The Anatomx of the British Battle Cruiser and British Naval Policy, 1904-1920

THE ANATOMX OF THE BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER AND BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1904-1920

By Marc Drolet, History Department, 1 McGill University, Montreal Submitted: November,1993

A Thesls submltted ta the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fuI filment of the reguire~ents of the de~ree of M.A. in the field of History

, The Battle Crulser was the resul t of the n~val arms race and the reallsatlon that England's undisputed mastery of the seas was

over. The Shlp v'as the next loglcal step in the evolutlon oi th€'

Crul ser. Hl stonans have genera lly consldered thi s type of warsillp

as an expenslve mistake. Whlle i t was not as successful as 1 ts

creators mlght have hoped, neither was it the disaster claimed by

many of ItS critlCS. Once the British chose to bUlld these ShlpS

not only did they have no choice but to keep building more of them,

but they al so had to bui Id larger, more powerful and expenSI ve

Battle Cruisers in order to maintal.n the lead in the arms race wi th

Germ,any.

, RESUME Le Croiseur de Bataille a été crée à cause d' \.me course

d'armements concernants les vaisseaux de guèrre, et dussi à cause

du déclin de l'Influence de la flotte BritannIque. Ce vaisseau

marquaI t la pI'ochaine étape dans l'évolution du Croiseur. Plus lelHS

historlens ont écrit que la création de ce type de vaisseau étalt

un erreur de la part de l'Angleterre. En fait, le Croiseur de

Batallie n'a pas été à la hauteur des espérences de ses créateurs,

sans toutefois être le désastre que plusieurs détracteurs on

l'accusé d'être. Dès que l'Angleterre a ChOISi de construire ce

vaisseau, elle a été forcée de continuer à bâtir des Croiseurs de

Batai Ile encore plus grand, ce qui augmentai t le coût pour

maIntenIr leur avance sur la flotte de l'Allemagne. 1

___... ___ •• ____....'" ___ .. ____ -.. ___ .. _..::1: ... __._.:_= __ _ ••_ ••••••..,._-; ... Acknowledgements 1 The author would personally like to thank Professor

Robert Vogel for hlS invaluable assi~tance in the writing of

thlS thesj s. He would also like te thank Professor Hereward

SenIor, Mrs. Mary Mcdaid, the McGill History Departrnent, and

the staff of the McLennan-Redpath Library, particularly the

Interl ibrary Loans Department 1 for their considerable he.lp and

patience.

, a Table of Contents:

- 1 NTRODUCT l ON Page 1

-CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO INVINCIBLE Page 9

-CHAPTER 2: SISTERS AND RIVALS Page 43

-CHAPTER 3: THE BATTLE CRUISERS AT WAR Page 71

-CHAPTER 4: THE WARTIME BATTLE CRUISERS Page 97

-CONCLUSION Page 111

-ENDNOTES Page 115

-BIBLIOGRAPHY Page 122 1

1 /1

Introduction 1 Very few warships have created as much controversy as the Battie CruIser. It was first designed ln Enqiand to be the uitimate

Cruiser, capable of destroying any potential con~erce raider and

scoutlng fOL the maIn fleet. Just as the Dreadnoughts were the new ShlPS-of-the-Ll.ne, the Bri tish Battle Cruisers were to be the

modern equ 1 va] ents of the wooden Frigates. Historians, however, have had few good things to wri te abcut these ships. The final

verdlct has been t~at while the Britlsh ~readnoughts, the all-big- gun Battleshlps, proved themselves a success, the British Battle CrUlsers, the all-big-gun Armnured Cruisers, were a failure. They were extremel y expensi ve warships that proved capable of g1 ving ont

much punlshment, but unable to take as weIl dS they gave. The conventlonal arguments against the Battie Cruiser have 1 been agalnst Its designs and in the confusion as to what its ro1e was supposed to be. Most historians who have written about this ShlP, such as Oscar Parkes, Anthony Preston, V.E. Tarrant, Ruddock F. Mackay, N.J.M. Campbell, and Peter Smith, have argued that the 1 designs gave the ships too li ttle protection against heavy gunfire-:-

Arthur J. Marder, possibly th~ strongest supporter of both the SattI e Cnn ser and the Fi suer Revolution in the Royal Navy, stated that the maIn problems wlth these ships had more to do with

inadequate magazine pratectio~ than with its armQur scheme, but

even he was forced ta admit tha~ the British Battie Cruisers were too thlnly pratected ta be used in battle against other large gun ~ 1 oppanents. The deslgns for these ships emphasised glving them a /2.

large armament on a light: hull, which wnuld enable them ta achieve 1 a fast speed. As a result, protection was sacrificed. The raIe of the Battle Cruiser has also come under nllh Il

crl tlci sm. 'rhei r primary t as)ts were to act ab scouts ta [' the Illdl Il

.f leet and to hunt down commerce raiders, but they were not supposed

ta lie ln the ffialn hne of battle alongslde the more hcavl ly

f'!:"c~ected Battleships. As such, l t was not necessary for thern to

have heavy protection, sinee they would not, theoretl cal) y, COIlll'

under heavy gunfire. Along the way lt was forgotten that dlthough

their firepower ''las almost as powerful dS a Dreadnought, their

protection was not nearly as st~ong. Many Admira} S vlelNcd these

ships as Fast Battleships, and as the war would saon show, when

placed under the aegis of a brave AdmiraI, who did not recognize

their wealmesses, thesc ships could prove fatally vulnerable. Thus 1 came the cri t icisms against bui Iding ships that cost almost as mueh

ta build (and in sorne cas 's, W'3re more expenslve to build) ilS

Dreadnoughts, but could not absorb the same degree of punishment.

Few hlstorians have chosen to go beyond the prevlous

criticisms of the Battle Cruiser. The arguments am cerlainly

val id, but they don 1 t tell the who] e story. For example, John

Tetsuro Sumida has wri tten extensi v01y on the FIsher Revolution in

,-he Royal Navy during thlS period, and has looked at the Battie

Cruiser question from a less conventional point of view. He brlngs

in the question of economlCS and political 1actors wlth regards ta

the buildlng of the Battle Cruiser and the DREADNOUGHT. Among his t arguments, he has stated that It was the Battle Cruisers, and /3

not the Dreadnoughts, which were central ta Fisher's Shlpbuilding 1 policy. During the so-called "Dreadnought Revolution', the fast, llghtly armoured Battle Cruiser was much closer ta hlS vision of

the perfect warshlp than the slower, more heavlly armoured 3 Dreadnoughts, dS shall be shawn further along.

ResponSlbi Il ty for the conceptIon and the designs of these

ships rested with Flrst Sea Lord Sir John Fisher, who conceived of

bath the Dreadnought and the Battie CruIser. During his two tenures

as BntaIn's Flrst Sea Lord he strove hard to create the perfect

warshlp, one that had the greatest amount of fi repower and was al so

the fastest Sll1p afloat. In essence, they were the products of an

arms race, WhlCh perpetuated the need ta bUlld warshlps that were

supellor ta those of other navies. Thi s was a new concept, and , clearly the product of the age of steam and steel. Up until the mlddle of the 19th Century, the technological advances in

shi pbulldlng were sa small that they had very 1 i ttle effect O!l the

development of sea power. Once steel and steam ShipS were

lnt roduced, there evolved a race ta have a numerical advantage of

ShI ps that wen~ f aster, had more hi tting power, and could absorb more punl shment.

The buildIng of the Dreadnought and Battle CruIser was a large

advanc('! .ln the eVl Lution of the Battleshlp and Arrnoured Cruiser,

but Wl th regards ta the arms race, they were a1so the next Iogicai

step. Th] s was comparable in sorne ways to the deveIoprnent of the

Dest royer, winch started out as the Torpedo Boat. The threat of the , Torpedo Boat resul ted in the creation of Torpedo Boat Destroyers,

.------.------~~ /4 which evolved into the larger Destroyers. For the Battleships, It 1 was sirnply a matter of continually buildlng ships that were more

powerful and could wi thstand greater punlshment in the 1 i ne of

battle. When It was built, H.M.S DREP.DNOUGHT was Indeed the most

powerful Batt~eshIp on thp seas, but it was merely a contlnuat1on

of the earlier policy of the arms race.

The Battle Cruiser's evolution was only slightly dl.fferent.

Originally, Armoured CrUIsers were supposed to hunt down potentiùl

commerce raIders. They followed the same pattern of the other

vessels. This resulted in the creation of ShlpS that were almost as

large as Battleships, but which were faster but less heavlly

protected and armed. Wlth the creatIon of the BattIe CrUlser,

Fisher decided that the next step of the Armoured CrUIser was to

give them an armament that was only Sllghtly Inferior to the

DREADNOUGHT. This was a very large step for such a vessel, but tram

the perspective of an arms race, it was also the logical one. And

just as the Armoured Cruiser had crossed lnto the Battlestnp' s

domain wlth regards to size and armament, the next evolution of the

Battleshlp would be to make it as fast as a Cruiser, winch would

lead to the creation of Fast BattleshIps. Thus, the result of the

arms race would transform the Armoured CrUI sers into sh i ps ttld t

were as powerful as Battleships, and Battleships into ships as fast

as Cruisers. It is small wonder that these ships were 50

controversial.

There were man y argumen~s against the bUIldIng of the e• DREADNOUGHT. These included contemporary critics such as AdmiraIs /5 SIr CyprIan BrIdge and Sir Reginald Custance, AdmiraI of the Fleet

~ Sir Gerald Noel, and even Sir William White, a former Director of Naval Construction, and Alfred Thayer Mahan, the author cf THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY. Among their arguments was that it put aIl other nations on an equal footing with England with 4 regards to these vessels. The same could be said of the Battle CrUlser; It was designed ta be the ultimate Armoured Cruiser, and i ts creatIon also made England' s huge n.!mber of regular Armoured Cruisers obsolete. The maIn argument that has since been used agalnst Fisher's crItlcs, partIcularly by Marder, was that the all-big-gun

BattleshIp was already on the way. The United States had al~eady made plans for the two SOUTH CAROLINA-class Battleships, armed wi th eight 305mm (12-inch) guns, even before those of the DREADNOUGHT. ~ The Japanese had also started building the AKI and SATSUMA, and

although they had only four 305~~ and twelve 254mm (ID-inch) guns (ratlng them as Semi-Dreadnoughts), they were originally designed 5 for twelve 305mm guns. The only r8ason for the change in armament was because of Its cast, which Japan could not attord due to its war wlth Russia. Nevertheless, It did show that the all-big-gun BattleshIp was coming, and that even had the Brltish decided against building the DREADNOUGHT, its Pre-Dreadnoughts would still have become obsolete. The only difference was that Fisher decided to take the lead in this race rather than be forced to catch up. Untll the creatIon of the INVINCIBLES, MOSt nations armed thelr Armoured Cruisers with medium calibre weapons ranging from

~ /6 193mm (7.6-inch) to 254mm guns. There were two exceptions: the 1 Ital ian REGINA ELENA-class and the Japanese TSUKUBA-class Armoured § Cruisers, both of which had two and four 305mm guns respectively.

Ii: is uncertain whether or not Fisher bel ieved other nations wou] d

follow with other large-gunned Armoured Cruisers, but as in the

case of the DREADNOUGHT, he was determined to take the lead. He

wanted a ship that would not only be more powerful than

contemporary Armoured Cruisers, but which would guarantee thei r

destruction. The decision to give them a uniform armament of large

guns ralsed Many eyebrows, but the Iogic seemed to be that sinee

these ships would not engage more heavily armoured opponents (i.e.

Battleshlps) 1 the dangers of placing large guns on a lighter,

faster hull seemed negligible. This was the theary, but it was

another matter in practice.

Then there is the question of econamics: Was it worthwhil~ ta

build ships that were almost as powerfui as Battleships, and yet

could not fight in the line of battle? The essential role of the

Battle Cruiser was ~o hunt commerce raiders, aet as scouts for the

main fleet, and aiso to act as a fast division of the battle fleet.

While the Dreadnoughts had but one specifie dut y, the Battle

Cruisers were supposed to perform vërious tasks. It seemed ta make

sense to build one class of ship that could perform various duties

rather than building several different classes of ShlpS, and Fisher

would go even further when he tried to merge both the Battle

Cruiser and Dreadnought into one class of ship. But as will be e• shawn, again what worked in theory did not apply in practice . /7 The strongest argument in support of these ships came

following the Battle of the Falklands, when two British Battle • CrUIsers virtually annihilated two German Armoured Cruisers, while receiving only minor damages in return. This was seen as the

JustificatIon of their raIe as the ideal ships to hunt down

commerce raiders. It is true that they proved more than capable of

meetIng this threat, but it was unfortunate that the main danger to

Britain's commercIal shipping would come not from surface raiders,

but from the U-Boats. After the Falklands, the threat of German

surface raiders virtually ended, and was replaced by that of the

Submarine, which the Battle Cruiser could do little against.

As for the questIon of actIng as the scout for the main fleet,

again what was thought of ln theory did not work out in practice.

Bath sides used their Battle r.ruisers as a sort of bait te lure out

each other's forces, but the true scout would prove ta be the fast

and inexpensive Light Cruiser. Bath Hipper and Beatty used screens

of Light Cruisers, and it was these ships which made the initial

contacts at bath Dogger Bank and Jutland.

The concept of using Armoured Cruisers as a fast division of

the maIn fleet was also not new ta the British; the Japanese and

Russians both used their Armoured Cruisers in their main battle

lines during the Russo-Japanese War. As Jutland would show, bath

Beatty and Hood found it tao tempting not ta use their ships as

Fast Battleshlps, and the Battle Cruisers right in the thick of the

battle. They unwisely forgot that their armour protection was not

suitable against other large gun ships, and as a result both • /8 AdmiraIs paid an unfortunate priee .

The primary purpase of this paper lS not ta attempt a • technicai description of these ShlpS or to simply restate the conventlonai arguments against them. These wi Il of course be

addressed, but will alsa look at them fram a different perspective,

and try ta shed new light on the question of the Battle CruIser .

•

• /9

Chapter 1: THE ROAD TO INVINCIBLE • The Battie Cruisers were the resuit of the application of new technologIes to old ideas, but they also came into being at a time when Britaln's naval supremacy was in its twilight. Fisher's

reforms of the Roy~1 Navy made it more efficient and more powerful than any other existing fleet, but the days of Pax Britannica were clearly over. One could argue that the f1eet buil t during the Fisher Revolution was in a way the swan song of Eng1and's naval ! supremacy, but that lS an a=gument outside the scope of this ~tudy. The Battle Cruisers were designed ta be the 20th Century's version of the Frigates of the era of sail ing ships. They were intended to hunt down privateers and commerce raiders, and also to

be the eyes of the main fleet by acting as fast scouts. Along with the creation of the Dreadnought-class BattIeships, they were among • the most controversial of the major reforms brought about in the Royal Navy durlng Fisher's first tenure as First Sea Lord. However,

unlike the Dreadnoughts, which have be~n regarded as his greatest success, the BattIe Cruisers have been considered as his greatest fallure. Many historians, such as Parkes, Preston; and Smith agree that thelr armour protection proved somewhat inadequate when they 2 faced other capital ships (Dreadnoughts and Battl~ Cruisers).-As a result, the Battle Cruiser has been much maligned as a useless and expensive type of ship.

The fleet that Fisher created was built on the premise that the main raIe of the Navy was to seek out a large-scale battle • against an enemy battle fleet. If the British had the advantage in /10 both quality and quantity of large warships, victory would

certainly be guaranteed. Naval strategy at thlS time seemed ta • depend on materiai superiority above aIl eIse, WhlCh meant that ln order to ensure vlctory, England had to have the tead ln the naval :3 arms race, and this led to the Dreadnoughts and Battie Cruisers.

Just as the Dreadnoughts represented the new Shlps-ot-the-

Line, the Battle Cruisers were ln the same manner to act as the n~w

Frigates. However, there was a fundamental dlfference between the

two types of vesseis WhlCh Fisher created. The concept of the Ship-

of-the-Line was for a ship that would be used primarily ln major

fleet engagements against other Ships-of-the-Llne. They were to be

armed with the most powerful guns avallable and be given sufflClE'nt

protection that would enable them ta withstand considerable

punishrllent. The one drawback of hea.vy armament and protection was • that these ships would be relatjvely slow. In Nelson's tlme, for battles such as the Nile, Cape St. Vincent, and Trafalgar, large

Ships-of-the-Line were the main warships used for combat, but these

large engagements were only one facet of the dutles that the Navy

had to perform. Whi le they were perfectly sui ted for combat o.gainst

other Ships-of-the-Llne, they were completely Inadequate against

smaller and much faster commerce raiders. Jt 1s oiten forgotten

that after Trafalgar France focused her naval war agalnst England' s

maritime trade by building fast prlvateers instead of trying ta

rebui Id her shattered battie f leet. Against these vessaIs, the

Ships-of-the-Line were totally unsui table. The commerce ra iders

were ships which relied primarily on speed ta bath get close to • /11

their prey and to get away from larger and more powerful pursuers .

