Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo ’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC)

Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through

South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC)

Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo 10.22146/globalsouth.64156 Institute of International Studies, Indonesia [email protected]

This article aims to examine the link between self-identity and foreign policy, particularly focusing on how a state’s self-identity is built and sustained through policy. The article will rely on a combination of Lebow’s conception of state identity with Holsti’s idea of National Role Conception as a conceptual framework. Furthermore, this combined approach will utilize key foreign policy makers’ statements and official documents, as well as process tracing of international developmental policy discourse in its analysis. Using Indonesian development assistance policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) as a case study, this article finds that Indonesia self-identifies as a middle power country with strong affiliation towards developing countries as a result of national role conception processes. This self-identity in turn is built and sustained through SSTC development assistance policy, due to the suitability of role obligations as a middle power country with the values carried by the act of providing development assistance, as well as the deeply rooted historical dynamics of SSTC development policy with developing country status.

Keywords: identity; role; development assistance; SSTC; Indonesia

Introduction related to identities, such as historical narrative The recent decades saw a transformation and Indonesia’s role within the international of the global development assistance practices community as shown by official documents that Woods (2008) termed as a silent revolution, as well as statements by key policymakers marked by the emergence of developing (National Coordination Team of SSTC, 2016). countries as development donors and the Looking at the latter phenomenon, this article gradual shifts of developed countries’ dominant suggests that identity and policy are linked roles in that aspect. In this changing landscape, together by constructivist logic, namely that Indonesia has positioned itself in the group of identity is built and sustained through the emerging donors by bringing forward SSTC enactment of a relevant policy. To do so, this approaches in its development assistance policy article bridges together the concept of self- that is set to be executed by Indonesia’s novel identity from International Relations with development aid agency, officially known as role-theory from Foreign Policy Analysis. Indonesian AID or INDOAID. Interestingly, This approach will enable us to understand the this policy is often justified using the parlance formation of state identity and the processes

Global South Review 111 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) that link specific policy to that identity. This the policy. In this regard, previous studies have article asserts that how states perceive its pointed out two motives behind SSTC policy, identity affects the role it seeks to occupy namely material and normative that could be in international society, thereby led to the differentiated. However, following the finding of enactment of a policy that corresponds to motivational convergence by Winanti & Alvian, that role. To illustrate the argument, analysis this article attempts to reframe the approach of of Indonesia’s SSTC policy presents a good SSTC policy motives as a combination of both opportunity to develop and explore the role of material and normative interest as represented policy in the state’s self-identity. by the concept of identity. Furthermore, this Previously, several studies have been approach has the potential to open up a further conducted in regards to the motives behind the constructivist insight to be applied within the SSTC policy of various developing countries study of foreign policy, particularly in the and whether identity plays a role in that aspect. motives of foreign aid policy. First, a study by Six (2009) identified the motives The article offers the following of Chinese and Indian SSTC policies in Africa. contributions to the current studies of Six found that Chinese SSTC policy was guided International Relations, particularly in the by an interest-based Third World solidarity, in subjects of identity and foreign policy. First, the which an emphasis on material-self interest was article aims to explain that identity and foreign followed by normative concepts introducing an policy are linked together through the logic of alternate profile in international relations. India role enactment. Moreover, the enactment of the on the other hand, clearly displayed a preference role provides legitimacy to the state’s identity in moral Politik in its policy to strengthen the claims and in turn sustains the image of self- image of a responsible international power. identity. Secondly, by analyzing Indonesia’s Another study done by Santander & Alonso novel SSTC policy, the article contributes to the (2017) found a strong identity motive behind the studies of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Namely, SSTC policies of Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile the article seeks to give an empirical elaboration such as projecting domestically created images on the emergence of Indonesia’s self-identity that abroad and perception of a country’s capability affects its conduct on the foreign policy, shown and experiences. by the enactment of development assistance Lastly, a study with a particular focus policy through the SSTC scheme. on Indonesia’s SSTC policy was conducted by Winanti & Alvian (2019), which traced Methodology the development of Indonesia’s SSTC policy This article uses interpretive and throughout the years. Winanti & Alvian found qualitative approaches to answer the research a shift of emphasis to material interest in the questions. The supporting data will be secondary most recent form of the policy. However, it was by nature and taken from desk research of also concluded that there was a convergence of literary sources such as books, journal articles, material and normative interest in the narrative of official documents, online websites, as well as

112 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) key foreign policymakers statements through interests are and how those interests can be text quotations or YouTube video quotations. achieved (Wendt, 1992, p. 398). Identity In this regard, quotations from YouTube videos also creates a boundary that differentiates are important since there has been an increasing ‘self’ from ‘other’, thus forms the norms that number of official government statements being regulate actions appropriate to the boundary recorded and put online. Thus, it allows more in question (Bozdaglioglu, 2003, p. 23). data to be utilized for this research, particularly Identity is often differentiated between in the aspect of policymakers’ role conception. corporate identity and social identity. According Generally, the data used in this article is to Wendt, corporate identity refers to an intrinsic organized in the following lines: the data on quality that shapes an actor’s individuality Indonesia’s material capability is presented to (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Social identity on the other explain Indonesia’s identity specifically in the hand is understood as “a set of meanings that an aspect of the relationship to bodies. The data actor attributes to itself using the perspective of concerning national history on the other hand another” (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). is used to explain historical narrative as another Early thinkers such as Wendt views aspect of Indonesia’s identity. Key foreign that identity emerges from social interaction, policymaker statements are used to explain the which underscores the inability of an actor to process of Indonesia’s national role conception. understand its own identity without referring Lastly, the data relating to the development to its interaction with another (Wendt, 1992, of development assistance policy is used to pp. 397-398). This view proves problematic demonstrate the existence of an international since it sidelines the state’s internal dynamics structure that influences the course of Indonesian in the formation of its identity before the said development assistance policy. interaction took place. From this point of view, domestic sources such as social, political, and Conceptual Framework historical beliefs of society can be considered Identity is one of the focuses of as factors that shape a state’s identity (Hopf, constructivism. Identity is generally understood 2002). These domestic political and cultural as images of individuality and distinctiveness contexts then become a point of reference of (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor for individuals that represent the state to put (Jepperson, et al., 1996, p. 59). In the context meanings into objects, phenomenon, and of states, identity is a set of dominant ideas actions that is relevant with the formulation and images that defines state and shape state’s of foreign policy (Weldes, 1996, p. 280). This action in international politics (McCourt, logic creates a perspective of identity as a self- 2011, p. 1604). Furthermore, constructivism identity, which is the self-definition of actor contends that identity generates an actor’s understanding towards the role it occupies interests and actions (Jepperson, et al., 1996, in a social situation that motivates behavior p. 60). Thus, a state will always bring its appropriate with self-conception (Astrom & identity to interaction to decide what is its Rise, 2007, p. 225).

