Building Momentum Women's Empowerment in Tunisia

November 2014

Case Study Report Women’s empowerment

Building Momentum Women’s empowerment in Tunisia

Victoria Chambers with Clare Cummings

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Acknowledgements 6 Abbreviations 6 Abstract 7 1. Introduction 9 1.1 Why women’s empowerment in Tunisia? 9 1.2 Understanding women’s empowerment 10 1.3 Methodology 10 2. What progress has been achieved? 14 2.1 Pre-1990 reforms 14 2.2 Economic development 17 2.3 Concrete gains in women’s empowerment 17 2.4 Institutional and legal progress 26 3. What are the factors driving change? 28 3.1 Post-independence political dynamics and elite arrangements 28 3.2 Top-down political support for pro-gender policies 32 3.3 Social-economic policy 34 3.4 Women’s political and social mobilisation 38 4. What are the challenges? 40 4.1 Social and cultural conservatism 40 4.2 Domestic perceptions of the women’s movement 41 4.3 Constraints to broader political participation 42 5. What lessons can we learn? 44 References 46

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 3 List of tables, figures and boxes

Tables Table 1: Tunisia’s economic policy 1956–1996 18

Table 2: Women’s participation in the labour force, Tunisia and MENA countries 1990–2010 21

Table 3: Women and executive power in Tunisia 22

Table 4: Women and legislative power in Tunisia 22

Table 5: Women and the justice sector 23

Table 6: Women in local government 24

Table 7: Women in the RCD 24

Table 8: Key Tunisian women’s organisations 25

Figures Figure 1: GDP per sector, Tunisia, 1966–2012 17

Figure 2: Women’s health indicators in Tunisia and MENA countries 19

Figure 3: Female education enrolment ratios in Tunisia 1971–2011 20

Figure 4: Historical changes in rates of women in Parliament in Tunisia 23

Figure 5: Public health expenditure as a percentage of Tunisian GDP, 1995–2011 35

Figure 6: Public education expenditure as a percentage of Tunisian GDP, 1995–2011 36

Figure 7: Total ODA disbursed to Tunisian women’s organisations 2004-2012 39

Boxes Box 1: Social cohesion and women’s empowerment 10

Box 2: Definition of the dimensions of women’s empowerment 11

Box 3: Key elements of the Code of Personal Status (CPS) 15

Box 4: Tunisia’s ratification of human rights and women’s rights conventions 15

Box 5: Tunisia’s unified independence movement 29

4 development Progress Case Study Report A voter prepares to vote at a polling station in Tunis. Photo: © Ezequiel Scagnetti/European Union.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 5 Acknowledgements

This case study was written by Victoria Chambers with Clare Katy Harris, Amanda Lenhardt, Annalisa Prizzon and Craig Cummings of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Susan Valters. Deborah Eade provided thorough editing support. Nicolai and Pilar Domingo both of ODI provided oversight. The case study report was funded by the Bill & The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Melinda Gates Foundation as part of ‘Development Kristine Goulding (World Health Organization), James Progress’, a four-year research project that aims to better Doherty (ODI) and Remy Smida (London School of understand, measure and communicate what has worked Economics) who supported the research process. in development and why. Its findings and conclusions The authors are also grateful for the detailed comments are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect on an earlier draft from three peer reviwers: Kate Bird the positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates (independent consultant), Clare Castillejo (FRIDE) and Foundation. For more information, contact Victoria Alina Rocha Menocal (University of Birmingham, on Chambers ([email protected]) or Susan Nicolai secondment from ODI). We are also grateful for the ([email protected]). comments and information provided by ODI colleagues:

Abbreviations

AFTD Tunisian Association of Democratic Women ISCED International Standard Classification of Education AFTURD Tunisian Women’s Association for Research and LTDH Tunisian League for Human Rights Development MAFFEPA Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Family and Children, CECF Tahar al Haddad Club for the Study of the Conditions of and the Elderly Women MENA Middle East and North Africa CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against MMR Maternal Mortality Ratio Women NCA National Constituent Assembly CNFFPA National Council for Women, Family and the Elderly NDP Neo-Destour Party CPS Code of Personal Status ODA Official Development Assistance CR-EDIF Centre for Research, Documentation and Information on ONPF National Office for the Population and the Family Women RCD Constitutional Democratic Rally ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Initiative TFR Total Fertility Rate EPZ Export Processing Zones UGTT Tunisian General Labour Union FNE National Employment Fund UNFT National Union for Tunisian Women GDP Gross Domestic Product WB World Bank

6 development Progress Case Study Report Abstract

Between 1990 and 2010 Tunisia sustained major progress in relation to women’s access to health and education services and the labour market; maternal mortality and fertility rates were halved, girls’ enrolment in secondary school more than doubled and women were increasingly in paid employment. Moreover, despite the limited democratic space, the number of women in government grew significantly and women’s organisations began to play a role in shaping social and political transformation. This report argues that women’s empowerment in Tunisia is largely rooted in the particular features of the elite post- independence bargain, early political choices regarding state–society relations and the associated policies in the areas of education, health and labour, which increased women’s access to resources. It also highlights the interaction between changes in law, policies promoting gender equality and women’s capacity to mobilise. Women’s increasing individual and collective agency in both the public and private spheres explains the existence of opportunities to consolidate women’s empowerment in contemporary Tunisia. Cumulative change in different spheres has been mutually reinforcing, and may also have created resilience regarding potential reversals associated with the political changes brought about by the ‘Arab Spring’. Tunisia’s progress in women’s empowerment provides useful lessons on how women can obtain access to new resources – and the way in which politics and power, and the struggles, dynamics and contestation that these generate – can be used to challenge gender and social power relations. It demonstrates the importance of locating political trajectories of change – such as processes of women’s empowerment – in the context of wider political settlements.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 7 Tunisian women at work. Photo: © COPSE.

8 development Progress Case Study Report 1. Introduction

1.1 Why women’s empowerment in Tunisia? in particular the relationship between historic trends of For many decades Tunisia has been considered as a well social inclusion and greater gender equality. performing country in the Arab and Muslim world in Since independence Tunisia has been characterised terms of women’s rights. Since independence in 1956, the by a political system based on a dominant party, in country’s constitution, legislation and policies have evolved which democratic representation has been limited. in ways that promote the principles of gender equality and Despite the introduction of multi-party politics in 19881 eliminate gender-based discrimination in relation to health, and the abolition of life-term presidencies, between education, labour conditions and political representation. 1990 and 2010 Tunisia’s political regime remained The country’s Code of Personal Status (CPS), introduced in somewhat authoritarian. Moreover, during this period the the same year as independence, made far-reaching reforms general level of political and human rights deteriorated to family law – granting women equal rights in marriage substantially as the government of Ben Ali used and divorce, abolishing polygamy and the practice of increasingly repressive tactics to intimidate and control immediate divorce by men, and giving children born to political dissidents (Moumneh, 2010). It was not until the Tunisian mothers and foreign fathers the right to Tunisian so-called Jasmine Revolution in 2011 that fundamental citizenship. Women obtained the right to vote in 1957 and changes in the political system took place. Yet despite have had the right to seek an abortion without the need this, during the period addressed in this study the number for their husband’s permission since 1973. Tunisia has also of women in the executive and legislative branches been advanced in signing up to international commitments, of government increased significantly and women’s including ratification of the Optional Protocol to the organisations began to play a role in shaping social and United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All political transformation. Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in late A case study of women’s empowerment in Tunisia is 2008. In comparison to neighbouring countries, social also timely. Since the events of the Arab Spring in 2010 its policy has resulted in important advances in health and political system has changed significantly and while the education for women and girls, and in legal rights that introduction of political liberalism has improved political shape gender equity (Gribaa et al., 2009; Kautsch, 2009). freedoms more broadly it has also been accompanied by Between 1990 and 2010 Tunisia recorded high and the emergence of more conservative views about women. sustained progress in relation to women’s access to health, In December 2010, Tunisian citizens took to the streets education, and employment. During this period Tunisia’s to protest against economic hardships and lack of political maternal mortality and fertility rates were halved, girls’ freedoms. After several weeks of civil protest, President secondary school enrolment more than doubled and women Ben Ali, who had been in power for 23 years, resigned on were increasingly incorporated into the labour force. 14 January 2011. This sparked a wave of similar protests The sustained nature of these reforms and their effects across many Arab countries, which came to be known in Tunisia constitute the underpinnings of progress in collectively as the Arab Spring. In the aftermath of the women’s empowerment and make Tunisia a particularly Ben Ali’s resignation, Tunisia moved towards a more interesting case study. In order to understand what has liberal political system and for the first time, in October driven this progress in women’s empowerment it is 2011, the country elected representatives to the National necessary to examine the conditions that shaped the social Constituent Assembly (NCA). Following the overwhelming and political environment in which the progress took place, victory of the Islamist Ennahda party,2 however, there

‘We have already asserted that Tunisian women are a reflection of modernity, a guarantee of our people’s authenticity, and one of the pillars of the Republic. Indeed without women’s citizenship, the very notion of citizenship will be incomplete’ – President Ben Ali

1 National Pact of November 1988. 2 Ennahda formed a ‘troika’ coalition government with the leftist parties Ettakatol and Congress for the Republic (CPR), after winning 37% of the votes (Meyer-Resende and Weichselbaum, 2014; Goulding, 2011; Kausch, 2013; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013).

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 9 was widespread concern that the influence of religion in the country would increase and jeopardise the liberal Box 1: Social cohesion and women’s empowerment legislation which had been enshrined in the CPS since the The study of women’s empowerment, which is 1950s (Goulding, 2011a; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013). part of the Development Progress project, seeks to In fact, almost three years to the day after the Jasmine identify and explain examples of progress across Revolution, a neutral interim government voted on the different dimensions of development. The project adoption of a new Tunisian constitution, which has been draws on the work of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi widely applauded for its inclusiveness (Meyer-Resende Commission (2009), which identified a range of and Weichselbaum, 2014). Although implementation will dimensions of wellbeing, including political voice and social cohesion. Our working premise was that be a major challenge (see section 3, below), important women’s empowerment advances social cohesion compromises reached between Islamist and secular leaders when the (enabled) agency of individuals or groups have enshrined the principle of gender equality in the contributes to redefining power relations in ways country’s new constitution, not only preserving but also that help to reduce structures of inequality and advancing key social and political gains for women (Amera, push for more equitable outcomes. Policies that 2014; Pickard, 2013; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013). In focus on eliminating discrimination and exclusion 2011, a quota on gender parity on party electoral lists was across a range of spheres (economic, political, enshrined in law to ensure that women accounted for at socio-cultural) and that focus on different levels least 50% of the candidates elected to draft the constitution (domestic, community/sub-national and national) (Goulding, 2011b). The resilient nature of the advances may therefore enhance the social inclusion of in gender equality in the face of political challenges make disadvantaged sectors of the population. As the Tunisia an important case study and one that has implications work on women’s empowerment demonstrates, such histories of progress are deeply contested and for broader debates about the process and consequences of inevitably political. achieving progress in women’s empowerment. Source: O’Neil, Domingo and Valters (2014)

1.2 Understanding women’s empowerment This is one of two case studies on women’s empowerment Women’s empowerment is a multi-dimensional concept produced as part of ODI’s Development Progress project. that encompasses a number of loosely overlapping political, The objective of these case studies is to observe progress social and economic dimensions in both the private and on social cohesion through the lens of gender equality and public spheres, at different levels (national, subnational) women’s empowerment (see Box 1). and at varying speeds (see Box 2).3 Since it requires changes By taking a detailed look at two countries in which in how power and resources are allocated, the process of research suggests that there have been substantial strides bringing about women’s empowerment is also inherently in women’s empowerment in the last two decades, the political, and is therefore susceptible to resistance and studies aim to identify what this looks like in practice and reversals. Identifying and measuring progress in women’s the factors explaining it. This case study is underpinned empowerment therefore poses challenges. by the definitions and the analytical approach set out in Women’s empowerment involves both process and a background paper (Valters and Domingo, 2013) on outcome – empowerment involves a process of self- women’s empowerment. transformation but also reflects a state of change achieved, Women’s empowerment goes beyond the definition and thus an outcome of a varying range of enabling processes. of gender equality (which focuses on women’s condition relative to men) and incorporates the extent to which women have the power and ability to make choices and 1.3 Methodology control their own destiny. Following Kabeer (1999), This case study seeks to answer two questions: women’s empowerment involves the process by which women gain the ability to make and enact strategic life •• What does progress in women’s empowerment look choices. For Eyben (2011) empowerment takes place when like in Tunisia? ‘individuals and organised groups are able to imagine their •• What factors explain this? world differently and to realise that vision by changing the relations of power that have kept them in poverty, restricted In order to identify the first question, we track processes their voice and deprived them of their autonomy’ (p2). through two categories of change. First, we examine the range of institutional reforms and social policy measures

3 Jo Rowlands (1997) identified four types of power, including: power over – or the ability to control others; power to – or the ability to exercise choice and change external conditions; power with – or the power that comes from collective action; power within – or increased critical consciousness and self- respect. See also Luttrell et al. (2009).

10 development Progress Case Study Report may be the outcome of women’s agency; they are also Box 2: Definition of the dimensions of women’s enablers of the development of capabilities associated with empowerment agency and empowerment (education, for instance). But Political empowerment occurs when women gain the specifics of what enables institutional reform, or equity- the ability to influence the rules and norms that enhancing social policy, and how women’s agency and govern society and decisions about who gets what, capabilities are shaped – or constrained – at the collective when and how – individually or collectively. This and individual level are context-specific and deeply can be through public or private organisations, and embedded in the particular histories of how structure concern formal or informal (e.g. socio-cultural) and agency intersect to shape empowerment outcomes. rules/institutions, operating at the household, In the case of Tunisia, women’s empowerment is rooted community, sub-national and national levels. in the features of the elite post-independence bargain. Social empowerment occurs when women gain the Early political choices regarding the terms of state–society ability to make/influence decisions about their social relations created an enabling environment for women’s interactions (e.g. mobility, associations with others), capabilities – allowing voice and agency to develop – and reproduction, health and education. in more recent times have become more effective brokers Economic empowerment occurs when women gain of gender agendas, within the limits of authoritarian the ability to make, influence and act on decisions structures and resilient patriarchal social norms. about their participation in labour markets, their Although the focus of this analysis is from 1990 to share of unpaid work and the allocation and use of 2010, Tunisia’s progress in women’s empowerment during their own/their household’s assets. this period needs to be seen as part of longer-term trends Psychological empowerment occurs when women regarding the evolution of state–society relations and the gain the belief that they should be able to make or terms of the political settlement regarding independence influence decisions that affect them and gain the and state-building from the 1950s onwards. This is relevant confidence to act on this. because the consistency and continuity of gains made in Source: O’Neil, Valters, and Domingo (2014), drawing on Kabeer the early post-independence period have been critical to (1999); Luttrell et al. (2009); Eybens (2011) shaping the socio-political conditions that have enabled progress on gender equality and women’s empowerment in the two decades on which this case study is focused. that contributed to eliminating gender-based discrimination In order to address the second question, the case study and barriers to gender equality. These are both enabling situates the achievements in women’s empowerment within factors for progress on women’s empowerment, and the longer-term history of the post-independence Tunisian are in themselves a measure of progress regarding the state and the political settlement underpinning it. The elimination of gender-based discrimination and exclusion nature of the elite bargain laid important foundations for – such as legislation that aims to eliminate gender-based the advancement of gender equality, which in turn has discrimination or measures designed to promote gender contributed to women’s empowerment, the achievements equality. It also includes policies and institutional reforms of which have proved resilient since the Arab Spring. that enable implementation of new laws, such as establishing The case study demonstrates the importance of locating formal structures which aim to achieve gender equality (e.g. political trajectories of change – such as processes of a women’s ministry) or building up capacity in relevant state women’s empowerment – in the context of wider political bodies; and social policies on health and education. settlements. How these evolve is crucial to understanding Second, we assess progress in women’s empowerment the boundaries of empowerment processes, trajectories through gains achieved, or the measures by which of change at the intersection of institutional and political the achievement of gender equality and women’s change, and women’s agency. empowerment can be said to have taken place. This The case study therefore includes discussion on the includes quantitative measures such as the number of evolution of the post-independence political settlement in women in public office or women in decision-making Tunisia and the associated public policies in education, positions, or the number of girls and women in formal health and labour issues, as well as the introduction of education. Qualitative measures include assessments of the a progressive family code; the cumulative and iterative degree to which women are having impact on policy and interaction between legislation and policy choices and decision-making and, related to this, the extent to which women’s political agency; and policies on resource this results in a deliberate policy to achieve gender equality. allocation over several decades, given the particular socio- Qualitative measures on women’s voice are harder to economic features of Tunisian society. identify – but no less important for that. While we make reference to the Arab Spring and its These progress markers are relevant to women’s implications for women’s empowerment in Tunisia (see empowerment insofar as they reflect changes in women’s sections 1.1, 3.4, 4.3, and 5) the indicators on outcomes capacity to exercise power. Institutional and policy reform and institutional change we discuss do not encompass the

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 11 country’s Jasmine Revolution or the post-revolutionary era health, education and other related indicators, and academic (2011–2014), which falls outside the period of analysis. It literature on women’s empowerment broadly and in Tunisia. is nevertheless important to stress that the achievements The report is structured as follows: section 2 describes regarding women’s empowerment described in this study progress in women’s empowerment in Tunisia in the last 20 have contributed to ensuring that these gains are reflected years. Section 3 explores the factors that have driven this in the 2014 Constitution. progress, paying attention to trends across indicators of progress For this desk-based case study UK-based researchers and the possible relations between them. Section 4 outlines the reviewed key documents and published materials, including remaining and future challenges while section 5 highlights some government policies, surveys, project reports and grey key lessons to be drawn from Tunisia’s experience. literature, publicly available datasets on demographics,

12 development Progress Case Study Report Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 13 2. What progress has been achieved?

