changed its name to style clerical rule in Iraq. His movement engaged in violent resistance to the Alawi Al Qaeda in Iraq.4 has expressed vehement opposition to the government or United States troops. Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad has carried Baath Party, and is distrusted by many The Council is influential because it out spectacular attacks designed to ter- middle and upper class Shias, but is popu- is a nationwide grouping respected in the rorize the contractors who provide the lar among impoverished Shia Muslims. It Arab Sunni regions of the country. The support system for U.S. troops in Iraq has supporters in many major cities and overthrow of Hussein has meant the end and to sabotage efforts by the U.S.-backed al-Sadr has built up a militia of several of the period in which political power Iraqi government to establish security by thousand, the al-Mahdi army. was concentrated in Iraq’s Arab Sunni building up its police and internal secu-

N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4 487 rity forces. Targets of attack have been rapidly. He uses the internet to try to by Saddam Hussein, and stated that its foreigners and Iraqis working with the rally support from Islamists worldwide, presence in Iraq was proof of Hussein’s United States, a number of whom have and to attempt to project the message ties with Al Qaeda. Hussein denied the been kidnapped and beheaded by al- that his movement is the rock on which accusation, blaming Iran instead. For its Zarqawi’s group, as well as Iraqi police, U.S. efforts in Iraq will be shipwrecked. part, Iran denied any responsibility for security forces and army recruits who are Widely publicized videotapes of mem- Ansar al-Islam and claimed that the group regular targets of ambushes and car bomb bers of the movement beheading hostages was working with Saddam Hussein. attacks. The movement has been active are designed to terrorize foreigners work- Since the U.S. invasion, Ansar al- in Arab Sunni areas, especially in parts ing in Iraq, as well as supporters of the Islam has attacked coalition forces and of Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle. It U.S.-backed government, by projecting Iraqi targets in the north of Iraq. However, strongly opposes a democracy that would iconic images of burly, masked Muslims because it is largely a Kurdish organiza- bring the Shia majority to power because in black towering over Western hostages, tion, it has had little chance of playing a it views Shia Muslims as apostates. sometimes clothed in Guantanamo leadership role in the region where Sunni Al-Zarqawi has attempted to mobi- orange, who plead for their lives. has the best chances—the Sunni lize support among Iraqi’s discontented Triangle, where anti-Kurdish sentiment Arab Sunni minority. However, his ambi- Ansar al-Sunna runs high among the Arab population. tions go far beyond Iraq. An international Ansar al-Sunna (Defenders of Sunni jihadist whose ideas are close to those Islam) is another organization of foreign The Upcoming Elections of Osama bin Laden, he sees Iraq as and Iraqi Islamists that is linked to Al Iraq’s prime minister, Iyad Alawi, leads a simply one arena for Islamic struggle in Qaeda and Ansar al-Islam (see below). It secular party, the Iraqi National Accord. an ongoing jihad against Western influ- has similar aims and methods to those of Alawi has entered into a coalition with ence throughout the Muslim world. In al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad. The image Ansar members of the pragmatic Islamist parties, al-Zarqawi’s view, the U.S. invasion has al-Sunni projects is, however, less of an but he is attempting to build his party into opened the door for jihadists to reconsti- international Wahhabi Islamist group- a secular, unifying Iraqi movement. tute themselves in Iraq after a near-death ing, and more of a movement that seeks A Shia Muslim himself, Alawi is a experience in which they lost their base to mobilize Iraqi Sunni sectarian resent- former member of the Baath Party who in Afghanistan. ment against Americans, secular politi- fell out with Saddam Hussein and worked Al-Zarqawi’s emphasis on interna- cians, and the Shias of Iraq. closely with the CIA during the 1990s tional jihad means that there is tension to try to organize a coup against Saddam between his objectives and those of most Ansar al-Islam Hussein from within the Baathist govern- Iraqi insurgents, whose aim is focused on Ansar al-Islam is an older Islamist organi- ment. getting U.S. troops out of Iraq, rather than zation linked to Al Qaeda. Its origins lie For most of the last 50 years, the al-Zarqawi’s more grandiose ambitions. in the Kurdish fundamentalist movement political culture of Iraq has been largely Despite this, the Iraqi insurgents have known as the Islamic Movement of Iraqi secularist. Intermarriage between Sunnis been unwilling to move against Zarqawi’s Kurdistan that was formed during the Iraq- and Shias has not been uncommon in group because it is willing to fight against Iran war of 1980-88, and fought on the Iraqi society, and the divide between the U.S. presence in the country. side of Iran against Saddam Hussein’s Sunni and Shia parties concerns many Al-Zarqawi’s movement is less regime. Some members split with the Iraqis. Alawi is trying to group together numerous than the great publicity given Islamic Movement of in secular Sunnis and Shias, Kurds, former it would imply. Many estimates place its 1998 when the latter joined the predomi- Baathists, and other Arab nationalists membership at less than 1,000, or fewer nantly secular Kurdish government estab- and democrats who support Iraq’s secular than 10 percent of the total number of lished under international protection in political tradition. He is trying to bring Iraqi insurgents. Most insurgents in Iraq the “no-fly zone” of Iraqi Kurdistan. former Baath Party members back into are Iraqi, and the organizational back- Members of the splinter group fought the government and the new Iraqi politi- bone of the insurgency is still provided on the side of Al Qaeda and the cal system in an attempt to diminish the by former officials and army officers of in Afghanistan. In 2001, the group named rebellion in the Sunni Triangle, which has Saddam Hussein’s regime, sustained by itself Ansar al-Islam (Defenders of Islam) drawn considerable support and organiz- the ability to recruit Arab Sunnis who and its Kurdish fighters, reinforced by ing talent from members of the Baath. feel animosity toward U.S. forces and the Arab Islamists, returned to Iraq through The January elections are expected to Alawi government. Iran from Afghanistan after the U.S. be a watershed event that will determine While the total membership of ousted the Taliban. They then seized vil- whether Iraq can establish a new consti- Zarqawi’s movement is relatively low, he lages in the no-fly zone of Kurdistan from tution acceptable to most of its citizens. has engaged in a huge publicity campaign pro-U.S. Kurdish forces. U.S. officials Because of the rise of Islamism in Iraq to expand it, and it has recently grown accused Ansar al-Islam of being backed since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein,