Global South Review 113 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC)

This understanding of self-identity 1997, pp. 59-63). In terms of identity, the can be summarized with the national identity role is a part of the country’s social identity approaches of Richard Lebow. According (Aggestam, 2006). In other words, the role to him, identity is based on four elements has the function of shaping the state’s social which are role, affiliations, relationship to identity as an actor within the international bodies, and historical narrative (Lebow, 2016, community. As part of social identity, the p. 3). The role is associated with the state’s role provides the actor with a reference point behavior in a particular circumstance or order. or frame of reference to interpret existing Affiliation is seen as a strong attachment of social situations and expectations of behavior a state with other international actors such as following the social situations (Nabers, 2011, other states, groups of states, and international p. 83). In this situation, the role serves as a link organizations. Relationship to bodies in this between identity and state action in the form of regard is an emotional attachment of the state foreign policy (McCourt, 2011). to its geographical spaces as well as its national The state’s role is formed through a citizens. Lastly, a historical narrative is a process known as national role conception. collective narrative about the past, including This process was first defined by Holsti as: both ethnic-based and national-based narratives. “the policy makers’ own definitions of At this point, three reasons highlight the the general kind of decisions, suitability of Lebow’s approaches with the commitments, rules and actions suitable concept of self-identity elaborated above. First, to their state, and of the functions, if any, Lebow’s concept of identity includes two types their state should perform on a continuing of Wendt’s identities: corporate identity in the basis in the international system or forms of historical narrative and relationship in subordinate regional systems. It is to bodies; and social identity that corresponds their “image” of the appropriate to the state’s role and affiliations. Secondly, in orientations or functions of their state the aspect of identity formation, Lebow also toward, or in, the external environment” incorporates domestic elements into corporate (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246). identity, while also underscores the external In short, the role conception can also be aspects through social identity. Lastly, national understood as follows: identity links identity with foreign policy “an individual’s understanding of the through Role theory (Lebow, 2016, p. 73). state’s identity–his or her sense of what Role theory assumes that the state’s the nation naturally stands for and how behavior as an actor in the international high it naturally stands in comparison community corresponds to the role assumed to others in the international arena” by the state (Chafetz, et al., 1996, p. 732). (Hymans, 2006, p. 19). In this context, the role is defined as a set of Based on national role conception, expectations regarding the appropriateness of individual policymakers occupy an important actor behavior in a given situation (Hewitt, position in shaping the state’s role. The focus

114 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) on individual policymakers is justifi ed by the branches into an auxiliary role before fi nally tendency for policymakers from one country to transforms into foreign policy action through a have similar role conceptions (Wish, 1980, pp. tertiary role. 549-550). This phenomenon is possible because The arguments given in this article are policymakers participate in articulating a vision presented in two parts. The fi rst part explains of the state’s role in international relations that the formation of Indonesia’s self-identity originates from the cultural context of the state as a middle power with strong affi liations in question (Hudson, 1999, p. 769). In the towards developing countries. The formation concept of identity, this cultural context can be of Indonesia’s self-identity is elaborated understood as corporate identity. Apart of based through the emergence of Indonesia’s identity on domestic elements or corporate identity, that arises out of its relationship to bodies and national role conception too must also respond historical narratives. This personal identity in to the dynamics of the international structure as turn is referred to by foreign policymakers in a foundation of foreign policy (Breuning, 2011, the process of national role conception. With p. 24). The relationship between these various the strengthening of its political and economic elements can be seen in the following fi gure. stability, Indonesia’s national role conception consolidated towards middle power with strong affi liations to developing countries. The second part accounts for the connection between Indonesia’s identity and its foreign policy. In this part, the policy of development assistance is taken as a practice that marks the auxiliary role of the middle power as a good international citizen. The contributions Figure 1.Relationship between identity, structure, of Indonesia in SSTC are highlighted, national role conception, and foreign policy. particularly from the inception during the Afro- Asia Conference of 1955 to the formation of The role is categorized into two parts, the Non-Aligned Movement – Centre for generalized role (meta-role) and auxiliary role SSTC in 1995. Lastly, the explanation on how (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2011, p. 114) (Thies identity affects the dynamics of Indonesia’s & Sari, 2018, p. 403). A generalized role is a SSTC policy is presented as a relevant foreign salient role, thus can be seen across contexts, policy strategy for middle power with strong and consists of a set of supporting roles that are affi liations towards the developing country. shown in a specifi c issue scope. Auxiliary role The fi ndings are summarized in the on the other hand is demonstrated through a conclusion, which contends that Indonesia’s tertiary role that is foreign policy specifi c. Thus, self-identity drives the enactment of the state’s role manifests into foreign policy at development assistance policy through the fi rst instance through a generalized role, which SSTC scheme. This act highlights two related