In order to determine what progress in gender equality 2.1 Pre-1990 reforms and women’s empowerment in Tunisia looks like, we In the immediate post-independence era (1956–1987) distinguish between different types of change. Following Tunisia undertook significant reforms. These first wave of O’Neil et al. (2014) we observe women’s pathways of institutional and policy reforms began immediately after empowerment through progress in enabling conditions independence and were unprecedented in the Middle East (such as institutional and legal change) and achievements and North Africa (MENA), expanding Tunisian women’s (such as greater access to education for women and girls). entitlements in a number of key areas. The main elements of In practice these measures of progress are interconnected. this first wave of domestic legal reforms are described below. While this study is concerned with progress in women’s empowerment from 1990 to 2010, this period cannot be 2.1.1 Legal and policy change in social issues – family viewed in isolation from earlier reform processes. Ever law, education, religion – and implementing measures since independence, Tunisia’s constitutional and legislative over time framework has evolved in a progressive manner, with One of the most influential and important legal changes successive changes promoting the principles of gender in promoting women’s equality in Tunisia came with the equality and non-discrimination in relation to health, promulgation of the new Code of Personal Status (CPS) education, labour conditions and political representation. on 13 August 1956. In far-reaching reforms to marriage, In order to understand what has driven progress in divorce, custody and inheritance laws, the CPS gave women’s empowerment in this period it is also necessary to greater protection to women in the private sphere and examine the conditions that shaped the social and political considerable autonomy from husbands and extended male environment in which the progress was made. kin in family matters.4 Among other things it abolished Below we consider key elements of the legal reforms polygamy, gave women the right to choose their spouse, that were made before 1990 and offer a brief overview set the minimum age for women to marry at 15 years, of Tunisia’s experience of economic development since eliminated the practice of immediate divorce (repudiation) independence. This is necessary in order to understand the by men, and gave women equal rights to divorce (see Box political and socio-economic context that has underpinned 3). Coming less than five months after independence, and Tunisia’s progress towards women’s empowerment. before Tunisia became a republic, the CPS profoundly Given the relevance of Tunisia’s state-building changed family law, transforming the legal construction experience and the evolution of state–society relations in of gender roles within the family and women’s status. The shaping the socio-political conditions which have enabled CPS radically altered the vision of the family, privileging this progress, we present an overview of these, and the the ties between spouses, children and parents over those background to the early policy decisions taken by the of the extended kinship through male relatives. The new newly independent state which provided a facilitating code was pioneering legislation in the MENA region environment for change. We then consider the concrete (Bennhold, 2011; Charrad, 1997, 2001, 2007; Baliamoune, gains that have been made in the three dimensions of 2011; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Baliamoune, 2009; Gribaa women’s empowerment (social, economic, and political) et al., 2009; EU, 2010). and the consolidating reforms to the institutional and legal The 1959 Tunisian Constitution was also a milestone process made during the period in question. in recognising women as equals before the law. It states that ‘all citizens hold the same rights, and have the same

‘Look at us. We’re doctors, teachers, wives, mothers – sometimes our husbands agree with our politics, sometimes they don’t. But we’re here and we’re active’ – Mounia Brahim, Ennahda Executive Council member

4 Code de statut personnel in French; Majalla in Arabic.

14 development Progress Case Study Report Box 3: Key elements of the Code of Personal Status (CPS) Box 4: Tunisia’s ratification of human rights and women’s rights conventions The following are a number of key reforms to the CPS: •• Universal Declaration of Human Rights Marriage Universal Convention (1956) •• Polygamy was abolished (clause 18). •• Convention on the Political Rights of Women •• A minimum age of marriage for women and men (1967) was fixed at 15 years and 18 years respectively. •• Convention on the Nationality of Married In subsequent revisions (1964 and 2007) this was Women (1967) increased to 17 then 18 years for women (clause 5). •• Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum •• The consent of both spouses became a Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages requirement for marriage and the right of a (1967) guardian to give a woman in marriage without •• Convention Against Discrimination in Education her consent was abolished (clauses 3, 10). (1969) •• Registration with civil authorities became a •• Night Work (Women) Convention (1957, 1992) requirement for a marriage (clause 4) – so that •• Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and the state, rather than Shari’a or customary law Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (1967) would henceforth dictate family matters. •• The OTT convention on payment equality for the same work between male and female labour Divorce force (1968) •• The practice of repudiation was abolished, •• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of making it obligatory for a divorce to take place Discrimination against Women (1985) in a court (clause 30). •• Convention on the Rights of the Child (1991) •• Women and men were to enjoy equal rights with respect to filing for divorce (clause 31) and liability for compensation (clause 30). in a court and gave the judge decision-making powers over •• In cases of divorce, reconciliation attempts by the child custody. The creation of a national secular justice court became mandatory (clause 32). system effectively eliminated formal religious jurisdiction over women’s private life, which had served to reinforce Custody of children power relations between men and women. Henceforth, in •• Mothers and fathers were accorded equal rights Tunisian secular courts, a woman’s testimony has held the for the care of children and were given first rights same weight as a man’s. of responsibility for children above the extended In the immediate post-independence period Tunisia family. ratified a number of key international conventions related Source: La République tunisienne, 1956 [2012] to human and/or women’s rights (see Box 4). The most significant of these was ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination duties. They are all equal before the law’. The constitution against Women (CEDAW) in 1985, just before the end of accorded women the right to vote and stand for election, Bourguiba’s rule.6 While domestic legal reforms appear to and opened the way for the amendment of other legislation have been more important in promoting women’s equality (laws and codes) to progressively acknowledge women’s than Tunisia’s commitment to international conventions, fundamental rights in other aspects of life: the right to the latter nonetheless provided an incentive for Tunisia to work, to free education, to social protection and so forth. establish a number of mechanisms to protect and promote The unification of the justice system in 1957 involved women’s rights in accordance with CEDAW and the the abolition of religious courts (Maliki, Hanafi and Istanbul recommendations (see section 2.4). Rabbinic) and their replacement with secular courts5 and Of course, the ratification of international norms – and was also an important milestone for women in Tunisia. indeed codification generally of women’s rights – does not The CPS had made it obligatory for divorce to take place necessarily reflect the reality.

5 On 3 August, secular courts replaced religious courts as the high court for the application of Islamic law while the law of 27 September 1957 closed the rabbinical court of Tunis. 6 Tunisia, however, entered a number of reservations with respect to citizenship and inheritance issues: Article 9(2), regarding the right of a woman to pass her nationality to her children; Article 15(4), regarding the right of the woman to choose her own domicile; several paragraphs of Article 16 (c, d f, g and h) related to marriage, divorce and inheritance, and Article 29(1), regarding arbitration of disputes arising from the convention (UN-CEDAW, 1985). The latter reservation was registered on the grounds that the convention principles were not consistent with Tunisia’s interpretation of women’s inheritance rights in Q’uranic texts.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 15 A series of social reforms introduced in the first decade education, in order to ‘enable both sexes, without prejudice after independence (1956–1966), in particular in the area […] to develop their personalities and aptitude’ (article 1).8 of health and education policy, also fundamentally affected women’s roles in the public sphere, and contributed to 2.1.2 Legal and policy change in economic life – land giving women greater opportunities and participation in law, labour law and policy decision-making processes in the private domain. This Although not specifically aimed at improving gender occurred despite the fact that improving gender equality was equality, a number of institutional reforms in the not necessarily the main reason for these policy decisions immediate post-independence period were also beneficial (EU, 2010). Below we discuss each of these in turn. to women. Legal reforms concerning local administration Population control was a central element of the and tribal land that were intended to diminish the power country’s post-independence development strategy. of kinship ties and weaken the religious establishment Curbing fertility rates was a policy priority, which aimed were important for enabling women’s empowerment to reverse the pro-natalist policy established by the French in the domestic and private sphere. Touching, as they (Bacchri and Nache, 2003; Baliamoune, 2009). From did, on aspects of religion and kinship bonds, these the 1950s, Tunisia began establishing a national family- reforms fundamentally altered social relations and had planning (FP) programme, which focused on a range of important implications for family relationships in a way maternal health issues, with support from the United which favoured women (Charrad, 2001), ultimately Nations Population Fund and the Ford Foundation – undermining patriarchy and giving women greater access the first African country to do so (Baliamoune, 2011). to land and assets. The FP programme was integrated into the 1962–63 For example, in 1956 and 1957, public charitable National Development Plan and made operational by the foundations (waqfs)9 and private charitable foundations creation of a family planning agency (ONPF) in the early were supressed and abolished. The practice of leaving landed 1960s. This was accompanied by further investment in property in trust to religious institutions was thus made reproductive health and the enactment of social policy illegal, which considerably reduced the power of religious reforms to discourage large families (e.g. security benefits institutions by eroding their financial support base.10 This were limited to a maximum of three children) (Bechri policy also benefited female heirs by removing one of the and Naccache, 2003). Also critical in this respect were mechanisms by which they could be legally deprived of the revocation of laws pertaining to importing and selling the land they could inherit (Charrad, 2001). In 1957, legal contraceptives in 1961 and the legalisation of abortion reforms also saw collective tribal land dismantled and in 1965.7 These policies helped to give women greater distributed to individual owners11 (Charrad, 2001). This control over decisions about whether and when to have was coupled with extensive local administrative reforms, children and expanded their life choices in the private particularly in the south where there remained pockets sphere (Bechri and Naccache, 2003; Baliamoune, 2011) – of resistance to the modernist state-building agenda; the they were also unique in the Arab world and beyond. administrative structure was deconcentrated along with the Ever since independence, education has been a priority redrawing of territorial boundaries (Charrad, 2001: 212). for the Tunisian state. This is reflected in the legal measures The main objective of these measures and policies was to and policies that have been introduced and in the consistent weaken tribal lines (either cutting across them or grouping rise in public spending on the sector (see section 3.3.2). several together), and therefore the political leverage of In the immediate post-independence era, the creation of kin-based structures that might have challenged Bourguiba’s a skilled labour force to meet the needs of urban businesses agenda (Charrad, 2001). This had the effect of eliminating and to support the country’s manufacturing industry was a any organised challenge to the implementation of the far- key priority of Bourguiba’s government (Baliamoune-Lutz, reaching family code that contributed to gender equality and 2009). The Tunisian government therefore invested heavily women’s empowerment. in the public education system (primary and secondary The 1959 constitution also opened the way for other school) and passed legislation on improving all children’s legal reforms in relation to labour (laws and codes), which access to education. Article 1 of the November 1958 gave women the right to work, and the Labour Law of education law enshrined the right of girls to receive an 30 April 1966, which guaranteed women and men equal

7 The 1965 reforms permitted abortion for women with five or more living children who were in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy (Décret-loi du 26 septembre 1973). 8 Loi n° 58-118 du 4 novembre 1958 portant sur l’enseignement. 9 A waqf is a religious endowment, typically a building, plot of land or cash, donated for Muslim religious or charitable purposes, which is held by a charitable trust. 10 At independence an estimated 20–25% of Tunisian land was held in trust in this manner. 11 Loi n° 57-16 du 28 septembre 1957.

16 development Progress Case Study Report rights to employment. In 1983, the Public Sector Labour Figure 1: GDP per sector, Tunisia, 1966–2012 Law12 recognised particular rights for women including 25 two months’ maternity leave on full pay and the possibility

of an additional four months on half pay (article 48). It % of GDP also gave women the right to take two years of unpaid leave to raise one or more children. 20

2.1.3 Legal and policy change in politics The 1969 Electoral Code13 recognised women’s right to 15 vote and to stand for election to parliament. In addition, the 1988 law organising political parties14 required them to respect a number of values (including those human rights defined in the constitution and in ratified international 10 conventions as well as personal statutes) and to apply the principle of non-discrimination, although quotas were not a legal requirement. 5

2.2 Economic development Since independence Tunisia has recorded consistent annual 0 growth rates of around 5% (Baliamoune, 2011: 11) and 196619681970197219741976197819801982198419861988199019921994199619982000200220042006200820102012 demonstrated good economic performance since the 1980s despite structural adjustment (Baliamoune-Lutz, Agriculture, value added 2009). This growth is rooted in Tunisia’s pre-independence Manufacturing, value added experience. At independence, unlike its MENA neighbours, Tunisia was already highly urbanised with a relatively large Source: World Bank, 2014 business class, a centralised state, and a strong economy based on the manufacturing and export of textile, leather equilibrium of the political settlement (Baliamoune, 2011; and food products (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009). It also had Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009: 12). Table 1 (overleaf) summarises a competent civil service with the capacity to implement the key trends in economic policies and outcomes. administrative reforms (Charrad, 2001: 96).15 From the 1970s onwards, the share of agriculture in the Tunisian economy declined rapidly while exports and the 2.3 Concrete gains in women’s empowerment manufacturing sector grew enormously and at a sustained Since independence, Tunisia has recorded sustained rate until mid-1995 (see Figure 1). Since the 1980s Tunisia progress in a number of social, economic and political has significantly diversified its economy (Charrad, 2001). dimensions of women’s equality, although it should be In addition Tunisia has a proportionally larger urban noted that while there was significant change in the area of population than Algeria, Egypt and Morocco – in 2005, political representation between 1990 and 2010, this was 68% of the Tunisian population lived in urban areas not the case in terms of social and economic indicators. (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Ben Salem, 2010: 21). Improvements in women’s health, and access to education While the direction of social policies remained and employment, had already achieved significant consistent in the post-independence period, there were progress by the 1990s. An analysis focused solely on the several important shifts in economic policy. These changes absolute changes that took place between 1990 and 2010 were influenced by political dynamics when it became would therefore give an incomplete picture of progress. necessary to reduce or eliminate conflict among various Consequently, in order to examine the drivers of progress interest groups (see also sections 3.1 and 3.2). Policy and Tunisia’s capacity to sustain it, we situate more recent shifts were rooted in the successive need to appease the changes within a broader historical background. labour unions and the business elites in order maintain the

12 Loi n° 83-112 du 12 Décembre 1983, portant statut général des personnels de l’Etat, des collectivités publiques locales et des établissements publics à caractère administratif. 13 Loi n° 69-25 du 8 avril 1969, portant code électoral. 14 Loi n° 88-32 du 3 mai 1988 organisant les partis politiques. 15 Collège Sadiqi was founded in Tunis in 1875 with the principal mission of training Tunisia’s civil servants in a way which was ‘designed to adopt Western knowledge to the Arab-Islamic identity’ (Charrad, 2001: 96).

