Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General NATIONAL AUDIT @ICE

Ministry of Defence: Fire Protection at Main Store Depots

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 6 March 1990 London: HMSO E8.10 net 262 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the National Audit Act, 1983 for presentation to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act.

John Bourn Comptroller and Auditor General National Audit Office 26 February 1990

TheComptroller and Auditor General is the headof the NationalAudit Office employing some 900 staff. He, and the NAO, are totally independent of Government. He certifies the accounts of all Government departments and a wide range of other public sector bodies; and he has statutory authority to report to Parliament on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments and other bodies use their resources. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Contents

Pages Summary and conclusions 1

Part 1: Introduction 5 Part 2: The 1983 Donnington fire and subsequent risk evaluation 7

Part 3: The Services’ fire protection plans 11

Part 4: The 1988 fire and further lessons learned 17

Appendices 1. The recommendations of the 1983 Board of Inquiry and the extent to which they were implemented by 1988 20 2. Summary of fire protection improvements at Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force main store depots 22

3. As at April 1989 -the fire rotection measures in buftfi;gs. . holding stores va Pued at more than GO 24 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Summary and conclusions

Background 1. The three armed Services of the Ministry of Defence (the Department) hold general stores (that is excluding armaments and fuel) worth over E6,400 million in their large United Kingdom store depots. An important element in the stewardship of these items is to safeguard them against the risk of fire.

2. In the past, major stores fires have been rare and prior to 1983 the Department had a good record in this respect. However, the risk of major fires has increased in recent years owing to the increasing incidence of arson and more intensive storage techniques.

3. Since 1983 the Department have suffered the two largest warehouse fires in British history, both at the Army’s Central Ordnance Depot, Donnington, resulting in a combined loss of some E350 million. There have also been several other incidents-four of them potentially serious-at other Ministry of Defence general store depots.

4. The most significant feature of the fires at Donnington, in June 1983 and April 1988, was that they involved two very similar buildings containing stores held in very high density. Much of the evidence taken by the Army Board of Inquiry set up to investigate the second fire concerned the steps taken to prevent a repetition of the first. In October 1988 the Board presented their report. A summary of their findings and their recommendations in full were published by the Department in January 1989.

5. The National Audit Office (NAO) examined the lessons learned from the fires in 1983 and 1988 and the way in which the Army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF] assess the risks of fire and have implemented fire protection measures to minimise such risks.

Findings 6. The NAO’s main findings are as follows: On the lessons of the 1983 fire (a) Following the 1983 fire at Donnington, the Board of Inquiry were unable to ascertain its cause but could not rule out arson. They found deficiencies in the fire regulations and precautions at the depot [paragraph 2.6). (b) The Department concluded that there was a real possibility of another equally serious fire, because of increases in the incidence of arson and in the use of high density storage. Ministers were advised of plans to reduce the risk of loss [paragraphs 2.9-2.11). (c) Reports were made to Ministers up until February 1985, at which point the Department concluded that the central exercise should, in the absence of new or significant developments, be

1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

considered complete. The Services continued to have responsibility for progressing their individual actions (paragraph 2.11). (d) Of the assessments undertaken by the Services after the 1983 fire only the Army quickly assessed the risk for every significant general stores building. The Royal Navy, after an initial assessment in 1983, began a much wider assessment in 1988, before the second Donnington fire; the wider assessment was completed by October 1988. The RAF did not complete their latest and most comprehensive assessment until 1988 (paragraphs 2.11, 2.14, 2.18-2.27) On the adequacy of fire protection measures (e) Between July 1983 and April 1988, the Army had not implemented any structural fire protection measures in existing storesheds although they had constructed two new warehouses at Donnington and substantially improved the water supplies for firefighting at that depot and at Bicester; the Royal Navy’s plans at Copenacre and Eaglescliffe were delayed by reconsideration or by lack of funds; whilst the RAF had drawn up detailed plans for improvements which, although delayed by funding difficulties in 1986, will be implemented by 1991 (paragraphs 3.2-3.11, 3.12-3.22, 3.23-3.28 respectively). (f) A comprehensive programme of measures for protecting the Army’s stores estate was drawn up in 1984 but not implemented. Revised and more limited measures were proposed in 1987 for implementation by 1990. Since the 1988 fire the Army have drawn up a ten-year programme for the installation of fire protection measures in all their storehouses and are in the meantime installing interim fire protection measures, completion of these is planned for March 1990 (paragraphs 3.5-3.11, 4.16). (g) The Royal Navy’s awareness of the major risk of fire loss was accentuated by two small, but potentially serious, fires at one depot in 1987. Two main protection measures, which involved major works projects, were developed but could not be funded until 1988. One was completed in 1989, while the other, which is in progress, will not be completed until 1992 [paragraphs 3.12-3.22). (h) The RAF’s plans to install fire protection measuresin their general stores estate, drawn up from 1985, are being implemented in phases. Completion is expected in 1991 (paragraphs 3.23-3.28). (i) The guidelines provided in 1980 by the Department on measures needed to protect large store buildings from fire were revised and incorporated into a common Government Fire Standards Code in 1987. The Department regard the Code as mandatory in respect of new buildings and it is also applied to the major refurbishment of existing buildings where feasible or cost effective. The Code allows a significant degree of discretion in securing solutions (paragraphs 3.29-3.35). (j) Both the Army and the Royal Navy are currently using traditional brick construction for fire compartment walls in new buildings. These walls follow the Code’s guidance in that they are capable of withstanding fire for at least four hours. The RAF are

2 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

currently installing thin metal clad compartment walls, capable of withstanding fire for two hours. The latter can be installed more cheaply, more quickly and with less disruption (paragraphs 3.34, 3.35). On the lessons of the 1988 fire (k) The 1988 Board of Inquiry concluded that arson was the cause of the 1988 fire, and that damage had been exceptionally heavy because stores had been kept in high density racking with inadequate measures to prevent a fire spreading. They also found that the Army’s efforts, following the 1983 fire, to minimise the risk of loss in the building that was subsequently destroyed in 1988 were inadequate. The Department dispute this latter finding (paragraphs 4.5-4.19). (1) The Department have responded positively to the Board of Inquiry’s recommendations on the 1988 fire. Proposals have been made for action on all the major recommendations and these have largely been implemented (paragraphs 4.12-4.29). (m) All three Services have given higher priority to the funding of fire protection measures since the 1988 fire, but funding is still awaited to meet the full requirements of the Fire Standards Code (paragraphs 4.15-4.29). (n) The NAO found that stores worth at least El,000 million, in buildings across the three Services, are held in high-bay storesheds which do not meet the standards for compartmentation and sprinkler systems laid down in the Code. Stores worth at least E2,500 million are held in all types of other storesheds which also do not meet the required standards. The Department have informed the NAO that new buildings and major alterations, in progress across the three Services, are in accordance with the Code (paragraphs 3.32, 3.33, 4.15).

General Conclusions 7. In the NAO’s view the length of time which it took the Royal Navy and the RAF to assess the risk of fire throughout their stores estate must raise doubts about the adequacy of their response to the 1983 Donnington fire. The NAO consider that all three Services could have translated their response into practical improvements more quickly had fire protection attracted a higher priority in the allocation of funds. The Department point out that differences between the Services are a reflection of their different circumstances; regard must also be paid to practical considerations, such as operational and storage constraints, which restrict the desired speed of progress.

