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~ TheOuiet War ~Rv~ latin-AmericanInsurgency” r--- November 67 ~ UNITEB STATESARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. Davison

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT Colonel David S. ~ender80n

The Military Review is published by the United States Army Command and General Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It providesa forum for the expression of military thought on national and mititary strategy, national security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

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-’. Military Review Professional Journal of the US Army

Insurgency: Latin-American Style .” . . . Enrique Martinez Cod6 3

The QuietWar ...... MAJ Lewis S. $orley Ill, USA 13

Air-Supported Strategic Army Corps . . LTC Robert M. Shoemaker, USA 20

Red China’s Divided Army . . . Robert S. Elegant and Sidney C. Liu 31

An MR Special Feature Civilian Personnel: Vietnam . . . . . 2LT Larry L. Pressler, USA 39

Asian Mititary-Pofiticos . , . . . . LTC George D. Eggers, Jr., LISA 44

Thailand: A Confrontation ...... Charles W. Koburger, Jr 51

Soviet Volunteers in the German Army . . . Vyacheslav P. Artemiev 56

Douhet Revisited ...... William D. Franklin 65

Force de Frappe ...... CPT John A. Berry, USA 70

A Preface to Forca Planning ...... John F. Scott 79

living With Nuclear Proliferation . . . SQDN LDR D. C. Mazlin, RAAF 85

Hold and Pacify ...... LTC Richard E. Mack, USA 91

MilitaryNodes...... 96

iitmyBooks ...... )! 107

The VIEWS expressed in this ma azine ARE THE AUTHORS’ and not necessarily those of the Army or the Command and Generaf Staff College. [ Editor in Chief COL Donald J. Delaney

Associate Editor COL Thomas J. Cleary, Jr. Army War College

Assistant Editor LTC A. Leroy Covey

Features Editor LTC Charles A. Gatzka

Production Editor Helen M. Hall

Spanish-American Editor MAJ Juan Horta-Merly

Brazilian Editors LTC Paulo A. F. Viana LTC Samuel T. T. Primo

Publication Officer LTC Edward A. Purcell

Art and Design Charles A. Moore

MILITARY REVIEW-PubliShed monthly by the U. S. Army Command and Oeneral Staff College, Fort Leav enworth, Kansas, in Englwh, Spanish, and Portu uese. Use of funds for printing of this publication has been approved by Headquarfera, Department of the Army, 28 May 1965. Second.slaas postage aid st Fort Leavenworth, Kansaa. Subscription rata~ $4.00 (US currency) a year in the United States, i“mted States military post offices, and those countries which are membersof the Pan.American Postal Union (including Spain); $5.00 a year in all other countries single coPY Pfice 50 cents. Addreaa subscription mail to the Rook Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kanaaa 66027. (Extracted from a speech by Gwrerel Harold K. AN ANALOGY Johnson, Houston, Texaa, 18 MaY 1967)

Recognizing the danger that is always latent in historic analogy, I would still like to draw ona, just to bring home the point of how foolish it is to consider the conflict in South Vietnam as a “civil war.” For our analogy, let ua suppose that the people of Canada, strongly influenced by Great Britain, had refused to accept the terms of the “ Peace of Paris in 17S3, which, among other things, gave the CoIonies their independence and established the northern boundary between them and Canada. Instead or respecting the trea~~ direct parallel with the Geneva Accords of 1954 which separated North and South Vietnam-instead of keeping their hands off the young, inexperienced, war-impoverished, loosely united Colonies, let us suppose that the people of Canada had sent highly trained groups of Loyalists into the back country of New England, New York, and the Carolinas to train and incite the Loyalists already there to rise against the struggling new government, even before it had time to write a Constitution. Let us suppose that, after a lapse of time for setting the stage, the people of Canada had sent their regular army troops across the boundary to join forces with the guerrillas and overthrow the govern­ ment. Would that have been a “civil war; simply because some of the people of Canada and the Colonies shared a similar background and spoke the same language? Would it have been a civil war simply be­ cause the people from the north chose to call it that? Of course not. The whole thought is ridiculous. The conflict in South Vietnam isno civil war. It is just one more in a planned series of so-called wara of liberation by which the Com­ munists hope to subvert and overthrow the young, the unsettled, and the impoverished nations of the globs. And we are in Vietnam, I re­ peat, by invitation, and because we now know that a threat to freedom and peace anywhere in the world is a threat to all free men. We simply heve our toes dug in on freedom’s line there. We are not even seeking to extend freedom across the territory of any other nation. We are there to help the South Vietnamese hold on.

LATIN-AMERICAN STYLE

Enrique Martinez Cad6

N 50 years of existence, commu- Communism has developed a “clqs- Inism has not succeeded in bringing sic” revolutionary strategy with an any country into its orbit through eye toward the conquest of power. Thk free choice. In fact, history is quite conquest was to come through vari­ clear on this point. Despite propa- ous means, but there has always been ganda about individual cases, free a common pattern of operation. There democratic play has always been ab- must be a party whkh can initiate sent. The coup d’t?tat, revolutionary unrest among the masses. Soon, this wars, deceit, and the aid of Soviet ~c- party acquires a revolutionary char­ cupation troops have characterized the acter and is transformed into the advance of communism. “vafiguard of the proletariat,” It ae­

Hwemher1967 3 pires thus to a legal existence so that each of these cases follows a different it can participate for a time in the pattern. It would be a gross error to normal political life. This enables the think that the process followed in party to consolidate its position and China was the same as the one tried gain prestige. in Vietnam, or that the one followed The party recruits cadres, holds con­ in Cuba was like either of the others. gresses, edits n&wspapers, and seats In China, for example, the party representatives in the parliament who was not born to hold or seek a posi­ will use their positions to sabotage tion in the parliament, but for the democratic actions. The party also or­ revolutionary struggle. Following the ganizes civil resistance, student un­ calamitous first Chinese Communist rest, strikes, and public demonstra­ revolution (1924-27), which was char­ tions. Eventually, urban terrorism acterized by the urban insurrection aPPears and a clandestine militia is and Canton strike, Mao Tse-tung aban­ organized. doned the cities and fell back toward the country. Emerging from the Counteractions “great march” with the nncleus of an But when government counteraction army, lie increased his strength from comes, this clandestine organization 40,000 men in 1937 to more than a has not entered into the action or, if million in 1945. The solution to the it has done so, it has been in an un­ “Chineee problem” wae, for commu­ timely manner neither forceful nor nism, a purely military solution where decisive. It could not act forcefully the People’s Liberation Army played because this would endanger its “le­ the principal role. gal” etatus and parliamentary repre­ sentation so laboriously gained. Thus, Process Differs the martyrology of the Communist The case of Vietnam, although sim­ Parties was born. ilar to China, differs, especially in This process, the “classic” ime, has its process of military formation. demonstrated its inefficiency in the 50 The Vietnamese Communist party years that communism has held a “le­ emerged in 1930, organizing peaeant gal” existence. Therefore, it is not insurrections which were promptly strange that the fundamental suc­ repressed. Ho Chi-minh stated, in his cesses gained in that time are due to first program of action, that the only the large-scale application of another way to liberation is the armed struggle strategy—armed struggle. of the masses. China, Vietnam, and Cuba are char­ Soon that struggle took on the acteristic of this newer method of oP­ characteristics of a popular war of eration. It must be recognized that liberation against foreign occupants, — the French at firet, the Japanese after Enrique Ma@nez Cod6 is a civilian March 1939, and the French again journalist living in Bueno8 Airee. He in 1945. This means that the preeence ia the Editor of Manual de Informa­ of foreign troops on Vietnamese soil ciones, official publication of the In­ enabled the Iecal revolutionary war to telligence Service of the Argentine Army, and of Ucrania L1bre, hsde­ assume from the beginning a clear pewdent magazine publiehed in Bnenos role of struggle for liberation which Aires. did not occur in China.

4 MilitaryRsview INSURGENCY

The fundamental difference between .Latin America to develop a type of the Vietnamese and Chinese caees hybrid form. While influenced by steme from the fact that Mao Tse­ the experience of Asiatic communism, tung began his s@eond revolutionary they were especially influenced by the war with a, large, well-supplied army, unusual success of the Cuban course while Ho Chi-minh had to start from of action. In this action, everything scratch. Both cases involved a war of depended on a band of men inflaming “national liberation” against foreign the inhabitant of a mountainous for­ troops and, afterward, against local eet region and frightening tbe rul­ armed forces whom the Communists ing regime to the point of collapse. called “lackeys of imperialism.” The failure of the Colombian Com­ muniet guerrillas in Marquetalia, the Cuban Experience neutralization of the Venezuelan and Communist operations in Cuba dif. Guatemala guerrillae, and the anni­ fered from both China and V]etnam. hilation of the Peruvian and Bolivian In fact, contrary to the classic advice guerrillas made the Communist lead­ of fostering urban insurrections, ers see the need for reevaluating the street fighting, and coups to gain Cuban success. Thk renovating move­ power, Cuba typified the practicality ment, which began in 1965, concluded of developing revolutionary war in at the beginning of 1966 with the tbe field and staying away from the meeting of the Tricontinental Confer­ cities. With Cuba was born a new con­ ence of Havana cept of guerrilla warfare. This new concept has not been sufficiently stud­ Two Organizations ied and, therefore, has led many Two organization especially de­ Latin-American guerrilla movements signed to disseminate doctrine were to be influenced by the external aspects created—the OSPAAAL (Organiza­ of the movement rather than their tion of Solidarity of the Peoples of true essence thus inviting failure. Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and Many hasty readers of Mao Tse­ the OLAS (Organization of Latin- tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap American Solidarity). According to thought that Fidel Castro was con­ its own etatement, the OLAS has the tented with copying their tactics. objectives to: Other more adventuresome readers o Support liberation movemente by tbonght they recognized in the works all available means. of Castro and Major Ernesto (Che) o Lend strong backing to liberated Guevara the texts of the Asiatic countries and cooperate with them. * strategists. It is well known, however, o Link its action and that of other that the Cuban revolutionaries did not participating organizations to the ac­ read the works of Mao Tse-tung until tivities of the tricontinental organi­ recently, after the successful comple­ zation (OSPAAAL). tion of their military campaign. Those . Develop a constant campaign who believed thue confused the guer­ against the growing political aggres­ r61a combat tactics with the general sion of the United States. strategy of the movement. In order to spring their program This mistake has led certain Com­ into action, the two organizations be­ munist revolutionary movements in gnn t’o flood Latin America with bul­

Rwember1967 5 INSURGENCY

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6 MilitaryReviow INSURGENCY

Ietins, magazines, and pamphlets about s@uggle and the formation of a reg­ the resolutions and revolutionary di­ ular, revolutionary army. rectives suggested by the Triconti­ The fundamental difference between nental Conference. Furthermore, cadre the Latin-American and Vietnamese schools as well as special clandestine style lies in the fact that, while in messenger also disseminated this new Vietnam the pyramid of the military insurrectional course of action. organization was built from the base up in the order of armed groups, guer­ Armed Stmggie rilla, regional forces, and regular One widely circulated publication army, in Latin America, the armed, condensee the new tone of Latin- revolutionary forces tend to build f rom American style revolution.* the top down. This builds the regnlar The Cuban experience has graph­ forces tiret-the center of the action icaUg shown that the sociakt revolu­ —then around the outskirte of the tion is the result of an armed struggle action, irregular forces, and, finally, againet the armed pawer af the bewr­ the militia at the end, or after the geois State. Ac-med, revolutwuaqi victory as in Cuba. Also, the enemy stcwggle encounter specific eandi­ to be faced is not foreign, but local, tio?m in each contiuent, in each COW% one who ie traditionally reepected by try, conditions which can only be the people. found through ene’e own ezperienee. Further, thie new doctrine estab- Political Autonomy Iiehes that: On the other hand, the new etyle . . . a political line which canuot emphatically imposes strategic and be expressed accerding to an effective political autonomy on the guerrilla. militarg plan in a preciee arut caherent The guerrilla is the master of his own militarg line cannot be held to be politics. In thie way, it is the guer­ revolutionm-g. . . . The Cuban revo­ rilla, and not the traditional, political lution offers to her sieter countries in parties, no matter how leftist they the Amem”cae a solution that muet be may be, who dictates the politics of the studied in the light of their own his­ revolution. The guerrilla are the ones torg and by the more or lese slew who Ax the objectives for the armed buildup-through guem”lfa ware branch of the party. launched in the most propitious rural The experiences of Cuba and, more zmwe-of a mobile, strategic force recently, Venezuela, Guatemala, Co­ which witl be the nncleus of the peo­ lombia, and other countries, seem to ple’s army and of the future socinlist confirm that gnerrilla combatant de­ state. velop eooner and more thoroughly Po­ Thus, the new revolutionary style, litically by guerrilla participation the Latin-American style, establishes than by spending the came amonnt in a clear form that the solution is of time in a conventional school of to be armed struggle. It puts aside partkan cadree, According to Che all deliberative, parliamentary proe­ Guevara, a politically well-rounded eee, all the useless talk, in order to man who allows himself to be torn to place maximum emphasis on armed pieces in a dungeon without eaying

* R&de Debrar, ‘ltevol.tkm ?. the Revel.ti.n?”, a word is not worth se much for the hdemoa de la Eeviatu Casn & la. [email protected], revolution as one who fmowe how to I Jsnuaw 19137. Nwurtber19S7 7 1., take a machinegun nest By assault. guerrilla thoroughly reconnoiter the The guerrilla is the core of the polit­ area of operations. ical formation of the combatants and � Strengthening or adaptation, is the party itself in gestation. during which the combatants become The marked military emphasis noted accustomed to the terrain and in the new revolutionary doctrine in­ weather. dicates that there should be a trained � Overt operations, during which a military force from the beginning. minimum area of operations is estab. The guerrillas’ primary mission is to lished, and where their actions become evident to both the local population and the government forces to form the swell of the next war. In the first two periods of this stage, the guerrilla’s worst enemy ia him. self. He mtist overcome all hia owu inertia and change the habits of his bourgeois life. It is a hard struggle with himself and againet Qthe condi­ tions of land and climate. There me many who abandon the struggle, de­ sert, or go on to fill other, less dan­ gerous roles in the insurrection. These are often a part of the nrban guerrilla force whose physical reqniremente are considerably less. In the second or development stage, since the existence of the guerrilla force has already become pnblic knowledge, the enemy offensive mnst C..rteau of ..thor be confronted with ita own charac­ R6gis Dabmy teristics such ae raids, sieges, airborne assaults, and aerial bombardments. At fight and to evolve into a people’s the same time, this ie the indicated army or strategic mobile force capa­ stage fof assuming the tactical initia­ ble of defeating the government’s mil­ tive, for detaching elements from the itary structure. However, that initial principal forces so as to create other professional force should not be par­ zones of guerrilla operations and to ticularly large in the heginning. On form urban guerrillas. the contrary, it must follow step by The third stage, the offensive, is step in three phases: inception, devel­ characterized hy the strategic employ­ opment, and offensive. ment of the militias and the regional The inception phase ia further sub­ guerrillas against the enemy in com­ divided into three periods: bination with the action of the ur­ � Absolute nomadism, a period of ban guerrillas in unleashing general extreme secrecy where the initial cen­ strikes and other harassments. The ter of action knows no rest and the essential objective of this stage is to

Militsry RWIW INSURGENCY destr6y the national military forces pollcy of the guerrilla. The prime ob­ whi$h are the armed support of the jective of every guerrilla is the de­ government. struction of enemy forces and obtain­ The guerrilla force also has defen­ ing arme and equipment. Constant, ex­ ive neede both for itself as well as ternal, offensive action wilf lead to the br the people who support it. Many base desired for logistic support. we often wondered how the guer­ How will the course of action for ,illae succeed “in protecting the zone the new Latin-American style de­ vhicb serves them ae a base of op­ velop ? It will begin with the selec­ erations for regrouping forces, hid­ tion of a group of trained guerrillas ng, resupply, a d for obtaining re­ to act in a specified zone of operations ? kteements. According to new direc­ in a sparaely populated area. At first, tivesfrom Havana, these bases should it ia expected that they will he mis­ lot be protected in the claesical, tac­ trusted. The peasant will follow only ieal manner by establishing defen­ the one who haa certain powere, partic­ fiveperimeter lines firmly tied to the ularly the power to accomplish what :enter. On the contrary, protection be says be will. Prior to this, the only hould be in a fluid, operative form power which the peaeant has known ia by acting offensively upon an uncle. the power of the government forces. iined periphery and far from the He knows their arme, their uniforms, center. and their discipline. Generally, just the display of armed force ia enough BaseProtection to impress a defenseless people. A guerrilla base may be protected by maintaining constant aggreeeive Display Ferce activity in a wide area, keeping the The guerrillas must show that they eoemy from advancing toward that also have force. They do this by dem­ center, and creating for hlm a truly onstrating that government soldiers defensive complex. Such a guerrilla are not immune to bullete and gre­ base may include a field hospital, nades and that they can be defeated smallindustries, repair shops, schools even with crude weapons if deter­ for recruit’ training, the command minedly employed. To accomplish this, wst, and the rebel radio. But, in the Cuban theorists realized that there is initial stage, the snpport base of the nothing better than combat, ambueh, Koerrilla is the knapsack of each com­ and elimination of land owners or un­ batant and hia hbility to survive. popular leaders. Such actiona break The establishment of a stable guer­ down the respect for traditional au- * rillabaae may take a long time. The thority and promote respect for tbe @errilla base will grow graduallY— guerrillas’ power. ss it undergoes changee and its ee­ Tbe backing of the peaeant ie almost curity improvee based on diWI’Y assured once the guerrilla have suc­ 8meesses. The baee eventually be- ceeded in overcoming hla respect and Comeea free or liberated zone. fear of governmental forces. Incorpo­ The new Latin-Amerieen etyle ration into the guerrilla force and Wint.abjs that the foundation of a participation aa a combatant and es O&rilla baae cannot constitute tbe a new ~ember in tbe Communist so­ Ioain,military objective and primary ciety will come later. The primary con­

hrmber 1967 9

k tern is to make him a good fighter. generally based in the capital of the The guerrilla never admits that country. It turns to the offensive and he has Communist objectives. The the so-called war of movement. Si­ word “Communist” has lost prestige multaneous] y, it unleashes the urban in many countries of the continent guerrillas and promotee general and ie heard with scorn or fear. He strikes to imrnohilizo and divide the speaks only of anti-imperialist liber­ government forces which are com­ ation, agrarian reform, and social pelled to protect railway centers, fac­ revolution. tories, vital public services, and works of art. This type of diversionary ac­ Additional Fronts tion made it impossible for more than When the etrength of the first nu­ 10,000 of the 50,000-man government cleue of guerrilla forces becomee ex­ force of Cuba to enter battle against cessive for local security and the logis­ Castro’s guerrillas at one time. tic capacity of the zone, the guerrilla force should break up into column- A ttegulsr Army cells which, in turn, can he trans­ But according to Communist doc­ formed into yet another guerrilIa trine, what still counts most is to front. In Cuba, four guerrilla fronts strike the greatest possible number of were formed this way, but none devel­ bIows at the armed forces of the gov­ oped precipitously. Instead, they ernment. These forces constitute the formed only after the main focus wae sustaining support of the government well established. and only with their defeat can the Impatience to create numerous final objective be attilned. Therefor% guerriIla fronts without consolidation it is imperative that the guerrilla brought disaster to the Communist unite must transform into a regulzr guerrillas who sprouted in Peru two army in order to match the forces of years ago. In spite of the great tac­ government regulare on equal terms. tical freedom whic~ they enjoy, this Until a short time ago, it wae main. multiplicity of fronts must respect at tained that one of the prime missions all times an undisputed central com­ of the guerrilla was dissemination of mand which will prescribe the general revolutionary doctrine among the pop strategy of the guerrilla movement. ulation. To accomplish thle, agitation No experienced fighters are rejected and propaganda patrols were cent to as long as they agree to, conform to every zone of guerrilla operatiom. the guerrilla discipline and obey the Such action wae termed “armed prop guerrilla commands. What is rejected aganda” and wae baaed on unquestion­ is any alliance or a common political able international experience gained front. The responsibility for the gen­ in Russia, China, and Vietnam. In eral conduct of the etruggle is not Cuba, that experience either was not shared with anyone. used or proved to be inadequate and Once the various fronts have been dangerous. In this confrontation of formed and hasee of guerrilla opera­ doctrines, the Cuban experience irn. tions have been created, the snpreme poeed ite own theme which was that revolutionary command coordinates armed propaganda must follow armed the convergent action of all forcee action, not precede it, since it is d+ upon the governmental power which is veloped essentially along the internal

10 Militarynew forced flight the fellow propagandists, acquired certain military prestige, it and reveak a possible or future zone must keep in contact with the enemy of guerrilla action. military leaders, not to foment a coup* The instructions recommend that d’dtat, but to accelerate the breakdown the guerrilla, in the initial stages, of the regime and to heighten the un­ avoidall contact with the civilian POP­ rest within the army. In the begin­ dation and especially refrain from ning, and generally after some re­ goingto the villages and openly visit­ sounding success, they should com­ hg collaborators. There should be a mence to ekhort governmental officiale, general mistrust in regard to the ci- inviting them to meet and talkj but Vilianpopulation. The three charac­ without imposing humiliating condL teristics of the work in that period tions. me the so-called three “golden ru]ee” Once ‘the prestige of the guerrilla which are constant vigilance, con­ movement hae been recognized, a ra­

kber 1967 11 dio transmitter is needed so that the This new Communist revolutionary high command can establish direct doctrine, evolved in Havana and based contact with the people living outeide on the experiences of the Cuban rev­ the zones of operations. The guerrillas olutionary process, should alert tbe PO. are cautioned to broadcast accurate litical and military leadership in Latin news; they must not remain silent America to the new threat which over­ concerning defeats or exaggerate vic­ shadows the cent inent. The guerrillas tories. The radio transmitter offers a who appear in the future in these new quality to the guerrilla movement. countries will not be mere groups of The exact mention of enemy units de­ enthusiastic, although unhurried and feated, specifying, when possible, the inexperienced, idealiete, nor will they names of the leaders liquidated or cap­ be makeshift combatants. tured in combat, has a ruinous effect When the guerrillas flourish, they upon the regular government troops. will have already passed through mozt With regard to the psychological of the first or inception stage of action for guerrilla troops, the new the revolutionary war—nomadism and adaptation. They will be professional method shows that the guerrillas have fighters, well armed, instructed, ac­ their own rules of instruction and climated, and determined to defeat the ideological development based primar­ regular government forces. They will ily on the conviviality o,f guerrilla life. be acting under military-type orders New Latin-American guerrillas, for issued by a single competent com­ example, differ from Communist guer­ mand. This is a threat that can only rillas in other places in that political be dealt with by the military forces. commissary are missing. The strictest These elite professional guerrillas, military discipline prevails in the trained outside the respective coun­ guerrilla force, and command is not tries where they operate as invaders, shared with the political commissar. can be overpowered only by armed There is no room, then, for delibera­ force. They must be detected and sup­ tive assemblies, for councils of soldiers pressed as soon as possible, before to discuss orders issued to launch an they pass to the developmental stage assault or initiate a retreat, or for and begin their devastating raids friction between the guerrilla and the against the public peace and the con­ party. stituted authorities. The guerrilla does not belong to The period of parliamentary con­ any recognized or previously existing quest, of legal action on the part of party. The guerrilla force is a new the political party, is past history. The form which is both military and polit­ old experiences of China, Vietnam, ical at the same time, and its com­ Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, or mander in chief is its political direc­ the USSR itself should not impress tor. Therefore, the revolutionary, psy­ us. We must face in the future, ia chological action is always in the fact, some countries are already fac­ hands of the guerrilla commander ing it, a new course of action—the in chief, and there is no chance of new, Latin-American style of revolu­ any possible dichotomy or military- tionary military action at ita highest political confrontation whatsoever. degree of perfection.

12 MllltarvRuM The Quiet War: Revolutionary Development ,) ) Major Lewis S. Sorley III, United States Arm#

EVOLUTIONARY development, a term heard more R and more often, remains unclear in its meaning to many Americans, both in Vietnam and at home. Revolu­ tionary development ie the second of three basic steps lead­ ing to the establishment of a free and independent Vietnam. It ie preceded by a military offensive and followed by the open-end procese of nationbuilding. Revolutionary develop­ ment tasks are to rid an area of enemy main forces, de­ etroy or neutralize the remaining local guerrillas, and pro­ vide security for the population. Other tasks include dis­ covering and destroying the Communist infrastructure, helping the people to initiate self-defense, organizing local government, and instituting economic and social self-help projects. The emphasis on self-help and self-defense is inten­ tional, for a primary objective of the program is to get the people involved in the management of their own affairs on

ihmber 1967 13 REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENT a community level. This is a Vietnam­ them the essential of physical secu­ ese program, supported and encour­ rity, health, and education. But the aged by United Statee and other Free revolutionary aspects of the plan to World forces to be cure, but essen­ bring this about affect both the people tially Vietnamese in concept and exe. and their government. cution. Only if the program can bring Incipient revolution is a fact of life about the involvement of government in Vietnam. Enough people have be. and the people in a cooperative enter­ come aware of the poasibllitiles for a prise will it achieve ite revolutionary better life to foredoom the paesive ac­ aims. Thie muet come from whole­ ceptance of an aRotted fate which hearted Vietnamese commitment to prevaiIed for centuries under the old revolutionary development as their mandarin system of government. No own program. matter who governs in the Republic Philosophical Movement of Vietnam, thk3 revolutionary poten­ Military success can be superim­ tial will have to be reckoned with, posed on the situation, but eradication Suppreeeion of newly awakened aspi­ of the causes of insurgency ie equally rations is not a viable alternative, essential, and can come only from Political Awareness within. Recognition of this truth and This is not to say that the average subsequent restraint on the part of peaaant possesses a political aware­ allies anxioue to see the program move nese which will lead him to active re­ forward are a necessity. bellion if he feels exploited; the aver­ Revolutionary development is aptIy age peasant probably desires, above named, for if successful, it will bring all, that he be left alone. However, about a restructuring of the Vietnam­ enough opinion Ieadere poseese such ese society that will be truIy revolu­ an awareness to foment revolution if tionary. In this sense, it is a pro­ the government in power fails to meat foundly philosophical movement, al­ the needs of the people or, worse, ex­ though at the working level and in ploits its position of trust. its impact on the people in the hamlete The international political situation it ie practical, seeking to bring to being what it ie, the peasant’s chances of being left alone are nonexistent. Major Lewis S. Sorley III, a 1956 The government of Vietnam, faced graduate of the US Militarg Academy, is attending the School of Naval Com­ with these realities, has had to make mand and Staff of the Naval War C!of­ a demanding and courageous choice lege at Newport, Rhode Island. Fol­ involving the reformation, not just of lowing service in armored cavalry reg­ the government in being and those iments (n Europe and the United who comprise it, but of the entire phi­ States, he attended the Urtivereity of losophy of government of the Viet­ Pennsylvania at Philadelphia where namese people. he veceived an M.A. degree. He wue There exists in the Republic of Viet­ an Assistant Prof eesor of Englieh at nam no concept of a dialogue be­ West Point, and has served with the G9 Revolutionary Development tween the government and the people. Brawh, 1st Field Force, and with the By encouraging pa~lcipation by the let Tank BattaJiow, 69th Armor, in people in the management of their Vietnam. own affairs through the employment

14 REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENT

If revolutionary development cadre Vietnam. The existence of large, ra­ cams-specially trained- tack forcee cial minorities, often further frag­ ‘or” pacification-the government mented into tribal groups, and the lopes to break down this lack of com­ fractionalization of life centered about rmnication and promote an inter­ the hamlet or, at best, the village are change of ideas. Ideally, the cadre formidable barriere to a national con­ ;sams form a link between the popu­ sciousness. This tendency has been re­ stion and the government. inforced by tbe actions of govern­ At the national level, the constituent ments which have given tbe people membly provides a possible vehicle little cause to welcome their influence.

for achieving a similar result. Thus, Folklore hae it, with considerable the critical middle echelons of re­ justification, that the five evils are gional, provincial, and dietrict gov­ fire, flood, famine, robbers, and the ernment from both sides will feel the central government. To overcome these, influence of an awakening citizen par­ inheritances from the past, to build ticipation in government. The re­ a viable nation, and to establieh a woneivenees of officials at those levele government responsive to the needs to the people will play a key role in of tbe people and capable of inspiring the succeee of the Revolutionary De­ and deserving their truet and willing velopment Program. eupport-these are the goals of the The attitude of the people, tw, is Revolutionary Development Program, being eubjeeted to revolutionary goals made more difficult by the neces­ Change.NO general concept of nation­ eity of combating an entrenched and hood hae existed throughout South pervasive military invasion.

