Issue 79, 4th Quarter 2015 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE SEVENTY-NINE, 4
Trends in Defense Analysis TH QUARTER 2015 Integrity in Military Writing 2015 Essay Competition Winners Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 79, 4th Quarter 2015 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
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Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air War College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Col Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RADM P. Gardner Howe III/U.S. Naval War College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Brad Williamson/Joint Forces Staff College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
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Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Airman with Paktika Provincial Reconstruction Team, in coordination with Afghan government, provincial government, and Ministry of Youth Affairs, interviews 14-year-old Afghan boy attending large Paktika youth shura (U.S. Air Force/William Greer); Marine with Marine Rotational Force–Darwin handles black-headed python during orientation brief aboard Robertson Barracks, Northern Territory, Australia, in preparation for training “out bush” with Australian Defence Force during 6-month rotation (U.S. Marine Corps/James Gulliver); As part of conducting carrier qualifications for its upcoming deployment, Sailors pull arresting-gear wire across flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) (U.S. Navy/A.A. Cruz). About the Cover In this Issue U.S. Army Rangers, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, advance toward their objective Forum during Task Force Training on Fort 2 Executive Summary Hunter Liggett, California, as part of rigorous training to maintain their 4 Defense Intelligence Analysis tactical proficiency (U.S. Army/ in the Age of Big Data Steven Hitchcock) By Paul B. Symon and Arzan Tarapore 12 Transforming Defense Analysis By Catherine Johnston, Elmo C. Wright, Jr., Jessica Bice, Jennifer Almendarez, and Linwood Creekmore 19 Improving Joint Features Interagency Coordination: 113 Lessons about Lessons: Changing Mindsets 77 The Impact of Rising Growing the Joint Lessons By Alexander L. Carter Compensation Costs Learned Program on Force Structure By Jon T. Thomas and 27 Decentralized Stability By Mark F. Cancian Douglas L. Schultz Operations and Mission Command 83 The Case for the Joint Theater 120 Joint Doctrine Update By Jeffrey M. Shanahan Air and Missile Defense Board By S. Edward Boxx and Jason Schuyler Essay Competitions Winners of the 2015 88 Expanding Combat Power Through Military Writing Competitions Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Cyber Power Theory Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 38 Time to Come in from the Cold By Sean Charles Gaines Kern Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship (War): Nuclear Force Structure joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, for an Uncertain World allies, and other partners on joint and integrated By Wallace R. Turnbull III Recall operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; 96 The Gallipoli Campaign: 46 Strategic Development of and developments in training and joint professional Learning from a Mismatch of military education to transform America’s military and Special Warfare in Cyberspace Strategic Ends and Means security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges By Patrick Michael Duggan better while protecting freedom today. All published By Raymond Adams articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the Defense Office of 54 Countering Extremist Prepublication and Security Review. Groups in Cyberspace Book Reviews NDU Press is the National Defense University’s By Robert William Schultz cross-component, professional military and academic 102 The Commander-in-Chief publishing house. Reviewed by Alice A. Booher The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations JPME Today expressed or implied within are those of the 102 The Invisible Wounds of War contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views 57 Writing, Integrity, and of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Reviewed by David F. Eisler the Federal Government. National Security Submissions and Communications By Larry D. Miller and 104 Thieves of State JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Laura A. Wackwitz Reviewed by William H. Waggy II research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic 63 Extending the Shelf Life of specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to Teachers in Professional Joint Doctrine [email protected], with “Attention A&R Editor” in the Military Education 106 Interorganizational subject line. Or write to: By William G. Pierce, James E. Cooperation—Part I of III: The Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Gordon, and Paul C. Jussel NDU Press Interagency Perspective 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair By James C. McArthur, William Washington, DC 20319 Commentary D. Betts, Nelson R. Bregón, Faith M. Chamberlain, George Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 71 Why War Plans, Really? Email: [email protected] E. Katsos, Mark C. Kelly, E. Craig JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm By Robert A. Gleckler Levy, Matthew L. Lim, Kimberly 4th Quarter, October 2015 K. Mickus, and Paul N. Stockton ISSN 1070-0692 Rangers from 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, as part of a combined Afghan and coalition security force operating in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, await CH-47 for extraction (DOD/Pedro Amador)
Executive Summary
s this column is written, a on the Korean Peninsula once again I suspect, will be figuring out how to number of significant events has both sides on high alert but talking keep the best people in the force even A are occurring that will shape to each other at Panmunjom. On the though the tempo of operations may not the future joint force. The barriers to home front, another Presidential and get slower, despite the drawdowns in women engaging in ground combat congressional election campaign has Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of the force are being reassessed and, in all likeli- begun while the sequestration shadow continues at a high operational tempo in hood, most if not all will be removed. looms over the Federal Government part because of unfolding events around At the same time, the U.S. Army’s and especially the Department of the globe. The good news is that we will end-strength is expected to be reduced Defense. What does this all mean? always find we have great people among significantly (to below pre-9/11 levels), The easy answer is that a great deal us who know what to do even when while other Services are already there. of unsettled business from the past is the circumstances unfold in unexpected The price of oil has hit historic lows likely to remain while some new work is ways, as we saw recently on a high-speed and global stock markets have fallen added to our collective “inboxes.” Inside train from Brussels to Paris. Five people significantly. The situation would seem the military, as I have said in previous took action to stop a man with weapons to put pressure on some states that columns, the need for smart leaders and the intent to do harm, and each depend on high oil prices for revenue. who can figure out a way to lead their was rightly awarded France’s highest The combat and growing refugee crises organizations to success will continue. honor—the Legion of Honor—for taking in Syria and Iraq (and now Europe) Constrained budgets are nothing new swift and effective action. As we now continue without end. Afghanistan is for many of us, so adapting to these know, four were Americans, including still dealing with a difficult transition. circumstances should be almost standard two Servicemembers, and the other hero The area around the demilitarized zone operating procedure. The hard part, was a British businessman. While few of
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 us will ever find ourselves in such a situa- discusses the role for special warfare op- Schuyler suggest a better way to organize tion, being able to respond to a threat by erations in cyberspace. In the Chairman’s decisionmaking at the operational level of doing what you think is best—especially Strategy Article, Lieutenant Colonel air and space warfare through the Joint for the common good of others around Robert William Schultz, USA, discusses Theater Air and Missile Defense Board. you—is often the difference between how to deal with extremist groups in As military leaders at all levels search for success and failure, and these times call cyberspace. ways to get more while dealing with less for people doing what they think is best In JPME Today, the discussion of resources, Sean Kern sees the develop- for the common good. Those who serve two important and ever-present issues for ment of military cyber power theory as their nation honorably are just such peo- graduate studies, and PME in particular, crucial to adding punch to our combat ple. Some even try to share their good are brought into focus in two excellent power. ideas for how to do what is best through articles from teams within the U.S. Continuing our Recall offerings on journals like this one. If you are looking Army’s PME institutions. If you missed World War I during this 100th anniver- for good ideas to help you deal with in- the class on what plagiarism is and how to sary period of the “war to end all wars,” creasingly difficult events, I think you will avoid it, you will want to read and share Raymond Adams takes us to the Gallipoli benefit by reading Joint Force Quarterly. Larry D. Miller and Laura A. Wackwitz’s Campaign, the last great battle of the This issue’s Forum begins with an engaging article on the nexus between Ottoman Empire, and shows us how article by Paul B. Symon and Arzan an author’s expression of thought and things went wrong for the Allies far from Tarapore, who see both the great poten- ethical behavior, especially how it affects the fields of France. As the title suggests, tial and the inherent risks in harnessing national security. William G. Pierce, strategy only works when ends and means big data to our intelligence processes. James E. Gordon, and Paul C. Jussel, a are matched. The hard part is getting Seeking to improve another key stra- team from the U.S. Army War College, them to do so when the fighting starts. tegic process, Catherine Johnston and next offer suggestions on how to help Joint Doctrine provides two inter- her co-authors from the Intelligence PME instructors possessing advanced esting and important articles. A team of Community offer insight into how but dated operational experience remain experts, led by the Joint Staff J7’s James intelligence analysis is adapting to the dis- relevant in the classroom. C. McArthur, provides us with the first organized world we work in. Alexander In Commentary you will find Robert in a series of articles on interagency orga- L. Carter next provides some important A. Gleckler’s important analysis of war nization. Jon T. Thomas and Douglas L. ideas regarding improving joint inter- planning. His article should help those Schultz then offer an excellent recap on agency coordination. As we continue to who are not planners understand the the history and status of the 30-year-long assess the last several years of war and its strengths and limitations of our most im- effort to achieve success in providing aftermath, Jeffrey M. Shanahan provides portant military efforts prior to the start the joint force with the effective lessons a new look at stability operations as seen of operations. As a former operational learned capability now known as the through the lens of mission command. and strategic planner myself, looking at Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned JFQ next presents the winning essays what the plans can mean for strategic de- Program. Of course, we also bring you from the 9th annual Secretary of Defense cisionmakers is a unique interpretation, at the latest Joint Doctrine Update as well and 34th annual Chairman of the Joint least in the pages of military journals. as three book reviews on Russia, PTSD, Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions. In Our Features section takes on three and corruption in Afghanistan to help May, 24 judges from across the joint distinct but central issues for the joint you in your professional reading. professional military education (JPME) force: the effect of military pay and No matter what new challenges the community met to determine the best compensation on the force we can field, world brings us, JFQ will endeavor to JPME student entries among the three how best to manage theater air and provide what you have come to expect categories. This year’s winners provide missile defense at the operational level, from us: high-quality thinking and writ- a diverse set of issues and recommen- and how cyber has an impact on con- ing that is useful as you work your way dations to consider. In his winning ventional combat power. Anyone who forward. Let us know what you think. JFQ Secretary of Defense National Security has served or been aware of the pace of Essay, Lieutenant Colonel Wallace R. compensation in recent years for military William T. Eliason Turnbull III, USAF, argues that the members, especially those approaching or Editor in Chief nuclear force structure planned for 2040 at retirement age, knows that the benefits lacks key elements in the air-delivered currently provided have been steadily elements of the triad that must be con- increasing. Mark F. Cancian shows us sidered for our deterrent to be credible in what he believes is the consequence of 25 years. Winning the Chairman of the that part of the Defense Department Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Research budget growing as the total budget is Paper competition, Lieutenant Colonel affected by legislated cuts: the military’s (P) Patrick Michael Duggan, USA, force structure. Edward Boxx and Jason
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Eliason 3 Crew chief with 36th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, Osan Air Base, South Korea, checks computer data during Red Flag-Alaska 14-2, ensuring F-16 Fighting Falcon readiness (U.S. Air Force/Peter Reft)
Defense Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Big Data
By Paul B. Symon and Arzan Tarapore
ver the past decade, the U.S. their greatest challenge will be to ing, and the “Internet of things”—and and Australian intelligence com- develop new capabilities to manage the advanced analytics used to process O munities have evolved rapidly and exploit big data.1 We use the term that data. Big data yields not simply a to perform new missions. They have big data to mean the exponentially quantitative increase in information, developed new capabilities and adapted increasing amount of digital informa- but a qualitative change in how we their business processes, especially in tion being created by new information create new knowledge and understand support of joint and complex military technologies (IT)—such as mobile the world. These data-related informa- operations. But in the coming decade, Internet, cloud storage, social network- tion technologies have already begun to revolutionize commerce and science, transforming the economy and acting as enablers for other game-changing Major General Paul B. Symon, Australian Army, served as Director of the Defence Intelligence technology trends, from next-genera- Organisation from 2011 to 2014. Arzan Tarapore is a Doctoral Student in the War Studies Department 2 at King’s College London. The authors thank Josh Kerbel and Peter Mattis for comments on an earlier tion genomics to energy exploration. version of this article. In defense intelligence communities,
4 Forum / Defense Intelligence and Big Data JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 some of these technologies have been ing tools such as Wikis and Chat are big data are both enabling and driving adopted for tasks, including technical already being used to facilitate better the creation of IT solutions that are cus- collection and operational intelligence collaboration between analysts. Beyond tomized and intuitive for the user. Gone fusion—but big data’s impact on all- simple software acquisitions, however, are the days of hefty user manuals or ob- source intelligence analysis has scarcely disruptive information technologies scure text-based user interfaces. Specific been examined. have birthed a number of trends in how applications perform specific functions. This article offers a view on how these data are collected, moved, stored, and Even major platforms such as Palantir are disruptive information technologies could organized. Four of the most salient delivered with bespoke service support, transform defense intelligence analysis and prevailing concepts, which are already both in tailoring the product to customer the functions of the all-source enterprise. transforming the economy and society, requirements and in providing ongoing It is not a comprehensive study on trends could reshape all-source intelligence. software development support. Complex in technology or in the intelligence Everything Is Social, Mobile, and data-driven analysis demands a menu of profession, nor is it a deterministic Local. Much of the explosion of big data apps or even dedicated software develop- scenario of a high-tech future. has been driven by the fact that informa- ers integrated into analyst teams—as they Rather, here we seek to identify some tion is increasingly social (generated and already are in some parts of the IC. opportunities and risks of the disruptive transmitted by many users, rather than a The Internet Is Everywhere. The rate technologies at hand. First, we sketch a few big producers), mobile (collected by of increase in big data will only grow as background of the most important IT sensors on ubiquitous Internet-connected more devices join the Internet. These trends that are shaping today’s economy mobile devices), and local (geospatially devices not only provide an interface for and society. Second, we outline how big tagged). These trends have irreversibly users, but are also creating a growing data could transform intelligence analysis; transformed IT; mobile devices in partic- “Internet of things”—everything from it has the potential to unlock enormous ular have become the primary means of household appliances to industrial ro- productivity gains and effectiveness connecting to the Internet and have thus bots—that generate and use more data, by automating some currently labor- become the primary market for much IT in turn creating more potential knowl- intensive tasks, enabling new forms innovation. This has already created new edge and vulnerabilities. At the same of analysis and creating new forms of opportunities not only for collection, time, emerging technologies (such as presentation. Third, we argue big data but also for intelligence processing, ex- free-space optical communications, which cannot do it all; its utility in making ploitation, and dissemination (PED), and use lasers to transmit data through the at- sense of complex systems and addressing analysis. mosphere) are allowing users to bring the knowledge gaps is limited. Finally, we Data Are Useless Without Data Internet into austere communications en- outline how big data could transform the Science. The exponential creation of vironments in order to enable the wider wider assessment agency enterprise. We digital data holds enormous potential for military use of Internet-connected IT and argue that the explosion in data supply creating insight and knowledge through greater resilience to network failures. and demand will incentivize assessment PED and data analytics. The burgeoning These technology trends have been agencies to reposition their roles more field of data science—at the intersection driven by the commercial and scientific toward service-delivery functions and to of statistics, computer science, and other sectors, but they also have powerful rebalance their workforces. related fields—is increasingly being used implications for the IC; they are rapidly None of this is inevitable. In both by the private sector to realize the com- challenging long-held conceptions analytic operations and enterprise mercial potential of big data, often for of intelligence collection targets, management, much of how the scenario prosaic tasks such as tracking a person’s business processes, required IT tools, actually unfolds will be determined by the consumption patterns to better target and workforce skill sets. But the IC’s vision and agility of our leadership, our advertising campaigns. The IC’s routine capacity to adopt these technologies partners, and our adversaries. Defense work of collection, PED, and analysis is remains inadequate; fully exploiting these and intelligence community (IC) leaders still largely organized on the Cold War trends would require a deep revision must play an active but balanced role, model of seeking out sparse and secret of innovation policy and IT-acquisition exploiting big data’s potential, but information. Now, however, it must cope business models. To adequately exploit understanding its limitations. with the inverse challenge (and exploit these opportunities, the IC would the opportunities) of managing and need to incorporate a “technology Today’s Tech Trends analyzing massive quantities of data and, push” acquisition model alongside the The big data phenomenon presents in the process, compete with the lucrative customary “demand pull” model. In to- defense intelligence with a range of private sector to attract the highly special- day’s IT environment of faster innovation opportunities, from off-the-shelf tools ized skills of data scientists.3 and more disruptive and unpredictable to complex business-process reforms. IT Solutions Are Customized and technologies, where government lacks Some tools can be absorbed wholesale Intuitive. The accelerating pace of the speed or vision to lead innovation, by the IC; for example, social network- innovation and the need to best harness the IC’s best option may be to monitor
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Symon and Tarapore 5 and leverage incipient innovation instead and algorithms are set, the data could be collection, PED, and analysis, and cueing of attempting to drive it. Rather than managed—collected, moved, stored, and further collection. Vast quantities of dictating requirements to firms through a organized—with relatively little additional data—unprocessed and unseen by any byzantine acquisitions process (as in most effort. Applied to all-source intelligence, analyst—would be stored, available to defense procurement programs), the IC’s the exponential increase in data and ana- be mined later in the context of future greatest potential for IT adoption may lie lytics would render manual information data or requirements or to discover in injecting its “use cases” (and resources) retrieval impractical and unnecessary; the or recognize associations or trends. in the start-up or development phases of heavy lifting of data management could be Machine learning would allow this en- future technologies. And in a data-inten- largely automated. Already-existing tools tire process to improve with time. The sive information environment, assessment can create an automatic and persistent accumulation of data and the refinement agency leaders would need to recognize push of data to analysts, obviating the of algorithms would allow for dynamic that adaptive IT is integral to analytic labor-intensive requirement to manually and progressively more accurate models operations and no longer an ancillary pull data from various sources. That push or more robust and adaptive normalcy support function toiling in the basement. of data could be more processed and patterns, and would enable the detection The analysis mission-owner should valuable—for example, collated across dif- of finer or more meaningful anomalies therefore be responsible for shaping the ferent sources or formats—before it even accordingly. agency’s IT architecture as never before. reaches the analyst. There are significant challenges to Even if imperfectly realized, today’s Automated data collation and ana- fielding these new capabilities. Some technology trends hold enormous lytics would both save analyst effort and of these challenges are technical—for potential to transform all-source enable powerful new capabilities. Data example, optimizing ways to ingest and intelligence. analytics could, with varying levels of collate data from different sources and in human supervision, characterize data different formats, especially unstructured Transforming Analysis into meaningful clusters or categories, data from text and media. The thorniest Across intelligence problems, big data’s categorize and file new data into existing challenges, however, are associated with greatest promise is its potential to inte- clusters, and detect outliers or new data policy settings and governance frame- grate and organize information. New that do not fit into existing clusters.5 For works. For example, intelligence agencies technologies for collecting, moving, all-source analysis, new methods such as will need to set standards for the vetting storing, and organizing data could give object-based production could enable and quality assurance of data they source all-source analysts access to vastly more seamless integration of data from multiple from interagency or other partners; information with more automation and sources and in multiple formats, thereby establish security and legal compliance productivity, thereby allowing them building comprehensive libraries of data protocols for sharing data across organi- to concentrate their finite cognitive on given targets. Analysts could use that zations; establish robust security measures capacity on the hardest, highest-prior- mass of data and associated analytics to to protect data from spoofing, cyber ity problems. But rather than simply more quickly identify intelligence gaps, exploitation, or insider leaks; and stan- bolting new technologies onto current unexpected correlations and associations, dardize the tagging and coding of data processes, assessment agencies now or anomalies or irregular behavior. This for use in analytics. Once mission-owners have an opportunity to incorporate new range of capabilities could be profitably set these frameworks to govern the effec- technological trends in ways that funda- used, for example, for everything from tive and secure use of big data, all-source mentally reshape how data are used for finding patterns or anomalies in a ter- analysis should yield unprecedented gains all-source analysis. The new technologies rorist target’s pattern of life, to tracking in productivity and capability. could be usefully applied to a range of military targets automatically in wide- Presentation Is Everything. Once defense intelligence problems, including area surveillance, to tipping and cueing collated, managed, and applied to gain social network analysis, weapons systems for humanitarian assistance and disaster new insights, data must be presented modeling, trend analysis for tactical recovery support. In such cases, human effectively to the customer. Here, too, military intelligence or nontraditional intervention—especially expert analysis big data carry risks and opportunities. warning problems, and nascent analytic of the target—is still critical, but big data Customers will never lose the temptation constructs such as “object-based produc- could empower those analysts to know to acquire and interpret their own data, tion” and “activity-based intelligence.”4 more and to know it more quickly and and big data, plentiful and apparently au- Thus, they not only improve our capac- with less effort. thoritative, will exacerbate that problem. ity to execute existing intelligence mis- Big data technologies allow in- The IC faces the risk that these quantities sions, but they also create entirely new telligence to move quickly, be stored and varieties of data will create the ap- data-intensive types of analysis. indefinitely, and yield more valuable pearance of veracity—and customers’ easy More Information with Less Effort. insights over time. Much of the newly access to raw data streams or intelligence Big data and data analytics rely heavily collected data would arrive at or near reporting could become even more haz- on automation. Once the architecture real-time, compressing the latency of ardous. In an environment where data are
6 Forum / Defense Intelligence and Big Data JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Airman checks diagnostic information after applying three different upgrades that give pilots more situational awareness data in user-friendly formats (U.S. Air Force/Alexander Guerrero) ubiquitous, customers will expect imme- multi–collection platform reporting and “Information Cut-Off Date.” Third, they diate and authoritative answers and will data streams and use “recommendation would be interactive; the customer could sideline IC producers that cannot quickly engines” of the type used by Amazon and interrogate the product, using hyperlinks deliver user-friendly products. Netflix to suggest other relevant outputs or some other intuitive interface, to pur- Fortunately, big data and data ana- tailored to the customer’s requirements. sue additional layers of data. lytics also present opportunities to create The most effective finished intel- These attributes of data-intensive compelling and effective outputs for the ligence outputs, exploiting the full presentation are clearly better suited to customer. Data-intensive solutions to in- potential of data analytics, would incor- some outputs, and some customers, than telligence problems demand appropriate porate the following features. First, they others. Already, strategic assessments for forms of presentation; just as in science would use a visualization platform, and national policymakers can profit from and commerce, these solutions would for strategic analysis, the most common visual and interactive outputs—even the be best presented as graphics or visuals, platforms would most likely be geospatial. President’s Daily Brief, the pinnacle of not text-heavy assessments. Assessment Much digital data are already geospatially national-level intelligence, has been deliv- agencies could profitably use one or a tagged, and geospatial presentation often ered on an iPad. With time, big data and few main data-agnostic platforms (such yields powerful insights that are not data analytics could transform all phases as Google Earth), connected to relevant otherwise apparent. Second, they would of analytic operations, culminating with intelligence databases and easily overlaid be dynamic—using automated feeds, the quicker, more accurate, and more tailored with various customized data layers, to product would be constantly updated intelligence for customers. electronically deliver finished intelligence with data collated in real time. Outputs to the customer. With the concomitant would offer more than just a recent snap- Limits to Transformation improvement in IT, these outputs could shot of intelligence, as the IC typically The promises of big data are tantaliz- be easily pushed to the customer, just as provides now with written assessments, ing, but they are limited. The greatest data are pushed to the analyst. Presented and they would render obsolete terms impact will be felt in the analysis of in multimedia, they could incorporate such as “Latest Date of Intelligence” or who, what, where, and when ques-
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Symon and Tarapore 7 need to provide the necessary context or value-added interpretation of the data an- alytics—the “so what?”—which requires not only subject matter expertise but also sensitivity to customer requirements. Consider the conflicts that flared in Ukraine and Iraq in 2014. In both cases, irregular forces—Russian-backed separatists and Islamic State militants, respectively—made rapid advances against their adversaries, not only de- ploying effective military force but also documenting their campaigns in social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube. Exploiting the content and metadata of these sources, fused with data from traditional intelligence, surveil- lance, and reconnaissance (ISR), could yield significant data about those forces’ tactics, social networks, and geolocation at particular times. Those data-intensive Intelligence analyst gives commander of 21st Theater Sustainment Command terrain brief of Hohenfels Training Area on enemy activity (U.S. Army/Henry Chan) streams would allow Western defense in- telligence to build a high-fidelity picture tions, using single– or multi–collection and to ensure the enterprise is serving of these forces’ composition, materiel, platform structured data to address customer requirements—asking the right and disposition. They could thus provide discrete, bounded questions. It plays a questions and directing collection and useful context and cueing for tactical smaller role in analysis of why or how analysis accordingly—rather than being intelligence support. But they would add questions, which are salient not only slaves to the data. little to the customers’ understanding of for strategic intelligence supporting the Second, analysis needs expert ana- the militants’ intent—their operational policymaker, but also for every level lysts. Data-intensive fusion, PED, and plans and political agenda—or even some down to tactical intelligence supporting analysis are better suited to some types elements of their capability, such as their subunit commanders. of intelligence problems than others, level of unit cohesion. Framing, solving, Analysis Needs More Than Data. but they always require expert analysts and interpreting these puzzles, even for Data-intensive forms of analysis promise to make sense of outputs. Data-intensive tactical military intelligence problems, new efficiencies and insights, but at its analysis can more profitably be applied require analytic judgment, attuned to heart, all-source analysis needs more than against “puzzles,” with bounded, empir- customer needs. just data. First and foremost, analysis ically discoverable answers, rather than For mysteries, data may offer valuable needs expert leadership. Faced with the “mysteries” that deal with a contingent, piecemeal insights, but expert analysts allure of compelling data, the IC faces imponderable future.6 Puzzles typically need to do even more heavy lifting to a risk that available data will drive the relate to discrete objects—places and translate those insights into meaningful analytic agenda rather than the other way things—whereas mysteries are tied to assessments for customers. Expertise is around. The sheer availability of certain complex phenomena.7 Mysteries or critical for inferring a target command- types of data could skew the analytic en- complex phenomena are the product of er’s intent (as in the Ukraine and Iraq terprise to prioritize its efforts or distort inscrutably complex human interactions irregular warfare examples above) and its assessments by placing undue impor- and, like any complex system, are sensi- even more so for assessments of complex tance on the most data-intensive activities tive to countless variables and therefore phenomena, such as political unrest. For or by emphasizing the most visible and inherently unpredictable. Defense intelli- instance, a more perfect data-intensive trackable targets or issues. Instead, expert gence must be postured to tackle both. coverage of the Arab Spring unrest could leadership must still determine which data Even puzzles require expert ana- have provided better insights into the are collected and in the service of which lysts—to frame the puzzles in the first depth of popular opposition to Arab re- analytic priorities; these tasks demand place, solve them, and then to make them gimes or tactical warnings of intensifying judgment and knowledge of customer re- relevant. Analysts need to verify collected protests, but simply a better coverage of quirements. The analysis mission-owners data that may be flawed or spoofed by social-networking or other data-intensive must be careful to redouble their em- denial and deception, which requires tools would not have prepared Western phasis on directing the intelligence cycle expert analytic tradecraft. They then intelligence agencies to anticipate the
8 Forum / Defense Intelligence and Big Data JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 revolutions. Twitter feeds alone could not address enduring knowledge gaps. Unlike explain why revolutions swiftly consumed intelligence gaps, knowledge gaps have A Modest Time Horizon regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, or explain no single, durable answer and may not The pace of technological innovation the difference in political trajectories in be required to directly support specific is extremely high and increasing. Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. An actionable decisions or actions. Rather, they are an Many of the consumer products intelligence response to Arab unrest ongoing requirement, a framework to and underlying technologies that would have required marrying that da- guide collection and to improve deci- have revolutionized the high-tech ta-intensive coverage with subject matter sionmakers’ understanding as they seek sector have gone from prototype expertise, comprehensive analyses of state to execute a plan. These gaps would only to ubiquity in a few short years. stability, and a receptive and agile policy be satisfied—or, more likely, de-priori- The iPhone—the device that made customer; big data without those factors tized—when they are no longer essential mobile Internet routine—was would have provided tactical tipping for decision advantage. More data can- launched only in 2007. By 2008, the of protests, not strategic warning of not close a knowledge gap. As a result, number of mobile (WiFi) broadband regime collapse or civil war. For complex knowledge gaps involve an inescapable users overtook the number of fixed problems, big data can provide a more degree of uncertainty and limit analytic (wired) users. The two giants of granular picture of the target, quickly and confidence. They remain extremely useful social networking, Facebook and with little effort, but the mystery can only constructs to structure and prioritize in- Twitter, were both opened to public be anticipated or managed (if at all) by telligence collection and analysis, but they use in 2006; by 2011 Twitter was the enterprise’s expert leaders and ana- also highlight the limitations of big data’s being credited with facilitating polit- lysts, working closely with the customer. utility to strategic analysis. ical organization in the Arab Spring, Addressing Knowledge Gaps. Some Knowledge gaps may be comprised of and by 2012 Facebook boasted more big data proponents argue that new stor- multiple intelligence gaps, but critically, than a billion members. age and processing technologies should they also require analytic interpretation These technology applications all allow users to collect and manage virtu- and judgment. For example, cataloging had a widespread disruptive effect ally all relevant data about a given object. the signatures of China’s new aircraft in less than 5 years; other technolo- By examining the entire population of carrier, charting the performance of its gies such as the “Internet of things” data rather than a sample (that is, where aircraft and weapons systems, or tracking are yet to mature, and their impact n = all), users could make direct obser- its position on a patrol all represent intel- can scarcely be predicted. Big data vations rather than relying on inferences ligence gaps with discoverable answers. technologies present a complex set based on partial data. Induction and But understanding how that vessel might of challenges that the Intelligence modeling would be unnecessary, replaced be used by Beijing, in concert with Community (IC) will grapple with by the volume and fidelity of a virtually other capabilities in a crisis or as part of for years, but the extreme pace of complete data set, manipulated by well- a coercive strategy, would represent a technological change will continue. tested algorithms. In this view, better complex knowledge gap comprised of Within another 5 to 10 years, the understanding only needs better data. many constituent intelligence gaps and high-tech ecosystem will probably The quest for more data is all too unknowable future courses of action that be unrecognizable, and the IC will be familiar for the Intelligence Community. are contingent, complex, and unpredict- faced with a radically different set of Built in the Cold War, when clandes- able. Data cannot reveal what does not risks and opportunities. Thus we can tine collection was key to uncovering yet exist, such as adversary decisionmak- only meaningfully project the impact scarce information, and reinforced in ing in a crisis. For such knowledge gaps, of existing disruptive technologies the past decade of ballooning technical collecting and collating all relevant data with a maximum time horizon of ISR collection to support warfighters, would not be sufficient; better data may about 5 years—a period that will be the community has developed as a col- provide richer evidence for interpretation dominated by adoption of big data lection-centric system geared toward and anticipation, but it would only be a technologies. Anything beyond that is plugging intelligence gaps or arith- supplement to subject matter expertise science fiction. metically connecting the dots, and any and rigorous tradecraft. missteps or intelligence failures are most In defense intelligence, creating commonly met with demands for more knowledge requires more analyst effort all relevant data for a problem (or or better data.8 For some problems, ad- than closing intelligence gaps, but it is achieving n = all) should allow users dressing intelligence gaps is vital, and big also more important, at least to strategic to draw reliable empirical correlations data will help—with both open source policy customers. Making sense of without needing to understand causality; and intelligence collection. complex systems and phenomena— indeed, in some fields, that may be Complex phenomena, on the other creating knowledge—is central to sufficient. But in intelligence analysis, hand, are not so easily conquered by data. sound decisionmaking. Some big data understanding causality is indispensible For these, assessment agencies need to optimists suggest that uncovering because customers seek to take action
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Symon and Tarapore 9 to influence outcomes, and actionable support from a proliferating array of Another key service the enterprise intelligence support should accordingly competing suppliers, from established could deliver is access to a much wider highlight causality, enable the customer and nontraditional media to commercial network of expertise from across, and to understand their points of leverage, intelligence services, which can provide from outside of, the IC. In this view, be alert to key decision points, and act quicker and more user-friendly answers— assessment agencies would retain their effectively against threats or opportunities. at a tiny fraction of the IC enterprise’s core analysis and production mission, Understanding causality in the context of operating budget. but to meet customers’ demand with the customer requirements—in other words, Fourth, the proportion of useful best possible intelligence support, they creating and applying knowledge—is thus information that is classified, the unique would also leverage networks of other central to the IC mission. province of the IC, is rapidly declining. agencies, allied partners, commercial Increasingly, decision advantage hinges sources, and cleared outside experts. In a Transforming the Enterprise on speedily integrating multiple streams world awash in data, assessment agencies’ Simply passing the deluge of data on to of data rather than on a well-placed spy— prime advantage will lie in the privileged customers would be counterproductive; and big data provide a wealth of open access to their customers; while they will even neatly presented fused data, absent source or gray information that can more not be able to internally produce all the expert assessment and advice, would cheaply and automatically be deployed answers, they should be able to tailor and only decrease the signal-to-noise ratio for intelligence solutions. Classified fine-tune intelligence solutions sourced of useful, actionable intelligence. Big collection will remain indispensible, from intelligence collectors and from data are exacerbating that problem by but IC leaders will be incentivized to elsewhere. This service then amounts sharply increasing both the supply of more judiciously deploy those relatively to enterprise management: using data available to the IC and the demand expensive and risky means against their networks of experts and data sources for it from senior customers. Caught toughest hard targets. and collaborative mechanisms including in the middle, IC leaders will need to With these clunky production social-networking tools to quickly address adapt not only to the transformation of processes, tough competitors, and less priority knowledge gaps. Effective analytic operations, but also to the func- unique information, an unchanging IC enterprise management hinges on robust tions and staffing of the enterprise. enterprise will face an urgent threat of integration with both those networks and From Production to Service Delivery. irrelevance. This threat sharpens already with the customer. In an environment of ballooning data existing incentives for assessment agencies Renewed Importance of Staff inputs and expected outputs, the IC to reimagine their function, from the Functions. All-source analysts have cadre of all-source analysts will find it current industrial-age model of linear traditionally been the core skill set of increasingly difficult to remain the original finished intelligence production to an assessment agencies, and as we have producers of all finished intelligence for information-age model of integrated and argued, big data create powerful their customers. Even with the anticipated adaptive assessment service delivery. Even reasons to integrate data scientists productivity dividends, the enterprise in without the advent of big data, a growing and software engineers into analytic its current form will not be able to cope body of literature on the state of the art of teams. Additionally, intelligence staff with the pace or scale of the big data all-source analysis argues that intelligence functions—a greatly enabled version of challenge, for at least four reasons. agencies should cultivate a more intimate today’s collection managers as distinct First, customer expectations are relationship with their customers—to from all-source analysts—would be a already growing and outstripping the IC better understand their requirements critical force multiplier by facilitating the capacity to adapt. As their decision cycles and more effectively deliver influential agency’s enterprise management roles. continue to be compressed, customers support—and to reconceptualize their In an enterprise transformed to provide will demand immediate and data-rich role from sole producers to service assessment services rather than simply answers rather than lengthy deliberations providers.9 Much of this literature production, effective staff work would or vague and unverifiable “gut calls.” points to the importance of timely and form the vital connective tissue between Second, in the face of these tailored on-call expertise (as distinct the assessment agency and its network of increasingly unforgiving expectations, from discrete written products) as a key collectors and partners. the current production process—tasking service for customers. The J2 briefing the The force-multiplying quality of these collectors, collating and analyzing data, commander or the analyst briefing the staff functions will prove particularly and producing finished intelligence policymaker is an indispensable face-time valuable as agencies seek to manage both reports—is too cumbersome and time- moment for both the customer and the the demands of big data analytics and consuming. If the IC rigidly sticks to that intelligence provider. The customers’ resource constraints. Assuming the U.S., process, dissatisfied customers will seek abiding preference for agile and Australian, and other ICs will continue to their information elsewhere. responsive in-person expertise will ensure face tough budget and staffing pressures, Third, these dissatisfied customers such services remain a prized feature of any future investment in data analytics– will find data-intensive information assessment services. related functions will likely come at the
10 Forum / Defense Intelligence and Big Data JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 expense of all-source analyst capacity, the IC. The risks and opportunities we leadership must ensure that expertise and as analyst billets are retasked for new have outlined are foreseeable in the next 5 tradecraft are at the center of analytic data-related missions. Investing more in to 10 years; other disruptive technologies operations and that knowledge creation staff functions would provide a scalable not yet conceptualized (let alone fielded) and assessment services are at the center solution for the agency to leverage more will have other, unknowable effects of enterprise management—all in the external capacity to meet rising customer in coming decades. The unknowable service, ultimately, of decision advantage demands—and a scalable solution to nature of future disruptive technologies, for the customer. JFQ maximize service delivery will become however, should not prevent IC leaders particularly salient in case of future from executing a big data strategy budget or staffing cuts. immediately to transform both analysis Notes Thus, the future assessment agency and the enterprise. 1 should have a more diverse ecology None of these changes is inevitable; Big data is now a hackneyed, almost passé, term, but in the absence of a widely accepted of personnel. Rather than treating exploiting big data’s remarkable substitute, it remains useful. For a non-scientific all-source analysts as the sole core opportunities and mitigating its risks introduction to big data and its transformative competency and all other functions as demand strategic vision. An adaptive and potential, see Kenneth Neil Cukier and Viktor ancillary support, an effective assessment effective defense intelligence enterprise Mayer-Schoenberger, “The Rise of Big Data: agency that has adapted well to big will need new IT tools, new skill sets, How It’s Changing the Way We Think about the World,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2013). data–related disruptive technologies and new business processes to embrace 2 James Manyika et al., Disruptive Tech- will rely critically on the interaction of innovative technologies, and these will nologies: Advances that Will Transform Life, three core job types, none of which can be costly. It will also entail a formidable Business, and the Global Economy (San Fran- be fully effective without the others: recruitment and training challenge not cisco: McKinsey Global Institute, May 2013), data analytics disciplines, including data only to cultivate a cadre of skilled data available at
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Symon and Tarapore 11 Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, USMC, delivers inaugural address as director of Defense Intelligence Agency and commander of Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, January 23, 2015 (Defense Intelligence Agency)
Transforming Defense Analysis
By Catherine Johnston, Elmo C. Wright, Jr., Jessica Bice, Jennifer Almendarez, and Linwood Creekmore
he Defense Intelligence (IC). These traditional security crises century has seen groundbreaking dis- Enterprise is on the precipice are compounded by global demo- ruptive technologies adopted on a global T of tremendous change. The graphic, economic, and climate chal- scale, and the pace of technology innova- global environment is experiencing a lenges that need to be viewed through tion and further disruptive developments mind-numbing quantity and diversity the prisms of nontraditional disciplines. looks to increase exponentially. Drivers of challenging crises. Perhaps not since Against the backdrop of this complex of technology innovation are no longer the end of World War II have so many operational environment, the volume, simply government-funded initiatives; pockets of instability and change con- velocity, and variety of data continue to commercial and private industries are fronted the Intelligence Community grow at a dramatic pace.1 The early 21st also involved. Individuals are increasingly empowered with a low barrier of entry for truly sophisticated technological Catherine Johnston is Director for Analysis at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Elmo C. fields. The IC must take advantage of this Wright, Jr., is the Senior Expert for Analytic Modernization and Innovation at DIA. Jessica Bice is an seemingly boundless information age by Intelligence Officer in the Defense Counter Terrorism Center at DIA. Jennifer Almendarez is a Strategic leveraging large volumes of data, using Communications Officer at DIA. Linwood Creekmore is an Analyst at DIA.
12 Forum / Transforming Defense Analysis JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 innovative technology, and employing percent of an all-source analyst’s work significantly enable and make easier a common analytic strategies and tradecraft hours is spent searching and compiling number of cross-agency analytic mod- to provide the United States and its allies information, and less than 20 percent is ernization efforts, such as object-based with critical information when and where actually spent performing higher order production (OBP). it is needed. analytics of the assembled data.4 Object-based production is a concept The Defense Intelligence Agency The crux of this inefficiency is the being implemented as a whole-of-com- (DIA) recognizes that the collective onset of large electronic data sets that munity initiative that fundamentally response of these defense all-source have created challenges for analysts in changes the way the IC organizes infor- enterprises to such challenges will be how they retrieve, mine, and amalgam- mation and intelligence. Reduced to its significantly limited by the stark realities ate information to glean key insights. simplest terms, OBP creates a conceptual of fiscal austerity. The intelligence budget As automated data expand, analysts are “object” for people, places, and things is unsustainable given fiscal pressures, overwhelmed, with no reasonable chance and then uses that object as a “bucket” and yet it is inadequate considering the to find all the relevant information, to store all information and intelligence scope and scale of current and future op- much less analyze it. Instead, analysts produced about those people, places, and erational requirements. The solution will spot-check roughly 1,400 data sources things. The object becomes the single not be in lobbying for additional funds— for information they believe will be most point of convergence for all information mandated reductions and decreased relevant.5 This introduces hidden biases, and intelligence produced about a topic budget authorizations must be adhered as analysts are more likely to seek data of interest to intelligence professionals. to—but rather in effectively transforming sources that reinforce their preconceived By extension, the objects also become the our tradecraft and technology. We are opinions. Unfortunately, data can be- launching point to discover information addressing the threat environment by come operationally useful only if we can and intelligence. Hence, OBP is not a aligning our priorities with the 2014 make sense of it at the right time and in tool or a technology, but a deliberate way National Intelligence Strategy objectives: the right context. The intelligence ana- of doing business. innovating the way we share data while lytic enterprise must find a way to ensure While simple, OBP constitutes a rev- safeguarding it, managing the defense analysts can access data from areas, tools, olutionary change in how the IC and the intelligence analytic enterprise, investing and platforms not previously discover- Department of Defense (DOD) organize in our people, and working with our able. This challenge is the driving force information, particularly as it relates to partners.2 In this article, we examine in behind DIA’s analytic modernization discovery and analysis of information turn how we are doing in each of these initiative. and intelligence. Historically, the IC four areas. The article then concludes Working in conjunction with the and DOD organized and disseminated with what the future of defense all-source Director of National Intelligence’s information and intelligence based on analysis might look like. information technology strategy, the the organization that produced it. So IC Information Technology Enterprise retrieving all available information about Innovating Information-Sharing (IC ITE, or “I sight”), and the Mission a person, place, or thing was primarily While Safeguarding Data User Group, DIA is facilitating this performed by going to the individual The defense intelligence ecosystem fundamental shift in the analytic envi- repository of each data producer and/ has evolved rapidly over the past 10 ronment. The IC ITE architecture will or understanding the sometimes unique years, but our analytic methodologies enable the Intelligence Community to naming conventions used by the dif- have only incrementally adapted to the become more transparent, efficient, and ferent data producers to retrieve that changing environment. As of 2012, effective, moving us from an individual, organization’s information or intelligence more than 90 percent of the stored data agency-centric model to an enterprise about the same person, place, or thing. in the world had been created in the model that shares resources and data. The Consequently, analysts could conceivably previous 2 years.3 Historically, informa- common cloud-based data architecture omit or miss important information or tion in the IC was disseminated through will reconcile single-source, multi-source, erroneously assume gaps existed. single intelligence discipline stovepipes and all-source collection and analysis in OBP aims to remedy this problem according to the specific sensor that near real time. This new IT architecture and increase information integration detected it. This method of receiving provides a tremendous opportunity to across the IC and DOD by creating a data forced the all-source analyst to reimagine our intelligence process in ways common landing zone for data that cross hunt for and gather information in that eliminate dissemination stovepipes, organizational and functional boundar- these stovepipes—basically finding all increase multi-intelligence data-sharing, ies. Furthermore, this business model of the disparate pieces of information and integrate knowledge at the data layer, introduces analytic efficiency; it reduces and acting as the manual fusion engine thus eliminating, or at least reducing, the amount of time analysts spend or- for single-source reporting. Given the the existing linear and labor-intensive ganizing, structuring, and discovering manual method of collecting informa- tasking, collecting, processing, exploiting, information and intelligence across the tion, we estimate that at least 70 to 80 and disseminating process. IC ITE will enterprise. By extension, OBP can afford
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Johnston et al. 13 analysts more time for higher orders of also be described in this object-centric not only for data access control measures analysis while reducing how long it takes data construct. Moreover, the concept but also for data-auditing purposes. to understand how new data relate to could expand to cover all teams in a Enterprise managers will have a retriev- existing knowledge. A central premise of professional baseball league or other pro- able history of the types of data each user OBP is that when information is orga- fessional sports or abstract concepts that accessed, potentially at the specificity of nized, its usefulness increases. include people, places, or things. knowing which individual object facts A concrete example best illustrates Similar to the example above, the were retrieved. the organizing principle of OBP and IC and DOD will create objects for the The path forward faces significant how it would apply to the IC and DOD. people, places, things, and concepts that challenges. Existing stovepiped processes Consider a professional baseball team are the focus of intelligence and military are well entrenched in DOD. Even in and how OBP would create objects and operations. Topics could include South its early stages, IC ITE will change both organize information for all known peo- China Sea territorial disputes, transna- analytic behavior and intelligence pro- ple, places, and things associated with the tional criminal organizations, Afghan cesses, though current pilot programs are team. At a minimum, “person” objects elections, and illicit trade. Much like the not fully operational because the archi- would be created for each individual di- sports example, IC and DOD issues have tecture is still stabilizing. Until we have rectly associated with the team, including associated people, places, and concepts a stable architecture, we must maintain coaches, players, the general manager, that could be objects for knowledge the legacy system, data, and associated executives, and so forth. As an example of management. processes. IC ITE–enabled analytic person-object data, these objects would OBP is dependent on implemen- integration and exposure to sources of include characteristics such as a picture, tation, evolution, and maturation of data at the point of system ingestion will height, weight, sex, position played, col- policies and technologies to set the provide a much richer knowledge pool; lege attended, and so forth. The purpose conditions for IC and DOD transition to however, this integration will require a is to create, whenever possible, objects OBP as a core production process. OBP concerted change-management program distinguishable from other objects. This services—as they relate to object manage- to standardize changes across the Defense list of person-objects can be enduring ment, data storage and availability, access Intelligence Enterprise and the IC. over time and include current and/or control, and security—will largely depend Analytic efficiency, increased pro- past people objects or family or previous on the infrastructure, policies, and capa- ductivity, and a stronger, more robust team relationships. bilities that come with IC ITE. intelligence enterprise are the promises In a similar fashion, objects could OBP services will be delivered as a of analytic modernization. These big be created for the physical locations back-end cloud-based platform service data–enabled gains across the IC are par- associated with the team, including the within IC ITE and take full advantage ticularly critical in a time of fiscal austerity stadium, training facility, parking lots, and of enterprise security capabilities related and an increasingly complex operational players’ homes. The same could be done to access control and auditing.6 IC ITE environment. Austerity and complexity for “thing” objects associated with the will establish and recognize the elec- will compel the community to function team, such as baseballs, bats, uniforms, tronic identity for all users across the IC as a cohesive, integrated, and responsive training equipment, team cars/buses/ and DOD enterprises, with a comput- unit. The pilot programs are already driv- planes, and so forth. er-recognizable understanding of the ing cultural and behavioral changes for With the baseball team’s objects types of data that each user is allowed to both collectors and analysts. Continued established, producers could report access, regardless of agency affiliation.7 community innovation in data-handling information to the objects (for example, This IC ITE capability perfectly methods will increase collection efficiency games, statistics, news for players, or complements OBP’s data-conditioning and analytical accuracy. Ultimately, these stadium upgrades), which would serve as standards to “atomize” data. Within efficiencies will translate into height- a centralized location to learn about ac- the OBP framework, as data are objec- ened responsiveness and accuracy when tivity or information related to the team. tified, individual data fragments (such meeting the demands of warfighters, Also, relationships could be established as individual facts about the object) will policymakers, and national leaders. between the objects to create groupings be tagged with a classification. This is In the future, an analyst will begin of objects that represent issues or topics. effectively called atomization of data.8 the day at both the operational and For example, a grouping of people-ob- Combining OBP’s data atomization and strategic levels by reviewing automated jects could be created to stand for the IC ITE’s enterprise capability to recog- aggregated data and deciphering anom- infield or outfield, coaching staff, or team nize user access privileges, object views alies to instantaneously begin interacting executives. Tangential topics/issues such will be assembled dynamically based on with key strategic, operational, and as “professional baseball players involved the role, authorities, and access of the tactical colleagues. Collectors and ana- in charity” could be established as well. individual user at machine speeds on lysts working together in a networked, Events or activities (such as games) and enterprise IC and DOD data, regardless nonstovepiped environment will leverage the objects associated with them could of agency affiliation.9 This is important collaboration to focus collection and
14 Forum / Transforming Defense Analysis JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 analytic assessments when informing decisionmakers. Though these pilot pro- grams are in their nascent stages, DIA is committing time and resources to ensure successful, full-operating capability. These pilot programs are the basic building blocks that will enable the true transfor- mation of defense all-source analysis.