8. The major lesson from the first fire at Donnington in 1983 was the risk inherent in holding large quantities of stores in high-density storage in buildings which were not designed for that purpose. The Department recognised that many more of their stores buildings were at risk. Following the 1983 fire, the Army designed and had built a fully fire protected warehouse (B55), and all three Services had enhanced water supplies, provided more fire protection equipment, increased fire patrols, introduced stock dispersal programmes and planned additional measures. All new storesheds were being constructed to meet the 3 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

requirements of the Fire Standards Code. However, when another high density store was substantially destroyed at Donnington in 1988, the Services had not completed any major structural fire protection measures in their existing storesheds.

9. The Army’s vigorous response to the 1988 Board of Inquiry has so far gone much further than the action taken after the 1983 fire and they have emphasised the importance of the other Services learning the lessons from the fire. However, practical considerations apart, a considerable amount of work remains to be done.

10. In the NAO’s view three major lessons can be learned from the 1988 fire. The first is that the risk from high-density storage in buildings without adequate fire protection is such that urgent remedial measures need to be taken to prevent further losses. Secondly, there is a need to ensure that schemes for reducing the risk of fire are properly prioritised and funded. And, thirdly, the Department need to ensure that their existing systems for implementing the guidance in the Government Fire Standards Code work properly. The NAO recommend, therefore, that the Department give further consideration to the prioritising and funding of fire protection measures in the course of their annual procedures. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Part 1: Introduction

Background previous guidance dating from 1989 (Part 3). In both versions the onus is placed on departments to 1.1 In order to meet peacetime demands and decide on the standard of precautions necessary for provide stocks for war, the Ministry of Defence (the particular classes of storage or types of premises on Department) hold about 3 million lines of general the basis of maximum foreseeable loss. Within the stores items, worth some E9,499 million. These lines Ministry of Defence each Service has developed its range from nuts and bolts to tank engines and gun own protection arrangements: all three Services barrels, and in many cases large quantities of each employ specialist advisers, and whilst the Army and line may be held. Some &3,400 million of these the RAF maintain a professional fire-fighting stocks are held within main store depots in the capability at their general stores depots, the Royal United Kingdom; the remainder are held in the Navy places more emphasis on fire prevention and forward supply chain, for example Army units,, precautions, maintaining fire patrol men in Royal Naval bases and ships, Royal Air Force (RAF) particularly vulnerable areas. stations and various intermediate depots (Table 1). Major fire incidents in general stores 1.2 Management has a duty to prevent avoidable buildings since 1983 damage to stores by adopting policies of “good housekeeping”; and the development of cost 1.5 In June 1983 a serious fire at the Army’s effective strategies to safeguard assets against theft, Central Ordnance Depot, Donnington, destroyed flood and fire. stores valued at f169 million. The ensuing Board of Inquiry was unable to establish the cause of the 1.3 For firs, the Department are also required to fire, but did not rule out arson. The National Audit comply with two principal Acts of Parliament in Office (NAO) referred to this incident in their report determining prevention policy. The Fire on the Economy of Stores Support (HC 359 of Precautions Act 1971 specifies fire prevention Session 1983-84; paragraph 4.23 of this report). standards, including escape doors, fire extinguishers and fire alarms for buildings such as stores, whilst 1.6 On 25 April 1998 two separate fires occurred in under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 the another building at the same depot. The first fire Department’s premises must provide employees was rapidly extinguished by the Army Fire Service with adequate means of escape in the event of fire. but the second, some three hours later, took hold and destroyed two-thirds of the building together 1.4 Because these requirements are concerned with stores worth some El89 million. A subsequent primarily with the safety of life and may be Board of Inquiry concluded that these two separate insufficient to deal with situations where the fires were attributable to arson. potential loss from fire is high, the Government estate is also regulated by a Code of Practice drawn 1.7 In June 1989, another fire struck the Army’s up in 1987 by various departments including the storage estate. It occurred in a large storeshed at a Ministry of Defence. This revised and expanded depot near Hereford. Although the fire was brought

Table 1 Holdings of general stores (at April 1989)

Main UK Depots 1,092 1,761 3,624 6,477 69 Other Establishments 370 640 1,916 2,926 31

Total 1,462 2,401 5,540 9,403 100 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE:FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS under control within two and a half hours, three examination concentrated on the general store out of ten storage bays were destroyed; clothing depots of the three armed Services, in particular the stores provisionally valued at some 24 million were two largest depots [by inventory value) in each lost. A civilian employed at the depot has been Service. Specifically, the NAO considered: charged in connection with the fire. An Army Board (i) what lessons the Department learned from of Inquiry has been convened but will not complete the 1983 fire, and whether these together with its work until after the trial. previous practice resulted in adequate procedures for identifying the risk of fire in 1.8 Neither the Royal Navy nor the RAF has the Department’s stores depots: experienced fires on the scale of those at Donnington. Nonetheless, each has experienced two (ii] whether the risks so identified were potentially serious fire incidents in the past three translated into adequate plans to minimise or years. In three cases arson was strongly suspected prevent future store losses at major depots; and in the fourth illicit smoking was thought to be (iii) whether the 1988 fire could have been the cause. prevented, and what further lessons have been Scope of the NAO’s examination learned.

1.9 In view of the combined losses at the 1.10 The NAO did not examine the Department’s Donnington depot and the fires experienced by the arrangements for fire prevention at depots holding other two Services, the NAO examined the ammunition or fuel. These stores are subject to Department’s arrangements for assessing fire risks separate supply and storage procedures, and to and implementing preventive measures. The more stringent legislative control. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Part 2: The 1983 Donnington fire and subsequent risk evaluation

Cause and extent of the fire associated fire risks could be minimised by installing: 2.1 On 24 June 1983 building B6 at the Army’s (a) in-rack sprinklers; Central Ordnance Depot at Donnington was destroyed by fire. The building had a floor area of (b) enhanced water supplies to support these nearly 10 acres (40,000 m2) and burnt out despite and other fire fighting facilities; the presence of 140 firemen and 24 fire appliances. (c) automatic roof ventilation; and It contained clothing materials, motor spares, technical spares and radio equipment valued at (d] fire proof compartment walls that limit El69 million. At the time this was the most the spread of a fire. expensive warehouse fire in the United Kingdom. The Ministry of Defence convened a Board of 2.5 Only automatic roof ventilation had been Inquiry. The Board found that the exact cause of implemented at Donnington by 1983 when building the fire could not be defined but that arson could B6 burnt down. Compartment walls, the only not be ruled out. method known to be fully effective, had not been introduced for financial and operational reasons. 2.2 Apart from the size of the building a key factor in the extent of destruction was the use of high rise 2.6 The Board of Inquiry convened to investigate adjustable pallet racking. This is a high density the 1983 fire were unable to ascertain its cause, but storage technique which enables stores to be held to could not rule out arson. They found deficiencies in the full height of a building in an easily accessible the fire regulations and in the fire precautions. manner. Building B6 and a similar building (Bl) at They took a considerable amount of evidence on Donnington, together with several smaller buildings the risks of adjustable pallet racking and elsewhere, were converted to use adjustable pallet commented that enhanced water supplies and racking in 1977. This enabled the Army to close one compartmentation could have reduced the loss. The of their three major depots without constructing Board made the twelve detailed recommendations any new buildings. The other two Services installed which are set out in Appendix 1. adjustable pallet racking in many of their major storehouses for similar reasons. 2.7 The intensity of the fire at Donnington came as no surprise to the Army Fire Service. They 2.3 Adjustable pallet racking consists of metal considered that the fire confirmed various dangers racking sufficiently strong to support whole pallets well known to Fire Officers, such as: of stores placed one above another. Pallets are inserted and removed from the racking by means of “Adjustable pallet racking is certainly the best fork-lift trucks specially designed to minimise the bonfire you could build. If someone width of the aisles necessary between racks and deliberately set out to arrange combustible hence increase the density of storage. Whilst the material in a way that would most favour racking itself is not combustible, the wooden intense, rapid and widespread fire pallets, cardboard and plastic packaging are, and development, and at the same time most once a fire has reached a very high temperature the hinder fire protection activities, it would be racking tends to collapse, thus spreading the area of hard to find something more dangerous than the fire. adjustable pallet racking storage. But whether we like it or not, adjustable pallet racking is here to stay and its use is likely to be 2.4 The potential dangers of high rise adjustable extended throughout the whole storage pallet racking had been recognised virtually since industry”. its commercial introduction in the early 1970’s. In 1977, when the Army decided to introduce (Extract from the Army Fire Service adjustable pallet racking into a number of their presentation on the Donnington Fire given to storesheds, the Army Fire Service advised that the the 1964 International Fire Conference).