Ibrmber1957 15 REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENT

US support for this program re­ different programs which bear on the flects the realization that it offers at accomplishment of the common objec­ once the best hope of achieving what tive. Heading this effort is a Central we want for the Vietnamese people Revolutionary Development Council and nation and what we want for our­ which numbers among ite members the Chief of State, President Nguyen Van Thien, Vice President Nguyen Cao KY, and Major General Nguyen Duc Thang who was, until August, Minister of Revolutionary Develop­ ment. A tireless traveler, General Thang personally visited every province, ad­ dressing the revolutionary develop­ ment cadremen and members of the. revolutionary development councils, counseling, r+dmonisbing, and setting the example. General Thang was under no illusions about the past: The old life meame etar’vation, mi8­ ery, disease, amd illiteracy. It should be eliminated amd the new life shomld be built with security, freedom, d+ mocrexy, justice and haw”ness. Five Virtues To members of the cadre teams working in the hamlets, he continu­ ally stresged “the five virtues: gener­ osity, gratefulness, politeness, spirit and faith,” at the same time remind­ ing them of their duty to eliminate tyrannical officials. .. —. General Thang was also named Maior General Nguyen Duc Thang was Assistant to the Chief of the Joint Minister of Revolutionary Development General Staff for Territorial Affairs until his August 1967 appointment to and Pacification. In this post, he set eliminate corruption and inefficiency in the policy for military operations in the armed forces support of revolutionary development, selvee—a worthwhile life free of out­ and exercised operational control over side domination for them, and for us, Regional and Popular Forces, the pro­ an end to our involvement which vali­ vincial and district defense troops. dates rather than negates the sacri­ This appointment had important im­ fices already made. plications in terms of effective in@­ Properly mudcing, revolutionary gration of the military and civil prw development, is not a program at all, grams which support revolutiona~ but rather the coordinating of many development.

MilitaryRovitl REVOLUTIONilRYDEVELOPMENT

A second key post in the snccess of this ~xtends only through the period the. Revolutionary Development Pro­ of cadre service. Following training, gram is that of Commandant of the they return to their home provinces National Training Center for mem­ to be organized into 59-man groups, bers of the cadre groups. The post is with leaders chosen by the province filled by Major Tuong Van Nguyen Be, chief based on recommendations made a combat veteran who brings to the by the training center. training miesion great dedication and It is often stated that the war can strength of purpose. His experience be lost in Saigon, but it must be won includes a widely recognized snccess in the hamlets, and it is to the ham­ in achieving pacification of an impor­ lets that the cadre goes. Clad in the tant area in Binh Dinh Province now black pajamas which they wear to considered something of a model pro­ identify themselves with tbe peas­ gram. Overcrowded and austere, the antry, cadre members undertake the training center is itself an introduc­ tack of hamlet organization. The phi­ tion to the sacrifice and perseverance losophy of cadre employment entails which Major Be attempts to instill in placing the cadre group in a relatively each cadreman. safe hamlet, with sufficient military suPport to enable it to work freely, for Public Service The concept of public service has the period of time necessary to achieve its objectives. Emphasis is placed on been little known in Vietnam. Cadre members are expected to perform a results obtained, rather than meeting valuable service in demonstrating that an arbitrary timetable. concept and the corollary of public Basic Elenssnts trust. Major Be’s influence is widely The basic elements of the cadre apparent. Revisions of the training team are the people’s main force and program and the internal organization development interteams. The main of the cadre group and faculty have force cadre seeks out and attempts to been implemented, and a series of sem­ neutralize or destroy the Communizt inars has been instituted to keep prov­ infrastructure, then organize and ince and district chiefs and other gov­ train hamlet self-defense forcee. In ernmental functionaries abreast of the the meantime, tbe development cadre program. conducts census grievance interviews, To the training center located at establishes hamlet records, issues Vung Tau, the beautiful seaside vil­ family certificates, conducts elections, lage formerly known as Cap Saint and promotes modest economic, CU Jacques, come candidates for the cadre tural, and social development projects. teams recruited from the various prov­ A basic element of the cadre’s ap­ inces, approximately 5,000 to a class. proach to each hamlet is tbe censns Each receives 12 weeks of training grievance program. Interviewing and about equally divided among special­ tabulating each inhabitant, members ist, paramilitary, and leadersddp sub­ of this team determine who the legit­ jects. It is significant that all cadre imate residents of the hamlet are and members are volunteers, some of them what aspirations they have. On this M young as 17. Although they are is based the planning of self-help granted exemption from the draft, projects, projects which are then truly ‘1MIwmher 1967 REVOLUTIONARYOEVELOPiENT responsive to the needs of the people, ited resources of the manpower pool. rather than being what the people are Many of those recruited are quite assumed to want or need which has young, and most lack administrative too often been the caee in the past. and leadership experience. Yet tbe The cadre also attemptc to get the cadre team does posseee a greet ad­ people to establish a hamlet council, vantage in training and direction over elect a council of elders, appoint sub­ the people in tbe hamlets. At the rela­ committees corresponding to the var­ tively unsophisticated level at which ious development celle, and conduct a they operate, thie is often enough tn hamlet election to select the hamlet produce very meaningful results. In chief, his depnty, and a senior admin­ addition, many cadre members poseess istrator. Involvement of the people in real determination to get the job done, the functioning of the government is Cadre Meets Enemy the key: The degree to which the beet of the With the hamlet organized and sta­ cadre groups are committed to per­ bilized, and projects. for its develop­ forming their mission is demonstrated ment underway, the cadre team moves by a group deployed in the Van N]nh on to a contiguous hamlet. In the area of northern Khanh Hoa Province, meantime, the team maintilns a con­ Within a few weeks of the completion tinuing interest in the hamlets in of its training, this team received in­ which it had previously worked. This telligence pf enemy activity in the is done by frequent visits and by leav­ area. Acting on the information, the ing representatives of the cadre in the team established a defeneive night hamlets. ambush position and made contact Bridge of Understanding with an estimated enemy company. Ultimately, a given cadre might Following an intensive fire fight in work in, perhaps, half a dozen hamlete which three cadre members were in the area, might remain there per­ wonnded, the enemy was routed, kszv­ manently, become a part of the com­ ing behind three North Vietnamezs munity, and provide the nucleus for soldiers killed and two weapons capt­ a civil service. If sncceseful, the cadre ured. Villagere later reported seeing will have formed a bridge of under­ 10 more bodies being carried into the standing between the government and hills. This evidence of the cadre’s de­ the people, and have involved the peo­ termination to cast ita lot with the ple in purposeful action which will PeoPle sent ita ateck soaring and got lead to their exercising greater con­ its program off to an impressive start trol over a life with markedly im­ It has been accurately observed that proved prospects for dignity and hap­ the first need and absolute necessity piness. of revolutionary development is secu­ Realistically, it must be recognized rity. This is largely the task of mili­ that the cadre does not in general tary forces to provide. Far from being poesess exceptional qualifications for a static or conservative role, this calls the tasks which face them. The cadre for aggressive search and destroy OP program must compete with the armed erations to clear the area to be devel­ forces and the mnkitude of other gov­ oped, followed by maturation patrol. ernmental organizatione for tbe lim­ ing, amhnshea, and raids over an ex-

MiiitarY Ravl~

1 REVOLUTIONARYDEVELOPMENT tensive area. Concurrently, there is work .ti go forward without outeide the advantage of bringing the army interference, intb close contact with the people in If the revolutionary development the role of active helper, with a re­ cadre, eupported by an effective mili­ fIultant beneficial modification of the tary security force and a relatively Imny attitude toward the people. scrupulous government, can succeed As the Revolutionary Development to a significant degree in rooting out 1Program gathers momentum, its euc­ the Vlet Cong infrastructure, instill­ (:ess will force a Viet Cong reaction ing a sense of national consciousness t;hat should guarantee extensive fur­ in the people, and commencing eco­ 1ther testing of the army’s combat ee­ nomic and social improvements, there 1pabllities. Within the hamlets, it will is hope that the Republic of Vietnam be the revolutionary development as a nation eerving the interests of (:adre that works toward the goals of its people can survive. There appears (development; close in, the Regional to he recognition of the importance md Ponular Forces nrovide security: of the program on both sidee of the military forces operating in wid~r alliance. How it proepere in the year scope in their traditional role of offen­ to come seems likely to portend the sive combat make it possible for that outcome of the Vietnamese endeavor.

The formal name for the program ie Revolutionary Development. It ia a joint effort-mifitary and civifian-Vietnamese and Ameriran. It meane many typee of security-aecm’fty for the future in the form of acheel+ security for today in the form of mediral attention—security for tomorrow in the form of a market place snd a pig farm. Revolutionary “Development not only aecnres what we have won for the people-it enables them to pick up the barren threads of their lives and weave them into anme sort of fabric for the future. * General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.

MUrter 1987 19 Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Shoemaker, United States Army

NEW era in US military capabilities is unfolding. Two separate but re­ A lated events mark its arrival. The first is the success of the Army’s air­ mobile division, and the second js the marked increase in military airlift her­ alded by the present C-130 and C-141, and tbe soon to arrive C-5A. An imagina­ tive marriage of theee two mobility developments can lead to the creation of more effective Army forces for typical worldwide stability taske. At the same time, this could permit the streamlining of the logistic system to eliminate the need for much of the vast support inf raetructure required for conventional sur­ face operation. . We probably should be proud of tbe awesome base development and con­ struction program in Vietnam. This tremendous and costly outlay of US re­ 1 20 Military Revlt? STRAC sources for the building of Ports, air­ One can argue that our bases in fields. cantonments, and storage areas Vietnam are unnecessarily elaborate, in ariother nation halfway around tbe but aueterity alone will not aolve the world is a dramatic example of US entire problem. What is required is power and determination. a comprehensive overhaul of our whole It seems clear that we should accel­ concept of deploying, fighting, and erate a search for new strategic con­ sustaining expeditionary forces in cepts for the overseas projection of the developing world. US power which will eliminate or re­ Test New Concept duce greatly the need for huge and To test the feasibility of a new con­ costly support facilities such as we cept, let us assume that we will de­ find necessary in Vietnam. The rea­ ploy acorpsof two divieions,’entirely sons go far beyond the problem of air supported, at adiatance of efveral US costs alone, although these cer­ hundred miles from sea access. tabdy are formidable. There is no intent hereto deprecate Magnify Instaldlity sealift. The advantages of sealift over In terms of destabilizing pressurea airlift for the sustained overseas on the fragile economy typical of de­ movement of large tonnages are cer­ veloping countries, major clhersion tain to remain, although the cost and of indigenous skilled and semiskilled capability gap may narrow somewhat manpower, and the nourishment of with time. We need strategic choices social decay caused by inevitable large- other than waiting until ports can be scale pilferage and black-market ac­ eecured, a military logistics infra­ tivities, massive US construction and structure created, and surface lines base activities magnify the instability of communication opened up for the of the host country—the very prob­ commitment of ground forces. lem our presence is designed to help It is recognized also that a light solve. In itself, the construction of corps force of two divisions may not great, sprawling base complexes cre­ beadequate for the job. Sixdiviaions, ates a credibility problem. It certainly or more, maybe needed, demanding a must be difficult for poor people, or maasive logietic surface effort both by poor nations, to believe US pronounce­ sea and land. Even in this instance, ments of her willingness to withdraw the ability of an all-air-supported and vacate such bases. force which can be deployed rapidly Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Shoe­ and is ideally suited for a covering maker b with the O@e of the As- force or mobile defense operations Atant Chief of Staff for Force Devef- would be of the greatest strategic Wment, Washington, D. C. A gradzuzte value. of the US ArmII Command and Gen­ There are three principal geograph­ eral Staff College awd the US ArmII ical elements included in the concept: War College, he has served in Korea the continental United States (CON­ with the .23d Infantrg; the MilitaW US) base, theoverseas strategic base, Assistance Advisosy Grvap fn Iran; the Ilth Air Assault Division, Fort and the area of employment, plus, of Benning, Georgia; and wtth the l.vt course, the air routes interconnecting Cavalry Divieion (Airmobile) in Viet­ theee land areas. Also highly desir­ nam. able i? a sea link between CONUS and

‘nomdler 1967 21 STRAC

the strategic base. Figure 1 shows a he within 1,700 miles of the arsa of schematic layout of the system. employment-the radius of the C-180E The CONUS base is the reserve or with an efficient payload. Okinawa and home base location of the strategic the Philippines are excellent examples airlift forces, the army strategic corps of highly developed strategic base fa­ and logistical command elements, ex­ cilities. cept for small caretaker and depot The experience of the 1st Cavalry detachments to manage prestocked Division (Airmobile) in Vietnam has supplies at permanent strategic bases. shown clearly the unique tactical ca­ Most all class II supplies are stocked pabilities of an integrated airmobile

here, as are the major reserves for all force. Indeed, airmobile operations ap­ other classes of supply. pear to be the best, if not the only The strategic base is an overseas way, efficiently to seek out and de­ location at which the United States stroy an elusive enemy in difficult ter­ has long-term base rights. Deeirably, rain. However, the airmobi]e division it ehould consist of a complex includ­ as presently equipped and based in ing two or more airfields capable of Vietnam does not have the lightness handling all types of aircraft, a sea­ and agility required in an all-air­ port, and supply storage and handling supported expeditionary force. facilities. Reeerve stocks of classes I, Because of the unique etrategic con­ III, III (A), IV, and V supplies would cept in force in the relatively small be maintained. The amount of each ares of South Vietnam, elaborate would depend upon the baee location, semipermanent base camps are feasi­ the significance of the strategic threat ble from a tactical viewpoint. But this in the area, and the. scale of US con­ special case should not serve as a tingency p]ans for the area. It should model for the future nor deter our

22 MilitaryMm search to isolate the combat essen­ ent airmobile division, even though it tials from the administrative “nice to is recognized that experience in Viet­ haves.” The division contains far too nam may have shown the need for many wheeled vehicles. Most’ of these some change. are required only when the division Some organizational changes would base operates. and is administered in be made: m environment of ground lines of . No general purpose vehicles communication. From the brigade base would be provided solely as radio forward, howetier, the Ist Cavalry Di­ mounts and power sources. Instead,

STS&GIC

Figure 1. vision’s operations in Vietnam will battalion and higher level headquar­ serve as an ideal model for our ters would use a-multiple radio pack­ m+mmed light airmobile division age and a small generator mounted on (LAM). the bed of a mechanical mule. The tactical concept for its employ- � No ground fighting vehicles ment includes a division base from would be included. This eliminates’ whichone brigade would operate, and 106-millimeter reeoilless rifles and the two brigades operating separately wheel-mounted cavalry troop of the from bases Up to 75 miles from the air cavalry squadron which would be division base. In turn, infantry bat­ replaced by a standard rifle company. tdione might operate up to 30 miles � Vehicles would not be provided fromthe brigade bases. For simplicity for storage or as shelters for repair ofcomputations, the LAM would con­ parts or personneL Lightweight con­ tsin the same riffe strength and the tainers or shelters with integral wheel Cameaircraft and artillery ae the pres­ mobilizers capable of being towed,

We9ier 1987 23 STRAC train fashion, for short distances troop movements forward of the bri. would perform these functions. gade base, but with little capability � Powered, two-wheel, rough ter­ left over for movements from tbe di. rain scooters would be used in lieu of vision base forward to brigade bases jeeps for local command and staff and or beyond. Therefore, brigade as well messenger communication. as division bases must contain fixed. � Transportation for supply and wing strips to accommodate air linen service support would be designed for of communication (ALOC) aircraft. short hauls around forward airstrip The division normally would require

The C-142has already greatly enhanced US ability to deploy and supply ground forces tactical bases employing the ware­ three airstrips in simultaneous opera- house train principle. tion—the division baee and two bri­ o Standard field kitchens would be gade bases. Base movements will usu­ eliminated except for one mess each ally require the construction of new at brigade, division atilllery, aviation strips. The engineer construction ef­ group, and support command levels fort, therefore, becomes a prominent which could provide an occasional hot consideration. The engineer battalion B-ration meal to unite on a rotational of the 1st Cavalry Division has con­ basis. structed a number of C-1,% and C-190 Experience of the airmobile division class airfields in Vietnam including. in Vietnam has shown that the divi­ three in which all equipment woe sion organic helicopter lift is gen­ moved to the site entirely by helilift. erally adequate for combat support The average working time for the con­ and logistics movement as well as struction of these strips was 51 hours.

24 MimeryRo?iel The probleme of strip construction a$d unloadhg as well as facilitate willvary with each specific site, but, movement by tow vehicle withh the generalizing, based on experience in tactical bases. Vietnam and Exercise AiT Assault II Petroleum, oils, and lubricants conducted in the fall of 1964, the en- would be delivered in two waye, one gineerconstruction effort will increase of whkh would be by tanker aircraft from a factor of one for a C-7A which would pump directly into flex­ (CV-2) strip, t~ five for a C-L90 ible, pillow tanks. Also, there would strip, to 10 or 15 for a C-5A field. The frequently be a requirement for de­

STOCKA6E LEVELS

class Division Base Brigade Base

I 3 days 1 day II (repair parts) 15 days 15 days 11,1 3 daya 1 day 111(A) 2 daye 1 day v 3 daya 1 day Pigure 2. C-141with its higher ground pres- livery of 500-gallcm fuel bags directly sures requires a better load-bearing to brigade bases. surface than the C-5A. The vulnerability of the bases to , Auother major factor which must enemy ground or air action must be beconsidered at the tactical base air- taken into account. Greater risks ar­ fields is the unloading and cargo- gue for the increased insurance of bondlingcapability. Thie includee euch ermdler sized, multiple deliveries. wbfactors as parking space, material- Stockage levels at forward tactical bmdling equipment available, size of bases muet be held to the irreducible omtahers and pallets, comparability minimum. One of the chief hurdlee ofcargo-handling systeme and equip- here is psychological. All logieticians,, ment,and, not least, matching of the and commanders, too, are happier sizeof cargo loatfe with needs and when a large reserve or safety factor Qpability of the baee being served. ie on hand-except, of course, when Packages Of about 1,500 pounds aP- they want to move tbe base. Without * Pearto be best. These would be sling strict control, the hoarding or “let’s Wtable by the UH-1, several could double it and be safe” instinct can deal be lifted in clusters by the CH-.47, a deadly blow to mobility. The division md the mechanical mule could move stockage should be no more than hem for short distances on the shown in Figure 2. wound.Perhaps lightweight, reueable A strategic base 1,500 miles distant W&g platforms with small radius is less than five hours away by C-lSO, dO@nurtwheels could be developed. or no more in time than, a vehicular ‘fbesecould speed up aircraft loading delivery ~rom Qui Nhon to Pleiku,

M@er 1967 25 STRAC

South Vietnam. Assurance of delivery, to relay logistic traffic from tbe divi when and where needed, must be guar­ sions to tb~ Iogiatical command at th anteed. Precise United States Air strategic base. Force (USAF) navigational and po­ o An engineer battalion structuru sition-fixing systems coupled with for airfield construction and helico] improved air-drop and low-level ex­ ter transportability eimilar to the en traction techniques provide a high ae­ gineer battalion in the LAM, but wit] surance capability. As a further reli­ an airborne en~ineer light equipmen ability hedge, light cargo aircraft company attached. (C-7A) baged witbin the area of em- � A corps aviation battalion con

DAILY TONNAGES (short Tons)

Division Base Brigade Base Grand Corps Base Each Two Each Four Total

Peak 250 400 800 200 800 1,850 Average 200 250 600 125 500 1,200

Figure 3. ployment permit the emergency trans­ taining a general support compan~ fer of supply stocks between tactical with twin-engine, utility, fixed-win! bases. aircraft and utility helicopters fol An army corps headquarter, command, liaison, and messenger sew stripped down to bare essentials, will ice; two c7H-47 (Chinook) companiei provide command and control func­ and a CH-54 (Flying Crane) compm~ tions for the two-division force. Suit­ to provide lift for corps troops ant ably augmented with air force pereon­ general support for the divisions. nel, it could also serve as a joint task e A HAWK battalio; for air d~ force (JTF) headquarters if a JTF fense. were deemed desirable for the mission. e A medical unit to provide mm In any event, a USAF element to per­ gical and evacuation support. form direct air support center func­ o Small detachments, as required tions, and, most important, to plan, for specialized functions such as AI’10] coordinate, and direct the USAF in­ Security Agency, military intelligenc~ tratheater airlift supporting the corpe, weather, and civil affairs. would be colocated with the corpe o An airmobile infantry battaUoO headquarters. for security of the corps command Austerity would prevail in the corps post (CP) and airstrip. The corps C~ headquarters and corps troop list with could be colocated at a division bse! all elemente being capable of move­ or it might be as much aa 100 mile! ment by (7-1.90. The short corpe troop from the division basea and possibly list would consist of: receive some security from friend9 e A signal upit to provide com­ indigenous units, but the provision d mand and adminietrative support links its own eecurity battalion eeeme toM to the divisions and corps troops, and prudent in any event.

26 MilitaryR* STRAC

� One vitally important USAF ~hat is, in cases of doubt, the highest unit would be attached to, or in sup- estimate was used eince we are not port”of,the corps force, a light trane- concerned here with stockage, but with port (C-7A) squadron. Its ability to meaeuring the capability of the ALOC operate from small, minimum con- to satisfy peak requirements. struction strips provides the flexibility Considering the factors discussed required in the eelection of brigade earlier—base security, strip construc­ bases. A brigade could be supplied tion requirements, cargo-handling solelv.bv . this intra-area lift if euit- eauirrment. and size of daily reauire­ ableC-L90 strip sites were not avail- m~rr~s-it” seeme clear tha~ br~gad

DAILY SORTIES RE(UIIRED (Peak Loads)

Brigade Bases Dhision Bsses Corpe Base Four Two One Totsl

Option 1 C-HO (12.5 ton) 64 64 C-5A (50 ton) 16 21 (6,300-mile range) Option 2 I C-190 (12.5 ton) 64 64 C-5A (100 ton) 8 3 11 (3,500-mile range) Option 3 C-190 (12.5 ton) 64 64 20 148 Figure 4. Me, or if the tactical situation did E bases would be best served by the tot allow time for conatructilon to C-190. Aa pointed out previously, ?-190criteria. however, there may be times when Assuming a separate corps base, this may not be possible and C-7A therewould then be seven airstrips in aircraft will have to make retail de­ usein the normal employment of the liveries to the brigade from the divi- , force.mat are the daily tormagee sion base. Figure 4 Iiste sortie require- which wOuld be required to be input ments with all deliveries to the bri­ at each?Clase III(A) and claes V are, gade by C-1$0 and alternative options Ofcourse, the major weight problems. of C-5A or C-130 delivery to the divi­ ones111(A) will also vary, but within sion and corps basee. rnuebnarrower Iimite. But the system It mnst be understood that Figure musttake care of peak demands. The 4 shows only the requirement for ~JY tonnagea shown ifi Figure 3 daily aircraft arrivals at the tactical W derived from gross calculations bases, and not total aircraft required whichare felt to be on the high eide. in the ALOC stream. If the strategic

b 1S67 27 STRAC base were approximately 1,500 miles army logistical command comDonent from the area of employment, indi­ manned to perform those combat serv­ vidual resupply aircraft operating ice support functions normally per­ therefrom would probably perform formed by support increments, less only one round trip per day (flight services associated with a ground line tirve of 10 hours for the C-I.?O and of communication. The ALOC auto. seven hours for the C-5A ). matically provides a back haul capa. If we assume the area of employ­ bility which will be used to full ad. ment is 9,000 miles from CONUS, this vantage for medical evacuation and would require a four-day round trip evacu~tion of equipment requirin,

DEPLOYMENT OATA

Corps Force Closes (Days) if C-5A Anew. eble Cargo Load Is:

100 Short 5oTfi# Tww

1. 100 C-5A’s, 100 (!-141’s 146 9 16 2.50 C-5A’s, 100 C-141’s I 7 10 17 30 3.50 C-5A’s, 50 C-141’S, 8 12 19 36 100 C-f 90’8 I Figure 5. for the C-5A (10 flight hours Der day) fourth or fifth echelon repair. Even a to deliver goods dir&tly from-CONUS great deal of personnel and pay ad­ and to return. Thus, direct delivery ministration could be performed in from CONUS would require a fleet the strategic base rather than in the of operable C-5A aircraft four times area of employment. the size of the daily sortie arrival re­ A great proportion of repair parte quirement. The slower C-I.90 would and class II replacement items would require a factor of six for the same be shipped direct from CONUS. The distance. Application of these factors Red Ball Express system which is to the daily sortie requirements will used for the provision of critical parte quickly highlight the economic and to Vietnam illustrates one way this operational value of forward strategic could be handled. The initial deploy­ bases which can be resupplied with ment of the force might be acconv heavy tonnage items by sealift. plished under these assumptions: Approximately half of the tonnage . Weight of deployed force iu: requirements for the corps force is Each division 9.600 short tons 19,000 for aircraft fuel. Therefore, a tanker cCmLlstmom 2,600 short tom 2,600 configuration of the C-5A, as well as m.ti] 21,600 short rm for the C-lSO, is required. o Deployment distance of 9,000 The str~~gic base would contain an miies.

