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Home , Beji Caid Essebsi, Egypt, Egyptian Armed Forces, Mohamed Bouazizi, Moncef Marzouki, President of Tunisia

Iman Zekri

Dictatorships to : The Democratic Progress of and

Egypt Following the Arab

Aquila – The FGCU Student Research Journal Volume 3 Issue 1 (2016)

DOI 10.24049/aq.3.1.4

© 2016 Zekri

Distributed under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0

OPEN ACCESS Aquila - The FGCU Student Research Journal to Democracies: The Democratic Progress of Tunisia and Following the

Iman Zekri

Florida Gulf Coast University, College of Arts & Sciences, Fort Myers, FL 33965

Faculty mentor: Hootan Shambayati, Ph.D., Florida Gulf Coast University, College of Arts & Sciences, Department of Political Science & Public Administration, Fort Myers, FL 33965

ABSTRACT This paper compares Tunisia and Egypt by analyzing their and examining how two similar countries yielded vastly divergent outcomes after the Arab Spring. Tunisia and Egypt are both Muslim-majority, speaking countries in North that were under authoritarian rule before the Arab Spring. Following the wave of revolutions, Tunisia has made tremendous progress in transitioning to a , but Egypt has struggled as the nation deposed a democratically HOHFWHGSUHVLGHQWDQGXQGHUZHQWDFRXQWHUUHYROXWLRQ7KHYDULDEOHVWKDWZLOOEHLGHQWL¿HGLQWKLVSDSHUDVSRWHQWLDOH[SOD- nations for this divergence are economic conditions, the role of the military in the , and the role of religious groups in politics. A case study methodology is carried out to collect, study, and synthesize information from primary and secondary VRXUFHVVXFKDV¿UVWKDQGDFFRXQWVIURPLQGLYLGXDOVZKRZLWQHVVHGWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHUHYROXWLRQVDQGSHHUUHYLHZHG journal articles that address the democratization of both nations since the Arab Spring. After reviewing all three variables, WKH¿QGLQJVVKRZWKDWWKHHFRQRPLFYDULDEOHLVDVKDUHGIDFWRUWKDWGRHVQRWDFFRXQWIRUWKHGLIIHUHQWRXWFRPHVLQ7XQLVLD and Egypt; it is, the military and religious variables that are the strongest predictors of why the democratic progress of both countries is extremely divergent. This paper facilitates an understanding of democratization by identifying factors that are decisive in determining if the transition of a nation from a to a democracy will be successful or unsuccessful.