Global South Review 115 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) justifications: first being the role as a good On the economic aspect, Indonesia is one of international citizen and middle power; the largest economies in the world with the secondly, Indonesia’s strong affiliations to potential for rapid growth. The Indonesian fellow developing countries. Examining its economy is ranked the 16th largest in the world formation, Indonesia’s role and affiliations using GDP calculations (World Bank, 2019). are a byproduct of national role conception Furthermore, Indonesia in 2050 is projected processes, done by foreign policymakers using to become the fourth-largest economy in the Indonesia’s physical and historic qualities as a world after China, India, and the United States reference. Furthermore, these findings put the (PwC, 2017). The last aspect of the relationship identity approach as a middle way that bridges to bodies is the population size of Indonesia. material and normative approaches together. In 2019, Indonesia’s population will reach 270 million (World Bank, 2019). This figure places Indonesia’s Identity and Role Conception Indonesia in the ranking of the fourth largest Relationship to bodies is one of the country in the world by population. sources of Indonesia’s corporate identity. The historical narrative is also Generally, relationship to bodies includes an important reference for the formation material capability that state possesses and of Indonesia’s identity. This reference is specifies state’s behavior in the international specifically directed to two historical periods, order. In this context, the relationship to namely the ancient heyday of the Srivijaya and bodies is represented by geographical space, Majapahit eras, as well as the national revolution resource and economic wealth, as well as the period 1945-1949 (Smith, 2000) (Leifer, 1986). size of the population. From the geographical The formation of a modern Indonesian identity point of view, Indonesia is mainly seen to that refers to ancient glory can be traced to have a strategic value that President Soekarno Soekarno’s defense speech in 1930, which termed as a cross-position (kreuzposition) compared the triumph of Indonesian kingdoms since “[it] situated on cross-position between in the past with the darkness under Dutch two continents and two oceans” (Simatumpang colonialism (Soekarno, 1970, p. 29). This & Matondang, 1989, p. 60). Besides having a thinking was further developed by Muhammad strategic value, Indonesia’s territorial spaces Yamin who introduced the concept of Sriwijaya have an area of 1,9 million km2, placing it as and Majapahit as the first and second national the largest country in Southeast Asia and the states, the precursor to modern Indonesia as the fourteenth largest in the world. third national state (Yamin, 1954). In terms of resources and economy, Beside the image of ancient glory are Indonesia has great potential. In the first aspect, the experiences during the national revolution Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of 1945-1949. In this context, Indonesia’s various mining and plantation products such 1945 proclamation of independence had to as coal, processed tin, and nickel as well as be defended through a bitter and expensive palm oil, rubber, and coffee (Dutu, 2015). physical and political struggle before it was

116 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) officially recognized (Leifer, 1986, p. 37). 1946, p. 7). Under these conditions, world peace This situation was driven by the Dutch’s became the main prerequisite for Indonesia to efforts to restore Indonesia’s status as a colony, rehabilitate its national economic conditions supported by the United States and other major (Hatta, 1953). Commitment to peace through powers. Even though in the end this support the principle of neutrality also allows Indonesia was withdrawn, Western powers backing of to receive assistance from any country or bloc the Dutch has formed a perception of antipathy (Hatta, 1958, pp. 480-481). towards western countries which are seen The conception of Indonesia’s as having the same interests as the colonial international role in the following years was state (Sukma, 1995, p. 307). This perception adapted to the context of the Cold War into in subsequent developments became more the principle of free and active foreign policy entrenched, partly due to the issue of West Irian which was coined by Hatta through his speech and the involvement of the West in various in 1948. In this speech, Hatta underlined the regional rebellions. In the end, this perception need for Indonesia to take an independent stand gave rise to a strong anti-colonialism tendency in the conflict between the two superpowers: and manifested itself in vigilance against the USSR and the United States (Noer, 2018, western powers and solidarity with fellow p. 123). This principle was later clarified in the colonized countries in Asia and Africa. statement of Prime Minister in 1952. In the independent or independent aspect, this Formative Era of Indonesia’s National Role principle is stated as: Conception “[T]he government’s foreign policy Indonesia’s national role conception can will be carried out be seen for the first time in the Preamble of the in an independent manner, 1945 Constitution which stated Indonesia’s role ... namely within the international to realize world order based on independence, sphere that confronts two blocs - peace, and social justice as one of the national namely the Western bloc and the Eastern government’s goals. The emergence of this bloc, the Republic of Indonesia has conception is a consequence of the perceptions decided to adopt an independent policy of policymakers towards the reality of the in the sense that: international system and the condition of a) do not permanently take Indonesia in general. In the first instance, sides by promising oneself to independence, peace, and social justice were one of the two opposing blocs; chosen as a form of opposition colonialism b) does not promise to which was seen by policymakers as an integral permanently abstain or be part of the international order (Weinstein, 1976, neutral in any incident that may p. 50). On the other hand, the principle of peace arise from the two-bloc feud.” reflects Indonesia’s position as a postcolonial On other hand, the active principle is elaborated state, relatively weak and vulnerable (Hatta, as follows:

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“[T]he government’s independent Through the statement above, Hatta policy is positive in the sense that if conceptualized Indonesia as a third a problem involving two blocks arises power that stood outside the Cold War ... the Republic of Indonesia will feud (Noer, 2018, p. 124). This continue to base its policy on its free conception is contextualized specifically action by relying on: with Indonesia’s material capabilities, a) the view of the aim and including geographic location, size of purpose of being a sincere, loyal area, and population and results and serious member of the in perceptions of policymakers about United Nations; the importance of Indonesia’s role in b) ... the international political arena Given its aims and intentions as a (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 7). In this case, member of the United Nations, the Hatta argued that “[with] the wealth Republic of Indonesia will support all of natural resources and a large efforts within the framework of the population automatically places United Nations to eliminate or reduce Indonesia as an important factor in the tensions between the two blocs to world political arena” (Hatta, 1958, p. 1) prevent the possibility of a large-scale conflict that could trigger a Third World This view of Indonesia’s important War” (Hatta, 1953, p. 447). position in the international order was increasingly shown during the reign of Prime Although the active principle is formulated Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. Under his with reference to the United Nations, it should leadership, Indonesia joined the Colombo be underlined that Indonesia’s active principle Powers1 which affirmed their position as is articulated based on independence in action. ‘representatives of the new Asian power’ who In this context, Hatta stated: stood outside the political bloc but remained “The government believes that the active in international relations (Ewing, 2019, stance we ought to take is that we do p. 1). In that capacity, Prime Minister Ali not become objects in international Sastroamidjojo initiated a broader meeting political struggles, but that we must between African and Asian nations (Abdulgani, remain as a subject who has the right 1980, p. 13). This idea was successfully realized to determine our own policy” (Hatta, in the Asian-African Conference (KAA) held 1953, p. 446). in Bandung in 1955. As a consequence, this

1 Colombo Powers was a participant of the Colombo Conference which was held on 28 April 1954 to 2 May 1954 in Sri Lanka. The conference was attended by Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Burma, India and Pakistan. This conference did not discuss specific issues, but instead discussed issues related to common interests such as the Indochina conflict and recognition of the People’s Republic of China.

118 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) success strengthened Indonesia’s image as a General Suharto in his speech to the MPRS in leading country (Leifer, 1986, p. 56) among 1966: Indonesia’s foreign policymakers. “To create solidarity between nations Fueled by this success, Indonesia’s in this world in general and Asia foreign policy under President Soekarno and Africa in particular, arrogant was characterized by further ambitions to attitude, conspicuous Indonesian make Indonesia a true leader among other leadership, posing as pioneers, postcolonial countries (Leifer, 1986, p. 82). champion and so on have been Under President Soekarno, Indonesia became abandoned and replaced by more one of the five countries that initiated the reasonable approaches based on equal Conference for the Non-Aligned Movement standing and mutual respect” (Leifer, (NAM) in 1961 (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 173), 1986, p. 171). and also became the founding country of the G-77 in 1964. Furthermore, President Soekarno While the flamboyant foreign policy pioneered a novel view of the international order was rejected, perceptions of Indonesia’s characterized by “conflict between emerging prominence were still deeply rooted among powers (NEFOS)… and old dominant forces Indonesian foreign policymakers (Leifer, (OLDEFOS)” rather than conflicts between 1986, p. 162). However, this perception will ideologies (Leifer, 1986, p. 85). Indonesia in be put aside for a moment in the context this case was categorized as a NEFOS (Leifer, of stabilization of political and economic 1986, p. 86). As an effort to affiliate Indonesia situations, as stated in President Soeharto’s into NEFOS, President Soekarno initiated the statement in 1969: “[W]e can only play an holding of the Conference of The New Emerging effective [international] role if we have a great Forces (CONEFO), a United Nations opposition national power” (Leifer, 1986, p. 163) organization based in (Modelski, 1963, This effective role only began to pp. 1-31). In addition, President Soekarno also materialize after the re-election of President proclaimed the Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi- Soeharto in 1983 and was also supported by Peking-Pyongyang axis (Redfern, 2010) as a Indonesia’s political and economic stability. revolutionary bloc in Asia. At this point, Indonesia’s foreign policymakers began to conceptualize Indonesia’s role as a Indonesia as Middle Power middle power. This view was first coined by The revolutionary fervor of Indonesian CSIS2 researchers in 1985, who stated that foreign policy gradually fades away with the Indonesia should behave like a middle power withering of the Old Order. This was stated by (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 8). Furthermore, this

2 CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) is a think-tank that was founded in 1971 and focuses on raising issues surrounding public policy in Indonesia. During the New Order, this institution was known to have close links with policy makers, especially from ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) such as Benny Moerdani and Ali Moertopo.

Global South Review 119 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) role as an influential and prominent middle defined in this sense as those that are “in terms power is seen as a natural thing for Indonesia of strength, capacity, and influence at the middle given its position as the largest country in level and demonstrate the ability to promote Southeast Asia (Djiwandono, 1985, pp. 450- or hinder global governance and governance” 451). This view can also be seen in Minister Ali (Jordaan, 2003, p. 165). In terms of behavior, Alatas’ 1988 speech regarding a new direction a middle power country is characterized by for Indonesia’s foreign policy: three aspects that are part of the concept of “The political consolidation and middle power qualities. The first quality of a economic progress that Indonesia has middle power is a commitment to universal achieved through national development values ​​such as human rights, multilateralism, have enabled us to not only play a and international law (Souter, 2016, p. 795). participatory role. This commitment is often associated with the As the initiator and host of the KAA aspiration for moral superiority. The second and also the initiator of the NAM; quality is a commitment to multilateralism, as a member of the Organization for which is the strategy of the middle power Islamic Cooperation, OPEC, ASEAN, countries to increase their bargaining power and Group of 77, the Conference of legitimacy relative to the major powers (Thies Disarmament as well as other & Sari, 2018, p. 401). Lastly, middle powers international organizations; as a major are characterized by their tendency to maintain producer of raw materials, Indonesia a degree of autonomy over the major powers. has a noteworthy and potential position However, this autonomy is still influenced by among third world countries. the major power countries which determine and Therefore, if we play the role of limit the behavior of middle power countries pioneers, as has been proven in our (Holbraad, 1984). process of struggle for independence The three qualities above are translated and North-South negotiations, the into the language of role theory by categorizing world will accept our role as something the three into supporting roles of the general role natural. This is expected of us too” as a middle power, namely: good international (Alatas, 1988). citizen, supporter of multilateralism, and supporter of the international order (Thies & This statement was later concluded by Sari, 2018, p. 404). For the auxiliary roles, these Alatas by stating that “this is the moment for three roles are further translated into tertiary Indonesia to play a more active and assertive roles that are specific to context and policy. role which also corresponds with our national These tertiary roles include peacekeepers and interests” (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 177). mediators as part of good international citizens; This point marks the beginning of the consensus builders and regional leaders as a consolidation of Indonesia’s specific role as part of being a supporter of multilateralism; as a middle power. Middle-power countries are well as economic collaborators in the role as a