There were several smaller classes of ships to do this task, such • as SloopG, Corvettes, and Brigs, but the largest of the non-line- of-battle Sh1pS were the Frigates.

While Ships-of-the-Line emphasized firepower, Frigates tended

to emphasize speed. It lS true that the Sloops and Brigs were

taster than Frigates, but these ships usually carry fewer

provIsions, and their range tended to be limited. Most Frigates

were capable of operat1ng on the high seas for longer periods,

which made them more useful as fast predators and scouts.

The firepower of the wooden Battleshlps was often three times

that of the standard Frigate, which meant that along with their

weak protection, they were totally ill-suited for fleet

engagements. Ships rated as Frigates ranged from having twenty-four

to forty-fcj'lr guns, and sorne of the heavier Frigates were almost • 1. equal to the smaller Ships-of-the-Line. It was these larger French

and Americdn Frlgates which tended to cause the most trouble for

the British, who in turn had to build more of these vessels. In

sorne ways, the need to match these ships resulted in an arms race

that was not disslmilar to the one at the beginning of the next

century. Since other nations had these ships, Britain had ta have

tts own as weIl.

It was this combination of speed and endurance that made the

Frigates invaluable as scouts for the main fleet, which allowed

them to dart around and reconnaitre for the battle fleet, and to be

used as commerce raiders . • e /12 The introduction of steam and iron-pld~ed ships signalled the • end of thf~ era of sai 1 ing warships. The technological advancements of the lélst half of the 19th Century brought the navies of the world aIl the way from Nelso:n's day to the eve of the DREADNOUGHT.

For the Battleships, the nE~W steel Ship-of-the-Line, i t was reiatively easy to adapt the concept of the Ship-of-the-Line to the new technologies available; aIl that was needed far them was to have a heavy armament and sufficient protection that would a110w

them to lie in the 1ine of battie. However, th.~ Cruisers, which acted as the new steel Friçrates, were another matter. The development of theEe ships would lead to the creation of veEsels that, even before the first Battie Cruiser was constructed, would e rival Battleships in size. The bi l'th of the modern Armoured Cruiser for the Bri ti ~h Navy 2 • c,ame with the construction of H.M.S. SHANNON in the 1870's. The AdmiraIt y decided that aIl ru~w vertically armoured ships wauld be rated as Battleships, Armoured Cruisers, and Coast-Defence Ships. The differences between the Battleships and Cruisurs at this time

were suppast~:d to be the sarne as those of the earli.:!r Ships-of-the- Line and Frigates, in which the former had the greater firepower and protection while the latter had the greater speed. This was supposed ta be true for the steel ships, but from the beginnlng it did not work out this way. The 'best way t.o show this Is ta compare the SHANNON with a contemporary Battleship of the period, H.M.S. §. TEMERAIRE. The TEMERAIRE' s dis.placement was 8540 tons, whi ch waa e• 50% more than the SHANNON (5670 tons), which did fi.t the theory /13 e that the Battleship should be 1arger than the Cruiser. The • TEMERAIRE's main armament consisted of four 280mm (lI-inch) and four 254mm guns as opposed to the SHANNON's two 254mm and seven 230rnm C9-inch) guns, which again fits the theory that the

Battleship should have a h~avier main armament than an Armoured Cruiser. And finally, the TEMERAIRE had superior protection over the SHANNON, which enabled the former to wi thstand much more punishment than the latter, thus enabling her to remain in the line of battle. But the SHANNON was found lacking in the one area where she was supposed to have the advantage: speed. Her machinery enabled her to reach a design speed of 12.25 knots, whi1e the TEMERAIRE' s allowed her to do 14.65 knots. Both vessels were e launched in 1873, and were completed wi thin a few days of each other in 1877. The cost of the SHANNON came to L302, 707, whi le the • TEMERAIRE's was L489,822, which made her 60% more expensive than the Cruiser. However, the TEMERAIRE proved itse1f superior over the SHANNON in every category, wllich meant that al though she was cheaper to build, she was inadequate to both remain in the line of batt1e and to chase fast commerce raiders, which made her usefulness quite limited. Thus, England's first attempt at the Armoured Cruiser was c1early not a major success. From the SHANNON came two offsprings, H.M.S. NORTHAMPTON and H.M.S. NELSON, which were laid down in 1874 and comp1eted in 1878 1 and 1881 respectively, at a cost of about L410,OOO. These were in every way superior to the SHANNON; they were 1arger, had a more e• powerful main armament, more protection, and th.-:·ir machinery gave /14 e them a deFlgn speed of 14 knots. However, the same criticisms which applled ta the SHANNON also applied to them: they were too weak to • be part of the line of battle and too slow to chase down fast. unarmored commerce raIders, which again made them qUI te llspless for

the prlce that was paid to bUlld them.

The next class of Armoured CruIsers to be built ln England

were H.M.S. IMPERIEUSE and H.M.S. WARSPITE, which were large enougll § to be considered as light Battieships. Their dlsplacements were

over 8500 tons, they carried an armament of four 234mm (9.2-ineh)

guns, the first British warships to mount these weapons, and ten

152mm (6-lnch) breech-loading guns, a maIn belt of 254mm, and were

capable of making 16.1 knots, which was d marked improvement over

the previous ShlpS. They were also tL last British warshlps to be

e deslgneà with square rig, as sorne in the Admilalty still belteved • that the use of sails was an efficient way of saving coaI, thuB extending thelr range. The IMPERIEUSE was completed in 1886 (the

WARSPITE was fini shed two years later) at a cost of around

L540,000, which was only LI 00,000 less than the ADMI RAL-cl aSb

Battleships bUllt in the 1880's.

These Cruisers were not very weIl recei ved; One Adml rd 1

referred to them as,

"Amongst the most complete failures of modern ships; tJadly deslgned; badly carried out, and absolutely dangerous." ~

It is true that once again the speed difference between theso

ShlpS and co.temporary Battleships was either non-exIstent or in

the Bdttleship's favour. As a result, they were rerated as •e /15 - Protected Cruisers and sent to Britain's foreign stations, where • their shortcomings would cause no embarrassment. The seven ORLANDO-class Cruisers were the last set of Armoured 10 CrUlseLS England was to build before the end of the century. They

were also the last set of Cruisers laid down during Slr Nathaniel

Barnaby's tenure as D.N.C. (Director of Naval Construction). what

was MOSt remarkable about these ships was that they were much

smaller instead of larger than the previous class. They had a

displacement of 5COO tons, but their armament was the same as the IMPERIEUSE, with the exception of having two fewer 234mm guns, and

they were designed to do 17 knots, wh;ch was a minute increase in

speed. Rated as Bel ted Cruisers, their armour scheme was much

lighter thaù the IMPERIEUSE and WARSPITE, and they were, like the - earlier ShlpS, also regarded as failures. • AlI that Britain achieved in building these early Armoured Cruisers WùS to create ships that were smal1er, slower, and 1ess

powerfui than the Battleships of that era. While they were more

PQwerful than the unarm0red raiders they were designed to hunt,

they were not fast enough to catch them. The real problem lay with

this lack of speed. While there were marked improvements in gunnery

and protection, the progress in engine machinery had not evolved as

quick1y, and until such improvements were made, Cruisers simply

could not perform their primary 'Frigate' tasks.

The 1890 ' s was a decade in which Cruisers were rated in

categories of first, second, or thlrd-class Cruisers, depending on •e their size. Since none of these ships had any vertical armour to /16

speaJ~ of, they cannot be regarded as Armoured Cruisers. Sti Il, sorne

of the CrUIsers bUIlt were large even by B:lttleshlp standards;

• H.M.S. TERRIBLE and H.M.S. ~OWERFUL, laid down ln 1894, had displacements of 14345 tons, making them only Sllghtly smaller thëUl Il the MAJESTIC-class Batt1eships. The BattleshIps agaln had the

advantages of more protectIon and greater firepower, but the specd

difference was finally and very notlceably ln the Crulser's favour:

while the MAJESTICS' rnachlnery al10wed them to do about 17 knots,

the two Cruisers' could do 22 knots. This gave the CrUIsers the

necessary speed they needed ln order to be able to scout for the

fleet and be able to retreat from mOTe powerfu] Battleships, which

could no longer catch up to thern.

The rebirth of the true Armoured CrUIser in England came about

near the end of the century, following a breakthrough ln the rneans • of givlng ships gredter protection from shellflre without drastically increasing thei r weight. The breakthrough was the

introduction of Krupp steel in 1894, which increased the hardness 11 of steel plates to a significant degrep-. Within a short perlod of

time, aIl of the major naval powers began ta adopt the use of Krupp

steel for building warships. Because of thlS, it was now posslble

ta build CrUlsers that could be given adequate armour protection,

and as a result, Britain ended its Armoured CrUIser holiday ln 1897

with the construction of the six CRESSY-class CrUIsers, which WJl]

be described below.

Al though the B~i tish AdmIraI ty did have sorne concern about the

passage of the German Navy Laws in 1898, which led to the creation • /17

of the Hlgh Seas Fleet, the main naval threats at the turn of the

century were still France and Russia. It would not be until the eve • of the bUIlding of the DREADNOUGHT that Germany would be regarded as Brltaln's main naval rival. The possibllity of conflict with

both France and Russia was of great concern, particularly in the

realm of commerce ralding. Germany had on] y a few Cruisers" and

Ilmlted access to the open seas, while the other two nations, which

together had an ample number of potential commerce raiders and

coallng statIons around the globe, could strike at British

commercial shipping almost anywhere. The French Admiral ty had

returned to the theories of AdmiraI Aube and his . Jeune Ecole'

towards t~e end of the 1890's, which called for an emphasis on the

guerre de course' by building fast Cruisers and Torpedo-Boats that

could strike at Brltain's mercantile fleet and therefore pose a 13 • serious threat to her life-line. Whlle England built Cruisers with very little proteetion at

thlS time, France and Russia managed to gain a head start in the

arms race WI th regards to the construction of fast Armoured

Cru·sers. The French managed to build the DUPUY DE LeME, BRUIX, and

JEANNE D'ARC-classes, which would have given the existing British 14 first-class Cruisers considerable difficultie~ The French Rear-

AdmiraI Fournier felt that instead of building ships with big guns

and thlck armour, they should instead build ships which had quick- 1.2 firing guns, high speed, and great coal endurance. The French

readopted Adml raI Aube' s views, and by 1898 France had no less than • elght Armoured Cruisers under construction .

----___,~~N. _____ s ______.=~_~:NEL~ ...... ~4aWUa.P~~!w .. 1i4...... ~ •• a ... I.IlMM~ ... ~ .... ~ .. ~ e /18 The AdmiraIt y did not waste time in trying to find a solution • to this threat. Much as the threat of the Torpedo-Boat created the Torpedo-Boat Destroyer, the solution to the Armoured Cruiser threat

was to bUlld the anti-Crulser Cruiser, that is to bUlld ShlpS thdt

were faster, had bet-'.:er protection and more firepower than thp

Cruisers of the rival natIons; in short, it continued to follow the

dictums ot ele arms race by tryIng to bui Id an even bet te r wa l'sh i p.

The building of the SIX ships of the CHESSY-class, laid down

in 1898 and 1899, was an important development of the Armoured

Cruiser. Marder wrote that these ships marked the genesls of the

concept of the line-of-battle Cruiser, which would allow these

ships to participate ln fleet actions as weIl as performing their li e 'Frigate' dutles. They were practically identlcal to the DIADEM- class Cruisers, but the important difference was that these had an • armour belt, which allowed them to be regarded as true Armoured Cruisers.

The CRESSYS' dimenslons were 144.3m in length, with a beam of

22.8m, and a maximum draught of 9.2m, along with a displacement of 11 12000 tons. Their armament conslsted of two 234mm and twel ve 152mm

guns. As for protection, they had a main belt of 152mm, and their

machinery enabled them to do 21 knots, which was as fast as the

rival Armoured Cruisers. Their dutles were the same as prevlous

Cruisers, but It was believed that they could be used in fleet 18 actions, WhlCh is what AdmiraI Fournier advocated. Sir WIllIam

Whlte, the D.N.C during thlS period, wrote this in hlS report on •- the CRESSY: /19 "There seems absolutely no reason, under modern conditions, - why first-class Cruisers should hold aloof i! designed and constructed sUItably. This has become true largely through • improvements in armour and armarnents in the last few years. If CruIsers are to be built capable of fighting with Battleships in fleet actions, they must be glven such protection to buoyancy, stability, guns, aud crews, as will enable them to come te close quarters with the enemy without running undue risks. Until the 1 atest improvements in armour were made, the thicknesses an~ weights necessary to secure adequate protection, over a sufficient area and height of broadside, were such as to involve very large dimensions and COF.t., when associated wi th the high speeds and large coal supplies necessary in Cruisers. Consequently, it may be said, wi th confidence, that no existing Cruisers have the necessary protection to justify their undertaking close action with Battleships, except it to be the Italian Armoured Cruisers (CARLO ALBERTO and GARIBALDI are representatives of this type) and a few vessels slmilarly protected and of later date. "ll

The CRESSYS were followed in 1899 by the construction of the

four DRAKE-class Cruisers (14000 tons) and the nine COUNTY-class 20 Cruisers (9800 tons), laid down in 1900 and 1901. The French and - Russian Navies countered this by building another eight Armoured • Cruisers in this periode The Bri tish had no cholce but to lay down more Cruisers, and they followed this with the SIX ships of the .il DEVONSHIRE-class (10850 tons, laid down in 1902). Following this

came the two ships of the DUKE OF EDINBURGH-class (13500 tons, laid

down in 1903), the four WARRIORS (13550 tons, laid down in 1904),

and finally, the three MINOTAUR-class Cruisers (14600 tons, laid

down in 1905), which were the last Armoured Cruisers to be 22 constructed before the INVINCIBLES were laid down. In a space of

seven years, no less than thirty-four Armoured Cruisers were laid

down in British shipyards, which did give them the numerical e superiority over both France and Russia, who were regarded at thlS • time as the paramount naval threat to England . /20

Despi te Sir Wi lliam Whl te 1 s views, the di fferences between the • Armoured Cruisers and the Battleships became increaslngly blurred, and the construction of the INVINCIBLES merely added to the

confusion. These ships had nearly the same firepower, displacement,

and cost almost as much ta bui Id as Battleships, al though they were

not specifi.cally bUll t to 1 ie ln the llne of battle alongside other

Battleships.

The line between the Pre-Dreadnought Battleships and Armoured

Cruisers was almast identical to that of the Dreadnoughts and

Battle Cruisers. One could also compare the DUKE OF EDINBURGH-class

Cruisers with the KING EDWARD VlI-class Battleships, both of WhiCh

were laid down around the same tIme, for proo1 of the amblguity

between the two types of vessels: the displacement of the Cruisers

was 13550 tons, while the Battleship' s was 16350 tons, WhlCh • although this was not as small as the displacement difference between the DREADNOUGHT and the INVINCIBLE (17900 tons ta the

B.C. 's 17250 tons), it definitely put the CrUIsers in the

Battleship-weight class. In terms of speed, the DUKES had a deSIgn

speed of 23 knots, which was 4.5 knats more than the KING EDWARDS,

whi le the INVINCT D~.2' s 25 knots gave her an advantage of four knots 23 adVdnatge over tile DREADNOUGHT. In this respect, the Battle Cruiser

was nct breaking any new ground, and was ln fact following a

similar pattern ta the earlier ShlpS.