28 Miliiry RevltU STRAC

“o Resupply is moved from CONUS host country or in an adjacent friendly during the deployment phase, com­ country. Such an alternative might be puted at the average rate of consump­ workable if aircraft fuel could be pro­ tion for forcee in the area of employ­ cured locally or if the base could be ment, and included in fleet lift re­ supplied with fuel by sea. We are con­ quirements. cerned not only with fuel for the army � Two terminal aiffields are avail­ force, which will only be a small frac­ able which will accommodate both tion of the total required, but with C-5A and C-1.41 aircraft. refueling the strategic aircraft and � Turnaround time is four days the C-1$0’S of the intratheater lift. It each for C-5A and C-I4I and six days is clear that the provision of fqel for for C-lSO. the kntire system is the overriding � Aircraft loading: C-141,25 short logistic problem. tons; C-IW, 12.5 short tons: What if the environment were such that the risk is considered too great DeploymentDate for C-5A aircraft to operate at divi­ Figure 5 shows force C1OSU%times sion bases ? The answer is establish­ under several air fleet mix and size ment of a strategic base complex close options as well as for C-5A loads of enough to the area of employment so both 50 and 100 short tons. that C-MO aircraft can make more In the cahxrlationa for Figure 5, than one daily round trip to the tac­ aircraft were dispatched at regular tical basee. intervals spread evenly throughout the round trip time period. The daily num­ Several Workable Concepts ber of aircraft arriving in the objec­ Thie atilcle does not addrees the tive area would be: Option one, 50; problem of the deployment and em­ Option two, 38; Option three, 42. The ployment of tactical air forces because arrival density under Option one is air defense, interdiction, and close approximately one aircraft per hour eupport are eseential to support the at each terminal field, and somewhat concept. Close air support must be less for the other options. relied upon for the fire eupport nor­ Up to this point, the purpose hae mally supplied by corps atilllery. been to outline an all-air concept for There are eeveral workable concepts a corps force and demonstrate ite for the employment of the neceseary feasibility by means of groes calcula­ tactical air forces. These might in­ tions, but certain key questione re­ volve the uee of existing host country main. or adjacent country bases, perhaps in, What about those areas of the world conjunction with routine infllght re­ in whkh the United States doee not fueling. In any event, it ie probable beve bases within 1,700 miles of pos­ that a substantial amount of strategic eible areas of employment? The an­ air2ift would be required to eupport swer, of course, is to obtain them. In these forces. some areas this may not be possible, International commitments hind the or the political cost may be considered United States to come to the aid of too high for the strategic gain. natione around the globe should their An alternative would be crash ne­ independent exietence be threatened gotiations for base rights with]n the by agg#eeeion. The etrategic need for

Nmmher1967 29 STRAC an all-air, rapid deployment, corps- of testing and developing a corps all. sized force is preseing. The advent of air, strategic force. The target date the C-5A will; for the first time, make for the test should be in 1970 and it such a force feasible. Much work must should last for a year or more. be done, however, to make the force a I vieualize that the ArnrY would reality. We are beginning to under­ commit to this test necessary logistic stand the problems and appreciate the units and the 18th Ahborne Corp capabilities associated with strategic which hopefully by then would consist and tactical air mobility, but the spe­ of two airmobile divisions. The first cifics of organizational structures, operational C-5A squadron should also joint control, systems compatibility, be committed to the test as well a continuous flow logistics, and opera­ other Military Airlift Command and tional concepts must still be developed Tactical Air. Command units which in detail. will be required. The Army’s approach to the devel­ US strategy demands the develop opment of tactical air mobility—that ment of a flexible, rapid deploymot is, creating a major test and develop­ force. It hae been shown that sucl a ment unit to work out the concept concept is feasible, but it will not through a series of exacting and ex­ spring forth in final form solely as a haustive test exerciees—has estab­ result of studies and analyses. PIw lished a successful precedent for the ning and preparation should start now task before us. The Commander in to develop, in the field, an operational Chief, US Strike Command, is the all-air, strategic force at the earliett logical commander to be given the job possible moment.

With the deployment of the First Csvslry Division to Vietnam and its highly successful employment in the air mobility role, one might well SSY that Army Aviation has now truly come of age. While there had been some pioneer use of Army Aviation in support of ourselves and the Vietnamese until the deployment, Army aircraft had primarily been largely a supplement to conventimml roles and -a premium mesns of carrying out priority tasks. With the acceptance of the air mobility concept, the future of Army Aviation took on a complete new light.

Lieutenant General Lawrenoe J. Li?woln

%2 30 MiliiIy norm ff~ p~: VW From The Reporter

Red China’s Diuided Army Robert S. Elegant and Sidney C. Liu

UST 18 years ago, the People’s throughout the following decade ap­ JLiberation Army (PLA) was com­ peared to be the first effective subati. pleting the conquest of the world’s tute for the state ideology of Con­ largest nation for the new state fucianism that had shaped Chinese idsdogy that Chairman Mao Tse. life for more than 2,000 ysare until it tung had compounded of Marxism- died with the 19th century. The PLA Leniniem, traditional Chinese political had, in effset, seized the world’s old­ thought, and KIS own personal vi­ est civilization and wae prepared tO sions. Avowedly baeed upon “the transform that civilization totally. Power of the gun: Mao’s doctrines For the past eight months, the

Hwmher1987 31 RED CHINA

PLA has heen playing quite a differ­ leaders who themselves exercise only ent role in the midst of a spreading titular authority and its ability-er anarchy that makes the chaos of the willingness—to carry out that assign. Knomintang’s last days appear an ment. Certain units have eupported orderly retreat. It is split into at least the Maoiet “mass organizations” in two major factions—and probably their campaign to “take power” from additional emaller factions although the regular structure of the Commn. no one outside the headquarters of the nist Party and the People’s Govern. PLA knows the exact categories. ment. Those units are, however, a Main Assignment minority. The PLA’s main immediate assign. Another minority, still quite small ment is no longer either internal as far ae one can tell, has chosen te “liberation” or external defense, but support anti-Maoist officials in their the control of civil disorder, the sup­ particular provinces and localities. pression of political riots, and the Meanwhile, the major part of the maintenance of industrial and agri­ PLA has tried its best amid great cultural production by the threat of difficulties to keep the normal pulse its guns. In pursuit of these duties, of Communist China beating. Like the PLA exercises physical control of any peacekeeping force, it has favored most vital installations from ware­ the side that gives it the least trouble houses to banks, from railroad de­ —that ie, the moderates. pots to radio stations,. and from Army Intervenes schools to shipyards. If the army did In Sian, the capital of Shansi Prov­ not occupy them, they would at once ince, in mid-February, opposing fec­ be fought over by half a dozen con­ tions of workere and students fought flictin~ factions. for possession of t~e loudspeaker in­ Adn&ions by Maoist publicity or­ stallations dominating the city’s main gans in July indicated the gap be­ equare. Each wanted the microphones tween the deceptively straightforward for a maes meeting to extol its posi­ assignment given the PLA by political tion. Since both factions claimed to be “true revolntionary rebels’’-loyal This article was digested Mao enpporters—the army merely from the original, pmblbhed in stood by. But when the mob claehw THE REPORTER,10 August 1967. swelled into a struggle to occupy the Copyrighted @ 1967 by The Re­ offices of the provincial newspaper, porter Magazine Company. the army did step in to prevent either Mr. Elegant h Hong Kong side from winning. Neither faction bureau chief for the Loe Angeles Times and has made a special could claim a victory, but the more 8tUdv of the Red ArrnY in more militant faction was frustrated by the than a decade of Far Eastern arnry’e intervention. reporting. The same pattern had already die- Mr. Liu is a correspondent for played iteelf in Shanghai when ex­ Newsweek and spent bet year at tremists laid siege to the Liberation Harvard University, Cambridge, Dai&, the organ of the Municipal Massachueette, working on a Committee of the Communist Par’b’. milita~ hieto~ of Chinese com­ As attackers hammered on the doors tnunislh. with makeahift battering rame, ed.

32 MilitaryReviSe cessful, so far, in suppressing the ment in the turmoil and hk own ap­ internal strife that dominates the life praisal of its gravity when he told of Communist China today. But even senior commanders: , so, the army ia emerging as the only Many men and women have com­ relatively s~ble institution in the mitted suicide, and many others have nation. been murdered. Production hue frdletz Increasingly, the military services . . . but owrlosses are not as great as have beeome the chief instrument of theg were during the war against the both conciliation and indoctrination. Jafmneee or the civil waragai?wt the Patient officers not only attend mass Kuomintang! Plitica] meetings, bit sit down with In the same speech Lh instructed small groups of students, workers, all units: and famers to instruct them in the You’must take no actiort ~ithout

Hwulllmr19d7 33 RED CHINA

Qcleaving it with higher authoritg. But fates—arise from the essential char­ IIOU must pay no attention to the acter of the PLA. provincial committees of the party. The PLA is today a force of some. They are all rotten! what more than 2.3 million men, in. The PLA is not s lengthened in eluding 1.3 million in the infantry, its endeavors to keep t i e peace by the 135,000 in the navy, and 100,000 in fact that a major source of the con­ the air force. The ground forces, 90. troversy which has splintered the Chi­ percent infantry and largely post- nese nation is military doctrine and Korean War in weapons and training, the future of the army. Two funda­ also include the substantial logistic mental questions are at issue: Is the apparatus called the Rear Area Com­ PLA, springing from the old guerrilla mand. The navy is most powerful in forces of Mao Tee-tung to become a submarines, with 30, and in a var. modern technological force, or is it to iegated fleet of minesweepers, torpedo depend primarily upon what Lin Piao boats, gunboats, and other craft num. calls “our spiritual atomic bomb, the bering about 75o. great numbers of the courageous Chi­ The air force was once ranked nese people” ? Is Pekhg justified in fourth in the world in size and pre risking confrontation with the United sumably in capability until it wcs States and the Soviet Union when the deprived of replacement aircrafi army is incapable of tnrning back an spare parts, fuel, and new technologi­ attack by either great power? cal devices ae a result of the Sin& Soviet quarrel in 1960. It is stii Foreign Policy Anti-Maoists argue that an adven­ sizable with its 2,500 aircraft, most turous foreign policy cannot be jus­ of them MiG fighter bombers, but it tified until the PLA has acquired pos­ could not meet the first-rank air session and mastery of modern arms. forces of the world. Despite its num­ Maoists contend that the Thought of bers, and even despite the rapid de. Mao ‘Z%e-tungmakes present guerrilla velopment of the Chinese nuclear bomb, the PLA is not a modern, first doctrine invincible and guarantees the victory of a “forward” foreign rank force. policy. Secrrrity Police and Militia The Maoists further insist that In the task of maintaining a degm “politics mnst command.” This means of order within Communist Chiw promoting officers and men for ideo­ the army is, in theory, assisted by logical fervor rather than professional Public Security Forces numbering competence, and the use of troops in eeveral hundred thonsand, and the a variety of nonmilitary activities People>e Militia with a nnmericd ranging from farming to building strength of about 10 million.’ BIIt dams. neither the security police nor the h Jui-thing, the PLA’s Chief of militia is a reliable reserve in the Staff from 1959to 1966, espoused the burrent internal conflict. Both sm’ first position. He was purged by the bven more closely bonnd by local loy~ Maoistq~L]n Piao, Minister of De­ ~lties than is the regular army, andl fense since 1959, is a wholehearted lboth have tended to support anti pnblic advocate of the sscond position. Maoist local party leaders. I Their divergent views-and disparate The burden, therefore, falls dirsctly’

34 Military REM; I ~ RED CHINA

poses further handicaps ‘for the job try to uproot all regional cbaracter­ in hand. Although the regular army ietics and loyalties all at once. From has been a more or less autonomous 1959 to 1966, however, Lin Piao at-, state within a state since the estab­ tempted precisely that feet with the lishment of the People’s Republie in PLA.. His text was the Thought of 1949,it is still divided by the regional ~ao ‘1’ss-tcmg; his practical means and clique loyalties of its commanders wae massive reeesignment of officere and soldiers. and, in 1965, the abolition of formal A primary concern of the P8rtY ranks to discourage “profeeeional­ center has been the attempt to foster ism?’ He was, perhaps, moderately national loyalties among the messes sueceseful in no more than 40 percent OfChina. The taaehing of Kuo-z/ii, the of the major units. For the rest, it was “national language: the diseemina­ again the army’s deeply rooted tradL

~e+ber 1967 35 RED CHINA tion of autonomy that defeated him. became leaders of production brigades From the heginning of its formal on rural people’s c0mmune9 or fOre­ existence in the guerrilla capital of men in civilian factories managed by Yenan in the distant northwest in the captains and majors. mid-1930’s, army headquarters has In the early stages of the cultursl heen a rigidly restricted area, inac­ revolution, the military’s organ, tbe cessible even to high-ranking govern­ Liberation Army Dailv, became tbe ment officials unless they held special intellectual and doctrinal bellwether permits. The army has possessed its of the country, and Lin Piao himsslf own intelligence network, its own was hailed as: factories, and its own channels of . . . the closest comrade-in-arms of communication which even the party’s Chair-man Mao, the deputy supreme omnipresent security apparatus could commander of the nation, Mao Tse­ not often penetrate. tung’s best disciple, who has crea­ tivel~ interpreted and applied the Security and Intelligence The army’s Political Security Bu­ Thought of Mao Tse-tung. rean, which is responsible for the In theory, Lin Piao held a nearly safety of senior leaders, has always unassailable position atop the military been the most powerfnl security and structure when he began the cultural intelligence organization in China. Its revolution. In his position as de facto Leaders’ Safety Office even maintains head of the Communist Party’s Mili­ its own farms to grow tobacco and tary Affairs Committee, he was nomi­ food—and separate factories to pro­ nally in a position to control all unita cess both—all to guard its charges Personal Loyalty against poisoning. In addition to having at bis corn. The PLA maintains its own news­ mand the army’s channels of commu­ papers, radio networks, and theatrical nication and the secret dossiers whose troupes under its own Propaganda reading and disposition can literally Department. Just as the military Rail­ mean life or death in a totalitarian road Corps is out of bounds to the society, Lin Piao had been assiduous Ministry of Railways, the army as a in replacing men who were not. con whole is beyond the control of what pletely loyal to him with his own remains of the People’s Government. adherents. For instance, the post ot Under Lin Piao, however, the PLA Director of the General Political De­ was encourag~d to become more di­ partment of the PLA was given to his rectly involved in national activities. faithfnl follower Hsiao Hua who was, From the time he assnmed control in in terms of military rank, mnch ts+ 1959 until the Great Proletarian Cul­ junior for the job. Similarly, a former turaI Revolution threw everything orderly of Mao’s became a division into disorder in 1966, the army meth­ commander. odically thrust its tentacles into every But not all Lin Piao’s shntfling of corner of civilian life. Retired mili­ senior commanders could break tbo tary men took on diverse roles, includ­ fundamental matrix of the PLA. R@ ing the presidencies of universities, gional predilections and personal lop government posts, editorships, and alties have demonstrably proved to b? even film stardom. Major ministries stronger than tbe cult of Mao Tse were tilled by generals, and sergeants tung or the fear of Lin Piao.

36 MilitaryRedm[ RED CHINfI

A rough measure of the degree of come, in effect, an anti-Maoist redoubt Lin Piao’s failure can be drawn from in the Southwest China Region de­ an analysis of the situation -in those spite Lb’s attempts to regain in­ areas formerly controlled by the four fluence by sbutftiug commanders. The great field armies and still occupied, agricultural abundance of Szechwan for the most part, hy the same troops. Province and the mineral resources L]n Piao himself commanded the of its neighboring provinces are vir­ 4th Field Arwy whose strength, for complex historical reasons, lay in Man­ churia in the north and in the slice of provinces from Hunan south to Kwangtung known as the South China Area. Most of the troops in those areas are, quite naturally, still loyal to Lin Piao. But the situation is far from satisfactory in Maoist eyea. Violent Fighting Heilungkiang, in Manchuria, one of the four provinces that Pekhrg claims to rule, is shaken hy violent fighting between Maoists and anti- Maoists. In Canton, the metropolis of the south, there is, in reality, no func­ tioning government, but only a .tenu­ ous military administration that can, at best, keep disorder witbin certain bounds. Still, the former area of the 4th Field Army as a whole is the best t?esue Milit.$vs of a bad lot for the Maoists. (rInfmmltiOn In the East China Region, area of Chsn Yi, Fereign Minister ef Communist the former 3d Field Army commanded China by Field Marshal Chen YI, now For­ eign Minister, the situation is slightly tually denied te the Maoists as is al­ worse for the Maoists. Chen Yi has most all administrative authority. managed to survive in office despite In an attempt to appease the recal­ a fusillade of verbal attacks by the citrant troops and civilians, Chang Red Guards. His former soldiers, ae Kuo-hua, who had himself defied the one authority put it, “take a non-posi­ Maoists as corninander of the Tibet tive attitude, maintaining a degree M~litary Region, was transferred to of order without helping the Maoists Chengtu, the capital of tbe southwest, very much.” The three senior com­ as First Political Commissar. His at­ manders of the area’s troops include tempts at conciliation have had as two old followers of Chen Yi and one little effect as the attempt at open devoted Uln piao man who has the suppression made by the area’s mili­ misfortune of commanding two army tary commander, Huang Hsing-ting, corps made Up of Chen Yi’s old troops. a dedicated follower of Lkr Piao who, The 2d Field Army area has be­ it is ,eaid, would willingly sacrifice an

November1967 37 RED CHINA

entire army of 30,000 men to satisfy the last decades of the Ch’ing dynasty. his mentor’s slightest wish. Wide­ Still acknowledging the titular suzer­ spread violence in the entire area and ainty of Peking and the preeminence its defiance of the Maoists have dem­ of Mao Tse-tung, each Red viceroy onst rated his inability to bring either might go his own way in internal troops or civilians under control. matters and, to a certain extent, even The 1st Field Army in the North­ in dealing with the foreign nations west China Region was formerly com­ on which hie fief abutted. manded by Field Marshal Peng Teh­ The PLA has already demonstrated huai wbo was simultaneously deposed that it is capable of moving a good as Defense Minister and the nation’s distance toward such a loose federa­ foremost soldier when Lin Piao took tion, with each general supporting his over in 1959. His fall from grace was lncal political ruler-or becoming that caused by his uncompromising advo­ ruler. Even so, the PLA would not be cacy of professional military stand­ apt to lose its national character. arde, the alliance with the Soviet It would become a wide-meshed net Union abroad, and more pragmatic cast around the fragments of a China policies at home. that would otherwise drift apart. Much of the area which lay under A more dramatic but less likely that army is now commanded from possibility existe, Each paesing day Lanchow in Kanau Province by an ob­ makee it ever more apparent that tbe scure general who has proved unable greatest obstacle to peace and nnity or unwilling to bring the barren in China is the obsessed figure of Mao northwest, with its nuclear and rock­ Tse-tung with hie uncompromising etry installations, under the Maoists’ visions and his ambitious hatchetman, control. Lin Piao. A group of generals, many As the Peking regime becomes ever of whom are eseentidly patriotic na­ more isolated and civil strife in­ tionrdiets, might one day move against creases, the army’s role in Chinese the Mao-Lin clique. Perhaps gathered society becomes critical. It would be around the figure of old Marshal Chu misleading to suggest that the mili­ Teh, they might create a new national tary is moving toward complete con­ regime in cooperation with Premier trol of the state and civilian institu­ Chou En-lai and the more practical tions in the manner of Burma, party leaders of whom the Maoists Indonesia, or the United Arab Re­ have been unable to rid themselves. public. But if it is to salvage anything The generals certainly have the of the past accomplishments of the power to depose Mao, but it is doubt­ People’s Republic, it may have to fnl that they have the will. Besides, choose between at least two difficult the sheer magnitude and variety of and perilous courses of action. China make the recreation of a uni­ An acceleration of present tenden­ tary regime an immense task. Yet, cies, if sufficiently prolonged, could whether they seek the dramatic solo­ well see China splintered into regional tion or, ae is more likely, move with groupings roughly corresponding to the tides, the army will continue to the vicer@@ies, each composed of play juet as vital a role in the future four or five provinces, which enjoyed of the People% Republic as it did in a large measure of autonomy during bringing that republic into being.

38 Military Revi@v CIVILIANPERSONNEL VIETNAM Second Lieutenant Larry L. Pressler, United States Armu

HE United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) employs about 30,000 Vietnamese civilian employees to perform support functions for mili­ Ttary commands. Without these workers, additional US support troops would undoubtedly be needed. In addition, there are many jobs which can be done best by local individuals-translator and interpreter, for Y instance. Hiring local workers yields another benejit too. It provides employment

November1967 ii CIVILIAN PERSONNEL–VIETNAM

A Vietnamese civilian assists a US soldier at an Army salvage company

and training to a growing segment of the Vietnamese workforce. One of Vietnam’s most critical needs is for more skilled manpower, and this need will increase. * Most local employees, 72 percent, hold blue-collar jobs. Over one.half are unskilled workers, and, of these, most are women. The large number of women doing unskilled work is, in part, a reflection of the immense manpower drain of the war. White-collar workers make up about 25 percent of the workforce with about half of them in the equipment, facilities, and service group. This includes cargo checkers, guards, tiotor vehicle dispatchers, procurement and purchasing personnel, radio operators, stock contro clerks, shipping assistants, telephone operators, and other service jobs. A slightly smaller group includes the general administrative, clerical, and office person nel while interpreters and translators make up about seven percent of the total workforce. Professional personnel are present only in minute quantities. This is partly a reflection of the shortage of professional personnel in the Vietnamese economy, and partly a result of the higher compensation available elsewhere.

Second Lieutenant Larry L. Pressler is with the Ofliee of Civilian Peswm­ nel Director, Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam. He holds a B.A. in Governmevt­ Econotn@@om the Univemitst of South Dakota in Vemnillion and an M.B.A. from Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. He attsnded Oxford Uni­ versity, England, as a Rhodee scholar and received a Dipknrca in Economics.

40 Militsry Review CIVILIAN PERSONNEL–VIETNAM

The skill level of the workforce is low. South Vietnam is basically an agricultural country. She has a population of approximately 14 million with an estimated 35 to 40 percent available to the workforce. Of this total workforce, approximately 70 percent are employedin agriculture and fishing. The economy ,has had no significant industrial base or large-scale industrial training facilities. The literacy rate in Saigon has been estimated to be amwoximatelv 6(I Dercent

i

In addition to typing and English, the typing course includes training in military correspondence, filing, and telephone courtesy

whilein the provinces it is as low as 40 percent.. Much of the elite of the workforce is in the army. The result is a shorfage of brdusttially skilled manpower available, and this is reflected in the USARV workforce. ­ Since most of the skills required by the US Army are not available in the Vietnamese labor market, and since US forces have been cautioned not to disrupt the local economy “ byhiring skilled personnel away from it, US forces must train their own personnel, The Office of the civilian Personnel Oirector, USARV, administers the Central Training Institute (CTI) with a staff of five United States and 66 Vietmanese teachers to meet COmmand.wide training needs. The CTI at Cholon, with branches in Saigon and Long Obrh, has responsibifi~ for giving preemployment training with pay to Vietnamese workers in Skills required by IJ,$ forces. At present, the CTI offers courses in the English language, clerical SMIS, military correspondence, telephone operating, mechanical trades, vehicle Operation, material handling equipment, and office machines.,

Mwmher 1967 41

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL–VIETNAM

Courses at the CTI vary in length from as short as a few hours to as long as 16 weeks. In the clerk-typist basic course, for example, students attend six days a week, seven hoursa day, for six weeks. The objective of the course is to develop typing skill up to 35 words per minute and English-language comprehension and speaking abifity sufficient to perform duties es clerk-typist for US forces. The largest course, thus far, is the two-week Vehicle Operator Course. Most of the studentsare men, who have never driven before. The course includes driver safety, vehicle care and maintenance, and qualifying for a Vietnamese Government driver’s license. Nearly 3,000 trainees have taken this course. Students attending any CTI training course receive a salary less than they will earn ontheir new job, but which provides them with a living wage while in training. The Office of the Civilian Personnel Ofrector is responsible for planning, directing, and evaluating the civifian parsonnel management program. This includes responsibility for eight area civilian personnel offices with subarea offices which are located throughout Vietnam. The director is a member of the Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Committee which determines the policy concerning Vietnamese employees of US forces and the Ambassador’s Civilian Manpower Committee. He maintains close contact with the VietnameseGovernment agencies and labor unions. Inflation is one of the most serious problems facing the employment program. While pay has been raised periodically, fiving costs have risen faster. The result has been an unusuallyhigh quit ratio as Vietnamese employees have feft to take jobs in fiefds where wagesare more responsive to inflation. USARV’S30,000 direct hire Vietnamese employees constitute the largest local national workforceempfoyed by the Army in the Pacific area. They constitute an important factor inourwer effort.

-,.