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 17 Table 1: Tunisia’s economic policy 1956–1996

Dates Economic policy Key characteristics of economic policy Key features of economic Why was policy not sustained? orientation policy 1956-1960 State-led capitalism Liberal policies but with state intervention State interventions deterred The powerful Tunisian General Labour (e.g. protection, prohibitive tariffs, private investment. Union (UGTT) was a potential threat monopolies in public utilities, banks). to Bourguiba’s power, and in order to appease and control it he appointed a former UGTT secretary-general, Ben Saleh, as Minister of Social Affairs and Economy in 1961. As a result the NDP adopted UGTT economic policy. 1961-1969 Socialist Central planning,* collectivisation, public A severe economic crisis Faced with the need to resort to the use investment in infrastructure. fuelled popular discontent of the army to enforce economic policy, and regional violence in the President Bourguiba dismissed his 1960s. finance minister, Ben Saleh, ultimately bringing about a policy reversal. 1970-1980 Market economy with Support for private initiatives and Although internally Strategy failed to achieve desired protectionism export-promotion policies (i.e. creation of inconsistent this policy results. Public investment remained export-processing zones (EPZs) alongside created significant job dominant and import-substitution bias protection for import-substituting opportunities in the urban increased. Street unrest and union industries). manufacturing sector for activity resulted in the adoption of semi-skilled labour. The share populist policies. of agriculture in the economy declined rapidly and Tunisia’s manufacturing sector grew at a sustained rate right until the mid-1990s (see Figure 1). 1981-1985 Economic populism Wage increases. Populist policies fuelled Proposed price rises to combat inflation inflation and generated a and the balance of payments crisis in balance of payments crisis. 1984 led to widespread social unrest. Bourguiba’s response was to cancel the proposed rise and appoint a new Prime Minister in 1986. 1986-1991 Crisis-triggered Devaluation of currency, restrictive The package of structural The government recognised the need International Monetary monetary, fiscal and income measures; adjustment and liberalisation for additional measures. Export-oriented Fund structural trade and financial-sector liberalisation. achieved some initial strategy had created a constituency with adjustment success, but the reforms stake in exports.** failed to revive private investment. 1995-2000 Association agreement Provided for establishment of a free-trade Long implementation period with the EU*** area. for tariff removal has limited restructuration in import- substitution activities and slowed down reform in crucial areas such as banking, telecommunications and boards of trade.

Source: Bechri and Naccache (2003) * With the publication of the ‘Perspectives Decennales’ (Bechri and Naccache, 2003: 15). ** Becchri and Naccache (2003: 36) note that only a third of Tunisia’s exporting firms in the textile and clothing sector were foreign-owned. They also highlight the shift from import-substitution to an interest in promoting exports in the mechanical and electrical sectors. *** Tunisia was the first of the countries in the MENA region to sign an association agreement with Europe in 17 July 1995, a partnership which was consolidated by the Neighbourhood Action plan adopted in July 2005 in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy Initiative (ENPI).

18 development Progress Case Study Report Figure 2: Women’s health indicators in Tunisia and MENA Eltigani, 2009). As the World Bank’s World Development countries Indicators (WDI) show (see Figure 2), Tunisia’s TFR fell from 7.04 births per woman in 1960 to 2.13 in 2011, 80 a faster reduction than the average among MENA 70 countries. The absolute drop in fertility rates has also % change 60 been higher than any other country in the region, 50 including Morocco and Turkey. Moreover, Tunisian 40 national statistics indicate that while there is a rural– urban disparity, showing TFRs of 1.5 and 2.6 respectively, 30 rural fertility rates in Tunisia remain lower than the 20 average for the MENA region (EU, 2010: 35). 10 Tunisian life expectancy at birth has also improved 0 significantly over the years, from 42.01 years in 1960 -10 to 74.75 years in 2011 and rising female life expectancy -30 has contributed to this trend, increasing from 43.01 -30 years in 1960 to 74.7 in 2011. As Figure 2 shows, -40 improvements in female life expectancy accelerated most -50 quickly between 1960 and 1980. Like other health-related -60 indicators, these are better than those of the MENA -70 region overall. -80 Tunisia has more than halved its maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in the two decades, from 130 per 100,000 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2011* live births in 1990 to 56 in 2010 (Figure 2). The Tunisia MENA disaggregation of progress across income groups or Women’s life expectancy between rural and urban areas is constrained by a lack of Fertility rate, total longitudinal data on MMR. Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) UNESCO data show that girls’ enrolment at all levels of education – primary, secondary, and tertiary – has increased steadily since 1971, reaching 108%,16 94% *Maternal mortality rates are for 2010 and 45% respectively by 2011 (see Figure 3, overleaf). ** Although the MMR for the MENA region reflects a higher percentage In particular, the period between 1990 and 2010 was change from 1990 to 2010, Tunisia’s MMR is lower than the regional characterised by marked progress in secondary and average, reducing from 130 per 100,000 live births to 56 during this tertiary enrolment. Girls’ secondary school enrolment rose period. This compares to a reduction from 220 to 81 in the MENA region as a whole. from 38% to 94%, while their tertiary school enrolment Source: World Bank (2014) increased from 6% to 45%. Not only does this represent a reduction in the gender gap, but also that more girls and women are in secondary and tertiary education than are 2.3.1 Social outcome indicators boys and men. This differential is particularly so in tertiary Data on women’s health in Tunisia indicate that women education where women’s university-level enrolment rate live longer and have fewer, and apparently healthier, in 2011 was 44.9% compared to 29.5% for men. children than their MENA counterparts (Baliamoune, The rise in girls’ gross secondary school enrolment can 2011: 7). Moreover, Tunisia has made significant progress be at least partially attributed to the high levels of girls’ in increasing girls’ education, as reflected in higher primary school enrolment, which had been achieved by the enrolment of girls at all levels of schooling and overall 1970s and continued to rise in the 1990s (see Figure 3). school life expectancy, increased female literacy and a The average number of years a girl spends in diversification in their areas of study. formal education in Tunisia (from primary to tertiary Tunisia’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) declined level) – known as the school life expectancy – has risen dramatically in the post-independence era and has consistently since the early 1970s. In 1971, a girl’s school continued to fall steadily since then (Cochrane, 1995; life expectancy was only 4.9 years. This had risen to 9.3

16 The value is over 100% because of the simultaneous enrolment of some over-age and under-age children, as well as (potentially) the transition first to an 11-year and then to a 12-year school system.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 19 Figure 3: Female education enrolment ratios in Tunisia Finally, it is important to note that there are regional 1971–2011 disparities in levels of education. According to the National Institute of Statistics – Tunisia, 2010 data show that while education levels have increased dramatically since the early 120 1960s, when 68% of the labour force had no schooling, the proportion of the labour force with no education in 100 Grand Tunis is 3.7%, compared to 26.2% in Sidi Bouzid, 25% in Kef, 21.7% in the northwest, and 21.5% in the mid-west (Boughzala and Hamdi, 2014). The significant

Female gross enrolment ratio 80 differences in literacy and schooling rates among regions and between urban and rural areas has been of concern to the government, as reflected in programmes for priority 60 education areas and the focus of the 2000 National Adult Education Programme on women and rural areas. As a result, the variation in educational levels between rural and 40 urban areas and between different regions is far less marked than in other MENA countries (Boughzala and Hamdi, 2014). 20 2.3.2 Socio-economic indicators Women’s participation in the labour market has shown 0 sustained progress as their representation as a percentage 1971 1980 1990 2000 2011 of the total labour force has risen from 20.8% to 25.3% between 1990 and 2010 (see Table 2). Primary All levels combined (except pre-primary) Government data indicate that the number of women Secondary (all programmes) actively seeking work in Tunisia multiplied by 2.65 from Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6) Primary & Secondary combined 1994 to 2002. A comparison with male job applications shows that women represented 33.36% of job seekers in Source: UNESCO (2009) 1994 and 43.3% in 2002 (La Republique tunisienne, 2004: 25). Of women looking for work, the number obtaining years by 1990 and to 15.1 years by 2010.17 This compares jobs also increased during the same period, from 25,497 with an increase from 11.3 to 14.3 years for boys over in 1994 to 33,120 in 2002, and women’s unemployment the same period, indicating that the gap between girls’ rate fell from 17.2% in 1994 to 15.2% in 2001 – the and boys’ school life expectancy has gradually been equivalent of a 30% increase in the number of women reversed in favour of girls. finding work (La Republique tunisienne, 2004: 25). A Furthermore, Tunisia’s achievements in increasing 2004 government report indicated that by 2002 women literacy and school enrolment ratios and school life represented 25.3% of the population employed or actively expectancy outstrip those in other MENA countries. seeking employment and 25.1% of the population in Baliamoune (2011) refers to World Bank data to employment (La Republique tunisienne, 2004: 25). show that Tunisian women have a higher probability Not only do women have better access to jobs but of obtaining secondary and tertiary education and of they also obtain more diversified types and levels of having more years of schooling than their counterparts employment. Gribaa et al. (2009) indicate that women’s in Morocco and Turkey: from 1971 to 2007, Morocco’s representation in various professions in the private sector school life expectancy for girls rose from 3.1 to 9.8 years, (particularly in law and medicine) increased significantly while in Turkey it went from 6.3 to 11 years. Moreover, in the 1980s. In 1982–1983, women occupied only in contrast to Tunisia, in Morocco and Turkey secondary 16.46% of professional positions, which had increased to and tertiary school enrolments remain higher for men 21.66% in 1991–1992. By 1990, women represented 10% than for women and the gap between female and male of lawyers and in 1992–1993 they accounted for 33% of literacy is closing less rapidly (Baliamoune, 2011; Bechri doctors, 57% of dentists, 65% of pharmacists and 18% and Naccahce, 2003). of veterinarians and biologists. These professional women

17 School life expectancy aims to show the overall level of development of an educational system in terms of the average number of years of formal education schooling that the system offered to the eligible population. According to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics, ‘it is calculated as the sum of the age specific enrolment rates for the levels of education specified. The part of the enrolment that is not distributed by age is divided by the school-age population for the level of education they are enrolled in, and multiplied by the duration of that level of education. The result is then added to the sum of the age-specific enrolment rates’ (UIS, 2009:7).

20 development Progress Case Study Report played a key role in the women’s associations that became At the executive level, the percentage of women in active in the 1980s (discussed further below and in section government increased from 9.25% to 12.5% between 3.4). 2001 and 2009, with the 2009 government including one In addition, there is evidence that from the late female minister and five female secretaries of state (Gribaa 1990s women benefited from government programmes et al., 2009). Since 2004, women’s integration in the intended to better integrate them into private- and country’s constitutional and consultative institutions that public-sector employment (e.g. through entry and manage the country’s affairs has also been strengthened higher-level work experience, on-the-job training, (see Table 3, overleaf). By 2007 women held 24% of specialist training, particularly in IT and media, from decision-making posts, up from 21% in 2004 (Gribba, the National Employment Fund (FNE),18 apprenticeships 2009: 90). and vocational training).19 The 2004 government report As shown in Table 4 (overleaf), the number of women in highlights in particular the massive entry of women into the legislative branch of government has also increased. The sectors that are traditionally reserved for men (i.e. mining, number of women elected to the Chamber of Deputies – the construction and energy). In addition, many women who lower chamber of parliament, which has legislative powers – participated in vocational training also received training nearly doubled between 1999 and 2004, from 12% to 23%. in setting up businesses. Many of these women went on to Figure 4 (overleaf) shows the rate of increase of create micro-enterprises in a variety of sectors including women’s participation compared to the rest of the world the industrial sector (39%), the services sector (45%) and and highlights the key policy moments. the agricultural sector (18%) (Gribaa et al., 2009: 26). Since 1988, women have been present at all levels of There is a strong correlation between women with a high the judiciary – 24% of magistrates are women and nearly education level and those owning their own business: 15% of women in the judiciary are in senior positions. Gribaa et al., (2009: 90) notes that of 18,000 women By 2005, women constituted 29% of judges and 30% of who owned their own companies, 79% had higher levels lawyers (see Table 5, overleaf) (Gribaa et al., 2009). of education. Likewise the percentage of women represented in local government has also increased, largely due to a 2.3.3 Political indicators presidential decision to impose internal quotas on the Given that Tunisia was under an authoritarian regime Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) electoral lists as that constrained political representation, women’s of 1999 (see sections 2.4 and 3.2). representation in formal politics and decision-making Between 1995 and 2005, the number of women in processes has nonetheless improved gradually but municipal councils doubled from 13% to 26% following consistently between1990 and 2010. Women’s the President’s instruction to his party to increase the representation increased at all levels, including the number of elected women to at least one in every four executive and legislative structures, local government seats (see Table 6, page 24). This measure resulted in and judicial power. Again, in the areas of women’s female candidates representing 36% of the ruling party participation in politics (ministerial positions and (RCD) electoral lists in the May 2005 municipal elections national parliaments), Tunisia outperforms both Algeria (Gribaa et al., 2009). Women elected to municipal and Morocco (Baliamoune, 2011). councils representing the RDC increased from 21% in 2000 to 29% in 2005 (Gribaa et al., 2009: 93).

Table 2: Women’s participation in the labour force, Tunisia and MENA countries 1990–2010

Female labour force (% of total labour force) 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 MENA 18.7% 19.36% 20.54% 21.31% 22.51% Tunisia 20.8% 22.60% 23.7% 24.3% 25.3%

Source: ILO Laborsta (Accessed 10th November 2013)

18 By December 2002 the FNE had assisted 108,029 persons (La loi 99-101 du mois de décembre 1999 portant loi de finances pour la gestion 2000, Article 13). 19 From 1997–2001 3,702 women benefited from on-the-job training contracts compared to 4,502 men, 21,791 women gained entry-level work experience and 4,496 gained higher level work experience – 56% of the workers undertaking entry-level work experience and 4% of those undertaking higher-level work experience were women (La Republique tunisienne, 2004: 25). In addition, by December 2002, of 2,108,029 people assisted by the FNE 31.7% were women (ibid). Through the various programmes conducted under the FNE over 150 women also received specialised skills training and 32,618 women benefited from apprenticeships. A further 7,000 women were registered in public and private vocational training programmes.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 21 Table 3: Women and executive power in Tunisia the immediate pre- and post-independence periods, women’s voices were articulated around a shared nationalist agenda rather than gender-related issues, but women’s organisations 2001 2004 2009 had emerged by the mid-1980s (see Table 8, overleaf). Government 9.25% 12.5%* Other associations which developed in the 1980s Ministerial 7.1% include the National Commission of Working Women; positions the National Businesswomens’ chamber (CNFCE); the National Federation of Women Rarmers (FNA); the Consultative Tunisian Mothers’ Association (ATM); as well as women’s structures groups in political parties, religious groups, small leftist Constitutional 25% networks and the business community (Charrad, 2007). council The significant gains made in achieving greater equality Economic and 20% between women and men in the social, economic and social council political spheres during the 1950s and 1960s led to an Magistracy 13.3% increase in women’s individual agency in both the public higher council and the private domains. Women’s expectations of further Communication 6.6% progress towards gender equality were, however, frustrated higher council in the changing political environment of the 1970s (Labidi, 2007). By the 1980s, there was a critical mass of educated, Source: Gribaa et al. (2009) professional women who were increasingly dissatisfied * Women represented two out 29 ministers, three out of 25 secretaries with the slow pace of reforms, in particular with respect to of state, one of 30 ministers and five out of 18 secretaries of state. the limited advances in women’s political representation. It was at this time that a women’s movement in defence of women’s rights and interests began to evolve. These Gribaa et al. (2009: 89) argues, however, that despite organisations were drawn for the most part from the the growing number of women in the executive branches educated and professional elite (i.e. academics, lawyers and of government, women remain underrepresented in journalists) and were largely government or self-funded executive roles (diplomatic functions, governorships, (see also section 3.4). special advisors etc.) both at central and regional level. The women’s organisations that were part of this Moreover, the higher up in the hierarchy, the lower the movement came from a variety of ideological orientations proportion of women. In local government, for example, and feminist discourses. The Tunisian women’s movement women represent only 10–20% of positions and few of in the 1980s was thus pluralist. While most differentiated these are executive positions; in 2010 there were only five themselves from so-called ‘Western feminism’, they came female municipal council presidents (Gribaa et al., 2009; from very different understandings of feminism, e.g. EU, 2010). cultural feminism, liberal feminism, secular feminism, Islamic feminism (Labidi, 2007; Zoughlami, 1989). 2.3.4 Development of women’s movements Charrad (2007) argues that despite these differences, The above indicators focus primarily on quantitative these various organisations and the government had a measures of women’s increased political representation. In common goal – to defend the gains in women’s rights under addition to women’s formal participation in politics and Tunisia’s gender legislation (in particular the family law) public office, women’s movements also began to develop. In – and she contends that women’s organisations became

Table 4: Women and legislative power in Tunisia

1989 1999 2002 2004 2008 Detail House of councillors 15.2% 15.8% 126 indirectly elected members Chambers of deputies 4.3% 11.5% 22.75% 189 directly elected members Legislative electoral lists 19.6% 30.05%

Source: Gribaa et al. (2009)

22 development Progress Case Study Report the ‘watchdogs of [Tunisia’s] gender legislation’ (Charrad, feminism that lacked an independent voice and 2007: 1525). Goulding (2010), however, underlines the marginalised a number of women’s voices from the debate. fact that the key women’s organisations of the 1980s were In section 3, we discuss the impact of women’s political those that enjoyed government approval and were willing participation on policy and decision-making and the extent to promote its particular version of secular feminism. to which women’s movements have been able to influence She contends that this created a form of state-sponsored policy in favour of women’s equality.