It is anly ln terms of armament that one can claim a major

difference between the earlier and later ships: the KING EDWARDS • had an armament of four 305mm, four 234mm, and ten 152rnm guns, /21 while the DURES had six 234nun and ten 152mm guns, which was a • considerable difference; the only difference between the DREADNOUGHT and the INVINCIBLE was that the latter had two fewer

305nun guns. But i t was another matter in the cost of building these

ships: the average price for the KING EDWARDS came ta Ll,350,OOO,

while that of the DUKES came to LI, 200,000, which was a di fference

of only LISO,OOO; the DREADNOUGHT's cost came ta L1,783,883,

while the average cast of the three INVINCIBLES came to about

LI,650,OOO, which was practically the sarne price difference as 24 between the eariler ships. It can therefore be claimed that the

development from ~rmoured Cruiser to Battle Cruiser was practically

the same as the one from Pre-Dreadnought to Dreadnought-Battleship,

and that the only major difference for the Cruisers was in having

replaced the medium-cal ibre guns wi th a unlform armament of • Battleship-slze guns. Sir John FIsher became First Sea Lord on Oct. 20th, 1904, one

day before the 99th Anniversary of Trafalgar, and f~r the first

time Since Nelson' s victory Brl taIn' s naval hegemony was being

seriously challenged. When he came to power, France and Russia were

still regarded as the Britain's prlmary naval threat, but he was in

offIce for less than one year when the whole naval situation

changed. France and England signed the Entente COLdiale in April,

1904, WhlCh 1 "lid the foundation for a more friendly atti tude

between the two nations, and the war against Japan had effecti vely

elirninated the Russian Navy as a threat to Britain. As a resu1t, • Gerrnany would soon be recognised as the paramount threat to /22 - England's naval supremacy. • Fisher 1 S early views of the Armoured Cruiser are somewhat confusing. While in the Mediterranean he wrote:

"It is a cardinal mistake to assume that Battieships and Armoured Cruisers have not each of them a distinct message. "25

However, he thp.n went on ta write:

" •.. The Armoured CruIser of the fi rst-class is a swi ft Battleship in disguise. It has been asked that the difference between a Battleship and an Armoured Cruiser may be def ined. It might as weIl be asked ta define when a ki tten becomes a cat." 26

This shows that even Fisher was not entirely clear as to the

purpose of these vessels, and his papers aften show Many

contradictlons.

Fisher wrote another report while in the Medi terranean

entitled "Notes on the Imperative Necessity of possesslng Powerful - Fast Armoured Cruisers and their Qualifications", ln WhlCh he • proposed that these warships had ta be faster than aIl other Cruisers, have a main battery of 254mm guns fore and aft and a

secondary battery of 190mm (7.S-inch) guns, and enough protectIon

ta withstand the impact of 203mm (8-inch) Melinite shells. He

strongly recommended the use of turbine propulsion ln the ships and 27 the use of oil fuel, both of which were radical ideas at that time.

Later, in another paper enti tled "The Design for a 25-knot Armoured

Cruiser'l, he dispensed wi th the 254mm guns and replaced the main

armament WI th four 234mm guns, along wi. th a secondary battery of

twelve 190mm guns. They were to have a displacement of 15000 tons 28 (14000 tons if they used oil fuel). ThIS idea was very close to •- what eventually became the MINOTAUR-class Cruisers, WhlCh had only e /23 two fewer 190mm guns. However, by the time this class was laid • down, Fisher had already decided on another plan for the Armoured Cruiser. Speed and long-range firepower were the two driving forces in Fisher's vision ai the ideal warship. When he was Captain of H.M.S. INFLEXIBLE, the most powerful warship in the British Fleet st the time, he wrote ta the C-in-C of the fleet, AdmiraI Seymour, stating that his Shlp was markedly inferior to the Italian Battleship DANDOLO: " 1 t i s di f fi cul t to exaggerate the importance of thi s excess of speed possessed by the DANDOLO. As the Yankees say, it would enabIe her to do "just what she darn pleases'. She would have more than the advantages gi ven in the olden time by possessing the weather gal'ge, and her guns being of far greater power than ours, e she could remain out of our range and deliberately shell us ... "29 However, as Sumida points out, one of the main f laws in • Fisher's argument was in equating a larger gun calibre with a 30 superiority in long-range hitting. Nevertheless, Fisher continued to beIieve that British warships had to be faster than their opponents in order ta force the fleeing enemy to fight. There is little doubt that Fisher preferred the Armoured Cruiser over the Battleship. In August, 1904, Mackay notes that he 31 began to have sorne doubts about building more Battleships. Fisher suggested that fast Torpedo Crafts outdated the "Battlefleet' principle, and that Battleships had no function that could not be perfol'med by a fi l'st class Armoured Cruiser. Upon becoming Fi rst e Sea Lord, he toyed wi th the idea of suggesting that Bri tain suspend • its construction of new Battleships, which would be replaced by e /24 fast Armoured Cruisers. To compensate for their thin armour, they • would fight the enemy head on, which would mean that shells would hit the ship at an oblique angle, thus re~ulting in deflection 33 instead of penetration. Fisher then went on to write that while it would be unwise to stop building Battleships while other nations were also building them, he believed that the new Battleships would 34 have to be as fast as Armoured Cruisers. One can see at this point the beginnings of Fisher's plans for what would be the concept of the Fast Battleship. However, Selbourne rejected the proposaI. As will be shown later, Fisher would again try to push this idea to the Committee on Designs, but 35 the only support he wouid receive was from Lord Kelvin. e The men that Fisher chose to form the Committee on Designs in the development of new warships were revealed in a letter he wrote • to Lord Selbourne, the First Lord of the AdmiraIt y, prior to his becoming First Sea Lord. This Commi ttee on Designs, which was formally created on Dec. 22nd, 1904, included Capt. Henry Jackson (Controller), Capt. John Jellicoe (Director of Naval Ordinance), Capt. Reginaid Bacon (Naval Assistant to the First Sea Lord), Capt. Charles Madden (Naval AssIstant to the Control 1er), Commander Wilfred Henderson, W.H. Gard (Chief Constructor of Portsmouth Dockyard), and Alexander Gracie, whom Fisher regarded as the best Marine Engineer in the world. It also included Rear-Admiral Prince

Louis of Battenberg (Di rector of Naval Intell igence) 1 Engineer e Rear-Admiral Sir John Durston (Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet), • Rear-Admiral A.L. Winslow (C.O. Torpedo and Submarine Flotillas), e /25 Philip Watts (D.N.C.), Prof. J.H. Biles, Sir John Thornycroft, R.E • • Froude, and Lord Kelvin. Fisher made himself Chairman of the Committee, and had Henderson as the Secretary, along with E.H. 36 Mitchell as the Assistant Secretary. The first meeting of the Committee took place at the AdmiraIt y on Jan. 3rd, 1905. The Committee proposed the following: 1) Battleships of 15900 tons, capable of making 21 knots. 2) Armoured CrUlsers of 15900 tons, 25.5 knots. 3) Two types of Destroyers: a) Ocean-going, with a displacement of 600 tons, 33 knots; b) Coastal service, 250 tons, 26 knots. 37 4) Submarines of 350 tons, 14 knots (on the surface). ThlS left a huge gap between the Armoured Cruiser and the - Destroyer, which should have been filled by the Light Cruiser. • However, Fisher saw very llttle use fOI these ships in modern 38 warfare. This was clearly short-slghted of him; not only were th~y useful as scouts, but they also cost considerably less to build (L350,OOO was the average prlce for a SOUTHAMPTON-class Light Cruiser, which was armed with eight 152mm guns and capable of 39 doing 2~ knots). As a resul t of Fisher' s opposi tion to this class of ships, England would have far fewer Light Cruisers than i t needed in 1914. The Battleship design which probably gave the inspiration for the DREADNOUGHT came from an article in a 1903 issue of "JANE' S FIGHTING SHIPS" written by Vittorio Cuniberti, entitled "An Ideal 40 •- Battleship for the British Navy'. Cuniberti suggested blueprints /26 - for a 17000-ton Battleship armed with twelve 30Smm guns, twelve • l i.ght 12-pounders, wi th a 305mm main bel t and capable of doing 24 kTJots. The reason for gi ving the ship su eh heavy armour was

presumably beeause he felt that future Battleship actions would

take pl ace ai: point-blank range, sinee most heavy naval guns at

this time could not flre accurately over 1500 yards. However, the

threat of the torpedo and new advanees in naval gunnery made i t

desirable to increase the battle range for such engagements. This

would lead ta a whole controversy about a sui table fi re cont roI

system for British warships later on.

What is less widely known i5 that Cuniberti again probably

gave Fi.sher the inspi ration for the Battle Cruiser. He had eari ier

designed the four Armoured Cruisers of the REGINA ELENA-class, il - which were laid down between 1901 and 1903. They had a displacement • of about 12861 tons and had a design speed of 21 knots, WhlCh was standard for Armoured Crui sers at the time. However, thei r armament

was not; they were armed with two 305mm, twelve 203mm, and twenty-

four 76rnm guns. These were in fact the first Cruisers deslgned ta

carry Battleship-size guns, and as Fisher was C-in-C of the

Medi terranean Fleet at this time, i t is most probable that these

ships made qui te an iInpresslon on him. AIso, towards the end of

1904, the Admi raI ty learned that Japan was bui Iding i ts own pal r of

large-gunned Armoured Cruisers, the IKOMA and the TSUKUBA. They had

a displacement of 13750 tons and an armament of four 305mm, twel ve

152mm and twelve 120rnm (4. 7-inch) guns, WhlCh easily placed them in 42 •- the same league as the contemporary Pre-Dreadnought Battleships . /27 Their main belt was only 178mm (7-inches) thick, but they could do • 21 knots, which was again on a par wi th the average Armoured Cruiser at the time. The introduction of these ships effectively outclassed aIl Armoured Cruisers in the Royal Navy. These ships could in fact be called the first Battle Cruisers. the symbiosis between the Battleship and the Armoured Cruiser. The AdmiraI ty decided that the only possible action was to create Armoured Cruisers that would also carry a heavy armament. Fisher was therefore not the first one who - rai sed the stakes'

of the Armoured Crulser race, but he was determined not to lag behind. The argument that appl ied to the DREADNOUGHT would thus aiso be applled to the new Armoured Cruiser. Sincp. lt looked llke other nations were planning to bui Id thei r own ali-big-gun

Battleships l the American SOUTH CAROLINAS and Japanese SATSUMA). • England had to ensure that i t constructed i ts version before everyone else, and also be able to maintaln a numerical superiori ty in these ships, and this wou1d also prove to be a major factor for the a11-big-gun Armoured Cruiser.

The question of armament for the new Battleship and Armoured

Cruiser was one of the maln problems facing the Committee. It was

one thil'g ta have a powerful gun, but i t was also necessary for i t to fire accurately. In 1898, Capt. Percy Scott came up with a system of "continous aim" gun-Iaying that enabled gunners to lay

their guns wi th precision, which he hoped wou1d increase the

proportion of hits to shots fired by medium-ca~ibre guns at ranges • of 1500 yards or 1ess. In 1899 and 1900. gunnery officers in the /28 e Medi terranean Fleet carried out firing experiments at ranges of • 5000 to 6000 yards, and found that the effect of naval fire could be accurately estimated when several guns were fired together in a

salvo. A salvo that resulted in splashes that were both short and

long, and right and left of the target suggested that there were

projectlles in between these extremes that were probably scoring 43 hits, and that the gun sights were correctly set. Later, Scott

would propose the system known as directoT firing, which laid and

controlled the entire main armament from one point high up on the

ship. Although an efficient system, not aIl British Battleships and

Battle Cruisers were fitted with 'directors' at the beginning of

the war. e Further tests had shawn that the splashes from the 234mm shells were practically the same as the 305mm shells, which meant • that there were greatec difficulties in fire control for ships with mixed armament. The conclusions reached were:

1) Increasing the battle range because of the threat of the 10ng-

range torpedo attack.

2) Long range hitting now being practicable, it might very weIl

determine the result of an action.

3) Salvo-firing was the only known method of control at long

ranges.

4) This necessi tated a uni form heavy armament of eight or more

guns.

5) The heaviest guns made for the most accurate firing with 44 •e decisive results. /29 e Fisher pondered whether ta use 254mm guns instead of 305mrn • guns for his new Battleship, as a ship conld carry a greater number of these guns than they could of 305mm guns. Also, they could fire much faster and therefore achieve more hits than the larger gun, but Jackson, Madden, and Bacon were aIl in favour of the use 45 of 305mm guns. Another of the key factors in the decision to use the 305 guns came from the experlences learned from the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-05. Capt. William Packenham, the British Naval Liaison to the Japanese fleet, was aboard Togo's flagship, the MlKASA, during the major fleet encounters between the Russian and Japanese fleets. On the engagement which occurred on Aug. 10th, 1904, he noted: "The 10-inch (254mm) guns of the PERESVIET and POBIEDA were of e 45-calibers, and may have also been of greater range than the 12- inch/40-c.alibre (305mm) guns carried by the (other) Russian Battleships, but the fire effect of every gun is sa much less than • that of the next larger size, that when 12-inch guns are firing, shots from 10-inch guns pass unnoticed, while, for aIl the respect they instill, 8-inch (203mm) or 6-inch (152mm) guns might just as weIl be peashooter&, and the 12-pr. simply does not count."46 Packenham later stated ln another report to the AdmiraIt y that: "The only absolutely "knock-out-blow' in the Aug. 10th action was delivered by a 12-inch gun firing on the Battleship TSAREVI TeH. "47 He summed up his reports with a despatch that was received at the AdmiraIt y on Feb. 28th, 1905: "Medium arti llery has had i ts day, and the natural process of evolution demands it should now give place to primary artillery. "48 e To FIsher, the conclusion that was reached was that there were • three essentials for doing the maximum amount of damage to enemy /30 e target$ at long range: • 1) Hitting, which is assisted by: a) Low trajectory (high muzzle velocity- therefore high calibre guns). b) Accurate spotting of fire. 2) Damage done by each hit, which depends on: a) Remaining energy at the range of action. b) Bursting charge. 3) Rapidity of fire: a) Rapidity of loading. b) Number of guns carried c) Capability of the maximum number of guns being able ta bear 49 e on the enemy at any one time wi thout interference Wl th one another. Points la, 2a, and 2b showed the advantages of the heavier • gun, while points 3a and 3b showed the advantages of the use of a l ighter gun. In the end, the Commi ttee decided that the heavier gun was more suitable for the new Battleship, and that its armament 50 would be uniform. The Armoured Cruiser was another matter. There was no question

about the advantages of a uniform armament, but there ~as a question with respect ta the actual size of the gun. The standard gun calibre for British Cruisers at this time was the 234mm gun, which was an excellent weapon. Fisher had written earlier about the armament of the Armoured Cruiser, clalming that:

"In deal ing wi th Armoured Cruisers speed 18 the one great essential, a rel iable highest speed is their one great attribute to e attain, ta thlS everything else must be subordinate; having • attained it a certain weight 1s 1eft for guns and armour. Arrnour /31 e protectlon is fixed to enable them to arrive within sighting distance of a fleet, the remaining weight can be devoted to guns. How should this weight be uti l ised'? Should a certain number of 12- • inch (305rnm) guns or a larger number of IO-inch (254mm) or of 9.2- inch (234rnm) guns be carried'?" "Naturally the question resolves itself into one of what class of vessel she wi Il norrnally be expected to fight against. The answer is, of course, a simllar class to herself. In this case 9.2- inch guns are of sufficient size, the advantage of the lO-inch over the 9. 2-inch is not great enough to warrant the extra weight. rfhe 12-inch is unnecessarily large. "g l t was not long before Fi sher changed his rnind about putting 12-lnch guns on these ships. The logic behind the use of large-

calibre guns on Battleships seemed to apply equally to the Armoured Cruiser. Wi th the building of the four REGINA ELENAS by Italy and the two TSUKUBAS by Japan, i t seemed to the Commi ttee that the future of the Armoured Cruiser was indeed to give it large guns. e The role of this ship had certainly evolved in a short space of time, and Parkes describes that its duties were now to include: • 1) Reconnaissance in force. 2) Support for smaller scouting Cruisers 3) Hunting down enemy marauding Cruisers

4) Pursulng a retreating enemy Battle Fleet and possibly bringing it to bay by concentrating on stragglers.

5) The abi l i ty to rapidly concentrate and/or attempt enveloping 52 movements during a fleet action.

To perform such tasks would seem to require a type of ship

that was somewhat more powerful than even a MINOTAUR-class Cruiser.

To give the new Cruisers 234mm guns was therefore not acceptable;

l ike the new Battleship, they would aise have a uni form armament of •e 305mm guns . /32

It 1s important to note that Fisher at first dld not claim • that the new Cruisers would 1 ie in the maIn llne of battl e clIH.1 fight alongslde and against other Battleshlps. Howevcr, while the

Bri tlsh were makIng plans for their new Armoured CIlll ser, the

concept of puttlng Armoured CrUIsers ln the I1n8 ot battle was put

to the test at the Battle of TsushIma. In thlS engagement, AdmIraI

Togo included two Armoured CrUlse~s ln his maIn batt Il" Ilne, and

had another squadron of these ships act as a type ot fast dlVISlon.

The 1dea of uSlng the Battle CrUIsers ta act as a tast dlvlslon of

the Battie Fleet was already considered by the BrItish dS a role

for them, but not their InclusIon ln the Ilne of battle Itself.

Togo' s lncluslon of these ShlpS was probably the r esul t ot hl S ne(-~d

to strengthen his battle 11ne, due to the 10ss of two Rattleshlps

which were sunk earlier ln the war. Nevertheless, It must also be • noted that he would not have put them ln unless he fell that they were strong enough ta flght alongslde the Battlestllps. Tl11s WélS a

temptation that would be repeated wlth the Battle CrUIsers.