*

Wmbar we7 4a ASIANMILITARY-POLITICO Lieutenant Colonel George D. Eggers, Jr. United Staten Arrau

HE role of the military elitss T in the political development of the emerging countries of the world has only recently become a subject of serious and sustained research. Throughout the first decade of the post-World War II err+ it was gen­ erally assumed that the future of the newly independent states lay in the hands of their politicians, their bu­ reaucrats, or their intellectuals. Dur­ ing the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, however, it became apparent that the military elites were playing an im creasingly larger part in the domestic affairs of many of the emerging states. Since the end of the Second World War, the international tensions cre-

44 Militery Reria MILITARY-POLITICOS ated by Communist belligerence and tional caretakers, the military forcee by the prolonged dispute between In­ eeize the reine of power, ostensibly to dia and Pakistan over Kashmir have establish conditions under which PO. resulted in the establishment of large, Iitical authority may be eventually standing military forces in South Ko­ returned to a civilian government rea, South Vietnam, Thailand, PakL through constitutional procedure. A stan, and India. ‘These forcee have variant of thie role is being played participated iti a variety of military by President Chung Hee Park of activities. Also, they have contributed South Korea who became a civilian indirectly, and in varying degrees, to in 1963 and was elected to the Presi­ political development through the con­ dency in the fall of that year and re­ duct of givic action programs in the elected in 1967. fields of education, training, public Thailand works, agriculture, transportation, Thailand military elitee have played communication, health, and sanita­ a dominant role in politice since 1932 tion. when a group of army officere and il Political Ferce civil servants brought an end to ab­ As the threats to national security solute monarchy and established a con­ have pereieted or even increased, the stitutional government. Subsequently, military elites have become conspicu­ the military officers have been either ous eegments of society. They have, caretakers or behind-the-ecenes sup­ except in India, developed a signifi. porters of the civil regimes in poweq cant potential as a political force. switching from the supporter to the This potential has been realized by caretaker role ae deemed necessary. intervention in domeetic politice at The position of the military elite the higheet level. In so doing, the elites as a primary source of Thai political of four countries have assumed the power and political change can be roles of constitutional caretakers or ascribed to’ its control over the means reformere. of violence, to ita firm stand against When playing the role of conetitu- communism, and to its organizational ability. Another important factor has Lieutenant Colonel George D. Eg­ been the lack of a viable political al­ gerx, Jr., is with the 1st Battalion, ternative. 12th Cavalry, Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile), in Vietnam.’ He holds a In South Vietnam, unlike its coun­ B.S. in Military Science from the Uni­ terpart in Thailand, the military elite versity of Mar@wrd, G’ollege Park; a hae only recently begun to play a der Master of Pnblic Affairs from Pm”rwe­ cisive role in domestic politics. At the ten Univevetty in New Jereeg; and time of the coup and overthrow of WS4 graduated from the lJS Army President Ngo-dinh-Diem in Novem­ War College in 1966. He has had ber 1963, the military constituted the t?’oopand staff duty in Japan, Korea, only element in a melange of conflict­ and Germang, and waa with the War ing ethnic, religious, political, and eco­ Plswe Dknkion, Directorate of Stra­ nomic interests that was sufficiently tegic Plawa and Policv, Oflice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operation, strong and integrated to depose Pree­ Department of the Army, Wa.shing­ ident ,Diem and his authoritarian re­ ten, D. C. gime.

Hwember 1967 4s South Korean elements of the mili- National elections were held in the tary elite seized control of that coun- fall of 1963. General Park, saris uni­ try’s government in 1961. One year form, was elected President when his earlier, public dissatisfaction with political opposition was rendered in- Preaident Syngman Rhee’s adminis- effective hy ifi internal disunity. He

US Arm Dissatisfaction with President Syngnmn Rhee’s administration eventually led te rule by military juntz in Kerea

tration had forced his retirement. was reelected by a substantial margin John M. Chaig became Prime Minis­ in 1967. ter, hut a military junta overthrew The military reformer assumes him and took office in May 1961. Steps power to sweep away all vestiges of were take to restore public order, to the old order and to create new polib reduce the9 evel of corruption, and to ical institutions. President Mohem­ initiate a program to stimulate, eco­ med Ayub Khan of PakL4an is a suc­ nomic growth. cessfully practicing reformer.

46 MilSsry RwM MILITARY-POLITICOS

Pakistan, in 1958, was beset by a of World War II, large military forcee myriad of problems which bad accum. have been established, equipped, ulafed when officials failed to provide trained, and deployed to deter or to for the progressive social, economic, fight aggression against each of the and political development of the coun­ five countries. As threats to the na­ try. The military elite considered the tional security have continued or in­ situation serious enough to warrant creased, tbe prestige of tbe military its intervention. man has risen, and with it the polit­ President Ayub’s military govern­ ical potential of the military elite. ment declared martial law and pro­ � The armed forces of the five na­ ceeded systematically to restructure tions have contributed indirectly, and tbe existing political mechanisms. in varying degrees, to political devel­ Pafdetan was introduced to the con­ opment through the condnct of mili­ cept of “basic democracy” based on tary civic action programs. the election of one representative for � Int&vention in domestic politiee every 1,000 to 1,500 people. by the military elites in four countries In accordance with the provisiona is attributable primarily to tbe failure of a new constitution promulgated in of the civilian political leadership to 1962, a presidential election wae held cope with preaeing internal and ex­ in 1965 with Mohammed Ayub Khan ternal problems andtothe lack of co­ emerging victorious. hesion within and between the civil Apolitical Elits of India elites. In each case, the military elite The military elite of India baa re­ was tbe only organized and dkciplined mained essentially outside the political group ca~able of creating those con­ arena for three major reasons. First, ditions of order and stability which the Indian political leadership has could lead to political, social, and eco­ been relatively effective in dk+charg­ nomic progrese. ing its constitutional responsibilities. o In Pakktan, South Korea, and Second, Indian federalism presents an South Vietnam, the military regimes almost insurmountable obstacle to any have been legitimatized through con­ seizure of power by the military stitutional proceeees. Procedures have forces. The chief ministers of the 15 been established for the orderly trans­ states of the Indian Federation are fer of political power at least in the capable of putting up considerable re­ first two countries. sistance to any military coup. Finally, e The continuing Communist the military professionals in India threat and the lack of viable political were downgraded administratively and alternatives in Thailand should keep secially during the long era ofi non­ itstmilitery leaders in power for the alignment which followed Indi n in­ foreseeable future. ? dependence. ‘Thus, the caretaker and the re­ Several broad conclusions may be former place the United States in a drawn from a survey of military par­ singular dilemma. Our tradition of ticipation in the domestic politics of liberal Western demecracy makes it Pakistin, South Korea, South Viet­ distasteful for us to associate with nam, ‘Phailand, and India. governments controlled by profes­ � During the years since the end sional military officers. On the other

November1S87 4 MILITARY-POLITICOS hand, we accept the principle of mu­ Vietnam, South Korea, Pakistan, and tual security as a means of combating Thailand has been limited. The expe. militant communism. What, then, rience of the post-World War II period should be tbe nature of our relation. indicated that the choice lay between ships with the soldier-politicians some form of tutelage that would lead whose countries are tied to us by eventually to a form of democracy bilateral or multilateral security ar­ suited to the needs and capabilities of ran$rements ? Should we susmort them each nation, or political disintegration accompanied hy social and economic chaos that would make these countries particularly vulnerable to Communist incursion. Classic Prerequisites While the domination of domestic politics by the military services will pass, we must not expect the coun. tries concerned to conform in time to the Western model of democracy. They lack the classic prerequisites for democracy as we know it: a high level of literacy, social homogeneity, and economic prosperity above the sub­ sistence level. At best, we can antic­ ipate and encourage models similar to the “basic demoeracy” of Pakistan and the “Koreanized democracy” of South Korea. The managerial and techniral skills of the military elites and their control over the means of violence will KoreanS2.mrt contilnue to assure them key roles in Repubfic of Korea President Chung Hee the evolution of whatever politicsl Park systems finally develop. without qualification, or should we An important element of the US exert our influence to encourage the strategy of containment has been the establishment of governments akin to policy of providing economic and mil­ the representative democracies of the itary assistance to selected non-Com­ United States or Great Britain? munist countries located on the periph­ To begin with, it must be recognized ery of the major Communist powers. that the United States does not have The events of the past few years have it within her power to provide each demonstrated that this policy was ef­ of these nations with the type of gov­ feetive in advancing our national in­ ernment which we might think it terest. It is presently undergoing its should ha e. The people of the indi­ most rigorous test in South Vietnam. vidual cot%t ries must determine how Our foreign aid policy shonld rec­ they wish to be governed. The range ognize the military elites in Pakistan, of optione open to the people of South South Korea, South Vietnam, and

4s Militaryfiwiea MILITARY-POLITICOS

Thailand as essential elements of eo­ plicit effort should be made, however, ciety whose competence is nqt limited to provide present and future officers to purely military matters. We should with the skill and sophistication re­ support these “kernels of integration” quired to play constructive roles in by helping them to sustain their the development of political procesees strengths and to overcome their weak­ within their natilons. nesses as natjonbuilders in general, This effort should be designed to and contributors to political develop­ improve the quality of their contribu- ment in particular. Much of the aid required to accomplish these tasks can be provided under the aegis of the US Military Assistance Program (MAP).

Purpose of Training The training of foreign military pereonnel has been a recognized ele­ ment of the US military aseietance ef­ fort since its initiation. The primary purpose of this training has been to increase the effectiveneee of foreign officers and enlisted men in perform­ ing their military duties. A wide va­ riety of military skills has been im­ parted to tbe trainees both in their own countries and at military facili­ ties in the United States. In recent years, there has been an expanaion of MAP-supported instruc­ tion for foreign officers in nonmilitary subjects. This trend reflecte the mas­ President Mehsmmed Ayub Khan sive emph?sis that has been placed on the tactics and techniques of counter­ tion to this development in several insurgency and on the contribution of areas. One of these is the achieve­ military civic action programs to na­ ment and maintenance of the politilco­ tionbuilding. It also stems from the military proficiency necessary to pro­ recognition that many MAP trainees vide an adequate defense against the have aesumed key civilian posts in manifold forms of aggression and sutY­ their countries. version. Another is the planning and The training and orientation in­ implementation of military civic ac­ cluded in the US ArIuy Command and tion to foster economic and social de­ General Staff college couree and in velopment, with particular emphasis other courses of instruction attempt on baeic citizenship and literacy pro­ to capitalize on the potential of the grame and on the training of tech­ MAP program for tbe creation of non. nician to staff government and pri­ military side effects which are bene­ vate institution. Additionally, ee­ ficial to the recipient countries and lected, members of the military elites favorable to US interests. A more ex­ should he prepared for their contin­

Nsvember1967 i MILITARY-POLITICOS gent employment in high-level posts versities. There should be an increase in government or in private life. in the present number of high-caliber Specific items in a program of this junior officers selected to study po­ nature ehould include public adminis­ litical science, public administration, tration, the elements of economics and economics, and related subjects at US sociology which relate to the problems colleges and universities. of the emerging nations, and compara­ � Research projects. Additional at­ tive studies in civil-military relations tention should be given to systematic and political systems. New or ex­ and continuing research into the spe­ panded mechanisms for the conduct of cific roles of the military elites in the thk training are incorporated under political development of the newly these recommendations. The first is emerging nations. This research applicable solely to Asia, tvhile the re­ should form the basis for the evolution maining could be applied, on a selec­ of future strategy and tactics for pre­ tive basis, to other regions and coun­ viding MAP training to selected mem­ tries of the world. bers of these elites, � The establishment of an Asian The major objections to these rec­ Defense College. This institution ommendations center around the prob­ would be patterned after the North lem of political sensitivity. However, Atlantic Treaty Organization and In- the central and traditional Angb- ter-American Defense Colleges. The American argument that the proper curriculum would include instruction military role is an apolitical one, does in the military, economic, political, and not apply to all of the developing na­ social factors involved in the security tions. We have seen the military elites of the non-Communist nations of Asia. in four Asian countries thrust into the The college would offer an unparalleled political arena by the failure of the ci­ opportunity for selected senior mili­ vilian authorities. The military forces tary officers of the region to establish in Burma, Indonesia, and the Repub­ personal contacts and to exchange lic of China have alao played key roles ideas and techniques on a wide range in domestic politics. These facts point of subjects to include those specifically to the requirement for a program sim­ concerned with nationbuilding. ilar to the one outlined. o Politico-military training for The establishment of politico-mili-” foreign officers of senior and middle tary objectives for the MAP training rank. The US Army and Air Force of selected military officers is not an should give consideration to the es­ endeavor to encourage permanent pafi tablishment of courses of instruction terns of military rule. Rather, it is an:, at their staff colleges which would attempt to cultivate the potential C& parallel the Navy’s command course these individuals to contribute cow$ for senior foreign officere. structively to the creation of viablO”’ o Schooling at US colleges and uni­ political phcesses in their countries.

50 Military Rerbe d A Confrontation

Charles W. Koburger, Jr.

CONFRONTATION is the op­ A posing of one element of mili­ ‘i tary power with another element of & military power. The object is to ac­ i a’ complish this in such a way as to pre~ent the first po~er from &mceed­ ing in whatever he set out to do, with­ out combat. Confrontation includes such tactics as interposition, the plac­ ing of one element between two othere. If the confrontation is badly handled, or if the task was impossible to start with, the outcome can well be Iimited war. When major powers are involved, escalation into general war is always possible. The problem is, therefore, a touchy one. In this type of operation, as in other sublimated efforts, three levels of foreign policy objectives influence our conduct: � Long-range basic policy objsc­ tivee—the avoidance of general warl for example. Q Immediate political objective. � Potential military objsetives. Regarding the military deployment of tactical nuclear wsapons, for in­ stance, we would consider not only the ever-present political danger of un­ wanted eeealation, but also what the immediate local political coste and gaipe rn]ght be. Each case is different. IIkwnrber19S7 a CONFRONTATION

The deployment of US forces to that accepted the protection offered by Thailand in 1962 is an example of the treaty, the Manila Pact repre­ such use of US power. The deployment sented the choice of a Western orien­ offers a good case study of the suc­ tation in international politios, a ceseful use of this technique. choice that exposed them to pressures SfAIO Treaty from the nonaligned as well as the On 8 September 1954, representa­ Communist-oriented nations, and that tives of Australia, France, New Zea­ also had ite consequences in the do­ land, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thai­ mestic politics of th’ese countries. For land, the United Kingdom, and the them, it could be an expensive choice. United States signed the Southeast A simple, relatively straightforward Asia Collective Defense Treaty in demonetration of the use of force Manila. These eight countries thus within the SEATO framework was became members of the Southeast not too long in coming. Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), US-Thai Relations a regional defense organization with]n For the Thais, 1950 was the year the meaning of the United Nations of great decision. Before that time, charter. On the same day, and by Thailaud had privately made clear her means of a special protocol, the sig­ sypathy with the Free World, but, natories extended the be~efits of the with the Communist attack in Korea, Manila Treaty to three other coun­ the threat of Communist subversion tries—Cambodia, Laos, and South from China, and the increasing Vietnam. strength of Communist forces in In­ The documents signed at Manila dochina, Thailand dscided formally to were important for both military and align herself with the .West. political reasons. First of all, they In 1950, Thailand accepted her first were a military alliance extendhg military aid from the United States. western military protection to the One of the first countries to offer states in the treaty area. Prepara­ armed forces for the Korean Conflict, tions against “aggression by means Thailand was the first state to ratify of armed attack” made up the domi­ the Manila Pact. nant part of SEATO activities; the Permanent SEATO consultative or­ prevention of such armed attack was gans and combined SEATO military a test of their success. command structures were organized Just as important, for signatories in Bangkok. like Thailand or those protocol states As the political situation in south­ Charles W. Koburgev, Jr., is a ci­ east Asia continued to worsen, how­ vilian employee with the Department ever, the Thais requested a relation­ of Defense and a lieutenant com­ ship with the United States outeide mander in the US Coast Gv.ar& Re­ of the Manila Treaty. These requests serve. He holds a B.S. in Foreign led to a joint statement in Washing­ Service from Georgetown University, ton in March 1962 hy US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Min­ .PH;%:rncNG:r?:L2z New York, and s% Political Science ister Thanat Khoman, of Thailand, in from the University of Oregon at which it was said that in aiding Thai­ Eugene. land, “its ally and historic friend:

52 Militaryllevie~ CONFii!)NTATION the US Government did not believe In April 1962, the collapse of the that her obligation depended upon the right-wing government forces in the prior” agreement of all other parties north of Laos threatened to upset that to the SEATO Treaty. The treaty ob­ couutry’s delicate , political balance, ligation of the United States to as­ gravely adding to the Communist sist Thailand in ease of Communist pressures upon Thailand. In late armed attack, either direct or indi­ April, the scale of Commnnist irreg­ rect, was thus declared to be individ­ ular (Pslhet Lao) military activity ual as well as collective. in northeastern Laos increased. Large A month earlier, in February 1962, Pathet Loo forces moved southwest ..”. b * .,

US troops arrive in Thailand during the confrontation Robert F. Kennedy, during a visit toward the Mekong Valley, toward the to Bangkok, took the occasion to de­ Laos-Thai horder, in early May. clare publicly that the United States The United States, after joint US- “is dedicated to the security of Thai­ Thai consideration, received a formal land.” While there, the President’s request for assistance from the Thai brother had also pointedly conferred Government. Acting within the scope with the Thais on the growing Com­ of the Manila Treaty, the United* munist threat in Laos. Statea, therefore, sent ArmY and Ma­ The Thai-American commitment rine’ combat forces to reinforce Thai meant action in accordance with US troops in areas in Thailand near constitutional processes in the event the threatened border. Approximately of external aggression, and consulta­ 5,000 troops were eventually sent. tion in the event of subversion. It On 15 May 1962, President John meant that we would act in the event F. Kennedy publicly announced both of a Thai request for help regardless the deployment of our forces to Thai­ of the response of other countries. land, and the limited objective of this

Hwember1967 53 CONFRONTATION

deployment. He had ordered, he display of allied solidarity that this etated: crieis engendered did not produce a . . . a4kfiti0%td eleme?zte of the SEATO military command. Each of United States military forces, both the national contingents served under ground and air, to proceed to Thai­ its own commander under a specific land aud to remain there until fur­ invitation issued by the Thai Govern­ ther orders. These forcee are to hels) ment. Only strong necessity could have brought the Thais to admit euch military forcee to bases on their ter­ ritory. Military-Political Pyramids At the top of the local US military pyramid was the Military Aesietance Command Thailand (MAC Thai), headed by General Paul D. Harkins, who aleo commanded the Military As­ eietance Command Vietnam. Subordi­ nate to”him were the limited US unite preeent in combat roles and the ML itary Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Thailand. The MAAG re­ tained considerable independent ad­ ministrative authority, as well as pri­ mary responsibility for supply and training of the Thais. MAC Thai as­ US Arnw Phd.s sumed primary respofisibility for all Thai Rang,ers jump from a US Army operational mattere; it commanded aircraft during a training exercise in only US troops, bowever. August 1962 At the top of the local US political ineure the territorial e%tegm”tgof thie pyramid was the Ambassador. To co­ peaceful country. . . . ordinate the activitilee of thoee US This, deployment was preeented as agencies subordinate to him—mainly, a necessary response on the part of the Embasey, Agency for Interna­ the United Statee, an act wholly con­ tional Development, and the United sistent with both the letter and epirit States Information Service, and for of her international obligations. some purposes, tbe MAAG-the Am­ The SEATO council and the United bassador chaired the “Country Team: Nations were immediately informed a committee of senior representativsr of the US action. The next day, the from those agencies. SEATO council endorsed the deploy­ From MAC Thai the military linw ment. In a matter of days, token units of responsibility and authority ran from Australia, Great Britain, New back to the US Pacific Command in Zealand, r@ the Philippine were also Hawaii, and from there back to the on their way to Thailand to join the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Hark- United States. ins, as a major force commander, was Contrary to some expectations, the not subordinate to the local Ambassa-

54 MiliteryRevim CONFRONTATION dor. This was standard, current US The best managed victories are command and control procedure. It those won without actual fighting. was not teated. This simple, straightforward use of Surprisingly, our military deploy­ force provided such a victory. ment to Thailand brought only mild This waa, however, not the end. In Soviet and Chinese Communist pro­ 1963, we alerted the 7th Fleet and tests. Not long after the first US units staged war gamea in Thailand to landed at Udon ~hani, across the Me­ make clear our continued interest. kong from Laos, the Communist Thus twice balked, the Communists Pathet Lao advance toward Thailand turned to indirect aggression, Today, stopped. Withdrawal of some US the Thaie face a threat of insurgency forces soon began and by mid-Novem­ in the northeaet part of the country. ber 1962, all but the MAAG had left. The United States suppliee them with Thus, US forces this time simply equipment and aeeiete them in train­ by their presence and without com­ ing, at their request, in eupport of bat had helped to protect Thailand counterinsurgency operations. Our from Communist attack, helped pro. SEATO obligation continue. vide at least temporary local mifitary The Thailand deployment vindi­ stability, and aided in restoring the cated the baeic concepts underlying status quo ante. The United States SEATO and other such multilateral in helping to accomplish theee ends security organizations. They showed fulfilled her bilateral pledge of assist­ again that the power of the United ance to Thailand, proved her determi. Statee can, and will, be used effectively nation to support SEATO, and demon­ in such situations. strated to the world her willingness Throughout the confrontation, all to withdraw her military forces upon three Ievela of foreign policy objec­ attainment of her announced limited tive influenced our conduct. All three political objective. were important.

Send in your CHANGE OF ADDRESS To assure uninterrupted delivery of your Military Review, be sure to submit promptly both your old and new address, including Zip code-four weeke in advance, if possible. Addrese to Military Review Subscription Service, Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col­ lege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6602%’.

lbrembw1SS7 55 SovietVoIunte in the GermanArmy Vyacheslav P. Artemiev

56 SOVIET VOLUNTEERS

the Soviet Union serving in the Ger­ ROM the first days of the war between Germany and the Soviet man Army continued to grow. Union,F volunteers from among Soviet There were actually two divergent prisoners of war and from the civilian points of view within the German population in German-occupied terri­ High Command on the question of ue­ tory within the Soviet Union began ing Soviet citizens in the German te appear in the German Army. With Army, One group, the most avid be­ the paseage of time, the influx of theee lievers and followers of Adolf Hitler volunteers took on ever greater pro­ —such as Generals Wilhelm Keitel potilons; the desire of the people who and Alfred Jodl who belonged to Hit­ had formerly lived under the Soviet ler’s Supreme High Command—re­ regime to participate in the struggle jected categorically all arguments againet communism began to develop about the advantages of drawing So­ into a mass movement. viet people into the fight against com­ Unfortunately, however, the Nazi munism. regime had no desire to comprehend Voluntary Assistants the true motivee of its recent enemies Only later, under tbe force of cir­ and treated them with dktrust, re­ cumstances at the front and under garding almost every Soviet individ­ pressure from the growing intensity ual ae an adherent of communism. of the arguments of those who did Every effort was made by the Nazi advocate the use of theee Soviet cit­ leadership to hinder the formation of izene, wae Hitler obliged to make sev­ Soviet, anti-Bolshevik forces. eral concessions. He decided to use PoliticalElement Ignored former Soviet citizens in the active Relying only on force of arms and German ArrnY but only as auxiliary the suppoeed military superiority of forces—the so-called voluntary aeeist­ their troops, the Nazis ignored the ants (H2WI). political element in their war with the The opposing view was expressed Soviet Union. They completely under­ ‘ mainly by German officers serving in estimated the tremendous force which commande directly involved in opera­ they could have utilized if the people tions at the front. These officers cor­ of the Soviet Union had been allowed rectly concluded that the policies of to fight for their own liberation. De­ tbe Communiet regime were directed spite the ohetacle of official Nazi pol­ againet the interests of tbe people and icy, the number of volunteers from that the average Soviet individual Vyacheelav P. Artemiev is a free­ wanted a change. In addition, the offi; fance writer reeiding in Gevmany. A cers knew that large numbers of men former oficer in the Soviet Army, he were needed at the front. ie a graduate of the Soviet War COl­ To carry ont any program involv­ lege (Frunze Military Aeademu), and ing the use of former Soviet citizens hae written eztemively on the Soviet meant that a number of changes in armed forces. This article was tra?w­ policy wordd have to be made. The sit­ late&from the Russian by Major Mat­ thew J. Gately. Mr. Avtemiev km uation of the prisonere of war and been elected an Honorary Member in tbe workers from the east would have the Mark Twain Society for his out­ to be improved and a sharp altera­ standing contm”butionto literature. tion, ‘if not a complete rejection, of I November1967 57 the so-called “eastern policy” that was German combat commands eventually directed against the population in became infeasible since the more than the German occupied territories would 700,000 auxiliaries could not be main­ have to be carried out. tained with illegal or semi-illegal sup­ There were other opinions on the plies. It became necessary to legalize solution of the over-all problem, but the existing volunteer national troop they were limited to compromises and unite. half measures and were not supported In 1942, a Headquarters for the hy any of the higher authorities. General of the Eastern Forces was Despite the indecision, arguments, created, the title later being changed and contradictions which revolved to Headquarters of the Eastern Vol­

around the Soviet question, the mat­ unteer Forces. The first commander ter within the German Army was was the German General HeKmich taking its own cnurse. Taking advan­ who wae foKowed by General Ernst tage of Hitler’s sanction of the use of Kostring. former Soviet citizens as auxiliaries, Volunteer units, now legalized, were the frontline commands began to cre­ created along national lines. Although ate entire units composed of such peo­ no large separate units were allnwed, ple. These u “ts were armed, equipped, many separate battalions were cre­ and given ra% ons equivalent to those ated. Hitler ordered that all ethnic received by frontline German eoldiers. officers be removed from these bat­ The measures carried out by the talion and German officers put in

58 Military Review SOVIET VOLUNTEERS their place. Often, these German offi­ ian, and Belorussian units eerving the cers did not know the langpage of the Germans. These unite were located troope they were commanding and, in on Soviet territory only and were ir­ many casee, the German unit leadere regular organizations created from were noncommissioned officere. Train­ among the local population. They were ing was carried out according to Ger­ organized along territorial lines and man ArmY regulations and all com­ operated as separate battalions and mands were in German. regiments under their own command­ These units, representing many of ers. Their mission was to combat So­ the varioue nationality groups in the viet partkans and guard rail lines and Soviet Union, were to serve in the other installations. The Iargeat of German ArmY without any national these formations was the Kaminskli identification. Many of their former brigade which called itself the Rus­ officers, barred from command poei­ sian Liberation National Army. tions because of German mistrust, Brigade Composition served in these unitri es privates. The Kaminskii brigade was com­ Later, the German Army Command, posed mainly of peasants, many of against the orders of Hitler’s staff, whom had never served in the army began to use these former officers in and were, therefore, not well-trained. command positione. Even so, there There was also a lack of trained otfi­ were many Iimitationa and there was cers and many without military edu­ constant supervision and control by cation were assigned to command po­ the Germans. sitions. Former regular army officers CossackUnits were rarely found in this unit and The Cossack units were in a spe­ often junior officers were assigned as cial category. They were created as regimental commanders. Kaminskii large cavalry formations and their was not a professional soldier, but he commanders were, in many cases, organized a small detachment-which Cossack officers. Thus, in addition to later grew into a brigade-to fight the Coseack corps commanded by the against Soviet partisans. In 1944, he German General von Pannwitz, there was promoted to the rank of general, were units commanded by the Cossack but was killed shortly thereafter. Generals Domanov and Krasnov and None of the volunteer organizatione General Shteifon’s corps compoeed of had an independent organization, cen­ Cossack emigrees. tralized command, or a clear-cut chain Usually, however, eastern volunteer of command until the end of 1942.* units were assigned in an uncoordi­ It was only with the appearance of nated manner to German commande. General Vlaseov at that time that the General Hellmich and later General idea of a Russian Liberation Army or Kiistring were only formally the com­ a Russian liberation movement took manders of these units and concerned definite shape. It was Vlassov who themselves with the organization, re­ laid down the ideological hasis for the placement, and assignment of per­ struggle against communism and im­ sonnel. parted it to the many different na­ In addition to regular forces, there tionality units. were other types of Soviet, Ukrain­ It is difficult to determine whether

