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-/ /~ 1; on >-1%‘? %7 Moscow, refusing Ben-Gurion visit as p ‘\"‘~ 1' “ , A / "untimely," tells Arabs Cleopatra N case >5? ’\ J!‘ A is further proof of Zionist influence, I ;~“’ .; v Western hatred for UAR. 6/; 5 v ~¢§_,_\ (D s*»- r /A . W A ‘\"_\;/<<< I |D1 /J“ K , ‘ll’ .2,‘

USSR under pressure to proceed with /, W-‘mfil " E Z I [\\“* ' ' I’ conflicting Eup E)? > ~//

I I . . / ,i§{(_ Syria and Iraq. @ W/J J » iv! at ~@\ ‘Z _\ ‘~ F‘ _ ~.\ - I . /~\‘d.. p _rH_/ / L‘ 4* -.:1 ' Poland--Reported assignment 4:1 Q of Stalin- ' ' “$3 ‘ ___ 0 ," ist general to influential party post in- ‘;k4iT‘;\_ W‘ I ~ I I I/'(__ __/-x‘ xg-' \ - O (\ .-flfi terpreted as reflection of regimes de- ‘. --.1 \ -" 1,7/I, .9 I. ..' l L mg. _. termination J ._ to put down antiregime dis- I ., lT>~hQ4b¢1w *\¢¢§~a r~’/ ~K /‘T <.

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I I][ ASIA-AFRICA ,7 . 1)

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\s;§@~ Turkey- -Sporadic student demonstra- /1 tions continue; opposition party expects 2 ~<‘_ <5(:'; to be proscribed after NATO meeting ends. J 4‘ J W \. / ‘ . 5 I V /‘ ' Lebanese election set to start 12 June ‘ ”\~J . despite continuing Christian- Moslem " v tension. ~\+_ Liberal party moving to \ / reassert itself .'I?\ in South Korea. \\ \ ’Q< 's 4 /;3'-'!:'/ J 5/~ /’ ”“?<§I~ @ South Vietnam--Criticism " 0 of Diem's - ' " p ,_ authoritari _ a nism 1S increasingly open. I » ash; Q -’ _ __'_

_ ‘QR Soviet technicians tap substantial oil I / ,9 tr deposits / \ ‘ D. in northern Afghanistan. / ‘\\ = ‘hog t \<

5. A. - \/\ ‘If ‘ III. THE WEST

‘ Af

p \,§_ . @Truji11o‘s K \' relations with Church appear [ ,. \~ ,_ near breaking point. ~”' “rim Ll_‘AV_v__j§' *( -

\ ~L__- -. _

Y (“rs LATE ITEM

‘L.\/ K K ;_ ‘K USSR--Soviet personnel ----_-=_.v_. ~-.>_A__ _. %__ ‘<' F’ § changes .. If _____ 7_ -- ' . ,_ , _,j___ . ___ , ' s t reng en K ozlovsI positioni as Khru- shchev's successor.

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\\\\\\ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN \\\\\

5 May 1960

I‘,-1 \

.~S§\ DAILY BRIEF

5‘-*l\ \ \ \

>\,\,\\ . :~,»>.~>\,\\ I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC 5§:\\“ ‘»

Q-\\.\ _\_*\ \_ _USSR--Arab Boycott: Moscow, apparently seizing E‘:\\\\ the opportunity afforded by the Arab boycott, has an- nounced that it has turned down as "untimely" an Israeli made in late March, for Ben-Gu-rion to visit the USSR. is? 111.“. bid, \ 3;;/D propaganda to Arab countries is charging that §??§§‘i‘\ Soviet radio Zionist influence is behind the refusal to unload the Cleo- \ M? =,\\\ patra and that the dispute is "further roof" of Western