7 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Subsequently, during late 1983 and 1984, tasting at strategically important buildings. The Minister the Home Office Fire Research Station had shown asked that he be kept informed of progress on these that, once established, a fire could spread initiatives. remarkably quickly, with a tremendous elongation of flame at roof level due to the build-up of heat 2.11 Reports were made until early 1985, at which and gases there. The higher the racking in relation point, in the absence of new or significant to roof height, the faster the spread of the fire. developments, the Department considered the central exercise to be complete. The Services The Department’s subsequent evaluation of continued to progress their individual actions. In risk these circumstances it was for each Service to consider the risks and decide which fire precautions 2.8 Whilst the Board of Inquiry into the 1983 fire were justified and when to implement them. were gathering evidence, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, concerned about the implications for the rest of the Department’s stores estate, The Army’s fire risk assessment commissioned a rapid survey of fire risks across the three Services. The survey was initially limited to 2.12 The Army have two main store depots in the buildings containing stores worth f 50 million or United Kingdom They are at Donnington which, more. Twenty seven such buildings were identified; prior to the 1988 fire, had six large buildings in use three of which held over f270 million each. Five, on site and two more at a satellite depot; and including these three, used adjustable pallet Bicester with 21 large buildings, none of which held racking. Only one was reported to be fully protected large quantities of stores by value. against fire. In addition, the Royal Navy re- emphasised the inherent fire risks in the large 2.13 Following the destruction of building B6 at underground storage facilities at the Royal Naval Donnington in 1983, the Army’s first priority was Stores Depot, Copenacre. While the actual risk of the other large building using adjustable pallet fire is low and stores are not held in high-rise racking-Bl, which burnt down in April 1988 (Part racking, the potential consequences of a serious 4 refers). The Army commissioned the Property underground fire had been acknowledged for a Services Agency, the Department’s advisers on considerable time. building matters, to undertake a study of appropriate preventive measures. The Property 2.9 The report accompanying the survey noted Services Agency used a firm of risk management that the Department had, until 1983, an enviably consultants to provide an independent appraisal. good record as far as actual loss from fire was The consultants advised in December 1983, that concerned. However the report concluded that in building Bl “was fundamentally unsuited to the the short term, because of an increase in the storage of up to f320 million of materials” and had incidence of arson and in the use of adjustable “hopelessly inadequate fire protection”. In the pallet racking, there was a real possibility of consultants’ view the building was amongst the another equally disastrous fire. Ways of reducing worst fire risks they had seen and was likely on the risk included compartmentation to contain the average to burn out once every fire years. After spreadof a fire, and dispersalof critical storesitems analysingtwo optionsthey supportedthe to reduce the risk of total loss. The report further construction of a new building as a replacement for concluded that action in reviewing the estate and both Bl and B6. Both of the options assumed that the requirements for installing fire protection Bl would continue in use for a similar (unspecified) measures were matters for the individual Service period. Boards who alone were in a position to assess all the factors involved. 2.14 The consultants’ appraisal was followed by a review of the whole Army general stores estate by 2.10 The Minister requested that the survey be an internal Fire Protection Working Party. The extended to cover the likely operational impact of working party’s report, in April 1984, used a fires in the Department’s store depots. The resultant mathematical approach based on available report, in November 1983, stated that each Service statistical information to assess the prima facie risks had in hand a programme for identifying in each of the Army’s 87 stores buildings, taking operationally vital stores and progressively dual- into account the financial and operational locating them. Further, it indicated that the consequences of a major fire. They concluded that 9 Services were drawing up plans to provide full buildings (including Bl) posed a ‘very high risk’ and protection for some of the larger and more a further 3 a ‘high’ risk-see Table 2.

8 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Table 2 precautions below ground at Copenacre. Their main response to the fire was to review, in accordance Working Party’s analysis of fire risk in Army store with Ministerial directives, the vulnerability of sheds their operations to the total loss of any one of their buildings holding stores in excess of 250 million. The review led to proposals for relocating stores holdings and for improving fire protection measures. They also extended their long-standing fire audits from armament depots to all storage depots. These fire audits provide assurance, through Number of a triennial inspection, that fire prevention and fire Buildings 9 3 39 36 87 fighting arrangements are in accordance with regulations, and their wider application resulted over the next few years in a steady accumulation of 2.15 The Fire Protection Working Party technical information. emphasised that their application of fire risk methodology to the stores estate was a theoretical 2.19 The 1983 review did not assess technically exercise and that their conclusions and the the risk of fire in each building. To some extant this consequent recommendations for remedial action is understandable. The Royal Naval Stores Depot, needed to be confirmed by detailed surveys, Copenacre, partly consists of three underground including professional fire insurance advice, prior to caverns (previously quarries) holding, in April 1989, the implementation of any works programme. stores worth some E650 million. If a serious fire Firstly, the working party developed a protection took hold in any one quarry it would be priority score for each shed by ranking the contents considerably harder to fight than a fire above on the basis of strategic value, stock value, the ground. The Supply and Transport Service accept extent of dispersal and ease of replacement. They that a fire, if not detected, tackled and brought then applied a “fire risk factor”, which was under control in its very early stages, would dependent upon the stacking height of the stores. probably have to be left to burn out although this They did not quantify the probability of fire against would be confined to one quarry. To reduce this elapsed time. risk, the Supply and Transport Service instituted in 1975 patrols by fire patrolmen (24 hours a day, 7 2.16 The Fire Protection Working Party’s 1984 days a weak) in the quarries. Furthermore, they set report provided the Army with a sound base for in hand greater dispersal of stacks of cases below more detailed work and the assessment of relative ground and established close liaison with local Fire priorities. The Army decided to subject the Brigades to ensure prompt attendance and to recommendations of the working party to further provide familiarity with the unusual environment scrutiny, through the United Kingdom Future underground. More recently, extensive disposals of Storage Study (paragraphs 3.6-3.11). Following the surplus and obsolete stocks have reduced the second fire at Donnington (paragraph 4.1), and in concentration of stores below ground: this would accordance with a recommendation of the 1988 ease fire fighting and reduce the risk of a fire Board of Inquiry, the Army began using the spreading. working party’s methodology for the purpose of determining future fire protection requirements. 2.20 The risks at Copenacre have concerned the Supply and Transport Service for at least twenty The Royal Navy’s fire risk assessment years. An assessment in 1981 used an internally 2.17 The Royal Navy’s stores are administered by developed modal of risk and of the possible affects the Royal Naval Supply and Transport Service, of the loss of stocks. It concluded that in theory the which has two large inland store depots, Copenacre effects might justify the expenditure of up to f7 and Eaglescliffe. Storage in the former is largely in million per annum if this would eliminate the risk. three underground storage areas supplemented by a The Department informed the NAO that no positive number of surface buildings; the latter holds most recommendation emerged because, in practice, the of its stores in one surface complex. Substantial risks and effects of fire can never he completely holdings of general stores are also maintained at the eliminated. three naval bases, Devonport, Portsmouth and Rosyth. 2.21 The other main depot for the Royal Navy, Eaglescliffe, clearly posed similar problems to 2.18 Prior to the fire at Donnington in 1983, the building B6 at Donnington. The 1983 assessment of Supply and Transport Service had improved the fire Eaglescliffe’s fire risks showed that the main