November1987 59 SOVIET VOLUNTEERS

Hitler knew exactly what was taking High Command for using the volun- ,, place in these volunteer national units, teer units forced Hitler to accept what either during the early argumente or already existed in fact. [ during subsequent events. Probably These uncoordinated forces, num. he did not. It is to be doubted that bering more than 700,000 men, could he would allow the generals to do not be called a Liberation Army, anything which . he himself was bowever. Actually, what existed were $ against or even to move realistically Soviets, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and ‘ in a situation which he did not want other nationality groups from the Se. I, viet Union who found tbemselvee $ serving in the German Army. Among these people conld be found a great desire to fight against the Commu. nist regime and liberate their borne. land. Vlassov constantly tried to cre. ; ate an organized form to the move- ; ment and dhwst it in a channel ap propriate to the wartime conditions which existed. , Propaganda Oevice The Germans used the name of Vlassov as a propaganda device de. signed to raise the morale of the German population and the German forces and to lower the morale of the Soviet troops at the front. V1assov [ himself had no direct relations wjth the HI WI, the national volunteer bat­ Lieutenant General Andrei A. V1assov talions, or the other formations ex­ cept an ideological call to action die- ; to recognize. In all probability much tated by the Germans. He was’ not ~ was hidden from him. In this case, able to influence the condition of the all tbe generals were acting in the personnel in the units nor the mili­ interests of the German Army, fight­ tary utilization of these units. The ing on the Eastern Front where the Germans often used his name to sup­ situation was becoming more and port measures which he opposed. more fluid and where there were hints There were cases when Vlassov found i of forthcoming setbacks which could out later that the Germans had used I be serious. his name to help carry out some pro. ; One can assume that Hitler, after gram. becoming aware of some of the de­ In 1944, for example, V1assov ob­ tails of what occurred, found it nec­ jected to the transfer of some volun-.~ essary to pretend that he did not teer battalions from the Eastern notilce anxl$hg seriously wrong. The Front to the defense of the Atlantic situation at the front and the rather Wall in the west. Under plausible pre strong reasons given him by tbe Army texts, he was isolated and given no

MilitaryReviN SOVIET VOLUNTEERS chance to communicate with these One of the main difficulties that units. At the same time, the Ge~ans confronted Vlassov lay in the fact that fabricated a meseage from Vlaesov to he was struggling against two ene­ the unite, calling on them to continue miee: communiem and nazism. It wae the fight in the west. In response to thie dual struggle which demanded nis proteet, the Nazi High Command from him ench exceptional persistence srdained that $he volunteer units and elasticity. Hie calculatilone about ware being transferred to the more the future guided all hk activities and guiet western theater to give them a he would constantly tell the Germans rest from the intenee actione on the that: Eastern Front. MZ,Icompatriot; will believe in ad follow me only if they see that I am “Eaatern Pslicy” General Vlaeeov was not able to in­ leading them into the battle against fluence the policiee of Germany and communism aloug the correct path, along that path which will lead to at­ the Nazie who, by doing what they considered neceeeary only for them­ taining the goals of my homekwzd awd selves and not calculating the Soviet its peopte. problem ae a whole, made mistake Msral SUpport after mietake. Vlassov and his fol­ Vlaseov, with the help of some of lowers realized that, among the mil­ the German generale, constantly in­ lions of priaoner-of-war workers from sisted on the creation of a united Lib­ the east, and the peoplee of the oc­ eration army of anti-Communists cupied areas, hope in the liberation formed into large units and under the movement and in the possibility to command of the Soviet . Vlassov’e fight againat the Bolshevik would be idea wae to use this arm J as a single lost if the policies continued. Theee unit and only on the Eastern Front. policies gave sufficient reaeons for ac­ In principle, thie idea was accepted cusing the liberation movement and and he was authorized to draw up Vlassov himself of acting only to the plans for the creation of such units advantage of Nazi Germany and not and to carry out preliminary work. for the peoples of the USSR. The final decision was to be made in Despite all previous failuree, Vlaa­ the future which meant that, for the sov continued to insist on a sharp time being, not much could be accom­ change in the German “eastern pol­ plished. icyfl maintaining that the implemen­ The German Army generale and tation of his demands were a neces­ officers were well disposed to Vlaeeov, * sary condition for success in the anti- his ideas, and his intention, and Communist struggle. He constantly tried “in every way to give him moral strove to better the condition of the support and hope for the future. This prisonere and the eaet workere and, good will on the part of the German in the face of numerous setbacke, he, generale implied that they did not nevertheless, hoped that eventually he want Vlassov to leave the liberation would be able to obtain some agree­ movement. Whenever someone would ments from the Germans. Thie hope put some obstacle in the path of the grew as he was able to get more con­ furthe? development of the move­ cessions from them. ment, Wassov would be told by thoee

Sefember1967 61 SOVIET VOLUNTEERS swwathetic to him that it was done of Russia were to be formed under” on orders from the Fiihrer’s head- the command of Lieutenant General quarters. Vlassov. I The situation became more and A military headquarters of KONR more desperate for Germany. At the was hurriedly created and the Chief front, the Germans were suffering one of Staff, the former Soviet Major defeat after another and the outcome General Trukhin, went to work orI~ of the war in favor of the Allies and a plan for the formation of the army, ~ the USSR was becoming evident. This plan, worked out jointly with the j After the attempt on Hitler’s life German command, proposed to corn.~

Ph.t@ .owvew of aufhof Officers’school of the Russian Liberation’Army at Dabendorf, near Berfin on 20 July 1944, Heinrich Himmler plete the formation of three firstline turned away from his intense resist­ rifle divisions by 1 February 1945, ance to the eolution of the Soviet with seven second-line rifle divisions problem and, finally, for the first time, —aviation, tank parachute, engineer, decided to meet with V1assov. The au­ signal, and other special and auxiliary dience lasted less than an hour, but units, including officer echookv—to Himmler gave his consent to the for­ foRow. In half a year’s time, Generol mation of a Committee for the Vlassov wae to have more than 100,­ Liberation of the People of Russia 000 personnel in hie command. (KONR). AR national committees AR volunteer national units eer% which had existed in Germany, for­ ing with the German Army were to ma]ly or ~ therwise, were to become become part of the Liberation Array part of ~ %NR and 10 divieions of a and they were to have their own offi­ co-called Armed Forces of the People cers. No German officers, with the 6x­

62 Miliiry Revisu SOVIET VOLUNTEERS J ception of liaison officers at division among the Soviet prieoners of war level, were to serve in the units. All and the volunteer units in the Ger­ sesignments and transfers of @erson­ man Army. The couree laated six 1:nel were to be carried out independ­ weeke and the officers were awarded ently by tbe various headquarters of the ranks which they had previously the Vlassov command. held in the Soviet Army. 1‘ Vlassov felt $hat all replacement At the beginning of tbe formation ~ ~er,onne, should be drawn from of the Liberation Army in November ~ among prieoners of war and Soviet 1944, thk school had graduated 12 . workers in the hands of the Germans claeses, each having about 350 men, and from those Soviet soldiers and so that there were approximately officers who might come over to the 4,500 officers of all ranke, up to lieu­ Liberation Army during the course tenant colonels, who were ostensibly t of battle. serving as propagandists. . Despite the time which had elapsed and the many miesed opportunities of Prop&wrda~paigm Accordi g to the agreement reached the past, this plan could have been with the Germans, the plan for the carried out even then. The utilization Liberation Army proposed that, when of tbe volunteer national units, which the formation of the first and second already existed withh the German line uni~s wae completed, the army, Army, would have provided the neces­ under Wassov’s command, would be sary number of personnel for the Lib­ sent to the Eastern Front for combat eration Army. In addition, the Ger­ duty. The introduction of the Liber­ mans held several million Soviet sol­ ation Army to combat against the diers and officers, including scores of Soviets wae to be preceded by a mas­ ~ Soviet generals, in prisoner-of-war eive propaganda campaign both at the camps. front and in the rear of the Soviet Anti.CommruristForce forces. This campaign was to be con­ Vfassov’s plans went considerably ducted, not as the previous German further, for he envisaged the crea­ propaganda efforts wh]ch only used : tion of a united anti-Communist force, the name of Vlaseov, but by the not only from among the peoples of KONR itself. ~ the USSR, but from among all the The final themes of the campaign 1 other Slavic peoples of eastern Eu- were to be appeals to the Soviet Army I~ rope, This force would be free of to cease defending the Communist re­ ~ Nazi control. gime and come over to the Liberation, The main source for officer replace­ Army to fight against communism. [ nlents was to be the Liberation News of the beginnings of a forma­ Army’s School for Propagandist tion of a Russian liberation army was ; which had been in existence since widely published in all Soviet, TJkrain­ 1942. The school wae located at! D8­ ian, Belorussian, and other national­ [~ bendorf, not far from Berlin, aqd to ity newspapers which existed in Ger­ it had come volunteers, mostly .offi­ many. Thie news quickly reached all cere, from among the prisoners of the volqnteer units in the German { war. The school’s official miesion was Army apTpenetrated intu the camps ~ to prepare propagandists for work of pri~oners of war where it served SOVIET VOLUNTEERS to raise the spirits of these previously at its height among many of the So. despondent people. viet people in Germany. They seemed Literally hundreds of thousands of to believe that, after the defeat of these people began to think about Germany, a war of liberation from joining the fight against communism communism would begin and that under their own national banners. they would he on t~ side of the Even those who previously had looked liberators. with skepticism at Vlassov and his From all parts of Germany, the efforts to get them to join the libera­ KONR rsceived requests for enroll. tion movement now responded to the ment in the ranke of the Liberation call, In the prisoner-of-war camps, Army. Mass voluntary contributions many officers and soldiers, who were to the fund to help Soviet citizens in formerly opposed to Vlassov because Germany began to pour in which of their jndgment that the liberation served to sbaw the changing attitud~ movement was based on the principles of the bulk of the people toward the of Nazi Germany and because of their liberation movement. In a short timq own antipathy to nazism, now reeval­ tbe fund was able to collect several uated their attitudes toward collabo. million marks which were used to hell ration with the Germans. The new the needy in the German camps. form of the liberation movement and Despite all this, the Germans con. the proposed scale which it would as­ tinued to put the brakes on the ac. sume led these thousands to strive ceptance of volunteers, would not al. for participation in it. low recruitment in the camps, and There were, as might be expected, kept the volunteer national unik many who continued to be against within the ranks of the German Vlassov and his platform. They had Army. The situation was strange and lived through many tortuous years contradictory. Finally, the creation of under the condition of the Nazi a Russian Liberation Army was lim­ prison camps and now, when they ited to only three divisions, of which could foresee the defeat of Germany one was never formed, while another and nazism, they did not want to remained in a conceptual stage until subject themselves to any further the end of tbe war. Ordy one division ordeals. was organized and ready for combat At this time, the Allied armies when the war ended. Thie was the 1st were moving forward with one suc­ Division under the command of Gen­ cessful campaign after another, but, eral Bunyachenko. It received the of­ paradoxically ae it might seem, the ficial German designation of the 600th appeal of the liberation movement was Infantry Division.

64 Military Revim I

. f’-% .(”-%

DOUHET REVISITED

WWiam D. Franklin

T HAS been said that General Giulio Douhet possessed the I most original mind that has, thus far, lent itself to the theory of airpower. In 1909, when the airplane had hardly demonstrated its capacity for sustained flight, Douhet, an obscure Italian artillery officer, had already grasped the full significance of the new machine as an advanced tool of aerial warfare. During his colorful, outspoken, early career, he was tried for criticizing existing military methods and spent a year in prison. His comprehensive philosophy of airpower, Ths Command of the Air, was published in 1921. Douhet viewed the essential character of war as being * formed by the tremendous use of mechanical means and by economic activity. War had become a clash of natione rather than of armies. Any decision would result only from intelli­ gent and economical use of one’s own resources, material and moral, and from utter exhaustion of the energies and re­ sources of the enemy. The new reality was the airplane. Its effect would be to revolutionize the nature of war. Territory behind the battle­ front could no longer be protected merely by successfully resisting enemy surface attacks. The aerial arm had the

Hl!smbw 1967 65 DOUHET

ability, through bombing, to “strike period that the wars in China, Ethi. directly at the resources of a nation opia, and Spain revealed the new role before these resources could be ap­ that airpower was beginning to play plied to military purposes. An air in armed conflict. Douhet’s strategic force could also be used extensively philosophy was an early influence for and effectively in operations on land such men as Brigadier General W]!. and sea, either for or against ground liam Mitchell and Major Alexander and naval forces. P. de Seversky in the United States, and corps commander V. V. Khripin Twofold. Philosophy in tbe Soviet Union. Douhet’s philosophy is twofold: what is the relevance of the Douhet e The nature of airpower requires theeis today in thermonuclear war? that command of the air be won hy What excerpts from his philosophy aggressive bombing action. apply to limited war conditions? How � The air force which achieves has his strategy fared in the jungle this command thereby insures victory. conflict of southeast Asia? The objective of war, according to Strategic Area Douhet’s strategy, has never been Tire keystone of present defeaee the destruction of the enemy’s mili­ strategy is still nuclear superiority ~tary forces. Their destruction or de­ at the level of strategic warfare. In feat is always simply one means to the strategic area, present nuclear attain the fundamental aim which is strike forces are composed primarily to conquer by compelling the enemy of manned bombers, intercontinental to submit to one’s will. If the aerial ballietic miseiles of the Strategic Air arm can create intolerable conditions, Command (SAC), and the ‘Navy’s the enemy nation must admit defeat. submarine-borne Pokzr% miesiles. As As Douhet saw it, organization for more missiles come into the inventory, national defense depends upon the the number of strategic bombers is precise nature of the warfare to be decreased. waged. He reasoned that, to ascertain It is doubtful that the mannsd the latter, one must coneider the bomber will be completely phased out teachings pf the past, look about one because of its unique capability to, in tbe present, and then give thought strike targets that are mobile or~ to the probabilities of the future. whose location is not precisely known Tbe period between 1920 and 1940 As antimissile defenses improve, strs. was what may be called the formative tegic bombers may have to serve es years of airpower. It was during this penetration aids for missiles by de stroying these defenses. This would~ William D. Frank16n is an Assistant be somewhat equivalent to Douhetk ~ Research Economist in the Depart­ thesis that the attacker must destroy ment of Economics, Tezas Transpor­ enemy aircraft on the ground at their tation Institute, Texas A&M Univer­ home base. sity, College Statfon, Texas. He hofds To provide defenses against 00? a B.S. degree in Historg! and Econom­ ics, and an M.S. in Economics. His bombers, potential aggressors would article, “Clausewi@ on Limited War-,” need to divert substantial resourcfe was the MILITARY REVIEW Award from their own offensive forces. AS Article for the June 1967 i-wue. demonstrated in South Vietnam, W

M Miliiry Barb &

DOUHET

arge strategic bombers can also be viva] through the elimination of the mt to good combat use in limited enemy rival. Douhet regretted ~t, but vars by carrying large payloads of he accepted the: conventional munitions to targets far . . . realitg that all the restr-ictiorw ~mmtheir home base and, as Douhet and all the international agreements ritualized, by destroying enemy air­ made ~during peacstime are fated to :raft on the gnound at their home be ewept away like dried leavee on )ases. the winds of war. Douhet placed an enormous pre- Douhet later modified his views on

TheB-52ie widely used in Vietnam for area bombing of guerrilla positione and facilities

mium upon’ hitting first and with the moral advisability of hie “first overwhelming power. He suggested etrike” philosophy in order for a coun­ that, whatever its aims, the side which try to secure a better position before decides to go to war should unleaeh world public opinion. all its aerial foices en masse against Douhet favored the bombing of pop­ the enemy nation the instant the deci­ ulation centers. Thie was the “Douhet , sion is made, without waiting to theory of frightfulness.” His attitude declare war formally. Thie is the was that the battlefield wae limited modern-day preemptive strike strat­ only by the boundaries of the natione egy advocated by numerous strate­ at war. The immediate aim of the gists, but considered by most to be aerial force must be to inflict the most morally unacceptable. possible material and moral damage He felt that air war by its very on the enemy in the least poseible O&tirehad to be concentrated and un­ time. To bend the enemy’s will, one restrained violence. Every war muet must put him in intolerable circum­ bs a general war. There could be no etrmcee; and the beet way to do that ineaningful objectives other than eur- ie to attack directly the defenseless

Utmltor 1967 61 I DOUHET populations of his cities and great indispensable aid to surface forces. industrial centers. Another airpower responsibility is He contended that there are no to destroy the- enemy’s industrial weapons divisible into noble and igno­ strength in order to disrupt the other ble kinds, only ignoble men who wage essential aepects of his national life, war. He also maintained’ that all Airpower is the ability to command means available are justifiable and the air so that land and sea forces that the only relevant point was their may exercise their power. effectiveness. The one dictum Douhet Douhet felt tha$ it may be impers- asserted as a “babic principle” was “Inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time.” lboughts Valid Today Bernard Brodie, author of Strategy in the Missile Age, points out that, by introducing the nuclear bomb, Douhet’a thoughts are-for any gen­ eral war—more valid today than they were during his lifetime or during World War II. This type of observa­ tion has erroneously led the general war school of strategy to use Douhet’s thesis ae a framework on which to build a thermonuclear philosophy of conflict. But it is unlikely that Douhet himeelf would have approved of this direction of thought. It seems that, were he alive now, he would counsel that hia ideas be considered solely in the light of our today and tomorrow and not of his yesterday. General Giulio Douhet Douhet had as his policy the terror of urban bombing and the use of toxic tive or preferable to cut hostile mili­ gas as a means to reduce the will of , tary lines of communication, to chatter the population and bring any conflict moral resistance by attacking special to a swift close. It is debatable targeta, or to follow some other ap­ whether the total annihilation of propriate course. He attached great thermonuclear war would satisfy his significance to something that is more criteria. than strategic surpria~intellectual Douhet saw that the use of swarm or technical surprise. is governed by the nature and scope Douhet did not deem the air arm of the war contemplated. The air arm the sole factor of victory: he viewed is decisive ae a deterrent to, and an the surface arms aa indispensable. The instrument of, general war; along essence of his doctrine was to resist with land and seapower, it is essential on the surface and to attack in the for the implementation of foreigu air. ,He favored strategic bombing policy; and in limited wars it ie an over tactical, and, on the tactical aid%

68 MilitsIyRevlss DOUHET he clearly favored interdiction targete down, or stopped completely until the such as those affecting supply, trans­ enemy is willing to negotiate a settle­ portation, or communications. ment. Interdiction operations include He tended to discount the tactical attacks on the sources, routee, and effectiveness of aircraft in favor of means of supply to impede the flow its use in strategic bombing. But he of reinforcements and material which recognized that, objectives vary con­ the guerrillas are receiving by way of siderably in war, and the choice de­ North Vietnam. pends chiefly upon the aim eought. In South Vietnam, Viet Cong posi­ The choice of objectives may, there­ tions and facilities are subjected to fore, be guided by a great many con­ area bombing by SAC B-5.ZS ,which sideratione—military, political, social, are effective tools in this unusual non­ and psychological-depending upon nuclear role. Tactical aircraft provide the conditions of the moment. close fire support to the ground A limited war of a nonnuclear type forces, conduct reconnaieeance, trans­ permits the expansion and mobiliza­ port supplies, escort convoys, and tion of industrial war potential for a perform a host of other tasks. country. Douhet, in his analysis, ob­ It is clear that modern theories of served that a nation has a definite airpower are of a neo-Douhet variety. sum total of material resources. In On one side of the coin, a modified organizing for national defense, it ztrategic bombing philosophy is em­ makes all or a part of these reeources braced, whereas tbe other side of the available for military purposes. The coin reveals a philosophy that placee resources so allotted must be used to airpower in tactical support of ground produce the greatest possible results. forces. Douhet is not simplified and It follows that these resources must taken neatly-only as an advocate of he divided among the land, sea, and strategic bombing—instead, modern air forces in such a way as to produce strategists retain the complex genius the greatest possible return from the of his tbeoriee, use them, and go be­ use of the armed forces as a whole. yond them to weave an acceptable Airpower has aseumed an expand­ theory to fit both a thermonuclear ing role in limited wars and wars of and a limited war framework. “national liberation.” The present fo­ This use of his work would not have cus is the struggle in South Vietnam. displeased Douhet. To his mind, the There, the Alr Force places greater changes he saw taking place around emphasis on tactical warfare. him in the methods of war changed In North Vietnam, both new and the basic character of war. “It iq traditional airpower features are em­ always dangerous: he said, “to keep ployed extensively. One purpose is to looking backward when marching for­ aPPIY Pressure in measured steps ward and still more so now when the which can be accelerated, slowed path is full of sharp detours.”

Nw8mber 1967 69 FORCE DE FRAPPE

Captain John A. Berry, Um”tedStates Arm#

cle are the author’s and are not nec­ essarily those of the Department of the Army, Department of De­ fense, or the US Army Comm&d and General Staff College.—Editor,

NE of the most important and o most criticized elements of French policy since the return to power of General Charles A. de Gaulle hae concerned ite nuclear policy and, more specifically, ite strike force, the force de frappe. The actual dscision for the construction of this force, up. on which all future nuclear policy wee baeed, wae not taken by De Gaulle, but by an adminietration of the Fonrtb Republic. Nonetheleee, it can be fairly stated that De Gaulle hae linked the force de frappe to the conduct of

Militsry Rwiff

A FORCE DE FRAPPE

French foreign policy in a manner ~ are expected to remain in service never intended by the original deci­ until 1971. sion nor in a manner deeired by hia The second generation—the IRBM principal allies. miseiles—will be installed in Haute- MilitaryComposition Provence by 1968, over an area of A look at tbe military composition J approximately 140 square milee. The of the force de ,frapsre permits a bet­ missilee are expected to remain opera­ ter evaluation of ite capabilities. Ae tional until 197s. There will be be­ conceived by General de Gaulle and tween 50 to 100 such “missiles which hie Defense Ministry, tbe French nu­ are two atage, eolid propellant, with clear force coneiete of three genera­ a range of 1,900 milee, and an atomic tions of delivery means with appro­ warhead to be replaced later by a priate nuclear bombs or warheads: thermonuclear warhsad. the Mirage IV ~ircraft, a grourid-to­ The third generation will consist ground intermediate-range ballistic of nuclear submarine, each to be missile ( IRBM), and a sea-to-ground equipped with 16 IRBM miesilee. mieeile of the Pofaris type fired from These missiles, with a range of 1,550 a nuclear submarine. milee, can reach any target in Euro­ The first of theee systems-the pean Rueaia from a position in the Mirage IV-consistc of over 60 air­ eastern Mediterranean or the North craft in active service. Theee aircraft Sea and will carry a warhead of have a maximum range of 1,550 milee eeveral megatons. Tbe first of the which can be extended to 3,000 miles submarines is expected to be in serv­ by midair refueling, thus permitting ice in 1969, the eecond in 1971, and a them to reach any target in European third in 1973. At least one, and oc­ Rueeia, but not to return to France casionally two, of these submarines upon completion. They carry a 60­ will always be in port for repairs or kiloton nuclear bomb for payload, provisions, thus reducing their ef­ equivalent to three or four times the fectiveness. strength of the Hiroshima bomb, and Rick Is Great which is capable of destroying any One may be tempted to conclude Soviet city if put on target. These that the French forces, equalling only aircraft are preeently the only deliv­ a’ minute fraction of those of the ery rqeane available to France and United States and tbe Soviet Union, Captain John A. Berry ie attending are too few in number ever to be an the Infantry o~er Career Course at effective deterrent. Although size is the US Armg Infantry School, Fort an important factor, it must be con-’ Banning, Georgia. From 1960 to sidered in the light of the purpose 1964, he eerved in company and bat­ of the force. France’s needs are con­ talion level positiorse with the 827th siderably less than those of the Big Airborne Infantry at Fort Campbell, Two and the relative size of her force Kentuckv, and the 18th Infantrg in is only a minor criterion of its evalua­ Berlin, Germany. He recently corn. tion. &ted two years of etudy at the Uni­ t’ereity of Bruseels, Belgium, ae an With the advent of atomic weap­ Ohrwted Schofar, for the Belgian one in 1945, and especially eince the Licence degree in Political and Dip­ diecovary of the hydrogen bomb, gen­ kmsatic Scienee. eral war haa become an almost un­

tivernber1SS7 71 FORCE OE FRAPPE thinkable means of settling disputes in a level of destruction to Soviet between nations. In the past, war cities and industries that the Soviet could he considered as an exteneion Government would not consider ac. of politics or ae an extremely effective ceptable, the deterrence is effective tool of foreign policy; the risk for and the fo~ce de frappe has ade­ the aggreesor was slight and the pos­ quately served the needs of France, sibility of gain was high. Today, this By convincing the USSR that sbe will theory is no longer valid. The risk is lose more than she could gain, France enormous and the possibility of gain has, with a minimum of deterrence, is slight, especially if it becomes secured herself from nuclear aggres. necessary to destroy the enemy before sion. conquering him. It muet be kept in mind, however, that the Soviet Union is capable of Deterrence Tkeory destroying France completely, using Military strategy has, as a conse­ quence, evolved and is now centered only a small percentage of her nuclear forces. The minimum of deterrence about the theory of deterrence: how theory ie applicable to France, not best to prevent the enemy from using his nuclear weapons, and often his only because of the relative ditYer­ conventional forces, to attain political ences between these countries, but objectives. By creating a nuclear also becauee there are other nuclear force of sufficient quality and quantity powers in the world more important to the Soviet Union. If these powers that the enemy is no longer willing to accept the destruction which thie did not exist, and if France were the only nuclear armed opponent of the force can inflict on him, a nation has Soviet Union, the importance of created its “deterrent.” In’ other France and her defeat would increase words, deterrence is psychological. accordingly in the eyes of the Se­ The enemy is rendered more satietied viets. France would then require a with the status quo than with a poten­ much larger and more powerful force tial politico-military victory which de frappe than the one which she can be obtained only at an unaccepta­ presently possesses. ble risk to his own national survival. In the case of France, only a lim­ Necessary Elements ited deterrent is necessary, and it Two elements are required to ren­ need only be defensive. How effective, der the theory of minimum deter­ then, is this military instrument, the rence credible. These are a material force de frappe, in deterring the So­ element and a psychological element. w Union from an attack on France? France, in order to apply the theory, 3 rance, in comp risen with the So­ must convince the Soviet Union she + viet Union, is a small country with is, in fact, capable of rendering an limited resources. Her conquest by unacceptable destruction, both by the the Soviets, although useful, would amount and by the quality of her nu­ not be initially necessary to the es­ clear weapons. It is questionable tablishment of world communism; whether the current or proposed gen­ neither does she harbor any aggres­ erations of the force de frappe are sive intentions toward the USSR. If capable of this destruction. Complete France can convince the Soviet Union proof of such an affirmation is not that any attack on France will result possible, but certain facts can be