Figure 4: Historical changes in rates of women in Parliament in Tunisia

25 RCD adopts 30% electoral list quota

RCD adopts 25% electoral list quota Women in parliament % 20

Creation of bicameral parliment

Beginning of systematic international data gathering 10

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali becomes president

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Tunisia Worldwide

Source: Goulding (2010: 24) [Data compiled in conjunction with the Center of Arab Woman for Training and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women , Tunis, Tunisia]

Table 5: Women and the justice sector

2005 Detail Judges 28.85% 509 of 1,764 Lawyers 30% 1,303 of 4,295 Legal experts 2.5% 56 out of 1,863 Notaries 19% 185 out of 994

Source: Gribaa et al. (2009)

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 23 Table 6: Women in local government

1990 1995 2004 2005 Detail Regional councils 23% Municipal councils 13.3% 16.6% 26% Elected based on proportional representation list

Source: Gribaa et al. (2009)

2.3.5 Structures to promote gender equality While some of these structures appear to reflect While the creation of complementary structures intended requirements laid out in the CEDAW approach to gender to develop policies to promote gender equality and monitor equality, which Tunisia ratified (with reservations) in the implementation of legal reforms can be seen as a factor 1985,21 this was not the primary driving force for their in women’s empowerment in Tunisia (see section 3.4), it can creation. In the 1990s, there was a continued political also be seen as an outcome of the empowerment process. incentive for the Tunisian government to support gender- Since the 1990s, government structures (i.e. ministries, related agencies and women’s movements. During the national centres and commissions on gender issues) and 1980s the strength of Islamic fundamentalism grew both government-initiated programmes and projects mandated in Tunisia and elsewhere – and this posed a challenge to promote gender equality have begun to have a tangible to the ruling party’s power. To counter this threat, Ben role in government policy and planning. These structures, Ali’s regime sought, among other strategies, to strengthen mostly funded by the government, with support from ties with advocates of women’s rights, for whom Islamic bilateral and multilateral donors, perform a number of fundamentalism was also a threat (Charrad, 1997: 300). roles (EU, 2010).20 They monitor the evolution of the The creation and support for gender machinery during the status of women, support women’s integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s may therefore be understood in development planning and policy process, ensure greater light of these wider domestic political developments. access for women to decision-making positions and give In 1990, the Centre for Research, Documentation and substance to improving women’s social, economic and Information on Women (CR-EDIF) was set up to develop cultural opportunities. The establishment of these gender- studies and research on women. This was followed in 1991 related agencies is a milestone in the institutionalisation with the establishment of a consultative commission on of the gender equality agenda in Tunisia. A more detailed ‘Women and Development’, with the objective of bringing examination of the impact of this machinery and the extent women’s issues into discussion of national development to which it has been effective at advancing gender equality plans, reflecting on a number of reforms to orient is given in section 3.4. government strategy and policies in ways which promote equal opportunities for women. Since 2007, the Women’s

Table 7: Women in the RCD

1957 1998 2004 2008 2009 Grassroots RCD 30% Central committee 3.1% 21.2% 26.4 37.9%

Source: Gribaa et al. (2009)

20 Tunisia has benefited from technical and financial support from European partners and the United Nations specialised agencies to facilitate the implementation of gender initiatives (EU, 2010). For example, the scientific body of MAFFEPA, CR-EDIF has been supported by bilateral and multilateral co-operation and, as a result, provides mechanisms for research exchange on gender equality nationally and internationally. 21 For example, the National Council for Women, Family and Elderly People (CNFF), which supports MAFFEPA in its policy work, is composed of three committees whose work corresponds to three roles of women as set out by CEDAW; reproductive, productive, and social (EU, 2010: 49).

24 development Progress Case Study Report Commission at the Chamber of Deputies has been charged were set up at the local government level to reinforce with monitoring the enforcement of women’s rights and women’s participation in public, political and socio- their representation in national and international structures. economic life at the sub-national level. At least until 2010, In 1992, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Family these regional branches existed in all seven of the country’s and Children, and the Elderly (MAFFEPA) was created to districts and were given the necessary support to build co-ordinate and develop government policy for women’s their capacity. At the national level, MAFFEPA received promotion. The structure was initially set up as the consistent government funding – its budget doubled Secretariat of State for Women and the Family, becoming between 1994 and 2002 – and it was accompanied by the a ministry in 1996. Its mandate was expanded to include setting up of a consultative organ, the National Council for Children and the Elderly in 2002 and 2004 respectively. Women, Family and the Elderly (CNFFPA), within which Following on from a recommendation of the Commission women’s issues could be discussed. of Women and Development, regional MAFFEPA branches

Table 8: Key Tunisian women’s organisations

Created Name Objectives 1956 National Union for Tunisian Women (UNFT) The UNFT was the only voice for women in the immediate post-independence era and is represented in all regions and in the remotest parts of the country.* It has formed alliances with professional/special-interest women’s groups and operates in a framework of partnerships with governmental structures or national organisations (i.e. in tackling illiteracy). It was the exclusive channel through which women could be elected to the RCD lists in local and national elections and many women who have reached decision-making positions (particularly political) have been UNFT members (Gribaa et al., 2009: 102).

1978/9 Club Tahar El Haddad** d’études de la condition de la Started by elite educated women (executives, teachers, journalists, lawyers, femme (CECF) students), the club addressed women’s dissatisfaction with women’s limited advances in political participation and prompted demands for further rights.

1983 Union of Tunisian Workers ‘women’s commission’ (UGTT) Created at a round table organised by CECF.

1985 The Nissa Group Created a bi-monthly journal to address women’s issues. Its various objectives included the defence of the CPS, encouraging women’s political participation, and highlighting the role of women’s hidden work. It published eight issues between 1985 and 1987.

1985 Tunisian League for Human rights (LTDH) A women’s commission of the LTDH was created in 1985.

1989 (April) Tunisian Women’s Association for Research and Created following political liberalisation in 1987, AFTURD was a response to Development (AFTURD) demands from the various women’s organisations and was made up of women academics. It was set up to carry out research on how to integrate women in economic and social development and has a broader societal agenda with a focus on women’s conditions.

1989 (6 Aug) Tunisian Association of Women Democrats (ATFD) Created following the Copenhagen convention by Arab-Muslim women, the ATFFD takes political, social and cultural action to defend, consolidate and develop women’s rights in the face of attempts to curtail them.

* The UNFT has extensive grassroots membership and up to 2010 had 27 regional delegations and 650 local sections. ** The Club was named after Tahar Haddad, a reformist nationalist, who published a book in 1930 entitled Women in Law and Society in favour of reforms to give women greater rights.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 25 Additional institutional support mechanisms included Revisions to the CPS in the same year further promoted the Observatory of Women’s Conditions, founded in gender equality by addressing a number of issues related 1997 with funding from the United Nations Development to the family (such as divorce and child custody). It Programme to collect gender dis-aggregated data. There removed the clause requiring a woman to obey her was also a concerted effort to ensure that rural women husband (article 2 of clause 23)22 and expanded women’s were not excluded from improvements in women’s rights rights to child custody after divorce (article 58). In and gender equality. The National Commission for Rural addition, divorced women with custody of children were Women was set up by decree in 2001, to promote rural automatically accorded rights to child-support payments women and enforce Tunisia’s non-exclusionary and and a fund was established to enable these and alimony gender equality approach. The national adult education payments.23 These were followed up in 1998 with the programme and programmes for priority education areas introduction of a marital contract and the adoption of were also focused on women and rural areas. Finally, a law which gave women the right to joint ownership the National Commission on Women’s legislation, which of marital property brought during the marriage, and to discusses amendments to the CPS, was created (Charrad, which they were entitled to in the event of divorce or their 2007). The extent to which these structures drove progress spouse’s death.24 is further discussed in section 3.4. The second wave of reforms continued previous reform processes and notable legal changes in the area of social policy critically built on these and further 2.4 Institutional and legal progress strengthened gender equality. Here we draw attention to Following the first wave of reforms in the post- further reforms to education and health policy, and the independence era (1956–1987) a second wave of reforms establishment of complementary structures mandated took place following the first change in Tunisia’s political with elaborating policies to promote gender equality and leadership, when the then Prime Minister Ben Ali replaced monitor implementation of legal reforms. Bourguiba as President. Important educational reforms included the 1991 This second wave consolidated the previous progress introduction of obligatory schooling for all children under in gender equality and the advancement of women’s rights the age of 16 and the increase in the basic education cycle by introducing additional constitutional and legislative to nine years. This improved girls’ access to schooling (see reforms. During this period, the policy directions led to section 2.3).25 These reforms were also accompanied by additional institutional reform following up on earlier legal other measures to employ better-qualified teachers, which changes, including the creation of a number of structures reduced school dropout rates (Baliamoune, 2009: 9), and aimed at facilitating legal change, and thus reducing gender to ensure that girls have access to university loans and disparities in practice. This enabled greater gender equality grants (EU, 2010). in social, civil, economic, and political transactions, in In continuation of the reproductive health policy both the public and private spheres, to be consistent and adopted in the immediate post-independence period to cumulative. Below we consider the key domestic legal reduce fertility rates, the government remained committed reforms that took place in this second wave of reform. to the area of reproductive health. The law of 6 May 1988 further limited child-welfare payments, from four to three 2.4.1 Legal and policy change in social issues – family children, the impacts of which are discussed in section 2.3. law, education, religion – and their implementation Amendments of the Citizenship Code in 1993 were an 2.4.2 Legal and policy change in economic life (land important and symbolic legal reform during the second law, labour law and policy) wave of reforms. Tunisia’s nationality code was amended With respect to improving women’s access to resources to allow children born to a Tunisian mother and a foreign and assets, Tunisia has implemented the principle of non- father the right of Tunisian nationality (article 6), with discrimination in a number of laws. the father’s permission. This afforded women greater The 1992 amendment of the Labour Code was an citizenship rights by recognising matrilineal descent and important milestone. It introduced non-discrimination was a significant step in challenging patrilineality as a between men and women in all aspects of employment source of membership in the political community (Charrad, including recruitment, promotion and salary, and has 2007). contributed to improving women’s access to work.

22 Modified by loi n° 93-74 du 12 juillet 1993. 23 Loi n° 93-65 du 5 juillet 1993. 24 Loi n° 98-91 du 9 novembre 1998 relative au régime de la communauté des biens entre époux. 25 Loi n° 91.65 du 29 juillet 1991.

26 development Progress Case Study Report Revisions to the 1983 public-sector labour law in 1997 and the subsequent programme (2004–2009) increased facilitated mothers’ return to work by introducing legal this to 30%. Following these programmes, affirmative breaks for breastfeeding their child (Article 48b).26 Similar action, in the form of temporary special measures, was guarantees were introduced in the private sector (i.e. taken by the RCD to integrate women onto the party’s maternity leave, securing the labour rights of pregnant electoral lists through the use of quotas. The quota was women so that they could not be dismissed without cause set at 20% for the 1999 legislative elections, 25% for and the provision of time off for breastfeeding) through the 2005 municipal elections, and 30% for the 2009 sector-specific common-accord labour agreements known legislative and 2010 municipal elections (Goulding, 2010: as ‘Conventions Collectives’. In 2000, several articles of 23). Since 2007, the Women’s Commission at the Chamber the Code of Obligations and Contracts were repealed so of Deputies has been charged with monitoring the that a woman no longer requires her husband’s approval enforcement of women’s rights and their representation in to work and he no longer has the liberty to terminate his national and international structures. wife’s employment contract.27 Goulding (2010) notes, however, that the women Since the late 1990s, the government has also who came to power as a result of these RCD quotas in established a number of programmes to promote women’s the 2000s were primarily those who were prepared to integration into the labour market in both the private echo the ‘state-sponsored’ brand of feminism supported and public sectors. This has included programmes to by the then government. As a result, she contends that integrate women into the labour force, on-the-job training rather than challenging patriarchal norms, these female initiatives as well the creation of a National Employment politicians served to reproduce existing patterns of power Fund (FNE) in 1999 to provide training to match women’s and entitlement (Goulding, 2010: 72). Moreover, she skills to market demands. Female entrepreneurship was highlights the fact that these women represented only one also a subject of focus during this period with women form of women’s voice. The voices of women’s groups receiving specific training in the creation of business and who did not share the government’s agenda were excluded the management of micro-enterprises (La Republique from this process (i.e. those considered too radical, too tunisienne, 2004). Islamic or too critical of the government). It was not until the aftermath of the 2011 revolution 2.4.3 Legal and policy change in politics that gender parity became a legal requirement, which While advances in terms of formal political rights during meant that there was an equal number of male and this second wave of reforms were nominal, a number female candidates for the 2011 Constituent Assembly of legal reforms confirmed women’s right to equal elections. As a result 27% of the seats were won by participation in political life. The 1997 revisions to the women, which marks a significant expansion in women’s constitution confirmed the principle of equality in politics presence in the political arena. It was also critical given by stating that political parties may not discriminate on that the Constituent Assembly was mandated with writing gender grounds. The amendments also explicitly confirmed Tunisia’s new constitution. the principle of the equality of citizens, regardless of their Importantly, as discussed in section 3, some of these sex (articles 8 and 21).28 measures of change regarding the rules of the game Moreover, since 1999, the ruling party’s presidential of social and economic interaction – less evidently so electoral programmes have included initiatives to ensure for political participation – are not only indicators of women’s representation in public life. The 1999–2004 progress but also enabling factors. The outcome indicators programme outlined goals to ensure women accounted for presented in the following section in many respects are 20% of decision-making positions and electoral structures, connected to these measures of institutional progress.

26 Loi n° 97-83 du 20 décembre 1997. 27 La loi n° 17/2000, datée du 7 février 2000, abrogeant certains articles du Code des Obligations et des Contrats. 28 Other legal measures included the 2005 penal code, which reinforced the imposition of sanctions in the case of domestic violence; and the 2005 Code of obligations and contracts, which banned all forms of gender-based discrimination relating to the possession, acquisition, management and transfer of property (for example, enabling both spouses to take out an individual loan for the purchase of a shared house).