120 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) supporter of the international order. However, it organizations, namely ASEAN, the United must be understood that the role of the middle Nations, and the (Fitriani, 2015, p. power always follows the context and dynamics 73). Within ASEAN, Indonesia is actively of the international system (Cox, 1989, p. 825). encouraging the democratization process of Thus, there will be variations in the roles that Myanmar and bridging differences between the middle power assumes depending on their member countries on the issue of the South role conception (Karim, 2018, p. 350). China Sea dispute. At the United Nations, After the fall of the New Order, it took Indonesia’s role was exhibited, among others, at least five years of recovery for Indonesia to through Indonesia’s membership as a non- be an active actor on the international stage permanent member of the UN Security Council once more. This coincided with the end of for the 2007-2008 period, the host of UN President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s tenure, Climate Change Conference in 2007, and the during which Indonesia hosted the 2003 appointment of President Yudhoyono as vice ASEAN Summit which was seen as an event to chairman of the UN high-level panel on the “strengthen Indonesia’s role, commitment and Post-2015 Development Agenda. Finally, in leadership in ASEAN” (Weatherbee, 2005, p. the G20, President Yudhoyono has never been 150). President , absent to attend the organization’s summit since who took the next term of presidency, also 2008, by posing Indonesia as a representative demonstrated efforts to strengthen Indonesia’s for Southeast Asia and developing countries international role (Karim, 2018, p. 352). In this (Fitriani, 2015, p. 76). context, President Yudhoyono stated that his Indonesia’s active foreign policy foreign policy would seek to make Indonesia an has been generally maintained during the “outward-oriented country, eager to establish Presidency of , even though his regional and international order, and to make its leadership tends to focus more on domestic voice heard” (Mitton, 2005). In terms of role, issues. As shown in various diplomatic President Yudhoyono conceptualized Indonesia initiatives, including holding the 60th KAA as a “peacemaker, trust builder, problem solver, Commemoration in 2015; chairmanship in the and bridge-builder” (Yudhoyono, 2005). Indian Ocean Rim Association multilateral The consolidation of Indonesia’s role forum in 2015-2017; Saudi Arabia - Iran as a middle power commenced again during mediation efforts in 2016; and the delivery President Yudhoyono’s second term. In terms of humanitarian aid in the Rohingya crisis in of Indonesia’s role, President Yudhoyono Myanmar (Rosyidin, 2017, p. 176). Under expanded it to include: norm-setters; consensus President Widodo, strengthening the role as builders; peacekeepers; bridge builders; a middle power became part of Indonesia’s and representatives of developing countries foreign policy direction for the first time. (Yudhoyono, 2012). The aspiration to take This can be looked at in the statement of the on these various roles can be seen through Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi, Indonesia’s contributions to three international who mentioned Indonesia as a middle power

Global South Review 121 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) country noting its population size, the form “There is a moral quality in this nation of government, and membership in the G20 that will not permit us to close our eyes (Kemlu, 2015). In addition, the Ministry of to the want in this world. . . . We have Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Plan also included shown the world that a great nation must the strengthening of the middle power role as a also be a good nation. We are doing what director of Indonesia’s foreign policy (Kemlu, is right to do.” (Nixon, 1969) 2015, p. 48). In this logic, it can be inferred that the Middle Power and Development Assistance policy of providing development assistance Development assistance is broadly is closely related to the fulfillment of a good defined as the practice of providing resources international citizen role (Jordaan, 2003, p. from one country to another or international 11). In this context, the role of being a good organizations and non-governmental international citizen can be understood through a organizations to improve the standard of living commitment to universal values such​​ as human of people in aid recipient countries (Lancaster, rights, international law, and multilateralism 2007, p. 1). This practice is one of the main issues (Souter, 2016). These universal values can​​ also in the sphere of contemporary international be expanded to include economic development, political economy. Hans Morgenthau notes peace, and solidarity which are often found in development assistance as “a real innovation in the justifications behind the policy of providing foreign policy practices brought about by the development assistance (Abbondaza, 2020, p. modern era” (1962, p. 301). This innovation 10). However, this does not mean that countries was initiated by the United States through the that act as good international citizens will base Marshall Plan which was aimed at restoring their actions entirely on altruism, but also on the economic conditions of countries that were instrumentalism to fulfill their interests (Murray, devastated after the Second World War. 2013, pp. 92-93). Thus, the role of being a good During the Cold War, the policy of international citizen incorporates a foreign providing development assistance as a practice policy based on values and​​ interests and thus of international relations expanded, both in represents a middle ground between realism and terms of the donor country and the recipient idealism (Thies & Sari, 2018, p. 400). country. This can be attributed to the views Conceptually, the role of a good of providing development assistance to fulfill international citizen is in turn associated with the role of a rich and developed country the role of a middle power as an auxiliary towards a poorer and less developed country role that establishes the general role. This (Lancaster, 2007, pp. 215-218). This view approach is attributed to the basic conceptual was also expressed by President Nixon in a similarities between the two, where the role of speech to the United States Congress in 1969 being a good international citizen represents which discussed the provision of development a qualitative connotation - normative and assistance as a foreign policy: behavioral aspects, of the role of a middle