72 MilitaryReview FORCE DE FRAPPE emphasized which have a direct bear­ IV’S to certain warning signals befor~ ing on the subject. an actual attack. This would greatly The Mirage IV’s are extremely vul­ augment the chances of accidental ~ nerabk+unprotected from Soviet at­ war and, at the same time, the tack because of their total exposure chances of nuclear destruction of to nuclear blast. Being vulnerable, France. and also being the only delivery means Even if all available aircraft could presently in possession of the French be sent against the USSR, it is not Government, they could be easily at all-certain how many of theee air-

destroyed by the Soviet Union in a craft would penetrate the Soviet air surprise attack without ever having defenses to reach their targets. The time to take off. Dispersal meaeures French Government claims a maxi­ over multiple airdelde would not mum of one-third while an American change this situation for a determined journalist, Joseph W. Alsop, claims enemy the size of the USSR. only two percent which would be one The few aircraft which might have aircraft. It is impossible for anyoie avoided destruction would create only to say with certainty what this figure a small threat to the Soviet Union, would be. providing, of course, that their order As for the IRBM’s in Haute-Pro­ to attack could be given and received vence, there is only a slight improve­ after the destruction by the Soviet ment in the matter of vulnerability attack. The only means for the French due to the concentration of these mis­ Government alone to deter effectively eilee in a relatively emall area. Be­ such a surprise attack would be to cause they will be placed underground automate the release of the Mirage and protected by concrete, their sur­

November1967 73 FORCE DE FRAPPE vival rate will be greater than that must design and conetruct a nuclear of tbe Mirage IV%, but not completely submarine, a missile capable of being assured. A determined enemy, espe­ fired from under water, and a thermo­ cially one with high-yield nuclear nuclear warhead. If the syetem can warheads, could saturate this emall be made operational, it does appear area with a cloud of nuclear missiles, that France will benefit from an ef. putting out of action at least the fective deterrent until approximately majority of the weapons installed. 1975-76. Whether she is financially and technically capable of building Penetration Capability the future fourth generation to her On the other hand, the penetration force de frappe at that time is a capability of these missiles is cer­ question impossible to answer for the tainly better than that of aircraft. present. This advantage will only last, how­ ever, until the day the USSR will Psychological Element -k have deployed an effective antimissile There is still another element re. missile system. At this point, tbe quired to render the theory of mini. relative vulnerability of the French mum deterrence credible to the So­ missiles and their inability to reach viets, a psychological element—the their targets will not provide France will to use the force de frappe. Any her minimnm of deterrence. attack by France on the USSR would The third generation—the nuclear result in total destruction of France. eubmarine-ean be considered a This is true whether France attacks highly satisfactory weapon system first in fear of a Soviet attack or for possibly the next decade+-invul­ whether she replies to a limited attack nerable because it ie entirely mobile, where only a portion of France was and capable of striking from any­ destroyed. where in the world. But for France, The French chief of state who re­ at least, it is not perfect. In 1973, leases the force de frappe would do eo near tbe end of this 10-year period, knowing full well that he was com­ she will have only three of these sub­ mitting euicide for his country. Why, marines. Tbe one normally in port is then, should the Soviets believe the as vulnerable to destruction ae a French if they threaten to use their Mirage IV. The other two must still fo$ce de frappe? In a bilateral situa­ receive the order to fire, always an tion concerning only a relatively weak uncertain factor if all of France is France and a very powerful USSR, destroyed in the initial attack. there is manifestly no reason for Furthermore, it is possible that be­ them to do so. tween 1967 and 1973 the Soviete will In reality, however, the nuclear have developed effective antisubma­ situation is not bilateral, but multi­ rine measures to detect and destroy lateral, with five different countries these submarines. There is aleo the possessing nnclear forces. One of question of the antimissile miseile these countries, the United States, is which would reduce greatly the ef­ capable of total nuclear deterrence of fectiveness of the French missiles. the Soviet Union, barring accident, And, finally, there is the problem mistake, or future unforeseen weak­ of realization of the entire system. ness. If France is not capable of even With her limited resonrces, France a minimum of deterrence, while the

74 Military Review FORCE DE FRAPPE

United States is capable of total Europeans is not, “Will they?” but deterrence, the logical solution for rather, “How will they ?“ Or, if tlexi­ France, for military reasona, is to hle response is the strategy, will the ally hereelf as closely as possible to USSR be tempted to take a small the United States, and thus to benefit nibble, on the calculation that the from her protection. gamble might work and weaken con­ The French insist that the United fidence in the United States, believing States may, .at some future date, that the US reaction will be limited decide not to rick nuclear ~estruction and nonnuclear ? to stop a Soviet aggression that in­ Neverthelese, in case of a full-scale volves only Europe, thereby leaving attack, US nuclear protection is com­

Europe at tbe mercy of the Commu­ plete. Inreply to the French, the nists. Stating it bluntly, the French United Statee insists that an inde­ ask why should the United States pendent nuclear deterrent which is sacrifice New York and Washington radically different in ita concept of for Paris and Berlin ? In fact, there nuclear strategy, and which is ap­ are excellent reasons for the United parently built in lack of faith in th~ States to protect Europe againet at­ US deterrent, will do nothing but tack. The security of the United erode the trust of the other membere States begins in Europe, If Europe of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi­ were de.qtr~yed or under soviet Oc­ zation in thie deterrent. Thie erosion cupation, the defeat of the United will weaken the capability of NATO States would be rapid and total. Other to deter the Soviet Union, and encour­ allies would dwindle away quickly, age aggreeeive adventurism and at­ fearing the same fate ae Europe. tempts to split the NATO alliance by The real question that disturbs the the Communists.

Wmlber 1s67 75 FORCE OE FRltPPE

Without attempting to pass judg­ for political and possibly military ment on either the United States or advantages ? Perhape this could be the French position, it is clear that, done, but it requires concessions from as long as the United States holds to both sides so that a new strategy can the principle of unity of command be adopted. Its principal advocate is -ene strategy, one center of decieion, General Andr6 Beaufre. It is not a in which all have faith—the force de perfect theory, but it seems to be a fnzppe can have nothing hut a detri­ clear improvement over the existing mental effect on the US deterrent. situation. Since it has already been indicated Weak Traits that France depends on US protection Itis necessary at the outset to for her defense, one cannot help hut recognize that the US strategy of wonder at the logic of the decision to flexible response does fiave certain build a force de frappe. weaknesses. By saying that each So­ Political Oecision viet aggression will be met with an “ It is at this point that most analy­ “appropriate” response, the United ses stop and inveigh against French States reduces correspondingly the nuclear policy. But the force de frappe risk to the Soviet Union of her in­ is a political decision. With it, Gen­ tended aggression. Instead of being eral de Gaulle intends to regain the faced with total nuclear destruction stature among the world powers for her action, the USSR would now which France lost in World War II only be faced with, at most, a slightly and the years following. He intends greater level of destruction than that to permit France to act independently she had caused. The risk being less, in her foreign policy, to act always she may be tempted to more adven­ in her own best interests, and not be turous activities involving only Iim­ tied to the decisione of othere. ited objectives. Although the United Although it maybe argued that the States would be certain to oppose this force de frappe does not actually aggression with conventions] forces, permit France this independence, Gen­ the aggression would have still taken eral de Gaulle thinke it does. For his place and would probably amount to eventual successor, it will probably be near-total destruction for tbe area of impossible to dispense with the force the world concerned. de frappe. The same political reason­ An additional weakness, not so ing may well inspire other countries much of the strategy as of the gen­ to undertake the came project in the eral nature of nuclear deterrence, is future. The independent nuclear de­ that it is extremely difficult for any terrent is a political fact of life which nuclear power to deter an enemy from must be accepted by tbe United States. an action which the enemy knows to Saying this, however, does not concern only the marginal interests change the difficulties in command of his opponent. While the defense of and strategy. Is there a way for the the United States and Europe may be United States and France to settle of vital interest to the United States, their differences; for the United the defense of other countries could States to maintain an effective deter­ be considered of only marginal inter­ rent against the Soviet Union and for est for which the United States would France to keep her force de frappe not risk nuclear destruction. Almost . 76 Mititary Reviw

I FORCE OE FRAPP the entire group of underdeveloped enemy will not and cannot use his countries may be considered in this nuclear weapone to prevent him. marginal interest area, and it is pre­ With the introduction of independ­ cisely in this region that the present ent nuclear forces, however, each struggle betwaen the Communist and side can no longer be certain the western camps is taking place. other will not fire first. The Soviet Any third nuclear power situated Union, faced now with three nuclear in one of theee marginal zones, or opponents—United States, United with a vital’ interest in its defense, Kingdom, and France-can never be could react to an aggression in a entirely sure that all three will refrain manner that would quickly draw the from using their forces in the case two main powers to the brink of full- of aggression. Here, then, is the in scale nuclear war. It immediately creased instability. The Soviet Union becomes of interest for one of these can no longer be assured of a nuclear two powere to tie the third power to stalemate. From fear that her action himself as an ally. Applying this on the conventional level may escalate principle to relations between France to the nuclear level, she will be de and the United States, there should terred more effectively, although no be a direct interest for the United necessarily totally. In effect, the force States to accept France, with her de frappe has added an increaeed force de fmzppe, into a close alliance. margin of doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders that any intended ag Francs’s Intsrests The logical question at this point gression will be eucceseful. is: What interests does France have Actual Significance that are not already vital to the One question still remains. Why United States ? First, if the Soviet would the United States, in spite o leaders ever doubted America’s vital the benefits she could obtain from interests in Europe, they could hardly close alliance ,with France, still risk doubt those of France in the earne her citiee and resources for anything region, or at a minimum, in central but a thoroughly vital interest? I Europe. France could never tolerate the risk of offering her protection fo Soviet aggression of any type in this nonvital interests could be reduced to area. an abeokrte minimum, the United An additional benefit to the United States may well find it acceptable. T States would reeult from the develop­ explain how this process could take ment of increased instability in the place, it is first necessary to examine nuclear situation. In a bilateral eitua­ the actual significance of the risk tion between the USSR and the In reality, tbe risk is that the ally United States, botb eides may reach will make a mistake, thereby involv a balance of nuclear forces so that ing his powerful partner in a nuclear each is assured that the other will not conflict against his wishee. The fac fire first if hie vital interests are not that the conflict would be a nuclear +h..fi. +,.”..,l T.. “.,-l...... ;,... +hc. Wu=aovneu. .“ lIuGIi a Dtwlal?l”’!, u.= one means that the mietake would i more aggressive country may turn to all likelihood be fatal. conventional warfare, where the So­ To eliminate the possibility of this viet Union has an advantage, to ac­ mistake, and thue the risk, there i complish his goals, knowing that his one completely natural solution: clos

Novemberlea7 7 FORCE DE FRAPPE 4 coordination of plans and strategies strongly emphasized. She must, if her on the military and political level, to force de frame is to remain at all be certain that each member of tbe credible, cooperate as closely as pos­ alliance understands completely the sible with the United States. Among chosen nuclear etrategy and how to other actions, she must always insure aPPIY it. The existence of modern, that sbe acte in the military domain ultrarapid communications will fa­ according to the strategy developed cilitate this process in the moments together with the United States and of crisis. During this process of close her other allies. It is only in this collaboration, the United States might manner that her force de frappe will have greater success in convincing not be dangerous for herself and the her allies of the correctness of the NATO alliance. strategy of flexible responee, espe­ Certainly, a change in present cially when she gives full guarantees French policy is required; neverthe­ of her nuclear protection against So­ less, the first move toward this end viet threats. muet come from “the United States. Close coordination does not imply De Gaulle’s proposal of a triumvirate unity of command. The French and of powers in 1958 to determine world. tbe British would still retain inde­ wide strategy indicates that he would pendent control of their nuclear at least consider the move. forces, but would subject these forces For those who think that France to a common strategy designed to could accomplish her principal goals serve the interests of all concerned. of security and independence within The risk for the United States would tbe framework of a unified Europe, he reduced to an absolute mini,mum. ignoring entirely the question of co­ Likewise, the United States would operation with the United States, it reduce the freedom of action of tbe must be answered that this is also a USSR and would increase the range poesible solution, although not as of her deterrent over this country by satisfactory as the one proposed. This the measure of the vital interests of new Europe, even with all its re. her allies. Finally, the other allies sourcee combined, would be subject would benefit from US protection and to the same dictatee of nuclear strat­ would establish a military raison egy and deterrence as ie France to­ d’&re for their nuclear forces. day. For an extended time after its Until this time, it has only been a creation, thie Europe would only be question of what the United States able to maintain an effective and non- should do. France, however, has re­ dangerous nuclear force in a close sponsibilities which cannot be too alliance with the United States.

18 Military Review A PREFACETOFORCEPLANNING

John F. Scott

HE land combat forces of a na- Land combat seems beset with many T tion’s armed services are unique more variables than are sea or air in that they operate in man’s “natural” warfare: people and their artifacts environment. We may guess that land get in the way; terrain is a complex, combat is the oldest mode of human ever-changing nightmare; and land conflict. It seems probable that water forces themselves are basically people vehicles came an appreciably long —and what could be more complex? time after man Iearried to move around It is not surprising, then, that of and to fight on the ground. Yet with the services, the ArmY is least able this long history, the problems of to present a neat picture of its needs land warfare still seem the most in- based, in part, on the compelling logic scrutable compared to their sea and of cost effectiveness analysis. air counterparts. The problem for those involved in This is not to say that military developing land combat forces or mak­ science exhibits a developmental gap ing choices among alternative forces in land warfare; rather, the implica- is to find a way to measure the etTec­ tion is that land warfare is harder tiveness of those forces. We may not to conceive, understand, and measure. , fu~ly agree that, “unless you can meas­ FORCE PLANNING ure it, you do not really understand was found by predecessors, that the it,” but we must agree that, unless the bread would develop molds of certain effectiveness of a land force can be varieties. If he covered the bread, the measured, we cannot subject it to results would be different. cost effectiveness analysis. This does For the objectivity necessary in an not mean that cost effectiveness is an experiment, then, events in nature end in itself. However, it is a positive must be duplicated, either on the part force in compelling military thinking of the observers witnessing one event, to produce “better” answers than or on the part of two or more observ. would be the case with less systematic ers, over a period of time, duplicat­ approaches to national security. ing tbe condition in nature to be ob­ How is it possible to be systematic served. about building or choosing among Factfinding Method land forces ? What can be borrowed The controlled experiment itself is from the lexicon of research tech­ a factfinding method requiring a con­ niques that would be applicable to our trol group ae a standard for compar­ purposes ? ison and a test group subjected to Objectivity some procedure whose effect one We might begin by noting that mil­ wishes to determine. This is difficult to itary science like social science deals set up in the real world of scientific with groups of people who cannot be investigation. Yet many people use studied by controlled experiments, on the “experimental” method quite often a large scale, in their natural environ­ without realizing it. They may not set ments. This is true both on a battle­ up an actual control group, but pre­ field and in an election campaign. sume a control or normal group “in Useful observation of such phenomena their minds” and subject a test group is possible, nevertheless, through ob­ to a particular procedure. jectivity. An example of this method is a pla­ If three observers were assigned to toon commander who suspects that study a politician’s speech, they could one of his men is an “unofficial” leader be told to record the number of times who is having an adverse effect on the the word “socialism” was used and platoon’s performance. This com­ they would probably come UP with mander is not a polished social-psy­ similar if not identical answers. Or, chologist: He cannot explain the dy­ a researcher could be instructed to namics of interpersonal relations. But leave some stale bread on a window­ he is given the liberty to remove bis sill, exposed to the air and dust of suspect and, when he does, he finds the laboratory, and he might find, as that the performance of the platoon improves. John F. Scott is an Operations Re­ The platoon commander would be search Specialist with the US Army justified in believing that the better Combat Development.$ Command In­ performance is in great part the re- stitute of Advanced Studies, Carlisle suit of his action. He does not know Barracke, Pennsylvania. Mr. Scott why, but he knows how the change holde a B.S. in Economics and Busi­ nees Administration from WiZkes Col­ came about-cme man was transferred. lege, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The control group in this experi-

80 MilitaryIleview is a poor leader and has removed only X+l, or X’; the real world has no the most vocal of his discontents. The such finite steps. The fact is that thfy morale problem will eventually reap­ take a hill faater and with fewer pear; the men are only temporarily losses, or set up a communications on guard against further disciplinary center rapidly, or do whatever it ia actions. But regardless of the root they were trained to do with greater canses, this example is a simple dem­ efficiency, initiative, and alacrity. onstration of an experimental method But what about a battalion, a bri­ to solve problems. gade, or a division? How can the per­ Assuming that the platoon’s im­ formance of such large collections of provement is long-term, we can be men and equipment, all inscrutably reasonably certain that the problem interacting, be measured? thvember1967 81 FORCE PLANNIN6

Using a division force as an ex­ Next, consider the eimulated war ample in a war game exercise, we see game. This may be manual or com­ it advance X miles against the Purple puter-assisted and such a game could, force. The game is played again with indeed, hold many values constant no everything the same except that for matter how many times it is played. one mechanized infantry battalion a But how can it be determined if tank battalion is substituted. This changes~ifferent outcomes—were time our division advances X+1O the result of substituting battalions or miles in the same time, against the of substituting commanders? The lat­ same Purple force. All other measure­ ter learn from experience and they are ments, such as casualties and tons of not the same “man” in the second petroleum, oils, and lubricants used, game that they were in the first, lit­ are assumed to be comparable except erally or figuratively. for that extra 10 miles. Can we con­ clude that the substitution of the tank Absence of Players Finally, consider a nonplayer battle battalion resulted in the additional simulation, fully computerized, for use miles ? It would seem so since nothing in the experimental method. The es­ else was changed. sential difference here, of course, is Additional Changes the absence of players. Command de. Yet other changes occurred. The cisions are preprogramed. This means division commanders learned from that when the force opposing Com­ their first war game; some learn more pany A is two to one stronger than readily than others. Perhaps a Purple Company A, the company will with. force armored personnel carrier had draw to a predetermined location. a broken axle in the eecond game and This total emulation lende itself blocked a road, rerouted a company or ideally to experiment. Suppose Blue two, or ruined a strategy. Undoubt­ Division I is played against Purple edly, such events occurred on both force and one of the results is that sides and they did not necessarily bal­ Blue I has captured 100“sqnare miles ance out. in Y time. Then B1ue Division II is An event cannot be repeated in real­ played against Purple force with all ity. NO two situations are the same. conditions the same except for the However, we can often approximate changes in Blue. This time, 80 square an event well enongh so that usef u] miles are captured in Y time. The conclusions can be drawn in compari­ difference in the ontcomes—20 square son-conclusions that have practical miles—must be the result of the applications in military science. change of divieions. The computer How can such comparisons be made was incapable of “learning” anything; between Army units so that we can there were no players. This is as arrive at the “best” units for a par­ close as it is possible to duplicate an ticular mission ? First, consider “live” event in nature. war games. As in the division exam­ Immediately, there are a great many ple, the game would be repeated, vary­ questions, mostly about the detaile of ing only certain inputs. Deducing re­ computer simulations. What is put sults from our changed inputs would into the machine to make it come up be, at best, a risky bnsiness. with meaningful military measure-

82 Militsry Review FORCE PLANNING

Intemati.m.l I?IL9

krrow what to do with all of that in­ are seen, shot at, hastily avoided, or formation. chased. The results of these actions This leads to modeling. Reality is are obtained even though we do rfot represented incompletely in a model, understand the dynamics of their in­ but for some applica&ons modeling terrelationships. Then, we can do has proved practical. For the simula­ nothing to allow for morale, training, tion of a battle, our model would rep­ and skN of commanders. These ele­ resent those factors found to be of ments must be left to professional mil­ such importance that we must abstract itary evaluation. Tbe military pro­ them from reality. Those factors fessional can concentrate on these in­ omitted are not disregarded; they are tangibles and other considerations either presumed to be reflected in the that, cannot be put “in tbe machine.”

November1967 83 — FORCE PLANNING

This is a top feature of good modeling effective divisions or best combination and good simulations—the user is free of divisions at that budget level. to tackle only the difficult problems; However, in either case, the mili­ the detail, the smaller problems that tary planner will have to decide bor­ tend to clutter hls mind are handled derline eases based on his judgment. mechanically. The intangibles—morale, training, It follows that if good models of and tbe like-would enter into the battles, good simulations, and good final choices. This means that no fore­ forms of output can be developed on seeable models, simulations, and meth­ which the planner can rely, we shall ods used to measure combat effective­ he coming as close as possible to a ness will be precise enough to relieve practical experimental method for the force planner from his responsi­ building better land combat forces, bility to make hard choices. and for pntting to the best use the In a world where technology ad­ forces already built. vances faster than our comprehension A further step is the use of the re­ of it, it is not enough to suggest a sults of simulations in cost effective­ concordance of frame of mind, tech­ ness analysis. Repeated simulations nique, and computer. It is more real­ of alternative Blue Division mixes istic to add the proper connotations against most probable enemy land to this recipe. What is suggested is a force threats would yield the most blending of dispassionate science, hon­ “effective” Blue Divisions. Where two est intuition, and instruments which or more divisions are comparable in master speed and accuracy to produce effectiveness, the least cost division the information necessary to make would become the logical choice. Or, the best possible military choices, and where a given budget is the bench­ which result in the most effective end mark, simulations could yield the most product—better military forces.

WE READ THEM ALL but . . . When submitting manuscripts for consideration, please send the original and one carbon, typed double-spaced, on one side of paper only. Pictures, charts, or illustrations (or just the ideas) always enhance the attractiveness and clarity of a manuscript. The Military Review accords manuscripts normal care, courteous consideration, and a prompt reply to the author.

84 Military Review LIVING Wmf NUCLEAR P#?OLIFEl?A~iOIU Squadron Leader D. C. Mazlin, Regal Australian Air Force

as an instrument of destruction against mankind, leading nations of the world are discussing the subject of nuclear proliferation se -s matter of priority. The coming of age of nu­ f clear weapons and the urgency of cur- rent negotiations on proliferation are not“’’’’’:’ merely coincidental. Never before ) has a nation had the ability to destroy most of the civilized. world by a single act, and national leaders are justifi­

Mvember1967 85 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

During this first generation, the in tbe ramifications of nuclear prolif­ nuclear family has grown from one eration. member to five. At first, the balance Most natione are currently pro. of power favored the West, but, as claiming support for a nonprolifera­ this has grown into a ‘“balance of ter­ tion agreement. This is reflected by ror” with vast numbers of enormously a recent United Nations resolution on powerful warheads entering the ar­ the subject which was passed by 93 senals of both world factions, an un­ votes to none, However, there is easy stability has developed. These often a wide margin between public last few years of adolescent develop­ pronouncements on, and secret activi­ ment have introduced an era when the ties in, a nation’s nuclear development. probability of general war bas been ‘IMs charge of hypocrisy can be lev­ reduced, mainly because wise and so­ eled at practically all of the nuclear ber judgment has prevailed in the powers, and there is no reason to be­ main power blocs. lieve that potential nuclear powers will act differently. Different Schools of Thought But as the second generation of the Incentives uuclear age is being conceived, people An assessment of the probability of in all nations are wondering what will proliferation depends primarily on happen next. The pessimists quickly the incentives to acquire nuclear sta­ point out that nuclear proliferation is tus. Perhaps the greatest incentive is the greatest potential danger that the the preetige afforded to nuclear pow­ world faces, and, unless it is stopped, ers. After all, the United Kingdom mankind is doomed. would almost certainly have lost her The optimists point to the increase position of eminence in world coun­ of the nuclear nation family and ex­ cile if she had not been a nuclear plain that, as this has only helped to power when the Britieh Empire dis­ st.abilize the power struggle, there is integrated. Neither would France bs no reason to expect a deterioration of commanding the notilce she does today conditions if more nuclear nations are without an independent nuclear capa­ born. Somewhere between the two bility. groups are those who will not accept For some countries, preetige maybe either simple philosophy, but who, merely a secondary consideration. The nevertheless,., have a genuine interest main incentive could be either a gen­ uine desire for the protection that Thi8 article wa8 digeeted from nuclear weapons can give or an abil­ the original, published in the ity to coerce a nonnuclear neighbor AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL, into making political conceeeions. March 1967. Crown Copyright Reeerved. Even those natione closely aligned Squadron Leader Mazlin at­ with either of the superpowers can tended the Royal Australian Air rationalize the acquisition of a nu­ Force Staf7 C’oUege in Fairbaira clear capability ?s a means to an in-, in 1966, and thie article won the dependent foreign policy or as a nat­ E. L. Heymamwn Award for the ural part of the evolution of tech­ beet eeeay written by a student nology. at the coUege that year. On the debit side, there are dieia-

Military BEVim NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION centives such as costs and the avail­ ment on nonproliferation among the ability of fissionable materials. Quite five nuclear powers appears to range apart from the financial cost, there from a strong affirmative by the is the price of diverting technical re­ United Kingdom to a vehement nega­ sources from national development. tive by China, with the United States, Furthermore, there is the problem of the Soviet Union, and France posi­ testing weapons if the expense of un­ tioned somewhere in between. If China derground teats is to be avoided aid is disregarded, the main obstacle to a country does not want to incur the consensus on nondiesemination ap­

odium of the rest of the world. This pears to be the US desire to salvage problem need not be significant if the North Atlantic Treaty Organiria­ a potential nuclear power is prepared tion by allowing some form of nuclear to develop weapone without testing sharing within the alliance. them. Political disincentives would be However, apart from this, there are the loss of stature a nation would face serious doubts that a nondissemina­ from nonnuclear conntries and the in­ tion agreement would prevent prolif­ ternal political environment. eration. At this time, potential nuclear na­ The real problem is to induce non­ tions must be assessing the possible nuclear powera to refrain from devel­ effects of current nonproliferation dis­ oping nuclear weapons and, if neces­ cussions. Enthusiasm for an agree- eary, to prevent them from acquiring