"hatred for the UAR." 1) :§>\§ \ USSR - Middle East: The Soviet Union, which is com- Y§§\ mittedflto assist in projects for the development of the Eu- phrates River in both Syria and-Iraq, may soon find itself involved in UAR-Iraqi rivalry over the utilization of the river’s waters. Moscow is trying to promote an amicable \ settlement before proceeding with construction, but both Cairo and Baghdad may insist that the Soviet Union carry out the planned projects in their respective countries with or Without a settlement. {Page 2) \§~ \»'{\: \ Poland: @eneral Kazimierz Witaszewski, a greatly feared and despised Stalinist who was‘ virtually exiled after the of the Gomulka forces in 1956-, has reportedly bee \\ victory appointed to a high party post which exercises major influence over military and security forces, the police, and the cour .t‘\ The report of his appointment has provoked alarm among Polish intellectuals and party moderates, and may reflect

the growing ascendancy of hard-‘line elements within the E3§§‘1.\

V,» party. It would also reflect the regime's determination to ss=\\\\\§ deal firmly with any future expressions of popular discontent;

the demonstrations at Nowa I-Iuta and Olsztyn last week and at » Poznanin February revealed the ease with which popular feel-

ings can be aroused] (Page 3) ~ \\\\\

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\\\\ I I. ASIA-AFRICA

Turkey: [Sporadic student demonstrations continued in Tur ish cities through 4 May. Many, students have been arrested in Istanbul, but morale apparently remains high and of the opposi- _ more demonstrations are possib le. Members OM tion Republic Peop1e's party expect the party to be prescribe ‘ and its leaders arrested, now thatthe NATO Ministerial. Coun- ‘ cilmeeting has .en<~1e<_1;1\ 4) y \}_(l?age,

Lebanon: President Shihab told the American ambassador on. 3 May that in spite of renewed Christian-Moslem tension, elections will begin on 12 June and be held on three successive Sundays. fihihab plans to name a caretaker government to re- place the Karami cabinet and carry out the elections. The set- ting of voting dates will il'1126I1Sif\L'OO1i1liC2t1 maneuvering and may precipitate clashes. ’% Shihab

- intends toiinterrogate a top UAR representative about "what he calls the truth of our position on Lebanon," presumably a refer- ence toflu ossible UAR intentions in regard to the election cam

its leadership in.the National Assembly,following the overthrow of ‘ ‘m ' ~ there gi e, now may b e moving t o reasse rtite1f's in th e hi ghly fluid political situation. There are also indications that aLiberal minority may be maneuvering for a return of Rhee, possibly as president under the new parliamentary system whichthe assembl ///// vs has taken the lead in developing. The student protest movement

' ' ' ' ' - h a s not as y'et evolved a unified organization or leadershi and , an unstable multiple-party situation might emer (Page 5)

\ South Vietnam: [The Diem regime is coming under increas- ingly open criticism in the relatively small circles of informed for maladministra- Vietnamese for its authoritarianism. ., Blame 0 tion corruption, and dictatorial practices has centered in the past]

?\~l.‘\“

5 May so DAILY BRIEF 11 %% %% % %' r

particularly on his brother ' [din the President's close entourage, Nhu, but now is shifting more directly to Diem himself. Nhu heads the regime's chosen political instrument, the corrupt Ca a principal architect of South Lao organization, and is also _ Vietnam's ventures against Cambodian leader Sihanouki]:

s (Page u i 6)

" Af hanistan-USSR: [ihe Afghan Government has confirmed

'

that suéstantial oil deposits have been discovered in northern . ] team-‘exploring Afghanistan near the Soviet border by the Soviet .

‘ the area under the January 1958 assistance agreement. Althoug

" ' Forei g n Mi n iste r N aim h as expresse d an in t ere st in fi ndin g oil markets in the_West, transportation difficulties make it almost

certain that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR for refin- A ' ' ' in at le ast until there is a r ef°ine ry in th e area. Naim has al- g, _

" " ready shown concernthat exploitation of the oil ma increase - Afghan dependence on the USSIEJ. (Page 7) _

III I. THE -WEST

' between Generalis-Y Dominican Republic: A break in relations . simo Trujillo and the church may be imminent. On 3 Maythe US Embass y re p orted that it n ow i s appare nt that T rujil 1 0 has launched a strong antichurch program inside the country. S