INTRODUCTION Islamic law in government. The nation has still been able to Zine El Abidine Ben (Ben Ali) took power on 7 No- avoid a , a military coup, and additional crises that vember 1987 in a coup d’état after declaring that Habib have confronted many other Arab Spring countries (Bay). Bourguiba was too sick to remain . After the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, Mohamed Ben Ali also later stepped down on 14 2011 0RUVL EHFDPH WKH ¿UVW GHPRFUDWLFDOO\ HOHFWHG SUHVLGHQW (Schiffrin and Kircher-Allen 48). Similar to Ben Ali, of Egypt on 30 2012, until he was overthrown in a Egypt’s ruled his people by means of military coup on 3 July 2013 (Szmolka 81). This massive W\UDQQ\XQWLOKHZDVIRUFHGIURPRI¿FHRQ)HEUXDU\ disruption of the constitutional process is a key setback 2011 (Abu-Remaileh and Mehrez 366). The quick and that demonstrates Egypt’s struggle for democracy. Pro- relatively peaceful overthrow of both dictators makes tests on the streets of Egypt in 2013 called for the removal Tunisia and Egypt unique compared to other states in RI0RUVLIURPRI¿FHDQGWKHPLOLWDU\UHVSRQGHGE\DUUHVW- the Arab that also had uprisings. This distinctive ing Morsi and other leaders (Sow- similarity is why Tunisia and Egypt are the focus of this ers 140). After the Muslim Brotherhood-led government paper because both revolutions started out alike, but pro- was deposed, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, former chief of the gressed extremely differently. The rulers of Tunisia and , was sworn-in on 8 June 2014. He Egypt almost immediately resigned, while other Arab was able to do so because he won 96 percent of the vote FRXQWULHV¶OHDGHUVSURYHGPRUHUHVLVWDQWWROHDYLQJRI¿FH (“Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Sworn in as ”). Tunisia has been cited as the success story of the Arab The Egyptian military coup was an undemocratic action Spring, and although the country has faced various chal- that undermined the power of a democratically elect- lenges, has been relatively effectual in implementing a le- ed government. Morsi was a legitimate leader who was gitimate democracy. Five years after the protests began in elected by the Egyptian people. It is evident that Egypt’s Tunisia, the country established a new constitution and a path to democratization is unstable because democra- democratically elected president. Mohamed Moncef Mar- cy is based on law and order, not anarchy and impulse. zouki served as president of Tunisia for a term of three In Tunisia and Egypt, social unrest triggered civil years, which ran from 13 December 2011 to 31 December uprisings that placed both countries on a revolutionary 2014 (Dawisha 18). Mohamed is the cur- path to democracy. The origins of their revolutions, the UHQWSUHVLGHQWRI7XQLVLDDQGKHDVVXPHGRI¿FHRQ'H- proceedings of their uprisings, and the rapid downfall cember 2014. Fortunately, the transfer of power to a new of their former oppressive leaders are commonalities president was peaceful and orderly. Tunisia has been deal- seen across the board in Tunisia and Egypt during the ing with economic troubles, terror attacks, and the role of Arab Spring. They both have such pronounced similar-

29 Zekri DOI 10.24049/aq.3.1.4 ities that most scholars tend to group together Tunisia demonstrations erupted against the government in Tu- and Egypt when discussing the commencement of their nisia, which were followed by uprisings in Egypt and revolutions versus other countries in and other Arab countries as . Nations throughout North the . Although the revolutions in both na- Africa and the Middle East were stirred by Bouazizi’s tions started the same, they undoubtedly did not end the DFWLRQV ZKLFK H[HPSOL¿HG WKH DQJXLVK RI KLV JHQHUD- same. The initial proceedings were very similar; never- tion; a generation that endured , politi- theless, the aftermath and outcomes could not be more cal , , and repression (Dawisha distinct. Why is this the case? This is the question that 19). Tunisia was the domino that set off a chain reaction this paper will endeavor to answer by examining three of political protests that would soon be called the Arab variables; the function of the economy, the military, and Spring, as a revolutionary wave of demonstrations in in each respective country’s path to democracy. one country was followed by mass protests in the next.

ORIGIN OF THE ARAB SPRING Many scholars claim that was a rev- olutionary who killed himself in protest of the author- itarian and undemocratic government ruling Tunisia. Instead he was simply an ordinary, young Tunisian who was working hard to earn a living. His actions are not a UHÀHFWLRQRISURWHVWRUSROLWLFDODFWLRQEXWDPDQLIHVWDWLRQ of poverty, despair, and hardship. This feeling of hope- lessness resonated with millions of Tunisians. Bouazizi did not have a political agenda nor did he predict what his actions would soon lead to. He was evidence of wide- spread Tunisian discontent that threatened to explode at any given moment. Even today, when walking down the busy streets of Tunisia, it is evident that street vending is a common occupation held by numerous individuals. The vendors sell fruits, vegetables, bread, and other pri- mary goods. For many working-class Tunisians, this is their entire livelihood and it is the only way they are able to provide for their parents, children, and families.

