Dreams of Babylon

By Ryan Crocker

ince the March 7 national elections shiqaq wa al-nifaq” (“Oh people of , in Iraq, we have watched the high people of disunity and hypocrisy”). Iraqis S drama and low comedy of the gov- quote him today with perverse pride—they ernment-formation process: candidates are the toughest guys on the Middle East- disqualified and reinstated, fraud alleged, ern block. recounts ordered and results upheld, co- Some argue that whether it be Hajjaj alitions forming and shifting in bewilder- at the turn of the eighth century or Sad- ing variations. And when all of this is fi- dam Hussein in the twenty-first, both were nally concluded and a new government uniquely successful as rulers in the land of is formed, it will face a huge agenda of the two rivers because there were no limits unresolved issues: Kurdish-Arab tensions; to their use of terror and violence to main- disputed internal boundaries; corruption; tain order. I was in Iraq early in my career, challenges from neighbors; institutional de- from 1978 to 1980. I was there when Sad- velopment; friction among federal, regional dam assassinated the founder of the Dawa and local governments—the list is virtually Party (of which politician Nuri al-Maliki endless. The truth is that more than seven is a member), Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr. years after the launch of Operation Iraqi His supporters risked torture and death Freedom, Iraq is still at the very beginning to plaster the walls of with post- of this chapter in its long history. ers commemorating his death. I still have one. I was there when Saddam ordered the raq is hard. It has always been hard, arrest and execution of his minister of plan- I and it will go on being hard. In Islam’s ning and protégé, Adnan Hussein, for dar- first century, a rebellion of the Khawarij ing to contradict him at a meeting of the in Iraq (whose fundamentalist theology Revolutionary Command Council, then and inclination to violence resemble that the supreme executive and legislative body of al-Qaeda) necessitated the dispatch of in Iraq. Our driver was taken in the middle the Umayyad Empire’s most successful and of the night and imprisoned for years for ruthless general, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf. He the crime of working for the Americans— began a famous speech at the mosque and for being Kurdish. My neighbors were with these words: “Ya ahl al-Iraq, ahl al- afraid to talk to me. It was, as Iraqi scholar and former exile Kanan Makiya so accu- Ryan Crocker is dean and executive professor at rately described it, the “Republic of Fear.” the George Bush School of Government and Public From the highest officials to the everyman Service at Texas A&M University. A career foreign- in the street, Saddam inspired a culture service officer, he served as ambassador to Iraq from of terror. I served in police states before 2007 to 2009. and after, but neither the Shah’s Iran nor

18 The National Interest Dreams of Babylon the Syria of Hafez al-Assad remotely ap- nuclear program. Prime Minister al-Ma- proached Saddam’s Iraq. liki got out just ahead of regime assassins. I returned to Baghdad in 1998 as the Other members of Dawa and his own fam- U.S. representative to unscom’s special ily were not so fortunate. Kurdish leaders t e a m c h a r g e d Massoud Barzani with inspecting and Jalal Talabani Saddam’s palaces survived Saddam’s for weapons of notorious Anfal mass destruc- campaign against tion—the first t h e i r p e o p l e . American diplo- Vice Presidents mat in Iraq since Tariq al-Hash- 1990. I met Abd emi and Adel Hamoud al-Ti- Abdul Mahdi kriti, Saddam’s were hunted. Al- personal secre- Hashemi lost two tary and one of of his siblings the most feared to regime death men in the re- squads. Such ex- gime. He took periences make delight in show- men tough. But ing me the pal- they also make aces of his boss’s c o m p r o m i s e s two sons-in-law difficult. There who had defected is a phrase in to Jordan in 1995 Pakistan—“two and were brutally men, one grave.” murdered follow- It’s you or me. ing their return. I Losing an elec- knew I was in the tion can be far presence of the more serious than man who had arranged those murders—and being forced out of office. It is a legacy that countless others. I saw the physical fear on haunts Iraq. the faces of every Iraqi he encountered. I was back in Iraq in June 2003 when he was y two years in Iraq as ambassador arrested. It was a satisfying moment. M from 2007 to 2009 saw some sig- Americans forget this heritage of fear. nificant developments, a virtuous circle fol- Iraqis do not. Virtually all of the current lowing the vicious spiral of 2006 when the leadership is scarred by Saddam, in some February al-Qaeda bombing of the Golden cases literally. Ayad Allawi, whose coalition Mosque in Samarra, one of Shia Islam’s emerged from March’s election with the most revered sites, triggered an escalating most seats in Iraq’s parliament, survived wave of sectarian violence that brought the an ax attack by Saddam’s agents. He walks country to the verge of civil war. President with a limp. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shah- Bush’s “new way forward,” popularly known ristani spent more than a decade in solitary as the surge, changed the dynamics. Sunnis confinement for refusing to assist Saddam’s in Anbar, confident that we had their backs,