' ruyillor

\ ask the Vatican to intercede with the local hierarchy, which has ‘eE§§e% been denouncing his regimels violation of human rights. 3 #43 Page 8)

T LATE .ITEM

*USSR: The Soviet leadership has undergone the most ex- tensive personnel shift since the defeat of the Malenkov-Molotov

' "anti-party" group in 1957. The evidence indicates that the changes were made at Khrushchev's direction. The net result is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan=-=Kozlov team is still prominently in the forefront and that Koz1ov's position as Klirushchev's de-

@%" signated successor has been strengthened. -

' (Page 9) -

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' I}, TI-IE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Rejects Bidfor Ben-Gurion Visit

- Moscow, in keeping with its continuing campaign to convince the Arabs that the Soviet Union is their big-power protector against Western-supported Israel, has announced that it turned down as a _ "untimely" an Israeli bid, made in late March, for Ben-Gurion to Soviet Union. The Israeli prime minister had hoped to .visit the _ -meet with Khrushchev as part of his series of talks with govern- ment leaders who will attend the summit meeting in May.

The Soviet refusal appears to have been timed to take full ad- vantage. of the propaganda opportunities afforded by the Arab ship- ping boycott. Radio Moscow, in propaganda to Arab audiences, declared on 3 May that Zionist influence in the United States is be- hind the refusal of union labor in New York to unload the UAR Ship Cleopatra. Censuring the amendment to the US foreign aid bill which was stimulated by the boycott, the commentatorasserted thatthe dispute is "further proof" of Western "hatred for the UAR," which he termed a "long-term political trend." In contrast the broadcast cited Moscow's economic aid policies as contributing to the establishment of "independent" national economies.

1 Soviet leaders have gone on record repeatedly as favoring con- tacts on the head-of-government level, and the public refusal Of a visit by Ben-Gurion shows that the USSR is prepared to re‘ect Such etin when it conflicts with Soviet policy objectives. Foreign Minister Gromyko on 9 April turne own a meeting between the Shah and Khrushchev in Austria after the sum- mit talks on the ground that such conversations must have as their "purpose" Iranian agreement to Soviet demands for a guarantee a- gainst foreign military bases in Iran.

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Soviet Economic Aid Conflicts .in the Middle East

Moscow may be confronted shortly with an awkward situa- com- tion arising out of .its apparently conflicting. economic aid mitments to the UAR and Iraq. Under its economic aid agree- ment with Damascus signed in 1957--before the Iraqi revolu- tion—-the USSR is to construct an irrigation and hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River in Syria. Now, however, the So- viet .Union also plans to build two dams, mainly for irrigation, river in Iraq under its 1.959,economic aid agree- on the same ' ment with Baghdad.

division - At present there is no UAR-Iraqi agreement on the seri- of the Euphrates waters, -and, in an effort to avoid future ous embarrassment, Moscow recently advised the UAR of the need for such an agreement before actual construction work is begun, It is unlikely, however, that an amicable accord will be reached in the near future.

Should the USSR now stall on its Syrian project, this would seriously damage Moscow's prestige in Cairo. On the other hand, Moscow presumably is well aware of Iraqi Prime Min~ ister Qasim's opposition to the. UAR's unilateral plans for utili- con- zation of the (Euphrates. The Soviet Union probably will tinue initial survey work for the river projects in- Iraq, in to give Baghdad cause for further disenchantment order not I with the. Soviet aid program.