This plaza remains quiet in 2016, but it once held mass protests WKDWGHPDQGHG=LQH(O$ELGLQH%HQ$OLWRVWHSGRZQIURPRI¿FH

TUNISIA’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS After the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s economy continued to suffer from high unemployment and a growing gap be- tween the rich and the poor (McCaffrey 57). During Ben Ali’s administration, pervasive corruption damaged the Tunisian economy. In Tunisia, where one out of three citizens in their twenties was unemployed, wealth was concentrated among an elite group of people who were typically related to the president and his wife (Dawisha  *RYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVLQ7XQLVLDHPEH]]OHGWKHFRXQ- Countless Tunisians make their living though street vend- try’s riches for personal gain, while ordinary citizens ing and these vendors in , Tunisia, endure long suffered the consequences of a weak economy (Lynch hours and low earnings to provide for their families.   ,W LV SURMHFWHG WKDW RQO\ ¿IW\ LQGLYLGXDOV ZHUH UH- sponsible for approximately 60 percent of Tunisia’s On 17 December 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a twen- economic activity (Dawisha 99). Although the degree ty-six-year-old Tunisian street vendor doused himself of corruption that transpired during Ben Ali’s regime is ZLWKJDVROLQHOLWKLVERG\RQ¿UHDQGODWHUGLHGLQWKH no longer present (at least not to the extent it was before KRVSLWDO 5RKGH   %RXD]L]L OLW KLPVHOI DÀDPH LQ the Arab Spring), Tunisia still possesses a high unem- IURQWRIDORFDOPXQLFLSDORI¿FHLQ6LGL%RX]LGDIWHUEH- ployment rate and a struggle. ing mistreated and humiliated by police (Chomsky and There are a lack of economic opportunities in Tu- Barsamian 44). The day after his self-immolation, mass