Managing the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Leveraging the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program. A centralized man- agement structure of the Defense Intel- ligence Enterprise is necessary to drive down duplication and create efficien- cies across the enterprise to meet the mission in an era of declining resources and growing requirements. The Defense Intelligence Analytic Program (DIAP) Enterprise includes DIA, nine combat- ant commands, five Service intelligence centers, two subunified commands, and the Commonwealth partners. Func- tionally managed by DIA’s Directorate for Analysis, DIAP ensures resources are properly aligning to each enterprise member’s core mission areas as defined by the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper gives testimony before Senate Intelligence Hearing, January 30, 2012 (Kit Fox/Medill/Flickr) Prior to 9/11, the DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) was the prioritization. The new era of defense production, and bolster the expectation managing entity of analytic production intelligence analysis demands collab- that intelligence analysis relies on the components in the department. After oration among all analytic partners. existing body of knowledge. The next 9/11, the establishment of DIAP dis- Reduced funding countered by increasing generation of The Source and the un- mantled the unpopular DODIPP in favor requirements necessitates unified effort derlying technologies, such as Defense of a decentralized program that essen- and much tighter integration among Intelligence Online, will add tools related tially allowed each member to perform enterprise members. Primary responsi- to production management, tasking, and the entire breadth of capabilities for its bility resides where primary capability individual profiles. respective organizations, which in turn resides, and this critical synchronization One capability enables analysts created enterprise-wide duplications and of enterprise capabilities not only creates and customers to see trending analytic redundancies. DIAP shifted the focus trust among members, but it also enables subjects based on usage from across the from quantity of production to level of necessary transparency under the new enterprise. This capability makes use effort by measuring outcomes rather paradigm of shared responsibility. of an existing technology that tracks than counting products. In this case, Technology Solutions to Provide intelligence use and aims to correlate pro- “outcomes” refers to things that took Transparency. DIA is investing in the duction and usage data for better security, place as a result of analytic effort, such as transparency needed to maximize the business analytics, and customer service. operations or special activities. efforts of every analyst with a suite of In addition, production data are mined After DOD funding decreased in initiatives and tools. The Source is a to provide a “Find the Expert” capability 2014 and 2015, DIAP was the only consolidated production portal that will that ensures customers are able to contact vehicle through which the enterprise function as an aggregator of all finished an expert for follow-on questions or for could implement changes to defense defense intelligence, regardless of orga- future collaboration across the enterprise intelligence processes adjusted to nization, on one site. It will improve and on any given topic searched. By investing diminished resources. Today, DIAP increase discoverability for customers, in better tools to capture analytic levels manages risk mitigation and requirements reduce the likelihood of duplicative of effort (business analytics), we enable
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Johnston et al. 15 greater insight that allows every member executive version—the third class was just has informed our own in production of the defense intelligence all-source ana- completed in September. of strategic defense intelligence in both lytic community to understand where the This robust training will give analysts joint and combined environments. We enterprise must focus its efforts. Ensuring the skills for foundational and advanced must understand the culture of our that these technologies and data schemas analytic tradecraft, and incorporate the allies’ intelligence services and that their are common across the enterprise also latest intelligence and academic methods intelligence collection employs different ensures a transparent baseline of informa- related to military capabilities, network methods, under different assumptions, tion to make more informed decisions. analysis, sociocultural analysis, analytic and with different analytical lenses. design, and alternative futures. Most im- Understanding these differences up Investing in Our People portantly, this professional development front facilitates seamless exchanges Training and Career Management for will ensure a superior level of tradecraft. during times of crisis, when relation- Common Understanding. In the longer Investing in common training standards ships are put to the test and are the term, training and tradecraft that foster will instill a culture of trust by creating most valuable. confidence and trust in products across analytic cohesion and transparency. This The United States and its allies the enterprise will need to be addressed. strategy is a cost-effective way for the possess comparative advantages in Currently, even if analysts find the right greater Defense Intelligence Enterprise different regional and functional areas. expertise or product, they must be to minimize duplication and bolster ex- This potential allied strength should be confident that their own analytic rigor isting networks to create analytic reserve leveraged through delineating analytic is mirrored in the products authored by strength. Moreover, DIA understands areas on which we can be interdependent. outside organizations. Even with all of the need for hiring individuals with For example, one of our allies may have the tools and communication vehicles nontraditional skills who can operate in a comparative advantage in a part of the available to analysts, an uncoordinated an environment where tools and meth- world where the United States is less en- product that is duplicative is easier than odologies must change as quickly as data gaged. By relying on that ally’s expertise trying to leverage outside expertise for a evolve. to cover that part of the “intelligence collaborative, more holistic product. That said, the major challenge over perimeter,” we can realign our focus To build the levels of professional the next decade is to develop intelligence on problems where our strengths lie. trust and skills needed for this degree officers who better understand the IC Such mission-sharing is a smart invest- of sophisticated collaboration, DIA is apparatus. Analysts must have a broader ment for the enterprise and the broader making strategic investments in training, range of experiences outside traditional Intelligence Community. education, and professional development. intelligence analysis, in both strategic This interdependence requires a high We will establish and measure critical and operational environments. We need level of trust and mutual commitment analytic skills for the Defense Intelligence analysts who understand nontraditional between the United States and its intelli- Enterprise through the analyst pro- sources, work comfortably inside col- gence partners, as well as the acceptance fessional certification program. The lection platforms, fully comprehend the of some risk in those areas and the loss program will assess analyst knowledge strategic and operational needs of the of the expert knowledge that comes and performance of critical skills and broad set of defense customers, and can with the day-to-day focus on them. Yet emphasize continuous analytic profi- drive focused collection to address key in a time of fiscal austerity, deepening ciency through lifelong learning. These intelligence gaps by using quantitative partnerships will expand our capacity to shared skill standards will ensure analysts methodologies and innovative tools. In understand the operational environment in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise the fiscally austere future, actively man- in mission areas with limited focus. are synchronized in their use of analytic aging intelligence officers will be critical This is a fundamental reason that DIA tradecraft. to ensure a collaborative, trusting, and established its Five Eyes Center, with Improving and adhering to standards efficient enterprise. Commonwealth allies working alongside ensure that all-source defense intelligence U.S. analysts to develop more efficient analysts are equipped with the best trade- Working with Our Partners and effective intelligence-sharing practices craft and skills to perform at peak levels. In an increasingly complex world with while breaking down cultural-sharing We have graduated two foundational a wide range of collection targets, we barriers. Professional Analyst Career Education must take advantage of not only our Impediments to better integration classes for new DIA analysts who received own intelligence assets but those of our with our allies are a combination of a extensive formal training in their first 6 foreign partners as well. DIA has always traditional reluctance to share sensitive months. We also have developed a cur- recognized the enormous value of coa- information and policy and information riculum, which was rolled out in October lition partners and the added value they technology issues. These barriers must be 2014, geared for midlevel analysts and bring to collection and analysis. Their overcome. With analytic modernization has graduated six classes. We are also collaborative participation has provided efforts based in technology improve- refreshing our senior ranks with a 3-day an important outside perspective that ments, information-sharing becomes
16 Forum / Transforming Defense Analysis JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 easier for even the most junior analyst. As that tagging of data is completed at the “atomic” level, making the information releasable without revealing sourcing be- comes automatic. When analysts can see the shared knowledge, collaboration with allied partners becomes easier. In the mid-term, DIA has placed resources and people to reexamine our security policies in light of the current information environment. When in- formation is shared in near real time and highly dynamic situations render analysis perishable, we cannot afford a lengthy release process. We must put in place the proper authorities and develop agreements or understandings with allies to mitigate becoming mired in process. Over time, an ad hoc patchwork of agree- ments will do little to address the holistic Afghan National Army soldiers wait for updates during runoff elections at Forward Operating Base concerns dealing with releasability. The Gamberi, Laghman Province, Afghanistan, June 14, 2014 (U.S. Army/Dixie Rae Liwanag) IC challenge is to ensure the range of policy and authorities related to the com- agency community. What worked in a Technical Analysis Center (ONI/FTAC) plex question of releasability deals with forward area cannot always be gener- counterparts, are providing combatant the current operational environment and alized to another venue, and we do a commands with projected threat ca- technology. disservice if we try to directly translate pabilities to counter U.S. contingency Our allies and partners have been lessons that worked in an interagency operation plans. These threat perfor- an integral part of how we overcome task force in Afghanistan to a large mance assessments, requested specifically the complex operating environment and complex organization such as DIA by the planning elements at the major that requires both policy and technical without adapting such lessons to the commands, have led to significant mod- solutions to optimize our collaboration. scale of the organization and the unique ifications to existing contingency plans, Synchronization of these efforts holds processes inherent therein. including target allocations; munitions se- great promise for focusing and integrat- The operational interaction with lection platform routing; weapons tactics; ing the capabilities of DIA with those of intelligence will look different in the targeting rules of engagement; and intel- our allies and partners. future. Historically, operators have been ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance given a lengthy analytic paper or a large placement. These innovative techniques, The Future Look of Defense intelligence annex describing enemy refined through years of iterative process All-Source Analysis composition, disposition, and most likely improvement, are now adopted for use The challenges that defense intelligence courses of action. In the future, using ana- in the U.S. research, development, and faces are complex and will require inno- lytic models of enemy doctrinal templates, acquisition communities. vative solutions if we are to maintain a the IC will create a dynamic environment Building on these M&S-based strategic advantage. Fortunately, more that will enable the warfighter and poli- analyses for the combatant commands, than a decade of integrated operations cymaker to interact with enemy weapons MSIC is leading development of the in the field has provided a blueprint. systems, command and control appa- next generation of integrated analysis Joint operations have already proved ratus, and doctrine in a more dynamic, capability. The Integrated Threat Analysis that the hardest problems are solved iterative environment. and Simulation Environment (ITASE) not by a single intelligence discipline A current example of this modeling provides DOD with a modeling and or single agency. Breakthroughs derive and simulation (M&S) technique has simulation capability to predict the ho- from technological advances that been developed at DIA’s Missile and listic performance and effectiveness of naturally enhance cross-intelligence Space Intelligence Center (MSIC). MSIC foreign and U.S. weapons systems and discipline collaboration and elimination analysts, in close cooperation with their plans. ITASE, which is jointly developed of organizational and cultural barriers. National Air and Space Intelligence by DIA/MSIC and NASIC, NGIC, Yet the field is not the hallways of Wash- Center (NASIC), National Ground and ONI/FTAC, establishes a standard ington, and the operational boundaries Intelligence Center (NGIC), and solution for integrated weapons system between brigades are not the inter- Office of Naval Intelligence/Farragut modeling, simulation, and analysis across
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Johnston et al. 17 the Director of National Intelligence, 2014). 3 Rosemary Heiss, “GEOINT IT Chang- ing to Better Support Analysts, Integrated Intelligence,” Pathfinder 10, no. 1 (September– October 2012), 6–7, available at
18 Forum / Transforming Defense Analysis JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Army and Air National Guardsmen carefully exit helicopter pad during PATRIOT Exercise 2015 at Mile Bluff Medical Center in Mauston, Wisconsin, July 2015 (U.S. Air National Guard/Paul Mann)
Improving Joint Interagency Coordination Changing Mindsets
By Alexander L. Carter
oint interagency coordination is years, successful interagency teamwork measures, if adopted by these teams, incredibly important but difficult remains elusive across the combatant would positively impact performance J work that is hampered by cultural commands. This article examines the and inform our senior civilian and mili- differences among team members and recent history of joint interagency coor- tary leadership on the nature of how we an absence of clear and focused per- dination, discusses some of the key cul- exercise national power to support our formance measures. Despite some rare tural and organizational impediments allies and defeat our enemies. successes in interagency work between facing these teams, and introduces a set the Department of Defense (DOD) of performance measures for immediate Why It Matters and other partners in the past 20 use across these commands. These Clearly, the world is getting more dan- gerous and unpredictable, and not just within the traditional paradigms of war Major Alexander L. Carter, USAR, is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officer. He currently works in the Leader and conflict. There have been global and Development Division in the U.S. Army Human Resources Command at Fort Knox. regional conflicts involving the United
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Carter 19 States, but there have also been natural Ups and Downs equivalent organization) as a capability to and manmade disasters (hurricanes, In the last 25 years, the U.S. experience enable the coordination of all instruments earthquakes, tsunamis, oil spills, refugee with joint interagency coordination of national power with joint operations.11 crises, and so forth) around the world. has evolved, spurred by our military And we have supported our allies and interventions in Panama (1989–1990), It is during this period of recent friends in their own humanitarian and Somalia (1992–1994), and Haiti history, and with the backdrop of these disaster recovery efforts. At the discre- (1994–1995).5 Reflecting on those supporting directives and policies, that tion of the President and Congress, we interventions, President Bill Clinton we can point to some rare but relevant have responded to many of these events issued Presidential Decision Directive success stories with joint interagency by typically leveraging our military 56, “Managing Complex Contingency work, despite organizational and cultural resources through any one of the unified Operations,” in May 1997, which estab- obstacles. Two such examples are the combatant commands. Increasingly, lished standardized processes and struc- Bosnian train and equip program and these manmade and natural conflicts and tures relating to joint interagency coor- Joint Interagency Task Force–South. disasters create a new and much more dination.6 However, a report reviewing Congress funded the Bosnian train complicated set of challenges—that is, the directive criticized the joint inter- and equip program following the Bosnian wicked problems—for our military plan- agency environment, citing a continuing war and the 1995 signing of the Dayton ners. These problems require a different lack of a “decisive authority and . . . the Peace Accords.12 The objective of the set of skills, ones that are increasingly contrasting approaches and institutional program was to provide the Bosnian being sourced outside of our military cultures.”7 Later, with our involvement Federation military force with training, structure and institutions. in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, weapons, and other types of equipment Wicked problems are almost impos- President George W. Bush promulgated to build up their capability to defend sible to solve. For example, there are national-level guidance relating to joint themselves against the neighboring multiple stakeholders whose interests are interagency coordination on December Serbian military. An interagency task linked to the problem(s). Wicked prob- 7, 2005: National Security Presidential force that drew its ranks initially from lems are unique; they are not discrete. Directive 44, “Management of Joint DOD, the Department of State, and the Typically, as the wicked problem gets Interagency Efforts Concerning Recon- Central Intelligence Agency was created analyzed, it morphs into a new or different struction and Stability.”8 The directive to oversee the program. set of problems.1 In short, those holding expanded the need for joint interagency At the outset, the task force faced opposing viewpoints would (and should) coordination across the “spectrum significant challenges. Initially, it had “no approach these problems from different of conflict: complex contingencies, money, no equipment, and no training.”13 biases, perspectives, and experiences in peacekeeping, failed and failing states, But during the first 2 years of opera- order to create a “shared understanding political transitions, and other military tion, the task force was able to obtain of the problem[s],”2 especially when interventions.”9 adequate funding, secure and execute they cannot be “solved by traditional Another key publication that contin- critical training contracts, obtain weapons processes.”3 Thus, the U.S. military’s op- ued the evolution of joint interagency (mostly donated from other countries), portunities to work more closely with its coordination was Joint Publication (JP) and overcome anti-U.S. sentiment against non-DOD (that is, interagency) partners 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination the program at home and abroad. Yet in have never been more relevant and timely. During Joint Operations,10 which es- writing about the task force, its former We cannot solve or attempt to solve these tablished guidance within DOD on deputy Christopher Lamb asserts that wicked problems without the expertise the structures and processes in place to its success was due to a combination and skills of those drawn from all of our support joint interagency coordination, of organizational, team, and individual instruments of national power (diplomatic, including key U.S. Government agency variables. Ultimately, Dr. Lamb surmised, information, military, and economic, or responsibilities and lead designations for the train and equip program “rectified DIME),4 including those from outside different types of military and nonmilitary the military imbalance between Bosnian the government sector (contractors, interventions. JP 3-08 also formalized a Serb and Federation forces, reassuring the academicians, not-for-profit agencies, cor- joint interagency team structure that U.S. Bosnians and sobering the Serbs,”14 and porations, and so forth). Joint interagency Central Command had created years ear- it “facilitated the integrated approach the teams, therefore, should be increasingly lier: the Joint Interagency Coordination United States pursued in Bosnia, proving viewed as attractive forums and vehicles Group. The goal of JP 3-08 was to: remarkably adept at implementing its con- to leverage our combined national power troversial security assistance program.”15 in support of U.S. interests, at home and provide sufficient detail to help Combatant Another example of interagency abroad. So how has joint interagency work Commanders, subordinate Joint Force success is Joint Interagency Task Force– evolved and progressed (or not) over the Commands, their staffs, and joint in- South (JIATF-South), headquartered years, and what lessons can help us make teragency partners understand the Joint in Key West, Florida. Its mission is to better use of these unique organizations? Interagency Coordinating Group (or conduct “interagency and international
20 Forum / Improving Joint Interagency Coordination JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 detection and monitoring operations, and the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.”16 Since its latest formation in 2003, when it combined with another task force (JIATF-East), the team’s composition has reflected a diverse body of team members including all branches of the U.S. military, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Additionally, JIATF-South has a plethora of international partners across the region. Over the past 10 years, JIATF-South’s accomplishments have been impressive, with its successes allowing “JIATF-South to stand toe-to-toe with the drug traffick- ers . . . driving up their costs, cutting their profits, raising their risk of prosecution and incarceration, and forcing them to divert their trade to less costly destinations . . . accounting for roughly 50 percent of global cocaine interdiction.”17 Despite these two examples of interagency successes, however, joint interagency coordination within the combatant commands continues to be difficult to achieve despite publications, speeches, briefs, endless memoranda, directives, and working groups. For example, two combatant commands Specialists prepare to investigate mock chemical weapons inside training village of Sangari at Joint were the subject of a 2010 review by Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana (40th Public Affairs Directorate/William Gore) the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).18 In its report, GAO of its logistical support to the 2010 Haiti within 3 broad performance areas: orga- cited that U.S. Africa Command earthquake disaster relief effort and the nizational (purpose, empowerment, and (USAFRICOM) demonstrated some command’s underlying joint interagency support), team (structure, decisionmak- practices that “sustain collaboration, but planning and staffing processes.22 The U.S. ing, culture, and learning), and individual areas for improvement remained”19 in Agency for International Development (composition, rewards, and leadership).24 key staff work associated with linking expressed similar disappointment in its af- A successful team will generally have geographic combatant command theater ter-action review of that same relief effort, positive indicators within these areas. security cooperation plans to country commenting that, in effect, the military Similarly, in reviewing interagency teams and Embassy strategic plans. In addition, commanders on the ground were not or environments that were not successful, USAFRICOM staff had “limited knowl- adequately educated on the humanitarian it can be argued there were negative indi- edge about working with U.S. embassies assistance/disaster relief operations.23 cators assessed within these same areas. and about cultural issues in Africa, which Why do some interagency teams suc- has resulted in some cultural missteps.”20 ceed while others struggle? In reviewing Culture Clash and Structure U.S. Southern Command, on the the examples of the Bosnian train and Two indicators of interagency team other hand, was viewed as having “mature equip program and JIATF-South, Dr. success or failure that deserve additional joint interagency processes and coordi- Lamb writes that both interagency teams enquiry relate to the team’s culture and nating mechanisms,”21 but GAO was were successful because they exhibited 10 structure. Perhaps joint interagency still critical of the command’s handling positive “determinants of effectiveness” coordination can be challenging because
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Carter 21 the individuals and institutions they of joint interagency decisionmaking is discussion, focus, and overall results. represent are so different in terms of the lack of decisive authority; there is no The framework developed by Lamb cultures and organizational structures. one in charge.”30 In reviewing the more provides a good starting point to assess For example, in comparing military offi- scientific study of organizational psy- the environment within which any joint cers (DOD) with Foreign Service Offi- chology, an argument can be made that interagency operates.34 But actionable cers from the Department of State, the joint interagency teams fit the definition measures within this framework are contrasts in approach and style are sig- of “leaderless groups,” which are those needed to tie individual, team, and nificant. For example, whereas the DOD that “usually do not have a professional organizational performance together. mission is to prepare for and fight war, leader or facilitator who is responsible for What measures are needed? the State mission is to conduct diplo- the group and its functioning.”31 Instead, The military typically refers to macy. Unlike DOD, State does not see members assume the role of leader or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and training as a major activity or as import- facilitator. The purpose for which the measures of performance (MOPs). MOEs ant for either units or individuals. DOD group was created can become lost or are defined as criteria used to assess is uncomfortable with ambiguity, but blurred over time. Group members who changes in system behavior, capability, or State can deal with it. Doctrine is seen as assume the role of leader are likely to operational environment that are tied to critical to DOD but not to State. Where be untrained in group leadership and measuring the attainment of an endstate, DOD is focused on discrete events and consequently may not understand group achievement of an objective, or creation activities with plans, objectives, courses dynamics and how to manage group of an effect. MOPs are defined as criteria of action, and endstates, State is focused leadership tasks. These groups may run used to assess friendly actions tied to on ongoing processes without expecta- the risk of groupthink that produces a measuring task accomplishment.35 Taken tion of an endstate.25 DOD views plans situation where disagreement and dif- together, these measures can inform and and planning as a core activity, yet State ferences are not tolerated.32 Some basic drive team performance if built and reg- views a plan in general terms to achieve team tasks, such as enforcing ground ularly reported on. According to JP 3-0, objectives but values flexibility and rules and team norms, may not be ac- Joint Operations, “continuous assessment innovation.26 Is it any wonder, then, that complished. Finally, team meetings may helps the Joint Force Command and “most Foreign Service Officers spend lack structure, focus, or direction.33 joint force component commanders the majority of their time engaging their Given these cultural and structural determine if the joint force is doing host-nation equivalents, not directing challenges, joint interagency teams may the right things (MOE) to achieve its actions along a line of subordinates?”27 benefit from a common set of standards objectives, not just doing things right If we are to become more effective or measures to strive toward, linking them (MOP).”36 MOEs and MOPs add with joint interagency coordination, with common standards and norms. Joint concrete, tangible indicators of whether DOD must understand and appreciate interagency teams may benefit by using a joint interagency team is operating the value that joint interagency partners some methods to evaluate how effective effectively, but these measures should be bring to the fight. Joint interagency they are within their respective combatant grouped according to a general area of coordination cannot “be described like commands. The questions surrounding observation or performance. the command and control relationships measurement of joint interagency teams, Both are important types of measures for a military operation. . . . [U.S. however, are initially daunting: How do for the purposes of driving joint inter- Government] agencies may have different you measure teamwork? How do you agency team behavior and performance. In organizational cultures and, in some measure coordination? How do you the table, the first column includes the 10 cases, conflicting goals, policies, proce- quantify a group’s success when most of Postulated Determinants of Effectiveness dures, and decision-making techniques its products and services (such as advice) that serve as an overall performance frame- and processes.”28 Because of the cultural are not quantifiable? Should we compare work through which to measure level of and ideological differences between our joint interagency efforts to other joint interagency success; the second col- DOD and non-DOD participants, the similar organizations or functions in other umn specifies the Supporting Measures. level of commitment exhibited by mem- combatant commands? Any measures This column is a collection of example bers of this joint interagency team may adopted by the team must be clear, unam- performance measures (a combination of vary tremendously, which will prevent or biguous, and unifying to the team. MOEs and MOPs). impede the team’s ability to become a “high performance group.”29 Performance Measures Building and Using Joint interagency teams can organize Group behavior and performance in a Performance Measures themselves in many ways to accomplish joint interagency group would be most The work of joint interagency teams their mission. Too often, though, they effectively harnessed and channeled by could and should be measured primarily face challenges in governance—how focusing on agreed-upon performance in how they produce advice, conduct work gets done and by whom. One measures. Introducing these critical coordination, and, in some cases, observer noted, “The principal problem few measures would help channel lead the combined U.S. Government
22 Forum / Improving Joint Interagency Coordination JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Table. Postulated Determinants of Effectiveness and Supporting Measures Mission, goals, objectives, and measures regularly reviewed and adjusted by sponsoring agency or command leadership. Purpose Customer satisfaction surveys consistently score in “meets” or “exceeds” expectations in terms of interagency products, services, and support. Team members are able to speak and make resource decisions on behalf of their home agency. Empowerment One or more team members are deployed with joint task force or equivalent organization in support of a regional event requiring a U.S. whole-of-government response. A percentage of theater security cooperation activities and exercises is supported and resourced by non–U.S. Government partners annually. Support Development of Annex V and supporting theater campaign plans (TCPs) is led by a Senior Executive Service (SES) civilian from an interagency partner. Leadership of team (facilitator) is rotated monthly on a random basis. X members of the joint interagency team are permanently staffed/embedded within the combatant command’s current or future Structure operations directorate (J33 or J35). Ratio of assigned versus authorized joint interagency billets is equal at each combatant command. Team member tours are at least 12 months and no more than 36 months in length. A number of combatant command’s TCPs are synchronized with country work plans annually. Decisionmaking A percentage of TCPs is completed with joint interagency input annually. A number of non-DOD personnel from joint interagency teams are formally trained on DOD combatant command planning processes. A percentage of joint interagency personnel who have received onsite Embassy briefs from country teams within the combatant Culture command’s area of operation is present. Location of team meetings is rotated monthly on a random basis. Cultural briefs/social events among DOD, State Department, and other interagency partners are held on a quarterly basis. A number of intergovernmental/nongovernmental organizations (IGOs/NGOs) partner with combatant command and/or State Department participating in TCP reviews, discussions, and plan approvals. A percentage of joint interagency personnel who receive foreign language training (and tested) annually through combatant command or home agency are present. Learning A number of joint interagency personnel (non-DOD) who have system access to a combatant command’s Theater Security Cooperation Management System (or equivalent) are present. Team-sponsored symposiums on joint interagency work within the region occur. Team-authored articles on joint interagency work within the region are published. Team members represent the full spectrum of support that can be provided through joint interagency coordination (governmental, Composition IGO, NGO, nonprofit, business sector). Level of funding for mobilized Reservists who support joint interagency exercises (civilian expertise) is equal. Formal and informal training opportunities are offered to joint interagency team members based on informal group consensus-driven Rewards “Order of Merit List” based on individual contributions to supporting team products and services. Performance evaluations are completed by general officer/SES equivalents. A number of wicked problems are introduced, discussed, and solved annually relevant to the team’s area of responsibility. Leadership Quarterly state of interagency work is briefed to senior leadership who provide support to the joint interagency team or command (DOD, State Department, other).
Source: Table based on Christopher J. Lamb with Sarah Arkin and Sally Scudder, The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power, INSS Strategic Perspectives 15 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, March 2014), 57. response to planned or unplanned conducting a team assessment of where better in culture, structure, and empow- events around the world in support of it stands and where it needs to go. This erment. This initial and subjective team national interests and as directed by is done through three simple steps. assessment sets a baseline for where to senior diplomatic or military leadership. First, a team self-assessment must be improve team performance. This should But how does one truly measure team- conducted using the framework areas of be a subject of hearty discourse and heated work? How can performance measures performance, focusing on where the team debate—an agenda item that may be best really gauge how well team members rates generally positively or negatively for planned as a singularly focused offsite cooperate or how well they provide out- each of the 10 areas within the framework. retreat. Second, the team should identify standing staff support to their command For example, one team’s members might a set of a few critical measures (5–7 MOPs or joint activity? To answer this ques- review the framework and self-assess that or MOEs within the table) across orga- tion, the team should understand the while they generally are doing fine in the nization, team, and individual areas. The areas of performance that it can influ- areas of composition, decisionmaking, and team may choose the ones offered in the ence within its structure and mission by leadership, they believe that they could do table or create others more appropriate,
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Carter 23 Crew of Coast Guard Cutter Stratton stands by to offload 34 metric tons of cocaine in San Diego, California, August 2015 (U.S. Coast Guard/Patrick Kelley) adhering to the principle of definition focus, direction, and added meaning teams operate within an enterprise, that each measure be specific, measurable, as team members seek to support their driven by either senior military or attainable, relevant, and timely.37 Third, command organization, whether it be civilian leadership. These teams may each measure must be selected with the a combatant command or some other ultimately report to four-star generals, endstate of improving joint interagency joint activity. Individuals will benefit from Federal agency administrators, gov- team results. being able to link their efforts and contri- ernmental senior executives, or even The team should then assign someone butions to the team. They will be able to specially appointed directors with qua- to be responsible for collecting the data report back to their parent commands or si-governmental jurisdiction and powers. and tracking and reporting the team’s agencies in a more factual and descriptive All of these leaders are charged with the progress against each agreed MOP and manner, informing their leadership in responsibility to support their organi- MOE. That person is also responsible for richer ways about how their agency is zational or enterprise mission and track helping to define where the team wants supporting this joint effort. But these progress toward goals and objectives on to go with that area of performance. As measures will not only drive performance a regular basis. The measures developed such, the measure will have some clear and results within each joint interagency for joint interagency teams can be a thresholds of what determines underper- team; this new model or framework with critical component of a leader’s evalu- forming, performing, or overperforming. its supporting measures also has the ation of how joint interagency teams The point is that the team determines opportunity to influence and inform the are supporting their “customers.” One which measures are right for it and charts most senior levels of military leadership. technique borrowed from the business a path forward on how to achieve success There are many forms of joint inter- sector that is worth a brief mention is in these measures. agency team constructs within the U.S. the power of comparing similar activities Any joint interagency team members Government. The more familiar ones (in this case, joint interagency coordi- can take the measures they have adopted may be found within unified combatant nation) across geographies (that is, U.S. to help them channel their individual and commands or even at Embassies, but Southern Command, U.S. European collective energies toward more produc- there are others. Regardless of where Command, U.S. Central Command) or tive activity. Measures will give the team they are and whom they support, these even comparing similar functions (that
24 Forum / Improving Joint Interagency Coordination JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 is, theater security cooperation activi- ties). Why do this? As senior leaders are facing increas- ingly complex problems within their areas of interest and operation and are being asked to do more with less through appropriated funding constraints, they also are having to question the efficiency and effectiveness of the programs and ac- tivities for which they are responsible. By comparing similar activities or functions using the same measures, leaders could be better informed about the resource and manpower decisions they make within these joint support activities. Many leading businesses, whether in the manufacturing, service, or retail in- dustries, for example, regularly score their performance using industry standard mea- sures. Using this internal assessment, they can see how their company performance stacks up against other similar companies in the same industry. For example, a manufacturing company may have as one of its key measures or metrics a need to capture “purchase order cycle time.” This would be a metric that would be regularly updated, reported on, and assessed relative to how other companies were performing in this same metric. Information on this measure would be collected from various sources on a regular basis. It is assumed that this metric is so universal that a com- parison of company-level performance across the industry would be instructive because it would allow the company to see how it is doing relative to its peers—where it stands. This review offers the company an external, independent look at a part of its operations and usually motivates it to improve upon key aspects of its business. This process is called benchmarking, which can be defined as: Soldier with 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, 17th Field Artillery Brigade, 7th Infantry Division readies firefighting gear at unit headquarters on Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, August 2015 (28th Public Affairs Directorate/Patricia McMurphy) a standard of performance . . . bench- marking helps organizations [to] identify Benchmarking is an example of a administrative processes, practices, costs, standards of performance in other organi- productivity solution (or management and staffing, to uncover opportunities to zations and to import them successfully to tool) in the business world that can be improve services and/or lower costs.”39 their own. It allows them to discover where properly applied to the joint interagency Critics of using self-defined measures they stand in relation to others. By identi- environment. Another way to look to benchmark themselves against others fying, understanding, and comparing the at benchmarking (which should have might be afraid of what they may find. best practices and processes of others with its increasing relevance to the government As Jeremy Hope and Steve Player write, own, an organization can target problem in light of continuing Federal budget “Benchmarking is the practice of being areas and develop solutions to achieve the challenges) is as “the routine com- humble enough to admit that others are best levels of government.38 parison with similar organizations of better at something than you are and
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Carter 25 wise enough to learn how to match or ernment, the nonprofit sector, academia, Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, INSS Strategic Perspectives 5 (Washington, even surpass them.”40 Proponents of this and even the business sector. DC: NDU Press, June 2011), 76. benchmarking practice, on the other These changes to our joint inter- 18 U.S. Government Accountability Office hand, argue that “setting aspirational and agency teams would involve a mental (GAO), Interagency Collaboration Practices directional goals can inspire and motivate shift in the way they (and others) evaluate and Challenges at DOD’s Southern and Africa teams. The process recognizes that ev- their performance through meaningful Commands, GAO-10-962T (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2010). erything is connected and achieving any performance measures. These measures 19 Ibid., 2. one goal depends on making progress must gauge not only whether we are 20 Ibid. towards all others.”41 doing things right, but also whether we 21 Ibid., 3. The measures introduced above are doing the right things. Through the 22 GAO, U.S. Southern Command Demon- should be further discussed, defined, and adoption of a performance framework strates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conduct- operationalized within each combatant and supporting measures, teams can ing a Large Military Operation, GAO-10-801 command. With adopted measures in channel their energies, talents, and re- (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2010), 1. place, joint interagency teams are better sources to support the leaders entrusted 23 Donald A. Ziolkowski, “Whole of Gov- able to chart a course of improvement by to represent national interests overseas. ernment Approaches: How Can We Capitalize understanding where they are (baseline) With measures in place and teams prop- on the Experience of Our Reserve Forces in Order to Ensure a Whole of Government and where they need to go (endstate). erly aligned, the Nation’s leaders, civilian Approach to Unfolding Crises? Can We Ensure But these measures by themselves are of and military, can begin an informed We Replicate Inter-agency Processes During limited value if they are not put in the dialogue about how to potentially assess Large-scale Exercises?” unpublished paper, broader context of how similar joint inter- and benchmark team performance that Joint Forces Staff College, April 2013. agency activities are performing across the cuts across and transcends geographies, 24 Lamb with Arkin and Scudder, 57. 25 Schnaubelt. combatant commands, since each of these jurisdictions, and commands. JFQ 26 Ibid. commands competes for funding and 27 Ibid., 43. resources. For example, are there some 28 Commander’s Handbook for the Joint measures that should be candidates for Notes Interagency Coordination Group (Norfolk, VA: comparison across combatant commands, U.S. Joint Forces Command, March 1, 2007), 1 II-2. despite their differences in mission, cli- Debra E. Hahn, “Predicting Program Success—Not Child’s Play,” Defense AT&L 43, 29 David W. Johnson and Frank P. Johnson, mate, geography, the type of interagency no. 1 (January–February 2014), 46. Joining Together: Group Theory and Group supported historically provided, and 2 Gabriel Marcella, Affairs of the State: The Skills, 9th ed. (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc., so forth? How can we compare joint Interagency and National Security (Carlisle Bar- 2006), 20. interagency activities across the DOD en- racks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2009), 38. 30 Marcella, 37. 3 31 Nina Brown, Facilitating Challenging terprise using metrics defined within our Christopher M. Schnaubelt, “Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art,” Groups: Leaderless, Open, and Single Session own combatant command? PRISM 1, no. 1 (December 2009), 47. Groups (New York: Routledge, 2013), 5. 4 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Opera- 32 Ibid., 3. Final Thoughts tions (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 33 Ibid., 88. 34 The United States will continue to be 11, 2011), VII. Lamb with Arkin and Scudder, 57. 5 35 JP 1-02, Department of Defense called upon to support its allies and fight Marcella, 29. 6 Ibid. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms its enemies across a broad spectrum of 7 Ibid., 30. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November conflict. Our measured response to each 8 Ibid., 31. 8, 2010), 159. of these calls for help should not be 9 Ibid. 36 JP 3-0, II-10. confined to purely military or diplomatic 10 JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordina- 37 George T. Doran, “There’s a S.M.A.R.T. Way to Write Management’s Goals and Objec- lines. As we see more wicked problems tion During Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March 17, 2006). tives,” Management Review 70, no. 1 (1981), taking the world stage, we must look 11 Ibid., D-1. 35–36. to our joint interagency teams and the 12 Christopher J. Lamb with Sarah Arkin 38 Jeremy Hope and Steve Player, Beyond commands and agencies they represent and Sally Scudder, The Bosnian Train and Performance Management: Why, When, and to deliberate on and provide advice Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Inte- How to Use 40 Tools and Best Practices for Su- perior Business Performance (Boston: Harvard across the full range of our national gration of Hard and Soft Power, INSS Strategic Perspectives 15 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, Business Review Press, 2012), 87–88. instruments of power (DIME). But March 2014). 39 Mark Howard and Bill Kilmartin, As- these teams will continue to be ham- 13 Ibid., 24. sessment of Benchmarking within Government strung by cultural clashes and structural 14 Ibid., 56. Organizations (New York: Accenture, 2006). challenges unless changes are put in 15 Ibid., 118. 40 Hope and Player, 94. 16 41 Ibid., 33. place to properly structure and support See Joint Interagency Task Force–South Web site at
26 Forum / Improving Joint Interagency Coordination JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to 1st Battalion, 503rd Airborne Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team prepare to jump while conducting airborne operations during exercise Allied Spirit II at U.S. Army’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, August 13, 2015 (U.S. Army/Matthew Hulett)
Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command
By Jeffrey M. Shanahan
ince the term first appeared in itary missions, from amphibious warfare tactical decisions in such environments, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, to stability operations.4 Yet arguably it is argued, renders the risks associated Operations, published in 1982,1 mixed results and seemingly slow with decentralized execution simply S 5 mission command has steadily risen to progress in applying the concept to the too high, while the decidedly robust prominence as the Armed Forces’ pre- stability operations mission set in Iraq and capable nature of contemporary ferred command and control (C2) strat- and Afghanistan over the last decade U.S. military communications networks egy. 2 In fact, “the decentralized execu- have called into question the efficacy leaves the approach ostensibly unnec- tion of centralized, overarching plans”3 of the approach and its suitability to essary. Furthermore, the complexity, permeates joint and individual Service Phase IV contexts. The increasingly turbulence, and dynamism inherent in publications across the spectrum of mil- strategic, political gravity of otherwise postconflict environments make setting the clear, concise objectives and engen- dering the shared understanding so Lieutenant Commander Jeffrey M. Shanahan, USN, is the Program Manager for the Air Training critical to successful mission command Program of the Chief of Naval Air and is on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Air Force Reserve. exceedingly difficult.6
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Shanahan 27 Local police, government leaders, and villagers gather outside new Anaba District Center in Panjshir Province, Afghanistan, August 11, 2008, to view weapons turned in through Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups program (DOD/Jillian Torango)
Paradoxically, many of these same interagency partners, nongovernmental success. Ultimately, mission command characteristics necessitate the highly organizations, and private volunteer orga- remains an essential tool in overcoming adaptable, flexible, and rapid decision nizations—render traditional military C2 the complex challenges inherent in Phase and execution processes that mission structures ill suited to the more holistic, IV operations, and an essential tenet of command is uniquely suited to afford. team-based solutions required.10 U.S. military doctrine, one that should be Phase IV operations rarely provide clear In an attempt to address these further refined, developed, and studied distinctions among offensive, defensive, competing concerns, this article ex- as a means of ensuring future operational and stabilization efforts, demanding amines the effectiveness and suitability effectiveness. a C2 system capable of quickly tran- of mission command as it pertains to sitioning from one mission set to the postconflict stability operations. This is Historical Context next, and often encompassing all three accomplished through a brief analysis The concept of distributive, decentral- simultaneously.7 Solutions must be tai- of two decentralized C2 approaches ized leadership and mission execution lored, often to individual communities as well as a more detailed examination in military operations is by no means or villages,8 leaving a one-size-fits-all of three contemporary initiatives in new. Emerging in response to decisive approach inefficient at best, and more Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) defeats by Napoleon at Jena and Auer- often entirely ineffective. Adversary C2 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In städt in 1806, the concept is generally networks, despite paling in technological short, it is posited that acknowledged attributed to Field Marshal Helmuth sophistication compared to U.S. systems, shortcomings in the success of stability von Moltke the Elder, Prussian and are quick, elusive, and highly efficient, operations in OEF/OIF are attributable then German Chief of Staff from 1857 demanding that U.S. approaches afford not to underlying weaknesses in mission to 1888.11 First termed Auftragstaktik, superior speed and flexibility as minimum command as a theoretical construct, or the theory hinges upon the dispersed capabilities.9 Finally, the significant in- to its lack of suitability to Phase IV oper- decisionmaking, initiative, and creativ- crease in applicable stakeholders inherent ations, but to a failure to meet fully the ity of subordinates, each guided by a in stability operations—coalition and prerequisites so critical to the concept’s superior commander’s larger objectives,
28 Forum / Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 constraints, and intent.12 U.S. interest in States has conducted postconflict stability between the two, and more specifically, mission command, despite the evidence operations every 18 to 24 months since the potential and suitability of decen- of its dramatic potential displayed by the end of the Cold War, with each tralized C2 constructs in meeting the German tactical ingenuity during World operation lasting from 5 to 8 years.21 daunting challenges presented by stabil- War II,13 and the more obvious limita- Moreover, while stability operations in ity operations. Prior to assessing mission tions of the U.S. penchant for central- Afghanistan and Iraq have undoubtedly command’s validity in modern postcon- ized C2 processes in Vietnam,14 did not taken center stage among U.S. foreign flict contexts, however, it is prudent to begin in earnest until confronted by the military interests, Michael J. McNerney, consider its historical antecedents. While numerical superiority of an impending former Director of International Policy some form of Phase IV operation has Soviet Cold War threat.15 Notwith- and Capabilities in the Office of the accompanied virtually every sustained standing the relative diminishment Deputy Secretary of Defense for Stability U.S. combat effort, the two in which of that threat in recent decades, the Operations, notes that additional, con- C2 decentralization efforts bear closest increasing complexity and dynamism of current Phase IV operations conducted resemblance to OEF/OIF stability the modern battlespace and the world as in the Philippines, Yemen, Georgia, and operations, and the two therefore most a whole account for continued interest the Horn of Africa are clear evidence of suited to comparison, are those con- in mission command as a fundamental the firmly entrenched nature of stability ducted during the Philippine-American C2 concept among U.S. and several operations as a 21st-century U.S. military and Vietnam wars. international forces.16 mission set.22 At the conclusion of formal hostil- The strategy was most recently re- U.S. military doctrine, however, has ities in the Philippines in 1902, U.S. emphasized as central to U.S. military been slow to acknowledge this stark efforts to stabilize the country and its operations and culture in particular by reality. Not until November 2005, with population were largely based upon the General Martin Dempsey in a white the issuance of Department of Defense decentralized, tactical unit execution paper entitled Mission Command, pub- Directive 3000.05, were stability op- of larger strategic and operational in- lished in April 2012. General Dempsey erations established as “a core U.S. tent. Employing more than 500 small noted, “Our need to pursue, instill, and military mission” to be afforded “priority garrisons throughout the islands,27 the foster mission command is critical to our comparable to combat operations.”23 An United States succeeded in neutralizing future success in defending the nation in accompanying U.S. Army field manual the remaining insurrection and stabilizing an increasingly complex and uncertain dedicated to the subject was not re- the Filipino population within 1 year of operating environment.”17 As described leased until October 2008,24 and a joint conflict termination,28 an accomplish- by the general, mission command is char- publication of the same name did not ment made all the more remarkable by a acterized by three overarching attributes appear until September 2011.25 Even decade of similar struggle in OEF/OIF. or enablers: understanding, intent, and more recently, then–Secretary of Defense According to historian John Morgan trust.18 These principles also generally Chuck Hagel suggested in 2014 that Gates, ultimate success in stability complement those identified by research- fiscal year 2015 defense budget proposals operations in the Philippines was attrib- ers studying the Dutch military’s mission would limit the U.S. military’s ability to utable to both the broad distribution of command doctrine: autonomy of action, conduct future stability operations on the American units as well as to the wide vari- clarity of objectives, adequacy of means, magnitude of those seen in OIF/OEF,26 ety of techniques and tactics employed by and trust between commanders.19 Taken perhaps reigniting the debate concern- localized subordinate commanders.29 In in sum, such attributes reflect a contin- ing Phase IV operations as a core U.S. fact, the writer purports that much of the ually evolving understanding of mission military competency. The strategic im- credit for any transfer of American ideals command as a guiding C2 strategy, yet plications of this discourse are ultimately or conventions to the subsequent colonial also highlight the credible challenge in well outside the scope of this article, but government was a result not of a grand adequately quantifying what remains a both the enduring nature of stability operational initiative, but rather the rela- fundamentally psychosocial leadership operations as an inevitable consequence tionships between individual soldiers and theory. Nonetheless, the widespread and of armed conflict, and the prevalence of the Filipino population.30 lasting appeal of decentralized mission such operations in the post–Cold War While the positive impact of de- execution is abundantly clear. environment, are impossible to ignore. centralization in stability operations Likewise, the prevalence of stability during the Philippine-American War operations as a contemporary military Two Decentralized is strikingly obvious, its effectiveness mission set, and the concept’s devel- C2 Antecedents during Phase IV of the Vietnam War opment as a refinement of the more While the U.S. military’s doctrinal is less palpable, largely overshadowed generalized term military operations commitment to mission command and by more conventional approaches that other than war,20 is increasingly apparent. the prevalence of Phase IV operations met with eventual failure.31 While ad- In fact, a 2004 Defense Science Board as a contemporary military mission are mittedly slow in reaching its ultimate study found that, on average, the United readily evident, less so is the relationship form, the U.S. Civil Operations and