Flsher's ideas concerning the Battle Cnllser as a Fast

Battleship were confirmed ln the first addendum to the Committee's

first progress report, in WhlCh he stated:

"The Armoured Cruisers are not comparable wi th anythlng existing; theyare, in reallty, Fast Bdttleshlps."5J.

While these ShlpS definitely had an armament that was on the

scale of a Battleship, as well as an advantage ln speed, they

clearly did not have the protectIon of a Battleshlp. It would seern • that Fisher was ahead of himself in pronouncing these ships as the /33

final evolution of the Armoured Cruiser into the Fast Battleship. • But one thing that would be shown as time went on was that Fisher would begln to consider heavy armour as being more harmful than

helpful to these ShlpS. He would later build ships which were very

fast and had a very powerful armament, but which would have

practically no protection.

The fi rst designs for the new Armoured Crul.ser, which was

named H.M.S UNAPPROACHABLE, WhlCh were labelled as designs "A", 54 "B", and "CH. They were drawn by the constructor, J.H. Narbeth.

Armoured Cruiser "A" had a general length of 177m, a beam of 25.2m,

and a mean draught ot 8.7m, with a total displacement of 17000

tons. In order to reach the aIl-important design speed of 25 knots,

it was necessary to sacrifice armour weight for machinery, but it

was already expected that these ships would retain the armour • scheme of previous Armoured Cruisers such as the MINOTAURS. This model was designed ta carry the standard reciprocating engines that

were common throughout the Navy at this time. The key to this

design was in the arrangement of the main armament, which had the

two rear turrets placed one on top of the other, whereas the two in

the front were placed directly alongside each other. This would

allow the ship to fire four guns directly forward and aft, and be

able to fire a broadside of SIX guns. It was reasoned at this time

that firing directly forward and aft was as important as being able

ta fire a large broadside, and this was especially true for these

ShlPS; they were more llkely ta be chasing after weaker Cruisers or • running away from a larger Battleship, which did not make the value /34 - of the broadsi de to these ships as important as i t was for the • Battleship, although it was ironie that they would wind up havlng a broadside that "las for a whi le more powerful than any other Battleship on the globe, except the DREADNOUGHT.

Design "B" had the same displacement and dimensions, but had both front and rear turrets placed alongside each other, which meant that the ship could fire a broadside of only four guns. Design "c" was a smaller version than the other two, wi th a displacement of 15600 tons, a length of 170.Sm, beam of 24.9m, and a draught of a.Sm. Most noticeable is the tact that it was designed

to carry only SIX guns, instead of the eight of the two previous designs. The two forward turrets were again placed alongside each other, while the remaining turret was placed aft. However, the - Comml ttee rejected the forward abreast turrets on aIl three • designs, and it was decided that an ideal armament arrangement that allowed good concentration abeam and axially was impossible, and as a result aIl three designs were regarded as unsuitable.

The next two designs, "0" and "E", that were proposed to the Committee were quite different from the three previous designs in 55 thelr armament schemes. The dimensions for "0" were the same as "A" and "B", but the armament was as fl111ows: one turret bath in front and aft of the ShlP, and two turrets abreast of each other amidships, which would enable the ship ta fire four guns both forward and rear, as weIl as a broadslde of six. Design "E" was the same as this, but with one slight modification in the armament •- arrangement. It was decided that instead of placing the two /35 e amidship turrets alongside each other, they would be placed • diagonally so as to ailow each turret to train on the opposite beam within an arc of 30-degrees if one was disabled. There was sorne debate as to whether a Middle 1 ine turret arrangement might be more practicaI, as this would allow aIl eight guns to fire broadside, but this was turned down for the simple fact that it would limit the chase fire to only two guns. The Committee finally agreed on Design "E" as the model for the new Arn;oured Cruiser, but addi tional changes were made to this. It was given a longer forecastle, two tripod masts, shelter decks for the smaller guns, and a projecting bow that was similar to that of the new Battleship. However, the MoSt noteworthy difference was e in regards ta the ship's machinery. Fisher once again decided ta take a gamble by adoptlng the new turbine systew developed by 56 • Charles Parsons instead of standard reciprocating engines. Fisher had been in favour of the use of turbines as ear1y as 1902, which he described in his report on the new Armoured Cruiser. Parsons introduced the steam turbine in 1897, when half of the Royal Navy was assembled at Spithead to celebrate Oueen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee. It was during this review that a tiny vessel named TURBINIA darted around the fleet at an astonishing speed of 34.5 knots, faster than any other vessel in the f1eet. The AdmiraIt y was sui tably impressed, and agreed to have a set of turbines installed on the Destroyers H.M.S. VIPER and H.M.S COBRA. These ships were given the design speed of 31 knots, but the turbines allowed these 57 •e ships 34.3 and 36.6 knots respective1~ A few more turbine /36 - experiments on Destroyers followed, and finally the Admiralty • decided to test turbines on a larger ship, and the Cruiser AMETHYST was chosen for this. The concept of Parson's turbine system quickly caught Fisher's imagination, as weIl as that of Watts and Durston. Bacon wrote: "Fisher knew that no fleet then at sea in the world cüuld be reiied on to steam for eight hours at full speed without one or more of the ships breaking down. One of his greatest preoccupations in the Mediterranean had been to work up the effective speed of his fleet; he had succeeded (in obtaining) a speed of 14 knots, but (could not yet get any) higher. He knew that thlS was due ta the defects Inherent in reciprocating machinery."58 AlI three men were intrigued by the apparent simplici ty of turbines, as compared to the reciprocators, and also by the fact that the installation would save 1000 tons in weight. However, e other mernbers of the Committee were less convinced, and urged for more tests on the suitability of this system of propulsion. On Jan. • 16th, 1905, tests were conducted between the turbine-engined Destroyer H.M.S EDEN and the reciprocating-engined Destroyer H.M.S WAVENEY, and a second set of tests were conducted later between the 59 EDEN and the DERWENT. These tests showed that the turbines had the

advantage of reduced weight, an abs~nce of vibrations (which made

for a steadier gun platform), a lower centre of gravIt y for th~ machinery, and economized in terrns of personnel needed. This ailowed the Committee to recommend that turbInes be installed in the new Battleships and Armoured Cruisers. The Committee on Designs sat for the last time on Feb. 22nd, 1905. The general design that they proposed for the new Battleship •- and Armoured Cruiser was approved by the Board of AdmIraIt y on /37 March l7th, 1905, and the final detailed design for the Armoured - 60 • Cruiser was approved by the Board on Ju1y 7th, 1905. In the Cornrnittee's final report, the new Armoured Cruisers would have a displacement of 16750 tons, a length of 177m, a beam of 25.9m, and a draught of 8.5m. When actually completed. the dimensions for these ships wouId measure 173.8m{pp)/185.9m(oa), a beam of 25.7m, and their fore and aft draughts would be 8.3m and 8.7m respactively. They were officially listed at 17250 tons, but their actuaI normal dlsplacements were as follows: the INVINCIBLE's was 17330 tons (deep Ioad: 19940 tons); the INFLEXIBLE was listed as 17290 tons (deep Ioad: 19975 tons), and the INDOMITABLE's was 61 given as 17410 tons (deep load: 20125 tons). e The machinery was divided into two engine rooms, with High- Pressure turbines pIaced both ahead and astern on the wing shafts, • while another pair of Low-Pressure turbines were aIse fitted ahead and astern on the inner shafts, which aIso had a separate Cruising turbine. The first of these Battle Cruisers were also fitted with thirty-one boiIers which were fitted in four boiler rooms, which proved more economicaI than the MINOTAUR's twenty-three boi1ers in five rocms. Altogether, this wouId enabIe the ships to generate 41000 8HP, which was greater than any other warship afloat by a large margin, and would allow the ship to reach the speed of 25 knots. The armour scheme was similar to the MINOTAUR-class Cruisers; 178mm for the turrets and redoubts; 152mm for the belt amidships •- which tapered off to 102mm (4-inches) forward, which would be /38 terminated just abaft of the redoubt in arder ta install a 152mm • bulkhead ta be worked across the ship at that pOint; 254mm for the fore canning tower and 152mm for the after canning tawer; the

protective deck amidshlpS would be 38mm (1.5-inches) thlck on the

fIat and 51mm (2-inches) on the slapes, which wauld be Sllghtly

increased abaft af the armoured bulkhead. The deck protection was

very thin, and offered little protection against plunging fire. Jt

would prove ta be a major weakness ln every Britlsh Battle Cruiser.

The Battle Cruisers were also deslgned to carry a maximum of

3000 tons of coai and an additional 725 tons of 011, WhlCh would

enable them ta travel 5500 sea mi les at economical speeds, élnd

about 4250 miles at 18 knots. As for crew complement, they requi red

784 men, but this wouid saon rise ta more than one thousand during • the First World War. In terms of armament the ships were to be armed wlth eight

305mm/45 cal. Mark X guns, which cauld be elevated 13.5-degrees and

could fire an 850-lbs shell over 16350 yards, and be able ta flre

a broadside of 51DO-lbs. Also, they were fitted with sixteen 4-inch

quick-firing guns, of WhlCh two were placed on top of each tUlret,

as weIl as three l02mm anti-aircraft guns, one 76mm gun, seven

rnachine-guns, and five subrnerged 457mm (18-inch) torpedo tubes.

Even before the DREADNOUGHT was laid down, Fisher continued ta

push his idea of the Fast Battleship befare the Admlralty. What he

proposed was that instead of having the two new types of vessels, • the Navy should instead adopt the use of one type of Armoured Ship, /39 e 62 which he dubbed as the 'Fusion-ship'. He had written to Balfour • earlier on about this general idea: "Pith of a Cruiser- She 1s a Battleship in disguise!!! She is the coming Battleship. Why? Because of speed! That's ,,,hy really only one Battleship. Now elaborating a new design.-Get rid of distinction of Battleship and Armoured Cruisers. Simply Armoured Ships! "63 Fisher argued at the meeting on Nov. 16th, 1905, of the Navy Estimates Committee that the designs of the new Armoured Cruisers made them superior to aIl other existing Battleships, and concluded the meeting by stating: "It is, indeed, so clear that if the Armoured Cruiser and the Battleship could be combined in a single type, a tremendous advantage would be placed in the hands of our AdmiraIs that the matter demands most serious consideration ....• " "Battle Squadrons 50 composed would possess a flexibili ty hi therto undreamt of. That such a combination can scarcely be e discarded as a purely visionary and preposterous compromise is shown by the Italian designs of Cuniberti ... "64 • On Dec. 2nd, Fisher arranged a meeting with the other Sea Lords and the Directors of Naval Intelligence, Ordnance, and Construction, in what turned out to be a second Committee on Designs. He informed them that a Parliamentary Paper was about to be issued which said: "The terms 'Battleship' and 'Cruiser' had been discarded, and the term 'Armoured Vessel' was substituted in place of both. The aim was to have only one type. The Armoured Cruiser design of this year had rather less armour and armament but greater speed than the Battleship design, but practically the new Armoured Cruiser was a Battleship. It was desired to bring about a fusion of the two designs by next year; it seemed possible for this to be done, and it would be a great assistance if the Committee would look into the matter. "65

The Committe~ made its report in January, 1906; it was •e /40 e 66 decided not to pursue the 'Fusion-ships' for the tirne being. The • elimination of Russia as a major naval power following Tsushima and the signing of the Entente Cordiale between France and England in

1904 would leave the British with only one naval threat to worry

about, that of Germany. It was argued that the cost of building

·Fuslon-ships', as compared to a Dreadnought, would result in the

reduction in the number of capital ships bui 1 t wi th no increase in 67 firepower to make up the difference.

Lord Cawdor, Selbourne's replacement as First Lord, agreed

that four armoured ships would be built from the 1905 Estimates,

and that three of these would be the new INVINCIBLE-class, which

shows that Fisher at least got his way in this respect. lt was e believed that these ships would more than adequately meet the existing Cruiser threat from Germany, and that it would then be • possible to focus on building a numerical superiority in current 68 Dreadnought-Battleships.

By October, 1906, it was decided that aIl post-DREADNOUGHT

Battleships and Armoured Cruisers would henceforth be categorised

as Capi tal Ships. It can be claimed that this decision was a

mistake, and that it misled the general public about the weaknesses

of the Armoured Cruisers. However, the differences between the two

types of vessels were such that now the Armoured Cruiser had

evol ved to the pOint where i t did indeed ri val the Batt 1esh! p.

Previous Armoured Crui sers were pract ically as large as

BattleHhips, and now their firepower was almost as powerful. Fisher •e /41 e agreed, and wTote: "For the sake of simp! ici ty we necd only consi.der the . capi tal ships' bui lding and in contemplation (the very phrase indicates the • new era. as we can no longer draw a hard and fast line between Battleships and Armoured Cruisers). It is on the capital ship that the command of the sea depends ... The INVINCIBLES are, as a matter of fact, perfectly fit to be in the line of battle wi th the battlefleet, and could more correctly be described as Battleships which, thanks to their speed, can drive anything afloat off the seas. "69

From this point onwards, the notion that Fisher did not intend for these ships to fight in the main battle line can be discarded. His logic that the speed and guns of these ships would enable them ta fight in fleet engagements was somewhat dubious. Filson Young's opinion of the supposed advantage in speed was this: "We never really caught up wi th the German Battle Cruisers when they were running away from us at full speed. It takes a long e tirne, and a huge distance has to be covered, if a ship going at high speed i5 to be overtaken by a slightly faster one of which she has the start. In the case of a ship steaming at 24 knots, having a 20-mile start of a ship steaminq at 26 knots, it would take just • five hours and 130 knots would have to be covered in a stern chase, before the twenty mi les were reduced to ten- the beginning of effective gunnery range. And the North Sea did not, in fact, prove big enough for the faster ships to secure theïr theoretical advantage."70

As would be de~onstrated during the time when he ordered the construction of his wartime Battie Cruisers, this attitude towards the advantages in speed was an error which Fisher never recognized. Neverthe1ess, it does prove that it was the Battle Cruiser, and not the Dreadnought, that was Fisher's idea of the perfect warship. The evolution from the waaden Frigate to the Battie Cruiser was clearIY not a smooth one. Nevertheless, the evolution ta the

Battle Cruiser did follow the logic of the arms race. The qu~st to •- build ships that were faster, had more hitting power. and could /42 withstand more punishrnent was the quintessence of this logic. This • was a pattern that was aiso foilowed by the Battleshlp and the Destroyer. However, the Cruiser's evolution was such that now It

could easily rival a Battleship in size and firepower.

Fisher was correct in h13 belief that the all-big-gun warship

was on its way. He couid have chosen to wait and see what the other

powers came up with, and simply try to match and improve on their

designs, but feit that if such a revolutlon was to take place,

England had ta be at the forefront and bui l d up a numerical

superiority of such vesseis. The constructlon of the DREADNOUGHT

and the INVINCIBLES did indeed glve Britain a head start in a new

round of the arms race. Fisher kept comlng up wlth larger, faster,

and more powerfui warshlps, continuously seeking to build the ldeal

warship that wouid guarantee England's naval supremacy. However, • this is where the logic of the arms race falls apart; the perfect warship that Fisher sought was an illusIon. The advantages of such

vessels couid be maintained only until other navies built thelr own

versions. Nevertheless, the construction of the Dreadnoughts and

Battie Cruisers ushered in a new phase of the arms race, which

England was determined to lead.