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 27 3. What are the factors driving change?

‘The men and women marching for relations: the nature and outcome of the independence democracy last month were all the struggle; the cohesive post-independence leadership; the relationship between the state and religious establishments; children and grandchildren of women and the reduction in the power of kinship structures. First, the nature of the independence struggle, in which who had grown up with an education and a modernist nationalist agenda overcame conservative a sense of their rights’ – Fatma Bouvet de forces, enabled Tunisia’s transition to independence to result in progressive social policy changes. Although la Maisonneuve, June 2011 women’s empowerment was not the objective of these changes, the reforms enabled greater inclusion of women This section examines four sets of cumulative, in the social and economic sphere, which was in turn a multidimensional, and mutually reinforcing factors catalyst for further social and political changes. It is also that have contributed to the expansion of women’s possible that the political elite saw women’s equality as a empowerment in Tunisia in the past 20 years. While many positive objective alongside a number of other liberal and of these factors can as be viewed as outcomes of women’s secularising political objectives. empowerment they were also key drivers of change: When Tunisia became a French protectorate in 1881 it already had a centralised political structure with a •• The nature of post-independence political dynamics and developed administrative apparatus, borders which were elite arrangements. largely accepted by its relatively homogenous population •• Political leadership, which has consistently supported and strong interactions between the political centre policies and reforms that have favoured women’s gender in Tunis and rural groups, based on a long history of equality over a long period. external trade (Charrad, 2001: 89, 94). The presence •• The combined effect of policy and legal change in the of an administration that could be used by the colonial socio-economic sphere (improved access to health, power, along with weak tribal organisation, meant that, education and paid employment for women and girls), in contrast with its other North African colonies, France which has substantially reshaped gender relations and decided to co-opt the Tunisian political elites and leave reinforced gains in gender equality. the existing power structures in place. The result was •• The emergence of women’s political and social that Tunisia’s colonial experience was characterised by a mobilisation for change. reasonably high level of political and economic continuity (e.g. the monarch, the Bey, was kept in place). These conditions facilitated the creation of a nationalist movement that was able to mobilise the majority of 3.1 Post-independence political dynamics and the population around a single agenda in the pursuit of elite arrangements national independence (see Box 5). As a result, the struggle In Tunisia, advances towards gender equality have been for independence in Tunisia was unified, but required an embedded in the dynamics of development and change alliance between two fundamentally opposed factions – a in the government regime. Nevertheless, it is important traditional, conservative faction and a modern nation- to note that these advances were the by-product of a building, reformist faction (Charrad, 1997: 293). commitment to build a modern secular nation and a strong When Bourguiba became Tunisia’s Prime Minister in economy, rather than being an explicit objective. 1956,29 he was beholden to the patronage networks of the urban elites and labour unions upon which his power base 3.1.1 Post-independence political development rested, the dynamics of which shaped post-independence There are four underlying features of the post-independence Tunisian politics (Baliamoune, 2011; Baliamoune-Lutz, political dynamics that favoured gains for women in gender 2009). The newly independent state neutralised and

29 Habib Bourguiba was proclaimed Prime Minister when Tunisia received independence from France on 20 March 1956 and then head of State in 1957 when Tunisia abolished its constitutional monarchy (ruled by the Bey of Tunis) and became a Republic on 25 July 1957.

28 development Progress Case Study Report Box 5: Tunisia’s unified independence movement The Neo-Destour Party (NDP) was created in 1934 and served as the principal organisation through which Tunisia’s national struggle for independence was fought. Its membership was drawn from urban and rural areas, different social classes and encompassed various regional groups. After the establishment of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), in 1940, there was close co-operation between the two organisations and the labour and nationalist movements joined forces. This broad support base enabled the NDP to incorporate two ideological tendencies within a single structure and to mobilise the country around a united national effort. Nevertheless, a conflict between two factions began to appear in the 1950s: •• A conservative faction led by the pan-Islamist, Salah ben Youssef, whose support came from traditionalists, tribal groups from the rural areas, and the religious establishment. •• A reformist faction represented by the modernist Habib Bourguiba, who found support in Tunisia’s urban and business elites, and progressive labour unions. At a special meeting of NDP in November 1955 to address this rivalry, the backing of the labour union for Habib Bourguiba tipped the balance and he was re-elected as party president. Ben Youssef’s faction was expelled from the organisation. Source: Charrad (1997, 2001)

incorporated both the old and new political elites and women greater voice and agency in the marriage, family organised interest groups (educated and business elites, and home. This had broad implications for women’s ability labour and trade unions) into an alliance which created to engage in paid work, be geographically mobile, engage the conditions for an elite consensus in favour of building with health and education services, and increased the a modern nation based on a state-led development model likelihood that they would express themselves politically. (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009: 17; Charrad 1997, 2001). As A third factor leading to greater women’s empowerment Alexander (1997: 36) describes it, Bourguiba set out to was the separation of the religious establishment and the become Tunisia’s chief patron rather than solely a political state and the removal of religious influence from important patron. public institutions and spaces. The body of institutional Second, the cohesive post-independence leadership was reforms undertaken by Habib Bourguiba following critical in neutralising resistance to reforms in pursuit of independence rewrote the nature of the relationship broad-based social transformation. As described below between the state and the religious establishment and (and previously in section 2.1), following his ascension radically altered these patriarchal social relations. to power, Bourguiba rapidly weakened Ben Youssef and The removal of the religious establishment from the his political support base and effectively eliminated his executive functions of the state (i.e. judiciary, political political rivals from the post-independence political decision-making processes) and as a provider of public landscape. This enabled Tunisia’s state- and nation- services (i.e. Islamic instruction in education) facilitated the building process to evolve in relative autonomy from local creation of a secular and modern state.30 This significantly kinship networks and the religious establishment, as the reduced religious jurisdiction and control over women’s new leadership faced little challenge in implementing its lives. The regulation of citizens’ lives – including women’s, modernisation reforms. which had previously been confined to the private Once established, these reforms generated a climate in realm – now became part of the public domain. This which a new set of debates and reforms could take place. weakening of religious influence had positive implications For instance, in the late 1980s and 1990s, reforms were for women. For example, marriage became a civil rather able to address women’s citizenship rights and the level than a private matter and was based on the principles of of their participation and representation in public life (see gender equality, while the education of girls and women section 2.4). Further reforms of family law gave women became a responsibility of the state. This secularisation of greater rights of custody of their children. These reforms institutions reduced the scope for patriarchy and expanded shifted women’s ability to end unsatisfactory marriages women’s access to social spaces, enabling them to benefit and fundamentally changed the conjugal contract – giving from progressive policy trends.

30 Islam has always played an important role in Tunisian social and cultural identity and, prior to independence, the religious establishment was extremely powerful. As such, Tunisian society operated under the widespread presence of the Maliki School of Islamic law (Charrad, 2007; EU, 2010). The inherently patriarchal nature of Shari’a, which permits male relatives to control women, ensured that power rested in the hands of male members of the extended kin-group and was transferred by the patrilineal line.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 29 The final factor, the commitment to break with tribal/kin- legal reforms in favour of women’s equality and greater based structures, was also important to gender relations. space for women’s political and social empowerment. The power struggle between the modernist and These key factors were supported by the compliance of traditional elements of society on the eve of independence, the judiciary and bureaucracy with the legal framework which had represented a threat to national unity, provided (further discussed in section 3.2) and reinforced by a strong incentive for the introduction of a first wave progressive social policies that have contributed to of reforms, which would diminish the power of kinship increasing women’s awareness of their legal rights groups and the religious establishment. Similar to other (discussed in section 3.2). They thereby contributed Maghribi societies, in pre-colonial Tunisia, political, social to a loosening of patriarchy in the private sphere and and economic organisation was structured around local substantive changes in the public sphere. kinship groupings in which the extended kinship (family) network wielded considerable power over the nuclear 3.1.2 Alignment of elite interests with a gender equality family unit (Charrad, 1997: 290). Following Tunisia’s agenda independence, Bourguiba moved quickly to eliminate the At key junctures in Tunisia’s state-building process, the political leverage of those who had opposed the modernist interests and incentives of the political and business elites state-building agenda and implemented a series of have resulted in political and policy-making processes that administrative measures and reforms to radically weaken have promoted gender equity concerns, both nationally these power structures (Charrad, 1997, 2001, 2012). and internationally. Collective tribal ownership of land was abolished (1957) In the 1950s, President Bourguiba’s early reforms, such and divisive territorial administrative reforms (from 1956) as the introduction of the family code, the suppression of were introduced to reduce the power of local, regional, waqfs, and the outlawing of religious courts were used as and kinship networks (Charrad, 2001: 211-12; 2012). At a political instrument to eliminate the traditionalist faction the same time, reforms were taken to weaken the religious of the rival nationalist movement (Baliamoune, 2011). establishment by reducing its financial base through the Increased women’s equality during this early period of abolition of Islamic property rights (1956–57), diminishing reform was a by-product of this political strategy not an its moral power by secularising the justice system (1956) outcome of feminist mobilisation or of an explicit gender and abolishing the independent power of Islamic courts equality agenda. Nonetheless, the broader transformation (Charrad, 2001: 214-5). The promulgation of the Code of social power structures that ensued created an enabling of Personal Status (CPS) in 1956, which fundamentally environment in the later period in which women’s challenged ‘kin-based patriarchy’, was part and parcel of individual and collective agency was able to push for this strategy to marginalise kinship groups and religious gender equality. Women’s empowerment in Tunisia did not authorities (Charrad, 2007: 294-5). therefore originate in women’s agency; rather, women’s The key consequence of these immediate reforms autonomy and capabilities that were enabled by earlier was that it eliminated any resistance to Bourguiba in the reforms and social policies helped to underpin action by aftermath of independence and enabled him to follow his later generations of women. reformist agenda unchallenged (Charrad, 2001: 211). In The post-independence political dynamic was based this respect the outcome of the nationalist struggle helps on co-operation between important interest groups (the to explain the minimal resistance to far-reaching family political elite, producer associations and progressive reforms during the first phase of reforms (Charrad, 2001: labour unions). The policies of neutralising and co-opting 223). This enabled Tunisia to pursue broad-based social these powerful interest groups limited domestic resistance transformation as a means of creating a modern nation to the state’s social and economic reforms (Baliamoune- state, and set the foundations for a progressive policy Lutz, 2009; Alexander, 1997). These interest groups had agenda in the first decade after independence, particularly in a shared incentive in investing in human capital as a the area of social policy (family law, education and health) means of creating a more skilled labour force, and this and economic policy (land rights and labour legislation). had favourable outcomes for women (Charrad, 2001; Although the underlying reasons for the reforms was to Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Baliamoune, 2011). The political eliminate opposition to Bourguiba’s modern state-building commitment to building human capital provided a agenda and to reduce the power of the extended family over rationale for allowing women access to education and men rather than women, the reforms resulted in a significant paid employment, as well as being an economic motive increase in women’s formal individual rights within the to reduce fertility rates, and it paved the way to more family and, by extension, in larger society (e.g. henceforth progressive education policy. a married woman held greater decision-making power Both the political commitment to build greater human regarding the nuclear family did than her husband’s parents). capital and the weakening of traditionalist kinship The formal increase in women’s rights appears to have been power structures enabled the introduction of progressive instrumental in creating an enabling environment for further reforms regarding women’s rights and freedoms that were unprecedented in the Arab world (Charrad, 2007; EU, 2010).

30 development Progress Case Study Report During the 1970s, the political elite faced a mounting in the Tunisian middle class and business elite, who felt threat from socialist movements and in order to preserve threatened by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, but Ben their political legitimacy they increasingly aligned Ali recognised that he did not have the same political clout themselves with conservative Islamic currents (Charrad, with these networks as Bourguiba had enjoyed (Alexander, 1997; Baliamoune, 2011). Although this alliance 1997: 37). In order to gain legitimacy among the business precipitated a slowdown in Tunisia’s progressive social elite and regain popular support for the party, Ben Ali sought and economic reforms, in particular with respect to gender alternative alliances to push back the rise of fundamentalism. equality, it was not until the early 1980s that support for While Tunisian women had played an important role Islamic fundamentalism began to have enough momentum in the independence struggle as members of the national to reverse the advances in gender equality (see section trade unions and the NDM, their voices had been 3.1) (Labidi, 2007; Baliamoune, 2009; Charrad, 2007). In articulated purely around a nationalist agenda rather than the 1980s, encouraged by the success of the 1979 Iranian gender equality issues, and women’s collective agency revolution and the increasing influence of political Islam did not play an important role in the first wave of socio- in the Maghreb, a political Islamic movement developed economic reforms. In contrast, as Charrad notes, ‘women’s in Tunisia and Islamic fundamentalists began to focus on associations emerged and the feminist discourse came to achieving state power (Charrad, 1997: 300; Labidi, 2007: the forefront of public debates in the 1980s and 1990s’ 12; Baliamoune, 2011: 5). It was at this point that political (Charrad, 2007: 1522-3) (discussed in depth in section Islam first began to pose a threat to the reformist agenda of 3.4). These women’s groups were concerned about the the Tunisian state (Labidi, 2007; Charrad, 2007). threat that Islamic fundamentalism posed to advances in Crucially, even during this period, when progress on gender policy and Ben Ali’s government actively courted women’s rights stagnated due to this alliance between the and supported women’s associations and organisations political elites and conservative Islamic currents, the earlier (Charrad, 1997, 2007, 2012; Labidi, 2007).31 advances in women’s empowerment were not reversed, Ben Ali also sought international support from France, despite increasing pressure from Islamic groups. the UK and the USA during the 1990s and 2000s, creating Another positive moment in women’s empowerment political and economic links based on a common fight occurred during the late 1980s and 1990s, when the against Islamic fundamentalism (Charrad, 1997; Bennhold, growing influence of political Islam became a major 2011; Goulding, 2010). External relations were an important domestic threat to the established power structures in means of counteracting domestic unpopularity at home and Tunisia. At this time, following Tunisia’s change of political political relations with the West provided an impetus for leadership, and in order to counter the threat of political a new wave of progressive policies with regard to gender Islam and maintain the support of the middle classes and policy in this period (Charrad, 1997) (see section 3.1.2). business elites, the political elite sought an alliance with Furthermore, when radical Islam became a wider geo- women’s organisations (such as the UGTT and UNFT), to political concern for the international community in the whom the traditional religious establishment also posed a late 1990s and early 2000s, President Ben Ali exploited this threat (see section 3.1 for more detail). to appease the international criticism of Tunisia’s restricted Following a protracted illness, in 1987 President political space and defuse the pressure to democratise Bourguiba was declared unfit to rule. Prime Minister (Bennhold, 2011; Charrad, 1997; Goulding, 2010). His Ben Ali took power in a peaceful constitutional coup government’s support of the fight against terrorism and (Baliamoune, 2009; Charrad, 1997: 315). This change of Islamic radicalisation made him an important Western ally. leadership happened in an era characterised by economic These domestic and external political interests led to stagnation and rising economic hardship (Bechri and policy changes that supported women’s empowerment in Naccache, 2003). It also followed a period in which different ways. This included the introduction of important left-wing politics had become increasingly popular initiatives to strengthen women’s rights, in particular (Baliamoune, 2011: 4) and in which fundamentalist Islam additional legal reforms (for example, the 1993 reforms of was becoming a political force in the MENA region the CPS and the citizenship code) and institutional change, (Charrad, 1997: 298). such as the creation of a ministry of women’s affairs. Ben Ali was well aware of the challenge these two Although the political agency of women’s movements at major constraints – economic stagnation and political this time contributed to shaping these reforms (discussed in Islam – presented both to the established order and to his section 3.4), they were essentially top-down policies driven own political survival when he took up office (Bechri and by the ulterior motives of the political elite. Naccache, 2003; Alexander, 1997). Power was still rooted

