ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 25, No. 4 (LT)

Jan 2020

Lithuania external relations briefing: is expanding bilateral ties to strengthen the diplomatic position in international organisations Linas Eriksonas

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Lithuania is expanding bilateral ties to strengthen the diplomatic position in international organisations

The year 2020 has added to Lithuania’s increasingly versatile and burgeoning external relations a new dimension – an emphasis on bilateral diplomacy and the involvement in the global diplomatic affairs as an emerging diplomatic proxy power aiming to strengthen its strategic position in international organizations and alliances. Lithuania’s capacity to act more globally and thus to respond to international affairs more effectively has been pursued by the further development of the diplomatic representation network (the opening of the new embassies in the United Arab Emirates and Australia was announced) and the bilateral relations pursued with the countries that play an important role within the international state-system as intermediaries within their respective regions (such as Canada, Israel, India and others).

At the same time, a pro-proactive stance has been taken by Lithuania in supporting the integration of the countries from Western Balkans into the EU and NATO (North Macedonia and Albania), while keeping in a stalemate the process of approving the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the and its Member States and the Republic of Cuba. Lithuania has been the only remaining country among the EU countries which has not approved the agreement which was signed by the European Commission in December 2016 and ratified by the European Parliament on 1 November 2017; its full application has been pending since waiting for the ratification by Lithuania’s Parliament. Lithuania used a similar approach with respect to the EU negotiation process with Belarus. Lithuania is blocking the signing of the EU-Belarus Partnership Priorities Agreement over the Belarusian nuclear power plant which has been built in Astravyets next to the Lithuanian-Belarus borders amidst the concerns and the protests from Lithuania’s side.

Below is a brief outlook of the primary rationale which drives the more robust stance taken by Lithuania in international affairs, thus opening up new directions for the country’s involvement with the regional and the global powers in the years to come.

The movement for Lithuania’s independence in the late 1980s, which resulted in the declaration of Lithuania’s independence 30 years ago on 11 March 1990, had two dimensions. On the one hand side, the independence movement sought to regain the national sovereignty and re-establish the nation-state, while, on the other, it was acutely aware that the independence of Lithuania has depended mainly on external conditions shaped by the balance of the major

1 powers. Already from the start, the country’s independence movement was instrumental in seeking to contribute to the balance between those powers in such a way as to decrease the unilateralism of a former power (the and its successor Russian Federation) and increase the multilateralism of the international alliances and organisations representing the Western powers. This rationale has been inherited by the diplomacy of independent Lithuania and has been pursued ever since.

The primary goal of Lithuania’s foreign affairs has ever been a very close integration into the alliances which can decrease the unilateralism of the Russian Federation, which has been repeatedly and, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, increasingly has been viewed as the main threat to Lithuania’s sovereignty and indeed independence. On 5 March, during his visit meeting in Washington with Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, the Speaker of Lithuania’s Parliament Viktoras Pranckietis expressed the following official position of Lithuania: “ still remains the most serious threat in the region. Lithuania congratulates the US on its firm stance with regard to maintaining and strengthening the sanctions as long as Russia does not change its behavior”. This statement clearly showed that in forging bilateral relations Lithuania is aiming to achieve equilibrium in the region by increasing the involvement of one great power (the United States) in the multilateralism while decreasing the involvement of another great power (the Russian Federation) in multilateral relations with the European Union and Western powers through the economic sanctions. As a result of this balancing act, Lithuania now hosts a US battalion with heavy armour.

A similar approach in using the bilateral approach in searching for equilibrium has been pursuing in the relation of the European Union and Russia and Belarus. Lithuania has seized on the opportunity to contribute to the bold vision of the French President Emmanuel Macron to reengage with the EU Eastern politics. On 10 February France’s Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian met in Paris with his Lithuanian counterpart, Linas Linkevičius to discuss expanding bilateral relations and security in Europe, specifically, as reported in a press release, the deployment of a French joint tactical battalion in Lithuania this July as part of a move to enhance the forward presence of NATO in the Baltic region.

Further, both ministers addressed the current European and international issues on which our countries are working together. Amélie de Montchalin, minister of state for European affairs, attached to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, also met with Linkevičius to discuss European issues. More importantly, Lithuania’s minister met with Ambassador Pierre Vimont, the President’s special representative for the strategic dialogue with Russia.

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A bilateral engagement with France over Russia served a similar purpose as in the case of the United States. It aimed to decrease the unilateralism of Russia within the context of the Minsk process and the continuing conflict in Eastern and to increase the multilateralism of France. Following the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU, France under the leadership of President Macron has become one of the major powers in continental Europe.