9 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS building there (holding stores worth f260 million in it assessed fire risks in greater detail than the Army April 1989) consisted of three spurs linked to a report (paragraph 2.15), for example by reference to central spine in an “E” shape, much of it containing building construction and floor area, and provided high density storage. There were no compartment the Supply and Transport Service with a sound base walls to prevent a fire, once established, from from which to plan, justify and prioritise their fire destroying the entire building. protection programme.

2.22 Two fire incidents which, but for quick The RAF’s fire risk assessment detection and effective response, would have had serious consequences occurred at Eaglescliffs 2.25 The RAF have two main store depots, Carlisle during 1987. After the first incident the Director and Stafford. These depots include among their General responsible for Naval stores commented storesheds tan buildings and nine buildings that the Royal Navy had been only minutes away respectively, each of which holds stocks valued at from a catastrophic loss. Both fires were attributable over f50 million. Several operational stations also to either illicit smoking or arson. The first one hold large concentrations of stores in converted provided the impetus for a further thorough review aircraft hangars. of the fire risks throughout the Supply and Transport Service’s stores estate. The purpose of the 2.26 Prior to the 1983 Donnington fire the RAF review was to update the 1983 report (paragraph had begun a staged review of the fire risks in their 2.18) in the light of fire audits since 1984 and the stores estate. The RAF had already asked the two fires at Eaglescliffe. Property Services Agency to undertake a design study for the fire protection of their two most operationally important buildings at Carlisle, 2.23 The review was charged with the creation of together holding stores worth around E600 million. a single comprehensive record providing details of The Property Services Agency commissioned a firm size, construction, fire prevention/suppression of consultants to provide advice, but no explicit measures, contents and stock values of individual quantification of the risks was requested or storehouses. Consequently, 62 buildings had to be provided. examined, of which 25 held stocks each in excess of E20 million. The review, which was not completed 2.27 The RAF’s subsequent in-house reviews until October 1988, used a points system to classify considered the possibility of relocating stores sheds as high, medium or low risk. High risks holdings to reduce the operational effect of a major required urgent action. Nine general stores fire. In 1986 however, they concluded that this buildings each holding over E20 million were approach would be prohibitively expensive and identified as high risk, of which four had not would not substantially reduce the risk of major previously been identified as such, (being below the fire. They therefore concentrated on drawing up x50 million guideline previously followed) and all plans for the fire protection of existing storesheds. these buildings now required urgent action to The planning process was completed by March reduce the risk of fire. 1988. Although a full technical analysis of the works requirements was carried out, the RAF did 2.24 This review did not quantify the probability not assess the likelihood of a major fire in each of of fireor thelikely extent of destruction.However, thebuildings surveyed.

10 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Part 3: The Services’ fire protection plans

3.1 Following the various assessments of fire risk 3.4 The Army considered building Bl set out in Part 2, each Armed Service drew up plans separately-the building similar to the one (B6) to implement preventive measures in their major which burnt down in 1983. Although the 1984 depots. Although several high level inter-Service working party considered that it could be fully committees already existed to develop and protected against fire at a cost of E7 million, the promulgate the Department’s storage policy they Army decided in July 1984 that this would not be were not intended as a forum to co-ordinate the cost-affective given that: Services’ plans or ensure that they were developed (a) 25 per cent of the building’s storage to common standards. Each Service is expected to capacity would be lost; implement fire prevention policy, taking into account their differing operational and (b) the storage activity could be disrupted for organisational environments. The reporting process up to three years; (paragraphs 2.8-2.11) set up to inform the Minister, (c) the long-term future of Bl was uncertain. of the Services’ plans, ceased in early 1985. A decision was deferred until a further study, carried out by the National Materials Handling The Army’s fire protection plans Centre (an independent body], evaluated the alternative options available to the Army for 3.2 After the 1983 fire the Army introduced a replacing both Bl and B6. This study concluded number of measures to reduce fire risks whilst that the most cost-effective solution lay in the more cffcctivc but expensive measures were under construction of a fully fire protected, semi- consideration. At their two main depots: automated warehouse at a cost of some ~31 million. This new warehouse (B55) was to replace both Bl (a) smoking and combustible materials were and B6 and was expressly intended to accommodate banned from storage areas in all storehouses; the stores held in them. In September 1984 financial (b) civilian patrolmen were engaged at approval was given for the project to commence Donnington to enforce smoking regulations, leading to its successful completion at the end of control access to buildings and undertake fire 1988. From September 1984 onwards, the fire patrols; protection of the Army’s remaining buildings was treated as a separate but related programme. (c) combustible cardboard cartons were replaced by wire mesh cages to reduce the quantity of flammable material; 3.5 The Fire Protection Working Party originally estimated that providing full fire protection for 64 of (d) the maximum height of storage was the Army’s storesheds would cost about EZO reduced so that there was clearance of at least million. In November 1984 they presented revised a metre between the stores and the lowest roof costed plans for fully protecting the Army’s nine member, and the value of stores held in the storehouses (excluding Bl) that were perceived to highest risk building was substantially be at greatest risk. These were costed at some f22 reduced; million and it was calculated that work on the three (e) operationally vital stocks were identified largest storesheds was justified on cost/benefit and held at two separate points; grounds alone, with payback periods between two and seven years. (f) water supplies for firefighting were improved; and 3.6 When considering these plans the Army took (g) fire precautions were enhanced in a new the view that the implementation of fire precautions building at Donnington (B54). in old buildings could prejudice a more fundamental review for 30 years, and that it would 3.3 It was the view of the Army Fire Service, be wrong for fire protection to be tackled in subsequently borne out by the fire in 1988, that isolation from the Army’s total storage operation. A these measures alone were not sufficient to prevent further study commissioned by the Army, the a serious fire: structural measures were needed too. United Kingdom Future Storage Study, was

11 MlNlSTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PRO

High Density Storage (paragraphs 2.2 to 2.7) Restricted access for firefightinr No4

The 1988 fire in shed Bl. New shed B55 is in the background (Part 4) rECTIONATMA,NSTORE DEPOTS

Photographs reproduced by kind permission of Ministry of Defence (photographs l-3), Wolverhampton Express and Star (photograph 4) and the Today newspaper (photograph 5). No 3

2 in high density storage (Part 2) The 1988 fire: fighting the fire from outside the shed (paragraph 4.2) No 5