122 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) power (Abbondaza, 2020, p. 5). A similar Indonesia in SSTC occurred when Indonesia vein can also be located in the discussion of became chairman of the NAM during 1992- international relations theorists, who stated 1995. During this period of chairmanship, that the role of being a good international Indonesia together with Brunei Darussalam citizen is the key to middle power behavior succeeded in initiating the formation of the Non- (Cooper, et al., 1993, p. 19). Furthermore, the Aligned Movement Center for South-South role of being a good international citizen leads Technical Cooperation (NAM-CSSTC) in 1995 to a classic role as a middle power (Lightfoot, (CEACoS, 2010, p. 53). The formation of this 2006), because the role in question helps define body is aimed at strengthening the Technical middle power diplomacy and enhances the Cooperation among Developing Countries global reputation of a middle power country (TCDC) scheme which was previously (Youde & Slagter, 2013). established by the G-77. In a larger perspective, Indonesia’s initiative was motivated by the Indonesia and Development Assistance desire to create new directions for NAM in the Apart from being a recipient, Indonesia post-Cold War world order. This goal is then also plays a role as a provider of development achieved by making economic issues such as assistance through SSTC. In this context, the economic backwardness the focus of the NAM holding of the KAA along with Indonesia’s (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 177). In addition, the important role in it marks the starting point of focus of NAM on economic issues also opens the SSTC initiative both in the global order and space for Indonesia to play a more decisive role in Indonesia’s foreign policy. This was stated in in the organization, referring to the success of the KAA’s final communique which contained Indonesia’s national development in creating an agreement of participating countries to economic progress and political consolidation provide mutual technical assistance (Ministry (Alatas, 1988, p. 15). In other words, the of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Indonesia, formation of NAM-CSSTC can be seen as 1955). This commitment to South-South Indonesia’s effort to reinforce its important role cooperation in the KAA was then continued at in the global order. the NAM Conference in 1961 which became a Experiencing a setback following joint initiative of President Soekarno and the regime change in 1998, Indonesia’s involvement heads of state of Egypt, Yugoslavia, Ghana, and in SSTC rose again in 2005 (CEACoS, 2010). India (Suryadinata, 1995, p. 173) Apart from This was demonstrated when Indonesia and these two landmark participation, Indonesia’s South Africa initiated an initiative called the involvement as one of the pioneers of the G-77 New Asia-African Strategic Partnership in in 1964 (Kornas KSST, 2017, p. 18), as well the 50th anniversary of the KAA (CEACoS, as the formation of UNDP in 1969 (Winanti & 2010, p. 66). In this document, the formation Alvian, 2019, p. 5) also participated denoting of technical assistance and capacity-building Indonesia’s track record within SSTC. programs is included in a joint ministerial The next important landmark for statement under the section on economic

Global South Review 123 Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) cooperation (NAASP, 2005). The significance Indonesia can be traced through Jakarta of SSTC for Indonesian foreign policy was also Commitment that was signed by Indonesia demonstrated through the establishment of the with donor countries. In general, the document Directorate for Technical Cooperation within confirms the equality of donor countries with the institutional structure of the Ministry of Indonesia as a recipient country in setting the Foreign Affairs in 2006 to increase the active direction of existing development assistance. In role of cooperation between Indonesia and addition, the Jakarta Commitment also contains develop countries (CEACoS, 2010, p. 67). clauses from the Indonesian government to The period of Indonesia’s increasing strengthen processes and institutions that role was accompanied by significant changes facilitate SSTC with development partner in the development policy architecture at the countries to support this step (Government of global level. In this context, the landscape of Indonesia, 2009, p. 3). Implicitly, the document development aid is experiencing a proliferation also refers to Indonesia’s participation in the of donors from emerging powers such as China G20 which underlines Indonesia’s important and India (Nurshafira, 2019, p. 53). This change role in contemporary global political economy was reflected in the approval of the Accra Action architecture, as well as the Accra Agenda for Agenda at the ministerial meeting of the High- Action which provides space for Indonesia, Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness 3 in 2008 which is a middle-income country, to be organized by the OECD and the World Bank actively involved as a donor of international and attended by donor institutions and donor- development assistance. Indonesia’s recipient countries. The Accra Agenda for Action commitment to the implementation of SSTC, in contains three main points in development this case, is again shown through the 2010-2014 assistance policies: ownership by recipient RPJMN, which alludes to Indonesia’s position countries; expansion of partnerships; and in SSTC as a strategic position referring to openness (OECD, 2008). The second point, in Indonesia’s various involvement in the SSTC this case, has an important position because it scheme and also it’s potential (Presiden RI, contains explicit recognition of the important 2010, p. 1139). Furthermore, the increase in role of middle-income countries and the South- SSTC is included in the RPJMN as the target South Cooperation scheme in supporting global of Indonesia’s foreign policy. development (HLF 3, 2008, p. 4) (Tortora, 2011, This commitment was included in the p. 2). Thus, the SSTC provided by developing 2015-2019 RPJMN that noted Indonesia’s countries is also given the same importance as the involvement in SSTC as part of the framework to development assistance provided by the OECD increase Indonesia’s role in global and regional through Official Development Aid (ODA). cooperation (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2015, p. 98). This is highlighted in the Ministry The Implementation SSTC as a Means to of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan 2015-2019. In Strengthen Indonesia’s Self-identity this document, Indonesia’s SSTC program is The implementation of SSTC by linked to two aspects: Indonesia’s position as