30 Aquila - The FGCU Student Research Journal

QLVLD JLYHQ WKDW  SHUFHQW RI 7XQLVLDQV DUH ¿IWHHQ WR Egypt experienced economic problems before and after WZHQW\QLQH\HDUVRIDJHDQG7XQLVLD¶VRI¿FLDOXQHPSOR\- their revolutions. The Arab Spring sustained economic ment rate is 14 percent (Schiffrin and Kircher-Allen 45). instability in both countries as they struggled to manage Dunahar has observed that “[i]n the years that followed high unemployment and poverty rates. Furthermore, in- the revolt unemployment went up, and so did prices. Life vestors and lenders have been reluctant to contribute got no better for the vast majority of Tunisians. Life got to Tunisia and Egypt, which has resulted in low no better for the vast majority of Tunisians. How could foreign direct investments in both countries ever since LW"7KHFRXQWU\KDGEHHQOHIWLQD¿QDQFLDOPHVV)RUHLJQ the Arab Spring. Investors are leery of giving funds to a investors were waiting to see what happened next before weak state that has been made particularly vulnerable by they spent their money” (Danahar 49). This quote illus- a revolution. Foreign investors will more than likely wait trates that even after the revolution, Tunisia was still deal- until they see proof of political and economic develop- ing with unfavorable economic conditions. These condi- ment, because a weak post-revolutionary state is at risk tions would be expected to make Tunisia’s transition to of becoming a failed state. This means that they might democracy a failure; yet, the process of democratization potentially be losing their investment. Taking into con- in Tunisia is thriving. Tunisia was able to resolve issues sideration the similarity of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s econo- of gridlock to design and approve a consensus consti- mies, it is implausible that the economic conditions in the tution, which was a major step towards establishing a countries explain their different paths of democratization collaborative democratic system of government (Bay). after the Arab Spring. These states have similar econom- ic conditions, marked by economic decline yet this does EGYPT’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS QRWH[SODLQZK\7XQLVLDKDVEHQH¿WHGIURPDUHODWLYHO\ (J\SW¶V ¿QDQFLDO VLWXDWLRQ LV QHLWKHU EHWWHU QRU smooth transition to democracy, Egypt has struggled. worse than Tunisia’s economic circumstances. Da- nahar describes this situation when he states that: THE TUNISIAN MILITARY Three-quarters of under thirty years old are - During the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s and Egypt’s militaries less and increasingly frustrated with the lack of change in became known for remaining dedicated to their nations by their lives after the revolution. The regular violent pro- defending their respective revolutions (Alhassen and Shi- tests have damaged its crucial industry, leaving hab-Eldin 27). Ben Ali was a cruel leader, but he was also Egypt in 2013 at the bottom of the rankings for safe and incredibly cautious and made sure to keep the army under secure places to go on holiday, below even (119). constant control (Lynch 149). The military under Ben Ali Similar to Tunisia, Egypt is also struggling with unem- was kept intentionally weak in order to ensure that it would ployment after the Arab Spring, and the new Egyptian not develop into a threat and jeopardize his power. The Tu- government has inherited various economic problems, nisian army had merely 35,000 troops and had never even including corruption, poor infrastructure, and a deterio- fought in a war (Danahar 47). Tunisia spent 1.4 percent of rating education system (Bilgin 151). The Muslim Broth- its GDP on its armed forces, which is less than half of what erhood was met with a country on the verge of bank- neighboring and spent on their militaries ruptcy with a massive population of 80 million people, (Lynch 148). Tunisia’s military was poor and apolitical, 25 percent of which were living in poverty (Rohde 133). but Egypt’s military possessed immense wealth and was Foreign investors were not willing to provide Egypt involved in various aspects of political life. A key factor with any money until the country demonstrated that it that distinguishes Tunisia’s military from other militaries was making improvements in its own economy (Danahar is that they essentially had nothing to lose when the rev- 120). The youth unemployment rate in Egypt is approxi- olution took place. The did not have a rea- mately 25 percent, and Egypt’s GDP dropped 5.1 percent son to preserve the former government’s old routine since before the revolution and 1.5 percent after the revolution they were essentially marginalized during Ben Ali’s rule. (Rohde 134). Unemployment in Egypt recently reached a Unlike Egypt’s military, the Tunisian military is ten-year peak, and it is projected that Egypt’s real unem- undersized and depoliticized since the former Ben Ali ployment rate is 20 percent with an added 175,000 indi- government primarily utilized police control rather than viduals entering the job market annually (Wickham 274). the military (Hicham Ben Abdallah). Danahar describes It is evident that Egypt was facing preexisting economic Ben Ali as being as: “ ruthless as Bourguiba, but he was problems before the Arab Spring, and that it will take time even more careful. He did not use the army to do his dirty for these matters to be resolved. Unemployment and eco- work, in fact he didn’t seem to want anything to do with nomic contraction are long-term challenges with lasting it at all. Instead he quadrupled the side of the internal se- effects. In 2012, the government reserves in Egypt dimin- curity services” (47). When Ben Ali left Tunisia, his en- ished to only 15 billion dollars and international lenders tire administration left as well. The military had been so were hesitant to offer funds to a nation they believed did VLGHOLQHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRWFRQFHUQHGZLWK¿JKWLQJWR not possess a functioning government (Dawisha 255). preserve the status quo. As far as the Tunisian army was Ultimately, existing data reveals that both Tunisia and FRQFHUQHGDIWHUDSSUR[LPDWHO\¿IW\\HDUVRIGLFWDWRUVKLS