Dreams of Babylon July/August 2010 19 turned against al-Qaeda. As this Awaken- will remain the indispensable partner. It is ing moved into Baghdad, Iraqi Shia began noteworthy that when our two agreements to notice that Sunnis were now fighting a on U.S. troop withdrawal and what the common enemy. As extremist Shia mili- postwar country would look like came to a tias like Jaish al-Mahdi became less neces- vote on Thanksgiving Day 2008, they had sary for security, they became less popular, the support of all Iraqi political factions ex- and in early 2008 al-Maliki could order cept the Sadrists. And even the Sadrists are his forces to confront them in Basra and now publicly acknowledging the success of Baghdad’s Sadr City with the full support the surge and U.S. involvement in stabiliz- of the population. Iraqi Sunnis in turn saw ing Iraq. al-Maliki behaving as a nationalist rather than a sectarian leader and rejoined his gov- t is vital that this engagement continue. ernment that summer. Landmark legislation I Iraq is not yesterday’s war. on provincial powers (a major step toward Strategic patience is often in short supply resolving Iraq’s states’ rights issues), a re- in this country. It is not a new problem for form of the controversial de-Baathification us, and it is not limited to Iraq. My time regulations and budget allocations for the in the Foreign Service, from Lebanon in Kurdistan region passed in the National the early 1980s to Iraq twenty-five years Assembly as political leaders were able to later, was in many respects service in a long fashion compromises in an atmosphere of war. Dates such as 4/18 and 10/23—the dramatically reduced violence. bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine Iraqis certainly deserve the credit for this Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983—were transformation; but it would not have hap- seared into my memory well before 9/11. pened without intensive, sustained U.S. I learned a few lessons along the way. One engagement, particularly by those in the is we need to be careful about what we get military who carried the surge forward. into. It is a complex, volatile region with The hardest months of my life came in the long experience in dealing with outside in- first half of 2007, as our casualties mounted terventions—our adversaries often do not with no guarantee that the strategy would organize for the war until some point after work. But it did, and the people of both we think we have already won it. But a sec- nations owe a tremendous debt to those ond lesson is that we need to be even more who fought to secure the Iraqi population, careful about what we propose to get out one hard block at a time. It was good to of. Disengagement can have greater conse- see al-Maliki lay a wreath in Arlington Na- quences than intervention. tional Cemetery last summer to honor their Our withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984 sacrifice. was a victory for Syria and Iran who cre- But the surge was not the only strategy ated and used Hezbollah against us with that helped to bring calm. We were en- devastating consequences. They drew con- gaged at all levels—political, economic clusions about our staying power, and when and diplomatic. My colleagues and I spent I stepped off the helicopter in Baghdad on countless hours with Iraqi political figures a warm night in March 2007 as the new throughout the country, working to find American ambassador, I had the eerie feel- compromises, suggesting alternatives, even ing that I was back in Lebanon a quarter of providing drafts. We were in the back- a century earlier. Iran and Syria had again rooms and on the floor of the assembly at combined efforts against us, this time sup- key moments. For some time to come, we porting Jaish al-Mahdi and al-Qaeda in-