Bilateralism has distinguished Lithuania’s interactions in all three key foreign policy areas: alliance formation (as in the case of the engagement with the US on defence and security issue), mediation (as in the case of involvement with the French diplomacy over the regulation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict) and also in the area of international aid. In the latter case, Lithuania has become involved in EU-Cuban multilateral affairs. In December 2016, the EU signed the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) with the Cuban government, following the three-year intensification of relations between the EU and Cuba. The PDCA has aimed to provide an initial legal and institutional framework to normalise EU-Cuba ties and may constitute a stepping stone towards a more ambitious trade agreement in the future.The agreement as approved by the European Parliament in July 2017. However, its full acceptance is only applicable after the ratification by all EU Member States.

Lithuania has remained the only EU Member State dragging its feet with ratification. On 6 March, Mike Pompeo officially addressed the Prime Minister of Lithuania Saulius Skvernelis asking not to ratify the EU-Cuban agreement due to the concerns from the US side over the situation with the human rights in the Cuban Republic. The official position of the Lithuanian government has not been formed yet. However, this episode shows how the bilateral relations with the US and the EU regional powers have created an interest diplomatic power triangle which has increased the strategic position of Lithuania in the international organisations and the political processes of which the concerned powers are the key participants.

On 10 March a meeting of the group called “ 9” (B9) consisting of the foreign ministers of , the , , , , Lithuania, , , and took place in Vilnius on the eve of the 30th anniversary of Lithuania’s independence with the delegates from the US and NATO attended the meeting as guests.

Participants of the meeting debated on decisions of the Alliance concerning commitment to collective defence on the NATO’s Eastern flank exchanged opinions on various security issues. In his concluding remarks, Lithuania’s foreign minister Linas Linkevičius noted that „for three decades we have been very consistent in putting every effort to unite Europe peacefully, to safeguard and strengthen our democracies, defend Western values, enhance

3 security, and promote the welfare of our citizens. Our progress is evident. However, we are still facing a big number of common and immediate tasks.“ The tasks that lay ahead has been mentioned in the speech of President Gitanas Nausėda who „expressed his hope that the unity and determination of the Bucharest Nine would help George and Ukraine become members of NATO“. By supporting the membership of two countries in the Alliance Lithuania further outlines the further strategic steps that can help to achieve a balance of great powers in the region currently immersed in conflict.

In this highly symbolic and politically choreographed event, Lithuania has demonstrated that it sees its role in the world as being pro-active in bilateral engagements in seeking a power equilibrium between the powers.

It might be that bilateralism will become a dominant form of engagement of Lithuania with the great powers in pursuit of strategic goals of strengthening national sovereignty and security. Yes, as compared to multilateralism or unilateralism, bilateralism is always based on preferentialism and changes its goals and priorities on a case-by-case basis. The scholars analysing different forms of diplomacies pursued by the nation-states argue that bilateralism explores how international sets of standards can be modified by the agreement of two states (sometimes with pressure from a state with greater leverage within the particular policy environment) and as such it requires a lot of follow-ups to flesh out the agreements with the details. In other words, bilateral relations are quick to forge but take effort to sustain. Lithuania will see to that now.

References:

1. Ministry of for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Lithuania – Meetings between Jean-Yves Le Drian and Amélie de Montchalin with Linas Linkevičius, foreign minister of the Republic of Lithuania (10 Feb. 20)”; https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- files/lithuania/events/article/lithuania-meetings-between-jean-yves-le-drian-and-amelie-de- montchalin-with 2. Government of Canada, “Minister of Foreign Affairs to welcome foreign minister of Lithuania to Canada”, 26 Febr. 2020; https://www.canada.ca/en/global- affairs/news/2020/02/minister-of-foreign-affairs-to-welcome-foreign-minister-of-lithuania-to- canada.html 3. BNS/TBT Staff, “Vilnius hosting meeting of Bucharest Nine foreign ministers”, The Baltic Times, 10 March, 2020; “https://www.baltictimes.com/vilnius_hosting_meeting_of_bucharest_nine_foreign_ministers/ 4. BNS, “US state secretary calls on Lithuania not to ratify EU-Cuba pact”; https://en.delfi.lt/politics/us-state-secretary-calls-on-lithuania-not-to-ratify-eu-cuba- pact.d?id=83714173 5. Atsushi Tago, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Unilateralism in Foreign Policy”, online publication date: Aug 2017; DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.449

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