AND EURASIA STUDIES PROGRAMME (RUFS) defends its sovereignty against Russian media siege

On 30 April 2019, Moscow recalled its ambassador in Lukashenka had to moderate his political ambitions , Mikhail Babich, for having made unprofessional when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia. Mean- remarks concerning the sovereignty of Belarus. The dis- while, the integration rhetoric did not disappear, as Russia missal of Babich has intensified the debate about Bela- remained the main economic partner and sponsor of the rus’s independence and its relations with its main political Belarusian authoritarian regime. ally and economic partner – Russia. The debate is highly As a result, the economic dependence of Belarus on affected by Russian propaganda that is widely present in Moscow became stronger with every year, while Russian the Belarusian media. Not only the Belarusian opposition, media established more stable positions in the Belarusian but also the governing political elites, are now actively media market. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, trying to counter the influence of Russian propaganda on the Belarusian authorities have understood that following Belarus. the loss of economic independence, there is a risk of losing Aliaksandr Lukashenka came to power in 1994. One political independence. This has prompted Lukashenka to of his campaign slogans was the restoration of closer inte- take steps unfavourable to Moscow. Thus, the Belarusian gration with Russia. Already in 1995, Lukashenka initi- government did not recognize Russia’s illegal annexation ated a referendum on several issues, including economic of Crimea. Lukashenka has also repeatedly stated that integration with Russia and recognition of Russian as a Belarus will never relinquish its sovereignty. second official language. In 1996, Moscow and Minsk Since 2014 the authorities introduced a so-called signed an agreement on the creation of a Union of Russia policy of ‘soft Belarusization’, which includes more fre- and Belarus and, in 1999, an agreement on the establish- quent appearance of the in public ment of the of Belarus and Russia. The agree- places and its attribution, with national symbols, to enter- ments implied the future creation of a single currency and tainment and cultural events. common institutions of governance. Such actions by the Belarusian government immedi- Both the referendum and the Union State agreements ately enraged Russian politicians and media. Lukashenka were products of Lukashenka’s political ambition to take a was accused of betraying Russia and selecting the ‘natio- position in the Kremlin. Economic problems and wars in nalistic path’. Chechnya had been undermining the authority and sup- Both Lukashenka and the opposition had problems port for the Russian president, Boris Yeltsin. Lukashenka resisting the wave of Russian propaganda. The short-sighted hoped that by signing an agreement on tight integration policy of the previous years had allowed Russian and Russian- he would have a clearer path to the Kremlin. language media to dominate in the Belarusian media market. This foreign policy was accompanied by brutal sup- Out of the nine channels in the standard TV package, pression of the pro-European and nationalist-oriented three are Russian and very popular among the Belarusian opposition in Belarus. Actors and organizations that population while the rest are Belarus-produced, Russian-lan- were associated with the Belarusian language, or that guage channels. Given that about 50 per cent of Lukashenka identified with resistance to his ‘Union’ ini- watch television on a daily basis, the influence of Russian tiatives, suffered in the first place. From the mid-1990s, media space on the ordinary citizens of Belarus should not educational institutions, public television, radio, and be underestimated. Young people tend to consume news newspapers rapidly began to translate their content into online. However, Russian propaganda has also learned how Russian. Civil society organizations and independent to work on the Internet. A new tool of Russian propaganda is media were subjected to an increasing number of eco- to target young people through chat messages on Telegram, nomic, political, and legal constraints. the social media messaging service.

FOI Memo 6773 RUFS Briefing No. 46 Project No: A11901 June, 2019 Approved by: Mike Winnerstig Recent studies show that in Belarus there are about 40 tions were closed when the government classified online active online media with pro-Russian and anti-Belarusian media as traditional media. Since December 2018, readers narratives. A recent study by the Warsaw-based think who comment on web pages of online editions have had tank, EAST Center, shows which messages promoted by to identify themselves. In 2018 alone, authorities fined pro-Russian Belarusian media in the first three months of independent journalists 55,000 Euro and rigged a few 2019 were most popular: court cases against them. There are still no independent socio-political television and radio channels. Although • Deploy Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus, only some have independent newspa- within the framework of a potential military con- pers and portals, there is at least one pro-Russian disinfor- frontation with the West; mation media outlet in every region of the country. • Develop Russian organizations that form a ‘Rus- Today, the Belarusian regime is caught between a rock sian identity’ among Belarusians; and a hard place: the independent media and Russian • Introduce the Russian rouble in Belarus; propaganda. • Stop dialogue with the West; The Belarusian government has focused so much on • Deploy Russian military bases in Belarus; restricting independent Belarusian journalists and on vio- • Introduce criminal liability for ‘incitement of fear lating their rights that they have failed to see the big ele- at the expense of Russia’. phant entering the room: Russian media and propaganda. In 2017, the influence of these media even forced the This elephant has every chance of becoming a ‘Trojan Belarusian authorities to arrange a show trial of three horse’ that will destroy the independence of Belarus, if the authors from the Russian propaganda service, Regnum Belarusian authorities remain reluctant to mobilise the News Agency, on accusations of inciting ethnic hatred. political will to strongly oppose it. They can only do so According to a recent social poll, half of the Belarusian with a more independent media. students polled said they have a Russian identity. While the Belarusian language is used for many entertainment Alesia Rudnik activities and events, the educational system remains com- pletely Russified. This shows that Lukashenka is hardly interested in promoting the Belarusian language. Instead, its public use in official meetings has the goal of reaching a About the author particular audience. The Belarusian language is essentially a tool for Lukashenka to send signals of sovereignty and Alesia Rudnik is an analyst at the Ostrogorski independence to the neighbour in the east. Centre (Minsk), based in Sweden. She holds a BA To deter Russian interference in Belarusian media in Political and Social Sciences, from the European space, the Belarusian government has introduced a con- Humanities University (Vilnius), and an MA in cept of informational security. The defining document out- Political Science, from Stockholm University. She lines how Belarus is to be protected from ‘manipulation of has been working as an international elections mass consciousness, discrediting ideas and values, erosion observer in different countries as well as in non- of national sovereignty, [and] instability of the informa- governmental organisations in Belarus and Sweden. tion infrastructure’. The informational concept is targeted Alesia is a chairwoman of the organization, at traditional as well as social media channels that use hate Sweden’s Belarusians. Her main research interests are digitalisation and democracy, civil society speech and disinformation. The document is unique in development, and human rights in EaP countries. itself and its appearance is the first documented attempt to restrict Russian intervention in Belarusian media space. There are several examples that show that the Belaru- The views expressed in this briefing are those of the author and sian government continues to limit opportunities for the do not necessarily coincide with those of FOI. development of independent media and to put pressure Please visit www.foi.se/russia to find more about FOI’s Russia on independent journalists who, ironically, are actually and Eurasia Studies Programme. helping to fight Russian propaganda. Several online edi-

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