20 The National Interest Dreams of Babylon Iraq is not yesterday’s war.

stead of Hezbollah (in fact, Hezbollah train- the oil sector. For the first time in fifty ers were working with Jaish al-Mahdi). years, we are witnessing an Iraq that wants The surge confounded their expecta- close economic and strategic ties with the tions—we stepped forward instead of back. West. Nuri al-Maliki and other Iraqi lead- But they almost succeeded. When then– ers have made multiple visits to Washing- commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General ton and European capitals. Immediately David Petraeus and I testified before Con- after his campaign against Jaish al-Mahdi gress in September 2007, the surge was in 2008, al-Maliki went to Brussels for starting to make a difference. But Ameri- meetings with eu and nato representatives. cans, and much of Congress, were tired of The signal to the West—and to Tehran the war. A major theme in our testimony and Damascus—was clear. Major interna- was that we needed to consider that the tional oil companies, including from the costs of disengaging from Iraq could be far United States, are now helping to develop greater than those of continued involve- the country’s petroleum resources. An Iraq ment. Al-Qaeda would have had a base on at the heart of the Middle East, strategi- Arab soil from which to plan operations cally linked to the West could profoundly throughout the region—and beyond. Iran alter the political calculus of the region. and Syria would have won a major vic- And we now have the blueprint to make tory over the United States, fundamentally this a reality. realigning the entire area with very grave In the post-surge climate of relative sta- consequences for the security of our allies, bility at the end of 2008 we were able to as well as our own. We continue to pay for negotiate two historic bilateral accords, the our loss in Lebanon more than a quarter of Status of Forces Agreement and the Strate- a century ago. The costs of defeat in Iraq gic Framework Agreement, which provided would have been exponentially higher. for a smooth handover from the Bush to the Obama administration. They are our ow we need to shore up the accom- road map for the future. Perhaps inevitably, N plishments of Baghdad. If it is true most public attention has been on the first, that failure in Iraq would have had far- which provides for the full withdrawal of reaching consequences for our interests U.S. forces by the end of 2011. That agree- in the region and beyond, it is also true ment effectively ended the allegations in that the emergence of a stable, prosperous Iraq that America sought permanent occu- and pluralistic country can have a positive pation, as it did the debate in this country impact far beyond its borders. Since the about our presence there. Although we are 1958 revolution that overthrew the mon- no longer involved in combat operations, archy, successive Iraqi regimes have defined the fact that our military is on the ground themselves in opposition to the West gen- is an important reassurance to Iraqis. The erally and the United States in particular. Obama administration’s decision to reduce For example, Iraq led opec in nationalizing troop levels to fifty thousand by the end

Dreams of Babylon July/August 2010 21 of August will require very careful manage- sovereign partners. At present, our active ment to ensure that Iraqis do not become involvement will continue to be vital. We less inclined to compromise as they wres- need to be sensitive to Iraqi concerns over tle with the hard decisions ahead of them. sovereignty, but we need to be in country. And if the new government in Baghdad ap- While recent progress has brought new proaches us about the possibility of extend- hope to Iraqis, the fear hardwired into their ing our presence beyond 2011, I hope we society from the Saddam era remains pro- will listen very carefully. found. The Shia are afraid of the past—that The Strategic Framework Agreement a Sunni dictatorship will reassert itself. The should emerge over time as the model for Sunnis are afraid of the future—an Iraq in our long-term relationship. It lays out the which they are no longer ascendant. And parameters for a U.S.-Iraqi partnership in the Kurds, with their history of suffering, education, trade, diplomacy, culture, and are afraid of both the past and the future. science and technology. It is the outline for Our sustained presence and involvement an alliance that can fundamentally alter the works to mitigate those fears. strategic map of the Middle East. But it will require U.S. commitment. I am heart- raq is in a far better place today than it ened to see Vice President Joe Biden engage I was before the surge. But it is a long war, directly and repeatedly on Iraq. That sus- and the need for sustained commitment tained, high-level effort will be essential in continues. Increasingly, that engagement helping the Iraqis deal with the multiple will be through civilian rather than military challenges ahead of them and in cementing means, but it is vital that we not lose focus. our partnership for the future. Over time, Iran and Syria have had a bad few years in these agreements will define an increas- Iraq, but they are willing to wait. Patience ingly normalized relationship between two is not our strong suit. Over the years, in

22 The National Interest Dreams of Babylon the broader Middle East, our allies have come to fear our strategic impatience, and Editorial Internships our adversaries to count on it. Our disen- gagement from Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet retreat in 1989 ultimately at The National Interest gave al-Qaeda the space to plan the 9/11 attacks. Now we are back; but in Afghani- stan in 2002 and in Pakistan from 2004 to 2007, I found many who wondered when Fall Positions we would head for the exits again. As it is in Iraq, the continuity in policy from the Available Bush to the Obama administration in both these countries is welcome and extremely important. We saw what happened the last time the United States decided to leave. We are dealing with the same enemies today, and they have not become kinder or gentler in the interim. n

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