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Stalinist Appointed L6’ High Party Poéit in Poland

[General Kazimierz-Witaszewski reportedly has been ap- pointed director of the recently reactivated administrative section of the Polish party central committee, which controls party cadres in the government, Such an appointment would give him a role in the execution of policy relating to Polish military and security forces, the police, and the courts]

Lwitaszewski is a Well-known Stalinist who was "exiled" to Czechoslovakia as military attache following Gomulka°s return to power in 1956 but recalled for an assignment with military intelligence in the fall of 1959,. The transfer of Witaszewski ttolthis powerful position in the party apparatus may reflect-,. a growing ascendancy of hard-line elements within the party hierarchy and the regime's intention to deal firmly with all manifestations of antiregime attitudes. Gomulka-—either of his own volition or as the result of prodding by elements of the party or the USSR--may have thought it necessary to re- activate the administrative section of the central committee apparatus and place a strong man at its head] ‘ decisive llhere appears to be a definite lack of strong, . leadership in the Polish party and government, and the popu- lace is becoming delmoralized by the regime's inability to cope, with the country's many problems. The clashes with police over religious issues in Nowa Huta and Olsztyn last week and worker demonstrations in Poznan in February il- lustrate how easily popular feelings can erupt, even over purely local matters;

Ellitaszewski, who received his nickname "Gaspipe" as a result of his advocacy of brutal suppressive measures during the Poznan riots of June 1956, is generally regarded by the Polish people, particularly the inte1lectuals,as the symbol ' ' ' ternal mattersji

5 50 Page 3 May "A5|E>F

Turkish Demonstrations

Sporadic student demonstrations continued in Turkish - cities through 4 May, but security forces now appear to control of the situationo Student leaders have been arrested in Istanbu1,where the major rioting took place. [Reports indi cate that some have been beaten in attempts to extract confe: sions that the demonstrations were planned as a means to = sabotage the NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Istanbul from 2 to 4 Mayj While their numbers have been reduced by arrests and the police appear to have successfully penetrate their ranks, the students seem determined to continue their struggle; new incidents are possible. Qccording to recent re ports, the students in Istanbul are also preparing apetition listing their grievances for submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Right_s_.Q

There are indications that the government is about to take new and possibly drastic action against its political opposition. Premier Menderes has denounced the Republican People's par- ty (RPP) for sponsoring "open rebellion"-~-despite denial of RPP involvement in the riots by both party spokesmen and stu- dent leaderso Important press organs of the RPP have been closed, and opposition newspapermen have been taken into custody. Several local leaders of the RPP reportedly have been arrested, and other RPP spokesmen have been interro-I gated by the Grand National Assembly's "Committee of Fifteen"--- created in mid-April to investigate the party's "illegal and subversive" actionsp

While no national RPP leader has yet been arrested, op- position spokesmen believe such arrests are imminent and ex- pect the government to ban the party. The RPP already has drawn up plans to go underground if it is proscribed. In the event of severe reprisals, opposition leaders may ask for political asylum in foreign embassies»

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5 May 60 (Approved for Release; 2026/63/‘1‘:>{"ocY:>T1'48941 Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148941 .

aw ' inf Rhee's-‘Party May Be Seeking. to Reassert Cp_r1trol__i_'n S_outh Korea

LSyngman Rhee'#’Liberal party, ‘lifter vir ually abdicating its leadership in the National Assembly immediately following the overthrow of the regime, may be moving to reassert its major- ity position in-the highly fluid political situation in South Korea.

im- - At. the same time, the party is resisting student demands for mediate dissolution of the assembly and the holding of general elections, and is attempting instead to devise a constitutional pro- vision for a government system--with a premier -and cabinet re- sponsible to the assembly--which would preserve Liberal control. The opposition Democrats, equally unwilling to surrender the as- sembly's newly acquired power and hesitant to face elections under present circumstances, are also supporting constitutional amend-

‘ ment as a prior stepj

L'_I‘here are also indications that a minority group in the Liberal party may be maneuvering to make possible Rhee's return as pres- ident under "a new cabinet system. Vice President and Democratic party leader Chang Myon, while not indicating support for such a move, favors indirect election of the president by the assembly. Some loyal Rhee supporters, apparently impressed by the strong public affection shown for Rhee following his resignation, are ad- vocating an immediate presidential election to test popular feeling?

Llt is not clear which course public opinion favors. A majority of the press is supporting constitutional revision as the first step, but student demonstrators in major cities continue to demand the ass-embly's" immediate dissolution. The student movement is at- tempting to evolve a unified organization and leadership, but has

' not yet succeeded] .