• /43 e Chapter 2: Sisters and RivaIs • The construction of the DREADNOUGHT and the INVINCIBLES caused a considerable uproar in England. Although the main criticisms of Fisher's reforms were directed at his plans for the distribution of the fleet and on the Selbourne Scheme of officer training, there was much grumbling about the new warships. There were many critics

of the new ships, which included AdmiraJ~-of-the-Fleet Sir Gerald Noel and Sir Frederick Richards, Admira.'s Sir Cyprian Bridge and Reginald Custance, former D.N.C. Sir William White, Lord Charles Beresford, and the author of THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON l HISTORY, Alfred Thayer Mahan. The most important criticisms of the ships were the sacrifice of protection for speed and gun power; the removal of the secondary 6-inch guns (which was mentioned in l - Parliament by Lord Brassey); and, specifically against the • DREADNOUGHT, the construction of this ship made Sri tain' s existing fleet of Battleships obsolete. They felt that this would allow other nations to challenge England's lead in Battleships by putting 1 everyone an even footing with them. Lord Beresford disliked the tendency to blur the distinction between the Battleship and the Armoured Cruiser, and also felt that the Dreadnoughts should not have been built because they would not 1. fit into Britain's existing drydocks. AdmiraI Richards wrote: "The whole Sri tish Fleet was ... morally scrapped and labelled obsolete at the moment when it was at the zenith of its efficiency and equal not to two but practically to aIl the other navies of the world combined."~ •e In Parllament, the criticisms came not only from Naval experts /44 e such as Lord Brassey but also from the radical wtng of the LIberal party, such as David Lloyd George, who viewed the DREADNOUGH'r d:; § • "a piece uf wanton and profligate ( ,tentatIon". Accordlng to

Marder, thlS was a feelIng shared by many ln the rddlcal wlng of the Liberal Party, who fel t that the creat Ion of Dreadnoughts wOlll d

lead to an IntensIficatIon of the arms race wrth Germ~ny, WhlCh would mean an increase ln naval expenditures dnd a dectease ln 7 funds available for SOCl 1 serVlces. FIsher generally tried to Ignore the opInions of the politiclans, and also brushed aSlde the critlclsms raised III

Mal1an 1 S artIcle "Reflections, Historlc and Other, Suggested by thp Battie of the Japan Sea". He claimed that Mahan had no specidl fi competence as an au~hority on tactics or modern constructIon.

e However, Flsher could not dismiss other naval opponents RD easlly. • For example, SIr William Whlte's article "The Cult of the Monsler Warshlp" suggested that the creation of these ShlpS was tantamount to puttlng aIl of Brltain's naval eggs into one or two vast, costly, majestlc, but vulnerable baskets He felt that it would

have been better to have a larger number of smaller vessels, Sl nef>

the loss of one of these ships would resul t ln a smaller frdct l onrlI !t decrease in the fleet's strength.

Fisher must have known that the introduction of the all-big- gun warships would effectlvely mdke Britain's existing Battle Fleet

obsolete. Bacon, however, wrote that it was the advent of long- range shooting, and not the DREADNOUGHT (or the INVINCIBLES) that 10 •e made ail eXlsting ships obsolete. Marder further argues that /45

previously, i t was wiser for Bri tain to let aI~uther nation create • a new type of warshlp, but that covered a period when England's speed ln shipbullding was without rIvaIs. By the turn of the

century, the constructIon tlme for Germany's Battieships was just

over three years, which was the sarne as the British construction 11 rate. The lnevitablilty of the all-big-gun warship therefore made

It ImperatIve for England to build ItS all-big-gun ships first and

ta maintain a numerlcal superiorlty.

Lord Cawdor had announced that only four armoured ships were

ta be built ln the 1905-06 Estlmates, which was three fewer than 12 had been sugg~sted by Selbourne thrp.c yi~ars earlier. It has already

been stated that out of the four, one would become the DREADNOUGHT,

while the other three would become the new INVINCIBLE-class

Armoured CruIsers. There wasn't much secrecy about the fact that • the DREADNOUGHT would be an ail-big-gun Battleshlp. In May, 1905, the journal ENGINEERING gave a reasonably accurate description of li the proposed Battleshlp. The so-called Armoured Cruisers were

another matter. On July 17th, a week after the final designs of the

ShipS were approved by the Board, Fisher gave strict instructions 14 that nothing be leaked about their desIgn. When Lord Cétwdor

announced the bUIldIng of these ships, he had simply referred to

them as Armoured Cruisers, and many assumed that these would be

another varlet y of MINOTAURS. The reason for secrecy had to do

mostly with thelr armament. The CruIsers' particulars were indeed

kept secret; ln the 1906 edition of JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, they • correctly described the CruIsers' main armament as being of a /46 e uniform calibre, but lncorrectly stated that It would consist of ~ • either eight or ten 234mm guns. In December, 1905, shortly after the DREADNOUGHT was laId

down, the Conservative government under Prime Minister Arthur

Balfour reslgned and was replaced by the LIberal CdbLnet under SIr

Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Cawdor was replaced as First Lord by Laid

Tweedmouth. Fisher's reforms might have been severely C!lrtJlled,

but he was fortunate to have retalned the confIdence of the new

government, clalmlng that hlS reforms would ln the long run be more ~ economical. As a result, his reforms proceeded.

Another important factor was that Balfour and the OpposItIon

front bench aiso contlnued to support Fisher's plans. Rhodrl e WillIams wrote that had Balfour and hiS supporters chosen ta repudiate the naval reforms, Fish~r's power with the government dnc} • his ability to convince them ta defy hiS crltlCS would have been TI greatly weakened.

The LiberaIs had a dlfferent outtook on defence spendIng, and

one of its electlon promIses ln 1906 was to make cuts ln the

defence budget. Cawdor had envisaged that four large ShlpS be bu] It

annually, but in May, 1906, Chancellor of the Exchequer Herbert

Asquith demanded that one big ship be dropped out of the 1906-07

Estimates. Later, on July l2th, 1906, in Vlew of the Hague

Conference and the possibllity of arms lImItatIons, the AdmIraIt y

agreed to ask for only two large ShipS ln the 1907-08 Estlmates,

but the government consented to build a third ship If there was no 18 •e arms agreement. Despite the fallure of the Second Hague Conference /47 e in June, 1907, only eight new Dreadnoughts would be authorised in • the naval estImates for the next three years, and only one of these would be a Battle Crui ser (H. M. 5 INDEFATIGABLE). Mackay noted that Fisher was in agreement with the reduction of the estimates, claiming that: "Our present margin of superiori ty over Germany (our only possible foe) is so great as to render it absurd in the extreme to tal k of anythIng endangering our naval supremacy, even if we stopped aU shipbuj lding al together. "li

This was in sharp contrast with his earlier Vlews, and this siding wi th the LiberaIs causF!d much agi tation from Tories who began to crIticise hlS reforms. However, despite his misgivings about the bUllding reductions, Bal four continued to voice his support of Fisher, and wi thout the support of the front bench, the e 20 back-benchers were faced with an impasse. • The contracts to build the INVINCIBLE, INFLEXIBLE, and INDOMITABLE, were glven to Elswick, Clydebank, and Fôirfield, .li respectively. Their construction schedu1e is as fo1lows: H.M.S. INFLEXIBLE had her kee1 laId down on Feb. 6th, 1906, was launched on June 26th the f0110wing year, and completed on Oct. 20th, 1908 (hers was the longest construction time of the three ships), at a cost of Ll,677,515; H.M.S. INDOMITABLE was laid down on March lst, 1906, launched on March 16th, 1907, and completed on June 25, 1908, wi th her cost coming at LI, 662,337; and finally, H.M.S. INVINCIBLE was laid down on April 2nd, 1906, launched on the following Apri l 13th, and completed before the other two ships on 22 •- March 20th, 1908, at a cost of L1,635,739. Fisher intended these /48 - ships to be completed within thirty months, and with the exception • of the INFLEXIBLE, which took two extra months to complete, the ships were completed ahead of schedule. They cost Sllghtly less to

build than the DREADNOUGHT (by about LIOO,OOO), which did raise

sorne questions about building ships which, though not as powerful

as a Battleship, cost nedrly as much. However, when one compares

the priee difference between the INVINCIBLES and the MINO'I'AUHS,

which was only slightly more than L200, 000, there is no doubt that

the INVINCIBLES can indeed be regarded as a bargain.

In terms of ship design few eould disagree that they were very

beautiful. One man remarked that these ships caught the publIC' S

imagination much more than the DFEADNOUGHT. With their speed and

impressi ve armament, they were seen as the ocean' s greyhounds, - capable of catehing anything wi th thei r speed and destroyi ng them 23 • with their mighty guns. But this was achieved at a prIce, and that price was in protection. BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL stated that:

"Vessels of this enormous S1ze and cast are unsuitable for man y of the duties of cruisers; but an even stronger objectIon to the repeti tian of the type i5 that an admi raI havlng INVINCIBLES in his fleet will be certain ta put them in the 1ine of battle, where their comparatively light protection would be a disadvantage and thei r high speed of no value." 24

Admi raI Kerr, who fel t as strongly on the subject of the

Cruisers' armour scheme, wrote:

"When the INVINCIBLE was completlng on the Tyne, Sir PhIlip Watts came ta see me. Among other questions discussed l pointed out that the range at which l considered future actIons would be fought, or anyhow commenced, would be at least 15000 yards, and a 5hell descending from that range wou1d go over the armoured barbette, penetrate the deck, and strike and burst against the armoured tube, going straight down to the magazIne, Which would e result in an explosion that would destroy the ship. Sir Philip • (Watts) replied that he knew the danger, but hlS orders were to /49

protect the vessel from a projecti le fi red at a range of 9000 yards and was not allowed sufficient weight to put on further • armour. "25 Most of FIsher' s crI tICS felt that to construct a ShlP which

was larger than the DREADNOUGHT in size, yet 1 ighter in overall

displ acement, was slmply an invi tation for catastrophe. This

feeling seemed to have been justified ln their minds by the Jutland

disaster. Here lS a comparison of the weight ratios between the

older Armoured CruIser MINOTAUR, the new Arrnoured Cruiser 26 INDOMITABLE, and the new Battleship DREADNOUGHT:

Ship( tons/percentage): MINOTAUR INDOMITABLE DREADNOUGHT

Equipment: 595/4.1% 660/3.8% 650/3.6%

Armamf~nt: 2065/14.1% 2440/14.1% 3100/17.3%

Machinery: 2530/17.3% 3390/19.7% 2050/11.5%

Coa1: 1000/6.9% 1000/5.8% 900/5.0% • Armour: 2790/19.1% 3460/20.1% 5000/27.9% Hull: 5520/37.8% 6200/35.9% 6100/34.1%

Board Margin: 100/0.7% 100/0.6% 100/0.6%

Total (tons) : 14600 17250 17900

The comparisons between the MINOTAUR and the INDOMITABLE are

clearly in the Battle Cruiser 's favour. In this respect, the

INVINCIBLES did indeed prove to be superior over every other

Crulser. But it is the comparisons with the DREADNOUGHT that is of

most interest. As is shown, the displacement difference is on1y

that of a few hundred tons, but there is a significant difference

as to where the welght went. The DREADNOUGHT had two more 1 arge • guns than the Battle Cruisers, which exp1ains the discrepancy in ;50 the displacement of the armament on both ships. However, the real • difference revoives around the ShlpS' machinery and armour. Roughly speaking, bath ships had nearly 40% of thei r total weight ln thel r

armour and machinery, but the INVINCIBLES devoted approximately 20%

ta bath of these, while for the DREADNOUGHT It was about 28% for

armour and only 12% for machinery. Thus it i8 clear that [or the

Cruisers, armour had to be sacrificed ia arder ta get the advantage

in speed.

The three INVINCIBLES were at this time the most powerful

Cruisers, and next ta the DREADNOUGHT the most powerful warshlps

aflaat, easily capable of annihllating any CrUIser from the world 1 S

other navies. But the Admirait y declded not to bUlld any more

of these ships, as 1 t was believed that these three vessels were

more than adequate ta deal wi th the current German CrUIser threat. • It was not untii the 1908-09 Estimates that the Admirait y decided to build another Battie Cruiser, while another seven Dreadnoughts

had already been laId down. Fisher tried ta have an improved

INVINCIBLE added to the 1907-08 programme, claimlng that i t would

be faster and more powerful than the Dreadnoughts currently being

built, and also less expensive, but thlS was reJected by the 27 Admi raI ty. Jell icae even urged that the Armoured Crui sers that wece

to be laid down under the 1908-09 estlmates be armed with 234rnm

guns instead of 305mm-weapons, which shows that support for these 28 ships was not as strong as Fi sher might have haped.

This wait and see attl tude about building more INVINCIBLES • probably depended on two factors: First, whether other nations, /51 - primari Iy Germany, would bui Id thei r own Battle Cruisers, and • second, how the first INVINCIBLES fared on their speed trials and gunnery practices. But before proceeding any further, the questlon

of flre control must be addressed, which brings in the whole

Dreyer-Pollen debate, which had an important effect on the

construction of the Battle Cruiser.

Arthur Hungerford Pollen had devised the Argo System, which

was a very reliable fire control system, which used gyroscopically

corrected simul taneous ranges and bearings to plot a target' s

movement. Fisher and Jell icoe were both interested in his system in

September, 1906, and it was agreed ta pay him L6,500 for trial

instruments. He was also promised a further LIOO,OOO award and a

monopoly of manufacture at a royal ty of 25% if the system was - adopted for serVIce use. However, the AdmiraIt y instead chose to • select the cheaper fire-control system developed by Lieutenant FrederIc C. Dreyer. Jellicoe was replaced by Bacon in the Ordnance

Department, and Bacon was convinced that gun Iaying and sight

setting could be accompl ished by human judgement alone. As a

result, he opposed aIl forms of mechanized fire control. According

ta Sumlda, when Dreyer introduced his cheaper manual plotting

method, Bacon used thi s oppurtuni ty to create the pretext by whi ch 29 the agreement with Pollen could be voided.

The Dreyer system was much cruder, as it could not compensate

for the yaw on instrument observation, nor could it plot quickly

enough. In November, 1907, a test was conducted between the two •- systems, which were to be judged by AdmiraI of the Fleet Sir Arthur /52

Wilson. Despi te the superiori ty of Pollen' s system, Wi Ison chose to • support Dreyer'~ system. Dreyer had been a former subordlnate of Wilson, and Sumlda writes that WilsoP was probably biased in his

decision to support Dreyer. Pollen later tried to appeal to FIsher

for additional retrials, but Fisher chose to follow the counsel of

Bacon and Wilson and stuck with the Dreyer system, desplte the fact

that Pollents system was more efficient. Sumida ha5 argued that

the advantages that were supposed to have been galned by a uni form

armament of heavy guns were lessened by the adoption of Dreyer's 30 system. The Admiralty's deallngs with Pollen can be described as

quite disreputable, and as the war would show, the selection of

Dreyer's system was indeed qUlte unfortunate.

On the continent, the construction of the Dreadnoughts left

Germany with the dilemma of elther backing off completely ln its • attempt to rival the Bri tlsh fleet, or paying the enormous costs to enlarge the Kiel Canal, WhlCh would be necessary for warships of

this size. In the end, i t was decided to accept the new challenge,

and the Germans paid huge sums to enlarge the canal. Germany fi rst

responded to the DREADNOUGHT in 1906 by laylng down the first of

their four NASSAU-class Battleshlps, but deClded to only lay down

one Armoured Cruiser in reply to the INVINCIBLES. This was to be

S.M.S BLUCHER. AdmiraI von Tirpitz had opposed the construction of

ships to counter Bri taln' s INVINCIBLES, which he regarded prlmarily .li. as scouting ships. Nevertheless, she was ordered to be constructed

along with the NASSAU's, and was laid down ln 1907. • The BLUCHER's tragic career started even before she was laid e /53 down. Fisher had gone to great lengths ta ensure the secrecy about • the INVINCIBLES, especially in regards of their armament. As stated previously, rnany correctly assumed that i t wauld be of uniform

cal ibre, but no one was able to guess just what Fisher had in mind.

The specul atlon that the INVINCIBLES would be arrned wi th 234mm

guns was encouraged when the Bri tish - leaked' information that

seemed to confirm this, which the Germans readily believed. The

BLUCHER was given a primary armament of twelve 210mm (8.2-inch)

guns, which was four more than their last class of Armoured

Cruisers, the SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, and al though her machinery

(34000 SHP) was supposed ta enable her ta do 24.5 knots, her 32 average speed wauld faii closer ta 23 knots. When the INVINCIBLES e were reveaied ta the world wi th thei r 305mm guns and 25 knat speed, the Germans qUlckly realised that their new expensive Armaured • Cruiser was not a match against the British ships in terms of firepower, and would prove tao slow to be able ta outrun them. The

BLUCHER would prove ta be exactly the type of warship which the

INVINCIBLES were created ta fight. It was too Iate ta change the

armament scheme on the BLUCHER, and she was finished as was

originally deslgned. The total cost of the BLUCHER came ta 28.5

mlllion Gold Marks, which was 50% more than the previaus Armaured 33 Cruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU.

The German AdmiraIt y decided ta make another attempt ta try

and counter the British ships. They announced that their 1907-08 e program wauld inciude an all-big-gun Armoured Cruiser comparable to • the INVINCIBLES. The first of these ShlpS constructed was S.M.S . /54

VON DER TANN, which became Germany's first true Battle Cruiser. • This i s a clear example of the so-ealled logie of the arms race. Germany dld not need to build a vessel to eounter the INVINCIBLES;

her only motivation in building ships of thlS type was because

another power had them. The only purpose of the German Battie

Cruisers was to fight the Bri tish Battle Cruisers.