31 Zekri DOI 10.24049/aq.3.1.4 their circumstances could only improve. Tunisia has done social life in Egypt. Furthermore, Tunisia only spent 1.4 an exceptional job of distancing military establishments percent of GDP on the army and Egypt’s army holds no from the government. Although the nation will with- less than 5 percent of GDP. Ben Ali kept the army weak. out a doubt continue to confront problems and setbacks It had also been so marginalized in the past that it was un- in its progression towards democracy, if it maintains able to pursue power after the Arab Spring. Unlike Tuni- this separation between the army and political affairs, sia’s military, the Egyptian military had always been held it should succeed in its democratic transition (Rubeiz). in high regard and after decades of dictatorship, the mili- tary knew that they stood to lose everything depending on THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY ZKRZRXOGULVHWR¿OOWKHSROLWLFDOYRLG7KLVPRWLYDWHGWKH The Egyptian military did not help overthrow Mubarak military to take a hands-on approach to governing Egypt, in order to protect the citizens of Egypt, but instead to which ultimately led to a military coup after successful protect itself (Danahar 55). Mubarak did not construct democratic elections were held and a legitimate presi- the government he ruled because the military had built it. GHQWZDVYRWHGLQWRRI¿FH7KH(J\SWLDQDUP\KLQGHUHG When Mubarak began to prepare his son, Gamal Mubarak, democratization in Egypt. The Tunisian army remained for leadership, the military saw this dynastic succession as subordinate to the , which has facilitated disloyal to the Egyptian revolution of 1952 (Rohde 139). the establishment of a promising democracy in Tunisia. In addition, the is wealthy and it is un- NQRZQKRZPXFK¿QDQFLDOSRZHULWSRVVHVVHV(FRQRPLVWV THE ROLE OF ’S GOV- estimate that the extent of the army’s grasp on Egypt’s ERNMENT HFRQRP\LVDWOHDVW¿YHSHUFHQWRI*'3 'DQDKDU  “The situation in Tunisia also had another factor that dif- Unlike Tunisia’s armed forces, Egypt had a strong ferentiated it from Egypt. It has always been a unique defense establishment that seized all presidential pow- country in the , in its ability to reject radical ers after the Arab Spring (Dawisha 124). The military and maintain a law against ” (Darwish won the support of countless protesters in ’s Tahrir  $IWHU%HQ$OLÀHGWR6DXGL$UDELDKLVSROLWLFDOSDUW\ Square by rejecting the use of brutality to repress the the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) was immo- revolution. This played a decisive role in Mubarak’s bilized. This allowed the restrictions on other parties to quick departure (Wickham 163). After the collapse of be removed (Heydemann and Blaydes 196). In October Mubarak’s regime, the military, which was backed by 2011, elections were held for the Tunisian Constituent the young Egyptians who had led the uprising, took over Assembly. Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, gained SROLWLFDOO\WR¿OOWKHSRZHUYDFXXP7KHPLOLWDU\SURP- control of the new Tunisian Constituent Assembly. Mo- ised to guide Egypt through a nonviolent and structured hamed was elected as the president conversion to democracy. While the army’s top members of Tunisia by the Tunisian Constituent Assembly and organized themselves into a committee named the Su- served as president from 2011 to 2014 (Danahar 274). preme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) (Lynch 16).  7KH ¿UVW IUHH HOHFWLRQ LQ 7XQLVLD¶V KLVWRU\ ZHQW WR Anya Schiffrin and Eamon Kircher-Allen declare that Ennahda. More than four million Tunisians voted, which “the revolution was far from over. Throughout the year, is 90 percent of registered voters and 52 percent of el- resentment grew toward the military leadership, especial- igible voters (Dawisha 117).. Ennahda did not concede, ly the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and or capitulate, to Ben Ali. In fact, the party was banned among the most ardent activists, who had expected much during his regime and it was heavily repressed before more than trading a dictator for a military state” (27). the revolution. Although some Tunisian citizens were When the Egyptian military took power immediately after not fond of Ennahda, they could not accuse it of conspir- Mubarak’s fall, the citizens of Egypt were eager to prevent acy and involvement with the old regime (Danahar 49). the possibility of permanent military rule. Accordingly, During the election, Tunisian voters had to deal with 0RKDPHG0RUVLGHIHDWHG$KPHG6KD¿NDFDQGLGDWHDI- approximately 11,000 candidates. These were dispersed ¿OLDWHGZLWKWKHPLOLWDU\DQG(J\SW¶VIRUPHUUHJLPHHI- between 1,428 lists, which included 787 party lists, 587 IHFWLYHO\EHFRPLQJWKH¿UVWGHPRFUDWLFDOO\HOHFWHGSUHV- independent lists, and 54 coalition lists (Dawisha 117). ident of Egypt (Szmolka 81). On 3 July 2013, Morsi was Many people were surprised by the extent of Ennah- overthrown in a military coup and it appeared that the da’s victory because the Islamist party was projected to Egyptian revolution was starting all over again, but this receive one-fourth of the votes. Instead, Ennahda man- time it did not appear to have the prospects of democracy. aged to receive approximately 35 percent of the votes, When examining the major differences between Tu- which gave the party 89 of 217 assembly seats (118). nisia’s and Egypt’s militaries, it is apparent that these The constitutional process in Tunisia was a collab- militaries played a major role in the aftermath of both orative effort, while the constitutional process in Egypt revolutions. While the Tunisian military was small and ZDVQRW 6]PROND $VLJQL¿FDQWYLUWXHRI(QQDKGDLQ marginalized, the Egyptian military was large, powerful, Tunisia is that although it is an Islamist political party, it is and involved in many aspects of political, economic, and willing to negotiate and compromise in order to establish