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Shanahan 29 Revolutionary Development Support Commander’s Emergency Response an Interagency Journal article, Timothy (CORDS) program, organized around Program. CERP, first initiated in Iraq D. Gatlin suggests that CERP, like small civil-military provincial teams and later in Afghanistan, was designed to many military initiatives, is ultimately positioned throughout all 250 districts provide tactical commanders direct access susceptible to a larger military culture in in South Vietnam,32 is heralded as a de- to discretionary endowments in sup- which short-term, largely quantitative finitive bright spot in an otherwise dark port of postconflict reconstruction and measures of performance are prized over U.S. experience.33 In fact, it has been development efforts.36 First funded by longer term, more qualitative measures suggested that a more comprehensive recovered Ba’athist Party cash stockpiles of effectiveness. As a result, CERP commitment to the program as a prior- discovered in Baghdad during the 2003 initiatives, Gatlin argues, often failed to ity in Vietnam may have ensured U.S. invasion, the program sought a more consider larger sustainability issues,45 and victory in the conflict.34 Regardless, the flexible, adaptive, and timely solution to the subordinate commanders responsible notable success of the CORDS program the challenges of Phase IV operations at for them often lacked adequate forces to is attributable in large part to its decen- the local level.37 Stated simply, the idea ensure consistent supervision and security tralization. Characterized by significant was to allow “soldiers who are patrolling of reconstruction efforts.46 levels of local adaptation, senior CORDS the streets, and have a ground-level Taken together, these criticisms leadership “specified only the chain of view of people’s needs, to make a quick highlight the credible limitations of de- command, certain functional sections, impact without having to go through the centralized C2 strategies in postconflict and a presence at the district level, but bureaucratic details that government con- stability operations. However, suggesting left subordinates free to adjust the orga- tracts usually require.”38 These impacts, that these shortcomings invalidate the nization to the circumstances.”35 Such an though decided on and executed by sub- concept of mission command in such approach, based in the empowerment of ordinate leaders, were to be governed by contexts altogether ignores the signifi- subordinate commanders to act within larger objectives, constraints, and report- cant successes enjoyed by the program. a broad set of operational guidelines, to ing mechanisms set by joint task force In merely 1 year in Iraq, for example, determine how to accomplish the what and geographic combatant command- CERP-funded initiatives resulted in 999 and why specified by superior command- ers.39 Recognition of the program’s initial water and sewage repair projects; 1,758 ers, lies at the heart of mission command. success led to the appropriation of U.S. road, bridge, and similar infrastructure While certainly not without its limita- funds in continued support of the initia- reconstruction ventures; 188 humanitar- tions, the historical precedent for the tive in Iraq, and later accounted for its ian relief distribution efforts; 742 projects effectiveness of the concept in Phase IV adoption in Afghanistan.40 Remarkably, aimed at facilitating local government operations is undeniable. CERP grew to encompass more than 10 standup; the refurbishment of over 400 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic schools; and the repatriation of countless Contemporary Conflicts product by 2010,41 and inspired the de- Iraqis displaced by the conflict.47 More History will also judge the lasting effec- velopment of a commander’s handbook importantly, evidence suggests that such tiveness of decentralized C2 strategies titled Money as a Weapons System, pub- largely quantitative measures, at least in contemporary conflicts, and yet a lished in April 2009.42 in part, were successful in achieving the more detailed analysis of U.S. efforts Despite its popular success, however, desired qualitative effect. “When well to exercise mission command in OEF/ CERP has been the subject of much spent,” notes Mark S. Martins, CERP OIF is warranted as a means of assess- criticism. Washington Post columnist “funding convinced Iraqis of coalition ing the concept’s continued applicabil- Ariana Eunjung Cha highlights concerns commitment to their well being, in- ity to Phase IV operations. Three such that the program provided too much creased the flow of intelligence to U.S. efforts are examined in this pursuit: the autonomy to local commanders, who forces, and improved security through Commander’s Emergency Response possessed little to no detailed knowledge economic conditions.”48 Program (CERP), the Provincial regarding contracting or development A closer examination of the criti- Reconstruction Team (PRT) construct, operations, and that a relative lack of su- cisms also highlights ambiguous and and the Village Stability Operations pervision generated a system susceptible often competing operational objectives. (VSO) program. Arguably, the more to corruption.43 Foreign Policy columnists While perhaps not consciously stated or mixed success in the majority of these Andrew Wilder and Stuart Gordon intended by superior commanders, an initiatives relative to their historical similarly cite a lack of contextual and cul- amalgamation of security, stability, eco- antecedents renders them invaluable in tural understanding on the part of U.S. nomic development, and humanitarian assessing the assertion that U.S. strug- military commanders concerning the assistance goals, each a distinct mission gles with stability operations in OEF/ fundamental “zero-sum nature of Afghan in its own right, undermined the clarity OIF are due more to larger failures to society and politics,” with aid projects of intent so crucial to effective mission set the aforementioned conditions for often “creating perceived winners and command.49 The improperly prioritized mission command than to any weakness losers” and subsequently producing a reward systems further exacerbated in the strategy itself. decidedly de-stabilizing effect.44 And, in this phenomenon, as subordinate
30 Forum / Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Soldiers rehearse night-raid training mission as part of Steadfast Javelin II, a NATO exercise focused on increasing interoperability and synchronizing complex operations between allied air and ground forces through airborne and air assault missions (USEUCOM/143rd Expeditionary Sustainment C) commanders were frequently forced to Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Afghan government at the provincial choose between the needs of the local Much like CERP, the PRT concept, first level, security of ongoing interagency community and the favor of higher head- introduced by U.S. forces in the capital and nongovernmental organization quarters.50 Finally, the lack of adequate of Afghanistan’s Paktia Province, Gardez, operations, intelligence and informa- force strength with which to supervise in December 2002,51 was designed to tion-gathering and dissemination, and and provide security for CERP initiatives confront the diversity inherent in the the facilitation of minor reconstruction reflects a failure to ensure that appropri- country’s distinctly provincial and tribal and development efforts.53 Individual ate means to accomplish the mission were culture.52 Comprised of relatively small teams were ultimately responsible to afforded to subordinate commanders, and highly autonomous civil-military regional area coordinators, an executive another key prerequisite of mission teams, the overarching objectives of the steering committee, and the International command. PRT system were the extension of the Security Assistance Force headquarters,
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Shanahan 31 Students of Sar Asyab Girls High School in Kabul sing national anthem of Afghanistan at ribbon-cutting ceremony commemorating completion of new school funded by U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Commander’s Emergency Response Program (U.S. Air Force/Jordan Jones) which set broad operational objectives the decentralized execution of stability that teams were consistently established and constraints.54 operations. without regard for whether the province C2 strategies were characteristically In spite of these notable accomplish- in question had truly shifted from conflict loose, seen as consultative rather than di- ments, McNerney notes that “PRTs to stability,62 without clear objectives or rective, exhibiting a definitive preference always have been a bit of a muddle,” authority,63 and with wholly inadequate for decentralization.55 Like CERP, the plagued by “inconsistent mission state- logistical support, often lacking basic PRT program has been lauded for “great ments, unclear roles and responsibilities, office supplies in what came to be com- success in building support for the U.S.- ad hoc preparation, and most important, monly, albeit tragically, referred to as the led coalition and respect for the Afghan limited resources [that] have confused “pencil problem.”64 government. . . . [It has] played import- local partners and prevented PRTs from Such criticisms are undoubtedly ant roles in everything from election having a greater effect.”59 These senti- alarming and well justified, yet again support to school-building to disarma- ments are echoed by Mark Sedra, who signal a failure not in the decentralization ment to mediating factional conflicts.”56 adds that the strict and frequent turnover of C2 in stability contexts, or in the In recognition of these successes, of PRT personnel rendered achieving adoption of mission command itself, in November 2005 the model was also unity of effort difficult,60 and by Touko but rather an unequivocal failure to adopted in Phase IV operations in Iraq.57 Piiparinen, the lead political advisor to recognize, appreciate, and cultivate the While divergent in structure and organi- PRT Meymaneh in 2006, who notes conditions for its success. A failure to zation from its OEF counterpart (OIF that a complete lack of standardization establish commander’s intent prohibited PRTs were civilian led, not military-led in PRT structure often set the conditions a unified and cohesive response to stabili- OEF teams), the overall objectives of for constant change within the PRT de- zation, characterized by “the impression the program in Iraq remained relatively cisionmaking process.61 Former Foreign that the PRTs were to be observing constant58 and clearly demonstrated Service Officer Mark Dorman, in refer- and facilitating everything—being all the U.S. belief in, and commitment to, ence to OIF PRTs in particular, notes things to all people—but not actually
32 Forum / Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 accomplishing anything vital to the politi- early 2011, were instrumental in clarify- initiatives begs the question: what made cal or military mission.”65 The competing ing objectives and priorities within the the ultimate difference? In large part, priorities of civilian and military leader- stabilization and reconstruction effort, the disparity seems attributable to VSO’s ship, and the same ambiguous assessment “nest[ing] tactical operations by military more comprehensive satisfaction of the mechanisms that troubled CERP ini- units and supporting activities by civilian conditions and prerequisites for effective tiatives, further limited clarity of intent agencies with the operational and strate- mission command. and prevented a common understanding gic levels of the war.”70 While still significantly ambiguous, among PRT leaders and their operational Village Stability Operations. While the relatively more narrow objectives set commanders.66 For example, perfor- the effectiveness of CERP and the PRT for VSO by senior operational leaders, mance measurements with regard to the program was undoubtedly mixed, a third namely the development of ALP forces Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups, U.S. attempt at mission command, the and connection of community leaders a common PRT mission, oscillated be- VSO program, has met with decidedly to the larger district and provincial gov- tween the qualitative sociopolitical signals more consistent success. Started in the ernment, resulted in greater clarity and valued by civilian leadership and the fall of 2009, the program is led predom- understanding of commander’s intent by quantity of weapons collected prioritized inantly by U.S. special operations forces subordinate units. Likewise, the highly by military superiors.67 Finally, inadequate (SOF) in conjunction with limited civil specialized cultural and linguistic training human and material means with which affairs and military information support of SOF relative to more conventional to accomplish the assigned mission both operations personnel. The overall goals forces undoubtedly facilitated the deeper limited the program’s potential success were to facilitate organic village-level contextual understanding so critical to and undermined the mutual trust so cen- security capability through the develop- effective mission command—and so tral to mission command. ment of Afghan Local Police (ALP) and, critically lacking within CERP.75 Such In sum, each of these shortcomings much like the PRT program, connect factors are also likely to have positively inhibited the overall effectiveness of local community leaders to larger district influenced the trust that operational decentralized C2, not because it was and provincial governments.71 Exhibiting leaders were willing to place in VSO unsuited to Phase IV operations but the essence of mission command, former unit commanders compared to their less because it was never given a chance to VSO participant and SOF operator Rory specialized PRT counterparts, fulfilling work. In fact, it may be argued that in Hanlin describes the program as “char- another key condition for decentralized the absence of the aforementioned con- acterized by managing and completing C2. The significantly more limited scope ditions, mission command was not, in a vast array of seemingly unrelated tasks of VSO compared with CERP and PRT fact, being exercised at all; rather, some that interact in complex unimaginable efforts, as well as the more reliable fund- amorphous or mutated form of C2 falling ways, all in a system of decentralized ing and personnel support provided to well outside the doctrinal spectrum was execution.”72 That such efforts have SOF, ensured means were adequate to being employed. The resulting effect, as achieved notable progress in many areas conduct the mission assigned. Finally, the expressed from the perspective of Foreign of Afghanistan is well documented in adoption of more reasonable and accu- Service Officers, was often that of being terms of notable reductions in coalition rate assessment mechanisms for the VSO let go or abandoned, a mere “pin on a and civilian casualties, security incidents, program, considered fluid and constantly map” seen as politically favorable but and enemy-initiated attacks, as well as evolving in response to local conditions, lacking the true mission focus or com- a November 2011 national intelligence limited the disunity of effort that seemed mitment of senior leadership.68 Further estimate that cited VSO as markedly to plague the CERP and PRT models,76 evidence of these conclusions is provided more successful than other coalition ini- reinforcing shared understanding of what by the fact that PRT performance was tiatives.73 The 2012 and 2013 iterations was to be accomplished and why, but assessed to have improved significantly as of the Department of Defense Report on leaving the how in the hands of subordi- the program’s objectives became clearer Progress Toward Security and Stability in nate commanders. and focused; as sufficient personnel, Afghanistan similarly highlight the VSO The limited critiques that have been equipment, and financial support were and ALP programs as making consider- offered regarding VSO rightly center provided; and as tour lengths of PRT able advancements in the stability of rural upon the program’s long-term sustain- personnel were extended (allowing more Afghanistan and its population.74 ability. Developing ALP in sufficient time to build common understanding While admittedly of limited duration numbers to ensure Afghanistan’s contin- and trust).69 As a more specific example, relative to CERP and the PRT program, ued stability is likely to stretch U.S. SOF James A. Russell argues that the issuance the fact that VSO have thus far enjoyed capability to the limit, and continued reli- of Integrated Civil Military Campaign more consistent success in the application ance upon U.S. funding for the project is Plans by General Stanley McChrystal of decentralized C2 strategies to Phase a credible challenge.77 Furthermore, while and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry in the IV operations is quite clear. In fact, the specialized cultural and linguistic summer of 2009, and by General David the seemingly stark contrast in results training possessed by SOF is undoubt- Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry in between the CERP/PRT and VSO edly a mission command multiplier, it is
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Shanahan 33 impractical and far from financially fea- counterinsurgency, humanitarian assis- While seemingly obvious, and a basic sible to expect the same level of training tance, development, and other stability principle of effective operational design, to be afforded on any large scale, though goals must be made as distinct as possi- shortcomings in this area in OIF/OEF some would argue that U.S. ranks are ble, and coupled with a clearly delineated suggest that it is a lesson worth reem- “flush with highly-trained, highly-intelli- precedence that allows subordinate com- phasizing. The reality is that significantly gent, and highly-capable Soldiers [who] manders to quickly shift and adapt their more personnel and material resources would serve as ideal supplements to the missions as conditions change. Likewise, are often required to execute stability op- VSO mission.”78 Likewise, it is increas- assessment mechanisms must be flexible erations than more traditional or visible ingly politically difficult for the United and robust enough to assess largely Phase III operations;81 a failure to rec- States to limit the scope of its stability qualitative effects, placing no undue ognize this reality undermines not only operations to those areas that force capa- pressure on subordinate commanders to the effectiveness of mission command bility will allow—though lessons learned adopt a strategy unsuited to the contex- strategies, but also more broadly the U.S. from operational art would suggest that tual nuances of the unique and perhaps stability mission as a whole. limiting the scope would be a prudent completely opposite situation they might The success of decentralized com- course of action. face compared with units only yards or mand and control in postconflict stability miles away. operations is largely dependent upon the Conclusion and These are difficult challenges, and extent to which the preconditions for Recommendations while certainly worthy of an operational mission command are set and maintained Ultimately, the challenges mentioned commander’s best effort, the pursuit of by operational leaders, and not by any de- herein, while irrefutably significant, do the remaining preconditions for mission ficiency in its suitability to such contexts. little to dismiss the fact that mission command (understanding, trust, and In fact, contemporary Phase IV envi- command is both the best and arguably means) may prove more fruitful. In fact, ronments are simply too complex, too the only command and control con- research suggests that increasing capabil- dynamic, and too localized to adopt any struct capable of maximizing the success ity in these areas may offset the deficiency command and control strategy other than of postconflict stability operations in a in clarity of objectives associated with mission command. While an undoubtedly global environment increasingly char- the ambiguity often inherent in Phase daunting challenge, the U.S. military’s acterized by complexity and disorder. IV contexts.80 Increased levels of under- doctrinal commitment to the construct Furthermore, it is apparent that in standing or trust between superior and is well founded, and every effort should the absence of the concept’s prerequi- subordinate commanders, for example, be made to ensure its adoption, refine- sites—intent, understanding, trust, and may facilitate effective mission command ment, and perfection by forces engaged means—success in Phase IV operations even in the absence of clear intent. in current and future stability operations. will continue to prove elusive and As evidenced by the success of the Enduring success depends upon it. JFQ inconsistent. How, then, might opera- VSO program, increases in linguistic or tional commanders best create, develop, cultural training have the potential to im- and sustain an environment conducive prove stability operations outcomes, and Notes to the decentralized execution so critical these should continue to be a focus for 1 to effective stability operations? While both special operations and conventional Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: The U.S. Army Managerial Approach to by no means all encompassing, several forces to the maximum extent feasible. Command and the Adoption of Mission Com- lessons may be deduced. With respect to the challenges to any mand (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic The first is that the intricacy and large-scale cultural awareness program, Studies 33, no. 5 (2010), 653. dynamism inherent in contemporary however, McNerney’s suggestions con- 2 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the postconflict contexts are unlikely to cerning the integration of conventional Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2013). diminish, and may in fact continue to forces into VSO units, and vice versa, are 3 Ibid., V-14. 79 increase in future conflicts. This real- worthy of further development. Ensuring 4 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, ity will also undoubtedly increase the training and exercises integrate and Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: already substantial difficulty faced by encourage collaboration of capabilities Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2011); and senior leaders in clearly and concisely is also essential moving forward, and JP 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011). articulating operational objectives and a will undoubtedly enhance the common 5 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational War- larger commander’s intent. Thus, senior understanding so central to trust and fare: Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Newport, RI: leaders must grow comfortable in em- effective mission command. U.S. Naval War College, 2009), X-22. bracing several concurrent lines of effort, Finally, operational commanders must 6 A.L.W. Vogelaar and E.H. Kramer, often with seemingly wide divergence continue to ensure that adequate means “Mission Command in Ambiguous Situations,” in The Human in Command: Exploring the along the stability operations spectrum, are provided to subordinate commanders Modern Military Experience, ed. Carol McCann and in prioritizing them as clearly as for the objectives assigned, or reduce the and Ross Pigeau (New York: Kluwer Academ- possible for subordinate units. Security, scope of those objectives accordingly. ic/Plenum Publishers, 2000), 230.
34 Forum / Decentralized Stability Operations and Mission Command JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 7 Jeffrey Buchman, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure,” Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005), 49. T. Wright, “Death of the Combatant Com- Defense.gov, February 24, 2014, available at 49 Johnson, Ramachandran, and Walz, 11. mand? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,”
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Shanahan 35 The NDU Foundation Congratulates the Winners of the 2015 Writing Competitions
he NDU Foundation is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Strategic Research Paper Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Joint Force Quarterly essay Lieutenant Colonel (P) Patrick competitions. NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 15–16, T Michael Duggan, USA 2015, during which 24 faculty judges from 15 participating professional military U.S. Army War College education institutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place “Strategic Development of Special winners in each of the three categories are published in the following pages. Warfare in Cyberspace” Secretary of Defense National Third Place Second Place Security Essay Competition Commander William G. Dwyer, Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Miller, USCG USAF U.S. Army War College Air War College “Interesting Times: China’s Strategic “Hybrid Warfare: Preparing for Future Interests in the Arctic” Conflict” Chairman of the Joint Third Place In 2015, the 9th annual competition was Chiefs of Staff Strategic Major Jesse W.J. Hamel, USAF intended to stimulate new approaches to Essay Competition Air Command and Staff College coordinated civilian and military action “Adaptive Airpower: Arming America for from a broad spectrum of civilian and the Future Through 4D Printing” military students. Essays were to address U.S. Government structure, policies, capabilities, resources, and/or practices Strategy Article and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how best to orchestrate the core compe- This annual competition, in its 34th First Place tencies of our national security institu- year in 2015, challenges students at Lieutenant Colonel Robert William tion. The NDU Foundation awarded the Nation’s joint professional military Schultz, USA the first place winner a generous gift education institutions to write research U.S. Army War College certificate from Amazon.com. papers or articles about significant “Countering Extremist Groups in aspects of national security strategy to Cyberspace” First Place stimulate strategic thinking, promote Lieutenant Colonel Wallace R. well-written research, and contribute Second Place Turnbull III, USAF to a broader security debate among Lieutenant Commander Graham C. Air War College professionals. The first place winners Winegeart, USN “Time to Come in from the Cold (War): in each category received a generous Naval War College (Junior) Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain Amazon.com gift courtesy of the NDU “The Strategic Significance of China’s World” Foundation. Recent Focus on the Rule of Law”
Second Place Third Place Colonel Patrick J. Dolan, USAF Colonel Samuel L. Calkins, USA Air War College National War College “It Is Time for an International “Recommendations on Reforming Convention to Ban Permanent Human Strategy Development and Enhancements for Warfighting Purposes” Implementation”
36 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Joint Force Quarterly Kiley Awards Each year, judges select the most influential articles from the previous year’s four issues of JFQ. Three outstanding articles were singled out for the Kiley Awards, named in honor of Dr. Frederick Kiley, former director of NDU Press.
Best Forum Article Best Recall Article (tie) Brett T. Williams, “The Joint Force Bert Frandsen, “Learning and Adapting: NDU Foundation Commander’s Guide to Cyberspace Billy Mitchell in World War I,” JFQ 72 The NDU Foundation is a nonprofit Operations,” JFQ 73 and 501(c)(3) organization established J. Darren Duke, Rex L. Phillips, and in 1982 to support and enhance the Best Features Article Christopher J. Conover, “Challenges mission and goals of the National Joris D. Kila and Christopher V. in Coalition Unconventional Warfare: Defense University, America’s preemi- Herndon, “Military Involvement The Allied Campaign in Yugoslavia, nent institution for military, civilian, in Cultural Property Protection: An 1941–1945,” JFQ 75 and diplomatic national security education, research, outreach, and Overview,” JFQ 74 strategic studies. The Foundation promotes excellence and innovation in education by nurturing high standards of scholarship, leadership, and profes- sionalism. It brings together dedicated individuals, corporations, organiza- Distinguished Judges tions, and groups that are committed Twenty-four senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took to advancing America’s national secu- time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and pro- rity and defense capabilities through fessional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition. the National Defense University. The Foundation provides NDU with pri- vately funded resources for: •• Education, Research, Library, and Teaching Activities •• Academic Chairs, Faculty Fellow- ships, and Student Awards •• Endowments, Honoraria, Semi- nars, and Conferences •• Multicultural, International, and Interagency Programs •• National Security and Homeland Defense Outreach Keep informed about NDU Foundation activities by visiting on- line at: www.nduf.org.
Front row, left to right: Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College; Ms. Erin L. Sindle, NDU Press; Colonel Tricia York, USAFR, Joint Forces Staff College; Lt Col Michelle Ewy, USAF, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Donna Connolly, Naval War College; Dr. Richard DiNardo, Marine Corps Staff College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Eisenhower School. Back row, left to right: Colonel Stephen J. Mariano, USA, National War College; Ms. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Captain Bill Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Jim Chen, Information Resources Management College; Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief, Joint Force Quarterly; Mr. John L. O’Brien, Information Resources Management College; Dr. Stephen Burgess, Air War College; Dr. Larry Garber, Eisenhower School; Dr. James Kiras, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Lindsay P. Cohn, Naval War College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. David A. Anderson, Command and General Staff College; Dr. Jan S. Breemer, Naval War College; Dr. James A. Mowbray, Air War College; Dr. Anand Toprani, Naval War College Not shown: Dr. Antulia (Tony) Echevarria, U.S. Army War College; Dr. Geoffrey Gresh, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. James Lacey, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Andrew Novo, College of International Security Affairs; Ambassador Paul Wohlers, National War College Photo by Katie Lewis, NDU
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 2015 Winners 37 Participants in Iran nuclear negotiations in Vienna on day deal was signed (Flickr/Dragan Tatic)
high-accuracy nuclear weapons and elec- Time to Come in tromagnetic pulse weapons to the air leg of the triad to bolster deterrence against limited nuclear war. The reality that nuclear weapons did from the Cold (War) not disappear with the end of the Cold War has been acknowledged by a number Nuclear Force Structure for of scholars, including Keith Payne, Paul Bracken, and Thérèse Delpech, as the so-called second nuclear age.4 Defined an Uncertain World by Bracken as “the spread of the bomb for reasons that have nothing to do with By Wallace R. Turnbull III the Cold War,” this second nuclear age is characterized by a multipolar world that contains a variety of nuclear actors who he U.S. nuclear deterrent is at This article considers the strategic wield a range of nuclear weapons and a turning point. Seven decades environment of 2040 and beyond to whose interests have nothing to do with T have passed since a nuclear assess whether the planned nuclear U.S.-Soviet dynamics.5 New nuclear actors weapon was used, and many noted force structure is sufficient to provide such as Pakistan, India, North Korea, and leaders have called for the abolition of deterrence in the uncertain world of Iran have all decided that these weapons nuclear weapons altogether—a “Global the future. Keir Lieber and Daryl Press are useful, and established nuclear pow- Zero.”1 At the same time, the legs of observed that the only way to do this “is ers such as Russia have rediscovered the the U.S. nuclear deterrent triad are to work through the grim logic of deter- value of such weapons. Russian President overdue for modernization at a pro- rence: to consider what actions will need Vladimir Putin declared, for example, that jected cost of $1 trillion over the next to be deterred, what threats will need to “only nuclear weapons allowed Russia to 30 years.2 This modernized triad—con- be issued, and what capabilities will be maintain its independence in the troubled sisting of a new long-range bomber needed to back up those threats.”3 This 1990s” and that “developing and deploy- and cruise missile, a replacement article assesses the U.S. nuclear deterrent ing an entirely new generation of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile, and a using the framework recommended by weapons and delivery systems” will be new ballistic missile submarine, as well Lieber and Press to show that the nuclear a main point of Russia’s defense mod- as refurbished nuclear warheads—will capabilities provided by the current and ernization activities.6 This should not be be fielded in the 2030s and, based on planned force are insufficient to provide surprising because, as Bracken notes, the historical recapitalization rates, will credible deterrence in the 21st century. United States once “found the bomb a operate well into the 2060s. It argues for the addition of low-yield, most useful weapon.”7 The stark reality of the second nuclear age is that many actors find nuclear weapons useful and are pursu- Lieutenant Colonel Wallace R. Turnbull III, USAF, wrote this essay while a student at the Air War ing their development and acquisition. College. It won the 2015 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition. Some may even use them.
38 Essay Competitions / Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain World JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Emerging Strategic the Cold War, where the Soviet Union Limited Nuclear War in the Environment represented an existential threat to U.S. Second Nuclear Age To understand which actions will need security, the Nation today “has limited Due to the potent combination of to be deterred by U.S. nuclear forces, stakes in many potential conflicts,” while multiplayer dynamics with overlap- we must first consider the strategic many potential adversaries are likely to ping security trilemmas, imbalanced environment in which deterrence is view conflict with the United States as an political interests, and an increasing expected to function. Former Secretary existential threat.14 This imbalance poses risk of catalytic escalation, the second of Defense Robert Gates observed that the danger that adversaries may be moti- nuclear age is likely to be a danger- divining the strategic environment of vated not only to pursue nuclear weapons ous one. Jeffrey Larsen argues that the future is fraught with uncertainty: but also to use those weapons to avoid these factors and others result in an “When it comes to predicting the defeat by superior conventional power.15 increasing risk of limited nuclear war, nature and location of our next mili- The key lesson for adversaries in the sec- defined as “a conflict in which nuclear tary engagements, since Vietnam . . . ond nuclear age, as demonstrated by the weapons are used in small numbers we have never once gotten it right.”8 swift defeat of the regimes of Muammar and in a constrained manner in pursuit Rather than making firm predictions, Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein, is that in a of limited objectives . . . or in the face we can only form some broad charac- conventional fight with the United States, of conventional defeat.”23 During the terizations that appear likely given the America’s enemies may be “fighting for Cold War, Herman Kahn suggested current strategic environment. their lives.”16 Deterring escalation during that there were “very large and very According to Bracken, the most sig- a conventional conflict when the adversary clear ‘firebreaks’ between nuclear and nificant feature of the second nuclear age believes the regime, and even its existence, conventional war.”24 In Kahn’s firebreak is that it is a multiplayer game.9 Unlike is at stake may make Cold War deterrence model, there were strong incentives for the bipolar Cold War world, the emerg- look relatively easy by comparison.17 the United States and Soviet Union to ing strategic environment is characterized A third feature of the emerging maintain the firebreak and avoid nuclear by the existence of many independent strategic environment is the potential war. Barry Watts, however, observed nuclear actors. Today, there are many for catalytic instability and escalation that the strategic environment suggests states with nuclear weapons, and the tu- from terrorism or a nuclear accident. the nuclear-conventional firebreak is multuous history of proliferation suggests Terrorism, according to Bracken, pro- shrinking and that “the taboo against this number may grow in the future.10 A vides a catalyst that “was not present in nuclear use is being threatened” by the consequence of the multiplayer game is the first nuclear age.”18 For example, a prospect of limited nuclear war.25 The that most nuclear actors now face security terrorist attack could greatly increase the current U.S. nuclear force was built to threats from more than one nuclear- risk of nuclear escalation if it occurred in deter the Soviet Union from waging armed opponent. India, for example, is the midst of an ongoing Indian-Pakistani total nuclear war against the United concerned about deterring both China crisis. Likewise, catalytic escalation could States. In the uncertain world of the and Pakistan. This security trilemma, be caused by terrorists who managed to second nuclear age, the United States as it has been called by Linton Brooks acquire nuclear material in the form of must also be prepared to deter a wide and Mira Rapp-Hooper, means “actions fuel or radioactive waste from a nuclear range of nuclear opponents across a taken by one state to defend against powerplant and built a radiological variety of circumstances. another state have the effect of making a dirty bomb.19 In addition to terrorism, Thomas Mahnken evaluated a num- third state feel insecure.”11 Overlapping a nuclear accident would be a powerful ber of plausible limited nuclear conflict security trilemmas suggest crisis stability catalyst. Though fortunately none re- scenarios such as demonstration attacks dynamics are geometrically more compli- sulted in a nuclear explosion, there were or nuclear use to prevent conventional cated in the second nuclear age. Thérèse at least 32 documented accidents involv- defeat.26 These scenarios are useful for Delpech noted that one has only to look ing U.S. nuclear weapons between 1950 considering what actions the United at the last three centuries of multipolar and 1980.20 The U.S. nuclear stockpile States might need to deter in the future. European history to conclude that the is, on average, more than 20 years old, Mahnken’s key insight is that in each sce- strategic environment of the future is and many weapons lack modern safety nario, an adversary uses a relatively small “just as likely to be one of confrontation features.21 The same concerns likely amount of nuclear force in a limited man- as of stability” and may indeed be less apply to Russia’s arsenal. More alarm- ner to accomplish limited objectives. The stable than the bipolar Cold War world.12 ing, however, are newer members of the plausibility of these scenarios lies in the In the Nuclear Futures Project, nuclear club such as Pakistan, which lacks perception of the adversary, who believes Duncan Brown and Thomas Mahnken decades of experiential nuclear learning nuclear weapons are useful and that the observed that another feature of the and whose stockpiles of nuclear weapons United States lacks a credible deterrent second nuclear age is the “imbalance lack sophisticated safety features.22 A against limited use due to the structure in political stakes between the United nuclear accident in this environment is of the current arsenal, which emphasizes States and potential adversaries.”13 Unlike not unthinkable. high-yield weapons delivered via ballistic
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Turnbull 39 President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign Joint Communiqué following talks on limitation of strategic offensive arms in Vladivostok, November 24, 1974 (Gerald R. Ford Library/David Hume Kennerly) missiles. Bruce Bennett, analyzing possi- to deliver a nuclear weapon is the type of the ability to rapidly deliver nuclear ble U.S. nuclear responses to limited-use weapon being delivered and the effects weapons with a range of yield options scenarios, observed that the United States that weapon will produce. to “achieve military effects and political would seek to minimize civilian casualties The United States maintains nuclear objectives without causing extensive col- and thus use only a few weapons, not- weapons “to create the conditions in lateral damage.”32 Likewise, Lieber and ing that the current nuclear force does which they are never used.”30 To create Press concluded in 2009 that the United not provide the limited options a U.S. such conditions, the United States must States needed high-accuracy, low-yield President might want and “thereby may be able to brandish a credible threat such nuclear weapons to give “leaders options be inadequate to deter adversary nuclear that an adversary concludes the cost of they can stomach employing in these weapon threats.”27 limited nuclear use outweighs any pos- high-risk crises.”33 In recent years, numerous studies sible benefit. The prospect of limited and reports have examined the optimal nuclear war highlights the need to be Required Capabilities shape of the nuclear triad.28 By and large, able to threaten a flexible, limited coun- In view of the types of limited nuclear these have focused on the structure of terforce nuclear response that minimizes scenarios that seem likely in the second the triad—the specific mix of bomber civilian casualties and avoids third-party nuclear age, the most significant gap in aircraft, submarine-launched ballistic escalation, such as overflying Russia on the current U.S. nuclear force structure missiles (SLBMs), and land-based inter- the way to a target.31 This is not a new is a lack of nuclear capabilities useful for continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—or revelation. The 2009 Congressional controlling escalation while minimiz- on the quantity of weapons required for Commission on the Strategic Posture of ing collateral damage. A number of deterrence. The contribution of a triad the United States, for example, empha- authors have concluded that low-yield of delivery systems to strategic stability is sized the need for a spectrum of flexible nuclear weapons and electromagnetic not being disputed.29 However, perhaps force employment options, as did the pulse (EMP) weapons are particularly more important to deterrence in the 2011 Nuclear Futures Project, which useful in many potential limited nuclear second nuclear age than the means used concluded that the United States needed scenarios.34 It is worth noting that
40 Essay Competitions / Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain World JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 these capabilities have, in the past, been in acquiring nuclear weapons precisely a new century with a boxcar of nuclear included in the U.S. nuclear force. to counter the conventional superiority technology.”41 Looking ahead to 2040, In his 1957 work on limited nuclear of countries such as the United States. the United States can expect to still war, Robert Osgood argued that deter- In a limited regional nuclear scenario, it be competing in a multiplayer nuclear rence credibility “requires that the means might be possible for a U.S. President game in which there are more nuclear of deterrence be proportional to the to absorb a limited nuclear strike against actors, possibly including both state and objectives at stake.”35 Unfortunately, the the United States and respond only nonstate actors, and characterized by bulk of the currently deployed U.S. nu- with conventional force. It is prudent imbalanced political stakes and subject clear deterrent consists of ballistic-missile to ask, though, what the impact of such to the influence of dangerous catalytic weapons with yields in the hundreds of a move on existing deterrence regimes escalations. It is prudent to invest now kilotons.36 In a limited nuclear war, these would be. in the capabilities that may contribute to weapons lack proportionality and thus The first effect of a U.S. failure to deterrence in the uncertain world ahead are not useful in most scenarios, calling retaliate in kind would be for all other so that the United States is ready when into question U.S. deterrence credibility. nuclear parties to question the long-term the Nuclear Express once again pulls into In a limited nuclear war, the lack of U.S. credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence. the station. means proportional to the limited objec- Any nation, particularly a nuclear-armed tives at stake means the President will one, seeking to attack the United States Recommendations be faced with only two options, both might entertain a theory of victory in High-Accuracy, Low-Yield Weapons. unacceptable: either acquiesce or escalate which the United States did not respond. A number of limited nuclear use sce- to general nuclear war, in effect commit- Such thinking could lead to crisis instabil- narios illustrate the utility of low-yield ting mass murder by inducing significant ity and risk further escalation. Thomas weapons to control escalation while collateral damage. The lack of credible es- Schelling asserted that a country’s reputa- limiting collateral damage.42 Nuclear calatory options short of general nuclear tion for action, which he called “face,” opponents, for example, may use low- war means nuclear opponents may calcu- “is one of the few things worth fighting yield weapons in demonstration attacks late that the United States is unlikely to over” because it “preserve[s] one’s com- or selective nuclear attacks or to prevent respond, thus increasing the adversary’s mitments to action in other parts of a conventional defeat, believing the use perceived value of nuclear escalation. In the world and at later times” and hence of relatively small weapons may avoid addition to continuing to modernize maintains credibility.38 further escalation due to a perceived the existing triad of delivery systems, the A second grave effect of failing to lack of credible U.S. response options. United States must preserve credibility retaliate in kind to a nuclear attack would Other nations, most notably Russia, for the second nuclear age by investing in be a serious erosion of the concept of find low-yield weapons attractive and new low-yield and EMP nuclear capabili- extended deterrence and, with it, the are pursuing the design of sub-kiloton- ties and the means to accurately deliver nonproliferation regime. Not only would class warheads for battlefield use.43 To these capabilities. future adversaries view U.S. deterrence as fill the low-yield credibility gap, the not credible, but so too might our allies, United States should pursue a two- Conventional Weapons who rely upon the extended deterrence pronged approach. First, the United as Substitute? provided by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.39 States should evaluate options for lever- Those in favor of eliminating the U.S. After a 2013 North Korean nuclear test, aging existing stockpile weapons designs nuclear deterrent often argue that polls showed 66 percent of the South to field low-yield capabilities in the near its conventional weapons are able to Korean public favored developing a do- term, and second, the United States provide a sufficient deterrent against mestic nuclear weapons program.40 That should develop a new low-yield weapon nuclear attack on the United States. number would likely be much higher if, coupled with a high-accuracy delivery The Global Zero Nuclear Policy Com- as Schelling warned, the United States mechanism suitable for minimizing col- mission report, for example, stated that lost face in a limited nuclear scenario by lateral damage. “strong conventional forces and missile not living up to its reputation for action. The B61-12 nuclear bomb, now defenses may offer a far superior option While it remains desirable to eliminate under development, offers one near-term for deterring and defeating a regional U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons, opportunity to field the recommended aggressor” and “precision-guided con- the realities of the second nuclear age and capability. The B61-12 program encom- ventional munitions hold at risk nearly the emerging strategic environment sug- passes both a life-extension program to the entire spectrum of potential targets, gest this is not likely to happen soon. The replace aging components and extend the and they are useable.”37 When evaluated knowledge to develop nuclear weapons life of the B61 bomb family, as well as a against the stark realities of the strategic cannot be unlearned. As Thomas Reed guided tail kit assembly to significantly environment, however, these arguments and Danny Stillman have observed, the improve the accuracy of the weapon.44 By do not stand up. As illustrated earlier, proverbial train has left the station, and improving accuracy with a guided tail kit, a number of nuclear powers see utility the “Nuclear Express now hurtles into a first for a nuclear weapon, the B61-12
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Turnbull 41 pulse effects may be useful. An EMP is an extremely energetic radio wave that can be generated naturally by the interac- tion of a powerful solar flare with the Earth’s geomagnetic field or artificially through nuclear or nonnuclear means.50 The energy from an EMP interacts with electronic equipment, causing a range of effects from temporary upset to perma- nent damage, but causing no biological harm to humans or other organisms.51 Nearly all nuclear explosions produce an EMP, the characteristics of which vary according to the altitude of the explosion (also known as the height of burst).52 A high-altitude EMP occurs when a nuclear weapon is detonated at an altitude of 30 kilometers or more, and in such a burst the EMP will affect a large area.53 It is General Dempsey testifies on Iran nuclear deal before Senate Armed Services Committee, July 29, estimated that a multi-megaton nuclear 2015 (DOD/Glenn Fawcett) EMP weapon detonated over the center is able to hold at risk the same targets as a can be placed in service on the LRSO.49 of North America would cause severe dis- much larger weapon.45 The United States This life-extension program, just now ruption and damage from coast to coast does not publicly disclose nuclear weap- entering the design phase, provides an and, according to Dr. Peter Pry, could ons yields. It is therefore not possible opportunity to modify the W80-4 design possibly “blackout the national electric to know if the B61-12 will provide the to include a low-yield variant for use on grid for months or years and collapse all required low-yield capability, though the the LRSO missile. the other critical infrastructures.”54 technology developed for it significantly The recommendation to field low- Conducting a catastrophic EMP reduces the risk of fielding the needed yield variants of existing weapons could attack, such as the one just described, capability. Paul Robinson, a former direc- be coupled with declaratory policy stating against the United States would require tor of Sandia National Laboratories, has that the United States would employ significant capability—the attacker would suggested using dummy secondary stages low-yield weapons only in limited-use need a multi-megaton weapon and space in existing weapons such as the B61 to scenarios, providing a stepping-stone launch capability to deliver the weapon produce yields in the low-kiloton range. to credible nuclear deterrence for the over the United States at high altitude.55 By replacing the secondary stage with an second nuclear age. These actions are There is some evidence North Korea may inert dummy, the only yield produced not, however, by themselves sufficient. have conducted a practice test of such would be from the fission-only primary As described earlier, developments in a capability in April 2013 when North stage.46 The United States should con- the second nuclear age show a worry- Korea’s KSM-3 satellite passed over the tinue the B61-12 program, but should ing trend toward the fielding of “highly eastern seaboard of the United States at consider technical options to field an ac- usable” nuclear weapons that may the optimal altitude for an EMP attack on curate variant with very low yield. significantly alter the firebreak between the East Coast electrical grid.56 The next opportunity to field a conventional and nuclear weapons. To In many scenarios, an EMP attack, low-yield weapon in the mid-term is to avoid a situation where adversary decision having the potential to be as catastrophic design such a feature into the warhead calculus favors the early use of such weap- as a large-scale nuclear strike, will likely be for the long-range standoff weapon ons, the United States should pursue the subject to the nuclear-conventional fire- (LRSO), which is a cruise missile being design of new very-low-yield weapons break—an adversary might be reluctant designed to replace the circa 1980s air- coupled to highly accurate delivery sys- to cross the firebreak and escalate to nu- launched cruise missile (ALCM) and is tems. Similar weapons once existed in the clear war. However, for an adversary with scheduled for fielding in 2027.47 The U.S. arsenal, and, given sufficient political limited nuclear capability, an EMP attack U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council recently will, there are no technical challenges may be seen as a way to maximize the selected the W80-1 warhead, currently preventing their re-introduction. military utility of a small arsenal. Such an deployed on the ALCM, as the warhead EMP Weapons. In addition to low- adversary may be more motivated to con- for the LRSO.48 Due to its age, the yield nuclear weapons, a number of duct an EMP attack, which might result W80-1 warhead will need a life-extension limited-use scenarios show weapons in no direct casualties, if it believed the program, designated W80-4, before it designed to produce electromagnetic United States would not respond with a
42 Essay Competitions / Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain World JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 nuclear attack that could potentially kill to restore deterrence and control escala- however, eliminates most of the concerns thousands or even millions of people.57 tion if they were used to answer a limited with ICBMs and SLBMs, as bombers can It is also possible to create a smaller nuclear strike or the use of an EMP avoid most overflight issues. EMP by adjusting the detonation alti- weapon. The United States should field Bomber aircraft possess a number of tude and yield of the weapon.58 Such a regional nuclear EMP capability to bol- other useful attributes for limited nuclear a weapon capable of generating effects ster its deterrent credibility in scenarios in war. A 2013 RAND study examined over a few hundred square kilometers which adversaries may consider an EMP contributions of the triad legs to crisis would have much more military utility in or limited nuclear attack. stability by evaluating 48 crises, conclud- a limited-use scenario and, like low-yield The United States can likely develop ing that long-range penetrating bombers nuclear weapons, would likely shrink an EMP weapon by modifying an existing were key contributors to crisis stability.66 the firebreak between conventional warhead, and it may even be able to use a Bomber aircraft also offer flexibility; and nuclear use. There is evidence that current ballistic missile warhead, launched they can be recalled as well as retargeted China, for example, already views EMP on an SLBM or ICBM, set to detonate at in-flight and are also useful for signaling weapons as a means to achieve informa- the correct altitude. Utilizing ICBMs to resolve to the adversary. For example, in tion dominance in a regional “high-tech deliver an EMP weapon is problematic, response to North Korean provocations, local war.” In their book The Science of though, as the missile would in almost the United States sent B-2 bombers to Military Strategy, Chinese generals Peng all target scenarios overfly Russia, and in overfly South Korea in March 2013 in Guangqian and Yao Youzhi write that many cases China, posing a serious escala- a demonstration of capability and re- “nuclear energy . . . will be employed tion risk as those nations might think they solve.67 Low-yield nuclear weapons are to seek information dominance. For in- are under attack.61 SLBMs launched from well suited for delivery by bombers, as stance, the electromagnetic pulse weapon ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are weapons with similar capabilities, such as still in laboratory stage is a kind of also problematic, though less so, because the B61 bomb, already exist. To employ nuclear weapon. It is possible for nuclear of overflight concerns as the SSBN patrol an EMP weapon on bomber aircraft re- weapons to move from deterrence into areas are optimized for attacks against quires development of a new air-launched warfighting.”59 Russia and China.62 One possible solu- missile to reach the requisite detonation In a nuclear escalation scenario, the tion is to mate an existing warhead to a altitude, although the technology to United States might also consider the use new delivery system that avoids overflight build such a missile already exists.68 of a limited EMP weapon as a sort of nu- concerns. An air-launched missile, for Bomber aircraft are likely to be clear halfway house to control escalation example, would allow an EMP weapon particularly useful in the limited nuclear by signaling resolve and demonstrating to be forward deployed and launched wars of the future, and the Air Force use of a nuclear weapon without direct toward the target while avoiding most should continue developing a nuclear- loss of life. Another scenario in which an overflight issues. The U.S. Air Force capable penetrating bomber. The Air EMP capability might be useful is to con- developed and tested an antisatellite mis- Force’s next-generation bomber program trol escalation horizontally in a scenario sile, the ASM-135, in the 1980s that was should be fully funded and remain a in which an adversary seeks to attack U.S. capable of reaching the required altitude top priority.69 The Service should also space capabilities.60 For example, if an for EMP generation when launched from begin studying solutions for an aircraft- adversary who was much less reliant on an F-15 aircraft.63 Another option is to delivered EMP weapon compatible with space than the United States threatened modify a commercial space launch system the new bomber and should seek to ac- U.S. space systems, horizontal escalation such as Orbital’s Pegasus air-launched celerate development of the LRSO cruise by EMP attack might be more effective rocket.64 Given the political will to field missile while ensuring it is compatible than a response-in-kind against the adver- an EMP weapon, there appear to be fea- with future low-yield nuclear weapons. sary’s space systems. sible technical delivery options. Critics will argue that the combination In the heavily interconnected digital Long-Range Penetrating Bomber. of a long-range bomber and a capable, world of the 21st century, nuclear EMP The triad of nuclear delivery methods— accurate nuclear cruise missile coupled weapons have the potential to create bomber aircraft, land-based ICBMs, and with a low-yield warhead is dangerous catastrophic effects both on the battle- sea-based SLBMs—is likely to be useful because it offers a nuclear capability that field and against civilian infrastructure. to deterrence in the second nuclear age.65 is actually usable in a nuclear conflict. Furthermore, these weapons are not The weapons capabilities recommended It is precisely because such weapons are difficult to produce for a state possess- in this article can likely be adapted to be usable that they offer a potent deterrent ing both nuclear weapons and ballistic delivered via any leg of the nuclear triad, to nuclear actors who might consider missile or space launch capability and, in though this may not be desirable. As limited nuclear war. a crisis, may be destabilizing as a limited described, ICBMs and SLBMs are prob- Other Considerations. In addition to nuclear power seeks to maximize utility lematic for a number of limited nuclear pursuing highly accurate nuclear weapons of its arsenal. Conversely, EMP weapons scenarios. Employing the recommended with low-yield and EMP effects and a with regional effects might also be useful nuclear capabilities on bomber aircraft, new bomber and cruise missile to employ
JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Turnbull 43 these effects, there are a number of other capabilities such as low-yield and EMP tics,” available at
44 Essay Competitions / Nuclear Force Structure for an Uncertain World JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 34 Bennett, 211–241; Brown and Mahnken, Younger, 23–24, 69–74. SiteCollectionDocuments/Orbital%20Data%20 17–24; Lieber and Press, 39–51. Yield refers to 47 Hans M. Kristensen, “W80-1 Warhead Sheets/2B2_Pegasus.pdf>. the energy released during a nuclear explosion. Selected for New Nuclear Cruise Missile,” 65 For a more complete assessment of the It is generally measured in tons, kilotons, or Federation of American Scientists, October 10, triad’s contribution to limited nuclear war, see megatons of TNT (trinitrotoluene) equivalent. 2014, available at JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Turnbull 45 Philippine special operations forces soldier fast ropes out of SH-60 Sea Hawk during training with U.S. and Australian SOF soldiers at Fort Magsaysay, Philippines, May 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/Pete Thibodeau) Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace By Patrick Michael Duggan Today, small teams of special operators armed with asymmetric cyber-tools, irregular warfare tactics, and mass disinformation can have truly strategic effects. —General Joseph L. Votel, USA1 hy are regional powers such at the strategic level? Why are U.S. as Iran and Russia better policies, authorities, and doctrine for W prepared for cyber-enabled cyber-enabled special operations so special warfare operations than the immature despite their first announce- Lieutenant Colonel (P) Patrick Michael Duggan, United States? How do Iran and ment over 20 years ago?2 Although USA, wrote this essay while attending the U.S. Russia empower their tactical opera- these are serious questions, what is even Army War College. It won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2015 Chairman of the Joint tors, while the United States masses its graver for the Nation is addressing the Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. cyber-authorities and cyber-capabilities root question: How does the United 46 Essay Competitions / Special Warfare in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 States develop a strategic cyber-enabled generation of warfare whose strategic information warfare blitzkrieg we have special warfare capability? value would exceed the “power of force ever seen in the history of information As far back as 1993, cyber-thinkers of weapons in their effectiveness.”7 warfare.”14 General Breedlove urged the John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in He called for widespread asymmetric Alliance to develop new capabilities to their seminal study Cyberwar Is Coming! actions to nullify enemy advantages counter Russia’s mastery of UW, pro- foreshadowed recent cyber–special through “special-operations forces and paganda campaigns, and cyber assaults operations forces (SOF) actions by Iran internal opposition to create a perma- immediately.15 NATO and the West were and Russia. The prescient notion that nently operating front through the caught off guard by Russia’s ability to “numerous dispersed small groups using entire territory of the enemy state, as advance its political objectives using non- the latest communications technologies well as informational actions, devices, traditional means in a manner once “not could act conjointly”3 to master networks and means that are constantly being even considered warfare by the West.”16 and achieve a decisive advantage over perfected.”8 Russia did not use Spetsnaz, informa- their adversaries has been played out In spring 2014, Russia successfully tion operations (IO), or cyber capabilities repeatedly. As predicted by Arquilla and demonstrated its new understanding of in a piecemeal manner to accomplish its Ronfeldt, “We’re no longer just hurling how to integrate asymmetric technol- objectives. Instead, as General Gerasimov mass and energy at our opponents in ogy into unconventional warfare (UW) described, “Wars are no longer declared”; warfare; now we’re using information, operations by supporting paramilitary they simply happen when SOF armed and the more you have, the less of the separatists in eastern Ukraine.9 Russia with advanced technology and mass older kind of weapons you need.”4 As dispatched small teams of unmarked information create the conditions for senior leaders have recently recognized, Spetsnaz, or special forces, across the conventional forces to achieve strategic groups of special operators armed with Ukrainian border to seize government objectives “under the guise of peace- asymmetric cyber tools, irregular warfare buildings and weapons armories, and keeping and crisis.”17 In other words, tactics, and mass disinformation can have then turn them over to pro-Russian choreographed cyber disinformation strategic effects.5 separatist militias.10 Concurrently, Russia and cyber attack bought time and space This article argues that Iran and disconnected, jammed, and attacked for laptop-carrying Spetsnaz to conduct Russia have already successfully employed digital, telephone, and cyber commu- unconventional warfare “between the cyber-enabled special warfare as a stra- nications throughout Ukraine. Russia states of war and peace.”18 Russia’s cyber- tegic tool to accomplish their national enlisted virtual “privateers” and bounty enabled UW was a brilliant success, not objectives. Both countries have integrated hunters to conduct cyber attacks against simply for its cyber-SOF hybridization, cyber-SOF that clearly demonstrate they Ukrainian government information and but also for successfully invading a sig- understand how to leverage this tool’s logistic infrastructure, from Internet serv- nature partner nation of the European potential within the asymmetric nature ers to railway control systems.11 Russia Union without sparking any meaningful of conflict. The countries’ asymmetric bankrolled a “troll army” to wage deza, Western military response. innovations serve as powerful examples of a Russian hacktivist term for disinforma- an irregular pathway for aspiring regional tion, paying millions for each troll to post Iran powers to circumvent U.S. military 50 pro-Russian comments a day on social In summer 2009, the Iranian regime dominance and secure their strategic in- media, blogs, and news sites that were strangled the Green Movement with terests.6 The diffusion of inexpensive yet critical of Russia’s actions.12 Russia surged the very tools that were supposed to sophisticated technology makes it easier epic streams of disinformation, both liberate it: information and communica- for potential adversaries to develop sig- inside and outside Ukraine, not only to tion technologies (ICTs). The regime nificant capabilities every year. Thus, the obscure its cyber-enabled UW campaign, exploited “emancipating” ICTs to time has come for the United States to but also to create complete political il- target activists, induce fear, and expand make a strategic choice to develop cyber- lusions: “Russia doesn’t deal in petty military and paramilitary suppression enabled special warfare as an instrument disinformation, forgeries, lies, leaks, and of cyberspace.19 Shortly after the Green to protect and project its own national cyber-sabotage usually associated with Movement began, the government dis- interests. informational warfare. . . . It reinvents patched its Islamic Revolutionary Guard reality, creating mass hallucinations that Corps (IRGC) to break the “counter- Russia translate into political action.”13 revolutionaries.” Charged with fight- In February 2013, Russian Chief of In response, during a North Atlantic ing domestic and foreign threats to the General Staff Valery Gerasimov Treaty Organization (NATO) security the regime, the IRGC mobilized its published an article titled “The Value summit in September 2014, the Supreme subordinate Basij cyber units and its of Science in Prediction” in the obscure Allied Commander Europe, General notorious clandestine paramilitary wing, military journal Military-Industrial Phillip Breedlove, USAF, proclaimed the IRGC–Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Courier. In the article, General Gera- that Russia’s “hybridized” UW in eastern The IRGC commander, Major General simov heralded a game-changing new Ukraine represented “the most amazing Mohammad Ali Jafari, quickly restruc- JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Duggan 47 tured and integrated Iran’s cyber, para- such as Amir Al-Momenin and integrated It seems that the Basij inundated the military, and clandestine capabilities into themselves into key command and con- Internet with disinformation to obscure a brutal national tool to terrorize Green trol centers across Syria.27 According to Iran’s true complicity in Syria and redi- Movement dissidents into “inaction and Dexter Filkins, “To save Assad, Soleimani rect any blame as a Western conspiracy to passivity.”20 called on every asset he had built since overthrow Assad. The Basij used various devious taking over the Quds Force: Hezbollah Iran succeeded against the Green cyber-intimidation methods against fighters, Shiite militiamen from around Movement and anti-Assad forces by activists, such as sending threatening the Arab world and all the money and interweaving ICT efforts to identify emails and Internet messages, publishing materiél he could squeeze out of . . . key human and information networks activists’ photos and offering rewards Assad’s own besieged government.”28 with brute force. Beginning with Jafari’s for their capture on government Web Inside Syrian operation centers, Quds reorganization of the IRGC, Iran’s sites, infiltrating social media networks, Force operators initially provided advice cyber-enabled COIN was later perfected seeding disinformation, sowing leader on techniques for suppressing social with Soleimani’s operations in Syria. mistrust, and staging false events to media and deterring civil disobedience, Throughout both campaigns, the Basij arrest people who showed up.21 The but soon escalated “with all kinds of ki- cyber force was a “core state instrument Basij also institutionalized cyber skills netic options” to crush the rebellion, just of suppression,” honing its techniques to on “blogging, social networking sites, like they had done at home.29 The Quds provide cover for Iran’s ruthless actions.36 psychological operations, online spying Force showed a ruthless understanding of Iran’s cyber-enabled COIN is a stunning . . . mobile phones and their capabilities, cyber-enabled COIN using “their intel- success, not only for its cyber-SOF hybrid- and computer games with the aim of ligence networks to train the Syrian army ization but also for crushing two separate targeted entry in the virtual world.”22 In how to fight people without killing; how rebellions and never triggering any mean- concert with Basij cyber-targeting activi- to use force to cause injury, without being ingful Western military response. ties, the IRGC-QF tracked, imprisoned, accused of a massacre . . . teaching them tortured, or assassinated regime threats.23 how to control Web sites and social media Lessons Learned Iran had set in motion a new symbiotic and how to jam television channels.”30 There are four primary lessons learned cycle of misattributable/nonattribut- As with the 2009 attacks on the from the actions of Iran and Russia able cyber-targeting activities married to Green Movement, the Quds Force that inform a conceptual framework old-fashioned brute force. Iran would backed up its cyber-targeting activities for aligning cyber capabilities to U.S. subsequently strengthen its marriage of with brute force. By this time, however, special warfare operations. counterinsurgency (COIN) and cyber operatives had learned to distance them- 1. There is a distinction between the activities in Syria. selves from the Iranian-trained Syrian, offensive cyber tools the IRGC-QF and Iraqi, and Hizballah proxies doing the Spetsnaz employed at the tactical level Syria dirty work. As a RAND paper pointed and those that exist at the strategic level. In 2012, Iran dispatched IRGC-QF out, “Iran has skillfully employed its own Iranian and Russian operators targeted operators and ICT experts, who had special warfare capabilities as part of a tactical-level “circumscribed or closed mastered their craft in breaking the long-term regional strategy, using state networks,”37 such as local communica- Green Movement, to Syria to advise and nonstate proxies to advance its re- tions, social media, and regional Internet pro–Bashar al-Asad forces.24 Iran sent gional interests.”31 At the same time, the and logistic infrastructure, while seem- “several hundred members of the Revo- Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) benefited ingly keeping their more sophisticated lutionary Guards al Quds force” to Syria from Iranian expertise, money, and tech- open network tools in reserve. armed with domestic COIN expertise, nology to attack anti-Assad social media 2. Cyber-enabled special warfare is money, arms, and advanced equipment and Web sites.32 The SEA “aggressively primarily a proxy-executed endeavor that “designed to disrupt communications, engaged in a wide range of online activi- values minimal source attribution. As the Internet, email, and cell phone com- ties to punish perceived opponents and described by General Gerasimov, “Long- munications.”25 Operations in Syria fell to force the online narrative in favor of distance, contactless actions against the under the command of Major General the Assad regime.”33 The SEA used dis- enemy are becoming the main means Qasem Soleimani, an infamous figure tributed denial-of-service attacks, jammed of achieving combat and operational described by General David Petraeus online portals, overloaded networks, goals.”38 Cyber-enabled SOF generally as “truly evil” and characterized by and used malware to thwart opponents’ avoid direct force-on-force engagement a senior Central Intelligence Agency messages and actions.34 Supporting and strive to operate in the gray areas officer as the “single most powerful the efforts from Iran, the Basij actively between peace and war. As observed in operative in the Middle East.”26 disseminated propaganda, developed Ukraine and Syria, cyber-enabled violence Under Soleimani’s authority, Quds increasingly advanced cyberspace capa- seeks to retain a modicum of deniability, Force operators trained proxy Hizballah bilities, and professionalized offensive letting proxies execute the dirty guerrilla and Syrian elements in Iranian camps paramilitary hacker field training.35 tactics of assassination, sabotage, and 48 Essay Competitions / Special Warfare in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Insurgents in Donetsk, Ukraine, May 9, 2014 (Wikipedia/Andrew Butko) ambush. Russia and Iran retained the partner nations in the building of security, and infrastructure architectures.41 FID strategic flexibility to cut and run should thereby helping to keep conflicts from clouds power encrypted mobile applica- things go awry. breaking out. tions, analytic tools, and pooled data 3. ICT exploitation, cyber attack, and through smart technology in the hands IO play significant roles in cyber-enabled Cloud-Powered Foreign of those involved with building security. irregular campaigns. Properly conducted, Internal Defense Although data are virtually tethered to a traditional special warfare campaigns Cloud-powered foreign internal defense cloud, the real value lies in enabling the extend to far more than SOF; “they in- (FID) is both a technical computing diffusion of timely information to ele- volve the comprehensive orchestration of concept and a metaphor for building ments at the tactical level. FID clouds broader capabilities to advance policy ob- partner capacity and trust through are also a metaphor for persistent and jectives.”39 Likewise, for these campaigns virtual means. Although not yet vibrant partnerships because, like the to work, expertise from other arenas must fully defined, FID clouds link cross- technology, the data never rest and the be integrated and synchronized. disciplined communities together to networks do not go idle. This technol- 4. Cyber-enabled special warfare better understand human, geographic, ogy is simply a vehicle to empower a could both deter conflict and be applied and virtual arenas, and then act con- deeper, broader, and more contextual throughout the spectrum of conflict jointly on targeted overlaps. Techni- community of understanding for the because it “is well suited to all phases of cally speaking, FID clouds strengthen sociocultural, political, and historical operation, from shaping the environ- partner relationships through federated factors that all too frequently fuel strife. ment through intense warfare through architectures that share data in real Instead of reactive relationships char- reconstruction.”40 Even though Iran and time, enhance automation, and diffuse acterized by intermittent FID deploy- Russia have operated at the malicious end analytic processes. Clouds have adjust- ments, which achieve a spotty under- of the spectrum, cyber-enabled special able configurations that can take the standing, FID clouds are metaphors warfare has a constructive side, too. The shape of private, public, community, for building a more persistent form of proliferation of low-cost information and and hybrid models, each character- capability, capacity, and trust between communication technologies benefits ized by different software, platform, partnered nations. JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Duggan 49 Senior Airman from 21st Special Tactics Squadron conducts air traffic control operations on edge of Geronimo Landing Zone at Fort Polk, Louisiana, during Joint Readiness Training Center rotation 13-09, August 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Parker Gyokeres) FID clouds lay a virtual foundation can save money, time, and manpower and actions. It puts a military twist on for future growth of diverse institutions, by feeding information to decisionmak- many of the ill-defined yet ubiquitous centers, and laboratories that can help ers when time is of the essence. For anti–social networking tactics practiced close the seams between U.S. interagency partner-building efforts, FID clouds can across cyberspace. Although these community interests in a country. From store information hosted by indigenous tactics are not clearly defined, this a strategic U.S. Government perspective, non-U.S. social media platforms, enrich- article characterizes them as actions FID clouds are a pragmatic “partner-cen- ing social network analysis, sociographic that obscure a perpetrator’s true iden- tric approach to design campaigns around mapping, and behavior and sentiment tity while he manipulates social media a partner’s core interests, rather than hop- trend analysis. Most importantly, FID for reasons other than what is stated. ing to transform them in ways that have clouds spread trust in a creative and Although social media pose a wide array frequently proved to be ephemeral.”42 super-empowered way that helps to es- of opportunities for any anti–social FID clouds also provide strategic discre- tablish long-lasting influence with allies, network, ranging from criminally tion “when a public relationship of a U.S. coalitions, and other partners. exploitative to benignly misrepresenta- partner state is problematic because of the tive, from a military perspective, social partner state’s domestic politics.”43 Counternetwork COIN media present a rich array of informa- FID clouds provide other oppor- Counternetwork COIN (CNCOIN) tion on ways to influence psychological tunities as well. The technology and is a simple concept aimed at leverag- vulnerabilities and an ideal attack plat- relationships that they foster across ing, harnessing, and exploiting social form from which to do it. communities can be quickly scaled up to media networks.44 Designed to break There are three broad functional respond to sudden emergencies such as an adversary’s asymmetric informa- categories for classifying CNCOIN: humanitarian assistance/disaster relief tion advantage, CNCOIN employs operations, intelligence, and IO. There operations, counter-genocide, or non- nontechnical attacks against people to are also several techniques within each combatant evacuation missions. They manipulate their perceptions, behaviors, functional category that help highlight 50 Essay Competitions / Special Warfare in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 its practice rather than define it outright. visualizations, or sociograms, provide a anonymous application could cause sub- These techniques are by no means all unique window to assess, map, and even stantial psychological harm and negative encompassing or without overlap. predict the intensity of relationship events consequences as messages are repeat- The first CNCOIN category is op- over temporal, geospatial, and relational edly viewed by the target or forwarded erations. It includes but is not limited horizons.51 across social media sites.54 Its value to to cyber-pseudo and cyber-herding During the September 2013 CNCOIN is in exploiting sensitive digital operations. A cyber-pseudo operation is Zamboanga City crisis in the Philippines, information that could shame, demoral- a classic COIN strategy “in which gov- rogue Moro National Liberation Front ize, or traumatize targets into taking ernment forces and guerrilla defectors (MNLF) forces, dissatisfied with the state psychologically impaired actions. These portray themselves as insurgent units” of national reconciliation, mobilized deliberate cyber aggression operations to infiltrate enemy networks and apply a force that seized over 200 civilian could undermine the target’s credibility, advanced tradecraft inside the network to hostages, raided businesses, and burned influence, and power to the point of trig- destroy it.45 A cyber-herding operation, on buildings throughout the city.52 During gering the target to neutralize himself or the other hand, “is the action by which the crisis, both crowdsourcing and other insurgents. an individual, group, or organization SNA exploitation were successful tech- The other techniques, sock-puppeting drives individuals, groups, or organiza- niques. Although inadvertently at first, and astro-turfing, are defined as fictitious tions to a desired location within the Philippine security forces (PSF) used online propaganda tools that disseminate electronic realm.”46 The beauty of both crowdsourcing techniques to encourage contrived views to fabricate a broader techniques is that they drive invisible Zamboanga residents to spot and report illusion of support or nonsupport.55 wedges between insurgents and their information on rogue MNLF locations Astro-turfing is the same concept as sock- command and control by exploiting the throughout the city. The PSF fused puppeting, but it is more sophisticated inherent weaknesses of communication crowdsourced information with intel- and organized and is undertaken on a and communication platforms within ligence analysis, informing both security larger scale than sock-puppeting.56 Both every network. Cyber-pseudo and cyber- and humanitarian operations. The PSF astro-turfing and sock-puppeting use herding operations prey on an enemy used SNA exploitation to assess populace virtual personas and “bots” to pump network’s natural need to maintain a low support for rogue MNLF, as well as to false information across cyberspace to signature to survive. Both techniques counter and discredit rogue MNLF state- incite reaction or mobilize mass action. target intermittent and decentralized ments on social media by taking down As witnessed with Russia’s army of trolls, insurgent leader communications, propaganda Web sites that violated social botnets, and hired hackers in Ukraine, manipulating or replacing them, which media user agreements. The PSF also astro-turfing networks are awash with synergistically leads to growing opportu- used crowdsourced information to cor- an arsenal of propaganda, pictures, and nities for the cyber counterinsurgent.47 don pockets of rogue MNLF forces and videos stoking conflict and obscuring The virtual world simply amplifies the raid ad hoc command posts. Although actions on the ground. Counternetwork environmental factors because personali- less sophisticated than Iran’s cyber- IO becomes even more effective when ties are harder to authenticate as real or enabled COIN, the PSF thwarted rogue combined with deliberate and mislead- fictitious.48 The lack of command and MNLF asymmetric advantage by using ing cyber-targeting activities, such as control authentication, communication social media to target key information IRGC activities during the 2009 Green frequency, and platform availability are and leadership nodes, following up with Movement. key cyber-pseudo and cyber-herding pres- physical force to defeat them. sure points to manipulate, misinform, or The third CNCOIN category is IO Cyber UW Pilot Teams drive targets toward desired outcomes. and includes but is not limited to cyber The third way to advance U.S. cyber- The second CNCOIN category is aggression, sock-puppeting, and astro- enabled special warfare is the Cyber UW intelligence, which includes but is not turfing techniques. All three techniques Pilot Team, a capability meant to harness limited to crowdsourcing and social exploit social media anonymously to social media networks to shape a physical networking analysis (SNA) exploitation misrepresent, misinform, and manipu- environment, establish regional mecha- techniques. Crowdsourcing is a practice late behavior, sentiment, and actions. nisms, and stitch together area com- that taps into large pools of diverse Advanced by Diane Felmlee, cyber ag- plexes prior to executing UW operations. knowledge willingly provided by partici- gression “refers to electronic or online Cyber UW Pilot Teams are purpose-built pants to solve problems with new ideas, behavior intended to harm another around the nucleus of a Special Forces services, or observations and quickly person psychologically or damage his or Operational Detachment Alpha, aug- broaden the organizer’s perspective.49 her reputation” by using “email, instant mented with interagency and technical SNA visually depicts and measures rela- messaging, cell phones, digital messages, support, whose mission is to digitally tionships, their density, and the centrality chat rooms, as well as social media, video, prepare an area for UW operations.57 of social links in order to illuminate social and gaming Web sites” and is wider in The teams undertake the same tradi- network structures.50 The social network scope than common cyber bullying.53 Its tional pilot team tasks that previously JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Duggan 51 were accomplished upon infiltration in solutions or specifics, but rather reiter- examples of integrating offensive cyber the physical domain, but do it through ates earlier cyber themes in a five-point capabilities into irregular tactics as dem- virtual means before they ever put boots outline.61 The lack of well-defined ideas onstrated by Iran and Russia pave the way on the ground in sensitive, hostile, or creates a vacuum in cyber strategy that for other U.S. adversaries to soon follow. denied areas.58 By operating virtually, puts the United States in danger of This article offers the Nation three new Cyber UW Pilot Teams could decrease ceding its superior cyber-technological options for aligning emerging technology the time, risk, exposure, and attribution advantage to potential adversaries.62 In to special warfare missions: cloud- to the U.S. and partnered resistance contrast, the asymmetric innovations powered FID, counternetwork COIN, forces because most of their activities demonstrated by Iran and Russia present and Cyber UW Pilot Team operations. would have been digitally accomplished a template for other aspiring regional and Developing these three concepts to their prior to physical infiltration.59 global powers to imitate as an irregular fullest transcends simply maintaining a Conceptually, Cyber UW Pilot Teams pathway to circumventing U.S. military U.S. cyber-technology edge; their devel- build human, physical, intelligence, and dominance and securing their strategic opment projects revolutionary influence information infrastructures on social interests.63 Moreover, the diffusion of across the globe to build critical partner- media platforms with cyber tools and inexpensive yet sophisticated technology ships and shape issues across the spectrum advanced techniques. The teams could increases this potential every year. Iran of conflict. If successfully developed, sharpen their localized language and and Russia have made the American lack cyber-enabled special warfare will become cultural skills while deepening their un- of specificity in strategic-level cyberspace a powerful new strategic option for the derstanding of the local human terrain. documents irrelevant, as the country does Nation. JFQ They could also identify resistance lead- not need simply to write about strategy, ers, assess motivations, evaluate resistance but must now catch up. capabilities, and assess overall support for Cyber-enabled special warfare is a Notes U.S. Government objectives while simul- strategic-level offensive capability gap that 1 taneously evaluating informal hierarchies, must be filled. Clearly, the United States General Joseph L. Votel, USA, com- mander of U.S. Special Operations Command, psychology, and behavior. In addition, must aggressively pursue a form of special email correspondence with author, December the teams could blend into the white warfare that integrates cyber operations 18, 2014. noise of the Internet by tapping into into tactical-level irregular operations. A 2 Maren Leed, Offensive Cyber Capabili- social media networks to “improve U.S. recent RAND report on special warfare ties at the Operational Level: The Way Ahead contextual understanding of potential concluded that “the United States needs (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and In- ternational Studies and Georgia Tech Research partners and the situation on the ground to employ a more sophisticated form of Institute, 2013), 12, available at 52 Essay Competitions / Special Warfare in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force The New Yorker, September, 20, 2013, 3. cial Warfare 26, no. 3 (July–September 2013), in a denied area.” See Army Doctrine Reference 27 Fassihi, Solomon, and Dagher. 21–23, available at JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Duggan 53 General Dempsey joins Secretary Carter for testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing discussing Counter-ISIL strategy, July 2015 (U.S. Army/Sean K. Harp) Countering these adversaries poses Countering Extremist a significant challenge. With an ever- increasing number of extremist Web sites, U.S. efforts to degrade these online op- erations have been inadequate, pointing Groups in Cyberspace to the need for innovative strategic solu- tions to counter these threats.2 However, By Robert William Schultz the same protection cyberspace offers them also makes these extremists suscep- tible to deception. This article argues that ow can the United States develop and grow. The ability to remain elusive false-flag operations could provide the effective strategic options to has made these groups the true benefi- strategic means to mask a deception that H counter extremist groups oper- ciaries of cyberspace. Using social media could degrade the bonds of trust among ating in cyberspace? For groups that outlets, these groups have a global reach extremists operating in cyberspace and promote hatred and violence, cyberspace for organizing, planning, and conduct- their loyal supporters by undermining the provides a virtual safe haven from which ing operations. They instill loyalty legitimacy of their governing ideology. to operate, using Web sites to promote among their followers through near- their causes, raise funds, communicate, constant, clear communication. Cyber- Deception Works space has also enabled extremist groups Deception is often employed strategi- to adopt decentralized organizational cally to manipulate an adversary’s Lieutenant Colonel Robert William Schultz, USA, structures with indiscernible command perceptions to gain a competitive advan- wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army hierarchies, making them difficult to tage while disguising the basic objec- War College. It won the Strategy Article category of the 2015 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identify and target using conventional tives, intentions, strategies, and capa- Strategic Essay Competition. military power.1 bilities of the deceiver.3 In cyberspace, 54 Essay Competitions / Countering Extremist Groups in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 suitable deception targets could include away in the mid-1800s because many trust had been broken, thus compelling an organization’s ideological infrastruc- states believed they were being carried supporters to terminate association with ture, legitimacy, and bonds of trust that out without proper oversight or govern- the extremist group in cyberspace.11 connect the group with its followers. mental control, FFOs today are more As an example, the recent trend of By targeting these three facets, a decep- than just a maritime deception tactic. using online radicalization to fill the tion strategy could directly challenge an They are holistically defined as secret ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and extremist group’s online existence. or disguised operations intended to the Levant (ISIL) could be countered During the 20th century, deception deceive an adversary into believing that through the use of FFOs that under- was an essential element of significant groups or states other than those who mine the bond of trust between ISIL military operations. Between 1914 and planned and implemented the opera- and potential recruits by using false-flag 1968, over 90 percent of the decep- tions are responsible.8 When employed Web sites to highlight the atrocities of tions conducted in support of military in cyberspace, FFOs could disguise the group’s ongoing operations, thus operations were successful.4 Based on the deceptions in a similar manner. Addi- delegitimizing the movement. Alienating technology available at the time, these tionally, where traditional FFOs used extremist groups such as ISIL from the deceptions were executed in the physical a disguise to approach the enemy, in international Islamic community through domain where actions and messages had cyberspace the interaction between the FFOs would not only degrade such or- to be seen or heard by their intended deceiver and the deceived is reversed. ganizations in the short term, but could audience for the deception to achieve its The deception target must choose to also potentially discredit its online activi- effect. In the virtual reality of cyberspace, visit the FFO’s Web site in the first place ties over longer periods. however, anyone has the ability to post for the deception to work. a message or influence perceptions. In Furthermore, this concept has long Implications loosely associated groups that are built been legally acceptable under the Law of There are three effects we could expect on rigid ideology, there is space to sow Armed Conflict, which permits the use to see if FFOs were successful in under- the seeds of dissent by making members of disguises prior to engaging in combat, mining the bonds of trust between look as if they are not conforming to and is also legitimized under Articles targeted online extremist groups and the agreed-upon ideology. Of note, “it 37–39 of the Geneva Conventions: would-be supporters. First, because is much easier to lead a deception target “Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such cyberspace FFOs would target the legiti- astray by reinforcing their existing beliefs, ruses are acts which are intended to macy of extremist groups, we would see thus causing the target to ignore the con- mislead an adversary or to induce him to measurable changes in online activity, trary evidence of one’s true intent, than act recklessly.”9 Since posting Web-based including decreases in membership, fun- it is to persuade a target to change his content is far from engaging in combat, draising, blogs, and chats, and increases or her mind.”5 For this reason, the deci- the need to eventually reveal attribution in offensive messages posted on FFO sion to employ deception must be based of the sponsor remains a question for Web sites. Second, we would see tar- on the ability to deceive adversaries into legal study. Thus, without actual combat, geted extremist groups policing or even believing something they want to believe the Web-based FFO concept is more akin attacking other like-minded Web sites as opposed to embracing an entirely new to black or covert deceptions in which the because they are questioning the veracity idea.6 In light of this, the United States sponsor’s attribution remains hidden.10 of ideology on sites they do not directly should acknowledge that rapidly improv- manage. Finally, we would expect to see ing information technologies enhance the How This Would Work an overall change in the use of cyber- ability to initiate unobserved operations This concept of FFOs in cyberspace is space, as targeted extremist groups and and create believable deceptions in cyber- designed around creatively developing their supporters—even if they detect the space over a protracted period of time.7 Web sites, blogs, and chat rooms that FFO—would no longer feel secure oper- With these favorable conditions, a means mirror a targeted extremist group’s ating in the virtual realm. of employing deception could be realized ideology. First, cyber-deceivers would through the use of an age-old opera- develop FFO Web-based content consis- Mitigating Risk tional concept called false-flag operations tent with the targeted group’s narrative FFOs normally have a limited shelf (FFO). in order to attract and co-opt potential life, as targets will eventually become extremist followers as readership and attuned to the presence of active decep- False-Flag Operations membership grew, the content on FFO tion.12 However, in cyberspace, time is The term false flag originated in naval sites would gradually change. Over on the deceiver’s side. Though cyber- warfare and describes a ship’s attempt time, the narratives would shift subtly based deceptions may take longer to be to deceive an enemy maritime vessel by to influence the target audience into effective, the vastness and anonymity of hiding or replacing its flag to maneuver believing the target group’s ideology cyberspace allow the deceiver to con- closely enough to destroy or capture is either corrupt or so devious that the tinually adjust messages and techniques the enemy’s vessel. Though FFOs faded target audience would see the bond of with new strings of code. In terms of JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Schultz 55 5 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., “Cognitive Factors in Deception and Counterdeception,” in Mul- tidisciplinary Perspectives in Military Deception, ed. Donald C. Daniel et al. (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 60. 6 Carolyn Pumphrey and Antulio Echevarria II, eds., Strategic Deception in Modern Democ- racies: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2003), 4. 7 Charles A. Fowler and Robert F. Nes- bit, “Tactical Deception in Air-Land War- fare,” Journal of Electronic Defense (June 1, 1995), available at 56 Essay Competitions / Countering Extremist Groups in Cyberspace JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 National Defense University’s 2015 graduation took place on June 18 at historic Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC (NDU/Katie Lewis) the military, “officers headed for high rank need to be challenged intellectu- Writing, Integrity, and ally and to sharpen their skills in critical, precise, rigorous, and imaginative think- ing and writing.”2 At the highest levels, National Security the tasks shift from artfully executing campaigns and missions crafted by oth- ers to identifying strategic challenges, By Larry D. Miller and Laura A. Wackwitz rendering assessments, and advocating well-reasoned options to the most senior military and civilian leadership. No longer dvanced professional military officers are invited, indeed encouraged, is the requirement simply to understand education (PME) affords senior to become “warrior-scholars”—indi- what is being done, why, and how to do officers the opportunity to viduals who recognize and understand A it; the new goal is to merge professional acquire solid intellectual footing and strategic issues, have the intellectual experience, critical thinking competen- enter the strategic dialogue follow- skills to chart a path forward, and have cies, and acute insights to identify what ing over 20 years of progressively mastered the professional competencies could or should be done while advancing more responsible leadership. With to make it happen.1 thoughtful analyses and perceptive rec- that opportunity, however, comes The mission is both educational and ommendations supported by reason and a responsibility new to many career knowledge generative. Effective execu- evidence. Most officers arrive at senior officers: engaging in ethical profes- tion requires development of critical Service colleges (SSCs) with considerable sional scholarship. The zenith of PME thinking and writing skills well beyond experience writing memoranda, opera- is transitional. Selected senior military the norm in military culture. Throughout tion orders, policy letters, point papers, and the like, but their written documents have been little more than tools for Dr. Larry D. Miller is Professor and Director of Communicative Arts in the Strategic Studies Institute getting the job done effectively and ef- at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Laura A. Wackwitz is Director of the Institute for Military Writing. ficiently.3 Customarily, Army documents JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Miller and Wackwitz 57 are written at a reading level halfway not the sort of activities that most senior while publically embarrassed and apolo- between that appropriate for a 12th-grade officers customarily embrace and read- getic, continue to be held in high esteem reader and a college graduate.4 A well- ily welcome. Writing integrity, like the despite well-documented evidence of honed mentality and skill set primed ability to write itself, is an acquired skill, plagiarism in their professional writings.11 almost exclusively for efficient and coop- not an inborn trait. Thus, PME institu- The expectations and consequences are erative execution provide little room and tions and others charged with developing much higher, however, for those charged minimal appeal for the time-consuming, senior leaders must revision writing with protecting the public trust, advanc- heavy intellectual lifting normally associ- integrity as a competency to be taught, ing U.S. interests, and providing for ated with knowledge generation. rather than a preloaded, well-embedded, national security. After revelations that The transition from writing as a and thoroughly integral component of a U.S. Senator John Walsh secured his U.S. routine day-to-day management tool to leader’s character. Army War College degree on the merits writing as the primary vehicle through of a heavily plagiarized document, his which to demonstrate subject matter Deception in the House degree was rescinded and he was forced mastery, advance fresh insights,5 and Plagiarism is the antithesis of writing to abandon his re-election bid amid wide- make reasoned strategic-level arguments integrity and can carry heavy conse- spread controversy.12 is a challenge, to say the least. Though quences. Generally recognized as a Cheating, plagiarism, and other forms only a few of the best students are able to form of intellectual and academic mis- of academic malfeasance are well docu- fully rise to the occasion, most learn to conduct, plagiarism entails “the appro- mented, widely decried, and increasingly reason well and embrace writing as a tool priation of another person’s ideas, pro- rampant across virtually every intellectual for achieving strategic-level objectives. cesses, results or words without giving landscape and professional activity. PME Some, however, fail to grasp the impor- appropriate credit.”6 To plagiarize is to institutions are not immune. Instances of tance of the mission and fulfill it. The misrepresent—as one’s own—the words plagiarism surface even among the most most unfortunate of these turn to plagia- and ideas of another. International elite cadres of impressively accomplished rism as a means of satisfying institutional and cultural sensitivity regarding what military professionals preparing to assume requirements, demonstrating competence constitutes plagiarism and how seriously the highest levels of national leadership. with the written word, and completing it should be viewed varies a great deal. Because integrity is fundamental to a the degree program. Such is the nature In Colombia, for example, an author’s professional military ethic, plagiarism of a normal distribution—some perform “moral rights” to his/her intellectual within SSCs is especially difficult to rec- exceedingly well, most are successful, work command legal standing. In one oncile. Senior officers and their civilian and a few fail miserably. But at an SSC, controversial case, the Colombian counterparts are mature, experienced, even the plagiarists are accomplished, Supreme Court sentenced Professor well educated, hardworking, and by most well-seasoned military professionals, Luz Mary Giraldo, an established liter- counts amply compensated. At the Army many of whom have held command over ary critic, to a 2-year prison term for War College, for example, all 308 mem- thousands, rendered decisions impact- plagiarizing portions of her student’s bers of the U.S. resident class of 2014 ing human life, assumed responsibility thesis in a brief article published in a held baccalaureate degrees, and 73 per- for multimillion-dollar equipment, and Mexican literary journal.7 In Germany, cent had previously earned one or more generally devoted their careers to the Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, a popular, advanced degrees from accredited gradu- service of the Nation. What accounts for promising, and highly effective member ate schools.13 Their average age was 45 plagiarism among a select population of of Angela Merkel’s cabinet, was pres- with 21 years of service. Ninety percent respected warriors-scholars? Do writing sured to resign as defense minister in held the rank of lieutenant colonel, colo- integrity and personal/professional integ- 2011 after it became known that he nel, or equivalent, and 28 senior civilians rity equate? Yes and no. had plagiarized portions of his 2007 represented a half-dozen Federal agencies. As in every profession, a minority doctoral dissertation.8 More recently, These are not youthful undergraduates of would-be strategic leaders has risen German Education Minister Annette who presumably plagiarize due to igno- through the ranks through a lifetime of Schavan resigned from Merkel’s cabinet rance, confusion, academic deficiencies, ethically suspect and deceptive behaviors. following the revelations that her 1980 laziness, or pressure to secure a degree But what of the otherwise honorable doctoral dissertation (titled somewhat to become gainfully employed or attend senior officers who resort to plagiarism? ironically Character and Conscience) was graduate school. These are seasoned In a military milieu, the expectation for revoked for “systematic and premedi- members of the profession of arms who original thought, while essential, is coun- ated” plagiarism.9 are considered above reproach. terintuitive for many and difficult for In the United States, plagiarism is most. Challenging authority, dissecting deemed “a moral and ethical offense” Forms of Plagiarism at the SSCs policy, unraveling doctrine, and critically rather than a legal one.10 Historians and Plagiarism among senior leaders is engaging the ideas and campaigns of best-selling biographers Doris Kerns unique in impact, striking at the very world-class strategic thinkers are simply Goodwin and the late Stephen Ambrose, heart of democracy. Its form, however, 58 JPME Today / Writing, Integrity, and National Security JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Historian and author Doris Kearns Goodwin speaks at a conference in Seattle, Washington, October 2006 (Quinn Dombrowski/Flickr) is unexceptional. Three of the most error is but an honest mistake that will be may be added in the interest of cur- common varieties of recurrent plagiaris- rectified before becoming final. The prac- rency. Manuscripts drawn from library tic malfeasance are the weave and duck, tice of weaving another’s words into a databases or sanctioned depositories such heavy import, and patchwriting. text without proper quotation, however, as the Defense Technical Information The weave and duck involves copy- is seldom rare or happenstance. Should Center are generally considered “reliable ing, typically word for word, portions the advisor broach the issue of integrity, sources of information” for plagiarizing.14 of another’s work, usually one or more the student quickly takes offense, main- Another less common practice for heavy complete lines of text, and then weav- tains that the advisor has compromised importers with multiple language capabil- ing it as artfully as possible into a larger the bond of trust, and expeditiously seeks ity is to locate a document published in a document. Sometimes a few words are another mentor. language other than English and lift sub- deleted, changed, or repositioned. An The heavy importer seeks to co-opt stantial portions, translate it into English, endnote frequently accompanies the text acceptably competent work lodged at and present the ideas as original with or though no quotation marks identify the the periphery of some topically relevant without mention of the original source. words as belonging to the original author. strategic concern. In a heavy import sce- Patchwriting is a far more frequent The plagiarist intends that the reader nario, the plagiarist locates one or more practice than is generally recognized at will presume the author has paraphrased existing documents consistent with a SSCs and in digital cultures across the what is actually directly lifted verbiage. If topic and writing task, but usually a little globe.15 Patchwriting entails “copying this scheme is noted and brought to the beyond the subject matter expertise/ from a source text and then delet- author’s attention by higher authority, interest of the faculty mentor. The heavy ing some words, altering grammatical the typical response is to “duck,” to side- importer then copies not only occasional structures, or plugging in one-for-one step the observation by acknowledging sentences, but also entire pages and even synonym-substitutes.”16 A patchwritten that the material “was supposed to be in whole sections. Transitions are offered document constitutes a more thoroughly quotes” while offering assurance that the as needed, and a fresh reference or two integrated and complex mosaic than the JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Miller and Wackwitz 59 weave and duck, often involving inte- Routinely performing—or asking stu- legitimate papers as plagiarized are pos- gration of material from three or more dents to perform—document checks sible scenarios. Accurate investigation sources. Quotation marks are often inter- fosters a culture of suspicion antithetical requires extensive review well beyond the spersed, along with paraphrasing, word to American values, places senior officers standard comparison report. A “clean” changes, and light structural altering of in the role of presumed plagiarist rather report, for example, provides no indica- the original—frequently accompanied than emerging strategic intellectual, and tion or assurance of writing integrity; it by a source citation. What is blatantly undermines confidence in both the self simply indicates that the proffered paper missing, however, is original thought and the written word.20 Educational insti- did not significantly overlap other papers or substantive development beyond the tutions are encouraged to subscribe carte in the database. mere recasting of the ideas and words blanche to the services of these compa- Because plagiarism frequently sur- of others. Somewhat paradoxically, the nies that neither provide compensation faces as a murky phenomenon open to most facile of patchwriters display suffi- for data collection nor undergo external multiple interpretations from diverse per- cient language facility to suggest that the (for example, PME) review of their spectives, adjudication is likewise difficult. writer could advance something original practices. The process is a self-reinforcing Textual transgressions are documentable, and worthwhile if he or she so desired. means of accumulating vast amounts of but matters of authorial intent are char- Moreover, in some circles patchwriting data without which the software would acteristically far less transparent. At the is considered a genuine, albeit prelimi- be useless. Software can only detect pla- Army War College, for example, most nary, effort by a novice to affiliate with giarism if the plagiarized artifact is in fact students who transgress offer apologies a discourse community, making identi- already present in the dataset to which and admit carelessness when confronted fication of authorial intent17 particularly a paper is compared. Moreover, course with evidence of plagiarism in their sub- troublesome.18 papers and larger documents submitted mitted work. Transgressors tend to claim become part of a potentially accessible that they failed to grasp the seriousness Plagiarism Mitigation database prior to institutional review. of the offense, misunderstood faculty at the SSCs Presumably, classified research would expectations, or unintentionally violated Characteristically a solitary initiative that never be submitted. Many unclassified institutional standards. Explanations have surfaces somewhat unpredictably and SSC student documents, however, are included statements such as: arises where least expected, plagiarism is not appropriate for unlimited distribu- “While I included no quotation an accelerating societal and worldwide tion: some use restricted materials (for •• marks, I intended to.” trend. Extensive debate rages over best example, for-official-use-only documents, “I sent the wrong version of my practices for its mitigation and whether nonattribution speeches), some advance •• paper with the references inadver- mitigation is necessary or even possible sensitive arguments (wargame scenarios, tently deleted.” in a digital world. The challenge within intervention strategies), and some start “My apologies, the quotation marks the senior Service colleges is presumably as Distribution A documents (approved •• were left out due to an administrative modest, but of unknown magnitude. for unlimited release) but migrate to oversight.” In educational milieus populated by Distribution B (authorized for approved “Quotation marks constitute busy- mature, highly respectable, impressively government institutions) after higher •• ness, which results in a cluttered accomplished, and academically cre- review. Once submitted, however, papers writing style.” dentialed senior leaders, comprehensive cannot be recalled. The potential risk to tracking of plagiarism is both inappro- national security and U.S. Government Most responses are softly apologetic priate and difficult. interests must outweigh the desire to opt acknowledgments moving as graciously Although many institutions of higher for a quick fix to what is but a symptom as possible in the direction of plausible education have adopted a “gotcha” of a larger problem: students poorly deniability.21 Depending upon the magni- mentality19 toward plagiarism tracking, equipped for the strategic-level thinking tude of the offense, institutional response that approach is antithetical to the goals and writing expected and required of may include working closely with the of professional military education and a senior leaders. PME institutions, as both student to address and correct the prob- potential threat to national security. The benefactors and protectors of the public lem, allowing the student to voluntarily practice requires students to routinely trust, must resist following suit. This is a withdraw from the degree program, or submit documents to for-profit software rabbit hole we should avoid. empaneling an Academic Review Board companies such as Turnitin. Once sub- Even if aided by online detection (ARB) to conduct a formal plagiarism mitted, documents are both compared software, unearthing plagiarized manu- inquiry.22 Review may be conducted at to other documents in the archive and scripts is time intensive, burdensome, any point following discovery of a prob- added to the database for future compari- and unpleasant. Database comparisons lematic document, regardless of when sons. The method may seem innocent are only as good as the database itself, the transgression occurred. Some former enough on the surface but is, in fact, far so failing to identify many a plagiarized students have been surprised to find their more insidious than first glance suggests. paper and incorrectly identifying some work questioned years after they have 60 JPME Today / Writing, Integrity, and National Security JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 U.S. Army War College graduating class of 2015 represented 387 men and women of the joint force, drawing from all branches of military, Federal agencies, and multinational environments (U.S. Army War College) graduated and moved on. Some others a means of redirecting student efforts profited from their plagiarism by accept- never make it to graduation. Once con- toward achieving true facility with the ing degrees they know were fraudulent vened, an ARB typically addresses two written word en route to assuming and not earned. Public trust is violated, questions: Does the proffered document greater leadership responsibilities. Should judgment tarnished, and security placed demonstrate clear evidence that work the student continue to plagiarize as a at risk. by another has been appropriated with- means to satisfy written requirements, If PME institutions are to meet 21st- out proper credit or acknowledgment, that student would eventually fail to meet century challenges head on, they must and if so, is there evidence or reason to standards. Students who fail to meet stan- embrace a cultural shift regarding the believe that the transgression reflects an dards do not graduate. Writing without development of warrior-scholars. Future intentional effort to deceive on the part integrity is a failure to meet standards. strategic leaders must be able to speak— of the person responsible? The matter Significantly, lack of writing integrity is and write—truth to power. They must of intent is frequently elusive, especially also a viable predictor of failures yet to be adept at advancing creative, original, when the plagiarizer is nascent, that is, come should the student advance to ever- and well-grounded ideas in support of someone who is comparatively new at greater responsibility at the strategic level. national security, worldwide stability, writing strategic analyses, which includes Academic misconduct remains an issue, and human welfare. They must learn to most students attending a senior Service of course, but need not be the sole reason embrace the value of both knowing and college.23 for denying degree status in an institution sharing how ideas have been developed. A more sound approach, consistent devoted to preparing warrior-scholars for And they must do so not as a means of with long-term national security interests, service to the Nation. Plagiarism identi- protecting themselves, but as a means would be to treat plagiarism identified fied postgraduation should continue of protecting the Nation through the prior to graduation as an issue of profes- to be addressed as an issue of academic free intellectual exchange of ideas that sional competence. This postural and misconduct. At that point, lack of writing are honest and original. Should students attitudinal shift would encourage more integrity reflects lack of personal/profes- and faculty alike become convinced that effective institutional intervention as sional integrity as well; former students original thinking and useful scholarship JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Miller and Wackwitz 61 14 are essential to national security and ing his resignation, Karl-Theodor zu Gutten- Sergey Bukakov, Vadim Dyagilev, and berg was appointed Distinguished (Nonresi- Alexander Tskhay, “Protecting Students’ related endeavors, plagiarism—for all but dent) Statesman at the Center for Strategic and Intellectual Property in the Web Plagiarism the most ethically vacuous—will drop International Studies in Washington, DC. Detection Process,” International Review of away quickly. Actively pursuing an “intel- 9 See Nina Werkhauser, “A Chronology Research in Open and Distance Learning 13, lectual renaissance”24 will bring forth of the Schavan Plagiarism Affair,” Deutsche no. 5 (December 2012), 9. 