[Preparations already are under way for the formation-or re- vival of a number of minor parties from the Progressive party on the left to the militant National Youth Corps on the right. An un- stable multiple-party situation may develop. The army seems in- tent on adopting ' ex-etofore to cope with demonstrations]

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Growing Criticism of Diem Regime in Sounth Vietnam

L facing [lfhe Diem regime in/South Vietnam, fin addition to a serious challenge from resurgent Communist guerrilla forces, is also under increasingly open criticism in the relatively small circles of informed Vietnamese for its authoritarianism. Resentment over various malpractices is felt throughout the country's'political' and military substructure, Various Viet- members and namese officials, including several cabinet , Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, have expressed apprehen- sion about the government's future stability unless political reforms are speedily effectedj '

[Ijgo Dinh Nhu, the Presidenfls brother and chief political adviser, his a major cause of resentment, As leader of the semicovert, corrupt, and pervasive Can Lao organization, Nhu has gradually fashioned over the years a commissar-like network which, on Diem's behalf, exercises the real power and control in the government, 'Healso is a principal architect of South Vietnam°s clandestine efforts to unseat Cambodian leader Sihanouk, who, as a result, has become suspicious of the West and is looking increasingly to Peiping for support.)

[Blame for maladministration, corruption, and dictatorial practices has centered in the past on the President's close entourage, but now is shifting more and more to Diem him- pro- self.‘ Diem is taking some steps to curb the excesses of vincial officials so asfto undercut Communist subversion in rural areas. Thus far,‘ however, he has refused to disavow his inner circle of advisers, and tends to attribute criticism of his regime to the work of Communists or disgruntled polti— cal "outs." Despite signs of increasing opposition to his narrowly based government, such as the petition for political reforms made public in $.igon afew days ago by a group of former Vietnamese officials, Diem probably will maintain his position that the exi encies of the times preclude more democratic practices] F

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[jfhe Afghan Govezfnmenfnas confmmeoftna substantial oil deposits have been discovered -at Shibargan in n0rth- central Afghanistan -some 40 miles from the Soviet border‘, A team of more than 200 bloc technicians has been exploring in the area under the terms of the $15,000,000 Soviet oil exploration assist- ance agreement signed in January 1958‘, The Afghan minister of commerce says the area now being tapped is estimated to con- tain.45,000,000 tons of high-quality oil. The total extent of the field is believed much broader, but is still unknown. A senior member. of the Soviet team estimates the field also contains 22 billion cubic meters of gas under pressure]

_>.. [Kabul presumably hopes that oil exports will greatly improve its international trade position in general and will increase its capacity to discharge its debts to the USSR in particular. Foreign exchange previously used to pay for imported petroleum products imports will probably be diverted to purchase more machinery and other capital goods abroad to develop the national economy; Prime Minister Daud, who has been visiting the USSR since 14 April, will almost certainly include oil exploitation in his discus- sions with Soviet officials about assistance for Afghanistan's Sec- ond Five-Year P1a.n~(l961-1966). He now may feel that Afghan- istan will be better able to repay additional loans, and relax his policy of accepting only grants]

[Although Foreign Minister Naim has expressed an interest in finding _mark.ets in the West, transportation difficulties make it virtually certain that Western companies will not be interested and that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR for refining, at least untilthe Afghans are able to have a refinery constructed in the area. The USSR in the past has objected to free-world ac- -tivity in northern Afghanistan near its borders, and it may offer to build a refinery for the Afghans, The USSR does not need the Afghan oil exports, but may accept them for political reasons. Naim has already shown concernthat exploitation of the oil may

1

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g

Dominican Republic's Relations With Catholic Church C

"