There i8 very little doubt that the VON DER TANN was a lOuch

better fightl.ng ship than the INVINCIBLE. 'I-he key to this WélS that

she had considerably more armour protection than the Bri tish

rivaIs, and was also designed with greater internaI subdivision,

making her almost unsinkable. This wauld be true of most German

warships, which were designed to wi thstand extreme punlshment, 'lS

wauld be shawn in the war.

The VON DER TANN was laid down on March 25th, 1908, and was 11 • finally completed in September, 1910, at a cast af 36.5 rnilllon GM. Her normal displacement was 19064 tons, and she had a length of

184.6m a beam of 28.6m, and a draught of 8.1m. The ship's

armament consisted of eight 280mm guns, each capable of fl ri ng a

666-pound shell (as opposed ta the INVINCIBLE' s 850-pound shells

from its 305mm guns), but unlike the INVINCIBLES, they could be

fired broadside. The ship a1so carried ten 150mm and sixteen 88mm

guns, which provided her wi th a much heavier secandary battery thdn

her British counterparts. As for her machinery. her engines were

capable (during her trials) of generating 42000 SHP, WhlCh enabled

the ship to reach a top speed of 24.8 knots. • It was on the subject of armour protection where British and e /55 German opinion differed most. While Fisher' s main belief may have • been that speed equailed protection, the Germans fel t otherwise. They were of the opinion that whi le speed was important, nothing

could better protect a ship than armour plat ing. The VON DER TANN' s main bel t was 254mm thi ck, nearly four inches more than for the

INVINCIBLES, and hel" turrets also had a maximum protection of

230mm, which was also greater than i ts Bri tish counterpart. The

distribution is as follows: 6004 tons to her hull (31.5%), 2604

tons to the armament (13. 7%), 3034 tons to machinery (15.9%), and 35 5693 tons to armour protection (29.8%). When these figures are

compared wi th INDOMITABLE, i t shows that the British devoted a

somewhat higher weight percentage towàrds the huI 1, armament, and e machlnery than did the Germans, but far less for the armour; INDOMITABLE allotted only 20% of her displacement towards armour, • whi le the VON DER TANN' s was just under 30%, wi th a 2200 ton wei :-"ht difference in the German ship' s favour. Thus, the combination 01.

greater armour protection and internaI subdivislon made this a

significantly better warship than its British cousins.

For Brl tain' s 1908-09 program, i t was announced that only two

new capltal ShlPS would be ordered, one of which would be the

INDEFATIGABLE. Germany, however, countered wlth four of her own.

Among these would be the second generatlon of what Fisher

officially referred to as Battle Cruisers (in a letter ta Watts in

September, 1908), al though they were only off icially called Battle 36 Cruisers in 1912. •- The first of Germany' s second generation Battle Cruisers were /56 S.M.S. MOLTKE and S.M.S GOEBEN. The MOLTKE was ordered as part of

the 1908-09 program, whi le the GOEBEN was ordered for the followlng • year. As good as the VON DER TANN was, these ships were an even better class of warships ln almost every respect, and far superior to even Britain's second generation Battle Cruisers, the threp. INDEFATIGABLES. They had a normal displacement of 22616 tons, had

two additional 280mm guns, better armour protectIon, and thelr

engines 52000 SHP were capable of giving these ships a top speed of 37 25.5 knots. If there was a flaw, it was their slow building rate; MOLTKE was laid down two months before the INDEFATIGABLE, but only fully commissioned in March, 1912, a full year after the British Shlp.

The AdmiraI ty had decided for i ts 1908-09 program to build one

Dreadnought and a pair of standard 234mm gun Armoured Cruisers, as weIl as five Light Cruisers, the first to be built durlng 38 • Fisher's tenure as First Sea Lord. The government wanted the estimates further reduced, and the AdmiraI ty was forced to drop one of the Armoured Cruisers. However, the reports of Germany bui lding its own Battle Cruisers fcrced the British to reevaluate their

plans. It was decided on March 31st, 1908, to build an improved INVINCIBLE, and Fl.;her had Watts come up with the plans once again. Although this new ship was at first referred to as the SANSPAREIL, 39 it would eventually become the INDEFATIGABLE. It looked at this point as if Fisher wouid have his dream of building the one- type all-purpose Fast Battleship come closer to fruition. He explalned ln a letter ta Watts that this new warshlp would be • /57 e superior to the current Dreadnoughts, while the increase in the • cost would be barely noticeable, as he explained: "1 f we go to work the same way as we did wi th the DREADNOUGHT we shall succeed because (it iS) so obviously silly to refuse an increase of 25 per cent of power in the SANSPAREIL (as it was still named), with only an increase of 4 per cent in cost and 5 per cent in displacement .... If you remember, the opposition succumbed at once against DREADNOUGHT when it was seen that such an increase of power resulted from so small an increase in expense and displacement."40

The design for what became H.M.S. INC~FATIGABLE was approved .li by the Board of AdmiraIt y on Nov. 20th, 1908. It was chosen when it was learned that the expected German Battle Cruisers would not be any larger than these. But now it was the Germans who beat the British at their own game; Jellicoe, who was then Third Sea Lord e and Controller, learned in fact that not only was this incorrect, but that the new German ships would be considerably larger than the • British Battle Cruisers, and he recommended to the Board that they scrap the designs for INDEFATIGABLE for something that could match 42 the German ships. H.M.S. INDEFATIGABLE was indeed the cheapest capital ship 43 bui 1 t by any country during the 20th Century, costing LI, 536,769. The Australian and New Zealand Governments aise announced, following the approval of the design of the INDEFATIGABLE, that they would each contribute one warship of this class under the Commonweal th Defence Programme, and would pay for the whole cost of construction. This resulted in the construction of an addltional pair of INDEFATIGABLES, which were given the names of the two •e respective Dominions. H.M.S. NEW ZEALAND was immediately placed /58

under the command of the Royal Navy, whereas the Australians placed

H.M.S AUSTRALIA under their own conunand, but would in the event of 9_1. • war grant England the right of disposaI of this ship.

In wri ting to Viscount Esher 1 Fisher described the new warship

as: " ... A new INDOMITABLE that will make your mouth water when you see l t! (and the Germans gnash thei r teeth!) Il 1~

However, such was not the case. In many respects, the ttuee

INDEFATIGABLES were still jnferior to the VON DER TANN, let alone

the MOLTKES. German designers could pride themselves in the

improvements they made when they constructed thei r second class of

Battle Cruisers, while the British opted for mere cosmetic changes.

The period of the INVINCIBLES' comp] ('te mastery ovel' aIl other

Armoured Cruisers was now at an end. Whi le more than adequate

against the medium-s.1ze guns cf regular Crulsers, tne Bat t 1 (~

Cruisers' armour scheme was totally inadequate against the 280mm

• guns of the German ships.

H.M.S INDEFATIGABLE was built by John Brown, and laid down on

Fe~.23rd, 1909 (AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND were laid down the 46 following June), and was completed by April, 1911. The first

noticeable difference between these ships and the INVINCIBLES was

that they could train aIl eight of their guns towa~ds the enemy.

This was accompl1shed by separi\ting "pli and "Q" turrets. Their

normal displacewent was 18750 tons for the INDEFATIGABLE and 18800

tons for the other two shl.ps, and thei r deep load displacement Wd9

listed at 21240 tons. Overall, this was only fifteen hundred tons

more than previous ships. However, most of this weight difference • il EU ras $ • /59

came from the Increased length of their hull; their exact

dimensions I,.Jere 182m(pp)/193.4m(oa) in length, with a beam of

• 26.2m, and a for(~ and aft draught of about 8.2m and 8.9m respectlvely. In this respect, the main difference between these

ships and the INVINCIBLES was that they were about twenty-five feet

longer.

When the figures are broken down, these ships devoted less in

terms of welght percentage towards armament, machinery, and armour

than did the INVINCIBLES. The INDEFATIGABLE 1 S armour scheme was

essentially the same as the INVINCIBLE, with a main belt of 152mm,

178mm for turrets, 254rnm for canning tower, and 25mm ta 64mm for

the decks. The armament also consister'f of the same e~ght

305nun/45cal. Mark XIII guns of the INVINCIBLES, which had a maximum

range of 19000 yards, as well as sixteen 102mm and four 3-pounder • secondary guns. As already stated, the main difference here was that she could train a11 of her main guns towards a target when

fi ring broadside, whi le the INVINCIBLES could oniy manage six of

thelrs. As for machinery, she had four-shaft Parsons turbines and

thlrty-two Babcock and Wilcox boilers, and was designed for 43000

SHP (44000 for the other two). She also had a fuel capaci ty of 3170

tons of coal and 840 tons of ai l, and her crew complement was

1 i sted as 800, although this would rise during the war.

Durlng her first trials, she managed to produce 44596 SHP,

which gave her a speed of 24.44 knots, which was deemed

unsatlsfactory. Fltted with new propellers, she later managed 55140

SHP, which enabled her to reach a top speed of 26.89 knots. Rer •

------~~------;60

overall deSIgn speed was rated at 25 knots. and she could onl y

surpass this on rare occaSIons. Nevertheless, the NEW ZEALAND was • able to generate 65000 SHP at Dogger Bank. Agaln, 1 t must be sald that tr.ese ships were not as successfu l

as FIsher thought they would be. Whereas the MOL'I'KES werC'

signl ficant Improvements from the VON DER TANN, the INDEFATIGARLES,

wi th the exception of belng able to flre aU eight guns 1 Il

broadsldes, were not much better than the INVINCIBLES. They were

generally considered ta be inferior to the VON DER TANN, which says

nothing about how they rated alongside the MOLTKES!

By the Summer of 1909, it was realised that Germany had laid

down or ordered no fewer than nine Battleships and Batt le CrUl.~H?rs.

and another four capital ships were ordered that year. Britain had

twel ve capi tal ships, and was planning for four more in i ts ] 909-10

Estimates. However, Regina~d McKenna, who replaced Tweedmouth dS • First Lord, announced that the Navy would ask SIX capItal ShipS that year instead of four, and another tweI ve over the next two

years. Many LiberaIs opposed to this Idea, including DaVId Lloyd

George and Winston Churchi Il. Fortunately, a compromise was

reached, in which it was agreed to lay down four capital ShlpS in 47 1909, and another four were to be added by April lst, 1910. One of

the resul ts of this programme was the construction of the fl rst of

the so-called 'Big Cats', H.M.S. LION. Thls ship, along wlth her

two sisters, PRINCESS ROYAL and QUEEN MAHY. was regarded as the

CrUI ser verSlon of the ORION-c lass Battleships. They represented a

major leap forward from the previous class of Battle CrUIsers .

• '

...... a.as ...... Z2.... ~&kL ..... ~~ ...... ~ .... ~ .... &... 5.d.;a. ... ~,~~~ .. ~~ .. ~"" /61 e Whi le the INVINCIBLES and INDEFATIGABLES had only slightly less of • a displacement than their Dreadnought counterparts, the LION's would outweigh the flrst of these 'Super Dreadnought' by more than 4000 tons: Fisher jubllantly wrote of these ships in 1909:

"Do you know that the ships that we have just laid down are as far beyond the Dreadnought as the Dreadnought was beyond aIl before her! And they will say agaln, 'D--n that blackguard! Again a new era of Dreadnoughts!' But imagine the German 'wake up' when these new ships by and by burst on them! 70000 horsepower!!! and guns that will gut them!!!"48

This last point had to do with the Navy's declsion to switch from 12-1nch to the new 13.5-inch guns as the main armament for the new capi tal ShlpS. Fisher had the idea of swi tching to this type of gun as early as 1908, as is shown ln the diary of Capt. Edmund J.W. e Slade, the Oirector of Naval Intelligence at this time: "Sir J. has now got the 13.5-inch gun on the brain- Bacon is • at the bottom of i t ... "49 Accordlng to Slade, Fisher wanted to create the new 343mm (13.5-lnch) gun ships for the express purpose of forcing the Germans to spend more money outside of their ordinary Naval 50 Estimate. However, the superiority of this weapon would depend on

an adequate fire control system, and only the QUEEN MARY was 51 partially fitted with Pollen's fire control system. The result was that shortly before her destruction at Jutland, her shooting proved to be the best in the whole Battle Cruiser fleet. There were consIderable problems with the design and constructIon of the LIONS. By comparison, the conversion from 305mm •e to 343mrn guns for the Battleships was considerably easier; /67 the tonnage difference between the 305mm H.M.S. NEPTUNE and the 343mm H.M.S ORION was no more than 2500 tons. Slade wrote • that he had dlscussed this new Battle Cruiser with bath Bacon and

Watts, and l t was agreed that she was ta be 500 tons more than the Battleship ST VINCENT (19560 tons), thuJ putting her at around 20000 tons, and would be able to fire aIl eight guns on one 52 broadside, and would cost about L2,OOO,OOO to bUlld. One month after this, on March l8th, 1908, a secret memorandum was written to Fisher (by either Bacon or Dreyer), which stated that:

"The substitution of l3.5-inch for 12~inch will involve an extra displacernent of no more than 2000 tons. It ls considered saie to estimate that a 13.5-inch DREADNOUGHT-type of ship will throw into an enemy 50 per cent more weight of shell in a given time, on any bearing, than the DREADNOUGHT. Thus, by a 10 per cent increase of displacement, we secure a 50 per cent increase of weight of shell thrown in .... " "General1y, it rnay be said that the advantages of long range, ease of fire control, and the rest of the arguments advanced in favour of a single type armament nearly aIl apply with equal • force to rnaking the type of gun the heaviest possible wi thi n thf'. practical 1 irni ts of tonnage of a battleship. "53

Slade recommended that the developrnent of the 343rnrn gun be postponed until, as he put it,

" .... We can collect information & data from what the DREADNOUGHT & her sisters can do. "54

Nevertheless, the 343mm gun was to be mounted on both the ORION-class Battleships and the LIONS. The LION and PRINCESS ROYAL were bath ordered as part of the

1909 programme, while the third Shlp of this class, the QUEEN MARY,

was ordered for the 1910 programme (along with ~he NEW ZEALANO and •

- --- ~------/63 5~ AUSTRALIA). The LION, built by Devonport, was laid down on Nov.

29th, 1909, and completed in May, 1912; PRINCESS ROYAL was • constructed by Vlckers, laId down on MJy 2nd, 1910, and completed ln Nov. 1912; and QUEEN MARY, built by Palmers, was laid down on

March 6th, 1911, and completed in Sept. 1913. Curiouslyenough, It

took aIl three ShlpS exactly thirty months to be constructed.

The specifics for the ships are as follows: their dimensions

were 216.4m/229.5m, though the QUEEN MARY's was listed as

23û.7m(oa), x 29m (29.2m for QUEEN MARY) x 9.5m, with a normal

displacement of 26270 tons (27000 tons for QUEEN MARY), and their

deep load dlsplacement was close to 30000 tons. Their armament

consisted of elght 343mm/45cal Mark V guns, which could he elevated

up to twenty degrees, and could fire a l250-lb shell over 24000

yards. They also carried sixteen 102mm guns and four 3-pounders, as

weIl as two submerged torpedo tubes. The armour for bath the main • belt and turrets ranged from 102mm to 230mm, 254mm for the conning tower, and 25mm to 64mm for the decks. They were given four-shaft

Parsons turbines and forty-two Yarrow boilers, which produced an

unprecedented 70000 SHP for the ships, enabling them ta reach 27

knots, although the PRINCESS ROYAL was able to attain a speed of

28.54 knots at her trials. Their fuel capaci ty consisted of a

maXImum of 3500 tons of coal (3700 tons for QUEEN MARY) and 1135

tons of 011 (1130 for QUEEN MARY), and their ~rew complement was

Ilsted as 997 men.

These ShlpS were not without their faults. They were given

armour protectlon only against 280mm gunfire, and only in lirni ted •

» ;64

areas. The turret arrangement was also seen dS a mistake. The 'Navy

had decided for 1 ts new desIgns that the turrets would be ln an • all-centrellne disposition, and this was trlcd on both the LIONS and the ORLONS. 'rhey both had superimposed turrets forward, but

only the Sattleshlps had superimposed turrets af~. The AdmIraIt y

Inslsted on slghtlng hoods at the forward end of the turret, which

caused unbearable blast effect on the personnel in the lower ;;6 turret, thus limiting them to broadsidL arcs. But Instead of

deletlng the mIdshIpS turret, it was decided to drop the after

superlmposed turret. This led to a cumbersome arrangement of

magazine and shellroom between two groups of boilers, and also ~I restricted the turret arcs to 120 degrees on elther beam. Parkes'

explanatlon was that the posi tian of "Q" turret enabled a dl visi on

of ~he boiler rooms, and sa made for safety where a transverse • bulkhead between them mlght be struck by a torpedo, leadlng to extenSl ve flooding. However, even he considered this an unnecessary .?8 precaution if it was intended as such. Nevertheless, they were Li

definite improvement on both the INVINCIBLES and INDEFATIGABLES.