31 Charrad (1997: 300) notes that in 1991, the National Union of Tunisian Women, which was financed by the state appealed to ‘all citizens, and foremost to Tunisian women, to show vigilance especially at this time… and to mobilise themselves even more around our President’ following the discovery of a fundamentalist plot.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 31 3.2 Top-down political support for pro-gender without actively co-opting progressive elements of the policies religious elite. Ben Ali’s employment of religious symbolism Despite the fact that they limited political rights, both in the 1990s (e.g. having prayer times announced of Tunisia’s post-independence regimes consistently on national television) as a means of co-opting and supported policies and reforms that created an enabling negotiating a truce with the religious elites was also key socio-economic environment for women’s empowerment. to limiting resistance to subsequent reforms that might This was in part due to the coincidence of domestic and favour women.32 Maintaining the support of the religious external interests in supporting policy processes that, elite, both during the first phase of reforms from the 1950s intentionally or not, supported gender equity. Sustained through to the 1980s, as well as in the second wave of political will has ensured that legal reforms were reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, accorded the state a moral accompanied by a mutually reinforcing institutional system legitimacy which enabled the party and its policies to be and the introduction of a wide range of complementary favourably perceived by the wider population. reforms (in cross-cutting sectors and policy areas) which integrated gender into planning processes so that equality 3.2.2 Sustained political support for pro-women reforms has been translated into clear objectives. and the power of gender machinery Progress in establishing formal rules has been accompanied 3.2.1 Gender equality and religion in Tunisian politics by a range of measures across mutually reinforcing policy The Tunisian political elites have consistently upheld areas and sectors sustained over a period of time, including the principle of depoliticising religion and marginalising the development of institutional mechanisms and structures the role of the religious establishment in political affairs to monitor the status of women. This has contributed to (see above for further discussion). Even so, early reforms substantive improvements in women’s opportunities in favouring women’s rights were firmly rooted in Islamic all fields: education, vocational training, involvement in intellectual traditions and were successfully communicated development activities (e.g. participation in the preparation to the electorate as part of broader desirable of the five-year development plans through the work of the transformations of state modernity. Commission on Women and Development), and access to Although the weakened power of the religious decision-making positions (see also section 3.2.3). establishment in the immediate post-independence era In practice, the multi-dimensional approach to policy helped to limit resistance to the progressive reforms that reform involved not only establishing a comprehensive supported greater gender equality, the commitment of legal framework but also consistent efforts to increase successive political elites to Islam as a cultural and moral the mandate, capacity and incentives of state institutions institution was also important. Both Bourguiba and Ben (e.g. judiciary) and bureaucracies to implement equality- Ali embraced Islam as Tunisia’s national religion, and their enhancing legislation. The judiciary has played a critical attempts to co-opt the religious elite demonstrated a clear role both in applying the law consistently and ensuring understanding that securing its support was necessary that state bureaucracies comply with it. For instance, the in order to bring about sustained, radical social change Tunisian government did not stop at making polygamy (Baliamoune, 2011). illegal in the 1956 CPS. Sanctions were specified and During the formulation of the CPS, for example, additional measures were taken to ensure the application Bourguiba made reference to earlier phases of of the law. Attempts to enter into a bigamous marriage interpretation (ijtihad) that mark the evolution of Islamic became punishable with a year’s imprisonment and a legal thought (Charrad, 2001: 221). Finding a justification fine of the equivalent of US$500, and in 1964 a new in the Islamic tradition for the reforms succeeded in law declared bigamous marriage null and void. This limiting religious resistance to its implementation and, as was accompanied by the imposition of tough sanctions, Charrad (2011: 421) notes, this enabled the codification including imprisonment and fines against both men and of Islamic law in Tunisia in ways that expanded women’s women, which judges were strongly encouraged to enforce rights, effectively eliminating religious jurisdiction over (Charrad, 2001: 228; 2007: 1520). There has therefore women’s private life. In addition, during the 1970s and been a concerted effort to ensure that the legal, policy 1980s, the state strengthened symbols of Islamic identity and practical environments are coherent and mutually and abandoned some commitment to reform processes (i.e. reinforcing. This has been central to enabling formal inheritance laws) that might have provoked confrontation changes to bring about substantive changes. with the religious establishment (Charrad, 1997: 299). The elite agreement underpinning Tunisia’s policy Implementation of the CPS, which fundamentally direction in the post-independence era limited political and altered social relations and constitutes a defining moment social opposition to reforms, giving President Bourguiba for women’s rights in Tunisia, may not have been possible the necessary space to build coalitions that supported

32 A similar process involving co-optation and negotiation has been employed in the post-revolutionary context in building the new constitution.

32 development Progress Case Study Report change, including within the judiciary, and to increase the of Women – were adopted in 1992 and referred to in state’s bureaucratic capacity, essential for implementing the the President’s speech of 13 August that year (Charrad, reforms (Bechri and Naccache, 2003). Bechri and Naccache 1997; EU 2010). Since its creation the Commission has (2003) note that the commitment to implementing key also participated in Tunisia’s development planning aspects of the CPS was made by the President himself,33 process. It was instrumental in integrating assessments and that following its introduction, he was active in efforts of the implications of public policy (action, legislation to support attitudinal change and to win support for the and programmes) for women into the country’s eighth reforms – for example by making women’s issues, girls development plan (1992–1996). In addition, as a result of schooling and population control regular themes in his its work, the concept of gender was institutionalised in the speeches (Bechri and Naccache, 2003: 14). ninth development plan (1997–2011), and budgeting that As noted in section 2.3, the establishment of gender- contributes to the advancement of gender equality was related agencies was a milestone in the institutionalisation introduced in the eleventh development Plan (EU, 2010). of the gender equality agenda in Tunisia. The capacity of The influence of gender-related agencies on women’s this gender machinery to elicit support for policies in favour status in Tunisia can also be seen in the numerous of gender equality has helped in advancing such goals. programmes implemented following the creation of A number of key actors are considered to have initiated MAFFEPA. For example, MAFFEPA designed two national and generated change, in particular with regard to women’s action plans recommending legislative and institutional participation in political life. Gribaa et al. (2009) argues measures to support family life, a national action plan for that the Ministry of Women, Family, Childhood and the the promotion of rural women, and a national strategy Elderly (MAFFEPA) has been a significant force for change against gender-based violence. These initiatives were in favour of women. At the executive level, MAFFEPA developed in collaboration with NGOs, service providers, has played a central role in implementing national policy and government ministries and so fostered networking and developing national strategies and programmes and among government and non-government organisations has helped to promote women’s participation in political to align their work and increase understanding of gender life (Gribaa et al., 2009). The Ministry’s power and concerns. Most of the work of MAFFEPA and the responsibility have been increasing since 1992 and by 2009 other gender-related agencies involves research, training it was co-ordinating the various women’s commissions monitoring, and advocating the integration of gender (Women and Development, Women’s National Council, concerns into a range of public issues. Family and Elderly) as well as following up on the The strategic decision to support policies that favoured implementation of gender-related measures taken at the gender equality, albeit motivated by other interests, has government level (including the Presidential programme). meant that the presence of women in public office has done MAFFEPA’s achievements include numerous action plans more than simply implement programmes to provide specific supporting women and the family, and the creation of and support to women. It has resulted in substantive changes support to institutional mechanisms and infrastructure, that have begun to challenge institutional discrimination such as the Observatory for Children’s Rights and the against women (see section 3.4 for further discussion). Observatory for the Family (EU, 2010). Together, these gender-related agencies encompass policy guidance, 3.2.3 Nature of a dominant party political system the development and implementation of reforms and In Tunisia’s political system, where a single party represents programmes, research and data collection and collation, a significant majority of the elected legislature and and specific support for rural women. municipal officers, the party’s commitment to increase the The active collaboration of line ministries and public position of women has been a key factor in women’s government agencies under the purview of MAFFEPA is increased political representation. also crucial, allowing gender concerns in public policy In this context, decisions taken by the Constitutional to be addressed in a relatively comprehensive manner. Democratic Rally (RCD) to increase women’s political Of particular importance in this respect is the Women participation have been important. The voluntary adoption and Development Commission, which brings together of gender quotas for candidates fielded in legislative and representatives from the government, NGOs, unions and municipal elections has been particularly valuable in academia to propose and promote actions to enhance increasing women’s representation in public life (Goulding, women’s status in all development sectors. In 1991, the 2010). Although gender quotas in pre-revolutionary Commission was asked to reflect on a number of reforms Tunisia were voluntary and not widely adopted by to orient government strategy and policies intended to opposition parties, the RCD’s decision was critical to promote equal opportunities for women. A number of its increasing women’s political participation because of the recommendations – such as the creation of the Ministry sheer number of women involved given that the RCD

33 Bourguiba had created a commission in 1956, which was mandated to examine women’s status in Tunisian society. The commission failed to reach a consensus and the President decided to promulgate the CPS by decree (Bechri and Naccache, 2003: 13).

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 33 represented a significant majority of elected officials prior Furthermore, the progressive education and to the January 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The expansion of development policies in the 1950s, which favoured a women in public office can therefore be directly linked to reduction in fertility rates and female access to schooling the temporary measures regarding quotas for women on and paid employment, planted the seeds for the women’s RCD electoral lists (at legislative and municipal level) in movement that began to flourish in the 1980s (Charrad, the 1990s and 2000s. 1997). As discussed in section 3.4, improvements in the The inclusion of women in the RCD’s electoral lists was socio-economic sphere contributed to increasing women’s in line with the Presidential electoral programmes, which collective agency and voice in Tunisia, which in turn helped included initiatives to increase women’s representation in to increase women’s representation in the political sphere public life. These programmes, which ran from 1999 to in the 1990s and 2000s. 2004 and 2004 to 2009, followed a period in the early 1990s in which Islamic fundamentalism had become a 3.3.1 Women’s reproductive health threat to the RCD. As discussed in section 3.1, this created Tunisia’s commitment to population control as an integral an incentive for the RCD to build alliances with women’s part of its development strategy in the post-independence associations. The RCD’s introduction of gender quotas and era laid the foundations for improvements in women’s measures supporting women’s representation reflects, at health in general and in women’s reproductive health more least in part, its need to consolidate its support of women’s specifically (Bechri and Naccache, 2003; Baliamoune, groups to bolster its power base against the Islamist threat. 2009). Legislation to raise the minimum age of marriage Following the 2011 revolution, the transitional for women and the introduction of pioneering family- authorities brought gender parity into law, requiring an planning policies in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. legalisation equal number of male and female candidates for the 2011 of contraception and abortion, and welfare reforms to Constituent Assembly election. This gave women the discourage large families) contributed to reducing the opportunity to participate in drafting the new constitution country’s fertility rate in the immediate post-independence and women candidates claimed 27% of the seats in the era (Baliamoune, 2009). Bechri and Naccache (2003: 17) Constituent Assembly. note that Tunisia’s success in controlling fertility rates was While women’s access to decision-making roles, accompanied by an increase in girls’ enrolment in primary including to high public office, has increased in Tunisia, education and women’s participation in the labour force, there are still very few female ministers and the extent to and argue that this enabled the country to enter a ‘virtuous which women’s political voice and empowerment have circle’ in which reduced fertility rates enhanced socio- improved is limited by the constrained nature of the general economic development which in turn reinforced population political environment. Nonetheless, while Tunisia’s political control. Baliamoune (2011: 20) also highlights the link regime was repressive (until 2010), elite interests’ alignment between reduced fertility rates and access to education, with gender equality over a 50-year period has created noting that the significant decline in fertility rates was some enabling conditions for women’s empowerment. associated with a substantial rise in female enrolment in formal education, particularly at the tertiary level. According to the World Bank, government expenditure 3.3 Social-economic policy on health as a percentage of GDP rose marginally from The implications of socio-economic reforms that took 1995 to 2010, from 2.8% to 3.1% (see Figure 5),34 while place in the 1950s and 1960s had far-reaching impacts health expenditure as a percentage of total government on gender equality and women’s empowerment. Although spending rose from 8.2% to 10.6% (see Figure 5).35 the initial pace of social reforms gave way to more Research indicates that while the uptake of conservative policies in the 1960s and 1970s, women’s contraception has helped to reduce fertility rates in earlier gains were not reversed. The presence of an Tunisia, the initial decline in the post-independence era enabling legal and constitutional framework in conjunction was determined by a rise in the average age of marriage with these progressive socio-economic policies prior – a result of the higher age limits for young women to to the 1980s was a key factor in broadening women’s marry in the family law36 (Eltigani, 2009; EU, 2010). empowerment in Tunisia between 1990 and 2010. This Comparative research by Eltigani (2009) on the decline of is the foundation of improved formal rights for women fertility rates in Egypt and Tunisia found that the impact (Baliamoune, 2009) and has increased women’s individual of contraceptive use in Tunisia became evident only from agency in private and public spheres. the 1980s onwards. She also noted that the fertility decline

34 Tunisian government figures show a slightly declining trend, from 2.2% of GDP in 1990 to 1.7% in 2009. 35 Tunisian government figures show a rise from 7.5% in 1990 to 9.1% in 1998 then falling to 6.8% in 2009. 36 Of all Tunisian women born between 1964 and 1968 only 9.7% were married by the age of 18 compared to 30.5% in Egypt, and this fell to 4.5% for the cohort born between 1976 and 1980 in Tunisia compared to 19.5% in Eygpt.

34 development Progress Case Study Report Figure 5: Public health expenditure as a percentage of Tunisian GDP, 1995–2011

20 12 % of GDP

8 % of total government expenditure

10 6

4 5

0 0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Total government expenditure (% of GDP) Health expenditure (% of GDP) Health expenditure (% of total government expenditure)

Source: World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators in the post-independence period was rapid and sustained correlate with higher levels of educational achievement, across all geographical regions and levels of educational literacy rates and access to paid employment (Baliamoune, attainment (Eltigani, 2009). 2009; Bechri and Naccache, 2003). Baliamoune (2009) Complementary laws, such as those limiting welfare notes that in Tunisia, a significant reduction in fertility payments and tax allowances for families with over four rates has been associated with a substantial increase in children, also acted as a disincentive to have large families. female school enrolment, in particular in further education. Eltigani (2009) noted that this integration of Tunisia’s family-planning programme into wider socio-economic 3.3.2 Education frameworks (such as taxation, family welfare allowance Since independence, Tunisia’s sustained commitment and labour legislation) was critical. This suggests that to nationalist/secular social policies to improve human reforms of family law, and more importantly their development, and the importance accorded to education in application, were pivotal in bringing down the fertility rate this context, has been a key element in Tunisia’s success in in the immediate post-independence era. This is important improving women’s educational attainments (Baliamoune- because lower fertility rates indicate that women have Lutz, 2009). This has been important in contributing to more freedom to make decisions regarding their bodies, capabilities and resources for women’s agency. family size, education and employment (EU, 2010). Since independence, Tunisia has invested significantly The increased capacity to make their own choices about in public education, especially in secondary and tertiary marriage and motherhood are an essential element in education. World Bank figures show that government women’s social empowerment. In this respect, enhancing expenditure on education remained relatively constant women’s reproductive choices directly contributes to between 1995 and 2010 at between 6-6.5% of GDP (see women’s social empowerment and indirectly contributes Figure 6).37 Expenditure on education as a percentage to their economic, political and social empowerment of total government expenditure rose significantly in the more broadly. Reduced fertility, which means that women period for which data are available (2000–2010), increasing dedicate less time to bringing up children, tends to from 17% in 2000 to 23% in 2008 before falling to

37 Tunisian government figures show a similar picture within a lower range of between 4.5-5.2% of GDP.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 35 Figure 6: Public education expenditure as a percentage of Tunisian GDP, 1995–2011

20 25 % of GDP

20 15

15 % of total government expenditure

0 0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Total government expenditure (% of GDP) Education expenditure (% of GDP) Education expenditure (% of total government expenditure)

Source: World Bank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableSelection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-development-indicators

22% of expenditure in 2010 (see Figure 6).38 Tunisia has sought a closer alliance with Islamist groups, increasing the thus reached the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Islamic content in the curriculum and reminding women Education for All target of dedicating 20% of public that their main place was in the home (Baliamoune, 2011: expenditure to education. 4). In the early 1990s, when the Islamist groups became a Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) argues that this policy can be challenge to the ruling party, it formed a stronger alliance explained by the post-independence politics of co-optation, with women’s rights advocates in order to strengthen its which gave rise to an alliance between the political elites hold on power. This coincided with the 1991 education and the urban, educated business elite – including the reforms, which made school attendance compulsory until labour unions. This alliance influenced development the age of 16 years (see sections 2.3 and 2.4). Thus, as with policy in favour of the expansion of the export-oriented other indicators of gender equality in Tunisia, progress in manufacturing sector, which generated an increased demand women’s access to education has been largely shaped by for a skilled urban labour force. These demands were a the elite political settlement, which continues to fluctuate strong incentive and hence a key element in the expansion under the opposing influence of modernists and religious of access to education in Tunisia in the 1950s and 1960s, traditionalists. including for girls and women. Law No. 65 enacted as part of the 1991 reforms states Overall, education policy and attitudes towards women’s that ‘the primary goal of the education system is to prepare education in Tunisia have followed a positive, though students for a life that leaves no room for any discrimination interrupted, trajectory since the 1950s. For example, while or segregation based on sex, social class, race or religion’. all children were accorded the right to free education The 2002 reforms reconfirmed these rights, noting that ‘the in 1958,39 during the 1970s, when the ruling party felt state guarantees all Tunisians of school age the right to a free threatened by socialists and Marxists, President Bourguiba public education’ (article 4). Other policies also recognised

38 Tunisian government figures also show a rising trend for the 1990–2010 period, increasing from 16.7% of all expenditure in 1990 to a high of 21.4% in 2005 before falling to 19.9% in 2009. 39 La loi 58-118 du 4 novembre 1958.