The 1988 fire resulted in a loss of f180 million [Part 4) MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS therefore undertaken to assess whether the (B55) at Donnington was almost complete. However, concentration of storage facilities at Bicester no new structural fire precautions for existing (Graven Hill, sites D and E) allied with the storesheds had been made when, in April 1966, modernisation of the depot at Donnington was a building Bl at Donnington burnt down. more cost-effective solution than maintaining the existing facilities at both depots. 3.11 Construction work on the first phase of measures approved in 1987 for Donnington (fire 3.7 The United Kingdom Future Storage Study protection of building B3) started in July 1989 with team reported in October 1965. They concluded that completion planned for February 1991. The new although fire protection was achieved most warehouse recommended for Bicester is now being effectively through the introduction of modern reconsidered as part of the Army’s overall warehouse design, modernisation was generally assessment of the requirements for the fire more cost-effective than rebuilding. They protection of its storage buildings (paragraphs recommended the construction of a new semi- 4.15-4.161. The water supplies for firefighting at automated warehouse at Bicester to permit the Donnington and Bicester have been enhanced, and concentration of stores functions on one site. The further enhancement at Bicester will commence study team suggested that if a second semi- shortly, with completion scheduled for December automated warehouse was built at Donnington and 1990. In addition, work is in hand to implement the two existing storesheds (Bz and B3) were fire first part of the Army’s fire protection programme. protected, four others including Bl could be A summary of the main measures implemented completely vacated. These measures were costed at since 1983 or in hand is at Appendix 2. some f83 million and were expected to produce efficiency savings sufficient to cover the cost in The Royal Navy’s fire protection plans seven to eight years. 3.12 In 1971 a report commissioned by Ministers 3.8 The Army accepted the study’s findings with recommended the transfer of all stores held regard to Bicester, but believed the underground at the Royal Naval Stores Depot recommendations for Donnington needed additional Copenacre to RAF Ha&bury. In 1974, however, investigation. A further review led to the decision, following the result of a further study, the in August 1986, that only one building (B3) at Department decided to abandon the Hartlebury Donnington should be fully protected against fire move and carry out a number of improvements at and that the findings of the 1984 Fire Prevention Copenacre. These comprised: Working Party be reassessed to develop more modest fire precautions for the rest of Donnington. (a) the compartmentation of two adjacent This reassessment was to be based on the time it areas underground and stock redistribution; would take to replace stores items if they were (b) enhancement of fire fighting destroyed in a fire but did not address the financial arrangements; consequences of such an event. (c) the introduction of fire patrolmen in the 3.9 Consequently in January 1967 a new plan underground areas on a 24-hour basis; recommended that: (d) construction of an above ground stores (a) items with long procurement lead times complex to accommodate one-third of the should be located at Donnington in either the stores held below ground, thus releasing fully fire protected Bl/B6 replacement or in B3 storage space to implement the other measures when it was refurbished: and detailed above.

(b) fire walls, affording an acceptable lower 3.13 The Supply and Transport Service progressed level of fire protection, needed to be installed the first three of these recommendations and the in three further buildings (including Bl) to fourth-the need for an above ground stores comply with health and safety regulations. complex-was accepted. However, after detailed planning, the costs had escalated from the original 3.10 In November 1967, the Army gave approval to f5 million to fl2 million. In 1961 another study was draw up a full planning brief in consultation with commissioned in order to investigate all the factors the Property Services Agency, the Army Fire which might have a bearing on the operation of the Service and the Directorate of Army Quartering. By Fleet. It reassessed the 1971 report and concluded 1966, in addition to the measures recommended by that: the 1963 Board of Inquiry, a policy of dual location of stock had been initiated and the new warehouse (i) owing to the significant increase in costs,

12 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

the above ground complex should not be built spine were to be internally divided by fire walls, unless additional stock ranges were with in-rack spinklers in the high density storage introduced; areas. [ii) the planned compartmentation should 3.18 In September 1986 however the Supply and proceed and that fire breaks should also be Transport Service decided that fire protection could created to the maximum possible extent in the be improved more quickly by physically separating underground sites; and each spur from the main spine (phase 1) and by (iii) fire fighting and fire prevention other works to be determined by a further arrangements should be further improved. feasibility study (phase 2) at an estimated total cost of f800,OOO. The Royal Navy stated that the aim of 3.14 The Royal Navy were already using aircraft the project was to contain costs within 2% of the hangars at nearby RAF Colerne to reduce value of the stocks being protected, and in this congestion underground at Copenacre when a context, some areas would remain outwith the further study, commissioned in 1982, assessed the Royal Navy’s size and value guidelines. scope for dispersal of stocks below ground. The study recommended that one of the hangars at RAF 3.19 In July 1987, the Royal Navy’s Chief Fire Colerne be converted to high rise racking to enable Officer expressed concern that because of funding smaller items to be brought to the surface. It was constraints, phase 1 of the project would not then envisaged that, to meet the guidance in the commence before 1988-89. He was also concerned Fire Standards Code, the hangar should be divided that phase 2 had slipped from priority 18 to priority into compartments. The Property Services Agency 70 in the Royal Navy’s building programme. The however expressed doubts about the efficacy of the start date was then further delayed while a full proposed compartmentation. The Supply and structural survey was carried out to ensure that the Transport Service then decided that to provide the basic structure would afford sufficient remaining necessary fire protection, an automatic, in-rack life to justify the planned modernisation and sprinkler system should be installed. This in turn installation of fire protection measures. On the basis would have necessitated improvements to the on- of a full structural survey by the Property Services site water supplies, doubling the budgeted cost of Agency, the Supply and Transport Service decided, the project to almost fl million. in late 1987 to adhere to the modernisation plan. But the funds originally allocated were then no 3.15 It thus took until October 1986 for fully longer available to permit work to start in that costed plans to be submitted for the revised project. financial year. Funds to carry out the hangar conversion were not made available until early 1988. Without this 3.20 With the allocation of further funds, work additional storage capacity, scope for segregation commenced in September 1988, some 12 months and dispersal elsewhere in the depot is limited. after the depot’s first fire incident and some five years after the first Donnington fire. Phase 1 of the 3.16 Because of these delays the hangar at RAF project has now been completed and phase 2 is Colerne could not be brought into use until mid- planned for completion by 1992. Even then, on the 1989. However, segregation of stocks below ground basis of the detailed planning brief for Phase 2, had commenced without the need for structural neither in-rack spinklers nor compartmentation of improvements. Planning is now in hand to provide the spurs will be provided though the floor areas of alternative storage accommodation within the the new compartments would themselves exceed Supply and Transport Service’s estate. This will those recommended in the 1987 Fire Standards Code. Further work to reduce these difficulties has * enable one of the underground sites at Copenacre to be closed in 1993, which was one of the main been identified. The Department informed the NAO recommendations of the 1971 report @amgraph that funds have now been allocated to allow these 3.12). additional works to be completed by 1994.

3.17 In 1984 the Supply and Transport Service 3.21 Following the fires at Eaglscliffe in 1987 a produced outline plans for the fire protection of the number of measures were introduced to lessen the Eaglescliffe storage complex. These were based on risks at this depot. For example, a ban on smoking the construction of fire walls to divide up the materials was imposed throughout the entire stores existing structure. During 1984 and 1985 complex. The Department informed the NAO that comprehensive plans were devised. Each spur was the depot water supplies have been enhanced since to be separated from the main spine by a fire the 1987 incidents, and that funds have been made compartment wall. In addition the spurs and the available for further enhancements in 1991-92.