32 Aquila - The FGCU Student Research Journal

D QDWLRQDOO\ XQL¿HG JRYHUQPHQW 'LDORJXH DJUHHPHQWV cess power by their vote, a privilege for which they had and compromises among political parties and other ac- already spilled blood in 2011” (69). Morsi was almost tions have been critical in ensuring the success of democ- immediately not living up to the expectations of the Egyp- ratization in Tunisia (Szmolka 91). Tunisia is unique when tian people. The citizens became worried that a theocracy compared to other states in the Arab world, because the might develop in Egypt and some called for the military’s nation has been able to maintain a degree of assistance. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, former chief of the Egyp- in its government. Tunisia has been cautious of allowing tian Armed Forces, launched a military coup in Egypt religion to overtake its entire political realm. By means when he arranged for the apprehension of Morsi and other of talks and collaborations, Tunisia has succeeded in es- members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Sowers 140). Ar- tablishing consensus building efforts and encouraging UHVWLQJWKH¿UVWIUHHO\HOHFWHGSUHVLGHQWRI(J\SWVLJQDOHG high levels of participation to facilitate democratization. the end of Egypt’s promising revolution, and democratiza- tion in Egypt seemed to be no more than a hallucination. Darwish has noted that “[t]o the Islamist, Mus- lim leaders in power were not Muslim enough, because they obstructed the Islamists’ demand for a pure Islam- LF VWDWH

33 Zekri DOI 10.24049/aq.3.1.4 the following variables, economic conditions of the state, in mind that Tunisia and Egypt are not the only states that the role of military in the state’s politics, and religious lead- had revolutions during the Arab Spring, given that Libya, ership in the state’s government, the research concludes

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Rohde, David. Beyond War: Reimagining American In- Middle East Studies, vol. 47, no. 1, 2015, 140-43. ÀXHQFHLQD1HZ0LGGOH(DVW3HQJXLQ*URXS Szmolka, Inmaculada. “Exclusionary and Non-Consen- Rubeiz, Ghassan. “Will Tunisia be a Mod- sual Transitions versus Inclusive and Consensual el for Political Reform in the Arab : The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia.” World?” The Arab American News, 2014. Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1, 2015, 73-95. Schiffrin, Anya, and Eamon Kircher-Allen. From Cairo to Volpi, Frédéric, and Ewan Stein. “ and the State after Street: Voices from the Global Spring. New P, 2012. the Arab Uprisings: Between and State Sowers, Jeannie. “ and Political Economy Power.” Democratization, vol. 22, no. 2, 2015, 276-93. in the New–Old Egypt.” International Journal of

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