124 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) a middle-income country in particular (Kemlu, governance and the economy. 2015, p. 18); and Indonesia as a middle Indonesia’s step in forming the power in international relations in general INDOAID program is seen by many as (Kemlu, 2015, p. 48). The idea of South-South something that is needed by Indonesia as one of Cooperation was also included in President the influential countries in the world. This idea Widodo’s first presidential program known as was expressed several times at the INDOAID Nawacita. In this program, there is a special inauguration ceremony (YouTube, 2019). On emphasis on the role of Indonesia as one of the this occasion, Indonesian countries providing South-South Cooperation Retno Marsudi stated that “Indonesia AID ... (Sekretariat Nasional Joko Widodo, 2014). can strengthen Indonesia’s contribution and The affirmation of commitment to SSTC role in the international world”. In response to by the government, in this case, was followed this statement, Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani by real implementation with the inauguration added that “[T]his institution ... will ... presents of the International Agency for International Indonesia as the world’s major country ...”. Development or Indonesian AID at the end More specifically, Vice President Jusuf Kalla of 2019 (Yasmin, 2019). INDOAID itself has referred to Indonesia’s position as “[A] member at least been planned since 2017 starting with of the G20 ... to help each other with countries a budget of Rp. 1 Trillion in the 2018 State in need”. Vice President Jusuf Kalla ended by Budget as an international aid fund (Pemerintah saying “[I]t’s enough for us to ask for help, it’s Indonesia, 2017, p. 38). This budget in the time for us to do the giving hand diplomacy ...”. following year is set at Rp. 2 Trillion in the On a different occasion, Vice President Jusuf 2019 State Budget, and the 2020 State Budget Kalla concerning the development aid policy is set at Rp. 1 Trillion (Pemerintah Indonesia, said that one of the reasons for the formation of 2018, p. 37) (Pemerintah Indonesia, 2019, p. INDOAID was that so “[W]e don’t always ask 38). The budgeting for the last two APBNs for help ... we also gallantly [give] ... thus gives has been under the International Development us value in this world ... (YouTube, 2019). Cooperation Fund (LDKPI), so that until 2020, Through the explanation above, the emergence INDOAID has received funds of Rp. 4 Trillion. of Indonesia as a donor country cannot be Although it is only projected to be fully separated from its role and affiliation as part operational in 2021, there are seven countries of Indonesia’s identity. The role of a middle confirmed to receive INDOAID grants in 2019, power country in the policy-making process namely: Tuvalu, Nauru, Solomon Islands, can be seen in several aspects. First, the focus Fiji, and Kiribati in the Pacific region; and on SSTC began to re-emerge under President Myanmar and the Philippines in Southeast Asia Yudhoyono (CEACoS, 2010). As previously (Hasan, 2019). Furthermore, this development explained, President Yudhoyono has a foreign assistance program will be realized in the policy vision that places Indonesia, among form of SSTC, and in addition, to focus on the others, as a peacekeeper; trust builder; Fixers; development sector, it will also focus on good and representatives of developing countries

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(Yudhoyono, 2005) which implicitly emphasized the Paris Declaration in 2005, which recognized Indonesia’s role as a middle power. The focus on the contribution and centrality of middle-income SSTC on the other hand can be seen through the countries as providers of development assistance initiatives signed under his leadership including and SSTC as a policy approach (OECD, 2005, the NAASP and the Paris Declaration in 2005, the p. 18). In the Indonesian context, this situation Accra Action Agenda and the Doha Conference can also be seen in the Jakarta Commitment, in 2008; and the Jakarta Commitment in 2009 which states the need for Indonesia as a middle- (CEACoS, 2010, p. 68). income country to contribute to improving Under President Widodo, the link the architecture of international development between their role as a middle power and assistance for both low-income and fellow SSTC policy became increasingly clear. This middle-income countries (Government of connection was shown when in 2015, the middle Indonesia, 2009, p. 1). power countries and SSTC were included in the As an example, this role fulfillment RPMJN and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry is shown through the flagship programs of of Foreign Affairs as part of the direction of Indonesia’s SSTC, one of which being good Indonesia’s foreign policy. In the first aspect, governance and peacebuilding programs the 2015-2019 RPJMN includes Indonesia’s (National Coordination Team of SSTC, 2014, involvement in SSTC as part of the framework to p. 10). Good governance and peacebuilding increase Indonesia’s role in global and regional programs are further specified into issues such cooperation (Presiden Republik Indonesia, 2015, as democracy, rule and law, and peacekeeping. p. 98). Referring to this point, the Ministry of In general, these issues form the universal values Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan in 2015 includes that Indonesia as a good international citizen increasing SSTC as one of the strategies to fulfill commits itself to. In particular, this flagship policy direction 3, namely increasing the role activity alludes to Indonesia’s identity as the and influence of Indonesia as a middle power third-largest democracy and also its experience (Kemlu, 2015, p. 50). In other words, fulfilling in handling transition process that is relatively Indonesia’s role as a middle power can be done successful (National Coordination Team of through the implementation of SSTC. SSTC, 2014, p. 32). Besides democracy, Not only related to the role as a middle Indonesia’s SSTC activities under the umbrella power but SSTC policy is also related to of good governance and peacebuilding also Indonesia’s role as a good international citizen. include issues such as human rights and women In general, this can be seen through linking the empowerment. role of a donor country with its position as a Furthermore, it should be noted that middle-income country (Kemlu, 2015, p. 18). fulfilling the role as a good international citizen Through the trend towards aid effectiveness, is included in the Indonesian constitution today’s position as a middle-income country so that the policy of providing development is seen as having a role in overcoming global assistance is also seen as part of realizing peace development issues. This idea was first raised in and social welfare which is the mandate of the