Rnwnbnr 1967“ 87 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION the weapons, Various I suggestions category, there is a high probability have been made about nuclear guar­ of prolif eration during this second nu­ antees by the great powers, and there clear generation. is a elight possibility that guarantees Neither the United Statea nor the could be effective for countries aligned Soviet Union could be expected to re­ with either blue. main idle while a nuclear arms buildup But the nonaligned countries such occurred in the rest of the world. Tbe as India, Israel, and Sweden would search for an effective defense sys­ need a joint United States-Soviet tem will continue, and space vehicles guarantee, and even the most opti­ may introduce new strategic pbiloeo­ mistic observer would have trouble phies, Owing to this, and the limited visualizing this while the United economic strength of China, the Chi­ States is involved in Vietnam and the nese nuclear capahility will probably Communists seek world domination. remain substantially less than that Communist China, who appears to be of either superpower. Nevertheless, at variance with both the Soviet Union China may well rank as the third most and the United States, will eventually important world nnclear power. have a profound effect on joint nu­ General War Risk clear guarantees. An agreement in­ Under these circumstances, the pos­ cluding China seeme impossible. sibility of general war as a deliberate Other Options act of policy will probably not be much Apart from the nuclear guarantee higher than it is at present. There proposal, other options are available will be a continuing risk of general to the superpowers to counter the war through accident or miscalcula­ epread of nuclear weapons. The most tion, but even this should be mini­ commonly debated is the proposal mized by the improved detection and for control of fissionable materials control techniques that must follow through an international agency. A1­ future advances in technology. though this may inhibit countries that The argument that a small nuclear have no independent supplies of ma­ power could provoke general war with terial, other prospective nuclear pow­ a nuclear attack on one or both super­ ers could evade this obstacle if they powers ignores the basic human in­ so desired. stinct of self-preservation in the small Potential nuclear countries aligned nation. It presupposes an instinctive, with either the United States or the almoat irresponsible retaliation from Soviet Union might decide not to de­ the superpowers. Therefore, in all velop nuclear weapons in the immedi­ probability, general war will remain ate future. This decision would rest on the prerogative of the superpowers. the faith they have in existing alli­ Nuclear proliferation could restrict ancee. However, the nonaligned na­ the optiona available to a major power tions who see themselves threatened in limited war. Therefore, the spread by either a nuclear or a etrong non­ of nuclear weapons may help to keep nuclear neighhor may well decide on a limited wars in perspective. Paradox­ nuclear weapons developmental pro­ ical though it may seem, nuclear pro­ gram. Since at least three potential liferation could have the opposite ef­ nnclear powere can be classified in thie fect in limited wars between smaller

88 MilitsryReview NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION uowere when one adverearv believes practically every country behind the It hae a temporrmy nuclear advantage Iron Curtain will be a potential nu­ over the other. clear power. Even though none of The effects of nuclear proliferation them has the capacity for nuclear on the cold war are difficult to predict. greatness, Soviet policy on prolifera. Of the factors affecting the cold war, tion will he affected. The country that the fragmentation of today’a alli­ could have the greatest impact on ances could be the meet important. power in Europe is West Germany NATO ie trying to close ranks after because ehe, like Japan, has great eco­ the withdrawal of France. However, nomic and technical potential. even greater strains could be placed Provide Impetus on the organization when the treaty These changes in the power balance is renegotiated in 1969 because at throughout the world, coupled with the least four members of NATO-Italy, prospective realignment of nations, West Germany, Belgium, and the could provide the impetus now lacklng Netherlands-are credited with the in nonproliferation negotiation. The capability of becoming second-genera­ present obstacles to agreement could tion nuclear powers. On the other side be relatively insignificant when one of the Iron Curtain, but, perhaps, at considers the prospecte of 10 to 20 a later date, the Warsaw Pact may nuclear powers grouped in a number be affected. Among the Soviet satel­ of alliances with different policies. lites, at least Czechosloval@ is a po. Perhaps individually tfley could not tential nuclear power today. threaten a superpower but collec­ Third tieneratien tively they would constitute a siza­ If more nations join the nuclear ble threat. Potential trouble spots family during this second generation, would aeeume a greater significance. what will happen during the third Some form of agreement, if not on’ generation ? The key probably lies disarmament then at leaet on arms with Communist China. While Mao control, should be possible. Tse.tung and hie proteges espouse In thie environment, the third nu­ power “out of the barrel of a gun” clear generation is not likely to pro­ and “wars of liberation,” the outlook duce an effueion of nuclear powers is bleak. But recent evente in China from the developing, small nations of suggeet that opposition elements have the world. The cost of producing war­ emerged, and, although they have been heads and delivery systems effective suppressed, perhaps for several years, against improving defenses will prqb­ they may eventually gain some influ­ ably remain a prohibiting fac~or. Poe­ ence. Meanwhile, Vietnam prevents a sibly one or two of these nations will diterzte between the Soviet Union and acquire a modest nuclear capability, the United States, and both India and but, with perhaps four or five centers Japan ponder over the complexities of power in the world, one small angry that an independent nuclear capability nation ie not likely to have much in­ would introduce. fluence on world peace. Europe could aleo have a changed Thus, there is a strong possibility balance of power at the beginning of that more nations will acquire a nu­ the third nuclear generation. By then, cleai capability during the second gen­

Nwember1967 8e NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION , eration. There will be an increased could create at least two more centers element of danger, but the most sig­ of power. But this diversification may nificant effects will be the disintegra­ provide the various intermediate tion of some existing alliances and ideologies and alignments that are the increased probability of nuclear lacking in present bipolar politics. In weapons being used in limited wars such an atmosphere, some Khd of between small nations. agreement to control arms maybe pos­ China’s attitude during the second sible. Consequently, the third nnclear generation will have a tremendous in­ generation, which may introduce one fluence on the world balance of power. or two small rebel nations into the Her failure to establish some rap­ nuclear family, could be much less prochement with the rest of the world significant than tbe second.

Nuclear weapons have made, for the first time, the destruction of the societies of Western Civilization a physical possibility. This means that in dealing with the control of nuclear weapons we are dealing with the gravest topic with which any of us can deal—survival.

Assistant Secretarg of Def enee John T. McNaughton (International Security Affairs)

Why Review Lfentemmt Colonel RMsrd E. Mae& VruYsd $?tates Armu

NITED States forces, allied ferred form, although a guest nation Uwith the Vietnamese and othere, cast as an agent can be effective, will become increasingly involved in Military action initially can take the “revolutionary development” proc­ any form from a helibome strike to ess, Revolutionary development is the a ship-to-chore assault. The introduc­ name used by the government of Vie& tion of combat powdr and authority nam and sometimes referred to as providea for conditions under which pacification-the vehicle that provides constructive changes may take place. for the internal defenses in Vietnam. When the area is vacated following a For thie reason, our forces and agen­ search and destroy operation, author­ ciee muet give heed to methods that “ity ie relinquished to the Vlet Cong are compatible to the accomplishment and the opportunity for progress lost. of the directive, “Hold and pacify !“ Military operations have always Differences in conditions from one focueed on objectives that achieve a,n Iwale to another preclude one cpntral advantage over tbe adversary. The plan for a country even aa small as holding action ie no different in this Vietnam—with one exception. ‘ That respect, except for the nature of the exception is the point of departure for objective. The mountain, the rail line, all pacification plans—military action. the road junction, and the enemy him­ This action has a twofold purpose self are not the only objectives. In —to prevent Viet Cong interference addition, another must always be con­ and to provide a meaningful link be­ sidered—the people, who have become tween the government and its people. the critical goal in this strug~le. The National military action is tbe pre­ objective, therefore, must include the

Hlrcmlmr1587 91 HOLO AND PACIFY

include Three complete districts, hut communications with the local people. should not include fractions of other This is the most effective means by districts. Governmental boundaries which the progress of change may be should become military boundaries as assessed. The loudspeaker, radio, aud well in pacification. leaflet can only support the story car­ While the brigade provides for the ried by the man. These modes are not destruction of enemy military and po­ capable of meaningful assessments.. litical control and resources, it also The holding action thus should be has to be prepared to assist in the conducted over an indefinite period replacement of these with the host of time guided by the recognizable government’s structures. The STAR change that takes place in all other

92 MilitaryReview HOLD ANO PACIFY aspects of pacification. The barbed small-unit operations will establish wire entanglement around a hamlet is continuous contact with the Viet an interim security measure. Real Cong, discover their caches, prevent achievement is not made until tbe wire their movement and assembly, and is supplemented by a “people fence” whose constant vigilance and sense of pride becomes the prime fortification. Tbe STAR would be organized into battalion areas of responsibility (BAR’s), and might maintain the PO- Iitical integrity at village level. No attempt should be made to divide the brigade area into three equal parte. There are areas where only the bri­ gade would have responsibility; how­ ever, these areas will eventually come under the influence of tbe holding ac­ tion. Key to Succsss The key to success in a holding op­ eration is the organization of com­ pany areas of responsibility (CAR’s) within the BAR’s. The company areas Jk@?/rd do not indicate a trace of a perimeter * DISTRICTHSADIIUARTERS defense, but rather an area in which @ VILLAGEHEADIIUARTERS offensive patrolling will take place (Figure 1). --- OISTRICT BOUNOARY Patrols range in all directions forti­ –o—VILLAGE BOUNOARY

fied by ambushes and raids. Well- ‘MILITARY ASEA OF RISPONSIBIIITV planned night operations must be used to the maximum extent possible. These Figure 1. Political integrity maintained at brigade and bsttrdion leveIa but not at Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Mack company. Small patrols range throughout is the Array re~esentative an the staff company areae of responsibility in all of the Commander of the Amphibious directiana and are relocated every two to Training Command, US Naval Awc­ five days. phibiona Base, Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. He holds a B.S. in Mathe­ influence tbe morale of the gove#rr­ matics from Kent State University in mental officials and population. Ohio, and is a graduate of the US Frequently, every two to five daye, Army Command and General Staff the CAR’s should be relocated within College. He eerved in Europe during the BAR in order to extend the influ­ World War II and with the Ist Cav­ ence of the battalion and to avoid alry Division dum’ng ths Korean Con­ flict. Other assignments include serv­ pattern formation that would be rec­ ice with the rTth Infant~ in Berlin, ognizable to the Viet Cong. The fre­ and as GS Advieor to the Zd Vietnam­ quency will be determined by the bat­ ese Infantry Division in Vietnam. talioh commander based on his knowl­

Nweinher1967 e3 HOLD ANO PACIFY edge of the enemy, weather, terrain, Ae the units in the STAR are given and the status of the pacification eit­ new areas, the STAR eventually will uation within the BAR. become saturated with patrole. The S1OW1Y,the knowledge of the enemy Viet Cong will lose the capability to and the area will increase until coun­ assemble a large force and his ability terinsurgency units become the domi­ to hit a constantly moving target will be reduced (Figure 2). Contingencies will exist which re­ quire the employment of unite in ex­ ploitation, reinforcement, and coun­ terattacking rolee. A “string” may be attached to designated battalions at division level or to a portion of a battalion within a brigade for these purposes without overly restricting the use of the units from holding op­ eration. Quick Assembly One battalion in a brigade may have to retain the capability of assembling in one or two hours. This will be a matter of locating its BAR in an ares that affords quick assembly. The bri­ gade commander may alao designate lq.wd one or two companiee to support his contingency plane. * DISTRICT HW!WARTERS The time factors for holding ac­ @ VILLAGE HFAOOUARTERS tions cannot be stated in definite --- DISTRICT BOUNOARY terms. When the STAR has been paci­ -— VILUCE BOUNO~y fied to the extent that it can be turned — MILITI!RYAREA OF REWUNSIBILITV over to the host government’s officials with reasonable assurance that their Figu#e 2. The subtactical area of re. paramilitary and police forces can sponsibllity becomes sstursted with pa. maintain order, then the regular trols and tbe insurgent loses his suppert forces will have accomplished their and ability to concentrate mission. nant force in the STAR. Their su­ The effect that holding actions have perior firepower and mobility will per­ on the efficiency of personnel must be mit them to export their capabilities recognized. While troops can adapt to throughout the area, when and where the weather and terrain and other they choose. environmental factors, boredom cou­ Periodically, the BAR’s muet be re­ pled with these can lower the effec~ located to exploit areas not included tiveness of units employed in holding within any BAR, to prevent the for­ actions. Allowing troopa to see the re­ mation of enemy sanctuaries, or to sults of their efforts-enemy weap­ extend pacification efforts. ens, , documents, suppliee, prieoners w Military Review HOLO ANO PACIFY

—is a stimulant that keeps morale these teams are familiar with the and esprit high. Recognition and problems and have a close working re­ awards in the battle area instead of lationship with district officials. at the next post are effective incen­ There is no established solution to tives. I.seal reet and recreation areas determine the amount of effort that might be established withh the STAR. must be apportioned to holding opera­ Regardless of the methods used to tions and to the other aspects of paci­ prevent boredom, leadership at all lev­ fication except to repeat that security els must accurately identify its symp­ of the area ie mandatory. toms and deeign a cure. There will be other agencies in the The commanders of STAR’s and STAR besides military ufiits. The BAR’s would have both military and United States Operations Mission, political responeibilities. Divisions United Statee Information Agency, would need augmentation by US and and a multitude of hoet and guest Vietnamese personnel who have had organizations will be operating. Over­ experience in the provinces in all of all euccess withh the STAR will he the fecete of pacification. Brigade and dependent upon understanding, coor­ battalion teame could provide for the dinated efforts, and the reeult of these qussi-military government functions which is mutual support. The onus is that these units would have in their on the military commander to pro­ areas. A team at battalion level would vide for this through his authority. then become the primary meane that There is no easy solution to the the hatttdion commander would use pacification probleme. The commander in effecting those aspects of pacifica­ of a STAR may feel that he is as much tion for which he was responsible. The an acting governor as he is a brigade teem would be organized for the par­ commander. The battalion commander ticular environment and requirements may find himself being called the within the BAR. eheriff in his BAR and hle company Wlthi~ the BAR, there would be commanders may perform some duties subsector advieory teame at district not unlike those of a deputy sheriffe. level. A ~close working relationship But the fact remains that the war is must be established between the bat­ not going to be won until we hold and talion and the subsector teams since pacify.

.

Ibvmber 1S67 95 .,1. ,.-.,,._“.”,..,_.3T-,.T,--:___MJLITARY ‘. ...’..’...!,,.!$?kliw%w:.i.g&~as NOTES

UNITED STATES “Most Wanted” Warrant Officer list Sound Experiments in Ionosphere The Army is continuing its efforts Recent experiments by Air Force to fill critical shortages in its warrant scientists have proved that satellites officer structure. The latest procure­ between ionospheric layers can “talk” ment circular notes shortages in to each other unaided by relay sta­ 35 military occupational specialties tions, even when they are on opposite (MOS’S), of which nine skills are sides of the earth. currently “most wanted.” High frequency and very high fre­ Heading the list of critical short­ quency radio signals were sent be­ ages are helicopter pilots and small tween “transmitter and receiver satel­ boat operators. lites launched into orbit by the Ab To meet shortages, the Army has Force from Cape Kennedy, Florida, modified its procurement program so in November 1966. Most signal trans­ that Reserve warrant officers holding missions occurred between 140 and any MOS on the list may apply for 180 miles’ altitude. The receiver then active duty, and enlisted personnel sent data from its twin satellite to who possess required qualifications six ground-tracking statione via a may apply for appointment as war­ telemetry system. The signals were rant officer W.-1, with concurrent call extremely etrong. to active duty. The theory behind the experiment The circular also authorizes retired held that the ionosphere is like a warrant officers to apply for active “whispering gallery” in which sound duty and provides for granting waiv­ waves travel along a curved area with ers on maximum age and service Iirn low loss of volume. On earth, the itations. No one over age 35 is eligi­ phenomenon is experienced in large ble without a waiver. domed structures like the Nation’s The standards have been cut and Capitol building where soft sounds application processing procedures can be heard across the room. streamlined to fill as many skills as The theory was first proved in 1962, possible. using a mathematical model of the Normally, only those applicants who ionosphere on a digital computer.— have scored 110 or better on the GT US Air Force release. (general technical aptitude area) test are considered. Applications of ArmY Cannm”d mid General Stm7 CON,=; as: men obtaining scores as low as 105 BIIme no reswmeibllitr f., ..CQIIICY of $nf.r­ nmtio” mntaimd in the MILITARYNOTES are now being considered for men in eutio” of this Dublkatim. Item are @ntcd 8s a service m the readers. N. .5.1.1 e.. the nine most needed skills.—DOIl dormmnt of the views, minions. m f.ctml statements in intended.—Tbe Editor. release. r

96 MilitaryRsview MILITARY NOTES

‘Marginal Terrain Vebicla XM759’

US Amv A newly developed ilfargind Terrain Vehicle (MZ’V) ie being evaluated by the Army for the Marine Corps. Preliminary reports say that tbe vehicle hae proved to be one of the most effective logistic troop carriere of its type ever tested. The pilot models, designated the XM759, are amphibious and em­ ploy the air-roll prtrwiple for botb land and water locomotion (MR. Jul 196’7, p 103) .—US Army release. , Reservists The Deputy Secretary of Defenee years of active duty and the balance signed the following memorandum to of their service obligation in the the Secretaries of the military depart- Navat Reserve. ments on 26 June 1967: Nothing in the forego{ng policy pre- Effective immediately, Reservists cludes the voluntary assignment of with a remaining military obligation, such obligated pereonnel to Reser’ve who have completed two or more gears units, nor does it preclude their invql­ of active militarp service, witl not be untary use with units of the Ready inookmtarily ass{gned to Ready Re- Reserve for annual active duty for serve units for drill parposes unless, training of approximately two weeks after diligent recruitment effort, it is duration. determined that a vacancv cannot otherwise be filled. In no evettt shalt a Personnel currently assigned in- man who has served in Vietnam be voluntarily to units contrary to the invotuntaril~ assigned. above policy will be veleased from This poli~ excludes thoee Naval such .aesignm ent as soon as practica- Reservists who enlist in the Reserves ble, but not later than December 1, under an agreement to serve two 1967.—DOD release.

November1967 97 MILITARY NOTES

General Orders The Army dropped. the 11 general anything not covered in my instruc. orders for guards on 1 August and tions, to the commander of the relief.” substituted the following three: The revised general orders are part No. 1—”1 will gnard everything of a new concept of Army-wide guard within the Iimite of my post and quit duty, both onpost (interior) and off- my poet only when properly relieved.” post (exterior), as stated in Depart- No. 2-”1 will obey my special or- ment of the Army Field Manual 22-6. ders and psrform all my duties in a The new manual, called Guard flut~, military manner.” replaces Field Manual 26-5, cslled No. 3—”1 will report violations of Interior Guard Dutv.—Army News my special orders, emergencies, and Features. ‘Will Rogers’ Fires ‘Polaris’

Gewmd Dumwnia New.

The fleet ballistic missile (FBM) Forty FBM submarines, each carry­ submarine USS Wilt Rogers has suc­ ing 16 Polari8 missiles, have deployed cessfully fired its first Po&is missile. on operational patrol. The Will Rog­ With the launch, alI 41 FBM subma­ ers is scheduled for deployment with rines authorized by Congress have the fleet prior to the end of the year, demonstrated the Pofatis system. completing the major shipbuilding The WW Rogsrs made the sub­ portion of the program which was ini­ merged firing about 30 miles off Cape tiated in late 1956. Kennedy, Florida, at approximately Each FBM submarine has two com­ the same location where the first FBM plete crews which alternate manning submarine, the USS Georgs Washing- on two-month patrols. Each crew con­ ton,fired a Pofmis Al on 20 July sists of about 130 officere and men.— 1960. DOD release.

aa Military Review . MILITARY NOTES

Mechanized Materiel Handling Systems sel. Unlike electric or hydraulic sye­ ‘Phe Air Force ie experimenting tems, its available power increasee with meehanised systeme for materiel with desraasing temperature, ! handling. One such system is being in­ The system is being studied to make stalled at McConnell Air Force Base, it still lighter, more compact, and less, Kansas, and is scheduled to be in op­ noisy.—US Army release. eration thie year. Facility for Processing Aerial Film The system will embody warehouse The Tactical Air Command of the mechanization techniques such as a Air Force has developed a new con­ driverless tractor operating over a cept in frontline facilities for process­ guide wire embedded in tbe floor, and ing and interpreting aerial reconnais­ programed to etart and stop automat­ sance film. The new facility is self- ically at preselected locations. supporting and mobHe and can be The automatic movement of a high quickly installed to support squadron- volume of materiel within storage and size tactical air reconnaissance units. ddpping areas will increase opera­ The facility’s continuous film pro­ tional efficiency, reduce costs, expe­ cessors will handle 6,580 feet of tive­ dite receipt and storage, ~nd reduce inch-wide film in 30 minutes, or nearly damage. 50 miles of film each day.—DOD re­ Pilot models will be installed at lease. several Alr Force bases, with each in­ ‘TNrick W“ Shooting stallation of the system engineered to Plans to incorporate the “quick kill” insure cost effectiveness and compati­ technique into basic rifle marksman­ bility with other facilities.—DOD re­ ship training at 12 US ArznY train­ lease. ing centers are scheduled to be tom. Turbine Starter Tests pleted by Deeember 1967. An experimental lightweight, pulse- The quick kill system of feet, un­ jet starter for a 300-horsepower gas aimed shooting by instinct where the turbine is being tested by the US enemy is often engaged at a range Army Mobility Equipment Command’s of 15 to 30 yards is presently being Engineer Research and Development taught in Vietnam-oriented advanced Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. individual training at eeveral ArmY Designed to keep pace with advances installations. that have decreased the weight but Using air-powered rifles firing BB’e, increased the starthg power require­ the quick kill technique is based on ment of gas turbine powerplants, the the concept that, when a person points pad-mounted unit weighs 60 percent his finger at an object in his line of 1sss than the electric starter and bat­ sight, his finger will align itself on teries now used. It also will operate the point of focus of his eyes. During at lower temperatures, minue 65 de­ the quick kill firing, the rifle beeomes grees Fahrenheit, without the use of an extension of the pointed finger. heat or other statilng aids. Air rifles used during practice al­ Essentially a turbine driven by twin low the soldier to fire many more pulse-jet ga$ifiers, the experimental rounds in less time and more econom­ starting system burns all gae turbine ically than using service ammunition. fuels inckrding gasoline, JP, and die­ -Army News Features.

Hweorber1367 w MILITARY NOTES

‘Sprint’ Missile Flight Test Military Space Communications Tested A Sprint antimissile missile was The first experimental tactical com­ launched from an underground cell munications by sateKite among Army, and has successfully completed a full- Navy, and Air Force units hae been duration flight test. accomplished. Sprint, a radar-guided missile pow­ Meeeages were exchanged among ered by two solid propellant rockets, airborne aircraft, a eubmarine, a ship, and fixed and mobile land-baeed terminals of the three services. The satellite ueed to relay the communi­ cation between the vehicles during the joint test was the fifth LincoZn Experimental SateUtte (LES-5) which wae launched by the Air Force into a 20,700-mile, near-synchronous or­ bit by a developmental Titan ZIIC booster from Cape Kennedy, Florida.

LfJS-5-the first all-solid-state, u1. trahigh frequency repeater sateKite —is cylindrical in shape, five and a half feet long, four feet in diameter, and weighs approximately 225 pounds. The satellite obtaine its power from two bands of solar cells around the periphery of the satellite body. In’ its present orbit, the sateKite is traveling slowly around the earth from west to east at a drift rate of The MertinCompcmv approximately 32 degrees per day. It orkmd. Di.i.i.n takee about 11 days to make a com­ Sprint antimissile system plete revolution. At any given loca­ is one of two interceptor missiles in tion, the satellite ie visible to radio the Nike X missile defense system. communicators for about five days Nike X project officiale said the per revolution. It permite extended Sw”nt flight at the White Sands Mis­ testing anywhere around tbe earth silel Range, New Mexico, accomplished between points up to 9,000 miles. major teet objectives and the mieeile The experiment with LES-5 are an function~ according to plan. Further initial step in the Department of De­ testa are scheduled at the Nilce X fense Tactical Satellite Communica­ project’s Kwajalein Test Site in the tions Program which is directed to­ mid-Pacific. ward meeting the needs of the highly Sw”nt is ejected from its under­ mobile, lower echelon land, air, and rrround cell by a xas charge, and the sea force using small, lightweight first-stage motor % ignite-d” once the equipment in tactical networke char­ missile is in the air.—Army News acterized by great flexibility and min­ Features. imum control.—DOD releaee.

100 MilitaryIfwisw — MILITARY NOTES

Low Frequency Communications System A communications station in the high-powered fixed stations or from desert at Hawes, California, with an similar but Iess-pnwered transmitter antenna taller than the Eiffel Tower, carried in jet aircraft. is in the final stages of testing. The Air Force will operate two of The Air Force lists the project as the 360-acre, transmit-receive sites— the 487L Low Frequency Communica­ one at Hawes, California, and another tions System~a network that will in­ in Nebraska, near one of ite users, the clude another station in Nebraska and headquarters of the Strategic Air Command.—US Air Force release. Vegetation Seasonal Change Report An analyeis of the seaeonal changes in vegetation has been published by the US Army Natick Laboratories. The report offers a freeh approach to environmental analyeis through the uee of color photoe and maps. It describes the seasonal changes in 16 New England landscapes, show­ ing marked alterations in vegetation color and deneity, visibility, drainage, and accessibility during the year. These changes are of interest for military purposes as well as scientific study. Military camouflage, cover and concealment tactics, and logistic re­ quirements for specialized types 0$ equipment are influenced by the en­ vironmental changes. US Air For.. For the report, landscape photos ‘lgOO-fOOtradio antenna were taken from the same site at dif­ ferent seasons, repeating the identical two other sites for the Navy. The field of view to show the full range system will be used by the Depart­ of variation. The time-lapse sequences ment of Defense as a general command indicated that the magnitude of sea­ channel and as a communications sys­ sonal change is greater than normally ~ tem in reserve. realized, even by reeidents aroind The 487L is a broadcasting net op­ whom the changee annually take place. erating in the low frequency range, The report suggests that the time- designed to provide reliable communi­ Iapse photography method could be cations for the Department of De­ applied to geographic regions, includ­ fenee. In addition to the two “receive ing the tropical savanna, which, un­ and transmit” stations, there will be like New England, has a seasonal cy­ over 200 “receive only” sitee which cle controlled by differences in pre­ can simultaneously or independently cipitation rather than temperature receive messages either from the main chatiges.-Army News Features.