36 development Progress Case Study Report the importance of education in relation to gender equality, manufacturing sector and led to a reduction in the size of for example ensuring that girls have access to university agriculture in the economy. Although much agricultural loans and grants (EU, 2010) and focusing the 2000 National work was still undertaken by women, these policies led to Adult Education Programme on the young, women, and a greater number of women working in non-agricultural those in rural areas. Furthermore, the considerable assistance sectors, and while women’s employment was initially to enable pupils from poor families to attend all levels of concentrated in the textiles sector, as the Tunisian economy education (UN, 2004) may have been especially significant diversified in the 1980s so did women’s employment in enabling families to break with social norms and educate opportunities (Bechri and Naccache, 2003; Moghadam, their daughters as well as their sons. Therefore, while the 2005: 136). Moghadam argues that from 1994, women right to education introduced in 1958 may have been have had more access to salaried jobs, mainly in the motivated by economic development interests, the 1991 administrative services, and that fewer women have legislation and other policies on education clearly recognise worked in the informal economy (Moghadam, 2005). The its importance both to gender equality and to economic types of economic activity in which women are engaged development. are of particular importance for an analysis of women’s Accelerated access to secondary and higher education empowerment. The fact that 50% of employed Tunisian are indicators of progress towards gender equality, and women work in the public sector – where jobs are of a also reinforce processes of empowerment. The reforms better quality, provide flexibility for childcare, and have in the mid-1950s, which should have enabled girls born higher salaries – and are less active in the private sector or at that time to benefit from smaller families (hence better industries where there is a high demand for unskilled labour childhoods), less pressure to marry young, and greater is an important indicator (Goulding, 2010) that women’s access to higher education and paid employment, appear improved educational status has been translated into greater to have enabled women with the education and social economic empowerment. freedom to voice their opinions (Baliamoune, 2011: 5). This The nature of women’s work also depends on the generation of women became politically active, forming economic climate. Tunisia’s economy has been a significant women’s agencies in the 1980s and 1990s (see section factor in the development of the post-independent political 3.4) as well as encouraging women’s agency in the private settlement that enabled progressive social reforms. As a sphere (Charrad, 2011: 426). Likewise, data suggest that service-based economy, building strong human capital across one result of more educated women is that there are more the country has been important for supporting economic female teachers, which is strongly associated with girls’ development and maintaining political power. As the school performance (Lockheed and Mete, 2007). It appears, Jasmine Revolution showed, however, public frustration therefore, that access to education, alongside the other CPS about unemployment and slow economic development can reforms, developed a self-reinforcing cycle for women’s be a stimulus to political change, which can lead to large empowerment in Tunisia. Gender equality in education policy changes in all areas, including women’s rights. policy was a crucial initial factor in women’s empowerment, Tunisia’s health and reproductive policy had an impact which then supported greater access and achievement by on women’s participation in the labour force, in particular women at all educational levels. by increasing women’s access to primary education. Baliamoune (2011: 20) shows that Tunisia’s significant 3.3.3 Women in labour markets (public and private decline in fertility rates is associated with a substantial sphere) increase in female school enrolment, particularly at the As already discussed, Tunisia’s post-independence political tertiary level, which has been a key element in increasing alliance had a shared interest in investing in human capital women’s access to paid employment (Baliamoune, 2009; EU, as a means to develop a skilled labour force, which had 2010: 41). good outcomes for women (Charrad, 2001; Baliamoune- Access to education has also contributed to expanding Lutz, 2009, 2011). The political commitment to creating a women’s employment opportunities. Moghadam (2005: skilled labour force to meet business needs and support the 136) argues that women’s employment became more country’s manufacturing industry provided a rationale for diversified in the 1980s ‘due to improved educational women to seek paid employment (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009). attainment of the labour force’, although while more women Sustained commitments to social policies, and the economic than men have a university education, more female than policies to realise them, have been key to improving male graduates are unemployed (Baliamoune, 2011: 7). women’s access to paid employment. The fact remains that Tunisian women are still largely in Tunisia’s economic policies since the 1970s, in lower-paid and lower-skilled jobs. These jobs may be more conjunction with a favourable judicial framework and accessible to women and more acceptable to their husbands, progressive social policies, benefited women’s integration but it may also be that in order to obtain higher-status into the labour force. The opening up of the economy employment, women need more technical and vocational in the 1970s and the export-promotion policies of the education. Tunisia’s economy is relatively export-oriented 1980s supported the expansion of Tunisia’s export-based and it appears that the country has not yet managed to

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 37 capitalise on female tertiary education in international trade In particular, the critical mass of educated women was a (Baliamoune, 2011). key factor in the development of women’s organisations and It is somewhat surprising that female tertiary education agency (Charrad, 2011: 426). The women’s movements can is not correlated with women’s participation in international therefore be considered largely as an outcome of the top- trade given that, according to Baliamoune-Lutz (2009), the down social policy reforms, which contributed to women’s main reason to invest in universal education was to develop capabilities and resources to express their voices and take a skilled labour force for the export-oriented manufacturing political action. sector. This underlines the fact that social norms and attitudes to women’s employment need to develop alongside 3.4.1 Women’s organisations as drivers of change policy reform. As discussed above, however, the CPS reforms While women’s movements and associations had begun to as a whole correlate with indicators on trade and economic develop from the late 1970s onwards, it was only in the development. This suggests a positive association between mid-1980s that they gained a collective voice in defence of economic development and improvements in women’s women’s rights and interests. health and education even if the causal relationship is not As detailed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, this was precipitated always clear (Baliamoune, 2011: 20). among other things by the perceived threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism to Tunisia’s advances in gender equality40 as well as women’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of 3.4 Women’s political and social mobilisation reforms in women’s political representation. Furthermore, The enabling socio-economic environment resulting from as noted in section 2.3, during the 1980s and 1990s reforms in the decades immediately following independence women’s organisations were largely government-funded and has supported processes of structural change in women’s operating within the boundaries of a state-sponsored view access to resources (education, health, paid employment of gender identity and gender-based relations. During the and political representation). As discussed in section 2.3 1980s, the activities of civil society organisations (CSOs) this contributed to the emergence of women’s movements, were severely restrained and women’s movements would which can be seen as an outcome of the favourable policy have needed government approval in order to remain active. environment. Women’s organisations that the state regarded as subversive Initial improvements in women’s individual agency risked being banned and it is questionable how far they subsequently enabled women to demand further changes to could have pursued an independent agenda (Goulding, policy and legislation in favour of gender equality. Having 2010).41 As a result, many influential women’s organisations greater autonomy in the private sphere – especially with were accused of being used as a mouthpiece of the regime.42 regard to fertility, marriage, divorce, and equality before Despite this, women’s groups during this period the law – all strengthened women’s collective agency, brought a feminist discourse to the forefront of public which further enhanced women’s empowerment. Although debates and enabled the further empowerment of women. women’s agency did not play a key role in the first wave of Many of the largely educated and professional women reforms, the early policies set the stage for the development involved in these groups (drawn for the most part from of women’s individual and collective agency in the 1980s, the educated and professional elites) became key advocates which would help in consolidating gains in the second phase for the advancement of women’s rights. They were crucial of reforms in the 1990s (see section 2.4). It was not the in participating in and building up the (state) gender main intention of the reforms to address women’s rights and machinery, which gave consistency and substance to equality. On the contrary, NDP took a conservative stance to the legal framework on gender equality; and as public women’s issues, which were never on the nationalist agenda employees they contributed to making the content of law (Charrad, 1997: 291). President Bourguiba’s reforms with more meaningful. As women’s movements grew in strength respect to women’s status in the family and labour market in the 1990s, they contributed to defining the scope of were motivated by a commitment to building a modern state gender legislation both through direct involvement with and a strong economy to which women could contribute the state and indirectly by putting pressure on those in rather than by a commitment to women’s rights as such. power (Charrad, 1997). Overleaf are some of the ways in Nonetheless, these central elements of the reform created which women’s participation in policy and decision-making a context for social change that was highly favourable to influenced policy in favour of women’s equality: women.

40 For example, in 1989 women protested against a speech by an Islamic fundamentalist leader in which he called for the CPS to be repealed (Charrad, 1997). 41 For example, women who wore the veil or who followed their religion too closely were considered dangerous and Nissa was banned in 1987 when it was considered too closely linked to communist groups in France (Goulding, 2010; Libidi, 2007). 42 The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (AFTD), for example, was led by the First Lady, while AFTURD was accused of being a mouthpiece for the regime.

38 development Progress Case Study Report •• Participating in the various commissions and councils Figure 7: Total ODA disbursed to Tunisian women’s described in section 2.3, which were critical to informing organisations 2004–2012 state policy. 20 •• Using gender machinery as a means to consolidate

reforms through follow-up and oversight. Millions $ •• Demanding new reforms – for example, playing a key role in the second wave of amendments to the CPS (described in 2.4). 15 •• Increasing the presence and visibility of women in the formal sphere (including in public office) and in society more broadly. •• Expanding women’s political representation (most 10 women who reached political decision-making positions were members of the National Union of Tunisian Women – a key women’s organisation (Gribaa et al., 2009) – reflecting the importance of women’s organisations to 5 women’s political voice. •• Bringing politics into previously non-political structures, such as cultural or study groups (e.g. the Club Tahar al Haddad), sub-sections of national organisations (such as trade unions and human rights organisations), 0 women’s magazines (i.e. Nissa), women’s commissions 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 in national political parties, academic research groups (e.g. AFTURD), political organisations (e.g. AFTD) Algeria Libya Tunisia and a variety of women’s cultural, social and economic Egypt Morocco organisations (Charrad, 1997; 2007). Source: OECD statistics (viewed 3 January 2014) These different expressions of women’s voice contributed to reinforcing gender equality in the policy space and to immediate post-revolution period, women’s organisations enhancing changes in social norms regarding women’s were key in ensuring that Tunisian women, Islamist and role in the public sphere. This has been important in others, made women’s equality central to the political consolidating gains in gender equality. The presence since the debate. For instance, women’s organisations drafted and 1980s of a vibrant, albeit constrained, women’s movement supported a measure that led to a quota on gender parity on in Tunisia is in itself indicative of achievements in women’s party electoral lists being passed into law for the October agency, particularly since other social movements (such as 2011 elections called by the transitional government. This trade unions) were declining during the same period.43 These was a radical move that guaranteed the presence of women, groups served to consolidate the earlier gains in gender particularly Islamist women, in the National Constituent equality and perhaps also contributed to their robustness. Assembly and subsequently shaped the redrafting of the Importantly, women’s organisations and the agency Tunisian constitution (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013). The that emerged from them grew from domestic demands and heated and nuanced debates about gender in article 28 of pressure for change and from state-sponsored agendas – the constitution, which had originally deemed women’s role most were self-funded or received government support44 in the family as complementary to men’s, was a testament – rather than depending on external financial flows, i.e. to the assertiveness of women’s organisations and activists. official development assistance (ODA), which was relatively Women’s organisations, such as the LTDH and AFTURD, minimal (see Figure 7). organised demonstrations and online petitions to protest such terminology and it is evidence of their collective 3.4.2 Women’s agency since the Arab Spring strength that Ennahda, the Tunisian Islamist party that won Women played a defining role in shaping Tunisian transition a majority in the 2011 elections, eventually agreed to omit politics following the Arab Spring. Women had participated the clause from the final text. in the protests as organisers and demonstrators, and in the

43 The 1980s were a key juncture for social movements in Tunisia. For example, the adoption of an economic structural adjustment programme led to the decline of trade unions in this period. This did not affect the discourse on women’s empowerment as by this time there were already several influential women’s movements. 44 ODA for women’s organisations in Tunisia has remained far lower than in other MENA countries. In 2004 it was US$120,000 and even at its highest in 2007 was only US$1.75 million.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 39 4. What are the challenges?