15 a rededicated intellectual era in which Welle, October 2, 2013, available at 62 JPME Today / Writing, Integrity, and National Security JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Then–Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno discusses Service challenges during Pentagon briefing, August 2015 (DOD/Clydell Kinchen) ver the past several years, a number of authors addressing Extending the O professional military education (PME) have expressed frustration about and occasionally disdain for retired Shelf Life of Teachers military officers who serve on the facul- ties of Department of Defense (DOD) senior-level colleges (SLCs).1 In a 2011 in Professional article, Dr. George Reed, a former U.S. Army War College (USAWC) faculty member, stated, “Their [retired Military Education military on faculty] experiences have a shelf life that begins to expire on the date of retirement. They can usually By William G. Pierce, James E. Gordon, and Paul C. Jussel be counted on to run a good seminar, but few contribute much in terms of scholarship as measured by the usual indicators of research and publication.”2 The authors are not in a position to defend those PME faculty members William G. Pierce, James E. Gordon, and Paul C. Jussel are Faculty Members in the Department of who have not performed well. However, Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College. it appears that the critics do not under- JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Pierce, Gordon, and Jussel 63 ing” and “joint planning processes and systems” in the curriculum.4 The focus of the OPMEP is clear regarding the goals of Service SLC edu- cation: “To prepare students for positions of strategic leadership and advisement; senior education focuses on national security strategy, theater strategy and campaigning, joint planning processes and systems, and joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and integration.”5 PoP Qualifications The OPMEP addresses Service SLC faculty qualifications but with little specificity. For civilian faculty, which includes retired military, “The Services and NDU [National Defense Univer- sity] determine the appropriate number of civilians on their respective college Retired Admiral James G. Stavridis, dean of Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, speaks at U.S. Naval War College, December 2014 (U.S. Navy/James E. Foehl) faculties. Civilian faculty members should have strong academic records stand that retired military officers faculty. Finally, it offers a number of ac- or extensive professional experience” bring a specific body of knowledge of tions organizations within DOD can take (emphasis added).6 In the case of PoP, operational and strategic expertise to to support PoP more effectively. extensive professional experience is PME—in most cases acquired through essential given that most of the subjects years of experience. Who Are Professors of Practice? they must address have no analogue in This is a body of professional knowl- The USAWC School of Strategic Land- civilian graduate degree programs.7 In edge that SLC graduates must master to power consists of four teaching depart- addition to the broad guidance in the be effective strategic planners, advisors, ments: the Department of Distance OPMEP, faculty qualification require- and leaders. Retired military officers on Education and three resident course ments in a recent job announcement for a Service SLC faculty have an important teaching departments that roughly align a PoP position at the USAWC included role in preparing students for service at to address the three “great problems” the following: “Ability to prepare, the strategic level. The faculty must know that former Secretary of War Elihu teach, and lecture on subjects related the past and current state of practice Root articulated over 110 years ago: to the theory and practice of military of operational and strategic planning, national defense, military science, and strategy, campaign planning, defense integrate new concepts into a continu- responsible command.3 This article management, and joint and combined ally evolving curriculum, understand the focuses on those who teach military military operations.”8 contemporary strategic environment, science in the School of Strategic and convey this knowledge to a diverse Landpower, although many of the ideas Factors Affecting PoP Currency student body. presented also apply to those who teach There are a number of significant differ- The faculty, referred to here as profes- other aspects of the professional body ences in how PoP and teachers of other sors of practice (PoP), are largely retired of knowledge. Military science is not a professions, such as medicine, maintain military faculty involved in teaching descriptive term, but two documents— currency. These differences generally the professional knowledge related to U.S. Code Title 10 and Chairman fall into two categories. The first are theater strategy and campaign planning. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the challenges in generating opportuni- This article explains the term professors of Instruction 1800.01D, titled “Officer ties for PoP to maintain currency in practice and examines some of the factors Professional Military Education Policy the professional body of knowledge that affect how they maintain currency in (OPMEP)”—provide some clarity on through practice. The second relates the professional body of knowledge. It what the Service SLCs granting Joint to the changing strategic environment. then describes how the changing strategic Professional Military Education Phase Although understanding the strategic environment affects PoP currency and II must teach. These two documents environment is not explicitly part of the offers ways they can acquire and dis- require Service SLCs to include instruc- body of knowledge, it is an essential seminate this information to students and tion on “theater strategy and campaign- aspect in planning and, as shown, is a 64 JPME Today / Extending the Shelf Life of PME Teachers JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 well-documented shortcoming in DOD Figure 1. The Dynamic Security Environment: Selected Guidance Published Since 2001 planning over the past decade. National Law and Guidance Medical school faculty members gen- • Amendments to Title 10 U.S. Code (for example, addition of the Chief of the National Guard erally work in positions where they are Bureau to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) able to practice their profession concur- • National Security Strategy (2002, 2006, and 2010) • Unified Command Plan (2003 with changes 1 and 2, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2011 with change 1) rent with teaching. This ability to practice would certainly help PoP maintain cur- Department of Defense Guidance and Doctrine • Quadrennial Defense Review (2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014) rency, but at a Service SLC, they do not • National Defense Strategy (2005 and 2008) enjoy the same opportunities for three • Defense Strategic Guidance (2012) reasons. • National Military Strategy (2004 and 2011) First, PoP are geographically • Guidance for Employment of the Force (2008, 2010, and 2012) separated from the offices and military • Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (2002, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) organizations (for example, combatant • Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (2007 with change 1, 2009, commands and joint force headquarters) and 2013) that translate national policy into execut- • Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (2001, 2006 with change 1, 2008, and 2011) • Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (2002, 2006, and 2011) able military plans. Second, in addition to the physical separation, planning for the employment of military forces at any Figure 2. The Dynamic Security Environment: Selected Concepts Introduced Since 2001 level requires a team approach. This team • Rapid Decisive Operations (defunct) includes experts from all staff elements • Effects-Based Operations (defunct) within the headquarters, interagency and • Systemic Operational Design (defunct) multinational partners, and potentially • Secretary of Defense In-Process Review in Adaptive Planning (ongoing, under revision) nongovernmental organizations. This • Requirement for Combatant Commander Strategy and Campaign Plans (ongoing) • Emphasis on Security Cooperation (ongoing) team establishes local procedures in addi- • Operational Design (migrated from Army doctrine to joint doctrine) tion to the guidance provided by policy • Air-Sea Battle (ongoing) and processes described in joint doctrine. • Mission Command (migrated from Army doctrine to joint doctrine) While PoP have special expertise, it • Inclusion of Department of Defense Interagency Partners in Planning (Promote Cooperation) normally takes time for any newcomer (ongoing) to establish the credibility and trust es- • Regionally Aligned Forces (Army, ongoing) sential to becoming an effective member of any high-performing team. Integrating Maintaining Currency rience is valued but is not necessarily the a PoP into an engaged planning team in The constantly evolving national secu- answer to better faculty. Figure 1 shows a timely fashion could be difficult under rity environment in which PoP operate that some component of the profes- the best of circumstances. requires various organizations within sional body of knowledge changed each Finally, there is a temporal aspect that the U.S. Government to review and, if year between 2001 and 2013. If this precludes engagement by PoP through necessary (due to world circumstances trend continues, all faculty members, a complete contingency planning cycle. or Federal law), publish new national no matter how recent their operational The near-term goal for developing strategic guidance, policy, concepts, experience, would have to understand contingency plans is 1 year, but a CJCS and doctrine. All of these documents and incorporate new guidance, con- instruction states, “This goal assumes [as are part of the PoP professional body cepts, or doctrine into the curriculum of now incorrectly] that APEX [adaptive of knowledge and affect currency and within a year or two. In figure 2, note planning and execution] planning tools curriculum development. Two figures the short shelf life of several concepts to and technologies has [sic] been fully illustrate the scope and variety of appreciate the flux experienced by PoP. implemented.”9 Episodic engagements these sources. Figure 1 is a partial list An additional challenge arises as several by PoP with a joint headquarters during a of government documents published of these concepts were never codified in planning cycle would certainly strengthen after September 11, 2001, that PoP joint doctrine, yet the OPMEP requires professional expertise, provide relevant incorporated into curricula. Figure 2 PoP to dedicate classroom time to them perspectives, and help validate SLC cur- lists doctrinal or theoretical concepts even in their embryonic states.11 ricula. Actual opportunities for a PoP to from the same timeframe. There are work through a complete planning cycle, a number of points worth noting in The Professional Body though, are rare because of time consid- these figures. Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese of Knowledge erations, faculty availability from teaching believes that Active-duty military with PoP maintain currency in the profes- duties, and the cost of an extended current experience should be the first sional body of knowledge through a temporary duty deployment at a joint or choice in selecting faculty for the topics combination of structured institutional Service planning headquarters. PoP address.10 Recent operational expe- support and significant individual effort. JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Pierce, Gordon, and Jussel 65 The OPMEP requires the Joint Staff their recent operational experiences The first lesson, documented in a J7 Joint Education Branch to host a and for PoP to offer perspective, 2012 study by the Joint and Coalition Joint Faculty Education Conference expertise, and instructional tech- Operational Analysis division of the (JFEC) every year. The conference’s niques to their new colleagues. This Joint Staff J7, concerned a failure to purpose is to “present emerging con- structured mentoring is especially understand the environment. The study cepts and other material relevant to valuable to new teachers who must concluded, “A failure to recognize, maintaining curricula currency to the coach SLC students in conceptual acknowledge, and accurately define faculties of the PME and JPME col- skills that will enable them to operate the operational environment led to a leges and schools.”12 The JFEC is held in the unfamiliar, uncomfortable, and mismatch between forces, capabilities, each summer, and the J7 hosts invite complex strategic environment that missions, and goals.”13 The second representatives of the PME community. is the new reality of their post-SLC reference is a 2014 study by the RAND DOD representatives’ presentations studies. Corporation titled “Improving Strategic focus on the evolving professional body •• Reference handbooks. Publications Competence.” This study critiques the of knowledge, but they also provide that integrate current doctrine and U.S. strategic effort over the past 13 insight into the strategic environment. best practices or consolidate diverse years. The authors make clear one of their There are numerous classified and information into one document findings in the section titled “Military unclassified policy and strategy docu- provide PoP with superb profes- Campaigns Must Be Based on a Political ments directly related to PoP expertise sional development references. Two Strategy, Because Military Operations (figure 1). PoP invest a significant effort examples are the USAWC Campaign Take Place in the Political Environment to remain current. Although the faculty Planning Handbook and the U.S. of the State in Which the Intervention at Service SLCs cannot use classified Naval War College’s Forces/Capabili- Takes Place.”14 The study concludes documents in class because of the pres- ties Handbook. the U.S. military did not adequately ence of international fellows, they serve •• Inputs to joint doctrine. Inputs to understand the political environment as an important source for PoP expertise. doctrine contribute to the body of in the process of developing plans for Detailed knowledge of these documents knowledge, and while the author Afghanistan and Iraq. is essential to shape the curriculum that is never acknowledged, changes to This requirement for environmental respects security considerations while en- doctrinal publications undergo an understanding is a recent addition to suring relevance to U.S. practitioners. extensive peer review process by doctrine and PoP expertise. Introduced Articles in professional journals serve practitioners. into joint doctrine in the 2011 version as valuable sources of PoP knowledge, •• Optional lectures. Throughout each of Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation both as sources of content and as vehicles academic year there are numerous Planning, operational design methodol- for research and contributions by PoP to opportunities to expand professional ogy assists the commander in developing share new knowledge. Students invariably expertise through optional lectures an operational approach. Three aspects raise numerous topics for scholarly re- provided by a variety of subject of the methodology leading to an opera- search such as flawed concepts, doctrinal matter experts on relevant topics. tional approach are understanding the voids, and inconsistent policies during •• Supervise student research. PoP can strategic direction, understanding the seminar discussion. There are a number maintain currency by serving as advi- operational environment, and defining of other ways PoP maintain currency: sors for student research projects. the problem.15 In a memorandum describing the six Faculty development. While the PoP •• officer-desired leader attributes for Joint at the USAWC join the faculty with Understanding the National Force 2020, General Martin Dempsey considerable operational and plan- Security Environment included the ability “to understand the ning experience, the subject matter In addition to the professional body environment and the effect of all instru- they address in class is so broad that of knowledge, another component of ments of national power.”16 Reinforcing no one person can be an expert on PoP expertise is an understanding of General Dempsey’s emphasis on this all facets of the theater strategy and the strategic environment. PoP educate environmental understanding, Army campaigning curriculum (Root’s students on the importance of inte- Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno “military science”). Effective faculty grating the effects of the environment sent a letter containing guidance to development programs at the institu- when applying the professional body Major General William Rapp, the newly tional and departmental levels ensure of knowledge to U.S. national security appointed commandant of the USAWC. all PoP have a common understand- challenges. Two studies document the Among other tasks, General Odierno ing of current strategies, concepts, undesirable results that occur when U.S. asked Major General Rapp to ensure he doctrine, and the strategic environ- strategic leaders failed to adequately understood the strategic environment ment. Faculty development is an understand the environment during to include “maintaining your current opportunity for new faculty to share planning and execution. sense of the global and Washington 66 JPME Today / Extending the Shelf Life of PME Teachers JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Graduates listen as General Dempsey delivers commencement address at National Defense University graduation ceremony in Washington, DC, June 18, 2015 (DOD/Daniel Hinton) atmospherics.”17 In a USAWC faculty in an advisement or leadership role at the for lesson development or inclusion in town hall meeting on September 29, strategic level anywhere in the joint force or seminar dialogue given the multitude 2014, Major General Rapp repeated the interagency.19 of unclassified information outlets is that charge to the faculty to ensure the a challenge. Examples of open source students also understood those aspects of The need for PoP to understand information range from recently pub- the national security environment.18 and convey relevant aspects of the stra- lished books, journals, and blogs to It is fair to conclude that SLC tegic environment to students is clear. unclassified daily summaries of U.S. graduates could learn what they need Achieving that environmental under- military activity. PoP must engage in to know about the environment in their standing is a significant challenge for environmental scanning daily and be post-graduation assignments. However, all PoP and is complicated by decisions good team players. PoP who find open this delay in effectiveness flies in the face regarding sources of information relevant source material that provides insight of the vision for USAWC graduates as to the curriculum and restrictions on dis- into the dynamic strategic environment articulated by the previous commandant, seminating environmental insight. and supports lesson or course objec- Major General Anthony Cucolo. One tives must freely share this information slide in his command briefing stated: Achieving an Understanding with colleagues. Taken to the extreme, of the Strategic Environment PoP inboxes could be overflowing Our primary purpose is to produce gradu- The effort by PoP to maintain cur- with interesting but not necessarily ates who are skilled critical thinkers and rency regarding the environment is a relevant environmental insight. This complex problem solvers . . . who have never-ending and time-consuming task. is where PoP experience makes a dif- rethought their professional identity for Fortunately, PoP do not suffer from ference: understanding what is and is continued service at senior levels . . . and a lack of sources regarding this aspect not important in making critical points who, upon graduation, can immediately of the profession. On the contrary, in class. Fortunately, sharing relevant [emphasis in the original] be value-added determining what is relevant and timely environmental insight is something the JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Pierce, Gordon, and Jussel 67 professionals in the authors’ department think tanks, government agencies, non- USAWC. During the peer review and have done well for years. governmental organizations, etc.”20 publishing process, the USAWC leader- While open sources are an important The second challenge PoP face is ship changed direction and moved away source of environmental awareness, that once acquired, dissemination of this from some of the curriculum initiatives information from government insiders environmental insight to a wide audi- the authors presented.22 A journal provides environmental understanding ence is affected, in part, by the USAWC article regarding publications describes that is extremely valuable to students and policy regarding attribution of comments this situation: faculty. However, access limitations and to sources.21 Engagements with senior constraints on dissemination of this infor- government officials or other subject As the rate of societal change quickens, mation pose a peculiar challenge for PoP matter experts who are not candid would cycle-times in academic publishing, which and affect currency. not be useful to faculty or students. have lagged behind those in industry and Over the course of the academic Source perspectives on the environment technology, become crucial. In a world of year, students often hear faculty and are enlightening but are often sensitive. instant communication in which 70 mil- guest speakers declare that “relation- The nonattribution policy protects those lion blogs already exist and 40,000 new ships matter.” For PoP, relationships are who are willing to provide insights, but blogs come on line each day—the majority critical. Maintaining contact with former this policy also limits the ability of PoP of which are not in English—academia students who are in relevant operational to document source insights in publicly cannot continue to rely on a venerated assignments is an effective way for available media. Another factor that limits journal-publishing system that considers PoP to maintain a feel for the strategic dissemination of environmental perspec- publication delays of up to two years to be environment. tive is the classification of the insight. both acceptable and normal.23 PoP can gain an understanding of Discussions with high-level sources the environment through primary source frequently involve classified information, Another consideration is the need for interviews or interactions with senior and there are restrictions on how this the PME community to recognize that members of DOD and interagency and information is shared with colleagues and peer review may not apply to environ- multinational partners who deal with students. mental insight. There is no doubt that operational and strategic level challenges While PoP will gain great insight from peer review is a valuable tool for proposed daily. The dedicated public servants who engagements with the sources described additions to the professional body of formulate and implement U.S. national thus far, it is essential that a wider audi- knowledge. However, for environmental policy are in ideal positions to provide ence (for example, faculty colleagues and aspects of the profession, first-person clarity regarding the strategic environ- students) benefit from these activities. Dr. accounts do not lend themselves to peer ment. Unfortunately, these national George Reed’s comment regarding PoP review. Washington, DC, atmospherics security professionals are busy and do “scholarship as measured by the usual are about perceptions and opinions of the not have the time to document their ob- indicators of research and publication” environment, and these opinions matter servations in an effort to enlighten PME does not necessarily account for how PoP if one wants to operate effectively in the faculty. share environmental insight. The “usual environment. When Eliot Cohen entered Access to sources that have special indicators of research and publication” government service in 2007, he believed insight is the first challenge. Relationships may not be relevant or useful in helping that “policy was forty percent substance developed between senior government PoP and students understand the strate- and sixty percent personalities.” As a officials and PoP have served the faculty gic environment. result of his service in the Department of well at USAWC. These relationships, es- State, his view changed: he now believes tablished during coincident assignments Nonstandard Contributions government policy is “ten percent sub- or student contacts, translate into access to the Body of Knowledge stance and ninety percent personalities.”24 where PoP are able to obtain and share Scholarly articles have an important Personalities change with every adminis- with faculty colleagues insights regard- role in ensuring PoP currency, but tration, and documented policy cannot ing current policies and practice. These there are a few drawbacks in relying always keep up. A recent example is the relationships do not grow overnight, but on peer-reviewed journal articles to difference between the current practice once they are established, many PoP are disseminate insight on the strategic regarding the Secretary of Defense cam- able to tap into individual expertise that environment. First is timeliness of an paign and contingency plan reviews and is simply not available to other faculty article. In a rapidly changing environ- the current policy as articulated in a CJCS or the public at large. The USAWC ment, traditional publication review and instruction.25 Substantive differences such leadership recognizes the importance of publishing processes might not keep as these are important to Service SLC access. A qualification in a recent job an- up. As an example, Anthony Cucolo graduates who must operate in this envi- nouncement for a Chair of War Studies and Lance Betros authored an article ronment and the PoP who must integrate was an “extensive professional network for the July 2014 edition of Joint Force these realities into the curriculum. enabling access to academic institutions, Quarterly regarding changes at the 68 JPME Today / Extending the Shelf Life of PME Teachers JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Trip reports, blog entries, online journals, and other nonstandard repre- sentations of new knowledge are ways PoP disseminate environmental realities to a relevant audience. These methods do not have the cachet of journal articles and may not have any enduring value. However, timely, relevant, and accurate insight into the strategic environment in any form arguably supports PoP currency and student learning. Recommendations A number of current policies and pro- cesses within DOD and the USAWC support the continuing education and development of PoP. However, the institution could do more if it seeks to extend PoP shelf life and leverage the years of teaching experience, context, and perspective that PoP bring to the classroom. Those responsible for PME within DOD should establish a system to disseminate critical references rel- evant to OPMEP requirements to the PME institutions. As noted above, PoP must have access to and integrate into the curriculum a never-ending flow of new strategic guidance, policy (classified and unclassified), concepts, and doc- trine. The Joint Staff J7 Joint Education Branch could act as a clearinghouse for strategic guidance, policy, and concept Former Secretary of War Elihu Root (Wikipedia) documents and push them to each of the institutions involved in PME, PoP to maintain currency with respect could host a global brainstorming session similar to how it currently provides joint to the strategic environment. Three on a regular basis to provide PoP with doctrine updates. This should include proposals could help provide critical best practices among practitioners on concepts and other strategic documents insight between the annual JFEC. First, status of policy and concepts between the that are in draft with an anticipated date J7 could host classified blogs available annual JFEC. One of the authors recently of release. to those involved in policy development participated in such a session unrelated to The Joint Faculty Education and planning, ranging from the Office of national security, but if done in a classi- Conference is a great start to every aca- the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy to fied forum, it appears to be an ideal way demic year. It provides current insights the joint force headquarters involved in to get worldwide input from practitioners for PoP and sets the stage for curriculum operational/strategic planning. Second, on a variety of issues.27 refinement. One change the J7 should J7 could develop a system similar to There are a few other ways PME consider is to conduct the JFEC in a the server list called STRATLST that leadership can support PoP efforts to classified forum. It is through access to connects Army strategists via email. It maintain currency. classified insight and material that PoP has generated great participation and will achieve the level of understanding Leadership in PME must resource insight among practitioners and PoP. •• of systems, processes, and concepts to regular staff visits to relevant organi- The one disadvantage is that the Army shape the classes that serve the U.S. zations and commands. These visits, STRATLST operates on an unclassified audience while respecting classification while expensive, are critical in ensur- network, which limits usefulness.26 considerations. ing PoP currency and relevance. Finally, OSD Policy or the Joint Staff Unfortunately, a JFEC-like confer- Service SLCs should actively seek J5 Joint Operational War Plans Division •• ence once a year is not enough to enable and resource PoP engagements with JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Pierce, Gordon, and Jussel 69 20 joint planning or policy develop- crucial to the PME mission, and should be the Announcement NEDQ1264682, first choice to teach the courses on operational “Chair of War Studies,” USAJobs.gov, accessed ment organizations for an extended warfare, not former officers far removed from at 70 JPME Today / Extending the Shelf Life of PME Teachers JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 President Obama and Vice President Biden hold meeting with combatant commanders and military leadership in Cabinet Room, November 12, 2013 (White House/Pete Souza) Why War Plans, Really? By Robert A. Gleckler n the surface, “What are war misunderstandings of the role of any used (and even misused) at the strategic plans for?” is a simple question. single war plan or war plans in general and policy levels, often as a result of O Clearly, these plans should state and of the conceptual timeframes for diverging interpretations of their nature what we propose to do in case of war. their execution. and value. Pointing out these pitfalls From this point of departure, however, This article is not meant to explore could help current and future strategists any further understanding of the role the dark arts of operational planning. and policymakers avoid problems in the of war plans can diverge significantly. Reams of articles and terabytes of blog future, thereby enriching the civil-military The fact is that war plans are used, space on the merits or failings of existing dialogue that should take place through- leveraged, and cited for more than just doctrine for joint operational planning out plan development. war planning, and this carries inherent have been produced, and read almost risks. The most common misuse of war exclusively, by practitioners. Rather, this What War Plans Are plans usually stems from fundamental article seeks to describe how war plans are Really Telling Us The term war plans is a colloquial substitute for operation or contingency 1 Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Gleckler, USA, is Deputy Chief of the Under Secretary of the Army’s plans. In addition to direct conflict, Strategic Initiatives Group. they can also address other condi- JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Gleckler 71 During second battle of Libya, before zero hour, brigadier commanding tank units in Tobruk instruct tank commanders on operations using sand table for demonstration purposes (Courtesy Library of Congress/Official British Army photo No. BO 773 [BM 7241]) tions such as humanitarian assistance biannually in the form of the Secretary Understanding the timeframe for and disaster relief, defense support to of Defense’s Guidance for Employment deliberate planning requirements is critical civil authorities, or any other type of of the Force and the Chairman’s Joint for an informed discussion on the role contingency that may call on resources Strategic Capabilities Plan. of war plans. Plans written by combatant from the military. Our joint operation The campaigns and contingency plans commands in response to biannual formal planning framework includes the activi- crafted in response to formal guidance guidance documents are expected to be ties that combatant commanders and documents are examples of deliberate developed and reviewed within the same joint force commanders undertake to planning. In the biannual revision of these timeframe. Though these contingencies respond to contingencies and crises. documents, the Secretary and Chairman may never transition to execution, the Plans can serve as a basis for dialogue articulate planning requirements for spe- conceptual timeframe for potential execu- from the joint force to national leader- cific contingencies and the level of detail tion is likewise within the 2-year planning ship.2 From planning guidance directed required of those plans. These are the cycle. Therefore, the plans must be based by the President, Secretary of Defense, formal methods by which senior leaders on current military capabilities if they and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of tell us, “We really need to think about X.” are to meet the criterion of feasibility.4 Staff, combatant command and joint Crisis action planning is used for these Campaign plans, though they are meant force command planners develop “cam- unanticipated emergent contingencies to span a 2- to 5-year timeframe, are also paign plans and contingency plans based that were not captured in formal planning meant to be developed and reviewed on current military capabilities [empha- guidance documents. Crisis action plan- within the 2-year window of the guidance sis in original].”3 Formal planning ning is used to address the problems that documents. Campaigns are ongoing and guidance from these leaders is provided we simply did not see coming. at various stages of execution at any given 72 Commentary / Why War Plans, Really? JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 time. Crisis action planning addresses 15 to 17 years. If plans written for was notably silent on the strategic ques- emergent contingencies, which are, by today’s threats with today’s resources tion of why Great Britain—or any other their nature, near term. In all the cases de- are used as the primary demand signal belligerent—would simply stand aside scribed herein, the plans must reflect the for future planning, programming, and and allow this to happen in the middle potential for near-term execution with the strategy development, DOD could find of World War I.9 Today’s SSA scenarios forces and resources available at the time. itself constantly staring in the rearview are directed to focus on the strategic To help inform planners of the realis- mirror looking for hints of future level of warfare and include “threat and tic availability of forces in the near term, demands. friendly politico-military contexts and Services annually provide data in the form This is where DOD Support for backgrounds, assumptions, constraints, of apportionment tables that describe Strategic Analysis (SSA) has a major role limitations, strategic objective, and other each Service’s best estimate of the average to play.5 Defense planning guidance planning considerations.”10 Accounting availability of certain types of forces in the that covers the 5 years of the upcom- for the strategic environment that would coming year. The data are not a perfect ing Program Objective Memorandum lead to conflict is a vital part of the civil- reflection of day-to-day availability of (POM) is published annually and gives military dialogue associated with any forces because unanticipated demands specific scenarios for DOD to examine. future scenario. accumulate throughout the course of Significantly, the scenarios use forces the year from the moment the ink dries programmed at the end of the POM What Are the Pitfalls? on the annual revision. However, the rather than those available today. In As noted, the greatest sources for mis- estimate still provides a general picture of parallel, assumptions about how the understanding plans at the strategic and how many forces a Service could provide adversary may have changed must also be policy levels come from differing views and the pace at which they could be made projected to the same timeframe. This is on the temporal aspects of the plan available in a contingency. Using this vital in avoiding the pitfall of examining (the timeframe for potential execution) data to inform planning at the front end today’s adversary with tomorrow’s force. and the purpose or value of the plan. does not mean those are the exact forces DOD provides direction on developing Below are a few observations on the that may be available at execution, but it scenarios to support senior leaders as they pitfalls associated with these different should decrease the difference between deliberate on strategy and programming.6 interpretations. what a commander expects and what a In contrast to campaign and war plans, If You Build It, They Will Come. A Service is able to provide at execution. which are written by combatant com- deliberate plan, developed by a combat- Referenced early in the planning pro- mands and undergo review before being ant command in response to formal cess, accurate force generation estimates presented to the Secretary of Defense, biannual planning guidance from the may even drive a commander to have a SSA products are collaboratively devel- President, Secretary of Defense, and discussion with policymakers regarding oped by the Office of the Director for Chairman, is meant to address potential feasibility and the range of acceptable Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation near-term threats using resources that outcomes before initially embarking on (CAPE), Under Secretary of Defense for could reasonably be made available. A deliberate planning. Policy, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs plan that is drafted uninformed by any of Staff using data provided by DOD consideration of available resources (that What About the Future? components.7 The scenarios can range is, force availability or logistics sustain- Given that deliberate and crisis action from near to long term, but they should ability) or transportation feasibility does planning are directed at the near be based on plausible (though not neces- not paint a realistic picture of the types term—the adversary as we see him sarily the most likely) challenges and are of decisions and tradeoffs that senior today and the forces and resources we not meant to be used in evaluating cur- strategic and policy-level decisionmak- can reasonably expect to be made avail- rent war plans.8 ers would be faced with should the plan able today and in the near term—how Plausibility in the scenarios should be required to transition to execution. do we address the future? A planning not be overlooked. This is where DOD At best, an uninformed plan shifts the process solely focused on near-term senior leaders can take the liberty to assumption of risk from the author threats and availability of resources does explore alternative futures but not stray (the combatant command) to the force not provide the impetus for long-term so far from reality that the exercise is provider (for example, the Services, U.S. innovation, strategic planning, or pro- either useless or counterproductive. This Special Operations Command, U.S. gramming. Not only will threats change somewhat obvious point was not always Transportation Command), or the trans- over time, but our forces and resources a given. In his history American War porter (U.S. Transportation Command) will change as well. Within the Depart- Plans, 1890–1939, Steven Ross notes that and masks potential shortfalls or lateness. ment of Defense (DOD) planning, pro- as late as 1916, the Navy General Board At worst, it can paint a three-dimensional, gramming, budgeting, and execution was still presenting plans for a naval overly optimistic picture that masks risk process, programming extends 5 years showdown on the high seas between the from all participants. A plan uninformed into the future, while planning extends United States and Germany. The plan by resources becomes, “If you build it, JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Gleckler 73 Soldiers plan for defense during decisive action rotation 15-02 at National Training Center on Fort Irwin, California, November 2014 (U.S. Army/Randis Monroe) they will come.” An unrealistic projec- development is sometimes used during flow of joint capabilities—whether based tion of available resources becomes, “If sustainment planning. Even when opera- on force generation timelines or transpor- the balloon goes up, we’re all in.” And a tional planners thoroughly adjust their tation timelines—do not simply extend policymaker has no idea of the tough de- force flow from the desired force to the the operational timelines of the plan; they cisions that might converge at execution, realistically available force, logistics plan- can drastically impact the entire scheme such as mobilization options, disengage- ners may stay fixated on sustaining the of maneuver for the operational com- ment from existing priorities, overlapping desired force. If the ideal, preferred force mander—and even result in discussions requirements, authorities needed, access for the plan is larger than the force that about policy implications (that is, time and overflight required, time required to could actually be generated, so the logic needed, projected casualties, international meet objectives, or resources. goes, then it is best to plan to sustain the or domestic pressures, and so forth). Ideally, these conversations happen at larger force. If, at execution, a smaller Capabilities that had been needed early the genesis of planning rather than deep force were provided, then certainly in the ideal timeline may no longer serve in the planning process when time has the plan would be sufficient to sustain their purpose by arriving later. The plan been squandered. Despite shortcomings that force as well. This is essentially the that is based on the realistic generation in the process, one of the great values of principle that “If you can make it here, and arrival of forces could have com- in-progress reviews of deliberate plans you’ll make it anywhere.” Why risk pletely different priorities for the arrival and campaigns is that they can serve as a being caught short if, by some supreme of sustainment capabilities from the plan training ground for civil-military policy effort, the preferred force were actually that is based on a desired or preferred discussions when the stakes are not nearly generated? force. as high, so that the participants are ready The flaw in this approach is that it can to have these discussions during crisis lead to sub-optimized sustainment for the War Plans in Strategy action planning. This applies not only to force that may actually arrive. Again, it Development the dialogue between military planners is not only the size of the force, but also We must concede that operation and and policymakers within DOD, but also the timing of arrival. For example, food, contingency plans carry a certain gravi- to the dialogue that includes interagency fuel, or munitions could be programmed tas that SSA scenarios lack, especially and potential coalition partners. to arrive in time to sustain units that had when the former are referred to as war The “New York, New York” Approach not yet been generated, misaligning valu- plans. After all, in the case of planning to Sustainment Planning. One com- able cargo space for medical assets for the contingencies formally directed by the mon argument for unconstrained plan units that do arrive. Changes in the force President, Secretary of Defense, or 74 Commentary / Why War Plans, Really? JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Chairman, war plans are developed in strategy working groups combine existing main focus may lie within one combatant response to direction from the highest war plans from today in an effort to get command but could require supporting levels. They are designed to meet real an understanding of the demands for efforts from other combatant commands, threats in the near term, are developed combined execution in the future. Not especially those with global or functional by the responsible regional combat- only were the plans written considering responsibilities. ant command, formally staffed for today’s resources for today’s adversary, Plans that are developed collabora- comment, and reviewed by the Sec- but they were also written independently tively from the start will expose potential retary of Defense or Under Secretary of each other. Simply adding two plans policy-level decisions that would have of Defense for Policy. SSA scenarios, together may not provide an accurate been masked previously. This applies not as described earlier, serve a different description of either the strategic environ- only to potential conflicts over resources purpose and are developed in a process ment or our national response to such a but also to opportunities that can be led by CAPE, often exploring the plau- scenario. The strategic environment that exploited, such as placing an adversary’s sible—though not necessarily likely— led to conflict in each of the individual interests outside the local theater at risk. challenges of the future. This creates a war plans might be completely different As General Ulysses S. Grant snapped disparity in the perceived value of both from the strategic background that would to a panicky subordinate after a hard products that unfortunately can carry lead to simultaneous conflict with both day’s fighting during the Battle of the over to the development of strategy for adversaries at once. The operational ap- Wilderness in May 1864, “Go back to the future. proaches and the tolerance for different your command, and try to think what When exploring how DOD might policy objectives and national resource we are going to do ourselves, instead of meet future challenges, working groups availability may be completely different what Lee is going to do.”11 A potential have a strong tendency to use today’s when the Nation is severely pressed by adversary whose threat is important war plans, rather than SSA scenarios, multiple adversaries, as compared to one enough for the national leadership to to articulate what the demands might at a time. direct us to plan against it should not be. As described earlier, a plan that is be addressed simply as one combatant developed for today’s adversary, with Take a Number, Please! command’s problem, but as the Nation’s today’s resources, and to meet today’s Plans that are tasked and developed problem. Our adversaries would not limit policy objectives may be inappropriate in isolation from one another run the themselves to taking on a single regional for exploring tomorrow’s threat with the risk of missing the entire demand for combatant command, and we should not resources that we believe will be available resources that may arise during the approach it that way either. in the future. At best, this can result in contingency. While there is value in This holistic approach to plan a temporal mismatch between today’s isolating a problem (a potential contin- development requires not only the needs and tomorrow’s threats. At worst, gency) for deep examination by specific involvement of multiple combatant this creates an incentive to distort a war regional combatant command planners, commands, but also interaction with poli- plan from a feasible near-term plan to the shortfall is that most contingencies cymakers who can be exposed early on to a programmatic demand signal, where will not be limited to a single combatant gaps and opportunities that we may ask desired future capabilities are shielded command problem. Even when plan- their help in addressing through inter- by the argument that “this is what the ners are diligent in crafting a near-term agency and international partners. This is war plan calls for.” The nature of the war plan informed by available resources, especially important when trying to grasp plan thus changes from an operational they may never have been formally what conditions might have existed prior approach for today to a justification for tasked to take into account other related to the crisis erupting. future programs. When a war plan is crises outside of their responsibility that distorted this way, it becomes difficult would place competing demands on Crisis versus Complacency to amend to meet changes in the opera- those same resources. Our planning, both for war plans as well tional environment for fear of losing a There is a growing acknowledgment as SSA scenarios, places a heavy empha- programmatic demand signal. Using to- within DOD that our approach to con- sis on the crisis portion (decisive action day’s war plans for strategy development tingency planning needs to account for or Phase III) of a given contingency or can also lower the incentive to explore the range of demands that may be placed scenario. War plans are often precluded innovative schemes or resource invest- on the entire force during execution. A by the phrase “and should deterrence ments to tackle the problem—or reduce move to combine plans to understand fail,” loosely translated as “when all hell its likelihood—in the future. After all, the total demand must be more nu- breaks loose.” Our planning construct who wants to argue with the demands of anced than simply adding together the describes contingencies as branches of a war plan that has been reviewed by the requirements of several plans developed the ongoing campaign plan, which is Secretary of Defense? in isolation. It should lead to plans that sometimes interpreted as “things were One of the most unsettling mani- are developed, from the outset, as collab- going fine, then we fell off a cliff.” Our festations of this tendency occurs when orative approaches to a problem whose Joint Operation Planning and Execu- JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Gleckler 75 tion System construct envisions trig- placed on a pedestal. War plans, to those to explore innovative approaches to gers such as the declaration of a C-day outside the dark arts of operational plan- the future—even considering alternate (crisis) by the President, authorizing a ning, seem to carry an aura of importance starting conditions—we can foster a whole host of force flow and mobiliza- that can make practitioners cringe when rich civil-military dialogue that captures tion activities. Our adversaries know asked about them. War planners need to risks and opportunities when the stakes this all too well, and they deliberately display utmost caution when responding are manageable and time is available. In operate in the ungoverned white space to the question “How many X (brigades, understanding the roles of war plans and of our planning construct that exists carriers, squadrons, and so forth) are scenarios and their temporal contexts, to the left of any sort of thresholds for in the plan?” Key follow-up questions DOD will be well positioned to address crisis declaration. should be: “Who is asking?” and “For near-term challenges and to develop For SSA scenarios, this crisis focus is what purpose?” Raw data, removed policy and strategy for the future. JFQ especially problematic because it can lead from the context of time (today or in the to an overemphasis on the weapons sys- future? total demand or phased arrival?), tems and capabilities we may need once strategic environment (in isolation or Notes the sky has fallen. By envisioning a start combined? start point assumptions?), 1 point where all our efforts to set condi- or purpose (plan refinement or strategy Examples of the legacy term war plans still in current use include the Joint Staff’s tions between now and the beginning development?) can be less than helpful. Joint Operational War Plans Division in J5, of a future catastrophe have been fruit- Such data can actually be counterproduc- Joint Strategic Plans, as well as Headquarters less, we actually avoid some of the most tive, especially when accompanied by the Department of the Army’s War Plans Division, substantial and informative policy-level declaration, “That’s what the plan calls formally known as G-3/5/7, DAMO-SSW dialogue about what we want to achieve for!” (Department of the Army, Maneuver and Op- erations, Strategic Studies, War Plans). in that ungoverned white space short of We must remember that any plan, 2 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation crisis between now and the future. While whether deliberate or crisis action, is Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, focusing on worst-case start points for a way, not necessarily the way, that the 2011). crisis activities is important for under- military instrument of national power 3 Ibid., xiii. 4 standing the highest bar of demand and will be applied during execution. In an Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff In- struction 3141.01E, “Management and Review for pushing the bounds of innovation, ideal world, near-term plans, based on of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)- SSA scenarios can bring added value if the reasonable expectation of resources, Tasked Plans,” September 15, 2011, C-1: they also explore alternative start points serve to stimulate the civil-military dia- “(2) Feasibility. The assigned mission can be for future crises, envisioning the fruits of logue early in the process. They identify accomplished using available resources within several years’ efforts on access, overflight, potential decision points when resources the time contemplated by the plan.” 5 Department of Defense Directive availability, relationships, prepositioning, or policy aims may be in conflict, and 8260.05, “Support for Strategic Analysis,” July advances in medicine and technology, they explore the range of acceptable 7, 2011. and so forth. Exploring alternative start outcomes before devoting valuable 6 Ibid. points would not be intended to be time and energy to developing specific 7 Ibid. 8 unreasonably optimistic about the future courses of action. Well-developed plans, Ibid. 9 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, but rather to actually inform ourselves, frequently reviewed for changes in the 1890–1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 64. while the stakes are not as high, of the strategic environment, can help narrow 10 “Support for Strategic Analysis,” 6. activities we may want to pursue to set the gap between expectations during plan 11 Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody Roads better conditions should the crisis arise in development and the reality at execution, South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May–June the future. when time is always short and pressure is 1864 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 113. abundant. In the End, It’s Just a Plan Though war plans can certainly in- In the universe of demands placed on form strategy development, they must combatant commands, Services, and the be understood for what they represent: entire DOD, war plans are simply one an approach for today’s adversary with of many. In the midst of ongoing day- today’s resources. To misuse war plans to-day operations, exercises, campaigns, as a signal for future demands is to walk and the Title 10 functions of man, train, backward into the future. This can stifle and equip, war plans and scenarios innovative ways to approach future designed to explore the future are challenges and even distort an exist- sometimes not used or consulted. ing war plan from a truly operational Ironically, the further one gets from approach for today into a holding pen the factory floor of plan development, the for programmatic demand signals for more the notion of war plans seems to be the future. When we use SSA scenarios 76 Commentary / Why War Plans, Really? JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Pilot with Task Force Medevac turns his back as UH-60 Black