Deteriorating Rapidly _

Trujillo A break in relations between Dominican dictator . and the Catholic Church may be imminent. The US Embassy - Trujillo has on 3 May reported that it now is apparent that launched a strong antichurch program inside the country. The since local church hierarchy has been denouncing his regime ear January for violations of human rights, and all segments a to be becoming more militant in opposition to Trujillo. lhe is considering ._-__,_, as W terminating the church-state concordat. Trujillo ‘Vat- cabled his embassy to the Holy See on 28 A ril to ask the with the local hierarchy“ ican to intercede fp l

The Immigration Service on 2 May canceled a resident permit an American citizen and held by Monsignor Thomas J . Reilly, in the one of the most vocal critics among the six Catholic bishops Dominican Republic. The next day, however, Reilly was summoned Generalissimo Trujillo, who reversed the order expelling Reilly by ' and 15 Spanish priests, Reilly told Ambassador Farland that the Generalissimo might do "anything" in his present state of mind, and pre- he feared thatwidespread press coverage of the incident could dictator cipitate violence by Trujillo agents against the clergy. The and told Reilly that he was anxious to have good relations with him -area that he would transfer a general assigned in the San Juan who for i "If they begin to hang priests, save Reilly alleg ,

The Generalissimo probably believes that he can control Reilly to have Monsignor if the -Vatican honors his request made on 3 May Beras- .-whom Trujillo believes to be responsive to his demands-- appointed archbishop, However, the embassy believes that the church has gained so much local prestige in opposing the dictator popular set- that it cannot afford to compromise without r-iskinga back.

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i‘ ' SE6 {E1 LATE ITEM

Khrushchev Shakes Up Soviet Leader'sh_i_p

The Soviet party ‘central committee, meeting on-4 May,

' made extensive changes in the top party and government leadership. The evidence indicate s.that'th'e changes were made at Khrushchev's direction.

Frol Kozlov, whom Khrushchev said last year would -

' be his successor, has been moved into the party seore- tariat and has relinquished his job as a first deputy premier. This move will give Kozlov the opportunity to gain control over the hard core of party professionals. In addition, the secretariat has been reduced from a 10-man body to T a tight group of six, sa size reminiscent ‘off'the-:~tSta1in era.-

Four old members of the party secretariat have been transferred out, but remain on the party presidium. With the obvious exception of Khrushchev, Suslov appears to be the only remaining party secretary who might have the semblance of an independent voice. _

The net.result is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov team appears to be stronger than ever,

In other significant changeathree presidium candidates-- Aleksey Kosygin, Nikolay Podgorny and Dmitry Polyansky--. were promoted to full membership in the presidium. Kosygin and Polyansky particularly had been mentioned frequently as rising stars on Khrushchev's team.

The central committee also fired Aleksey Kirichenko and Nikolay Belyayev from the presidium, thus formalizing their demotion earlier this year when they were assigned to remote provincial posts.

The principal shifts in the government were the promotion of Kosygin from Deputy _l?remier and USSR ecpnomic planning chief to_ Kozlov's old job as one of the two First Deputy Premiers Mikoyanremains the other FirstDeputy Premier. Kosygin in turn was succeeded by Vladimir. Novikov whoworked for a time

—-S-El-GR-E—'F

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!.!.E.H!..'. _ T3" T V in Leningrad, Koz1ov's old bai_liwick.. For the past year he has been the chief economic planner in the Russian re- public (RSF.SR).

The Soviet announcement also stated that the central committee had discussed matters pertaining to today's Supreme Soviet session. Khrushchev has told a group of foreign ambassadors that he will make a major speech at

' this session.

Khrushchev also told the foreign diplomats that the . central committee would consider '.'constitutiona1 questions"-- _ which would then have to be formalized by the Supreme Soviet" and there has been talk in Moscow that the office of President of the USSR would be created. Khrushchev may desire the constitutional change so he could become chief of state, of- ficially, as a demonstration that the Soviet people were solidly behind him as he goes into the Summit meetings.

_§E@R£-T-

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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget ‘ Director, Off.ice of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

» Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State _ The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research. The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force ' Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman

National Security Agency - The Director National Indications Center The Director

Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03148941 IIHIII/////IH J I I H I I I 0 I IH IIIKIII I /_

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