126 Global South Review Lucke Haryo Saptoaji Prabowo Indonesia’s Self Identity in the Development Assistance Policy through South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) constitution. This view was emphasized by context of international cooperation as one of Vice President Jusuf Kalla in his 2015 address the main considerations behind Indonesia’s to the UN General Assembly: position as an important actor in SSTC “[I]n narrowing global disparities, we (Kornas KSST, 2016, p. 13). The historical should encourage and support the context of this international cooperation refers strengthening of South-South to Indonesia’s formative involvement in the cooperation. In this context, Indonesia development of SSTC as a practice, which will establish the Asian African Centre was shown through its active role in the KAA … aimed at revitalizing the partnership in 1955, the NAM Conference in 1961, the between Asian and African countries to Buenos Aires Plan of Action in 1978 (Muhibat, promote peace and prosperity” 2016, p. 119). The NAM Conference in 1961 (UN, 2015). in particular became the starting point for the Referring to Indonesia’s eagerness to contribute development of the principles of solidarity to the international community, Vice President and cooperation which became the basis of Kalla also reiterates his views at the UN General SSTC (CSIS, 2014, p. 18). Fulfillment of the Assembly in 2016 by stating: principle of solidarity in turn also becomes one “[F]or Indonesia, SSTC is our way to of the themes underlying the implementation support development in the least of SSTC itself (Muhibat, 2016, p. 126). developed and developing countries … Furthermore, SSTC also represents Indonesia has always desired to a policy approach to provide development contribute to global partnership, global assistance that is more accommodating to peace and security, and global developing countries. In this respect, SSTC prosperity” (UN, 2017). is distinguished from traditional North-South This role was emphasized by Vice President cooperation through positive qualities including Kalla again in his speech before the UN horizontality and equality; demand-driven; General Assembly in 2018: not binding; and uphold mutual benefits and “As part of our global leadership and reciprocity (Nurshafira, 2019, p. 51). In other responsibility, Indonesia has taken concrete words, SSTC in principle does not have an steps to implement its commitments … interventionist tendency like traditional North- [t[hrough SSTC … We will soon launch the South cooperation. This in turn becomes Indonesia Aid for Development program to important because SSTC has a position as a reinforce the delivery of our international diplomatic instrument in Indonesia’s foreign assistance” (UN, 2018). policy (Kemlu, 2015, p. 19). Thus, it can be Apart from its role, Indonesia’s concluded that the implementation of SSTC that affiliation to developing countries also plays is more accommodating to developing countries a role in the policy of development assistance is an important instrument for Indonesian allocation through the SSTC scheme. This is diplomacy directed at fellow developing shown through the inclusion of the historical countries within or outside the region.

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Conclusion international audience. Thus, to fully grasp the Indonesia’s policy of providing development potentials of the policy in realizing Indonesia’s assistance that is implemented through the SSTC identity among the international community, an scheme cannot be separated from Indonesia’s effort to reinforce policy narrative should also identity. In this capacity, the policy of providing be carried out following the improvement in international development assistance has a role the policy infrastructure and resources. to strengthen the identity that encompasses Indonesia’s role and affiliation. This self- References identity in the form of roles and affiliations Books was then strengthened by the adoption of a Abdulgani, R., (1980). The Bandung con- policy of providing international development nection: Konperensi Asia Afrika di assistance by Indonesia through SSTC. In terms Bandung tahun 1955. Jakarta: Gunung of role, the adoption of this policy reflects the Agung. fulfillment of the role of a good international Aggestam, L., (2006). Role theory and Europe- citizen. By referring to the dynamics of similar an foreign policy: a framework of anal- policies carried out by other countries, this role ysis. In: O. Elgstrom & M. Smith, eds. can be seen as an auxiliary role that helps shape The ’s Roles in Interna- the main role as a middle power country. Thus, tional Politics. London: Routledge, pp. the implementation of this policy is closely 11-29. related to fulfilling Indonesia’s role as a middle Bengtsson, R. & Elgström, O., (2011). Recon- power country which is also supported by sidering the European Union’s roles in official documents and statements. On the other international relations. In: S. Harnisch, hand, Indonesia’s affiliation with developing C. Frank & H. W. Maull, eds. Role The- countries is also the basis for selecting SSTC ory. New York: Routledge, pp. 113-130. as a policy scheme for providing international Bozdaglioglu, Y., (2003). Turkish Foreign Poli- development assistance. This can be seen cy and Turkish Identity: A Constructiv- through the long dynamic between Indonesia ist Approach. New York: Routledge. and SSTC which is influenced by its corporate Breuning, M., (2011). Role theory research identity as a developing country, both ideally in international relations. In: S. Har- from historical and material narratives through nisch, C. Frank & H. W. Maull, eds. relationship to bodies. Lastly, it should be Role Theory in International Relations: admitted that Indonesia’s SSTC policy goal to Approaches and analyses. New York: strengthen Indonesia’s identity has not been Routledge, pp. 7-15. fully achieved. From an ideational point of view, Cooper, A. F., Higgot, R. A. & Nossal, K. A., this is due to the lack of an ideational narrative (1993). Relocating Middle Powers: given to the policy. This perhaps is connected Australia and Canada in a Changing to the fact that Indonesia’s SSTC policy has not World Order. Vancouver: UBC Press. been publicized enough, both to a domestic or

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