Hawk touches down at Eel River Conservation Camp in Redway, California, August 2015 (U.S. Army National Guard/Eddie Siguenza) high costs of a core workforce: reduce the number of high-cost personnel, The Impact of Rising replace full-time labor with part-time, use outside contractors where possible, substitute capital for labor, and be ready Compensation Costs to rebuild if the need arises. With the military, these adaptations have shaped force structure and, hence, strategy. As on Force Structure a result, the United States has built a technological force that cannot go to war without mobilizing Reserves and employ- By Mark F. Cancian ing vast numbers of contractors. This in turn shapes responsiveness to threats, the forces employed, and the level of public he battle lines have been drawn: resources contract, the debate intensi- involvement with the military and con- containing the growth of military fies. Angry op-eds are exchanged, con- flict. Yet these strategic shifts have been T personnel costs is either “a strate- stituting the kind of high drama that buried in the highly charged arguments gic imperative” or “breaking faith with attracts political and media attention. about the level of compensation. those who have sacrificed so much.”1 As Overlooked in this controversy are the adaptations that the Department of Rising Personnel Costs Defense (DOD) has already made to That personnel costs have risen steeply accommodate rising personnel costs. is not disputed. Since 2001, pay per Colonel Mark F. Cancian, USMCR (Ret.), is a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and These are the same adaptations that busi- Active-duty Servicemember has grown International Studies. nesses have made when faced with the over 80 percent in 2001 dollars (about JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Cancian 77 50 percent in constant dollars).2 Military creating the Military Compensation and editorialist makes deep cuts to personnel. pay has increased 40 percent more than Retirement Modernization Commission. In one recent budget “wargame,” for civilian pay since 2000, and enlisted In January 2015, following extensive example, four think tanks realigned force Servicemembers are now paid more analyses and outreach, the commission structure and acquisition programs to fit than 90 percent of their civilian coun- presented a broad set of proposals for lower future budget levels. All four teams terparts with comparable education and changes in health care, retirement, and proposed deep cuts to personnel, reduc- experience (officers earn more than 83 benefits. Although congressional action is ing numbers by 150,000 to 300,000. percent of their civilian counterparts).3 incomplete as of this writing, the House This was, they argued, the “Willie Sutton Retirement adds another $26 billion a and Senate appear to have rejected most principle” applied to defense budgeting: year, and non-cash benefits tack on $39 of the savings proposals but may modify personnel are where the money is.10 billion, mostly for health care but also the military retirement program to allow Rely on Part-Timers. The second for quality of life programs such as child- some benefits for personnel who leave adaptation has been to rely more on care, schools, and adult education.4 before 20 years. lower cost part-timers—that is, the Guard These increased costs, often described and Reserves. Before the Vietnam War, as “unsustainable,” have caused wide- Adaptations and Their Effects the Guard and Reserves comprised only spread alarm. Top military and civilian Critics of DOD efforts to reduce per- 26 percent of the total force; during the leaders in the Pentagon and a broad array sonnel costs argue that these expendi- draft years, Active-duty personnel were of think tanks have called for action to tures have stayed constant over the last readily available, so there was less need curtail personnel costs lest they crowd two decades and have not threatened to rely on Reserves. With the end of the out readiness and modernization.5 The modernization or readiness.7 This is draft and the announcement of the Total 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review makes true; the military personnel appropria- Force policy in the early 1970s, the pro- compensation savings a major theme, tions have varied within a narrow band portion began to rise. By the end of the so that funds are available “to sustain a from 22 percent to 30 percent of the Cold War, when the full cost of sustaining healthy, ready and modern force into the DOD budget over the last 30 years the all-volunteer force had been accom- future.”6 (about 33 percent when healthcare costs modated, Guard and Reserves comprised So far, these efforts have had little are included). Concerns that personnel 36 percent of the total force. In FY 2015, impact. Curtailing military pay or benefits costs will hurt readiness and eventually the proportion rose to 39 percent.11 during wartime is hard. Military pay “consume the entire defense budget”8 To get a sense of what budget pres- raises continued even as government are, therefore, misplaced. However, sure might do to force structure in the civilians endured 3 years of pay freezes, this is not evidence of long-term fiscal future, suppose military personnel bud- though the most recent raises in fiscal sustainability, either. To accommodate gets hold constant (a best-case scenario year (FY) 2014–2015 were constrained higher personnel costs, DOD has made for the next few years) but compensation to 1 percent. Repeated Obama adminis- broad adaptations, which have had increases at 2.5 percent per year (half the tration proposals to introduce higher fees major strategic effects that are largely recent rate). That creates an annual bill for TRICARE, the military healthcare unrecognized. of $3.4 billion. To pay this bill out of the system, have mostly failed in the face of Cut Expensive Personnel. The first personnel appropriations, the Services ferocious lobbying by military associa- adaptation is that, over time, DOD has would have to cut 23,000 Active-duty tions. An attempt to reduce the growth cut the number of military personnel, personnel a year or shift 32,000 positions of military retirement costs as part of the particularly Active-duty troops, to fund from the Active to Reserve Component.12 FY 2014–2015 budget deal was repealed higher individual compensation. For Historically, the Services have done a a month after it was enacted. example, in 1994, $130 billion (in FY combination of the two and cut opera- Indeed, just holding the line on new 2014 dollars) paid 1,610,000 Active-duty tions and modernization as well. Cutting benefits is difficult. In the last year, DOD personnel and 998,000 Guardsmen and Reserve personnel would also save some and Congress granted benefits to same- Reservists. In 2014, $137 billion paid money but only about one-quarter what sex partners, expanded medical stipends 1,324,000 Active-duty personnel and is saved by cutting Active personnel. To and transition assistance programs, 833,700 Guardsmen and Reservists. In budgeteers, the financial gain is often not allowed single parents and pregnant other words, the same amount of money worth the political and strategic cost. As women to enlist, and created a special (slightly more, actually) was only enough a result, the number of Reserve personnel TRICARE Prime enrollment process for to pay 450,000 fewer personnel. The has declined less; thus, their proportion remote eligibles. None of these expan- Army and Marine Corps are particularly has increased. sions are necessarily wrong, but they are vulnerable because their budgets are so The shift from Active to Reserve moving in the wrong direction if the personnel-intensive (45 and 60 percent, personnel has a basis in strategy as threats desire is to contain personnel costs. respectively),9 but all Services are affected. have diminished and required timelines Faced with this dynamic, the gov- Indeed, practically every budget-cutting for deployments have lengthened. ernment took the traditional path of concept proposed by a think tank or an Less sophisticated threats and longer 78 Features / The Impact of Rising Costs on Force Structure JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Airmen of 919th Special Operations Security Forces Squadron practice building-clearing techniques during annual training at Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, August 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Sam King) deployments allow Reserve units the time This dynamic of budget constraints 2015, Congress, concerned about similar needed to mobilize, train, and deploy, so and shifting power played out recently tensions within the Army, created the more of them can be used. The Guard in the Air Force. In 2012, the Air Force National Commission on the Future of and Reserves have also adapted by recon- proposed personnel cuts to both the the U.S. Army. With the methodology figuring themselves from a “strategic” Active and Reserve Components but used by the Air Force commission as a reserve to an “operational” one. Still, the more heavily to the Reserve. The Reserve precedent, the commission could pro- shift has introduced a degree of strategic Components, especially the Guard, duce a similar result. risk as the Nation relies on forces that are working through their congressional Substitute Capital and Outside inherently less ready and harder to use. supporters, had their cuts halted and a Support. DOD adaptations go beyond The disruption of civilian communities commission established “to undertake a the personnel accounts. A further ad- produced by deployment of Reservists comprehensive study of the structure of aptation is the classic substitution of may also make military force less usable (a the Air Force . . . to best fulfill mission capital for labor. Businesses have done good or bad thing, depending on one’s requirements in a manner consistent this as labor costs have risen (note the perspective). with available resources.”13 The com- large number of robots in modern fac- A shift in power has followed the shift mission, arguing both the ability of tories), and DOD has done the same. in personnel. In 2001, all Service Reserve the Reserve Component to meet more Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for chiefs received a third star to ensure their mission requirements and the need to example, now constitute a large propor- stronger participation in bureaucratic bat- save money, proposed further realign- tion of the aviation inventory. Expensive tles for resources and missions. In 2012, ment of missions from the Active to the new equipment such as the Navy’s Ford- the Chief of the National Guard Bureaus Reserve Component so that the total class carrier is justified in part by reduced received a fourth star and membership on force would shift from the present 69 personnel requirements. Over time, pro- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establishing the percent Active/31 percent Reserve to 58 curement spending per Servicemember Guard as a virtual fifth Service. percent Active/42 percent Reserve.14 In has increased, from $37,000 in 1994 to JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Cancian 79 $71,000 in FY 2014 (all in FY 2014 con- of contractors (U.S., third-country na- Afghanistan, where the Army and Marine stant dollars).15 More broadly, the U.S. tionals, and locals) supporting the war Corps were able to quickly add over Armed Forces are more capital-intensive effort.17 This growth mirrored expanded 100,000 personnel during an increasingly than the militaries of other countries. use of contractors at home where many unpopular war and without resorting to U.S. equipment spending runs about 25 base functions, and some headquarters conscription. The risk is in timing—mak- percent of the total budget; our North functions, had been turned over to out- ing the difficult political decision to Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) siders. There were solid strategic reasons expand when needed. The Iraq expansion Allies are only at 14 percent (as NATO for both. Contractors at home and on the did not begin until the end of 2006. It measures equipment spending).16 battlefield took over routine tasks that did should have started years earlier before This approach has had some success. not require military personnel, such as the force was strained by repeated de- The liberation of Kuwait in 1991 and the food service and base maintenance. When ployments, but it took several years for overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 the war or task ended, the contractors the political apparatus to acknowledge so were accomplished quickly and with few could easily be discharged. This paralleled publicly that the wars would be long and casualties. But the insurgencies in Iraq the practice in business of focusing core hard. Thus, future force structures might and Afghanistan could not be subdued personnel on core tasks and contracting only be viable if an early decision could despite the application of unprecedented other tasks out. be made to expand them. The Army is levels of technology, from UAVs and sen- But this new reliance on contrac- at greatest risk here, followed closely by sors to long-range strike and the Internet tors raised a host of concerns. Initially, the Marine Corps. Without rapid expan- battlefield. There is a whole literature these concerns were focused on financial sion, these Services will be stretched on exploring the impact of technology on issues—waste and unethical business the battlefield and stressed by long and warfare, and the U.S. focus on technol- practices. They prompted congressional frequent deployments. ogy has roots beyond just the high cost of hearings, new contracting structures, and personnel—for example, in a democracy’s a major investigating commission, the Labor Economics versus concern about casualties and a national Commission on Wartime Contracting in Moral Obligations fascination with technology. Nevertheless, Iraq and Afghanistan. Why can we not just settle on an objec- the military is not exempt from the laws On a deeper level, many commenta- tive formula for compensation that of microeconomics; high personnel costs tors worried about the strategic effects avoids these tough structural tradeoffs? drive organizations to substitute capital of depending on for-profit entities in The reason is that there are funda- for labor. national security. At home, contractors mentally different views on the nature Substituting capital for labor has had seemed to have taken over inherently and purpose of compensation. On one other limits, as the Navy and Air Force governmental functions such as intel- side are the labor economists—that found out in the 2000s. Coming out of ligence analysis and writing military is, people who argue that compensa- the procurement holiday in the 1990s doctrine. Overseas, the widespread tion should be set at a level adequate and not getting procurement money in and unprecedented use of contractors, to recruit and retain the numbers and war funding as the Army was able to do, particularly as they moved out of sup- quality of personnel an organization the Navy and Air Force needed a way port roles and into the direct application needs. Cindy Williams, formerly an to recapitalize. Even as the Army and of violence, raised concerns about economist at the Congressional Budget Marine Corps were expanding, the Navy “conduct[ing] wars with less political Office, came to symbolize this approach and Air Force cut personnel, planning debate . . . undermining the legitimacy of when she testified in 1995 that all to put the savings into moderniza- counterinsurgency efforts and damaging objective measures of compensation tion. Because of rising personnel costs, the perceived morality of the war effort.” fairness were badly flawed and that, however, the savings went instead into Indeed, some observers worried that con- ultimately, “in a volunteer environment, expanded personnel compensation and tractors “endanger the basic tenets of the the best indication of how well the mili- benefits. military profession” by blurring the line tary can compete as an employer is the Another adaptation has been the ex- between civilians and military.18 Despite overall picture of the services’ success in panded use of contractors both at home these concerns, the rising cost of military recruiting and retention.”19 Therefore, and on the battlefield, which shifts higher personnel and their declining numbers military compensation could be assessed cost and permanent military personnel will push force planners to rely even more like other occupations and vary based out of routine support functions. During on contractors in the future. on the state of recruiting, retention, and the Iraq War, for instance, Americans Expand in Wartime. The final the economy. When unemployment is and commentators were surprised to adaptation has been the need to rapidly low and the force is expanding, com- learn that contractors were the largest expand the force in wartime because pensation needs to rise to be competi- “coalition” partner. At the height of the peacetime force would be too small tive. Thus, compensation grew rapidly the war in 2007, there were 165,000 to handle large conflicts. This approach in the 2000s. However, when the force troops in country and the same number was remarkably successful in Iraq and is shrinking (as it is today), compensa- 80 Features / The Impact of Rising Costs on Force Structure JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 tion can decline. This view also held that compensation should be adjusted for personnel quality, with higher skilled personnel paid more than lower skilled personnel as happens in the broader economy. On the other side are those who argue that there is a moral obligation to pay workers a “fair” wage. This view has roots as diverse as Karl Marx’s social- ism and Catholic social teaching, from Pope Leo XIII in the 19th century to Pope Francis today (“Not paying a just [wage], focusing exclusively on financial statements . . . goes against God”).20 Applied to the military, this approach argues that the Nation owes generous compensation to the 1 percent who serve on behalf of all. The military is not a job; it is a calling or a profession (to use the words of Charles Moskos, the late dean New Jersey National Guard Soldier from 50th Infantry Brigade Combat Team launches RQ-11 Raven of military sociologists), and it deserves unmanned aerial vehicle during joint exercise, Warren Grove Gunnery Range, New Jersey, June 2015 (U.S. Air National Guard/Matt Hecht) compensation on a moral basis, not an economic one.21 This perspective is also morale, effectiveness, and public regard. personnel deserve or whether the costs egalitarian; all those who serve should be Whatever conscription’s benefits might are “affordable.” It is about the adapta- honored and treated equally, consistent be, however, politicians, the military tions the military establishment has made with the rank structure. These arguments leadership, and the American people to accommodate the higher personnel often take a moral tone. As General all oppose its reinstitution. Therefore, costs. These adaptations have had pro- Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.), head of the little more needs to be said about it as a found strategic effects—effects that no Association of the U.S. Army, stated, cuts solution. Quadrennial Defense Review or strategy to compensation “demonize our troops document discusses. The key strategic as unworthy of the benefits they receive The Strategic Dimension decision, then, is whether the military while ignoring the challenges, sacrifices, So the debate continues. Many com- structure that the compensation struc- and hardships military personnel and mentators complain about the struc- ture produces supports the strategy the their families face.”22 tural trends. Rachel Maddow criticizes Nation wants, with risks and costs that The debate is not limited to the “relying on a pop-up army . . . of greasy, are acceptable. The United States has military. It has parallels at universities lawless contractors.” Andrew Bacevich backed into the existing structure without regarding payment of a living wage laments “the large gap between the a lot of thought. As compensation discus- for low-skilled workers and in national military and society.” Bernard Rostker sions renew, the debate going forward debates about the level of the minimum warns about the risks in overreliance on ought to be broadened to include these wage. It does mean, however, that agree- “unready” Reservists.23 These concerns strategic effects. JFQ ment on military compensation has been may or may not have merit, but they elusive. What one side regards as “reason- are essentially irrelevant. Unless the able adjustments,” the other side regards approach toward military compensa- Notes as “betraying a commitment.” tion changes, the prospect is more of 1 Some commentators have proposed the same—a shrinking force, greater “Strategic Imperative,” from Posture Statement of General Martin E. Dempsey, conscription as a way out of this conun- reliance on Reservists, contractors as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Sen- drum of high costs and adverse strategic permanent element of the military force ate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year consequences. Conscription seems to structure, capital substituting for labor, 2015 Department of Defense Budget, March offer lower costs, abundant personnel, and rapid force expansion when wartime 5, 2014, available at JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Cancian 81 Armed Services Committee, March 28, 2012, 9 Military personnel appropriation as a per- of contractors on the battlefield, see Mark F. available at 82 Features / The Impact of Rising Costs on Force Structure JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) launches SM-3 Block 1B interceptor during Missile Defense Agency test and successfully intercepted complex short-range ballistic missile target off coast of Kauai, Hawaii (DOD/U.S. Navy) onsider this possible scenario: A rogue nation threatens to fire The Case for the C ballistic missiles at the United States and its regional allies. In response, a forward-deployed U.S. Army radar Joint Theater Air and transitions to high alert and continu- ally scans the stratosphere, intending to detect and track the adversary’s bal- Missile Defense Board listic missiles. U.S. Navy and partner nation Aegis ships armed with missile By S. Edward Boxx and Jason Schuyler interceptors depart their home ports and steam toward prearranged operat- ing areas. Meanwhile on land, missile defense convoys disperse near air and sea bases, activate their radars, and raise their launchers skyward. At multiple Colonel S. Edward Boxx, USAF, is Chief of the Space and Integrated Air and Missile Defense Division at operations centers, Airmen plan attack U.S. Pacific Command. Lieutenant Colonel Jason Schuyler, USA, is assigned to the Joint Staff J7 Future operations against the enemy’s command Joint Force Development Division. JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Boxx and Schuyler 83 and control and missile defense units. board or the joint collection management teams to rapidly employ a productive These joint missile defense movements board. A missile defense coordination and sustainable battle rhythm during a require a sophisticated response, but forum does not exist in joint doctrine, crisis. what should the mechanism be to social- yet a joint theater air and missile defense The same responsiveness demon- ize, synchronize, and recommend these (JTAMD) board, fed by a supporting strated in the Damayan relief efforts actions within a geographic combatant JTAMD working group, could provide needs to be applied to missile defense and command? The answer: that mechanism the much needed joint IAMD planning should be included in the USPACOM would include inputs from the land, and coordination support capability to B2C2WG process. North Korea’s mis- maritime, and air commanders (along the theater area air defense commander sile arsenal remains a worrisome threat with supporting agencies), yet present a (AADC) and the joint force commander. to U.S. and allied security and in fact holistic, inclusive, and effective missile continues to grow, as evidenced by the defense response from the joint force B2C2WG Defined 2014 firing of ballistic missiles into the commander. The hierarchal Napoleonic system of sea toward Japan. Successive USPACOM Planning and executing a layered mis- “J-codes” has of course been used by commanders continue to describe North sile defense using the assets mentioned military organizations for centuries and Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in the scenario requires coordination and continues to align commanders and and its proliferation of weapons of mass integration among the land, maritime, their staffs. But CCMDs and staffs have destruction and associated technologies and air components as well as subunified searched for responsive processes to as the major challenge to stability in the and regional missile defense partners. Not function more effectively in a diverse, region.4 The enormity of the region (the surprisingly, these resources for integrated complex, and ever-changing geopolitical USPACOM AOR covers half the Earth, air and missile defense will continue to be environment.3 The B2C2WG template contains over three billion people, and limited, as recognized by the Chairman offers a possible solution and has been includes the world’s three largest econo- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his Joint embraced by U.S. Pacific Command mies and one-third of all U.S. trade) also Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision (USPACOM) during its transition to epitomizes missile defense challenges. 2020.1 Missile defense systems are com- an operationalized headquarters. In The obligation to multiple subunified plex, expensive, and limited in number, the past, CCMD headquarters relied commands and treaty obligations further and the lack of affordable interceptors on subordinate task forces as the strain the demand for limited missile gives potential adversaries a cost advan- operational sinew for the theater; now, defense resources. Of the seven total tage as it is cheaper and easier to launch however, the USPACOM director- security treaties signed by the United ballistic missiles than to successfully inter- ates fulfill the operational as well as States, five reside in the USPACOM cept them. Navy Aegis ships, the Army traditional strategic responsibilities. So AOR with Australia, Japan, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense instead of completely eliminating the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. (THAAD) system, and Patriot PAC-3 200-year-old system, USPACOM main- Each represents differing missile defense systems have proven and impressive inter- tains the J-code system as a recognizable capabilities, and further exemplifies the cept records.2 Yet these systems are finite CCMD staff structure, but distinguishes need for a doctrinally recognized, theater- in number, cost millions of dollars, and the need to coordinate laterally through wide JTAMD board. are in high demand across the combatant the vertically aligned staffs. Therefore, Northeast Asia, and in particular command’s (CCMD’s) area of responsi- the B2C2WG process has been adopted the potential battlespace between the bility (AOR). In short, integrated air and as the mechanism to interconnect com- Korean Peninsula and the Japanese ar- missile defense (IAMD) is an inherently batant command J-coded directorates chipelago, illustrates the complexity of joint and increasingly multinational and and assimilate planners, operators, intel- missile defense in the USPACOM AOR cross-CCMD mission area. How the geo- ligence agencies, and stakeholders while and the need for the JTAMD board. For graphic combatant commander or joint simultaneously connecting with the example, the Republic of Korea’s navy force commander (JFC) orchestrates functional component commands. The employs KDX-III-class Aegis destroyers these multi-Service and international B2C2WG process has enabled tradi- and Patriot PAC-2 missile batteries, while missile defense operations requires a joint tional organizations to more effectively nearby Japan uses Kongo-class Aegis ships mechanism that is responsive and linked integrate and synchronize the battle and Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors. In to the CCMD’s battle rhythm. rhythm process, in both peacetime and and around both countries, U.S. forces One solution is to operationalize crisis. In November 2013, Operation (possessing similar Patriot and Aegis the CCMD staff through the Board, Damayan (the coordinated theater-wide assets) must be able to complement Bureau, Center, Cells Working Group response to a massive typhoon that the regional defense architecture while (B2C2WG) process with a dedicated struck the Philippines) validated this protecting the homeland from intermedi- and collaborative air and missile defense methodology. It illustrated the ability of ate and intercontinental ballistic missiles board—akin to the well-known and the USPACOM staffs, subordinate task targeting Guam and the United States. practiced joint targeting coordination forces, partner nations, and interagency Sensors such as AN/TPY-2 and SPY-1 84 Features / The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Board JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 General James D. Thurman, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea commander, and General Kwon Oh Sung, Combined Forces Command deputy commander, brief Republic of Korea President Park Geun-hye on status of Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise, August 22, 2013 (U.S. Army/Brian Gibbons) radars and Japanese and Korean sensors because of the finite numbers of Patriot, changes to the DAL, a JFC-approved list can cue other systems, greatly reduc- THAAD, and SM-3 interceptors and the of protected assets connected to a spe- ing the time required to compute firing multirole mission requirement to provide cific operations plan.6 The joint TAMD solutions. Concepts such as “launch on an air defense capability within the AOR.5 board would build upon this framework, remote” and “engage on remote” via To effectively manage these limited assets, open the aperture to other topics besides datalinks are significantly extending the the JFC and the AADC staffs must have DAL prioritization, and include other range of missile intercepts—meaning a an adaptable coordination mechanism to members. Coalition participation early successful ballistic missile defense (BMD) rapidly plan across vertically stovepiped in the C2B2WG process could facilitate kill chain (sensors, shooters, command organizational hierarchies. The theater faster allied approval and collaboration on and control) must overcome regional AADC certainly retains the prerogative proposed operations. In addition to mul- and political boundaries. For instance, to engage the JFC in all air and missile tinational participation, other JTAMD a U.S. Aegis ship positioned between defense issues at any time. However, board members/observers should also South Korea and Japan could impact due to the complex relationships among include subunified commands such as missile defense for either country. With partner nations, other U.S. agencies, and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. an overlapping defense framework, ships CCMDs, the JTAMD board’s ability to Forces Japan (USFJ). An IAMD func- and ground-based units are assigned plug into the CCMD commander’s battle tional representative from the CCMD or primary defense responsibilities such as rhythm could hasten theater and cross- JTF headquarters and, in some instances, those found in the defended asset list AOR missile defense coordination. other missile defense organizations (DAL). But if coordinated and planned, Currently in U.S. Army doctrine, a would also attend. The Missile Defense these systems can also assist one another theater air and missile defense (TAMD) Agency (MDA), the U.S. Strategic as a “backup” shooter and, in some cases, coordination board (formerly known as a Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint serve as the tertiary defense. It is impera- reprioritization board) led by the deputy Force Functional Component Command tive that these efforts are synchronized AADC exists primarily to recommend for Integrated Missile Defense, and the JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Boxx and Schuyler 85 U.S. Soldiers perform pre-launch checks on Patriot missile launcher as part of field training exercise on Kadena Air Base, Japan (U.S. Air Force/Maeson Elleman) Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense the U.S. Army’s process to include joint a coordinated and integrated approach Organization already provide liaison participants such as USFJ, the Japanese to missile defense training scenarios officers to USPACOM, and their partici- Self-Defense Forces, and CCMD of- that include all elements, from tacti- pation would allow the vital contributions ficers. Additionally, during Exercise cal units (sensors and shooters) all the of those supporting organizations. As Ulchi Freedom Guardian, USFK and the way to national command authorities. a case in point, the MDA Sea-Based theater deputy AADC further refined Air and missile defense must be con- X-Band radar, normally used for testing, the joint process with Republic of Korea sidered early in exercise development, could augment an operational layered forces. Both exercises demonstrated the and all training, testing, and evaluation missile defense, but would require inter- success of an inclusive JTAMD board by events should dovetail into an overall CCMD coordination. Other JTAMD improved allied involvement during plan- tactical-operational-strategic “pathway board observers would include the global ning, and significantly aligned the staffs to victory” road map. The deputy force management and the J4 munitions in supporting the missile defense weight AADC-led JTAMD board should offer divisions in order to facilitate requests of effort. With further improvements to a forum to formulate and provide for forces and expedite replenishment of the JTAMD process, continuing develop- timely adjudicated solutions not only high-demand replacement missiles. ment of IAMD officers, and additional for DAL priority, but also for intercep- In an attempt to mimic and codify changes to joint doctrine, missile defense tor resupply, requests for additional the success of the staff response during could become even more effective. forces, cross-CCMD coordination, and Operation Damayan and other B2C2WG changes to regional defense and readi- achievements, USPACOM AADC and Recommendations ness postures (alert states). Complex CCMD officers explored ways to improve First, the JTAMD planning process missile defense systems are increasingly missile defense integration with the goal should be adopted as a joint IAMD no longer just regional, but impact mul- of a collaborative problem-solving pro- planning capability and must be exer- tiple commands, and thus maintenance cess. Subsequently, during Exercise Keen cised regularly and continually refined. requirements for long-range radars such Edge 2014, the deputy AADC expanded Combatant commands need to adopt as the AN/TPY-2 need an operation- 86 Features / The Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Board JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 3 ally focused venue. Additionally, the are unable to adequately identify ex- For more information on the Board, Bureau, Center, Cells Working Group process USPACOM AOR, which includes the perienced joint IAMD planners to fill lessons learned, see Gary Luck, Mike Find- MDA Reagan Test Site in Kwajalen billets. A better way to manage human lay, and the Joint Warfighting Center Joint Atoll and the Pacific Missile Range capital would be to establish a joint air Training Division, Joint Operations Insights & Facility in Hawaii, conducts one of the and missile defense skill identifier, that Best Practices, 2nd ed. (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint most complicated and intricate missile is, a military occupational specialty or Forces Command, July 2008), 22. 4 Andrew Feickert, The Unified Command defense tests in the world. A JTAMD Air Force specialty code. Whether an Plan and Combatant Commands: Background process would serve as a conduit to Airman, surface warfare officer, or air and Issues for Congress, R42077 (Washington, strengthen warfighter and MDA efforts defender, these officers epitomize joint- DC: Congressional Research Service, January such as combining real-world missile ness, as they understand not only their 3, 2013), 47. tests with operator training at every Service-specific weapons systems, but also 5 THAAD and Patriot (PAC-2 and PAC-3) conduct terminal defense (intercepting an opportunity. Previous MDA tests have component interdependencies and en- inbound missile in the last phase of flight). The included realistic scenarios with multiple ablers. Initiatives such as regional IAMD Patriot system intercepts ballistic missiles at engagements of Patriot, Aegis BMD centers in U.S. Central Command, U.S. endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric altitudes. SM-3, and THAAD missiles against live European Command, and the emerging Aegis ballistic missile defense ship and Aegis targets, and recently demonstrated the USPACOM efforts are to be commended Ashore SM-3 missile intercepts occur solely exoatmospherically and are generally consid- successful first firing of the Aegis Ashore for filling the joint IAMD training void. ered mid-course defense capabilities. weapons system. Therefore, to better But a more formalized joint training 6 Field Manual 3-01.94, Army Air and Mis- leverage these singular live events, the pipeline is necessary to train and track sile Defense Command Operations (Washington, JTAMD board (supported by a JTAMD qualified joint IAMD-qualified personnel. DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, working group chaired by a captain The JTAMD board would not be the April 2005), 3–9. 7 Ashton Carter, Joint Ballistic Missile or colonel) should be instituted and panacea to complex missile defense plan- Defense Training Memorandum, August 26, practiced to inculcate the collaborative ning and execution, but it would allow 2012. process and render it routine. for deliberate and crisis-action planning Second, as Joint Publication 3-01, processes to shape missile defense strategy Countering Air and Missile Threats, in all phases of conflict. Much like the undergoes revision, more of its content better known joint targeting coordination should be devoted to the development board and joint collection management of joint air and missile defense officers board, the JTAMD board needs to mir- and intra- and inter-CCMD coordina- ror its importance in joint doctrine. The tion. Although USPACOM currently board has the potential to act as a leveler holds the distinction of being the only to bring the many facets of missile de- geographic combatant command to con- fense across the Defense Department and duct both regional and homeland missile partner-nation staffs together. During defense, other regional AADCs and JFCs peacetime operations, the JTAMD board will be required to routinely coordinate should meet regularly; however, during across combatant command boundar- exercise or contingency operations such ies as the air and missile threats to the as a North Korean provocation cycle, it Nation and its regional partners continue could convene daily. In sum, the JTAMD to mature and proliferate. board could serve as a much needed Last, in August 2012, the Deputy “nonmaterial” enabler for expensive air Secretary of Defense designated and missile defense systems to make them USSTRATCOM as the joint lead for more complementary and effective. JFQ integrating and synchronizing joint BMD training in coordination with the CCMDs and the military departments.7 Notes However, there is currently no joint 1 organization in the Defense Department Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020 (Washington, tasked with the responsibility of training DC: The Joint Staff, 2013). and developing joint IAMD planners. 2 As of time of publication, records were as More must be done to cultivate and track follows: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense qualified and experienced joint IAMD (THAAD) had 13 tests/11 attempts/0 misses; officers, as their experience is crucial to Aegis had 29 tests/31 attempts/25 hits/6 misses; and Patriot PAC-3 had 24 tests/25 at- joint layered missile defenses. CCMD tempts/21 hits/4 misses. and Service personnel managers currently JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Boxx and Schuyler 87 General Dempsey hosts question-and-answer session with Peter W. Singer, director of Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, in Washington, DC, June 2013 (DOD/Daniel Hinton) Expanding Combat Power Through Military Cyber Power Theory By Sean Charles Gaines Kern We need a theory for cyberspace operations that will allow us to understand the implications of employing cyberspace capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.1 —Major General Brett T. Williams, USAF ilitary theory is a primary com- theories help strategists and planners ponent of operational art. Early think about, plan for, and generate M military theorists such as Alfred joint combat power. Unfortunately, no Thayer Mahan, Giulio Douhet, and standard military theory for cyberspace B.H. Liddell Hart reasoned about the operations exists, although elements for maritime, air, and land domains respec- such a theory do. If a codified theory Lieutenant Colonel Sean Charles Gaines Kern, tively, generating frameworks, models, for military cyber power existed, it USAF, is assigned to U.S. Cyber Command. and principles for warfare. Today, these would greatly aid the joint force com- 88 Features / Expanding Combat Power JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 mander (JFC) in integrating cyberspace discussion by categorizing the elements especially critical in the context of military operations with joint operations, result- of the theory. It explains the categorized cyber power theory. Key cyber terrain ing in expanded combat power. elements by summarizing relevant events forms the foundation from which the Although JFCs have many years of and introducing additional frameworks joint force preserves and projects military practical experience and military educa- and models. It allows the members of cyber power and represents the attack tion in employing joint forces, they the cyber community to connect diverse surface that adversaries would likely tar- are not as experienced with cyberspace elements of the body of knowledge to get. It is defined as any physical, logical, operations.2 There is a lack of shared comprehensively address key issues. or persona element of the cyber space do- cyberspace knowledge and an agreed Finally, the predictive nature of the main, including commercial services, the operational approach to link cyberspace framework will enable the practitioner disruption, degradation, or destruction of missions and actions and place them in to anticipate key trends and activities to which constricts combat power, affording the larger context of joint operations.3 test the validity of the theory.5 Although a marked advantage to either combatant. Military cyber power theory is the foun- Major General Brett Williams called for Defining cyberspace as a global dation for such knowledge. a theory of cyberspace operations that domain suggests a homogeneity that The JFC requires a cyberspace addresses cyberspace operations at the does not exist in reality. There is not one component commander who, through strategic, operational, and tactical levels, cyberspace, but many cyberspaces.7 These education and experience, has developed the focus here is at the strategic and cyberspaces are in most cases intercon- the requisite expertise to apply military operational levels since the JFCCC’s nected by privately owned infrastructure. cyber power theory at a level equivalent responsibility will be to translate strategic DOD has over 15,000 networks, or cy- to his or her peers in the other domains. direction into operational plans. berspaces, interconnected by commercial However, joint doctrine does not de- Early cyber power theorists generally infrastructure that the department does scribe such a leadership role. Without identified and defined three key terms: not own or control. This has two signifi- the equivalent of a joint force cyberspace cyberspace, cyber power, and cyber strategy. cant implications. First, unlike in other component commander (JFCCC), it is Under the guise of military cyber power domains, the joint force is not solely unlikely that the JFC would be able to theory, this author offers four additional capable of generating its required military effectively integrate cyberspace operations terms: military cyber power, military cyber cyber power; it relies on commercial within the construct of joint operations. strategy, key cyber terrain, and military services. Second, not all key cyber terrain This results in a perpetual adjunct role cyberspaces. will be under control of the joint force. for cyberspace operations and suboptimal Military cyber power is defined as For example, there is no current equiva- combat power, as the Chairman of the the application of operational concepts, lent in cyberspace to the way in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself noted as a strategies, and functions that employ cy- United States fully militarized its airspace key operational problem in the Capstone berspace operations (offensive cyberspace immediately following the 9/11 terror- Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force operations [OCO], defensive cyberspace ist attacks. Thus, military cyberspaces are 2020.4 operations [DCO], and Department of defined as networks or enclaves wholly Defense [DOD] information network owned and operated by DOD, intercon- Toward a Preliminary Theory [DODIN] operations) in joint operations nected by means that are outside the The most challenging aspect of develop- to expand combat power for the ac- control or direct influence of DOD. ing cyber operational art is devising a complishment of military objectives and With key terms identified and de- military theory for cyber power, which missions.6 fined, military cyber power theory must is essential for assessing the operational Military cyber strategy is defined as conceptually consider the relationships environment and making predictive the development and employment of of these terms as well as other relevant judgments that will then guide strategy operational cyberspace capabilities inte- domain characteristics. The JFCCC must and plan development. By viewing the grated with other operational domain consider his or her efforts in the context operational environment through the capabilities to expand combat power of the three layers of cyberspace: physical, lens of military cyber power theory, the and accomplish the military objectives logical, and persona layers.8 Figure 1 de- JFCCC will be in the position to provide and missions of the JFC. These defini- picts the relationships between the terms his or her best military advice to the tions reflect an emphasis on cyberspace (left) and the relation of the cyberspace JFC, resulting in integrated cyberspace operations mission areas and their contri- layers in the context of the overall friendly operation and expanded combat power. butions to joint operations and joint force or adversary attack surface (right). A framework advances understand- combat power. Based on these relationships, the ing and provides a basis for reasoning Given the pervasive and ubiquitous JFCCC can then conceptualize the about the current and potential future nature of the cyberspace domain and the weighted effort of the cyberspace opera- environment by incorporating a number fact that the military relies heavily on the tions mission areas. These operations of elements. The framework identifies commercial sector for interconnectiv- comprise the ways and means for the and defines key terms and structures ity, the concept of key terrain becomes JFCCC’s cyber strategy and planning. JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Kern 89 Figure 1. Elements of Military The weighted effort, in priority order, with adversaries in other domains, one Cyber Power Theory and would be DODIN operations, DCO– of which is the concept of a kill chain. Cyberspace Domain Layers Internal Defense Measures (DCO-IDM), Conceptualizing a cyber kill chain enables DCO–Response Actions (DCO-RA), and the JFCCC to understand how the adver- OCO (see figure 2). sary plans and conducts cyber operations. The joint force conducts cyberspace The cyber kill chain depicted in figure Cyber Strategy operations, like all joint operations, with 4 provides an excellent framework for Cyberpower the adversary in mind. This leads to a the JFCCC to develop the appropriate Key Cyber final structured discussion to characterize strategy and corresponding operational Institutional Terrain Factors cyberspace adversaries and conceptualize plans to mitigate the adversarial threat. Cyberspace(s) Non-DOD adversarial operational planning and ex- The ultimate goal is to detect and defend Cyberspace ecution. Ultimately, this discussion gives against the adversary as early as possible the JFCCC the framework to assess risks in the chain, ideally at or prior to the ad- associated with generating combat power. versary developing access. The JFCCC and staff assess cyber- Figure 2. Weighted Effort for space adversaries similar to adversaries Military Cyber Power Principles Cyberspace Operations in other domains in terms of intent and A theory of military cyber power capability. It takes two types of capabili- includes principles that would inform ties in the cyberspace domain to conduct the JFCCC’s operational art. The true cyberspace operations: technical and test of a theory is how well these prin- Cyber Planning analytical. Analytical capability refers to ciples hold over time. The principles OCO, DCO-RA the ability to analyze a potential target examined here are not exhaustive and to identify its critical nodes and vulner- should serve as a foundation for future DCO-IDM abilities and potentially its connections to expansion of military cyber power DODIN Operations Foreign Spectrum other targets. Technical capability refers theory. Commercial Service to knowledge of computer software and Stealth and Utility. A cyberspace hardware, networks, and other relevant capability is effective as long as it can go technologies.9 The JFCCC can further undetected and exploit an open vulner- categorize cyber adversaries as simple, ability. If the adversary detects the cyber Figure 3. Cyber Adversary advanced, and complex, based in part capability or mitigates the targeted Characterization on the scope and scale of operations and vulnerability, the cyber capability is per- potential effects achieved. ishable. These characteristics may drive In addition to being simple, ad- the timing of cyber operations based on vanced, or complex, military cyber power the perceived utility.10 Cyber Persona theory categorizes adversary operations Convergence, Consolidation, and as either opportunistic or targeted. The Standardization. In peacetime, efficiency Logical Network former is usually cybercrime-related, au- is valued over effectiveness. Core services Attack Surface tomated, and rarely attempts to maintain are converging to Internet Protocol Physical Network persistent presence. Targeted attacks are technologies. Smaller bandwidth network oriented against friendly key cyber terrain interconnections are converging to fewer and are likely to be persistent and stealthy. massive bandwidth interconnections. In targeted attacks, cyber operators may DOD is consolidating data centers be manually interacting with target sys- and Internet access points, resulting in Figure 4. Cyber Kill Chain tems. These categories are not mutually streamlined, consolidated service ar- exclusive, as opportunistic attackers may chitectures. DOD is also standardizing gain access to high-value systems and in hardware and software. Convergence, turn seek to sell access to these systems consolidation, and standardization cre- Persistence to adversaries seeking targeted access (for ate an efficient, homogenous military High Low example, the nexus of cybercrime and cyberspace environment that reduces Persistence Automated state-sponsored cyber operations). Figure the DOD attack surface overall and bet- Opportunistic Manual Attack Surface 3 shows the relationships among adver- ter postures cyber defenders to preserve Simple Targeted Key Cyber Terrain sary capability, targeting type, and level of combat power. However, these efforts Advanced persistence. reduce system redundancy, limit alterna- Complex Cyberspace adversaries share com- tive routes, and increase the number mon strategic and operational concepts of chokepoints, making it easier for an 90 Features / Expanding Combat Power JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Joint Service and civilian personnel concentrate on exercise scenarios during Cyber Guard 2015 (DOD/Marvin Lynchard) adversary to identify and target friendly joint force constructs cyberspace, Gray Arranging Operations. The Joint key cyber terrain. contends that cyberspace operators can Operational Access Concept states that the Complexity, Penetration, and repair the damage. Each repair hardens critical support provided by cyberspace Exposure. Systems are becoming increas- the system against future attacks. Offense operations generally must commence ingly complex by almost every measure. can achieve surprise, but response and well in advance of other operations as Higher complexity begets a growth in repair should be routine. Cyberspace part of efforts to shape the operational vulnerabilities. Internet penetration is defense is difficult, but so is cyberspace area. Even in the absence of open con- expanding in terms of people and devices offense.12 As systems are hardened, an flict, operations to gain and maintain connected to cyberspace. People and attacker must exploit multiple vulner- cyberspace superiority will be a con- organizations are integrating an increas- abilities to achieve the same effect as tinuous requirement since freedom of ing number of services delivered through compared to prior attacks that only re- action in cyberspace is critical to all joint cyberspace into their daily lives and op- quired a single exploit.13 operations.14 Chris Demchak offers a erations, creating significant cyberspace Speed and Global Reach. Cyberspace cautionary consideration, suggesting that exposure. Complexity, penetration, and exhibits levels of speed and reach un- if kinetic operations eventually take place, exposure increase the attack surface by characteristic of the other domains. Like the United States may see the results of creating broader and deeper technical other domains, cyberspace operations, several decades of cyber “preparation of and process vulnerabilities, putting joint especially offensive ones, require signifi- the battlefield,” ranging from tainted combat power at risk. cant capability development, planning, supply chains to embedded malware.15 Primacy of Defense. History shows reconnaissance, policy, and legal support Resilience. Resilience is the ability to that militaries are prone to favor offen- prior to execution. However, once the continue operations in a degraded cyber sive operations.11 Yet Colin Gray, Brett JFC decides to act, cyberspace effects can environment while mitigating quickly the Williams, and Martin Libicki argue that be nearly instantaneous. The global cy- impact of any attack. Much like the Quick DCO, not OCO, should be the JFC’s berspace domain relegates geography to a Reaction Force construct in the physical primary effort in cyberspace. Since the subordinate consideration. domain, cyberspace operations require JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Kern 91 robust DCO-IDM capacity oriented in difficult, to one of assigning responsibil- Cyber Intelligence. Cyber intel- support of friendly key cyber terrain to ity to a nation-state—more pointedly, ligence—scanning for things that just do respond quickly to mitigate the effects of to national decisionmakers—for either not look right by sifting through chatter adversarial cyberspace operations. In con- ignoring, abetting, or conducting cy- to discern patterns of intelligence—can cert with these DCO-IDM efforts, the berspace operations against the United become close to police work.24 When total force will need to implement people, States, its allies, and key partners. DCO operators detect an adversary, it process, and technology measures, such Increase Security, Decrease Freedom is difficult to assess adversarial intent. Is as network minimize procedures or in- of Movement. In other domains, in- the adversary conducting reconnaissance, creasing bandwidth capacity, to continue creased security usually implies greater exfiltrating information, or instrumenting to operate in the degraded environment. freedom of movement and action. This the network for a follow-on operation? Cyber-Physical Interface. To gain same concept is not true for cyberspace A JFCCC must be able to assess cyber efficiencies, critical infrastructure owners since increased cybersecurity usually re- situational awareness beyond the joint and operators have increasingly con- stricts options in cyberspace. operational area to understand fully the nected their once-closed systems to the Scope and Scale of Effects. The most scope and scale of cyber risks to the the- Internet. As a result, industrial control sophisticated cyber adversaries have the ater of operations. systems and supervisory control and data means to create a regional disturbance for Centralized Control, Centralized acquisition systems are increasingly easy a short period or a local disturbance for a Execution. Because any point in cyber- to exploit. These systems are the two sustained period.19 The intelligence func- space is equidistant to any other, cyber primary means for cyber adversaries to tions should continually assess the intent forces are capable of deploying and achieve direct physical effects through and capabilities of potential adversaries to surging virtually without the required cyberspace. predict the potential scope and scale of mobilization time and physical proximity Decision Integrity. Assuring integrity effects. to theater operations. This characteristic of operational information is essential to Increased Reliance on Commercial is a contributing factor to the centralized maintaining trust and confidence in the Services. U.S. Central Command’s March control, centralized execution model quality of decisionmaking, since making 2014 posture statement noted the com- employed by U.S. Cyber Command. This decisions based on wrong information mand is “heavily reliant on host nation model affects the development of cyber- could degrade joint combat power. communications infrastructure across the space experience across the joint force. Without a baseline of what is normal, it is Central Region.”20 Whereas a JFC can Precedence. There are currently no impossible to discern if an adversary has easily partition and militarize the other universally accepted norms of behavior made unauthorized changes to opera- domains into internationally and nation- in cyberspace. As such, employment of a tional information. As Charles Barry and ally recognized contiguous operational cyberspace capability may result in a de Elihu Zimet observe, “The possession of areas, cyberspace largely exists via private facto precedence that other nation-states accurate and timely knowledge and the sector Internet service providers con- and nonstate actors may use as a barom- unfettered ability to distribute this as in- necting national and military network eter for how they may choose to act in formation have always been the sine qua enclaves.21 The JFCCC will have to con- cyberspace. Currently, some senior lead- non of warfighting.”16 sider this dynamic when attempting to ers view offensive cyberspace operations Speed, Not Secrets. Ninety-eight define his cyber joint operational area. as a last resort, restricting the ability to percent of all information is digitized.17 Perpetual, Ambiguous Conflict. develop cyberspace experience. Adversaries have proved adept at com- Cyberspace is in a perpetual state of