Social Education 488 it is already certain that a new Iraqi con- stitution will invoke Islam as one of the sources of Iraqi law. The big question is whether Iraq will continue to have the kind of coalition between secularists and pragmatic Islamists that Alawi’s govern- ment represents, or whether the country is at a different turning point from which one road leads to sectarian and ethnic strife and the other to the establishment of a new Islamic republic in the Middle East.

Notes 1. There are now a very large number of Islamist move- ments in Iraq, and this article omits those that are smaller or less important than the movements described here. 2. Interpretations of how to apply the sharia to contem- porary society range from an Islamic modernism that emphasizes the need for economic and political devel- opment to a fundamentalism that judges the success of Muslim societies by the extent to which their people live according to Islamic precepts and principles. 3. One of its founders was Iraq’s most influential Shia Islamist theorist, Muhammad Bakr al-Sadr, who is also venerated by the other Shia religious parties. Al-Sadr, a Grand Ayatollah of Iraq, was executed by Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1980. Although his concept of government was one based on Islamic law, he did not believe (unlike Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran) that the clergy should play an active role in government. Instead, he advocated a clerical right to veto legislation that is incompatible with Islam. 4. Movements of this kind are often described as Wahhabi, though their adherents describe themselves as salafi, a term that designates following the forefathers of Islam, or as muwahhidun, a term designating their belief in monotheism. Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad’s emphasis on monotheism makes the point that Muslims should fol- low the literal word of God as expressed in the Koran, and should not assign divine features to clergy who interpret Islam, or, for that matter, to the Prophet Muhammad himself. This Islamist trend considers Shias to deviate from Islam, because they vest great authority in the judgment of senior clergy and venerate the early Imams who were direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

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