The LION-class was the last class of Battle CruIsers ta be

constructed durlng Fisher's first tenure as First Sea Lord, and he

was partlcularly proud of them as the ul tirnate expressions of speed

and flrepower ln a warship.

The last Battle Cruiser to be laId down by the BrItish before

the war wasH.M.S. TIGER. She was intended to be the fourth Shlp of

the LION-class, with a closer resemblance to the QUEEN MARY, but in

fact became a warship that was far better than any other British •

..... - ;... a ._; il!l'pal "Ii J;; fa ,"fM? i Si ,U"" gai! J$Z 2j 14fll /65

Battle CrUIser. In January. 1911, the Japanese government ordered the constructIon of four Battie Cruisers. of which the prototype • would be designed and constructed in England by Vickers while the other three ShlpS would be bui! t in Japan. Th1s ship, the KONGO, was laId down on Jan. 17th, 1911, and was launched on May 18th, 59 1912, one month before the TIGER was laid down. She had a normal displacement of 27500 tons, carried a main armament of eight 14- Inch guns, a10ng with a secondary armament of sixteen 6-inch guns and eight torpedo tubes. Her main beit was no more than eight inches, but her averall armaur protection was better laid out than

the BrItish ships. HHr engines' 64000 SHP allowed her to reach, 27.5 knots. And finally. the turret arrangement changed the posi tion of

the "Q" turret. This change allowed the turret ta .I.ncrease i ts arc of bearing ta 60-degrees before the beam and 90-degrees abaft i t on either s1de. Parkes has claimed that the TIGER's design was • strong1y influenced by the KONGO, but CONWAY's disputes this; it clalms that the detaiis of the TIGER were settled before the KONGO's desIgn was complete, and believes it more Iikely that Vickers' chIef desIgner was given details of the new ship's 60 layout, so that he could incorporate them in the Japanese design-.- Regardless, there was no doubt in the AdmiraI ty' s minds that this was a superlor ship ta the LIONS. The origInal sketch desIgn for H.M.S. TIGER was approved by the Admlralty on Aug. 18th, 1911, and the final drawings in 61 December. She was Intended ta be the Battie Cruiser equivalent of the IRON DUKE-class 'Super Dreadnought' for the 1911 program. She • • /66

was lald own on June 20th, 1912, by John Brown & Co., and

eventually completcd in October, 1914, the sarne month that Fisher

• returned as the Fi rst Sea Lord. Her cost of L2, 593, 100 dWd l"fed 62 even the LION's. Her dlmensions were 216.4m(pp)j230.8m(oa) x 29.7m

x 9.3m, I~ith a normal displacement of 28430 tons (her wartime

deep load dlsplacement was 32800 tons), making her roughly 2000

tons heavier than the LION. She retained the same 343mm main

guns, but these were arranged in the same manner as the KONGO. This

lnnovatlon allowed aIl her boiler rooms to be grouped amidships,

whieh allowed a space of about 24. 6m between gun muzzles anl1 "X"

turret which, to quote Parkes, was considered sufflcient to dllow 63 the guns to be fired dead astern when required. Also, it provlded

sufflcient room to prevent bath turrets from being knocked out by

one lucky hit. She was ta be the only British Battle Cruiser to

mount a heavy secondary armament of twelve 152mm guns (four fewec • than the KONGO), sinee the later wartime Battle Cruisers would return ta using the lighter 102mm guns.

The TIGER was the first British capital ship ta be fltted with

Brown Curtis turbInes instead of Parsons, and was fltted wilh

thlrty-nlne Babcock and Wilcox large tube boilers, which enablect

her ta generate 85000 SHP, with an overload limit of 108000 SHP.

This allowed her to boast her speed from 28 knats ta 30 knots, but

at her trials, at 104635 SHP she could only reach 29.07 knots. She

carried a maximum coal and ail capaclty of 3320 tons for the former

and 3480 tons for the latter. As for armour protection, her belt

ranged from 76mm ta 230mm, 230mm for the turrets, 254mm for the • LW"- /67 cann1ng tower, and 25mm ta 76mm for the decks. She had nearly 1000 tans mare allocated to her armour than the LION, which represented 64 • 25.99" of her total weight (as compared ta the LION 1 s 24.2%). Altogether, she devoted 7390 tons in armour, WhlCh was near!y 4000 tons more than in the tirst INVINCIBLE. Finally, her crew complement was llsted as 1121 men. Though she was not quite in the German Sh1pS' league ln terms of percentage of weight devoted to armour, this ship was indeed the finest Battle Cruiser built by England until the arrIvaI of H.M.S HOOD in 1920. Just before the TIGER was laid down, the Admiralty agreed in the Summer of 1912 to the construction of what in fact becam2 the first Fast Battleships, the QUEEN ELIZABETH-class. Fisher, who had ret 1 red but sti Il carried some influence at the Admira! ty, tried ta push for the construction of a Battle Cruiser armed with eight ta ten 38lmm (15-inch) guns, that was capable of doing 30 knots, and 65 • cost under L2,000,000. The Admiralty, on ledrning of the Introduction of the 356rnm (14-inch) gun in the Japanese and American fleets, and of the rumour that Germany was also going to adopt a larger gun calibre, decided ta adopt an even larger weapon than the 343mm gun. He continued ta stress the impprtance of speed over armour, stating to Churchill, who was now the First Lord: "There MUST be the 15-inch gun... There MUST be sacri fi ce of armour. ... There must be further VERY GREAT INCREASE OF SPEED .•• your speed must vastly exceed your possible 8nemy! "66 However, Churchill reached a compromise in which the QUEEN

EL l ZABE'rHS wOllld be armed WI th eight 381mm guns and fourteen 152nun gllns, and these ships would also be the first British warships • a - ""~""----""-----"-"'" /69

to use cnly oil fuel instead of a mixture of oil and coal. ThlS

helped them to generate 75000 SHP and be able to ste(1iii at 24 knots, • which was a three knot advantage over most Dr.eadnoughts and nearly equal te the INVINCIBLES. The cost of these ShipS came to fJ..7 L2,685,799, WhlCh was only Sllghtly more than the TIGEH. However,

there lS no doubt that thi.s was a most formidable class, which

would prove to be the finest capital ShipS durlng the F1rst World

War. FIsher, however, was not impressed, and wrote back to

Churchill on Dec. 6th, 1911, that the first desideratum of aIl,

1\ •• 15 speed! Your fools donlt see it- They are always running about to see where they can put on a 1ittle more armour! to make it safe! You donlt go into Battle ta be safe! No, you go lnto BattLe to hl t the other fellow in the eyes fi rst so that he can 1 t see you! Yes! you hit h1m first, you hit him ha rd and you keep on hittlng. That's safetyl You donlt get hit back! WeIl! that's the improved 13.5-inch gun! bu~ dissociated from dominating speed, that gun 1s futIle. Why? Because you want ta fight when you like, where you llke, and how you like! and that on1y cornes from speed- Big Speed- 30 knots- you don't care a d--n then whether your bottoms dirty or a compartment' s bashed in wi th a torpedo making you draw more water because you have a big margin of speed over your Noah' s Ark • Dreadnoughts of 21 knots. "68 Fisher continued to dream about a sh1p armed wlth 406mm (16-

inch) guns and steaming at 30 knots, which was given the name of 69 H.M.S INCOMPARABLE. But the Admirait y later shifted completely away

from both Fast Battleships and Battle Cruisers ln the 1913-14 and

1914-15 programmes by introducing the slower but much more heavily

armoured ROYAL SOVEREIGN-class Battleshlps, which were intendcd to

Ile ln the battle line, not act as a fast diVIsion. It was feli

that the advantages gained in greater speed cost too much in terms

of protectIon, and their building cost was deemed too high for

thelr Inab111ty to fight against other Battleships. As a result, •

" • ~I·'. ".~•• ~.' .. ':).=' . /69

SIr Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt, the D.N.C., and others chose to

bUlld the slower, more heavily armed and armoured Battleships, • which appeared to mark the end of Fisher's dream pf the fast, 70 ultra-powerful Battie CrUIser.

Thus. from the Iaylng down of the INVINCIBLES in 1906 to the

begInnlng of the war, Britain managed tJ amass a f1eet of ten

Battle CruIsers, while Germany had on1y half as many ready for

combat ln 1914 (not Including the BLUCHER). They did, however,

manage to lay down four more Battle Cruisers before the war

started, which were the SEYDLITZ (24594 tons, ten 280mm guns, 305mm

main belt, and her machinery's 63000 SHP gave her a design

speed of 26.5 knots) and the three DERFFLINGERS, which included the

LUTZOW and HINDENBURG (26181 tons, eight 305mm guns, 305mm main

beIt, and a design speed of 26.5 knots), aIl of which proved 71 formidable warshlps. • There is one additional difference between the German and Bri tish ships that must be addressed. While the British Battie

CrUIsers were designed for use ln every ocean, the Germans designed

their ShlpS primarily to operate in the North Sea. There was never

any intent Ion on the part of the German AdmiraI ty ta let thei r

Battle Cruisers aperate in the Atlantic and disrupt British

shlpplng, as they were ta do in the Second World War. When the war

dld start, Germany had only one Battie Cruiser, the GOEBEN,

operating outside the North Sea, and she essentiaIIy ran straight

for ConstantInople rather than risk getting back home.

Nevertheless, thlS does show that Gprmany built her ShlpS for no • /70 better reason than because the British had them . - These ships, originally described as large Armoured Cruisers, • were later described as Dreadnought Cruisers, and by 1912, the name Battle Cruiser was permanently fixed ta them. Sorne have claimed that giving them this name caused sorne AdmiraIs ta rate these ships as belng able ta stand up to Battleshlps. The first Battle Cruisers, the INVINCIBLES, were originally intended ta be superior ta every other type of Armoured Cruiser, which they succeeded in being. Fisher' s decision to take the lead in the development of Dreadnoughts and Battle Cruisers gave England an advantage when war did break out in 1914, although it was not as large a lead as they might have been haped. But the logic of the arms race was quite apparent with regards to the Battle Cruisers; Britain bUllt hers e first, so Germany decided it had to have its versions as weIl, but • theirs would be even better warshlps. Britain cauntered with the INDEFATIGABLES and LIONS, which were bel ieved to be better than the German Battie Cruisers, who then countered with the SEYDLITZ and DERFFLINGERS, and so forth. Fisher's decislan ta take the lead in the arms race praved to be the right one, but the advantages afforded by the DREADNOUGHT and the INVINCIBLES lasted only until Germany came out wi th i ts versions of these ships, which meant that England had ta continue ta improve on these ships and build more of them. •e /71 e Chapter 3: The Battle Cruiser at War • The First World War has been considered something as a disappointment for the Royal Navy. It was widely believed that England's powerful Grand Fleet would defeat the German High Se as Fleet in the anticipated Trafalgar of the North Sea, while also

using i ts ships to blockade Germany' sports. Fisher also Il ade plans for the Royal Navy to conduct amphibious operations a10ng the German coastlines on the North Sea and the Baltic. And finally, to me(!t the threat of commerce raIders, Bri tain would use i ts Battle Cruisers to sweep the seas of this danger to its shipping. The decisive fleet battIe, the blockade, amphibious operations, and the

elimination of commerce raiders were key functions of the Royal e Navy in its history. Yet the Royal Navy was somewhat unprepared to fight this war. The German Fleet did not come out right away to • meet the Grand Fleet, and when they did meet, the resul ts would prove disappointing for both sides. The idea of amphibious operations on Germany's coasts fortunately never came to be, and Britain also dropped the conventional close blockade, due to the threat of Torpedo-Boats, Submarines, and mines, and replaced it

with a distant blockade of Germany. Lastly, while the Battle Cruisers proved successful against surface raiders, the main threat

against Britain's shipping would come instead from the German U- Boats. WhIle it is clear that the material side of the Royal Navy did improve considerably thanks to Fisher's reforms, i.t is also clear that it did not progress very far in terms of strategy. Its •e only real advantage was the fact that the German Navy was even less /72 .1 prepared for war.

The Flrst World War has often been regarded as the war of. the • Dreadnoughts, but the fact was that the Battle Cruisel's were engaged ln no fewer than flve battles, whlle the Dreadnoughts of

the Britlsh and German fleets only met for one engagement. Only

once durlng the course of the war were the Battle Cruisers ta

perform thei r prlmary task, ta hunt down and destroy potent la L

commerce raiders. Although they succeeded in this task, agaln the

real threat ta England' s commercial shipping during the war p.coved

ta he thp Submarines.

In thelr raIe as scouts for the fleet, lt is true that bott\

nations used their Battle Cruisers as the advance guard fOI the

main fleets, but even these had advance screens of L1ght CrUIsers,

which ln fact acted as the true scouts of the fleet. One roJe that

was ,added for these ShlPS that was never envisaged by FIsher was • shore bomhardment. The British sent one of their Battle Cruisers for such a purpose in the Dardanelles campaign, while the Germans

llsed thei r ships ta attack the Bri tish coast. Beatty even advocated

this prior ta the war, as wi 11 be shawn below. Another development

of the war was ta use these ships to lure each other's opposing

forces ta thelr respectlve main fleets. In short, they wero the

balt to set up a trap, albeit very expensive bait.

The dlspos1tlon of the Battle Cruisers at the start of the war

was as follows: the lst Battle CrUlser Squadron, under the command

of Rear-Admirai SIr David Beatty, consisting of the flagshlp LION,

PRINCESS ROYAL, QUEEN MARY, and NEW ZEALAND, along wi th eight oider •

..,... r~.. :'!.!f__ ;211@",iin, __ .,it!l!am;;::_II!I. t1E~§i!!~~Ej,nill,\\",ijJ,~iJjiJ""i'IIIWli"M",·""'" /73 e Armoured Cruisers, was placed with the Grand Fleet in home waters; • the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which consisted of the INFLEXIBLE, INDEFATIGABLE, and INDOMITABLE, along with four Armoured Cruisers, was based ln the Mediterranean; the AUSTRALIA was based in her own home waters; and lastly, the INVINCIBLE was undergoing a refit to her turret power system, which had been converted earller from the standard hydraulic ta an experimental eiectricai system, but this had proven unsatisfactory, and the ship went back ta the hydraulic ~ system. Germany had only three operationai Battie Cruisers in home waters at the start of the war, these being the VON DER TANN, MOLTKE, and SEYDLITZ(flagshIp), and along with the BLUCHER, these ShlpS were formed into the First Scouting Group, under the command e of Rear-Admi raI Franz Von Hipper, who would be Beatty' s main opponent during the war. The fourth Battie Cruiser, the GOEBEN, was • in the Medi terranean, and al though her serVIces were lost to Germany for the remainder of the war, she would cause considerable trouble for the Allies throughout the conflict. David Beatty's fame rests almost entirely on hlS having been commander of the British Battle Cruiser force throughout most of the war. He took command of this force on March Ist, 1913, and fIrmly believed that the role of these shlps to be purely

offensive. On April 5th, 1913, he issued his "Functions of a Battle Cruisler Squadron ", in which he wrote that their primary tasks would be: A. Supportlng a rapid reconnaissance by very fast Light Cruisers •e (27 or 25 knotters) on the enemy coast, at a high speed and e /74 sweeping a large area of hostile craft WhlCh sweep or • reconnaissance could only be interrupted by a strong force of enemy Battleships.

B. Supportlng a blockading force of of Armoured Cruisers.

C. Forming the support between an Armoured CruIser force and the

Battle Fleet when cruising.

D. Forming the supports to a Cruiser force watchlng an enemy's

Battle Fleet at sea.

E. And Final Function: Forming the first dIvisIon of a Battle Fleet 1 in a general action.

Thus he made it qUlte clear early on how he intended to use

hlS squadron. But Beatty was also weIl aware of the dangers from e Torpedo Boats, and issued another memorandum ln WhlCh he stated that the ideal defence against such a vessel was the Light CruIser, • and advised strongly that Light CrUIsers and Destroyers should 4 accompany the Battie Cruiser Squadron. This shows that Fisher's

earlier attItude ta the smaller Cruisers haù indeed been

shortsighted.

It 1s widely regarded that the Battle of the Falklands (Dec.