con- Uncertainty. Whereas the physical promising and extracting information flict that crosses geographic boundaries. characteristics of the other domains are from closed networks. In this environ- Unlike the other domains where one can well understood and defined, cyber- ment, how long is it reasonable to expect physically discern unambiguous threat space is a constantly changing, dynamic secrecy? The days of having a high degree indications and warning, operations in domain that is difficult to model due to of confidence that secrets will remain cyberspace are inherently ambiguous. its ubiquity and complexity. Unlike the secure are fleeting. Overclassification Ambiguity can make war more or less precision of kinetic weapons, there is a exacerbates this problem and negatively likely. Timothy Junio suggests this is level of doubt regarding the use of cyber affects key cyber terrain analysis. The the case because ambiguity “may lead capabilities in terms of understanding joint force should place value on the abil- states to overestimate their potential what effects cyber forces can achieve in ity to make decisions before the adversary gains, overestimate their stealth, and/or cyberspace and assessing the success of compromises key information. underestimate their adversary’s skill.”22 cyberspace operations. This uncertainty Strategic Attribution. From a strate- Demchak warns that actions by nonstate is compounded by a lack of cyber experi- gic perspective, it may be more important actors could lead to unintended escala- ence and education in the senior ranks, to know “Who is to blame?” than “Who tion as one state misinterprets the action thus creating a circle of uncertainty, reluc- did it?”18 This shift in perspective changes or uses it as cover for its own actions.23 tance to employ, and lost opportunities focus from technical attribution, which is 92 Features / Expanding Combat Power JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Soldiers training with first fully immersive virtual simulation for infantry at 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command in Grafenwoehr, Germany, December 2013 (U.S. Army/Markus Rauchenberger) to gain cyber experience, leading to even military theory expertly applied should cyberspace attack, which include, in greater uncertainty. result in increased combat power for the part, the ability to destroy and disrupt The combination of key terms, practitioner. Given the lack of cyber- adversary targets. The primary doctrinal frameworks, and principles serves as a space operations experience and educa- source for combat power is JP 3-0, Joint foundation for an evolving military cyber tion in the joint force, it may be difficult Operations, in which the JFC is the cen- power theory, which serves as a building to consider how cyberspace operations tral focus. block to enhance both the explanatory could contribute to combat power. The JFC seeks decisive advantage and predictive power of the JFCCC’s rec- It does not help that joint doctrine is using all available elements of combat ommendations to the JFC. Application of silent regarding the direct relationship power to seize and maintain the initia- the theory improves the soundness and between cyberspace operations and tive, deny the enemy the opportunity timeliness of these recommendations. combat power. to achieve its objectives, and generate a With expert understanding and applica- Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, sense of inevitable failure and defeat in tion of this preliminary military cyber Department of Defense Dictionary of the enemy.26 Joint doctrine leaves the power theory, the JFCCC will be better Military and Associated Terms, defines reader with a sense that there is a bias prepared to provide the JFC recommen- combat power as the total means of to operations and effects in the physical dations to integrate cyberspace operations destructive and disruptive force that domains. For example, JP 3-0 discusses in joint operations to preserve and project a military unit or formation can apply the relative combat power that military joint combat power. against an opponent at a given time.25 forces can generate in terms of deliver- The two key words are destructive ing forces and materiel. It describes the Cyberspace Operations and disruptive. Although JP 3-12(R), roles of long-range air and sea opera- as Combat Power Cyberspace Operations, does not refer to tions as effective force projection when Practitioners validate military theory combat power, it implies it by describing timely or unencumbered access to the through application. A successful direct denial effects achieved through area of operations is not available. It also JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Kern 93 doctrine, organization, and education to inculcate the military cyber power principles presented here. The Joint Staff should update doc- trine to reflect the growing importance of effectively integrating cyberspace operations in joint operations to expand joint combat power. It should update JP 3-12(R) to reflect the need for a JFCCC and incorporate aspects of the preliminary military cyber power theory presented here. Likewise, the Joint Staff should update JP 3-0’s description of combat power to broaden and deepen the rela- tionship between cyberspace operations and combat power. Moreover, profes- sional military education and advanced studies programs should include military cyber power theory in the curricula and Vice Admiral Jan E. Tighe, commander of Fleet Cyber Command and commander of U.S. 10th Fleet, right, discusses educational requirements for cyber and course matrices that support those challenge students to conduct research to requirements (DOD/Javier Chagoya) evolve the theory. Organizationally, the JFC should discusses combat power in the context of combat power. The second is moving and designate a JFCCC for most task force mass, maneuver, economy of force, and supporting the necessary combat power operations. However, depending on the surprise. Like JP 3-12(R), JP 3-0 does over the required distances. Cyberspace forces assigned, it may be difficult for the not reference cyberspace operations in operations play a critical role in accom- JFC to identify a JFCCC candidate that relation to combat power, although it plishing both of these tasks. Fifteen of the has the preponderance of cyber forces does note that cyberspace superiority may 30 capabilities required in the concept and the best means to command and enable freedom of action throughout the are either directly or indirectly associated control those cyber forces. Furthermore, operational area. There is clearly an op- with the conduct of cyberspace opera- organizations that must address A2/ portunity to link cyberspace operations tions, with significant requirements in AD in their strategies and operational and combat power in joint doctrine. command and control, intelligence, and plans should conduct extensive exercises In addition to doctrinal references to fires capabilities. The A2/AD challenge is with a heavy emphasis on cyberspace combat power, the Chairman also pub- an excellent operational problem to vali- capabilities. lishes operational concepts that provide date and expand the preliminary military With expert understanding and ap- broad visions for how joint forces will cyber power theory discussed herein. plication of military cyber power theory, operate in response to specific challenges. the JFCCC is poised to develop strategic For example, the Chairman’s Joint Conclusion and operational recommendations for Operational Access Concept (JOAC) calls Stanley Baldwin asserted in 1932 that the JFC to integrate and synchronize for cross-domain synergy to overcome the “bomber will always get through.” cyberspace operations in joint operations emerging antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ History has shown that he was wrong. and achieve expanded combat power. AD) challenges. Cross-domain synergy However, the adoption of this theo- The need for integrated cyberspace seeks to employ complementary capabili- retical airpower perspective did drive operations and its contribution to joint ties in different domains such that each acquisition, organization, and doctrine combat power is clearly illustrated in one enhances the effectiveness and compen- leading into World War II. Cyberspace of the most significant operational chal- sates for the vulnerabilities of others.27 To operations share some similarities with lenges the joint force will likely face in the this end, the JOAC specifically addresses the interwar years. Much remains unde- future, which is gaining and maintaining the need for greater and more flexible termined about the role of cyberspace operational access in the face of enemy integration of cyberspace operations into operations in joint operations and A2/AD capabilities. the traditional land-sea-air battlespace. their impact on joint combat power. The Joint Operational Access Concept It identifies two combat power–related Yet there are historic examples, key notes three trends in the operating tasks required to gain and maintain ac- trends, and operational problems that environment that will likely complicate cess in the face of armed opposition. The call for increased attention to the need the challenge of opposed access, one first is overcoming the enemy’s A2/AD for a military cyber power theory and, of those being the emergence of cyber- capabilities through the application of consequently, the need for updates to space as an increasingly important and 94 Features / Expanding Combat Power JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 contested domain. The implication is that Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown Publishing, the JFCCC and his staff are becoming 2014). New from ever more central in assisting the JFC 14 Joint Operational Access Concept (Wash- in generating combat power to disrupt, ington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, NDU Press degrade, and defeat enemy A2/AD 2012). for the Center for the Study of capabilities. If the joint force is going to 15 Peter Dombrowski and Chris C. Dem- Chinese Military Affairs chak, “Cyber War, Cybered Conflict, and the be successful in future advanced A2/AD Maritime Domain,” Naval War College Review China Strategic Perspectives 9 operations, the JFC must fully integrate (April 2014), available at JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Kern 95 British battleship HMS Irresistible abandoned and sinking, having been shattered by explosion of floating mine in Dardanelles during attack on Narrows’ Forts, March 18, 1915 (Royal Navy/Library of Congress) The Gallipoli Campaign Learning from a Mismatch of Strategic Ends and Means By Raymond Adams orld War I began on July 28, and relatively inexpensive in terms of tactics in response to new, highly de- 1914, 1 month after the assas- blood and treasure. Almost immediately, structive weapons, resulting in massive Wsination of Archduke Franz however, the combatants faced each other casualties. Rising calls from British po- Ferdinand, heir-apparent to the Austro- in a long line of static defensive trenches. litical leaders, the media, and the public Hungarian throne.1 Most Europeans The Western Front quickly became a demanded action to break the stalemate. expected the conflict to be short—“over killing ground of unprecedented violence British strategists responded by opening by Christmas” was a common refrain— in human history: combined British, a new front in the east with two strategic French, and German casualties totaled objectives: drive Turkey out of the war 2,057,621 by January 1915.2 by attacking Constantinople, and open 3 Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Adams, USMCR, is a The character of war had changed. a route to beleaguered ally Russia. The student at the National War College. Armies had not changed their battlefield decision to open a second front in the 96 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 east in 1915 ultimately failed to achieve military officers to plan for the seizure Flawed Assumptions Britain’s strategic objectives during the of the Gallipoli Peninsula, “with a view Underpinning the first full year of World War I. British to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea British Strategy leaders pursued short-term, politically of Marmara” and eventually knocking The British designed their Dardanelles expedient military objectives in Turkey Turkey out of the war.9 Representatives plan on a series of faulty assumptions. that were both ancillary to their military of the War Office and the Admiralty Political leaders and military planners expertise and contrary to achieving the met and concluded that an attack on the alike assumed the Turks were deficient overall ends of winning the war by defeat- Gallipoli Peninsula was not a militarily in martial skill, grit, and determina- ing Germany. This article examines the feasible operation.10 Director of Military tion.19 Churchill displayed unbridled disastrous results of the attempt to open a Operations Major General Charles confidence in the ability of naval bom- second front and the disconnect between Callwell11 presciently observed that a bardment to destroy land targets.20 Allied strategic ends and means. campaign in Gallipoli was “likely to prove British war planners assumed that the an extremely difficult operation of war.”12 battle fleet would easily breach the Genesis of the He proffered that an operation in the enemy’s coastal defenses, float directly Dardanelles Decision Dardanelles would require a force of not to Constantinople, and seize the straits With combat in France and Belgium less than 60,000, with strong siege artil- without requiring a landing force. characterized by hopeless direct assaults lery, echeloned into Turkey in two large Kitchener assumed that, once through on entrenched enemy positions, British waves.13 Kitchener also disagreed with the straits, with naval guns pointing strategists began planning for a new opening a second front, but for different at Constantinople, the fleet would direction.4 First Lord of the Admi- reasons. He was reluctant to divert troops “compel Turkey’s capitulation, secure ralty Winston Churchill contemplated from the continent, which he viewed as a supply route to hard-pressed Russia, amphibious operations in the North Sea the primary focus of effort for the British. and inspire the Balkan states to join to increase pressure on Germany. He A dichotomy of opinion thus emerged: the Allied war effort and eventually to proposed a joint Anglo-French amphib- the politicians advocated for a second front attack Austro-Hungary, thereby pressur- ious assault along the Belgian coast on the Gallipoli Peninsula, while senior ing Germany.”21 designed to outflank German positions military officers argued against interven- Kitchener further assumed that on the Western Front, liberate the port tion in Turkey.14 The debate continued once news of the arrival of the British of Zeebrugge, and prevent Germany into winter. The dynamic changed on fleet reached Constantinople, the entire from using Zeebrugge and Ostende as January 1, 1915, when Russia formally Turkish army in Thrace would retreat, submarine bases.5 Ultimately, the British requested a “naval or military demonstra- leaving Turkey to British control.22 Sir failed to convince the French to par- tion against the Turks to ease the pressure Edward Grey, Secretary of State for ticipate, effectively scuttling Churchill’s caused by the Turkish offensive driving Foreign Affairs, argued that once the fleet North Sea plan. through the Caucasus Mountains.”15 moved through the Dardanelles, “a coup British political and military leaders British decisionmakers debated the d’état would occur in Constantinople, next focused attention on Turkey and the Russian request and the larger issue of the whereby Turkey would abandon the possibility of military operations to seize future strategic direction of the war effort Central Powers and join the Entente.”23 the Dardanelles,6 attack Constantinople, during a series of War Council meetings in All of the foregoing assumptions proved and open a line of communication to early January.16 The council decided that false, and their cumulative effect fore- Russia. Secretary of the War Cabinet the British would continue to fight side ordained the Dardanelles operation to Maurice Hankey, Chancellor of the by side with France on the Western Front, disaster. Exchequer David Lloyd George, and and the Admiralty would, commencing in Churchill advocated military operations February 1915, prepare operations “to in- Naval Operations in against Turkey on the Gallipoli Peninsula.7 vade and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with the Dardanelles They agreed that the Ottoman Empire Constantinople as its objective.”17 British naval forces shelled the forts was weak and that “Germany [could] per- Bureaucratic maneuvering and ne- at the entrance of the Dardanelles on haps be struck most effectively, and with gotiation were thus necessary to reach November 1, 1914, well before the the most lasting results on the peace of the a decision to launch the operation. The formal commencement of the Gallipoli world through her allies, and particularly next major task for senior British leaders campaign. The purpose of the attack through Turkey.”8 Thus, within weeks was designing the strategy to implement was more to punish Turkey for siding of the outbreak of war, British attention the War Council’s decisions. The final with the Triple Alliance than an attempt turned east. plan would call for a combined force of to secure the strait. The shelling had At the end of August 1914, Churchill six British and four French battleships, ac- a more pernicious effect, alerting the formally requested that Secretary of companied by a substantial naval escort, Turkish defenders that a future mili- State for War Field Marshal Herbert to push through the Dardanelles and tary operation in the Dardanelles by Kitchener organize a group of naval and fight to Constantinople.18 the British was likely. Mustafa Kamal JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams 97 force of British, Australian, New Zea- lander, and French troops. Hamilton faced a challenge of epic proportions. His task was to conduct the first opposed amphibious landing in an era of high-powered defensive weapons that included innovations such as the machine gun and highly accurate artillery firing a new generation of high explosives.30 At dawn on April 25, 1915, British, Dominion, and Allied forces waded ashore onto six landing beaches at Cape Helles.31 Amphibious operations contin- ued for 8 months, but the Allies never gained more than a foothold on the peninsula. The campaign to outflank the stalemate on the Western Front ironi- cally began to resemble the fighting in France and Belgium, although on a much smaller scale, with Hamilton committing his troops against an entrenched and forewarned foe at Gallipoli.32 Although Australian troops charging near Turkish trench, just before evacuation at Anzac, ca. 1915 (U.S. Kitchener and Hamilton recognized that National Archives and Records Administration) a central assumption about the Turks— that they were a second-rate fighting Attaturk, overall Turkish commander at Council to delay further naval action force that did not stand a chance against Gallipoli, and Otto Liman von Sanders, immediately. British arms—was clearly wrong, they did a German general and military advisor The council charted a new course not change course.33 In fairness to British to Turkey, focused on fortifying the and called for landing troops in a beach- military commanders, a major reason for Dardanelles after the British attack of hopping campaign from the Aegean to continuing the operation was political November 1.24 The Anglo-French naval the Sea of Marmara, eventually attacking expediency.34 David Fromkin observes, force attacked the Dardanelles in force Constantinople.29 However, 38 days “Constantinople and the Dardanelles, on March 18, 1915. The battle initially would pass before British commanders because of their world importance for favored the attackers. Naval bombard- were able to embark, transport, and land shipping, and eastern Thrace, because it is ment in the days preceding the assault military forces on the peninsula. In the in Europe, were positions that occupied a successfully destroyed several Turkish interim, the enemy seized the initiative. special status in the minds of British lead- defensive positions at the entrance to Turkey deployed six divisions, some ers.”35 As Churchill further argued, “the the straits.25 By midday, the British fleet 500 German advisors, and civilian labor line of deep water separating Asia from neutralized most of the Turkish mines units in a hurried effort to strengthen Europe was a line of great significance, at the mouth of the Dardanelles, leaving Gallipoli’s defenses in anticipation of the and we must make that line secure by nine more mine belts in the approach next round of fighting. every means within our power.”36 to Constantinople.26 The Clausewitzian Despite the perceived importance concept of chance in war then emerged. Amphibious Landings of the region to British war aims, the The fleet approached an undetected line on Gallipoli Allies withdrew from the peninsula on of 20 mines, which a Turkish steamer The British did not reassess their stra- January 9, 1916, dashing hopes of de- had laid just 10 days earlier.27 Three tegic objective of defeating Turkey feating Turkey and reaching the Russians. Allied warships struck mines and sank; and opening a line of communication British, Australian, New Zealander, and a fourth suffered severe damage and with Russia after the failure of the naval French casualties totaled 130,000, yet the was unsalvageable.28 The assumption attack. In fact, the historical record operation achieved none of the goals set that the Turks would surrender on sight shows just the opposite: British leaders by British political leaders. of the British naval force was incor- redoubled their efforts, eventually com- rect, and the prospect of a collapse of mitting nearly 500,000 Allied forces Mismatch of Ends and Means the Ottoman Empire by means of a to the Gallipoli operation. Kitchener The British experience in the Darda- naval assault alone died on March 18. appointed General Sir Ian Hamilton as nelles is a cautionary tale that highlights The setback caused the British War the overall commander of a combined the flaws inherent in a strategy charac- 98 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 terized by improperly aligned ends and means.37 The initial plan—a navy-only effort to forcibly enter the Dardanelles, navigate the peninsula while destroying land-based targets with surface fires, and force the capitulation of Constan- tinople—is perhaps the classic example of imbalanced ends and means in World War I. Naval gunfire in 1915 was generally ineffective against land-based artillery and even static targets without ground-based spotters.38 Although the fleet had limited success in the opening days of the naval operation, decisively defeating Turkish defensive positions in the 35-mile-long strait with naval guns alone was not feasible. Furthermore, ships are by definition incapable of taking land and occupying terrain. In fact, neither Kitchener nor Hamilton had any sustainable plan to seize and hold terrain in March 1915. Ottoman soldiers and guns during Gallipoli campaign (Library of Congress) Another example of mismatched ends an amphibious task force. As a result, resistance which led to the disturbing lack and means occurred in the minesweeping Hamilton’s staff, what could be fitted of confidence by commanders, who felt phase of the first attack in Gallipoli. The aboard the Queen Elizabeth, was squir- that the men should be evacuated.”44 Allied fleet “applied its least capable set reled away throughout the ship.41 Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, chief of assets, that of fishing trawlers turned of the Prussian General Staff from 1857 minesweepers manned by civilian crews, The commander of one of the larg- to 1887, observed, “Strategy can direct against the most difficult part of the est, most complex amphibious assaults its efforts only toward the highest goal campaign, that of clearing mines under in history was thus virtually powerless that the available means make practically fire.”39 Even the amphibious landings of to exert his will over his own forces, possible.”45 British means in the Gallipoli April 25 lacked properly balanced ends let alone those of the enemy. Without campaign did not support British strat- and means. A total of five British, French, the means to command and control a egy. The imbalance between ends and and Commonwealth divisions landed at complex military operation, the ends means in the naval and ground campaigns five separate beaches against entrenched were all but unattainable.42 A lack of two in the Dardanelles doomed the overall defenders expecting an Allied attack.40 further means—amphibious doctrine and effort to failure. Although the number of forces in action previous army-navy joint training—also in the Dardanelles consistently grew dur- hindered Hamilton’s ability to orches- Conclusion ing the evolution of the operation, the trate the landings.43 The Clausewitzian The changing character of war, fact remains that the Allies never success- concept of friction, compounded by the embodied in the deadly intersection of fully held a beachhead for an extended lack of command and control, amphibi- 19th-century tactics and 20th-century period, largely due to the lack of means, ous doctrine, and previous army-navy weapons, created a staggering number that is, ground forces. training, took effect on the battlefield al- of casualties in 1914. The carnage Another imbalance in the ends-means most immediately. The historical record is prompted British leaders to seek a new paradigm was evident in British com- replete with first-hand accounts of prob- front to break the European stalemate. mand and control. Inadequate command lems exacerbated by weak command and Strategists looked east to open a new and control control. An Australian soldier succinctly theater of war. The plan to conduct described a frustrating scene undoubtedly operations against Turkey and open a handicapped Hamilton throughout the unfolding for thousands of men during route to Russia suffered from flawed campaign, but was especially evident the Gallipoli campaign: “Battalions dis- assumptions, which led first to an during the first, crucial days of the land- solved into separated groups of men, ill-advised, naval-only attack in the ing. Hamilton monitored the landing some making marvelous progress but Dardanelles. Six weeks later, this time from aboard the Queen Elizabeth. . . . without possibility of any support. It without the element of surprise, the [However], the Queen Elizabeth was was this and the strengthening Turkish Allies attacked again. The second round not configured as a headquarters for JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams 99 Warships near Gallipoli Peninsula landing 155-mm gun at Sedd-ul Bahr (Library of Congress) featured a larger naval fleet with an most challenging of military operations, conducted exercises, and structured forces embarked landing force of five divisions. were widely considered impossible after to overcome the problems associated with A series of amphibious landings over the failed Gallipoli landings. The seem- successfully assaulting fortified coastal the next 8 months, however, failed to ingly overwhelming challenges presented defensive positions. A generation after gain anything more than a foothold for by amphibious assaults—in command Gallipoli, the Allies successfully landed the Allies. The British lacked the means and control, amphibious operations tens of thousands of troops on beaches to achieve the desired ends in the Dar- doctrine (or lack thereof), interservice defended by entrenched and well- danelles, particularly in the command coordination, and maintaining a beach- equipped German and Japanese forces. and control, doctrinal, training, and head after landing—convinced military Allied amphibious operations in North manpower realms. The Allies ultimately and political leaders of the futility of Africa, Europe, and the Pacific were failed in their attempt to seize the Dar- operational maneuver from the sea. instrumental in the combined effort to danelles, force Constantinople’s surren- However, as Clausewitz observed, “His- defeat Nazism and Japanese imperialism. der, and open a link with their Russian torical examples clarify everything and Another lesson to emerge from ally. In the final analysis, a flawed strat- also provide the best kind of proof in the Gallipoli, despite failure there, was the egy, poorly executed, did not achieve empirical sciences. This is particularly importance of the indirect approach, Allied ends.46 true in the art of war.”47 which factored heavily into British During the interwar years, military strategy during World War II. Churchill Coda: Lessons Learned on planners and theorists validated the favored amphibious operations against Amphibious Assault Clausewitzian concept of the value of Germany in the North Sea in 1914 in The Dardanelles campaign was a disaster studying history. Planners and theorists an effort to bypass the main line of resis- for Great Britain. Amphibious assaults analyzed the reasons for the failure in tance on the Western Front. Less than against defended beachheads, among the the Dardanelles and developed doctrine, three decades later, Churchill opposed 100 Recall / The Gallipoli Campaign JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 the U.S.-favored Operation Roundup, extend for 4 miles, then widen again to 3 miles. theory of war. Under this theory, “when people They continue for another 20 miles before believe they have crossed a psychological a cross-channel attack planned for entering the Sea of Marmara. This geographic Rubicon and perceive war to be imminent, they mid-1942. The prime minister instead information is from Victor Rudenno, Gallipoli: switch from what psychologists call a ‘delibera- advocated for operations in North Africa, Attack from the Sea (New Haven: Yale Univer- tive’ to an ‘implemental’ mind-set, triggering a Italy, and the Balkans—presumably sity Press, 2008), 27. number of psychological biases, most notably softer targets than Adolf Hitler’s Atlantic 7 Fromkin, 125. overconfidence.” This theory helps explain why, 8 Ibid. even when the commanders realized their cen- Wall—before a cross-channel assault 9 Graham T. Clews, Churchill’s Dilemma: tral assumptions about Gallipoli were wrong, against Fortress Europe. The Real Story Behind the Origins of the 1915 British political and military leaders made no Finally, Churchill personifies the Dardanelles Campaign (Westport, CT: Praeger, change in the overall course of the Dardanelles greatest legacy of the Gallipoli campaign. 2010), 44. strategy. Information concerning the Rubicon A primary architect of the Dardanelles 10 Ibid. theory of war is from Dominic D.P. Johnson 11 Charles E. Callwell was an influential and Dominic Tierney, “The Rubicon Theory disaster, he managed to salvage his military theorist. He published a seminal work of War: How the Path to Conflict Reaches the reputation and career after Gallipoli, and on counterinsurgency titled Small Wars: Their Point of No Return,” International Security emerged as one of the most effective war Principles and Practice (London: His Majesty’s 36, no. 1 (Summer 2001), 7–40. leaders in history during World War II. Stationery Office, 1899). 35 Fromkin, 548–549. The lessons of Gallipoli, learned at great 12 Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and 36 As quoted in ibid., 549. the Dardanelles: A Dialogue in Ends and Means 37 Carl von Clausewitz devoted a significant cost in blood and materiel, were thus not (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 57. amount of discussion to the importance of in vain. JFQ 13 Ibid. properly linking ends and means in strategy. See 14 Fromkin, 127, observes, “The doctrine Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. of the generals was to attack the enemy at his Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Notes strongest point; that of the politicians was to at- Princeton University Press, 1984), 127–147, tack at his weakest.” This “politicians’ predilec- et seq. 38 1 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy tion” for attacking at the enemy’s weakest point Jonathan Schroden, “Strait Comparison: forged the Triple Alliance in May 1882. France, would surface again in World War II. Lessons Learned from the 1915 Dardanelles 15 Britain, and Russia formed the Triple Entente Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: Oxford Campaign in the Context of a Strait of Hormuz in 1907 in an attempt to balance the growing University Press, 2011), 14. Closure Event,” Center for Naval Analyses, 16 German threat as Berlin’s economy and military Ibid., 16. September 2011, available at JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Adams 101 The Commander-in-Chief is a honed, of the public for generations to come.” expanded version of Terry’s article “The Historians, scholars, and other readers President as Commander in Chief,” can only hope for someone as astute and which was published in the Ave Maria scholarly to carry on that legacy. JFQ Law Review (2009). There is generous citing of independent collateral sources as well as of Terry’s 30 years of earlier Alice A. Booher, JD, a former Foreign Service Reserve Officer and Counsel to the Department scholarly works, making broadened refer- of Veterans Affairs, Board of Veterans Appeals ences easily accessible. The index and (1969–2011), is well published in national particularly the extensive bibliography media on numerous subjects. She is editor of and contributing author to Glimpses of the and sources sections are immensely New Veteran: Changed Constituencies, Different productive. Disabilities, Evolving Resolutions (Carolina Terry’s fundamental initial focus is Academic Press, 2015). the constitutional source of Presidential authority found in Article II with incre- mental expansion and limitations thereof guided by the Presidents themselves and the specific exigencies in which they discovered themselves, within and some- times without the added dictates and directives of Congress and the courts. With text addressing both authority and The Commander-in-Chief execution, the fully comprehensive yet By James P. Terry concise discussion of the warfighting Carolina Academic Press, 2015 Presidents in the aggregate is contained 204 pp. $40 in the first five chapters, followed by foci ISBN: 978-1611636710 on Presidential powers used in response Reviewed by Alice A. Booher to terrorism, humanitarian crises, United Nations peacekeeping, and in defense of U.S. nationals abroad in chapters 6 ames P. Terry long wore the through 9. mantle of being one of the most Terry next gives consideration to J prolific writers in the areas of Presidential powers in “protecting critical security and international law. In 2013 infrastructure” in circumstances such as and 2014, his books The War on Terror electrical blackouts, protection of water and Russia and the Relationship Between supply, and actions post-9/11, post– Law and Power were recognized as pro- Hurricane Katrina, and so forth, including viding articulate, extraordinary analyses establishment of the Department of The Invisible Wounds of of both subjects. The Commander-in- Homeland Security and the strengthened War: Coming Home from Chief is certainly equal to these two review on cyber security. A final discussion Iraq and Afghanistan works and, in some ways, is better than relates to arms control. Each President By Marguerite Guzmán Bouvard both. Terry’s lifelong body of work and impacting elements and actions are Prometheus Books, 2012 was a product reflective of extraordi- addressed with remarkable objectivity 254 pp. $18 nary academic credentials, hands-on in a context virtually absent any political ISBN: 978-1616145538 service in the Marine Corps, both on “spin” other than learned analyses. Reviewed by David F. Eisler the ground and as Legal Counsel to A eulogy written by national security the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of expert Professor Robert Turner noted Staff, and senior leadership roles at the that James Terry “improved the lives of ach of us who has come home Departments of State and Veterans those around him through his willingness from war has experienced the Affairs. At the time of his death on to share his knowledge and his genuine E return in our own way. Some were December 12, 2014, Terry, a Senior compassion for everyone.” That assess- embraced by a loving family; others Fellow in the Center for National Secu- ment would appear to be fulfilled in this were alone. Some were respected by rity Law at the University of Virginia, worthwhile and final volume, which, as friends, while others were feared by had signed off on this book, which was Turner states, is “to be read by students, neighbors. Many adjusted quickly to published posthumously. policymakers and interested members the comparative peace of their previous 102 Book Reviews JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 lives, while some never adjusted at all, military. Several mothers even try to talk tormented by the demons of combat their children out of it. New from and post-traumatic stress disorder The book’s biggest issue is its propa- (PTSD). It is on this latter group of sol- gation of numerous negative stereotypes NDU Press diers that Marguerite Bouvard focuses about veterans. Bouvard contends that for the Center for the Study of her attention in The Invisible Wounds “returning soldiers harbor a grief that is Chinese Military Affairs of War through individual stories that, not widely understood” and that “they Strategic Forum 289 though incredibly moving, perpetuate can’t come home [because] . . . these An Empirical Analysis of Claimant many of the sensationalized stereo- memories will never go away. When sol- Tactics in the South China Sea types that have plagued the veteran diers drive down a highway or a road in by Christopher D. Yung and community. Illinois, Nevada, New York, Colorado, or Patrick McNulty In the last few years, there have been any other place, they look at rooftops and China, a number of books intended to open overpasses to make certain there are no Taiwan, a window into the experience of the enemies waiting with rifles.” But her con- Vietnam, the modern soldier and combat veteran, clusions and narrative are driven by a few Philippines, including David Finkel’s Thank You for interviews with select individual veterans Malaysia, and Your Service (Sarah Crichton Books, and family members and then told as if Brunei have 2013), Yochi Dreazen’s The Invisible representative of the entire population— used a wide Front (Crown, 2014), and Howard everyone in this book suffers from PTSD. variety of tac- Schultz and Rajiv Chandrasekeran’s In a few cases, Bouvard evokes tics to protect For Love of Country (Knopf, 2014). dangerous sensationalism. “Veterans and advance their maritime territo- Bouvard’s book, published in 2012, return in combat mode,” she writes, rial claims in the South China Sea. predates all of these and even antici- “which gives them the ability to respond China is the most active user of the pated many of the issues that have made instantly with deadly force. They are nine categories of tactics identified recent headlines, including military in perpetual mobilization for danger, in this paper, with the exception of sexual assault, controversy within the endurance, and hyper-arousal.” And in legal actions, and accounts for more Department of Veterans Affairs (includ- a later paragraph, she claims, “because than half of all military and paramili- ing a story of one veteran who received soldiers have to distance themselves from tary actions since 1995. an appointment for trauma counseling emotions suffered during a horrific war, The unclassified database used 3 weeks after he committed suicide), as their feelings often flare up at unexpected in this analysis undercounts military well as the philosophical issues associated times after returning to civilian life.” If and paramilitary actions, but cap- with maintaining an all-volunteer force. the book is meant as a way to engage tures enough activity to provide a In that regard, it is worth reading to civilians in understanding the emotions representative sample. A classified see how these themes have evolved over of war veterans, how will they come away version that captures more activ- time and to get a personal sense of how thinking about them? ity would improve the potential they affected real people. Even with these problems, much of to develop the database into an Much of the book, though, is writ- the book is poignant and excellent, such Indications and Warning tool to ten in an anecdotal tone of hearsay, with as her description of soldiers walking long assist in monitoring and managing many needless citations given for banal distances and waiting in lines just to get tensions in the South China Sea. details, while wild claims are neither a few minutes on the phone to call their put into context nor supported with wives or families. The author is at her best evidence. Because these stories are strung when writing about the emotions and together without pausing to consider the reactions of an individual person rather context of the situation, the book misses than making generalizations about all the chance to connect with the larger veterans. Her expert description of how conversation about military veterans. families grieve and mourn their loved In many cases, the author is unable to ones, whether lost in combat or to sui- distance herself from her subject, veering cide, is some of the book’s best material. too often into the political and seemingly It is easy to let those we have lost as a selecting her samples to confirm her country become a set of faceless numbers, convictions. In the chapter on mothers, but Bouvard refuses to allow that. She a subject about which the author has also captures the complex emotions of written several books, it is somewhat coming home and readjusting to civilian Visit the NDU Press Web site for surprising that every single mother was life, including the feelings of dissociation more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu upset when her child decided to join the JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Book Reviews 103 from others so familiar to those of us who Sarah Chayes, a historian and award- have gone through it ourselves. winning PBS correspondent who later The book may be designed to spur became a high-level advisor to former readers to action, to force them to spring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their comfortable lives outside these Admiral Michael Mullen, lived in the wars and immediately find the closest midst of Afghan corruption beginning veteran and shower him or her with care in 2002. Originally sent to Kandahar on and affection. If you take the message too a reporting assignment following the literally, though, you might come away U.S. overthrow of the Taliban, Chayes with the impression that everyone who decided to stay in Kandahar as part of a has served in the military is suffering and nonprofit venture. She provides her first- that the only way to ease their pain is to hand knowledge of the payoffs, bribes, pity them. and embezzlement seemingly entrenched Bouvard should be commended for in southern Afghanistan during that time her attempt to reach out, even if too period. Corruption has never gotten bet- much of her book is based on clichés and ter, but Chayes’s perspective has changed. the unfortunately common philosophy of Later brought into the highest policy thinking that veterans have a monopoly circles of the U.S. military, she advised on suffering that civilians cannot under- multiple International Security Assistance stand. She writes, “Living in the present, Force commanders in the late 2000s in- civilians have the luxury of managing cluding Admiral Mullen. their memories. We all have both good Corruption has long been on the and difficult memories, but we are able Thieves of State: Why mind of national advisors. In an early to turn them off if we wish.” But a per- Corruption Threatens chapter, Chayes surveys so-called mirror son who has had a friend killed in a car Global Security literature, tracks from the Middle Ages crash or lost a relative to an unexpected that provided advice to future rulers. By Sarah Chayes disease—or who experiences any of the Though Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince W.W. Norton, 2015 feelings of grief central to the human may be the most famous example, such 262 pp. $26.95 existence—can sympathize, if not em- advice transcends cultures and empires. ISBN 978-0393239461 pathize. We should not try to single out She persuasively shows that writers across Reviewed by William H. Waggy II veterans as the owners of traumatic loss, the centuries warned rulers of the dangers but rather use that loss as a starting point of corruption, some actually pointing to to form bonds with others who have corruption as a source of weakness and pring in Afghanistan brings the felt the same. Each side in the civilian- instability in their kingdoms. annual renewal from winter’s military conversation would benefit from Chayes expands on the idea that snowmelt, as rivers threaten their sharing their stories with each other, as S corruption causes instability and applies banks and bring much-needed water to well as listening to the stories of their it to Afghanistan. In this respect, she the country’s valleys. This year, spring counterparts. JFQ admirably contributes important ideas to brought the onslaught of another sea- conversations about Afghanistan security sonal occurrence: the annual evidence and stability. Chayes convincingly ex- of rampant corruption in Afghanistan. David F. Eisler is the Program Manager for Words plains how unchecked corruption causes After War and a Research Associate at the March brought a story from Stars and instability, national frustration, and Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Stripes that highlighted the Kabul Virginia. ultimately violence. Corruption should market for gaudy mansions constructed not be viewed as merely a by-product over the last decade with no small of weak national governments or an assistance from foreign aid. April was inherent problem of insecurity. Rather, no different, as a $100 million fuel con- corruption erodes any support for gov- tract scandal garnered attention in the ernmental institutions, breeds cynicism Afghan press. Later that same month, throughout the population, and pushes the Special Inspector General for people toward violent and puritanical Afghanistan Reconstruction released solutions. a report on the oversight of personnel As governments fail to contain preda- and payroll data that showed deficient tory impulses, the population looks for control mechanisms allowing personnel solutions that promise fairness. Looking to be paid regardless of attendance. across several countries, Chayes shows 104 Book Reviews JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 that Islamic radicals seize upon this frus- corruption to take root. Corruption tration and pledge to end corruption. undermines the institutions we develop New from Just as the Taliban promised to end the in Afghanistan. Less a necessary evil depredations of the warlords, so too do and more just an evil, corruption feeds NDU Press Uzbek radicals pledge relief from the insurgency and provides legitimacy to for the Center for Strategic Research vilely corrupt government in Tashkent. religious zealots. Chayes does not pro- Strategic Perspectives 19 Liberal reformers typically lose in this vide all the solutions to this problem, Understanding Putin Through a popular battle, as the ideas that they but the first step will always be to admit Middle Eastern Looking Glass advocate are inexorably linked to U.S. that there is a problem. JFQ by John W. Parker support for corrupt regimes. With liberals The resur- discredited, religious reformers gain the gence of upper hand in this war of ideas. Major William H. Waggy II, USA, is currently Russian influ- serving with Special Operations Joint Task Force– Chayes offers a host of recommen- Afghanistan. ence in the dations to fight corruption, although Middle East many of her suggestions are vague and has surprised nebulous. She advocates that intelligence Moscow as analysts should study corrupt networks much as any and develop models for understanding other capital. them. A functioning government takes Russia has done better than the in revenue that it passes through the bu- Kremlin and its Middle East experts reaucracy to the population in the form feared when the Arab Spring began. of benefits, social welfare, and physical Despite Moscow’s deep involvement projects. A corrupt network reverses in the Ukrainian crisis, Russia is now the flow of money in the government, in a stronger position with national taking in revenue from the population leaderships across the Middle East and passing the revenue up through the than it was in 2011, although its bureaucracy, with members at each level stock with Sunni Arab public opin- siphoning their cut of the money. ion has been sinking. A comparison to a Mafia-style orga- The Western reaction to Russian nization is telling. Calling the Afghan actions in Ukraine has given Putin government a vertically integrated a greater incentive to work toward criminal network, low-level govern- a more significant Russian profile in ment officials skim money from the the Middle East. As Moscow sees it, population and pass the money up the this impulse by Putin is being recip- chain. The high-level officials receive rocated in the region. the preponderance of the loot and in No outside power may be up to exchange promise protection from a controlling role in the region any prosecution. Illustrating how the sys- longer. But realism restrains all sides tem works, Chayes tracks the case of a from believing that Russia is any- corrupt “two-bit border police buffo” where close to eclipsing the major arrested over stealing funds. Despite a role the United States still plays in seeming chasm separating this official the Middle East. from proper Kabul, bureaucrats up to then–Interior Minister Hanif Atmar frustrated the investigation, prevented his replacement, and ominously warned of unrest if a prosecution unfolded. The corrupt system took care of its own. Though only associated with the mil- itary late in her career, Chayes effectively captures the military jargon and often irreverently highlights contradictions within the military’s response to cor- Visit the NDU Press Web site for ruption. Easily readable, Thieves of State more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu should sound a warning about allowing JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Book Reviews 105 USS George Washington (CVN 73) Sailors load relief supplies onto MH-60R Seahawk for transport to local villages during Operation Damayan in response to aftermath of Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in Philippines (U.S. Navy/Chris Cavagnaro) Interorganizational Cooperation Part I of III: The Interagency Perspective By James C. McArthur, William D. Betts, Nelson R. Bregón, Faith M. Chamberlain, George E. Katsos, Mark C. Kelly, E. Craig Levy, Matthew L. Lim, Kimberly K. Mickus, and Paul N. Stockton n 2012, the Chairman of the Joint ing the challenges of working with course of this series, authors from U.S. Chiefs of Staff directed the Armed non-DOD organizations. This article Government, intergovernmental, non- Forces to expand the envelope of is part one of a three-part series that governmental, and treaty-based orga- I 1 interagency cooperation. His edict features the other side of the story: nizations argue that broader inclusion inspired a profusion of Department interorganizational cooperation from of non-DOD perspectives into joint of Defense (DOD) literature catalog- interagency perspectives. Over the doctrine encourages the identification and propagation of much-needed inter- organizational best practices. Lieutenant Colonel James C. McArthur, USMC, is Chief of the Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine Division. This installment features perspectives Lieutenant Colonel William D. Betts, USAF, is the DOD Terminologist. Mr. Nelson R. Bregón is an from U.S. Federal executive departments Associate Assistant Deputy Secretary at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. and agencies (hereafter referred to as Lieutenant Colonel Faith M. Chamberlain, USA, is a Civil-Military Affairs Officer at the Department of State. Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR, is a Doctrine Strategist at the Joint Staff J7 Joint Doctrine organizations). We address many dif- Division. Dr. Mark C. Kelly is a Pentagon Planner at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Mr. E. ferences among our organizations that Craig Levy is a Supervisory Emergency Management Specialist at the Federal Emergency Management can disrupt the planning and execution Agency. Captain Matthew L. Lim, USN, is a Senior Policy Advisor at the Department of Health and Human Services. Ms. Kimberly K. Mickus is a Senior Liaison Officer at the Department of Energy. Dr. of interagency agreements. This article Paul N. Stockton is the Managing Director at Sonecon LLC. argues that better awareness of such 106 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 issues among organizations—especially specific comprehensive direction, orga- bottom-up, country-specific approach a recognition of which differences offer nizations tend to define their objectives to strategic planning allows it to better opportunities for compromise—would along organizational lines. Early U.S. involve host-country governments and foster improved interagency negotiation Government in-fighting in Afghanistan local civil societies in solving their own and unity of effort throughout whole-of- was partially due to the George W. Bush issues, leading to more sustainable and government endeavors. The following administration’s cancellation of a detailed effective solutions. sections sort the differences into three Presidential policy directive for managing Despite clear benefits in doing so, broad categories: purpose (goals and complex contingencies.3 organizations are not open to changing objectives), process (methods of work and Additionally, blurred congressional their geographic alignment. In a 2012 decisionmaking), and people (attitude and jurisdiction contributes to different audit conducted by the Government communication). The sections below ad- interpretations of higher level guidance. Accountability Office (GAO), State dress each category in order of increasing Co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission and USAID stated that the improved potential for compromise. The examples report, for instance, related this problem geographic alignment associated with demonstrate that organizations do not as it pertained to the Department of the standup of U.S. Africa Command willingly budge on purpose-based dif- Homeland Security, stating that “the improved cooperation among the three ferences, while process differences offer jurisdictional melee among scores of organizations. Despite this acknowledged some room for negotiation. People, how- Congressional committees has led to success, significant objections to a wider ever, appear the most malleable in that conflicting and contradictory tasks and alignment of world regions remain. State small efforts yield high payoffs through- mandates for DHS.”4 Unfortunately, raised concerns that adjusting its regional out planning and execution. congressional jurisdiction is not the only bureaus to look like combatant com- blurred line causing competing purposes. mands would signal a “militarization” Differences in Purpose Geographic Areas of Responsibility. of diplomacy, unnerving partners and Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the A well-documented difference between allies. The Department of Health and Armed Forces of the United States, organizations is the misalignment of their Human Services echoes this sentiment, defines unity of effort as “coordination areas of responsibility. There is a notable stating that many Americans do not real- and cooperation toward common objec- disparity between DOD, State, and the ize the mere fact that the organization tives, even if the participants are not United States Agency for International represents the U.S. Government can necessarily part of the same command Development (USAID) boundaries in affect relationships in unpredictable ways. or organization.”2 By definition, North Africa and Southwest Asia. Each Whereas in some relationships this fact is common objectives or shared purpose organization has valid reasons for its own likely to open doors, in others there may are a prerequisite for unity of effort. convention that support organization- be resistance to assent to U.S. wishes for Naturally, governmental organizations specific purposes. Some agencies group the sole reason that opposition to the were created to fulfill different func- countries based on cultural, historical, or United States is a domestic political ne- tions. For example, the Department of economic connections. DOD deliberately cessity. Other organizations, such as the State considers diplomacy the art and separates India and Pakistan to foster Department of Justice and Department practice of conducting negotiations and discrete military relationships, while State of Commerce, cited different reasons, maintaining relations between nations, combines them to address issues that per- including the burdens of retraining and while DOD provides for the security vade the entire region.5 The geographic relocating personnel. Additionally, all of the United States and its interests. mismatch can also be challenging when agencies professed a need to retain the When two or more organizations a country is clustered with lower prior- authority to change their boundaries to cooperate, their divergent high-level ity nations under one organization but adapt to changing mission requirements. purposes could naturally cascade into grouped with higher priorities in another. All of these factors led GAO to conclude opposing objectives at lower organi- Such mismatches precluded comprehen- that a government-wide geographic zational levels. This divergence could sive strategies for countering terrorism alignment is unlikely, and thus the result- be exacerbated by three differences: and piracy in Africa.6 ing disagreements over priorities and interpretation of higher level guidance, Organizations also tailor their objectives will endure. geographic areas of responsibility, and boundaries with inconsistent sizes and Time Horizons. Finding a common time horizons. scopes. DOD prefers larger, continent- purpose may also take extra effort when Interpretations of Higher Level sized groupings, while State and USAID different time horizons are involved. Guidance. Competing objectives are favor smaller subdivisions. USAID has A U.S. military civil affairs officer in often the result of U.S. agencies inter- challenges operating within the wide Afghanistan spoke plainly to a USAID preting the same strategic guidance in aperture of DOD’s combatant command official in Afghanistan, stating, “Our different ways. The National Security planners because the vast majority of objective is to fight and kill al Qaeda and Strategy contains general guidance and USAID’s strategic planning occurs within the Taliban. Your objective is to build a prioritization. In the absence of more the respective host countries. USAID’s democratic central government. Right JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 McArthur et al. 107 U.S. Army veterinarian trains local Afghans as part of joint effort including Provincial Reconstruction Team Farah, 438th Medical Detachment Veterinary Services, and Special Operations Task Force–West to promote public health in Farah Province (U.S. Navy/Matthew Stroup) now, our objective is number one, and possible anger toward the United States. USAID official eloquently summarized the consequences of our actions will be It can also undermine many of the tools that spending money quickly in unstable your problem in six months.”7 Many USAID uses to motivate populations areas usually means unstable results.9 organizations agree that this type of dif- to engage in solving their own prob- Best Practice: Finding Shared ference, which may generate inconsistent lems. For example, early in Operation Purpose. Different interpretations of planning benchmarks with subsequent Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military was higher level policy usually only see resolu- effects, is not uncommon. While State incentivized to achieve “quick wins” in tion at the highest level. The National and USAID perspectives on relationships civic and humanitarian assistance activi- Security Council (NSC) staff can settle and programmatic results can stretch ties. As a result, commanders spent large such disparities by issuing clarifying guid- into decades, DOD outlooks tend to sums of money quickly often without ance in the form of Presidential policy be much shorter. Thus, viewpoints on considering the downstream effects. One directives that clearly state goals and downstream effects can be valid yet dis- unintended consequence of cash infusion responsibilities for a particular mission.10 similar. In extreme instances, DOD may on Afghanistan’s agrarian economy was Another possible mechanism to encour- be the first U.S. implementer of civic a change in consumer behavior for vet- age shared purpose is a congressionally engagement in an area. As such, these in- erinary services. While USAID had been mandated review to include national secu- teractions can shape the environment and conducting long-term livelihood training rity. Although the State Department and set expectations of local groups for other for veterinarians and vet technicians in USAID 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy governmental organizations, even under- the country, the military’s free veterinary and Development Review is not con- mining access for humanitarian partners. services completely undercut the ability gressionally mandated, it identified the When DOD-USAID coordination of USAID-trained veterinarians to make need to turn to other governmental is absent, DOD activities may lead local a living. As a result, farmers chose not to agencies for experience and expertise groups to develop unrealistic goals for pay for local services because they could in performing international functions. future governmental interactions, lead- wait and receive free civic services from Both Homeland Security and Justice ing to disappointment, resentment, and military programming.8 A contemporary viewed this recognition as positive. Given 108 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 that congressionally mandated reviews to find the hidden symbiotic relationship mission set and needs of DOD make it may better instigate change, the U.S. that provides mutual benefit. A shared difficult for civilian agencies to find points Government could benefit from man- purpose is the first step toward a frame- of contact that can speak with finality. dated reviews for all Federal executive work of cooperation: a shared process. Each organization has its own de- departments or those departments only cisionmaking habits and may employ participating in the NSC system.11 A sin- Differences in Process command structures that are more flexi- gle comprehensive Quadrennial Security Once interagency participants share ble and fluid than those of DOD. Staffing Review for those departments under the a purpose, they can plan the shared decisions for a special project or specific NSC system also could be beneficial.12 process to achieve it. U.S. Government incident may be based more on individu- But not all interagency friction occurs organizations typically codify mutually als’ subject matter expertise than on their at a level that warrants NSC or congres- beneficial arrangements in the form rank, grade, or position. This facilitates sional attention. At the operational and of a general memorandum of under- application of the best resources to a tactical/field level, organization of- standing (MOU) or a detailed, more given problem, but it may also cause tem- ficials have to work through challenges. binding memorandum of agreement porary changes to traditional chains of Organizations may have varying func- (MOA).14 An example of a successful command or result in coordination points tions, but those do not prevent a shared shared process is the Homeland Security that reside at different levels within each purpose for a portion of the mission. National Response Framework (NRF).15 respective organization. Some organiza- “Promote Cooperation” is a DOD forum This off-the-shelf plan establishes roles tions may also take a different approach in which combatant commanders request and responsibilities for orchestrating the to managing an incident. While DOD input and feedback on their plans from government’s comprehensive domestic manages largely through individuals non-DOD counterparts. Simulations disaster response. An example of how within a rank structure, the Department and workshops can help organizations process differences preclude a much- of Housing and Urban Development find common ground that previously needed agreement is in the stalled Inter- (HUD) manages disaster response did not exist. In geographic combatant national Response Framework (IRF).16 through an internal committee known commands, military planners determined The current Federal system for foreign as the Disaster Management Group. So that there was a need to track, integrate disaster response, led by USAID, is while action officers in DOD may only with, and support efforts with State effective for normal disasters. However, need the approval of an individual, action Department activities to preclude the complex overseas catastrophes involv- officers within HUD may need the ap- need for a noncombatant evacuation ing infrastructure collapse (for example, proval of an entire committee. operation executed by the military. The Haiti) or radiological events (such as in Methods of Work. While DOD is functional combatant commands also Fukushima), especially in developed or accustomed to global connectivity, it is embed civilian organization liaisons big modern cities, beg for an interna- easy to forget that sharing data with inter- into their command structures.13 Even tional response capability comparable to agency partners may not be as easy. Much if objectives cannot align, the liaisons the NRF. Such complexities aggravate of the information that DOD possesses and humanitarian advisors can look one the process difference of would-be is classified, and the rationale for many or two organizational levels down to participants. To arrive at a shared decisions requires access to classified identify opportunities of mutual interest, process such as an MOA or MOU, U.S. material. The inability to quickly declas- for instance. Homeland Security and the Government organizations must first sify this information so it can be shared Federal Emergency Management Agency compare the processes—namely, deci- with non-DOD and U.S. Government (FEMA) also benefit with embedding sionmaking and methods of work—of organizations hinders effective engage- DOD liaisons in their organizations, their individual organizations. ment by many DOD senior leaders and which can prevent late resource requests Decisionmaking. Many organizations action officers. Additionally, the lack of that end up in unfilled requirements. view DOD as overly bureaucratic. The linguistic expertise and cultural sensitivity With respect to differing time hori- department’s sheer size and complexity on the part of many DOD members is a zons, organizations with a longer view can make liaison and cooperation difficult hindrance to effective cooperation. can seek short-term cooperative oppor- for other organizations. For starters, Some organizational cultures are dia- tunities with partners who have less time DOD’s enormity can cause a resource metrically opposed to that of DOD. The available. These opportunities, if taken, and power disparity. Smaller organiza- military’s strict chain of command and may overcome unintended consequences tions may be reluctant to cooperate for requirement to unquestioningly follow toward government efforts. Because fear of their efforts being co-opted and/ lawful orders are foreign to organiza- unity of effort requires common objec- or losing turf and resources.17 Other tions such as the Department of Energy tives, when there is no obvious shared organizations do not have the manning (DOE) and its need to challenge and purpose the organizations must actively or time to participate in planning events question, which are hallmarks of good seek common ground. The idea is not to or other settings to the extent that DOD science. Other practices such as ad- force an unnatural cooperation but rather does or might expect. Similarly, the broad dressing everyone, other than the most JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 McArthur et al. 109 senior leadership, by first name may be to take it, and how that assistance will be speaks a unique language peppered mistaken by DOD as disrespectful, while integrated into the larger Federal support with jargon, acronyms, and high-tech non-DOD meeting attendees are often operation. Complex overseas catastrophes PowerPoint lingo. But a unique language mystified when everyone leaps to their involving chemical or radiological events, has evolved at other organizations as feet when a general walks in. Working such as Fukushima, reinforce the need for well, and each side is often unaware that hours can be another contrasting trait. a comparable IRF. Additionally, DOD a common word has a different meaning Although many organizations maintain a information-sharing obstacles facing non- to the other. One well-known example is constant high operational tempo, some DOD personnel during time-sensitive the word intelligence; while in fairly com- operate according to “traditional business operations underpin the need for more mon use (as in “medical intelligence”) on hours.” This can create challenges during efficient ways of doing business. both the military and civilian sides, it can time-sensitive operations such as disaster It is important for DOD representa- cause difficulties in other settings when it response. Although organizations such as tives to remember that organizational may be interpreted as a form of espionage. DOD, DOE, or FEMA may be able to process differences are just that: dif- Many organizations echo this sentiment. vet and approve actions quickly, including ferences. There is not a right or wrong Without prior knowledge, DOD partners at night and over weekends, traditional organizational culture—just one that best can also read a more militaristic intent hour operations may have staff working suits the purpose of the organization. into innocuous DOD terms such as tar- extra hours in support of an incident. The Avoiding the tendency to mirror-image geting when, in fact, a DOD author may reachback of these other organizations to will prevent poor assumptions and only be referring to selectivity and focus headquarters or leadership for technical temper expectations. Each organiza- with no context of violent action whatso- assistance may be delayed during non- tion should clearly articulate its needs, ever. While militaristic terminology can work hours because the organization is resources, abilities, authorities, and, most make interagency players question DOD’s not structured or staffed to maintain its importantly, its constraints. Many issues intentions, withholding information can full suite of capabilities 24/7. arise from one party making assumptions cause longstanding issues of trust. Best Practice: Compromise for Shared about another party based on its own way Information-sharing. Often the mili- Process. DOD has learned in the last of doing things. Clear communication of tary is required to withhold information decade that trying to predict a partner’s requirements and timelines upfront af- out of operational necessity. However, reaction to a situation can be clouded by fords the opportunity to mitigate missed what looks like a clear operational necessity a common tendency known as mirror- connections down the line. To reinforce to DOD will not always appear as clear-cut imaging: assuming the other side will act positive communication among orga- to other organizations. A senior civilian in a certain way because that is how you nizations, MOAs and MOUs are good State official expressed his frustration at his would act under similar circumstances. foundations for a shared process, and an organization’s lack of awareness of DOD In recent conflicts, mirror-imaging has accessible DOD central repository would special operations missions: “None of us led to poor assumptions and offended enhance awareness on how the depart- knew in many cases what they [DOD] partners. Without awareness of a partner’s ment interacts with interagency partners. were doing until an operation had already organizational culture, mirror-imaging taken place. There was one really bad issue can also be a problem in interagency People: Communication where Special Forces killed the wrong cooperation. By improving organizational Makes Workarounds Work guys, and [the country team] had to cultural awareness, U.S. Government People actively search for a common explain it all to [Afghan president Hamid] organizations can compare their processes purpose. People compromise to forge Karzai without even having known such to find room for compromise. The result- a common process. People make deci- an operation would take place.”19 DOD ing interagency plan will reflect not only sions, and people do the work—with is not expected to curb this practice, only a vetted shared purpose but a shared other people from other organiza- to ensure the decision to withhold infor- process as well: one that incorporates tions. U.S. Department of Agriculture mation is a calculated one because even decisionmaking mechanisms and methods (USDA) representatives reported justified instances can erode trust. of work compatible for all participants. that their ability to work effectively Even more damaging cases of with- For example, under the NRF, several with interagency partners in Iraq and held information are those due to organizations that are accustomed to Afghanistan depended almost entirely negligence. Another senior civilian was leading have yielded in the name of a on developing positive interpersonal more incredulous when DOD withheld shared purpose and process. FEMA is relationships based on trust.18 There mission results long after a mission went designated as the supported organization are three types of communication bad: “They bombed a wedding party; we and a host of governmental organizations, differences that have stalled personal heard about it way after the fact. If we including DOD, are in appropriate sup- relationships in the past: terminology, had heard sooner, we could have helped porting roles. As FEMA assigns missions information-sharing, and attitude. mitigate the effects.”20 to meet specific assistance requirements, Terminology. Anyone who has experi- Attitude. Organizational cultures it also tells DOD what is needed, where enced a DOD meeting knows the military also affect how individuals act and treat 110 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 U.S. military humanitarian assistance capabilities support emergency relief efforts at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (U.S. Air Force/Shane A. Cuomo) others. Mirror-imaging was shown to us think. Most USAID people never work build vital interpersonal relationships with- lead to poor assumptions about decision- with the military, so this whole experience out struggling to earn respect over many making practices and methods of work was new.21 months or years. More frequent personal used in organizations. The same concept interaction will only accelerate the process can apply to individuals with equally Another USAID official explained a and build trust. For example, USAID damaging results. Differences in organi- progressive experience in Afghanistan: encourages DOD field personnel to reach zational attitude are merely unjustified “At one point I [told senior officials in out directly to USAID country staff in perceptions—that is, stereotypes. Even Washington] that I thought we had a hell both tactical and strategic planning. At the though a person works for an organiza- of a lot in common with the uniformed same time, USAID strives to educate its tion with a certain reputation, uniform, military, which was rebellious to say and own staff as to why DOD may be engag- rank, or grade, there are, quite often, stunned them. I said that they are opera- ing in activities that could be considered more similarities than expected. A senior tional, mission oriented, have a command within USAID’s purview and how to USAID official relayed his change of and control structure and chain of com- productively interact with such activities. heart about working with military officers mand, plan well and do strategies well, USAID continues its DOD outreach to in Afghanistan: and we [at] USAID do all the same.”22 build on cooperative efforts with its new Best Practice. Cross-organizational policy on cooperation with DOD.23 Ambassador Khalilzad asked a bunch of communication fundamentals are an easy One aspect of this policy is already military planners to come in and do plan- fix with huge payoffs throughout the proved. Interagency collocation was ning. The idea among USAID . . . staff planning and execution of an interagency widely recognized as a best practice in that we’d have five colonels working with endeavor. Given enough time, U.S. Afghanistan. Collocation at multiple us to do our planning . . . was uncomfort- Government representatives learn that levels of decisionmaking made possible able. But the more we got to know them, the people from other organizations are not regular joint analysis and planning and more we respected their talent, skill, hard as different as they assumed. If DOD per- facilitated relationship development and work. . . . We realized we were on the same sonnel can avoid the prescribed missteps mutual learning.24 Almost immediately team. They pushed us, challenged us, made and get off on the right foot, they can after Lieutenant General David Barno, JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 McArthur et al. 111 USA, took command of the combined This article raises awareness on U.S. Government, 2013), 13. In an effort to capture institutional lessons from complex operations, forces in Afghanistan in 2003, he moved Government organizational purpose, the Clinton administration issued Presidential his headquarters to the Embassy com- process, and people differences. By Policy Directive 56, Managing Complex Con- pound. Barno and Ambassador Zalmay presenting non-DOD perspectives, we tingency Operations, in May 1997. The Bush Khalilzad saw each other for a few hours aim to facilitate DOD interagency coop- administration replaced it in 2005 with the every morning and every evening. The eration through improved awareness of issuance of National Security Presidential Direc- tive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Ambassador emphasized the benefits of negotiation pitfalls. By definition, unity of Concerning Stabilization and Reconstruction. collocation: “Being . . . so close facilitated effort requires unity of purpose. Partners 4 Frederick M. Kaiser, Interagency Collab- more frequent interaction, not only may have different purposes for the task orative Arrangements and Activities, R41803 by telephone. . . . We made a commit- at hand, but comparing objectives across (Washington, DC: Congressional Research ment that what was important was the time, space, and organizational level can Service, May 31, 2011), 16. 5 John H. Pendleton and Jacquelyn L. mission, that we were a single team.”25 unearth commonalities. Once a shared Williams-Bridgers, Interagency Collabora- Collocation helps mitigate all three iden- purpose is found, comparing process tion: Implications of a Common Alignment of tified categories of differences. Neighbors differences will identify friction points World Regions among Select Federal Agencies, learn each other’s language, they feel that must be negotiated before codifying GAO-11-776R (Washington, DC: Government obliged to share information as much as a shared process. Where purpose and Accountability Office, July 11, 2011), 17. 6 Ibid., 6. possible, and they give respect and trust process differences present significant 7 Yodsampa, 14. where it is due. structural barriers to compromise, in- 8 Ibid., 27. Perhaps practice makes perfect. The terpersonal relationships just take a little 9 Ibid., 21. more opportunities organizations have to effort and are widely recognized as the 10 Richard A. Best, Jr., The National Secu- collaborate in more detail on a recurring most important facilitator in interagency rity Council: An Organizational Assessment, RL30840 (Washington, DC: Congressional basis, the better prepared they will be to cooperation. As new interagency differ- Research Service, December 28, 2011). collaborate during a crisis. Increasing the ences and best practices emerge, broader 11 Presidential Policy Directive 1, Organi- number of contact points and collabora- inclusion of interagency perspectives zation of the National Security Council System tive projects among agencies will bring into joint doctrine ensures these updates (Washington, DC: The White House, February greater familiarity for each of the others. are captured throughout the continu- 13, 2009). 12 Alan F. Mangan, Planning for Stabiliza- It is the relationships fostered on a con- ous cycle of joint doctrine revision. It tion and Reconstruction Operations without a tinual basis that will facilitate efficiency broadens the audience and truly expands Grand Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. when time is of the essence. the envelope of interagency coordination Army War College, March 18, 2005), 14. More interaction in force develop- per the Chairman’s remit. The second 13 Pendleton and Williams-Bridgers, 26. ment venues will also allow subject installment of the Interorganizational 14 DOD Instruction 4000.19, “Support Agreements,” April 25, 2013, 28. matter experts to better identify and Cooperation series expands the envelope 15 National Response Framework (Washing- proliferate much-needed best practices. further beyond the U.S. Government ton, DC: Department of Homeland Security, Although war college students will read with perspectives from intergovernmen- January 2008). lessons learned such as from the State tal, nongovernmental, and treaty-based 16 Independent Review of the U.S. Govern- Department and USDA, the other 90 organizations. JFQ ment Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Final Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for percent of the military will not look for International Development [USAID], March those perspectives. DOD joint force 28, 2011), 86; Quadrennial Diplomacy and development continuously grows in Notes Development Review (Washington, DC: Depart- importance due to the acknowledgment ment of State, July 2009), 140. 1 that no single military Service can win a Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman’s Strategic 17 Yodsampa, 9. Direction for the Force: Strengthening Our Rela- 18 Bernie Carreau, “Lessons from USDA in war on its own. In Iraq and Afghanistan, tionship of Trust with the Nation (Washington, Iraq and Afghanistan,” PRISM 1, no. 3 (June the United States learned that no single DC: The Joint Staff, February 6, 2012), 5. 2010), 144. governmental organization could stabi- 2 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the 19 Yodsampa, 14. lize a war-torn region alone. A similar Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, 20 Ibid. theme emerged at Fukushima and in DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), GL-13. 21 Carreau, 144. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination 22 Yodsampa, 19. Haiti. If DOD continues to be asked to During Joint Operations (Washington, DC: The 23 Alfonso E. Lenhardt, USAID Policy on support executive decisions in nontradi- Joint Staff, June 24, 2011), which is tradi- Cooperation with the Department of Defense tional military operations and complex tionally the one-stop shop for non-DOD and (Washington, DC: USAID, June 2015). catastrophes, which are likely callings nongovernmental entities to enter into the joint 24 Yodsampa, 35. for DOD in the years to come, then doctrine hierarchy, is presently under revision 25 Ibid., 16. with an expected signature date in 2016. interagency force development at the 3 Andrea Strimling Yodsampa, Coordinating strategic, operational, and tactical levels for Results: Lessons from a Case Study of Inter- must be cultivated. agency Coordination in Afghanistan (Wash- ington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of 112 Joint Doctrine / Interorganizational Cooperation JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Thunderbirds pilot banks right over Rocky Mountains after refueling in flight by KC-135 Stratotanker from McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, May 21, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Zach Anderson) Lessons about Lessons Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program By Jon T. Thomas and Douglas L. Schultz There is no decision that we can make that doesn’t come with some sort of balance or sacrifice. —Simon Sinek essons learned programs are tra- also intended to support organizational ditionally used to improve organi- learning—many times from the bottom L zational performance. As such, in up—through the sharing of information a very true sense, these programs are about common problems and solutions “leader’s programs” or top-down leader- throughout a community of practice. Brigadier General Jon T. Thomas, USAF, is ship tools. But at the same time, there Lessons learned and shared across the Commander of the 86th Airlift Wing and is another equally important aspect that larger organization enable all to learn former Deputy Director for Future Joint Force sometimes gets overlooked. In a large from others’ experiences with the aim of Development, Joint Staff J7. Douglas L. Schultz is a Lessons Learned Analyst in the Joint Lessons organization, with many distinct subor- avoiding the waste and redundancy of Learned Division, Joint Staff J7. ganizations, a lessons learned program is repeating the same mistake. JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Thomas and Schultz 113 U.S. Marine Corps officers assigned to Company A, The Basic School, listen to confirmation brief for field training exercise at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, April 16, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Ezekiel R. Kitandwe) The U.S. military, with its various readily share failures for the sake of group well as its individual suborganizations, Services, staffs, and support agencies, learning. But especially in a dynamic may offer some lessons about lessons to clearly falls into the category of a large or- environment characterized by evolv- any large organization faced with similar ganization with many suborganizations. ing threats and tight fiscal constraints, challenges. Within this large and diverse group- finding a way to balance the need for a ing, effective commanders and leaders commander’s program with the need for 1986–2006: Initial Attempts instinctively do their best to ensure that timely sharing of knowledge across the to Develop a Joint Process those under them learn from mistakes to enterprise is an absolute imperative. Goldwater-Nichols was Congress’s way avoid repeating them, while also seeking This article discusses how the Armed of saying that the Armed Forces had out best practices to give them an edge Forces have gone about this balancing act become too competitive with each other against likely opponents. In this sense, since the inception of a formalized Joint at the expense of the taxpayer and that lessons learned “commander’s programs” Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) fol- change was no longer optional. In addi- have been around since people first orga- lowing passage of the Goldwater-Nichols tion to many other legislated changes, nized into groups to fight one another. Department of Defense Reorganization the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Yet the other side of lessons learned does Act of 1986. This article maps the Staff was tasked with improving interop- not come so naturally in a military set- growth of the JLLP from nascent efforts erability of the Services to conduct ting, where hierarchy is firmly established to the current broad program of today more effective and efficient joint opera- and competitiveness abounds. While with particular focus on the significant tions. One important implication of this members serving within the same com- transformation that occurred by virtue task was to improve the sharing of joint mand or Service usually have no problem of transition to a single system of record. lessons and best practices across Service sharing with their compatriots, it can be The story of this program, as it sought to lines. Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, joint a different story with outsiders. Military meet and balance the needs of the large lessons learned activities were almost organizations often find it difficult to organization that is the U.S. military, as entirely a commander’s program carried 114 Joint Doctrine / Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 out independently by the Services as exercises and training, and the remedial of the two guiding policy directives was well as the unified and specified com- action program.”4 Partly in response the Remedial Action Project Program.9 mands. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff to GAO criticism, and partly because The JCLL was expected to con- did not have authority to direct actions of the increased authority to do so, the tribute significantly to the J7’s overall across Service lines, the need for sharing DJS specified a task to the new J7: stand responsibility “for evaluating the pre- lessons and best practices went almost up a Joint Center for Lessons Learned paredness and effectiveness of the unified unaddressed despite two General (JCLL).5 This marked the first recorded and specified commands to carry out Accounting Office (GAO) reports effort in DOD to institutionalize a means their assigned missions.”10 Three basic criticizing the Department of Defense to balance the commander’s program ap- elements of lessons learned, identified (DOD) for failing to do so. The first proach with a knowledge-based learning in the 1985 GAO report, were brought report, in 1979, found that “systems for capability. together within one organization. identifying, analyzing, and following up While the Chairman was reorganiz- Observations and issues would be cap- on exercise lessons learned and putting ing the Joint Staff, the Services and tured through inputs to the Joint After the results to use were not effective” combatant commands (CCMDs) made Action Reporting System (JAARS). and recommended that DOD develop their own independent adjustments to This information would be recorded a universally available database where improve their use of lessons learned. The and made widely available through the lessons could be stored and retrieved. 1 first to formalize and expand its program Joint Universal Lessons Learned System The second report, in 1985, recognized was the Army with the establishment of (JULLS). So while the RAP process efforts undertaken since 1979, but still the Center for Army Lessons Learned continued to reflect the imperatives of a found significant interoperability prob- at Fort Leavenworth for the purpose commander’s program, the JAARS and lems and noted the lack of any progress of “collection, analysis, archiving, and JULLS processes became the underpin- on developing the lessons learned dissemination of observations, insights, ning for the sharing of lessons and best system previously recommended. The and lessons; tactics, techniques, and pro- practices across the U.S. military. 1985 report identified three fundamen- cedures; after action reviews; operational In 1991, Operation Desert Storm pro- tal elements that should be present and records; and lessons learned from actual vided the first large-scale operational test well integrated in any successful lessons Army operations, experiments, and train- of the jointness legislated by Goldwater- learned program: capturing and report- ing events . . . to sustain, enhance, and Nichols. Desert Storm was widely viewed ing observations and issues, recording increase the Army’s preparedness to con- as a resounding validation of training and sharing this information, and pro- duct current and future operations.”6 to operate together as a joint force. viding a venue to ensure issues identi- At the same time, the Air Force es- However, interoperability problems still fied were being resolved.2 tablished its own formal lessons learned lingered and were documented during Goldwater-Nichols was enacted the organization under the Studies, Analyses, subsequent joint operations such as the following year, bringing the debate about and Assessments directorate (A9) of Hurricane Andrew disaster response in “jointness” to a close. The authority of the Air Staff, eventually known as the Florida and Operation Restore Hope in the Chairman was expanded to better A9L. This group was tasked to support Somalia. This led to renewed interest address continuing joint interoperability “operations, exercise, and wargame after from GAO and initiation of another issues. By enacting these changes into action reports as well as other [lessons report in 1995, which focused specifi- law, the intent was to “improve the func- learned] activities.”7 The Marine Corps cally on how the potential to use lessons tioning of the joint system and the quality also established a service-level lessons learned was not being realized.11 of joint military advice.”3 learned program under its Training Despite the establishment of formal In response, the Chairman and Education Command in Quantico, lessons learned programs in most of the reorganized the Joint Staff and Virginia, the Marine Corps Center for headquarters (including the Joint Staff), established three additional director- Lessons Learned.8 GAO assessed that DOD was still failing ates: the J6 (Command, Control, On the JLLP front, several of the to solve significant joint interoperability and Communications Systems), J7 unified and specified commands also problems. The report concluded: (Operational Plans and Interoperability), established staff-level lessons learned capa- and J8 (Force Structure, Resources, and bilities. The programs at U.S. European Despite lessons learned programs in the Assessment). The Director of the Joint Command and U.S. Readiness Command military services and the Joint Staff, units Staff (DJS) provided specific guidance were cited in the 1985 GAO report. All repeat many of the same mistakes during to the new Director of the J7 (DJ7) to of these programs were initially known major training exercises and operations. establish a “high level, single focal point as Remedial Action Programs (RAPs), Some of these mistakes could result in for functions of force interoperability to reflecting the primary emphasis on ad- serious consequences, including friendly include war planning, joint/combined dressing shortfalls rather than on sharing fire incidents and ineffective delivery of doctrine, JTTP [joint tactics, tech- knowledge of lessons learned. Even on bombs and missiles on target. As a result, niques, and procedures], readiness, joint the Joint Staff, despite the JCLL title, one the services and the Joint Staff cannot be JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Thomas and Schultz 115 assured that significant problems are being the Service systems or to develop some- As planning for Operation Iraqi addressed or that resources are being used thing in-house for local use.15 Freedom (OIF) neared completion in to solve the most serious ones.12 The new JWFC/JCLL organiza- early 2003, the USJFCOM commander tion operated as intended, even after knew immediately that the task of active Even before the 1995 GAO report the JWFC was transferred to U.S. Joint data collection would be well beyond the was published, the J7 staff recognized the Forces Command (USJFCOM) in 1999 capability and means of the 1 government need to improve the program. In 1994– as part of a defense reform initiative civilian and 10 contractors assigned to the 1995, J7 launched the Better Lessons seeking efficiencies within the Pentagon JCLL. On February 3, 2003, he tasked Learned campaign and undertook a staff. In August 2000, the new roles the USJFCOM J7 and the JWFC to series of visits to combatant command and functions were clarified as part of a build the necessary collection team, draw- headquarters, soliciting feedback on what rewrite and re-titling of Chairman of the ing resources from across the command. needed to be fixed. The feedback fell into Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) The resulting Joint Lessons Learned four broad categories: develop and field 3150.25. The new version, CJCSI Collection Team (JLLCT) numbered state-of-the-art software, provide online 3150.25A, bore the title “Joint Lessons over 30 Active, Reserve, and National capability, develop an analysis program, Learned Program,” in recognition of the Guard officers, and was led by then– and focus on and correct significant increased scope of the program beyond Brigadier General Robert Cone, USA. problems.13 the report-centric Joint After Action To provide reachback analytical support, Work on the two nontechnical Reporting System. During the subse- USJFCOM also formed a JLLCT-Rear categories began right away. Using the quent year, this arrangement appeared to element consisting of approximately 24 Chairman’s RAP process, the J7 argued function reasonably well, with the JCLL civilian analysts working in the JWFC.17 successfully for creating an actual center beginning to broaden the scope of its ef- Embedded within U.S. Central at the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) forts to perform trend analysis on JAARS Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) forward that would provide the missing lessons data for potential un- or under-reported headquarters, the JLLCT was able to learned analytical capability and thus the issues throughout the joint force. We will witness, record, and analyze operational- ability to identify and focus on correct- never know how the relationship would level lessons first-hand and to coordinate ing significant problems. The JWFC, have matured because on September 11, their efforts with Service collection teams. established in 1993 as a Chairman- 2001, its future was altered dramatically To receive the necessary level of access, controlled activity, was located in the along with that of the rest of the Nation the USJFCOM commander had to assure Hampton Roads area of southeastern by the terrorist attacks on the World the USCENTCOM commander that Virginia. It already provided extensive Trade Center and the Pentagon. the team’s sole purpose was to support support to the joint exercise and joint One of the first tasks that followed USCENTCOM and that there would doctrine programs, so it seemed a sen- the attacks came in the form of a question be no collection efforts tied to a hidden sible choice for this new task. The JWFC from the Secretary of Defense, asking agenda. In effect, this reinforced the commander and DJ7 formalized a JCLL what lessons had been learned in the commander’s program approach and Implementation Plan in early 1997, preceding years by U.S. forces combat- provided great value to USCENTCOM, which split joint lessons learned program ing terrorism. The initial response was although perhaps at the expense of responsibilities between their two orga- developed from data gathered from the broader sharing with, for example, other nizations, with production and analysis JAARS/JULLS database, supplemented commands supporting USCENTCOM. concentrated in the JWFC while leaving with information received as a result Despite the limitations on sharing, the policy and oversight of the program in of a force-wide data call. The resulting arrangement was considered successful the Pentagon with the J7. JWFC would product was delivered approximately 3 enough to be enclosed within the next also be responsible for maintaining the months later, but it was not considered version of CJCSI 3150.25 as a generic JULLS/JAARS database, which would adequate.16 Terms of Reference template for future theoretically give it direct access to ana- Over the next year (2001–2002), the active collection efforts.18 lyze all joint lessons learned data.14 JCLL found opportunities to explore the Once approved for release outside Developing user-friendly software and benefits of actively collecting observation USCENTCOM, the JLLCT report on providing online access proved to be a data first at the request of the com- OIF Lessons Learned (LL) was extremely much harder nut to crack. Although work mander of Task Force 160 (Guantanamo successful in garnering top leadership started on a prototype Windows-based Bay Detainee Operations), and later with support to resolve larger issues beyond JULLS, it was suspended before the end the Army’s 10th Mountain Division in the USCENTCOM commander’s au- of fiscal year 1997 to apply all available Operation Enduring Freedom. At the thority or capability to resolve. In May funding to develop the Joint Training same time, the Service lessons learned 2003, the Joint Staff directors held an Information Management System. After programs were beginning to send person- offsite to discuss and coordinate an OIF that, the joint community again was left nel forward to conduct active observation LL action plan. In October 2003, this to its own devices to either borrow one of and lesson collection in theater. Joint Staff–wide effort was formalized 116 Joint Doctrine / Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 U.S. Army Rangers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, fire 120-mm mortar during tactical training exercise at Camp Roberts, California, January 30, 2014 (U.S. Army/Nathaniel Newkirk) as the OIF LL General Officer Steering requirements20 and proceeded to formal- primary operational-level lessons learned Committee (GOSC), tasked to conduct ize the JLLCT as a permanent entity activity, based on the JLLCT’s strong quarterly reviews of progress on the that would later become known as the performance. They both recommended OIF LL action plan. The LL GOSC was Joint Center for Operational Analysis that Services and agencies continue to chaired by the DJS and attended by the (JCOA).21 concentrate their efforts at the tactical vice directors from across the staff, reviv- In December 2003 and March 2004, level. But they both also recommended ing and elevating the Chairman’s RAP DOD published two major lessons that more emphasis be placed on process as a forum for moving validated learned reports. The first, a report by the strategic-level lessons learned with more issues into the correct issue resolution Defense Science Board’s Lessons Learned formalized integration with planning, processes. This approach would later Task Force, was an independent, classi- programming, budgeting, and execution be formalized in the 2005 revision to fied, strategic-level view of lessons learned processes to institutionalize change across the JLLP’s guidance directive, CJCSI during OIF, but it also contained obser- DOD instead of at just one command. 3150.25B. vations and insights on the JLLP itself. In October 2003, the Chairman The second report, commissioned by the 2006–Present: Establishing expanded the scope of USJFCOM’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense a Better Balance Through a JLLCT, requesting that they “aggregate for Personnel and Readiness, focused on Single System of Record key joint operational and interoperability the status of the JLLP and how it might While JCOA continued to perform well lessons reported by combatant com- be enhanced to better support a project supporting the commander’s program mands, Defense agencies and Services to overhaul the Joint Training System aspect of the JLLP, the Joint Staff J7 derived from OIF and the War on called the Training Transformation lessons learned element worked largely Terrorism and initiate analysis of those Initiative.22 behind the scenes in 2005–2006 to lay lessons.”19 In response to the Chairman’s Both reports recommended that the groundwork for a new Web-based, guidance, USJFCOM identified funding USJFCOM continue in its role as the universally accessible automated support JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Thomas and Schultz 117 Blue Angels fly over Safeco Field before Mariners baseball game in Seattle, Washington, July 29, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Michael Lindsey) tool for sharing of lessons, the Joint launch in January 2008. The Chairman percent were actively using JLLIS to Lessons Learned Information System signed out a CJCS Notice on January 22 some degree. Additionally, JLLIS had (JLLIS). When fully developed and establishing JLLIS as “the DoD system been installed but was not yet being used fielded, this system was intended to of record for the JLLP.”23 This notice at the Department of State.25 As succes- improve the balance between support- was quickly followed in October 2008 sive versions of the JLLIS software were ing the commander and sharing lessons by an out-of-cycle revision to the JLLP released, the number of participating across the force. instruction, CJCSI 3150.25D, institu- organizations continued to grow, as did In April 2006, after examining tionalizing the decision. 24 The directive the number of observations entered in several existing lessons learned systems, was clear in communicating the intent to the system. the Joint Staff J7 announced that the make JLLIS a centerpiece of the JLLP, In addition to supporting the sharing U.S. Marine Corps Lesson Management but actual adoption of this new tool by and learning part of the JLLP, JLLIS was System had been chosen as the start- the greater DOD lessons learned enter- equipped with a capability to support an ing point for development of the new prise would take some time. The greatest issue resolution process. This new capa- system. In April 2007, the Joint Staff challenge to overcome was the existence bility was recognized in the 2009 revision J7, Marine Corps Center for Lessons of over 30 lessons learned systems that to the JLLP guidance directive, CJCSI Learned, and JCOA signed a memo- had proliferated throughout DOD since 3150.25D, with the addition of language randum of agreement that codified the mid-1980s. referring to CCMD level issue resolution responsibilities for establishing JLLIS, Issuance of a directive did not bring processes, especially USJFCOM issue with MCLL providing the baseline about immediate compliance, but the resolution processes. system, JCOA providing help with campaign to bring others onboard gath- When USJFCOM was disestab- integration, and J7 providing system ered momentum. By August 2008, the lished in 2010, the planners recognized requirements and executive sponsorship. initial baseline JLLIS had been installed that the command provided several After 2 years of development, integra- in all 10 CCMDs, the four Services, and major functions that had to continue. tion, and testing, JLLIS reached initial three combat support agencies (CSAs). Follow-on organizations were identified operational capability and was ready for Of these DOD organizations, about 50 to transition these functions without 118 Joint Doctrine / Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 interruption of service. JCOA had Intelligence Communications System, as database search technologies continue been providing one of those necessary and Five Eyes environments. to improve. Second, as the program functions. Given Joint Staff J7’s policy As the number of organizations and continues to grow as a result of the direc- and oversight role in the JLLP, it made active users grew, the benefit of using tive guidance in DODD 3020.ab, the sense to reunite the two parts of the one common system became more ap- number of joint operational and strategic JLLP under one organizational lead. parent. Operations and training exercises challenges to be addressed by the Joint JCOA remained physically in Suffolk, involving multiple headquarters, Service Staff IRP is likely to expand. Ensuring Virginia, presenting the challenges of components, and support activities there is adequate bandwidth, within the physical and cultural separation to the would be able to draw on each other’s JLLP in general and the Joint Staff in balancing effort. JCOA continued to observations and issues before and after particular, to execute this process will operate under its commander’s pro- event execution. With the addition of a be critical to continued success. Finally, gram paradigm, while the J7 Pentagon Collection and Analysis Plan module in developing a more clearly defined rule element, the Joint Lessons Learned 2014, units and organizations could also set for the JLLP to foster information- Branch (JLLB), continued to support gain visibility on planned collection ef- sharing across organizations remains an and expand the use of JLLIS, enhanc- forts to synchronize activities and avoid incomplete task. Timeliness of data entry ing the knowledge management and duplication of effort. None of this was relative to the completion of a major op- learning aspect of the program. When even remotely possible in the years prior eration or exercise, scope of data entered the first CJCS manual was published for to JLLIS, with multiple noninteroperable into the system, and the pace at which the JLLP in February 2011 (CJCSM repositories and support systems. issues are resolved vary across the joint 3150.25), the role of the JLLB included In the fiscal year 2014 National force. To an extent, this is predictable supporting a Joint Staff Issue Resolution Defense Authorization Act, Congress because no two operations or exercises Process (IRP), which had emerged to formally recognized the additional are exactly alike, and such uniqueness support the activities of the LL GOSC. responsibilities transferred from of events invariably implies differences Eventually, both elements would be USJFCOM to the Chairman and ex- in how lessons learned data are shared. placed under a single general officer panded his authorities to include the However, developing a set of minimum (Deputy Director for Future Joint Force functional areas of joint force develop- standards, and then producing metrics to Development), as separate divisions, ment. One of those new authorities measure progress toward meeting those each led by an O6, enabling a more ac- was “formulating policies for gathering, standards, would be of considerable use tive approach to balancing the two sides developing, and disseminating joint in assessing the overall health of the JLLP of the JLLP without taking away from lessons learned for the armed forces.”26 as it seeks to support the objectives of either. Successive revisions to CJCSI The Chairman’s new authority was both supporting commanders as well as 3150.25E/F and CJCSM 3150.25A in incorporated into the most recent JLLP sharing information across the joint force. 2013–2015 would further refine roles instruction (CJCSI 3150.25F), signed The Joint Staff has embarked upon an and responsibilities for gathering, devel- June 26, 2015. Additionally, a new initial effort to do so, but much more oping, and disseminating joint lessons DOD Directive (DODD), 3020.ab, work remains to be done. learned and clarifying the IRP’s place in DoD Lessons Learned Program, is being Notwithstanding these remaining the JLLP enterprise. staffed and, if approved, will reinforce challenges, the JLLP in 2015 is miles In March 2014, version 3.4 of JLLIS the imperative of lessons learned infor- ahead of the disconnected and disjointed software was released and the system mation-sharing by calling on all DOD lessons learned programs in existence was declared to be at full operational components to use the Chairman’s JLLP nearly three decades prior. A common capability. By this time, key stakeholders to improve capabilities and requiring system, and processes to share best included the Office of the Secretary of them to use JLLIS to manage their les- practices and resolve issues, today pos- Defense, Joint Staff, CCMDs, Services, sons learned information. tures the joint force for learning at the National Guard Bureau, CSAs, and other While great progress has been made organizational level. Embedded within U.S. Government interagency partners. in the joint lessons learned program the journey from 1986 until today are The Australian Ministry of Defence com- over the past 29 years since Goldwater- lessons about lessons that may be ap- pleted a foreign military sales purchase of Nichols, some challenges do remain. plicable to other large organizations version 3.4 for its national lessons learned First, as the JLLIS is populated by more seeking to maintain the same balance program. There were more than 111,000 observations, the inclusion of efficient, between leader’s programs focused on active users worldwide, and the database user-friendly search tools becomes suborganizational improvement and contained over 295,000 observations and increasingly important. While some im- information-sharing related to common approximately 135,000 documents. The provements are soon to be fielded using challenges across the greater organiza- system was available on Secret Internet IBM Watson Content Analytics (formerly tion as a whole. While still imperfect, Protocol Router, Nonsecure Internet IBM Content Analytics with Enterprise the story of the JLLP shows that it can Protocol Router, Joint Worldwide Search), more could and should be done be done. JFQ JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 Thomas and Schultz 119 Notes 1 General Accounting Office (GAO), Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision Comptroller General’s Report to Congress of (to be signed within 6 months) the United States, Improving the Effectiveness of JP 1-04, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation Joint Military Exercises—An Important Tool for Military Readiness, LCD-80-2 (Washington, JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence DC: GAO, 1979), 29. 2 GAO, Report to the Secretary of Defense, JP 3-13.3, Operations Security Management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise JP 3-14, Space Operations Program Has Been Strengthened, But More Needs to Be Done, GAO-NSIAD-95-46 (Wash- JP 3-34, Engineer Operations ington, DC: GAO, 1985), iii. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 3 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Organizational Development of JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–2013 (Washing- ton, DC: Joint History Office, 2013), 63. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations 4 Joint Staff Memorandum 251-87, Direc- JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine tor for Operational Plans and Interoperability Concept of Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1987). JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) 5 Alan D. Landry, “The Joint Lessons Learned System and Interoperability” (master’s JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare College, 1989). 6 Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery Learned Program (Washington, DC: Head- JP 3-61, Public Affairs quarters Department of the Army, 2006), 1. 7 Air Force Instruction 90-1601, Air Force JP 6-0, Joint Communications System Lessons Learned Program (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Air Force, 2013), 8. 8 Marine Corps Order 3504.1, Marine 19 CJCS Memorandum CM-1318-03, Ex- Corps Lessons Learned Program (MCLLP) and pansion of Joint Lessons Learned—The Next Step the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2003). (MCCLL) (Washington, DC: Headquarters 20 Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Com- Department of the Navy, 2006), 1. mand (USJFCOM) Memorandum, Expanding 9 CJCS 234-90, Remedial Action Project the Lessons Learned Effort, J00 9 Dec 03 (Nor- Program (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, folk, VA: USJFCOM, 2003). 1990). 21 Commander, USJFCOM Directive 10 Administrative Publication 1.1, Organi- 5100.4, Charter for the Joint Center for Op- zation and Functions of the Joint Staff (Wash- erational Analysis (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, ington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1988), III-8-1. 2007). 11 GAO, Report to the Chairman, Subcom- 22 Enhanced Joint Lessons Learned Program mittee on Military Personnel, Committee on Study Report (Washington, DC: The Joint National Security, House of Representatives, Staff, 2004). Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons 23 CJCS Notice 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned to Avoid Past Mistakes Is Largely Un- Learned Program and Joint Lessons Learned tapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 (Washington, Information System (Washington, DC: The DC: GAO, 1995), 2. Joint Staff, 2008). 12 Ibid. 24 CJCS Instruction 3150.25D, Joint Les- 13 Hugh Barker, “The Transformation of sons Learned Program (Washington, DC: The the Joint Lessons Learned Program, 1996–11 Joint Staff, 2008). September 2001,” unpublished white paper, 25 Joint Lessons Learned Program and Joint Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2006. Lessons Learned Information System, B.7.g. 14 Executive Summary: Joint Center for 26 10 U.S. Code §153 (a)(5), Chairman: Lessons Learned (JCLL) Implementation Plan Functions: Joint Force Development Activities (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1996, rev. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 1997). Office, 2014). 15 Barker. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 CJCS Instruction 3150.25C, Joint Lessons Learned Program (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2007), enclosure C. 120 Joint Doctrine / Growing the Joint Lessons Learned Program JFQ 79, 4th Quarter 2015 NEW from NDU Press Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War NDU Press, 2015 • 488 pp. This volume began as two questions from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What were the costs and benefits of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the strategic lessons of these campaigns? The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors composed a volume that assesses the war and analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s considerable in-house talent and the dedication of the NDU Press team. The audience for this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and the students in joint professional military education courses—the future leaders of the Armed Forces. Other national security professionals should find it of great value as well. The volume begins with an introduction that addresses the difficulty of learning strategic lessons and a preview of the major lessons identified in the study. It then moves on to an analysis of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from their initiation to the onset of the U.S. Surges. The study then turns to the Surges themselves as tests of assessment and adaptation. The next part focuses on decision- making, implementation, and unity of effort. The volume then turns to the all-important issue of raising and mentoring indigenous security forces, the basis for the U.S. exit strategy in both campaigns. Capping the study is a chapter on legal issues that range from detention to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. The final chapter analyzes costs and benefits, dissects decisionmaking in both campaigns, and summarizes the lessons encountered. Supporting the volume are three annexes: one on the human and financial costs of the Long War and two detailed timelines for histories of Afghanistan and Iraq and the U.S. campaigns in those countries. The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior offi- cers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/LessonsEncountered.aspx JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE SEVENTY-NINE, 4TH QUARTER 2015 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Our understanding of the importance and keeping peace is of women in building Around and activists are the globe, policymakers empower women as working to National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals.together The goal of this book is to bring these diverse voices. 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