No#ember19S7 101 MILITARY NOTES

Hydrofoil Gunboat ‘P6H-1’ Guard and the Army Reserv*were A hydrofoil gunboat to be built for to have eight combat divisions, 18 the Navy, designated the PGH-1 (Pa­ brigades, 13 training divisions, and trol Gunboat, Hydrofoil), and named reinforcing and supporting units with the Fhzgstafl, is scheduled to be a total drill strength of 640,000. launched in November (MR. Feb Of this, the Army Reserve was 1967, P 100). scheduled to have a drill strength of Constructed of aluminum, the craft 240,000, including the 13 training di­ is 73 feet long and displaces 60 tons. visions, two maneuver area commands, . . .. >.,.. the Arnry Reserve schools, and service ,., . ... “,.~,.’.,.,.. support units. The revised plan accommodates ma­ jor objections raised after the origi­ nal proposal was announced. Three infantry brigades will be retained in the Army Reserve, and the paid drill strength will be increased to 260,000. The National Guard will have eight divisions and 18 brigades, with a total Ale.. drill strength of 400,000 as previously Artist’s concept of the Flogatatf,ahydro. planned. foil gunboat The total force structure of the pre­ A 3,600-horsepower, gas turbhie en­ vious plan is essentially unchanged. gine, driving a pusher propeller Tbe number of combat maneuver bat­ mounted on the end of the tail-strut talion is the same. The proportion of pod, will provide foilborne propulsion. combat, combat support, and service Diesel engines provide hullborne pro­ support within each component is ap­ pulsion by meana of twin water jets. proximately the same as exists today. —News release, The revision includes .tbese major Revised Proposal to Reorganize Resetiea changes from the original plan: The Department of the Army has e Retain in the Army Reserve proposed a revision of the Reserve three brigade bases, 10 infantry bat­ components’ reorganization plan ap­ talions, and 16 combat engineer bat­ proved in June by the Department of talions, all of which were to have been Defense. included in the National Guard. The revision alters the original pro­ e Retain or form in the National posal by retaining some combat and Guard the following units which were combat service support elements in the planned for inclusion in the Army Re­ US Army Reserve and adding 20,000 serve: two military police brigades, men te the ArmY Reserve. The pro­ a Transportation Corps motor trans­ posed drill strength of tbe National port command, a support brigade, six Guard is 400,000. engineer construction battalions, three The original realignment plan allo­ signal battalions, 16 hospitals, 54 com­ cated all combat and combat support posite service companies, 20 truck unite to the National Guard. Tbe companies, and eight ordnance com­ Reserve components-the National panics.—Army News Features.

Military Ravisw t MILITARY NOTES

UnderseaCable in SotrtlreastAsia Sandw”per will reach speeds UP to A 25 million-dollar undersea cable Mach 4 and altitudes up to 90,000 feet. linking military bases in Vietnam and The missile’s airframe, 10 inches in Thailand is nearing completion. diameter and 180 inches long, has a The multichannel coaxial voice and highly ewepG clipped delta wing and teletype cable will start at Da Nang, forward-mounted canarda for pitch South Vietnam. Terminal and relay control. Full apan ailerons provide roll points will heat Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, control with symmetrical vertical sta­ Camrahn Bay, and Vung Tau in South bilizers installed on each wingtip. It Vietnam and at Sattabip in Thailand. weighs 600 pounds.—Newa releaee. Terminals will be connected with the communication system operated by Army Phasing Back OCS Frograin the US ArmY Strategic Communica­ The Army is phasing back its tion Command to provide instant expanded Officer Candidate School communications throughout southeast (OCS) program. Asia. Under the expanded OCS program, A 696-mile cable already in use be­ the Army commissioned more than tween the Philippines and South Viet­ 19,000 officers during the fiscal year nam will be joined into the eyetem at ending June 1967. This compares with the Nha Trang terminal.-DOD re­ 3,672 officers commissioned through lease. OCS in Fiscal Year 1966 and the 10­ year annual average of 1,1S7 OCS larget Missile commissions for the period endhg 30 A high-performance, rocket-powered June 1966. target missile, called Sund~”per, is be­ Since a reduced OCS program can ing developed for the Air Force. now meet programed objectives, the The new missile is”designed to sim­ Arsny ia phasing back to a three- ulate a wide variety of aircraft and school operation. New OCS applicants are being assigned to classes at Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Sill, Okla­ homa; and Fort Belvoir, Virginia. OCS operation will be discontinued at Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Aberdeen Prov­ ing Ground, Maryland; after the com­ , pletion of present clasees. The phase back to a three-school OCS program is planned to be com­ pleted early in 1968. Beech Aircraft Comor.t+m Although the OCS accession rate Sandpiper target missile and facilities will be phased back, the missile tbreate of the next decade, ac­ total number of candidates to be com­ cording to the manufacturer. missioned this fiscal year through the Powered by a hybrid engine that program will vary only slightly from uses both eolid and liquid propellant, last’ year’s totals.—DOD rek?eae.

Nwernber1367 loa MILITARY NOTES

FINLAND High-Speed Corvettes ., ,”-. --- .-,:”:y . . . ,. . .­ 4

. Bri.Ytol.viddeleuJournal A new class of high-speed corvettes has been designed for the Finni?h Navy. The first two vessels are currently being constructed in Heleinki. The corvettes are approximately 240 feet in length, weigh 600 tons, and are powered by two 2,000-horsepower dieset engines and one gas turbine. The diesel engines are used for cruising and maneuvering, and the turbine is used for boost. All three engines are used for high speed.—Bristol Siddeley Jouraal. FRANCE SOUTH AFRICA 6romrd Forces in Berlin Three Submarines Ordered France currently has one armored The Republic of Sonth Africa bas battaIion, oue armored infantry bat- ordered three aubmarinee of the talion, and two ge?wiarnzem”ecompanies Daphne class from a shipyard in stationed in Berlin. These forces are France. Tbe 1,040-ton submarines are under the command of the 1st French credited with a speed of 16 knots and Army in Baden-Baden, West Ger- have 12 torpedo tubes.—News item. many.—News item. USSR GREAT BRITAIN Sniper Sifle Howitrer Being Oeveloiaed A new sniper rifle has been intro- A new 155-millimeter howitzer is duced into the Soviet Army, according being developed jointly by Great Brit- to an East German source. The 7.62: ain and West Germany. The new millimeter rifle has a maximum range weapon is believed to be especially of 875 yards and a rate of fire of 30 light in weight. A prototype is cur- rounds per minute. It has a four- rent] y being built.—News item. powqr telescopic sight.—News item.

104 M61tsryRsvierr MILITARY NOTES

JAPAN WEST GERMANY Artillery Rocket Guided-MissileDestroyers A Japanese surface-to-surface The firet of three 4,000-ton, guided­ rocket, designated the RKT .VO,is un­ missile-armed destroyers of the US dergoing tiring tests. The solid fuel, Charles F. Adams class being con­ unguided artillery rocket resembles structed in the United States for the the US Little John. West German Navy was recently It is about 15 feet long, 300 milli­ launched. meters in diameter, and is credited The second destroyer is echeduled to be launched by the end of 1967. The start of construction on the third vessel is also planned before the end of the year. The three vessels are expected to be operational by 1969-70.—News . item.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Watsr Filtration Unit .%rdatand Technik A truck-mounted, water purification RKT .?0rockets on twin launcher unit, capable of producing 1,050 to 3,100 gallone of potable water per with a range of approximately 18.5 hour, has been developed for the miles. The twin launcher is mounted on a five-ton truck. The development of the rocket be­ gan as early as 1957. It is scheduled to enter service with the troops dur­ ing the period 1967-71.—News item. Naval Construction Program The Japanese Government haa passed a new five-year naval construc­ tion program. One guided-miesile­ armed destroyer of 3,500 tons, equipped with Tartar surface-to-air missiles, will be built under the new program. The progFam provides for the con­ .%&t .nd Techni struction of IWO helicopter carriers of 4,S00 to 5,ooO tons. These vessels will Czechoslovakian armed forces. The be fitted with the latest electronic oystem consists of two 3.6-tOn V9S equipment and will be able to serve trucks. aa floating operation centers. The One trnck is equipped as a labora­ program also includes 10 frigates of tory and also carries the crew re­ 1,500 tons, 10 motor patrol boats, and quired for the pnritication operation. five submarinea.—News item. —News item.

Mvernber1967 i MILITARY NOTES

AUSTRALIA Navy Receives ‘Skybawks’

The first two of 10 advanced Skyhawk military jet aircraft have been delivered to the Royal Australian Navy in Long Beach, California. The aircraft—an A-4G combat aircraft and a TA-4G trainer—are versions of A-4’s in production for the US Navy and Marine Corps. Australia has pur­ chased eight A-4G’s and two TA-4G’s. Although retaining the combat capabilities of the US versions, the A-4G Skvhawks are deeigued for an air defense role aboard the Australian aircraft carrier HMAS Zfelborwne, an antieubmarine-warfare vessel .—News item.” National Servicemen Oefense Budget for Fiscal Year 1968 National servicemen comprise about A rise of 18 percent in defense 40 percent of the Australia Army. spending is the major feature of Aue- Some 2,000 national servicemen cOm- tralia’s budget for the period 1 July pleted their two-year period of active 1967 to 30 June 1968, according to an service in Jnne. Three options were announcement. available to them: become members of The budget providee for a record the Regular Army Reeerve for three total expenditure of almost 7.28 bil­ years, join the Citizen Military Force lion dollars. Nearly 1.25 billion dol­ for three years, or join the Regular Iars is for defense, 188 million dollars Army Emergency Reserve for four more than was spent tbe previous years.—News release. year.—News releaee.

Military RsvlsI THE FALL OF SIN(ARNO. By larzie VNtacbi. THE SUPERPARLIAMENTS. brterparliameir­ 191Pages.Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New tery Consultation and Atlantic Cooperation. Yorkand Wasbirrgtorr,D. C., 1967.$4.95. By J. AlIan Hevey, Jr. 202 Pages. Frederick BY MAJ DANIEL D. LUOWIG,USA A. Praeger, inc., New York, Wqahbrgton, and London, Eng., 1966.$10.00. Mr. Vittachi, a journalist from BY MAJ FRANCISA. IANNI, USA Ceylon, was an eyewitness to many of the events ieported in this hook. One of the principal postwar in­ He has chronologically depicted the novation in regional organization course of events beginning with the has been the rise of international abotilve Communiet soup on 30 Sep­ parliamentary consultative assemblies. tember 1965, and cubninating with These superparliamenta are interna. the stripping of power from President tional regional assemblies of members Achmed Sukarno in March 1966. of natilonal legislatures convened to Throughout this period, Sukarno investigate and debate international resisted all efforts to place the au­ problems and to vote resolution of thority of the government of Indo­ opinion and recommendation. nesia into the hands of competent Mr. Hovey examines four of the authorities. The hook explains why aix consultative assemblies in the At­ the army did not force him from the lantic area, focusing principally on scene once hk implication with the the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ coup became evident. tion Parliamentarians’ Conference. Ae the Indonesian Army conducted The achievements, shortcomings, and ite campaign to eliminate the leader­ prospects of Atlantic parliamentary ship of Communist elements, Sukarno consultation are evaluated and the began to Ioee his magical hold on the alternatives asseseed. massee. This campaign incited the Since the present “disarray” among populace to carry out a bloody, purge the Atlantic nations dims the pros­ of thoueands of known Communists. pects of more effective institutions Student pressure eventually forced among them, the author suggests a bim to re~nquish his authority to number of posaibilitiles for devisihg Lieutenant General Suharto. a more effective organization while the The reader gaine an appreciation parliamentarian await the develop­ for the organizational and leadership ment of a broader consensus regard­ qualitiea of General Suharto whose ing “Atlantic” policy objectives. sctions were instrumental in saving Becauee one of the principal road­ his nation from becoming part of the blocks to further Atlantic cooperation Communist bloc. This book is valu­ is the disagreement over nuclear able to the professional officer inter­ strategy, this study will be of interest ested in this phaee of hktory. to the military reader. lbvemherISS7 107 MILITARY BOOKS

TO MOVE A NATfON. The Politics of Foreign VIETNAM IN THE MUD. By James H. Picke. Policy in the Administration of John F. Kenn­ rell. With an Introduction by Malcolm W, edy. By Roger Nilsman. 602 Pages. Oouble­ Browne. 129 Pages. The Bobbc-Merrill Co,, day & Co., Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1967. Inc., 1966.$5.00. $6.95. BY LTC FRANK E. VARLJEN, USA BY COL DONALD J. DELANEY, USA A firsthand account of the war in As head of State Department Intel­ Vietnam—support,ed by more than ligence and later as Assistant Secre­ 100 photographs. tary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, This interesting, easy-to-read book Mr. Hilsman actively participated in is Mr. PickerelI’s opinion of what is the great foreign policy crisee of the happening in Vietnam, the mistakes Kennedy administration—the Bay of being made, and the results that csn Pigs, Berlin, the Cuban missile crisis, be expected if the United States con. and Laos. tinues her present Vietnam policies The author includes agreat deal of and tactice. detail in his book about the politics In effect, the anthor says that and personalities of the principal ac­ the Viet Cong have outsmarted the tors. The reader will learn, if he did Unit,ed States, and he believes that not already know, that foreign policy she has not developed the ability ts is made by men, often astoundingly cope with guerrilla war and will lose fallible men, in day-to-day decisions in Vietnam. which become policy ae they are made. The book presente a pessimistic The wonder is not that the cathedral outlook of US efforts in Vietnam. thus built of matchsticks is somewhat BATTLESIN THE MONSOON.Campaigningin misshapen, but that, in the end, it the Central Highlands Vietnam, Summer does resemble a church. 196B. By Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshal~ The book makes for instructive, United Statea Army, Retirad. With Maps and fascinating, and suspenseful reading. Sketches by Jac Purdon. 408 Pages. Willisrn THE CHINESE IN CAMBODIA. By William E. Morrow & Co., Inc., New York, 1967.$6.95. Willmott. 132 Pages. Publications Cantre, BY LTC NIVEN J. BAISD, USA University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Once again, S. L. A. Marshall prs­ Can., 1967.$5.00. sents, in mosaic, a story of fatigne, BY LTC GAYLOSO A. LANSRUD, USA valor, and tenacity. Dr. Willmott, an anthropologist, To the historian, the requirement ta examines the Chinese minority in ieolate one part of the fight to the Cambodia from the historical, eco­ exclusion of the rest muet not be nomic, legal, and demographic points pleasant. In this inetance, time, and of view. a desire to represent at least one pars While primarily oriented toward of the picture. limited the author ts the China specialist, the book pro­ South Vietnam’s Central Highlands vides the military reader an insight in the summer of 1966 and the let into some of the condition that have Cavalry Division’s fight against the influenced the attitudes and behavior enem~ and the wet monsoon. of the Chinese ethnic minority in Many maps, sketches, and phot@ Cambodia and elsewhere in southeaat graphe make thie a desirable addi­ Asia. tiopto the military library.

106 MllItsrs Reti MILITARY BOOKS

THE DOOM PUSSY. By Elaine Shepard. 300 French geography or a set of maps Pages.Trident Press, New York, 1907.$4.95. of northern France is really needed BY LTC FRANK P. VELLELLA, USA to follow evente in the latter half of the book. The name Doom Pussy refers to In spite of this drawback, thk is the patch worn by flyers wbo have a story of war deftly and movingly flown over North Vietnam at night. told and an example of French liter­ The legend around the or%eyed cat ary ability and logical thinking at depicted on the patch, translated lit­ its beet. erally from the Vietnamese, reads, “1 have flown into the jaws of the cat OROIT OF CHINA. By Harrison E. Salisbrwy. of death.” Most American flyers say, 204 Pages. Harper & Row, krc., New York, “I have seen the Doom Pussy.” Evanston, Ill., and London,Eng., 1967.$4.95. Elaine Shepard is a reporter who BY MAJ VLAOIMIRA. Poepmm, USA hea concentrated on portraying the Mr. Salisbury, a Pulitzer Prize win­ flying man in Vietnam. She admits ner for reporting, wae aeeigned by that not everything happened the way The Nsw York Times to cover tbe she tells it, but it could have. Most periphery of Communist China. His of the names are real, and most of the journey of more than 25,000 miles incidents are baeed on fact in this along China’s frontiers included visite entertaining and colorful book. to Hong Kong, Cambodia, Laos, Thai­ THE MARNE. The Story of a Oattle That land, Burma, India, the Soviet Union, SavedParia and Marked a Turning Point of and Japan. World War L By 6eorges Blond. Translated Both peasants and princes were From the Franch by H. Eaton Hart. 250 questioned by the author regarding Pages. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., their views on whether there would 1966.$5.95. be peace or war between the United BY ROGERA. BEAUMONT States and China, the struggle between India and China for leadership in Asia, f% Macvte ie a etory skillfully told the Sine-Soviet conflict, and the po­ by a Frenchman for Frenchmen. Mr. tential of escalation of the conflict in Blond’s work traces old ground, te]l­ southeast Asia. He presents the wide ing this generation something about range of answers he received and of­ themselves in a brighter hour. fere a penetrating analysie. Beginning with a discussion of the The author concludee the hook with inane infantry doctrine &f the pre­ several steps that he believes the 1914 French Army, the author shows United States must take. There mu# how the concept for the French be a standstill in Vietnam; the United Army’s stand on the Marne evolved States must support a solution ad­ out of shattered plans, accidents, and vanced, negotiated, and guaranteed by clashes of personality. His description Asians; and a calculated program of the taxicab army is worthwhile must be devieed to end Chha’s isola­ reading for all junior officers since it tion. Mr. Salisbury adds, “China must was, to a great extent, a Iieutenarrta’ be dragged kicking and screaming into show. the United Nations.” Answers to ques­ The book euffers from a lack of ade­ tions and possible solutions are in­ quate mape. A detailed knowledge of ckrdetf in the book.

Nwmbsrlea? 109 I THE MEANING OF LIMITEO WAR. By Robert trained people, exchange programs, McClintock. 239 Pages. Houghton w~n Coo, foreign aid, and land reform. The Boston. Mass., 1967.$5.00. author concludes that eeapower pro­ BY LTC RALPH PUCKETT, JR., USA vides the most subtle and nearly corn. plete mix of military forces for the “The purpose of this hook is to task. study the nature of past, present, and This book provides insight into the probable war in the last half of the political machination behind the 20th century.” The author approaches his objective by using case studiee. scenes and, as such, makes a practical contribution to understanding the ob. Examined are the conflicts in jectives of limited war and how they Greece, Korea, and between the Is­ may be achieved. raelis and Arabs; the campaigns in Sinai and,r%ez; the US intervention THE UNITEO NATIONS ANO U. S. FOREIGN in Lebanon; the Chinese attack on POLICY.A New Look at the National Interest the Himalayan frontier; and the Revised Edition. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield, French involvement in Vietnam, The 266 Pages. little, Brown & Co., Boston, author describes the objectives of these conflicts and the ways in which Mass., 1667.$5.95. 1 they were concluded. Rather than 13Y MAJ FSANCIS A. IANNI, USA dwelling on the military aspects, he In this book, the author attempts to emphasizes the “diplomacy of force spell out tbe foreign policy objectiva and the force of diplomacy.” of the United States and to relate them The author’s qualifications are sub­ to the capabilities and limitations of stantial. In his lengthy Foreign Serv­ the United Nations. It is his conten­ ice career, he was in charge of the tion that the United States has failed US Embassy in Saigon during the to develop an entirely rational view battle of Dien Bien Phu and was the of the place of international political American Ambassador in Lebanon organization in world affairs. This, during the crisis there. The book was in part, is traced to the difficulty the written while he was assigned as the United States has in identifying her State Department advisor at the general political goals and objectives, Naval War College. and acting upon them. Ambassador McClintock enumerates In developing the relationship b~ the elements of a successful strategy tween US policy imperatives and UN to combat inaurgencies. He believes potentialities and limitations, Mr. that the threet must be met by all Bloomfield concentrates on the larger elements of uational power. A prereq­ political aspecte of UN policy rather uisite is that the indigenous people than on the technical or administrative must be willing to help themselves. aspecte. Thus, the problem of motivation ia Of particular interest to the mili­ baeic to winning. To develop the nec­ tary reader is the chapter dealing with essary zeal, the government muet be the UN and US national security rm beaded by a representative of the peo­ der the topics of military strategy, ple, not a foreign-installed puppet. general and limited war, peacekeeping, Other elements of a winning strat­ counterinsurgency, and diearmamerd egy include carefully selected and and arms control.

110 Military IteVim MILITARY BOOKS

SOLDIERSON THE SANTA FE TRAIL. By Leo plunged us into a full-blown war with E. ONva.226 Pages. The Universi~ of Oklrt­ China. This ie echoed by Mr. Gurtov, home Press, Norman, Okla., 1967.$4.50. who adde that “limited war will doubtless remain the dominant forsq The Santa Fe Trail was a major of Sine-American confrontation in artery of trade from the time of Mexi­ Southeaet Asia.” can independence in 1821 until the railroad finally reached Santa Fe in The books are valuable references 1880. It was kept open by the Army for the Vietnam echolar. Mr, But­ stationed at lonely outposts along its tinger’e two volumes are undoubtedly route. This is the interesting story the beet documented reference worke of the men in garrison and on patrol, yet produced on Vietnam. He, hae ex­ and of the now abandoned posta at ploited all the best sources. which they were stationed. Mr. Gurtov’s book is commended ae a “case study of the policymaking VIETNAM: A Oragen Embattled. Volume 1. process” in the foreword by Roger From Colonialism to the Vietminh. By Jo. Hilsman, yet its main thrust is the seph Buttbrger. 663 Pages. Frederick A, description of a tangled web at a crit­ Praeger, Inc., New York, 1967.$18.50 for ical time in Vietnamese history. two volumes. Each provides food for thought and VIETNAM:A Oragon Embattled. Volume N. an excellent historical analysie. Vietnam et War. By Joseph Butthrger. 1,346 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New THE PAPERSOF ULYSSESS. GRANT.Volume York, 1667.$16.50 for two volumes. 1:1037.1661. Edited by John Y. Simon. 456 THE FIRST CRISIS IN VJETNAM: Cbbrese Pages. Southern Illinois University Press, CommunistStrategy and the U. S. hrvolve­ Carbondale, 111.,1667.$15.00. ment 1953-1654. By Melvin 6urtov. 226 BY LTC HARRY L. MAIHAFER, USA Pages. Columbia University Press, New This book, first of a planned 15­ Yerk, 1967.$7.00. vohrme eeriea, contains all known BY COL PAUL L. BOGEN, USA papers of Ulysses S. Grant from his These scholarly research works are boyhood until the outbreak of the based on. analyses of writings and Civil War. Of particular interest are reports from the field. In addi$ion, the lettere to his future wife, meet of Mr. Buttinger was able to draw-on ‘which are being published for the hie personal background and experi. first time. They were written during enees in the areaa. The research and the Mexican War and contah pas­ documentation are impreeeive. $sages of warmth and vivid description. An interesting similarity is that in The papers will be welcomed by consonance with their historical orien­ students of Americana, especially tation, no real conclusions are reached now, at a time when many are “re­ by either author. The booke are back­ d~acovering” and gaining a new ap­ ground studiee, yet each seems to preciation of the complex and able make a restrained emotional plea, General Grant. The book ia fascinat­ carefully cloaked by the fully acknowl­ ing reading, due not only to the skill­ edged empirical basic for that plea. ful editing of Dr. Simon, executive Mr. Buttinger leaves one with the directqr of the U. S. Grant Associa­ thought that it might have heen tion, ,hut also to the well-paced writ­ worse, that Ngo-dinh-Diem could have ing of Grant himself.

Nowmber1967 111 OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED COMMAND AT SEA. Third Edition. QUICK ON THE VIGOR! Essays on By Rear Admiral Harley F. Cope, Defense Transportation. By Vincent United States Navy, Retired. Revised F. Caputo and Colonel John E. Mur. by Captain Howard Bucknell III, ray, United States Army. 241 Pages, United States Navy. 574 Pages. Traffic Service Corp., Washington, United States Naval Institute, Annap­ D. C., 1966.$5.45. olis, Md., 1966. $6.50. MEDIC. America’s Medical Soldiers, THE CIVIL DEFENSE DEBATE. Sailors and Airmen in Peace and War, Differing Perceptions of a Persistent By Eloise Engle. 225 Pages. The John Issue in National Security Policy. By Day Co., Inc., New York, 1967.$5.50. Professor Leon H. Weaver. 75 Pages. A NATION GRIEVED. The Kennedy Social Science Research Bureau, Mich. Amassination in ~ditorial Cartoons, igan State University, East Lanaing, Compiled and Edited by Captain Ray­ Mich., 1967.$1.50 paperbound. mond B. Rajski, United States Air LET’S END THE DRAFT MESS: Force, Retired. With a Foreword by A Proposal for a Fair System of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. 134 Pages, Universal Service for AK. By Colonel Charles E. Tuttle Co., Inc., Rutland, George Walton. 171 Pages. David Vt., and Tokyo, Japan, 1967.$5.00. McKay Co., Inc., New York, 1967. 9TH AIR FORCE IN WORLD WAR $3.95 clothbound. $1.95 paperbound. II. By Kenn C. Rust. Assisted by TO MY SON IN UNIFORM. By George J. Letzter, James J. Grygier, Henry Gregor Felsen. 125 Pages. and Richard Groh. 245 Pages. Aero Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1967. Publishers, Inc., Fallbrook, Calif., $3.25. 1967. $10.00. VIETNAM: The Logic of With­ GERMAN GUIDED MISSILES OF drawal. By Howard Zinn. 131 Pages. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. Ry The Beacon Press, Inc., Boston, Mass., Rowland F. Pocock. 120 Pages. Arco 1967. $1.25 paperbound. Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1967, $4.95. SMALL UNIT ACTION IN VIET­ NAM. Summer 1966. By Captain UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Francis J. West, Jr., United States ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1967-68. Marine Corps, Reserve. 123 Pages. Revised June 1, 1967.829 Pages. Of­ Arno Press, Inc., New York. $1.45 fice of the Federal Register, National paperbound. Archives and Records Service, Gen­ eral Services Administration, Wash­ THE MILITARY ATTACHti. By Al­ ington, D. C. $2.00 paperbound. fred Vagts. 408 Pages. Princeton Uni­ versity Press, Princeton, N. J., 1967. BRASSEY’S ANNUAL: 1966. The $10.00. Armed Forces Year-Book. Edited by Major General J. L. Moulton, Brigs. NAVAL REVIEW. 1967. Edited by dier C. N. Barclay, and Air Vice Mar­ Frank Uhlig, Jr. 336 Pages. United . shal W.”M. Yoo1. 400 Pagee. Frederick States Naval Institute, Annapolis, A. Praeger, Inc., New- York, 1966. Md., 1966.$12.50. $16.60.

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