13 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FLRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

3.22 A summary of the main fire protection essential, was cancelled because funds were no measures implemented at Copenacre and longer available. The RAF therefore decided on a Eaglescliffe since 1983 or currently in hand is more modest programme of improved fire measures, included at Appendix 2. Improved fire protection within a fl.1 million budget. This involved measures have also been implemented at other reducing the cost of fire protection for Carlisle’s two Supply and Transport Service establishments. largest buildings from El million to f550,OOO and investing the remaining funds in the The RAF’s fire protection plans compartmentation of five buildings at Stafford and a further five at Carlisle. 3.23 The RAF’s two main depots at Stafford and Carlisle together hold stores worth over f3,OOO 3.27 Towards the and of 1987 the RAF undertook million. Three sheds hold a combined total of over a further review of fire protection measures at El,000 million and a further 16 sheds hold at least Stafford and Carlisle producing a report in March E50 million each. The 1983 study by the Property 1988. The report considered buildings in which Services Agency of the RAF’s fire risks (paragraph compartments held stores valued at over f 75 2.26) made recommendations for improving fire million (in accordance with the RAF’s policy protection measures in two of the three large guideline) and certain other storesheds where buildings-both at Carlisle-that contained the compartmentation was deemed to be necessary on greatest concentration of stores by value. The third operational grounds. The report stated that the cost building-at Stafford-was considered to have of measures considered to be essential had risen to adequate fire protection. some f8 million, compared with the 1983 estimate of f7 million, of which only ED.6 million had 3.24 The consultants recommended that the two actually been approved. buildings at Carlisle could be protected at an estimated cost of El million. The RAF Fire Service 3.28 In April 1988 the Property Services Agency suggested that this estimate should also be used as revised their estimate of costs for the limited works a basis for calculating the cost of protecting the put forward in 1986 from El.1 million to f2.6 RAF’s other storesheds reported to the Minister in million. The RAF nonetheless agreed that these 1983 as holding stocks in excess of f50 million. On measures should proceed but that the additional this basis, they prepared a E7 million bid to protect works identified in the March 1988 report would seven of their larger storesheds. The NAO noted have to be strongly justified in order to compete that when preparing this bid, the RAF did not with other high priorities. Following the second fire establish whether any further buildings held stocks at Donnington in April 1988 these measures in excess of fX0 million. received approval. The programme is currently due for completion by mid-1991, by which time the RAF 3.25 Throughout 1986 the RAF drew up plans for will have spent almost f15 million. The fire installing fire compartments and sprinklers in those protection of the RAF’s two highest risk buildings, buildings identified to the Minister as being at risk. originally proposed as necessary in 1983, started in During this period the RAF raised the maximum May 1989 and should be complete by early 1990. value of stock, which could be held in any one The main measures the RAF have implemented and compartment, from E50 million to f75 million (with plan to implement are detailed at Appendix 2. somespecial dispensations of up to El00 million). The NAO noted that in 1989 several additional The Government’s Fire Standards Code stores buildings contained more than f 75 million per compartment; however, all of these buildings 3.29 Between 1986 and 1987 the Department’s Fire are in the RAF’s works programme to remedy the Officers worked with officials from the Property situation. In particular one high-density storage Services Agency and the Home Office to develop a building at Stafford currently holds in excess of common code of fire standards for government El90 million in each of its three fire compartments. departments including the Ministry of Defence. The This building was fully fire protected in the 1970s Code was published in April 1987 and consolidated by the standards then prevailing; further work is the previous fire guidance dating from 1980 in a now planned to incorporate the latest fire safety single policy document. technology developed during the 1980s. 3.30 The Code states, among other things, that 3.26 In August 1986, the entire f7 million fire “fast response in-rack sprinkler systems are to be protection programme (including further surveys by fitted in all high bay (above 4 metres high) storages the external consultants), which the RAF had where compartment sizes are over 2,000 m*. They categorised as “highly desirable” rather than may also be recommended by Fire Staff for small

14 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

compartments where the value of stores is high or change of use of the fourth building will where stores are operationally vital”. For stores of remove the need for alterations. Furthermore, flammable goods or non-flammable goods in one of the underground sites at Copenacre has combustible packing the Code recommends, as did now been approved for closure, the stocks the 1980 guidance, that storage compartments being moved to a new above-ground storage should not exceed 2,000 mz in buildings without area, by 1993. sprinklers, and 4,000 m2 in those with sprinklers. - eight held RAF stores to a total value of over f 940 million and ranged in size from 3.31 The Department informed the NAO that the 4,400 m’ to 6,000 m’. Fully costed plans had Code is mandatory in respect of new buildings and been submitted for all but the is also applied to the major refurbishments of compartmentation of one building (B4) at existing buildings where feasible or cost effective. Stafford. Funding had been approved in all The Department stated that, while setting out cases. technical and procedural guidance, the Code lays great emphasis on the judgement and priorities of 3.33 The NAO also found that: the Service Departments concerned. For instance, although the Code states that “the only feasible - the fire doors between the two adjacent form of fire protection for high-rise racking is an in- underground compartments at Spring Quarry, rack fast acting sprinkler system”, it acknowledges Copenacre, which necessarily remain open that “there will be cases where managers decide to while work is in progress, were not, contrary accept the risk after having been informed of the to the advice in the Fire Standards Code, self- consequences of fire”. closing in the event of fire. Work to correct this has now been completed; The NAO’s findings - the Royal Navy’s fire policy is firstly, fire prevention and ensuring the safety of staff, and 3.32 The NAO examined information supplied by then to encourage first aid firefighting. In early the Services on their buildings containing stores 1988, an internal fire audit indicated that there worth over f50 million (Appendix 3) in relation to was a lack of formal training of store staff in the requirements of the Code. The NAO noted that the underground sites at Copenacre. However, the Services had 16 storesheds above 2,000 m* with the full time fire patrolmen, who form the adjustable pallet racking higher than four metres. initial response for any outbreak of fire below Of these, 13 holding stores worth over El,000 ground, were regularly and fully trained and million had neither compartments nor in-rack subsequent investigation revealed that, in fact, sprinklers, including six for which there were no some staff training had been carried out. The fully costed plans for preventive measures. Of the Department informed the NAO in February 30 storesheds above 4,000 m2, there were 20 holding 1990 that the backlog of training of staff stores worth some f2,600 million which had neither underground has since been cleared; compartment&ion nor sprinkers. Of these: - the water supply at Royal Naval Stores - five held Army stores together worth some Depot, Eaglescliffe, was able to supply water at ET00 million and ranged in size from 7,000 m’ only 55 litres per second compared with the to 32,000 m2. When the NAO examination delivery rate of 75 litres per second specified began fully costed plans had not been by the Code. The Department informed the submitted for compartment&ion or installation NAO that the necessary works have since been of sprinklers in any of these buildings. The funded and should be completed in 1991-92: Department informed the NAO that they have now drawn up detailed requirements for two - twelve of the RAF’s storesheds had of these buildings and carried out detailed neither sprinklers nor hosereels, as required research into a third; by the Coda, and in five of those buildings the NAO observed that the height of the storage - four Navy surface buildings, ranging in racking exceeded the range of handheld fire size from 4,600 m2 to 15,000 m2, held stores extinguishers. The Department informed the worth some f260 million. In addition, stock NAO in October 1989 that, in accordance with worth f650 million was housed in three RAF policy, hosereels were being installed underground sites at Copenacre. The during the fire protection works programme; Department informed the NAO that improvements in three of the four surface - in one building at RAF Carlisle the buildings have now been funded for effectiveness of some of the roof sprinkler completion by 1991-92, while a projected heads had been degraded by painting and by

15 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

the installation of heating panels beneath the integrity of a compartment for longer than two them. The RAF have since rectified these hours. The Department also stated that both the matters. Royal Navy and the Army do consider using lower resistance fire walls where either the main 3.34 Whereas the Army and Royal Navy have structure has similar fire resistance or where less adopted the Code’s guidance that fire-proof than four hours protection is acceptable. compartment walls should be capable of withstanding a fire for four hours, the RAF are 3.35 The RAF are installing thin metal-clad fire installing walls resistant for two hours in all their walls in their existing storesheds. This has enabled major refurbishments. The Department informed them to compartmentalise their storesheds the NAO that the main storehouse structures in the relatively cheaply, much more quickly and with Army and the Royal Navy are generally of less disruption to the storage activity than the traditional construction, often with a rated traditional brick-wall construction favoured by the resistance against fire of four hours or more, but Army and Royal Navy. The NAO noted that these those in RAF storesheds have no rated fire metal-clad fire walls are available in a number of resistance. Consequently, if a fire started in an RAF fire ratings, including both two hours and four storehouse, it would be very difficult to maintain hours resistance.