Despite the progress achieved to date, several factors concerned that traditional gender relations and stereotypes continue to impede women’s voice and gender equality in are becoming stronger (Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012). Tunisia. These include the enduring character of patriarchal Public consultation undertaken by Borovsky and Ben social norms and the role of religion in social and family Yahia (2012) found that rather than changing legislation life, which are a source of discriminatory practices and to enshrine gender equality, most people would prefer to belief systems that disadvantage women. There is also a accommodate women’s needs separately. For example, range of other socio-political and institutional barriers that proposals to treat women differently with respect to limit the effectiveness of some of the measures reviewed part-time employment or childcare provision were more above, and constrain the space for women’s voice and popular than policies granting equal opportunities to men agency at the collective and individual level. and women. This reflects dominant social and cultural This section looks at the challenges in implementing norms that view men and women as having distinct roles policy reforms to bring about advancements in women’s and responsibilities rather than as equals who should empowerment in Tunisia. It considers the various have the freedom to decide how to live. These social and institutional constraints on the implementation of pro- cultural norms related to women’s (and men’s) status are gender policy reforms and outlines anticipated sources of not challenged by the media, which provides very little resistance to improving women’s participation in the socio- coverage of women in positions of power, meaning that economic and political spheres. It also considers socio- there are very few positive role models to encourage normative challenges, and newer threats to the existing other women to aspire to positions of political or social advances in women’s empowerment. The section focuses importance (Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012). on the implications of developments following the Arab The major reforms to Tunisia’s legal and institutional Spring for the country’s agenda on gender empowerment. framework over the last 50 years have been very favourable to women and are among the most progressive in the MENA region, but numerous challenges impede 4.1 Social and cultural conservatism further progress towards women’s empowerment. Despite impressive advances in favour of women’s equality Patriarchal norms and practices remain prominent in and empowerment, Tunisia remains in many respects a social and family life, and discrimination against women patriarchal society in which gender-based discrimination is reflected in many of the CPS articles and current persists in public and private life. legislation. Notably, dowry remains a legal condition of Social norms in Tunisia remain relatively conservative, the validity of marriage (article 12 and 13); fathers are and support views on women’s status that deviate from still considered the head of the family; although a wife’s the formal legal framework (EU, 2010). For example, obligation to obey her husband was abolished in 1993, while women’s marital rights have improved, marriage is spouses are still required to perform conjugal duties in still considered the only acceptable form of family unit; ‘accordance with traditions and customs’ (paragraph 2, divorced women can lose custody of their children if they article 23); despite progressive measures, women still remarry; and the legal position of unmarried mothers receive half of men’s share of inheritance (article 103); and children born outside marriage remains contentious and while the CPS allows judges to grant child custody (Charrad, 2007; EU, 2010). In addition, it is widely to either parent according to the interests of the child, it assumed that the man is the head of the family (Gribaa prohibits a mother from having or retaining custody if et al., 2009; EU, 2010). Borovsky and Ben Yahia (2012) she has remarried (article 58). The same restriction does found that while men often consider that women and not apply to fathers (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Such men have equal roles in society, women are likely to feel discriminatory provisions limit women’s empowerment that men do not respect them, in particular by expecting in the private sphere and also have implications for that they should do the lion’s share of household work. their economic and political empowerment, and support Although women participated in the National Constituent conservative social norms regarding the status and role of Assembly elections in 2011 and have since had active women in Tunisian society. roles in politics and civil society, women are increasingly ‘We are here to support women and to say there are men who stand for women’s rights […] we are proud of Tunisian women ... and we will not let Islamists turn our spring into a winter’ – Sami Layouni, at a protest march in August 2013

40 development Progress Case Study Report Cultural and religious norms also continue to influence With regard to political representation, although commitments to future policy reforms. For instance, while affirmative action in the form of quotas and more recently Tunisia formally declared in 2014 that it was withdrawing the introduction of gender parity for the National its reservations to CEDAW, the interim government Constituent Assembly elections has been significant for maintained a reservation regarding reforms which conflict women’s empowerment (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013), with Islam. Inheritance law, for instance, is affected by this women’s political participation remains limited and their reservation and discriminates against women. Inheritance presence in legislative and executive functions is marginal. remains a fundamental challenge in Islam and for Tunisia Women are poorly represented at the grassroots and in the because while the wording of other areas in Shari’a law leadership of opposition parties (EU, 2010) and Borovsky leaves scope for interpretation, the articles on inheritance and Ben Yahia (2012) argue that women tend to be offered are clearly formulated and leave less room for manoeuvre. the lowest positions on their party’s list. This raises the President Ben Ali regarded any attempt to address this concern that the parity law does not really enable women issue in the second wave of reforms as too risky as it might to gain greater political power. have precipitated a fundamentalist upheaval, which would Finally, although Tunisia’s comprehensive legal not have served the interests of the state or of the women’s framework has been accompanied by gender machinery movement. This reticence remains, meaning that although to support the implementation of formal constitutional, reform of article 24 in the 2014 Tunisian constitution legislative and policy reforms, it has only limited financial reduces the unequal rights of women regarding inheritance, and human capacity. it does not abolish them and thus impedes women’s empowerment (Charrad, 1997). Similarly, although women’s employment position has 4.2 Domestic perceptions of the women’s improved in Tunisia, women still face discrimination. For movement instance, while improvements in legislation regarding The women’s movement is very diverse and fragmented and pregnancy and maternity provision make it easier for does not present a coherent vision of women’s position in women to seek and retain employment, these are based Tunisian society and politics – either before or following the on the assumption that it is the mother rather than both Arab Spring. Although women actively participated in the parents who are responsible for bringing up children. revolution, the political opposition and wider public opinion This anchors responsibility for domestic duties firmly still do not have a positive view of the women’s movement. with women and limits their availability and capacity Before the 2011 revolution, Tunisian women’s to seek employment, which hampers their ability to movements faced severe political constraints and while they take independent decisions and reduces their scope for were seen as guardians of the CPS they were also criticised individual agency in the domestic and economic spheres. for being complicit with the status quo rather than a force Moreover, despite legislation on equality in employment, for contestation (Goulding, 2010). Although there was a this is not guaranteed, particularly in the private sector. rapid increase in the number of women’s organisations and Women’s wages remain lower than men’s – although Tunisia is their activities in the post-revolution period – which may not unique in this regard – and men are typically given higher signal that the women’s movement is gaining influence and priority than women in obtaining employment (EU, 2010: 41). power – the movement lacks a common vision. While unemployment may motivate the government to Moreover, whereas in other Arab countries their Islamic invest in universal education and health services to support faith is an important source of women’s participation in the country’s labour force, it also creates job competition, politics and of their political beliefs, in Tunisia Islamist which may result in women being side-lined in the context female politicians do not necessarily use their position of high male unemployment. Rising unemployment to advocate greater rights for women. Although it following the global financial crisis has meant that is questionable how far women in government have women’s work is becoming more precarious (i.e. short-term expressed an independent voice and agenda (see section contracts, low wages) (EU, 2010). Research has shown that 2.3), (Goulding 2010: 76) through MAFFEPA and other high male unemployment can foster negative attitudes to gender machinery, women in public office have built up women’s employment (Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012), the capacity of women’s groups and ensured that gender along with a common perception that women will accept equality continues to have a place in government policy. lower salaries than men and so can find jobs more easily. At the same time, the election of women to the National Given the social importance of men being able to provide Constituent Assembly (NCA) is often attributed to their for their family, women may feel that it is more important party affiliation rather than because of their qualities as for men to be in work and feel guilty if they have jobs politicians. This is in line with research that signals the (Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012). The belief that it is more limitations of electoral quotas. ‘Going beyond numbers’ important for men than for women to be employed may is now an established consensus, as merely being in office create domestic tensions regarding women’s freedom to does not automatically translate into seeking to bring about work, and restrict their ability to obtain better-paid work. change in favour of women’s rights (Goulding, 2010).

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 41 Women’s social movements, albeit operating in a 2013; Kausch, 2013; Pickard, 2013; Meyer-Resende and constrained political environment, have been an important Weichselbaum, 2014). factor in achieving progress in women’s empowerment. Despite such fears, Tunisia’s advances in gender equality Their emergence was enabled by effective social policy have proved to be resilient. The presence of women, reforms, as educated women were better able to articulate including Islamist women, in the new assembly – mandated their demands and to mobilise politically. In the post- with drafting the country’s new constitution – has revolution era, however, most Tunisian women know little ensured that the role of women has been hotly debated. about women’s organisations and do not necessarily regard In addition, there has been a significant departure from them as having had a significant influence on their status the top-down way in which gender policy had previously (Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012). been developed, with numerous activists and organisations participating in debates on women’s rights. The presence of women in the transitional assembly as well as a vibrant 4.3 Constraints to broader political civil society strongly influenced the drafting of the new participation constitution, which in its final version preserved and even While Tunisia has achieved progress in the social and advanced women’s key social and political gains (Amera, economic dimensions of women’s empowerment, prior 2014; Pickard 2013; Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013). The to 2010 there was far less advance in broader political new constitution states that the state ‘commits to protect participation. Indeed, the institutional and outcome women’s established rights and works to strengthen indicators of women’s empowerment discussed in section 3 and develop those rights’, and guarantees ‘equality of were achieved in spite of a repressive regime that accorded opportunities between women and men to have access to citizens only limited political rights. Between 1990 and all levels of responsibility and in all domains’. 2010, further advances in women’s equality and in This is epitomised in the dispute over Article 28 women’s political voice were therefore constrained by the (‘women’s rights’). As mentioned earlier, in the first lack of political freedoms more generally. draft, this article described women’s roles in the family The post-revolution environment in Tunisia has as ‘complementary’ to men’s (Draft Constitution of the considerably changed the political context: political Republic of Tunisia 2012). The wording, which is based on liberalisation saw the number of political parties grow the Qu’ran, was defended by Islamist women, particularly from eight to over 100 and there was a flourishing of Ennahda members in the NCA. The declaration by the new media outlets and NGOs as old laws were replaced Ennahda Executive Council member, Farida Labidi, that with decrees granting greater freedoms to associational ‘One cannot speak of equality between man and woman life (Kausch, 2013: 2-4). Paradoxically, the more liberal in the absolute’ (Cavaillès, 2012, quoted in Charrad and political environment also opened up political space to Zarrugh, 2013) highlighted the danger which the new, more the religious establishment, which had been previously religious, political leadership posed to women’s status in excluded from political influence. In the 2011 transitional Tunisia and that a more Islamist understanding of women’s elections, the moderate Islamic political party Ennahda roles could threaten women’s rights. Article 28 was strongly won 37% of the votes and formed a coalition government. contested by women and women’s rights activists, who This raised widespread concern that there would be a argued that it did not recognise the diversity of Tunisian move away from a secular state, which would create women’s way of life (Charrad and Zarrugh, 2013). tensions with women’s political voice. It was feared that Although the Arab Spring was an opportunity for while women’s greater political freedom to express an progressive constitutional change in Tunisia, and despite independent voice and contest state policy and legislation the fact that the country is making greater progress than were welcome reforms, a change that favoured a greater others in the MENA region, it has also reinforced forces of role for Islam in state affairs may threaten such gains social conservatism, including patriarchy, which may act as (Goulding, 2009, 2010, 2011a-c; Bennhold, 2011; a constraint to further advances in gender equality. Borovsky and Ben Yahia, 2012; Charrad and Zarrugh,

42 development Progress Case Study Report A woman votes at a polling station in Tunis. Photo: © Ezequiel Scagnetti/European Union.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 43 5. What lessons can we learn?

The analysis of women’s empowerment in Tunisia MENA region. The sustained and coherent political described in this report is above all a story of progress commitment to broad progressive social policies in rooted in the post-independence political settlement, and successive government regimes has been instrumental in associated public policies in education, health and labour challenging social norms and supporting the slow process as well as a progressive family code. It demonstrates the of changes in attitudes and behaviour (i.e. the informal importance of locating trajectories of change – such as rules of the game). This has sufficiently embedded notions processes of women’s empowerment – in the context of gender equality and women’s rights in the national of wider political settlements. In Tunisia, early political consciousness for them to survive the political and choices regarding state–society relations created an ideological turbulence following the 2011 revolution. enabling environment for women’s capabilities, voice and Indeed, further advances have been made since the agency to develop. 2011 revolution. The transitional authorities brought The analysis also highlights the cumulative and iterative gender parity into law and in 2014 Tunisia lifted most of interaction between legislative changes and women’s its remaining reservations to the ratification of CEDAW, capacity to mobilise, combined with sustained elite support with the exception of a reservation for the implementation for policies that would lead to greater gender equality. of reforms that conflict with Islam. Moreover, the CPS In the post-revolutionary era, the strength of Tunisian still contains provisions that discriminate against women, women’s collective agency can be seen as the combined particularly in relation to inheritance. These stepwise result of the organisational capacity and capabilities of improvements in women’s status reflect the political women activists. This has built on the progressive advances tension between reformism and religious and cultural in gender equality during the previous 50 years, which conservatism in Tunisia, which successive governments resulted in significant and consistent improvements in have had to handle. women’s access to resources, in particular education, Tunisia’s experience of progress towards women’s health, paid employment and political representation. The empowerment between 1990 and 2010 provides useful consolidation of women’s individual agency to participate lessons about the means by which women can obtain access in the public sphere enabled women’s movements to new resources – and the way in which politics and power, to have greater capital and resources and women to and the struggles, dynamics and contestation that these obtain stronger positions in the state bureaucracy. The generate – can be used to challenge gender and social power establishment of gender machinery and the increased relations. We summarise some of the principal lessons below: capacity of relevant state bodies contributed to a legal and policy environment which upholds the commitment to •• The role of social contracts, and particularly the way in gender equality. which elites negotiate these, can determine what level The combination of progressively increasing individual of women’s empowerment it is feasible to achieve. In and collective agency in both the public and private Tunisia, progress in women’s empowerment has been spheres over several decades explains the opportunities in conditioned by the unique manner in which political contemporary Tunisia to further advance gender equality dynamics have evolved throughout the state-building and to consolidate women’s empowerment. It also helps to process and the way in which elites have negotiated explain why women’s movements were able to maintain the relationship between modernist and secular their influence during the transition period following conceptions of the state. In Tunisia, the elites’ bargain the ousting of Ben Ali until the promulgation of a new undermined traditional norms of kinship and religious constitution in 2014. The cumulative nature of change in power structures. This was most notably reflected different domains has been mutually reinforcing, and, it in early changes to Tunisian family law, which were can be argued, has given women’s movements the resilience extraordinarily progressive in terms of gender equality to stand firm against threats of reversal, such as those for a country in the MENA region and indeed also by associated with certain outcomes of the Arab Spring. global comparisons. While Tunisia remains a patriarchal society, it has nonetheless made important advances in gender equality, •• Progress towards women’s empowerment can occur especially in comparison with other countries in the even under an authoritarian political regime. Until

44 development Progress Case Study Report 2010, Tunisia’s political regime was not democratic. contributed to change in both the private and public Nonetheless, the particular way in which elite interests spheres, reforming gender relations more generally and aligned with gender equality over a period of 50 years achieving some changes in social norms. These change created enabling conditions that have been important processes are mutually reinforcing, and have contributed for women’s empowerment in some areas. Progressive to progress in women’s empowerment. They improve change has thus been possible in a progressive women’s capacity for individual and collective agency authoritarian system. in negotiating with the family, religious beliefs, the state and the economy, and thus are indicators of women’s Change has been top-down and led by a committed empowerment. political leadership. The advantages have included the lack of opposition to legislation and implementation in •• Advances in gender equality and women’s empowerment support of gender equality. There have, however, also can take place even when not driven initially, or mainly, been drawbacks. Women’s political voice remained by women’s agency. Top-down women-friendly reforms constrained in Tunisia – as it did for all citizens – given can create an enabling environment for new debates and the authoritarian character of the post-independence further advances in women’s empowerment. regime that existed until the Arab Spring. Despite this, there has been some space for women to occupy In the case of Tunisia, both waves of institutional decision-making roles in public and political office, and reforms were driven by a top-down political approach support for important policies and legislation, which and implemented by an effective civil service. While have contributed to shaping the conditions in which women’s agency entered into play in the second round it was possible to make progress towards women’s of reforms and was important in consolidating advances empowerment. in women’s empowerment, their success had as much to do with the interests of the elite as with the actions of •• Women’s empowerment is closely connected to a the women’s movement. sustained commitment to public investment in health and education. To the extent that social policies are Although public policies seem very top-down, the gender-blind (and most seem to be) the gains also benefit capabilities and women’s empowerment to which they girls and women, contributing to greater advances in contributed have been a factor in the emergence of gender equality than in Tunisia’s neighbouring countries. women’s movements. It is the possibility of collective (if So, while social policies may not have been focused politically conditioned) agency from below that is crucial explicitly or even exclusively on gender equality, they to protecting and advancing gains in the period under have had positive (if not necessarily intended) impacts consideration, as demonstrated in the constitutional on gender relations and women’s empowerment. process since the Arab Spring – but also before. Progress in gender equality women’s empowerment in Tunisia has not relied on external aid but has been In conclusion, progress in women’s empowerment enabled by sustained public spending on social policy – does not necessarily always result from political notably health and education. struggles and policy reforms that are directly focused on improving gender equality. Other power struggles The CPS reforms to family law gave women greater – such as those over control of the state – are equally autonomy in the household (from their husbands capable of generating elite bargains that result in a more as well as the extended family) and increased their inclusive distribution of resources that favours women. individual agency in the private sphere. Progress in In Tunisia, consistent institutional reforms that were not socio-economic indicators (i.e. women’s access to health specifically aimed at improving gender equality resulted services, formal education and employment) are also in a radical shift in social relations and enabled women indicators of steps towards gender equality, and have to obtain access to new resources.

Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 45 References

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Building momentum – women’s empowerment in Tunisia 47 This is one of a series of Development Progress case studies. There is a summary of this research report available at developmentprogress.org. Development Progress is a four-year research project which aims to better understand, measure and communicate progress in development. Building on an initial phase of research across 24 case studies, this second phase continues to examine progress across countries and within sectors, to provide evidence for what’s worked and why over the past two decades.

This publication is based on research funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The findings and conclusions contained within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

ODI is the UK’s leading independent think tank on international development and humanitarian issues. Further ODI materials are available at odi.org.uk

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