16 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Part 4: The 1988 fire and further lessons learned

Cause and extent of fire 4.5 The Board concluded that arson was the likely cause of the fire. They found that the consequent 4.1 On 25 April 1988 two fires occurred at the damage was exceptionally heavy because of the Central Ordnance Depot Donnington in building Bl. practice of holding stores in high-density racking The building contained stores, mostly vehicle with inadequate measures to prevent the spread of spares, in adjustable pallet racking to a height of 9 fire. metres. The first fire, discovered in the morning, was rapidly extinguished; a spent match was found 4.6 The Board praised the actions of depot and in the debris. A second fire broke out at the firefighting staff to contain and extinguish the fire. opposite end of the building in mid-afternoon. They found that the fire regulations and day to day Despite the arrival of Army fire crews within 48 fire precautions were generally adequate but that, seconds of the alarm, and of the public service although security arrangements at the depot were within ten minutes, this fire took hold. otherwise satisfactory, they were insufficient in building Bl given the exceptionally high risks there. They noted that half an hour elapsed 4.2 The extent of the fire grew as racking between the first sighting of the fire and the alarm collapsed throwing burning debris across the being raised. Since the 1983 fire, civilian patrolmen narrow aisles. After approximately 15 minutes the had been employed during working hours, but they fire flashed across the top of the 17 metre wide did not patrol during break-times (during which central gangway and soon afterwards the firemen both the Bl fires started) and they had no powers of left the building because the roof structure had search for smoking materials. become dangerous. Because of the building’s size (10 acres-the same as B6 which burnt down in 4.7 The Board considered that the storage of 1983) fighting the fire from outside was ineffective. enormous quantities of stores highly vulnerable to Within four hours the two thirds of the building total loss by fire was a consequence of the Army’s containing adjustable pallet racking was destroyed. policy in the 1970s of concentrating their general The loss was valued at El80 million. stores at two locations. They reviewed the actions taken by the Army since the risks of this policy 4.3 The West Mercia Constabulary and were made apparent by the 1983 fire (as outlined in subsequently the Royal Military Police undertook Part 3) and concluded that the decision to build B55 extensive investigations of the circumstances and as a single replacement for Bl and B6 was the personnel involved in the fire in search of a correct course of action. They commended the possible arsonist. These investigations proved speed with which the replacement had been inconclusive. erected despite the amount of development work that had been required. The Board of Inquiry 4.8 The Board were not convinced that full regard was given to the need to protect Bl during the 4.4 An Army Board of Inquiry was convened to building of B55. The Board found that the examine the causes and consequences of the fire. In calculations leading to the decision to build B55 did accordance with established procedures, the Board not appear to take account of the predicted high of Inquiry heard evidence on a confidential basis. risk of losing Bl while B55 was being constructed. However, the NAO were given full access to their They believed that had a full cost benefit analysis entire proceedings and conclude that the Board been carried out of this risk, it was possible that examined the issues in a thorough and wide- different conclusions might have been reached; ranging manner. The Board completed their report funds for a higher level of fire protection in Bl in October 1988. The Department endorsed the during the interim period might have been made Board’s findings, with two reservations, and available or funds to provide alternative means of published a summary of the Report in February protecting the stocks held at risk in Bl might have 1989. been found.

17 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

4.9 The Department’s view was that the Board’s setting fire to store buildings. They limited the finding in respect of the protection afforded to the areas where combustion and smoking materials stocks in building Bl, pending their transfer to the were allowed but did not impose a total ban as the new building, took insufficient account of the steps Royal Navy had done at Eaglescliffe @aragraph which were taken after the 1983 fire to reduce the 3.21). The Army also increased the frequency of level of stocks and to improve the fire protection random checks for smoking materials carried out by arrangements. These steps included a reduction of the Ministry of Defence Police within the stores one metre in the storage height to facilitate fire area. The role of civilian patrolmen in preventing fighting, the progressive replacement of inflammable and detecting fires is still under consideration but containers by pallets and cages, and enhancement an interim review at Donnington decided that it of the water supply. would be inappropriate for them to be given powers of search. 4.10 The Department informed the NAO that there were also practical arguments against installing 4.14 On receipt of the Board’s report the Army set interim structural measures in building Bl: the up a high level committee to consider and take timescale compared to that of constructing B55; and action on its recommendations. They appointed a a shortage of spare storage space which meant that co-ordinator to ensure that their action plan, the installation of fire protection measures with approved in March 1989, would be implemented stocks in situ would of itself have increased the risk effectively. The plan was copied widely within the of fire. Department and it was emphasised to the other Services that the Minister expected the lessons 4.11 The findings of the 1988 Board in relation to learnt from the 1988 fire to be applied and the recommendations of the 1983 Board are at monitored wherever they were appropriate. The Appendix 1. Army had initiated action on all the major recommendations by mid-May. The Board of Inquiry’s recommendations 4.15 As part of their action the Army assigned a 4.12 The main recommendations of the Board team to update the 1984 Fire Protection Working were: Party report. The team concluded that of the 88 (a) funds must be made available urgently to storehouses relevant to their review, nine posed a provide storehouses with the proper level of ‘very high risk’ and eight a ‘high risk’. Their fire protection appropriate to the risk; recommendations for the installation of sprinkler (b) a cost benefit analysis should be carried systems and compartmentation closely followed the out to determine the most practicable way of guidance in the 1987 Fire Standards Code. protecting stocks in the period before proper fire protection is installed; 4.16 The team estimated that providing fire protection for the ‘very high risk’ buildings (holding (c) future studies and working parties will stores worth some f 750 million in total) would cost create delay and are unlikely to reveal fl6 million. Fire protecting the rest of the estate information on fire protection matters which is would cost a further f30 million and a further f37 not already well known. Most of the 1984 Fire million would need to be spent replacing the Protection Working Party recommendations storage capacity lost as a result of these measures. remain relevant and should be funded and The proposed programme would take at least ten implemented; and years according to a specified order of priority. (d) action taken on the recommendations of the Board should be co-ordinated by one 4.17 The Army subsequently produced a report agency to ensure their effective outlining the options for minimising loss and implementation. A clear plan should be proposing interim fire protection measures. One formulated with implementation dates such option was to insure the contents of certain identified. The plan should be progressed at buildings. The Department are currently examining six monthly intervals. this option. The Department accepted these recommendations in full. 4.18 The Army also considered the possibility of dispersing large holdings of stores out of buildings Action by the Army with unsatisfactory fire precautions. However, no suitable accommodation within twenty miles of 4.13 At Donnington the Army acted rapidly to Donnington was available. Small quantities of stores reduce the risk of staff accidentally or deliberately were transferred to nearby military installations:

18 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS but top priority was given to transferring stores into Department give further consideration to the the new building at Donnington in order to reduce prioritising and funding of fire protection measures to below f100 million the value of stores in the in the course of their annual costing procedures. main compartment of the building posing the highest risk. The operational effect of the fire 4.23 In an earlier Report [HC 359 of Session 1983-84) which referred to the 1983 fire at Action taken by the Royal Navy and RAF Donnington the NAO found that 75 per cent by value of the items destroyed were not replaced, and 4.19 The Royal Naval Supply and Transport suggested that this indicated excessive stock Service had already surveyed the risks from fire in holdings. The Government did not accept that the all storehouses with stock of over &20 million or of proportion of unreplaced items was evidence of particular strategic value. The RAF supplemented excessive holdings (Cmnd 9368: Treasury Minute their existing assessments by reviewing the risks in on the Public Accounts Committee’s 33rd Report buildings which already had some degree of fire Session 1983-84). They pointed out that because the protection. This exercise, which stemmed from replacement cost of certain stores is very much in their 1987 review (paragraph 3.27), indicated that excess of disposal value it may be cost-effective to the precautions in one building (holding stores retain existing holdings but may not be cost- worth f670 million) were inadequate. The RAF effective, or even possible, to replace them. have since drawn up plans to remedy this with the installation of fast-response sprinklers and further 4.24 The NAO therefore examined the need to fire compartments. The Department informed the replace stores lost in the 1968 fire. The Army have NAO that these improvements are planned for concluded that 30 per cent of the stores by value completion in February 1991. which were destroyed need not be replaced: their analysis of the items is shown in Table 3. 4.20 The priority accorded to fire protection in the Royal Navy and the RAF has increased since the Table 3 1988 fire, with significant amounts of funding being made available. The RAF schemes which have been Analysis of items not to be replaced funded now provide for improved fire protection. The Department informed the NAO that plans for further improvements in the Naval area have also been formulated. In December 1989, some f5.3 million was made available for various measures to Obsolete or obsolescent protect the main depots, mentioned in Appendix 3, (some still issuable, against fire. These measures include compartment some awaiting disposal) 17.5 42 walls and fast response in-rack sprinklers at Change of repair policy Eaglescliffe, compartment walls at Portsmouth (100 since procurement 7.5 18 store), Devonport (63-64 store) and at Rosyth (761 All time buy 1.6 4 store). The Supply and Transport Service are Stores held for others 3.1 7 drawing up plans to implement these measures Excess holdings of from 1990-91 onwards. initial spares requirement 10.4 25 Awaiting decision 1.9 4 - 4.21 The Department told the NAO that they Total not replaced f42.0 loo recognise the need to ensure fire protection measures are appropriately prioritised and funded; and that their annual Long Term Costing 4.25 It follows that the Army regard the 70 per procedures, through which the defence programmes cent which are to be replaced as essential for are prioritised within each Service and across the operational effectiveness. One of the lessons learnt Department, can achieve this. However the NAO from the 1983 fire was the need to ensure that vital consider that, with regard to the need for adequate stores are not held predominantly in one building. fire protection, the existing procedures did not pay Some details of the dispersal of stocks and of the sufficient attention to the risks which were being operational implication of the fire are sensitive and run. are being submitted separately to the Public Accounts Committee in a confidential 4.22 The NAO recommend. therefore, that the memorandum.

19 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

Appendix 1 The recommendations of the 1983 Board of Inquiry and the extent to which they were implemented by 1988

The Board recommended: The Board found: a. The early enhancement This recommendation was met in full. The loomm main serving the depot of water supplies at in 1983 has been supplemented with a 25omm main, served by three Donnington for fire fighting boreholes. The new main serves 162 hydrant pairs in addition to the since the existing system original main which serves 140 hydrants. provided something less than half the now mandatory figures for exceptionally high risk sheds. b. A review of all fire Fire orders were reviewed following the 1983 fire and are subject to orders. continuous review and amendment as necessary. c. A review of the use of An investigation into the use of polypropylene strapping was carried out in polypropylene strapping. 1983. It was decided, in the absence of any sensible alternatives to this widely used material, to continue with its use. Orders were however issued, forbidding the practice of cutting the strapping by burning, and scissors and knives were issued to all installations and sheds where the strapping was used. d. Constant checks to The Board found no reascm to suppose that the general standard of enforce discipline and discipline was other than good, although it heard evidence of same lapses, ensure compliance with some of which were in respect of contraband, that is to say the possession regulations. of cigarettes, lighters and matches within areas where these were prohibited. In this respect, the Board was satisfied that Ministry of Defence Police were generally effective in enforcing discipline and ensuring compliance with regulations, but felt that the responsibilities of civilian patrolmen employed at the depot neededgreater definition. e. Hose reels in addition At the time installation was being considered, the water enhancement to hand-held extinguishers programme was underway, and it was decided that an alternative option need to be installed inside would be adopted of installing hose reel carts, stationed inside the high rise storage sheds. building. By the time the water supply had been enhanced, the decision had been taken to erect building B55 as a replacement for the B6 and Bl buildings. It was therefore decided not to proceed with the installation of hose reels in place of the hose reel carts. f. Fire advice at the initial It is clear that fire advice is now a significant consideration in respect of planning stages for the both existing and new storage facilities, particularly in the new B54 and provision of storage B55 buildings. However, there is still evidence of occasional breakdowns in facilities whether by new communication. building or introduction of new methods in existing storage facilities.

20 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

The Board recommended: The Board found: g. Feasibility studies, Building B55, designed to be a replacement for buildings Bl and B6, including cost analysis, for incorporates all these fire protection methods. the provision of compartmentation and sprinkler systems with compatible automatic early warning detection linked directly to the Army fire station should be carried out before decisions are made for the replacement of B6. h. Analysis of storage Procedures have been established to identify, label and locate potentially locations by appropriately hazardous materials, through the means of systematic trawl of the trained depot safety officers inventory. for stores which could represent a health hazard. Consideration should be given to extension of that analysis to cover circumstances where a change of condition of equipment containing harmful substances could affect persons in the vicinity. i. Recording of all persons This was done for all Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency who may have encountered staff employed in the depot at the time of the 1983 fire, with the exception a health hazard connected of those who had left the area prior to the time the record was instituted. with the fire which took Those who had left the area could apply for and receive the necessary place at Donnington on 24 certification if they so wished. June 1983. j. Guidance and training Army Fire Service personnel are now given instructions based on for the Army Fire Service experience from the B6 fire and in line with Home Office guidance. They on fighting fires in high bay also carry out regular drills and practices around the storage sheds. There storage buildings. are also regular exercises with the local authority fire service. Neither local authority training schools nor the Fire Service college offer specialised training in this aspect of fire fighting. The Board was satisfied that as much is being done as is practicable. k. Vetting of all personnel A “Security Area” has been designated following the construction of new requiring access to the facilities at the depot. Security measures in force at Donnington are in depot security area. accordance with Departmental regulations and are subjected to periodic inspection. They have been found to be satisfactory. 1. In any future The Board took the view that, given the autonomy of the civil police and investigation involving military authorities, it was appropriate only to express the hope that civilian police, decisions consultation between them would take place before any decisions were which may affect the taken which could affect subsequent internal disciplinary processes. disciplinary process of either military personnel or civilian staff should be taken by the serving senior military officer.

21 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS Appendix 2

22 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS

23 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: FIRE PROTECTION AT MAIN STORE DEPOTS Appendix 3

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