8th, 1914) was the occasion WhlCh supposedly vindicated Flsher's

VIsion of the Battle Cruiser, but this was actually achieved

earlier on. Ironically, it was the escape of the GOEBEN which

achieved thlS. This episode is one of the most painfui ln the Royal

Navy'~ history, because of the fateful consequences It had wlth

regards ta the strengthening of Germany's ties ta the Ottoman •e Empire, which resulted in its entrance ta the war on the Central •

/75 ~ e Powers' side later in 1914 . • The first clash of Battle Cruisers nearly occurred in the Medlterranean when on August 4th, 1914, the GOEBEN encountered the

INDEFATIGABLE and INDOMITABLE on her way to Messina. Hm,'1ever,

Britain was not yet at war with Germany, and she was able to evade

the BrItIsh Battle CrUlsers while she made her run for

Constantlnople. There i5 no need to recount the whole episode of

the GOEBEN and Light Cruiser BRESLAU' s escape from the

Medlterranean squadron, but it is necessary to mention the court

martial of Rear Admlral Ernest C.T. Troubridge, who commanded the

lst Cruiser Squadron and who had the best chance of bringlng the

GOEBEN to battle. It had been hls intention to engage the German e shlps, but he was somewhat influenced by Capt. Fawcett Wray, commander of the squadron flagship H.M.S. DEFENCE, who felt that • even though the GOEBEN was but one Battle Cruiser, she nevertheless represented a superior force to the four Armoured Cruisers of

Troubrldge's squadron. The Admlralty had sent earlier instructions

to AdmIraI SIr Archlbald Mllne, the C-in-C of the Mediterranean

Fleet, on July 30th, 1914, a few days before war was declared,

wtllch stated the followlng:

" .... Your fl rst task should be to aid the French in the transportatlon of thelr Afrlcan Army by coverlng, and if possIble, brlnging to action Indlvidual fast German ships, partlcularly GOEBEN, who may interfere with that transportation .... Do not at thlS stage be brought to action agalnst superior forces, except ln comblnatlon with the French, as part of a general battle. "6

It was thlS definltion of what exactly counted as a superlor •e force that became the bone of contention . e j7b On the night of Aug. 7th. 1914, Troubridge's squadron was • patrolling off the island of Cephalonia, south of Cortu, when word came in that the GOEBEN was approaching towards hl s genera l

position. He ordered hlS squadron, WhlCh conslsted of H.M.S.

DEFENCE, H.M.S. WARRIOR, H.M.S. DUKE OF EDINBURGH, and H.M.S BLACK

PRINCE, to intercept the GOEBEN. l t was estimated that he could

have met her around 6:00 a.m. the followlng day. However, CdPt-.

Wray's opinion was that the GOEBEN's 280mm guns could easl1y

out range the 234mm and 190mm guns that the British Cruisers

carried, and that the German ShlP'S superlor speed over the BrItIsh

ships could enable her to remain outside the maximum fi nng rat}(Jf~

of the Bntish guns. In hlS mlnd, thlS combination of sllpenor e speed and long range firepower represented a superior force, WhlCh they were ordered not ta engage. Troubridge accepted thlS advlce, • and broke off the attempt ta intercept the GOEBEN at around 4 :00 a.m. ThIS brought about severe criticism by the AdmIraIt y, who

ordered Troubridge back ta England ta face a Court of Enqulry.

The case agalnst Troubndge essentlally rested on whether or

not the GOEBEN could be regarded as a supen or force. TIH?

representatlve for the defence, Leslle Scott, argued that Whl} e the

GOEBEN' 5 guns had a range of up to 25000 yards, the fu rthps t thi~

British guns could reach was 16200 yards, and that on a cledr rtay

such as Aug. 8th, the GOEBEN could have Ilsed her supenor speed ilnd

gun-range to maximum advantage. Scott turned the argument agalnst

Milne's dISpositIon of hlS three Battle CruIsers, the INFLEXIBLE, •e INDOMITABLE, and INDEFATIGABLE, WhlCh he stated were the proper

------/77

wilrshl[lS far watchlng the GOEBEN.

By Nov. 9th, the court we.ighed the factol's and came ta the

• conrlu::-non that at that paI:tJcular tlme, the circumstances

warranted that GOEBEN be consldered as a superlor force, and thus

,j('qultted 'rrouhridge. Th{~ Adnnralty was not pleased by this

vprdH.:t. FIsher, who had replaced Prince Louu:; of Battenberg as

Flrst Seél Lord ,l few weeks E'arlH~r, found that the iauit lay wlth

MIlne',:) diSposItIon of hlS BattlH CruIsers, whlle the rest of the

Admira] ty ("hose to place the blame squarely upon Troubridge's

should(~n). Yet It 1.S somewhdt ] ronlC that the Battie Cru1.scr should

havE' bE~en f 1. T'st v l n<1 lCc-1tcd l Tl a courtroom rath8r than i Il combat.

Fisher hdd boasted for years that these ShlPS were superlor to aIl

other Armouleù Cnnsers, and the Court ot Enqlllry agreed,

acqul ttlng Troubo.dHe. Ho\tlever 1 considenng the Impact Uns ShlP • hdd because of her escape, 1t 15 smaii wonder why sa many British Adml ra) s hü t: dlsgusted by 'l'roubrldge \ s act and t.he findlngs Dt the

court maltiai.

The BattIe> Crulser's flIS"t actual test as él warshlp accurrec1 7 on Aug. 28lh, 1914, c'lt the Battle of Heligoland l31ght. The plan for

thiS engagement was Inl t ldted hy CommodorE' Roger Keyes, head of the

Sllbmarlne Sel'v\co, and Commodore Reglné\ld Tyrwhltt, who commanded

the Hclrwlch Force. They camf~ up Wl th a plan to ambush the German

Dpstroypr Patrols off Hell<]olclnd, under the pretext t hat this would

st-'rvp ,lb d df.."'tence agrllnst Ell1elayers élnd U-BOilt!". The plan was

'lppr'av('d hy the Actnll raI ty Ull Puq 24th,

- &... __ scat rMiX /78 - with eight Submarines from Keyes' commando As a precaution, the • Adml raI ty al sa ordered Rear-Admi raI Si r Archibald Moore' s two Battle Cruisers, the INVINCIBLE and NEW ZEALAND, which were at the

Humber at the tlme, to assist Tyrwhitt to the northwestward. When

the INVINCIBLE had completed her refit, Beatty had expected her to

be added to his command, but was disappolnted ta learn that she and

the NEW ZEALAND were to be added to CrUIser Force K.

Beatty was ordered by Jellicoe on the morning of the 27th to

take hlS lst Battle CrUIser Squadcon, along with Goodenough's lst

Light CrUlser Squadron, to jOln Moore's Squadron and support the

operatIon. However, due to an error in staff work, Tyrwhltt and

Keyes never got word of thlS, which contributed greatly to ensuing

confusion. 1 t was saon :.1ade apparent that Tyrwhi tt' s force had - encountered much heavier OppOSl tion than had been antIcipated, and • Tyrwhitt sent out an urgent appeal fer asslstance, clalmlng that he was very hard pressed. Beatty declded to send Goodenough's squadron

in to support Tyrwhitt's battered force. Beatty correctly reallsed

that the plan had gone awry, and that Goodenough's force ffilght not

be strong enough to save Tyrwhl tt. However, if he moved hlS own

ShipS into the Bight, he would be exposing them to the very real

dangers of mines and Submarlnes. The fact that the VlSl~111ty WdS

very poor a1so added to his dilemma, Slnce there was also the

danger of being flred upon by friendly unIts or by belng surpnsed

by German capItal ShlpS. Capt. Alfr:~d ErnIe Chatfleld, Beatty'n

Flag-Captaln on board the LION, recall~d what happened:

"The Bight was not a pleasant spot lnto which to take great •- ships; It was unknown whether mInes had been laId there, /79

Submannes w(~re sure ta be on patrol, and ta move Into this ëJŒB s) near to thE' great German base at Wi Ihelmshaven was ri sky. VlSlblllty was low and la be surprlsed bl' a superior force of capltdJ ShlpS was not unllkely. 'rhey would have hdd plenty of time • to leavû harbour Slnce Tyrwhltt's presence had flrst been known." "Beatty was not long ln maklng up lus .mnd. He said to me, What do l'ou thlnk we should do? 1 aught to go and support Tyrwh l t t, but If J lose one ot these valuable ShlpS the country WIll never forglve me. '" "Unburdened \tH th respons i bi Il ty, and eager for exei tement, l salc1, Surely we must go.' lt was a11 he needed ... "~

Bealty turned hIS stl1p~ E.S.E., and wlth their arrIvaI the

bdttle was practlcally over. Moore's ShlpS, belng somewhat slower,

took prdctlrally no part ln the engagement, and the laurels went

prLmar11y ta Beatty's BIg Cats. It must be noted that Moore aisa

lh~d fI ve CRESSY-class Arrnouted Cnll sers in hl s forcA, but the.3(l

vesseis welf~ weIl pùst thelr prlme, and 1t was declded not ta

Include them ln the battle. The Battle Cruisers deslroyed ln short

ol.der the Light CruIsers AHIADNE and KOLH, as weIl aH damaglng • three other CrUlSf!rS, whlle the lighter ShlpS (llspatched the Llght CrUIser MAINZ. By early afternoon, Beatty ordered a general

wlthdrdwal, WhlCh ended the battle.

Beatty had used hlS ghlpS almost exactly llke a cdvalry ot the

seas, dnd then' lS no doubt thdt wlthout his IntE'rvention

Tyrwhltt's force would llav (\ heen defeated. But as he lùter put lt,

"The ends )ust-lfied the means, but if l had lost d Battlc~ C nu sel' 1 shonl ci have been hanged, drawn and quartered. Yet 1 t Wc1S necessary to 1-un the nsk to .::;ave two of our Llght CrulSf~rs and a large force of Destroyers WhlCh otherwlse would most certalnly have b(-~(~n l o~'j t . \1 ')

Beattl's Judg(-~ment (11d prnve to be rlght, but he WëlS also

qlllt.P correct that had he lost one of hls ships, he would have had • llluch t 0 .ln~Wet- fOl, wtllctl expl ains why he dHl not want to stay any /BO

longer in the Blght once the German Itght forces were drlvpn oft . • The Battle Cruiser' s moment of tn umph, dS weIl ,lS Fl 8h('I" S moment of vindicatlon, came at the Battle of the Falklands. This

was the battle for WhlCh they were speclflcalLy created, and the

prophecy that they coul d catch any Armoured CulÏ ser and ùntll tnl d t t' JQ it was fuifiiied by thlS engagement,

The vlctory was all the more sweet in the pub]}("s lI\1nd Wllll

the knowledge that they had avenged an e<1rl1(\{" def~at at COfO[\f> 1

that was almost as spectacul ar as the one they had In1 Il ct (~d on 111('

Germans. Both sides won dgalnst foes that wc n' ('onSldcldl>ly

inferior; at Coronel, Adml raI Von Spee' s Squadroll W(lS V.l~lt 1 y

stronger than Craddock' s, \..rhlle at the Fal klands l t WiiS Von Sppp

who found hlffisel t fac~ng hopeless ocids agalrlst Sturdee'~; Bdll 1 (l

Cruisers. The Br] tlsh vir.tory effectlvely ollm1 fldtpd t hp G('rUldrl • naval presence outSlde of the North Soa and the thn~al of pOWt' 1 j III surface raiders that could threaten Br l t i sh sh l pp. n~l, wh 1 ch mo,H1 t

that one of the pnmary dut les ot these sh t p~i had llc(!n ('omp 1(·1 pd

wi thin a few weeks after th(~ outbrcdk of thü WdT.

Flsher's reactlon ta the Caronel dlsaster was 10 dotach thr<.~{·

Battie CrUlsers from the Grand Fleet t 0 go ot f ilnd hunt- down Von

Spee's force. Winston Churchill, the Flrst Lord nL the Acjllllr~llty,

suggested to Fisher on thn 4t-h that they send orH~ H,itl le ('r111H(~r (fi

305rrun shJp) and the Armollrecl Cruiser DEFENCE to do thi<" but (.Hl hl'

Instead to send lwo. '['hese wauld b(l the INVINCIBLE ,Hld UIC' • INFLEXIBLE, and as a contlnqcncy plan he also ordered the

m" /81

e detachment of the PRINCESS ROYAL from Beatty' s force ta go the West • Indies ta watch the Panama Canal for Spee. This was certainly audacious of his part, for at this time Hipper had used his Battle

Cruisers to bomba rd Yarmouth on Nov. 3rd, and the Navy was still in

shock from the loss of the Armoured CrUIsers HOGUE, CRESSY and

ABOUKIR ta the Submarine U-9 in September, and of the mining of the

Dreadnought AUDACIOUS on Oct. 27th. To detach the three Battle

Cruisers following these events left Bri tain wi th a slim numerical

superlority in capital ships, but Fisher stood firm in his

decisIon.The actual hunting force consisted of the two Battle

Cruisers, four Armoured Cruisers (DEFENCE, CARNARVON, KENT, and

CORNWALL) , two L Ight Crul sers (BRISTOL and GLASGOW, the latter e having survi ved the Coronel di sas ter ) and the Armed Merchant Cruiser MACEDONIA, under the command of Vice-AdmiraI Sir Doveton • Sturdee. Against this force Von Spee had the two Armoured CrUIsers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, as weIl as the Light Cruisers LEIPZIG,

NURNBERG, and DRESDEN.

The supenorl ty of Sturdee' s force over Von Spee' s could have

but one outcome. The broadslde of the INVINCIBLE alone was heavier

than that of the entire German squadron (5100 lbs. vs. 4442 lbs.).

For most of the battle, the British ships used thelr speed to stay

out of the range of Spee's 2l0mm guns, but their long-range gunnery

was so poor that they scored the majority of their hits when they

were wIthln the range of the German guns. In sorne ways, the battle

dispelled Flsher's belief that supenority in speed would enable •e them to Slnk thelr foes wlthout ever corning within e /82 their effective firing range. The speed advantage was only useful • if they were able to fire accurate1y at extreme range, WhlCh they cou1d not.

A1though it is not certain, it is estimated that both German

Armoured Cruisers suffered about fort y 305mm shel1 hi ts. 'l'he

INVINCIBLE bore the brunt of the German fire, taklng a total of

twenty-two 210mm and 150mm hits, which caused moderate damage,

whlle the INFLEXIBLE suffered only three hl ts. The INVINCIBLE fi red

513 305mm she1ls, while INFLEXIBLE fired 661, which shows clearly Il that their shootlng was not very good. Part of this can be excused

by the fact that nelther ShlPS had operating directors, and the

burning of oi 1 fuel on the INVINCIBLE wi th her coal durlllg the e chase created a dense black smoke which hampered bath her own gunners and the INFLEXIBLE's as weIl. • The success of the Battle CrUIsers at the Falklands wal:i seen as the vindicatlon of Fisher's policies, but It also led to

hlS greatest foUy, WhlCh was the deciSlon to bUlld hlS wartlmo

Battle Cruisers. This pushed the whole concept of large guns on <.l

11ght frame tao far. These ShipS were part of the maJor bUlld Ing

programme he announced earller on Nov. 3rd for the Royal Navy,

which would amount to a total of 612 ShlpS, of Whl ch f] ve wou Id be

his light Battle Cruisers. Their main features were to have huge

guns, faster speed than any of the precedlng Battle CrUIsers, and

a very llght draught that would allow them ta operate ]n the Baltic

for hlS so-called carnpalgn of opening a new front on 11. •- Germany's Baltlc coast . •

/83 - Hipper had earlier managed to get permission on Oct. 29th to • take his Battle Cruisers on a raid on the English coast, which would act as a diversion for mining operations for his llghter 13 forces. ThIS was at a time when Jellicoe had concentrated aIl major

naval unI ts in the north, which left the entire Engl ish coast

practically undefended. Hlpper' s force included the SEYDLITZ,

MOLTKE, VON DER TANN, and BLUCHER, along with four Light Cruisers,

whlle the bulk of the Hlgh Se as Fleet remained around Heligoland

Bight. Ingenohl was not enthusiastic with this plan, and feared

very much that the Battle CruIsers would expose themselves.

Nevertheless, Hipper went off on the afternoon of Nov. 2nd. The

force came Into contact with a group of British Destroyers, which

were abl e to thwart Hlpper' s operation. He turned hi s force around - after having fired a few scattered shots at Yarmouth, none of which • actually hit the town. However, the raid did serve as a lesson for further operations.

Ingenohl decided to attempt another raId on the BrItish coast

on Nov. 16th, partly because of the information that INVINCIBLE and

INFLEXIBLE were not ln home waters. This raId was later rescheduled

for Dec. l6th, and Its alm was ta bombard the towns of Scarborough, 11 Hartlepool, and Whltby. Hipper's force consisted agaln of the

SCYDLITZ, VON DER TANN, MOLTKE, BLUCHER, and the new DERFFLINGER,

along with four Llght Cruisers and two Torpedo Boat flotillas. The

Bri tIsh, having decoded the German radio SIgnaIs (thanks ta the use

of the German Navy' s codes and posi tlon grId charts for both •- Hellgoland Blght and the North Sea that were salvaged from the e /84 wreck of the Light Cruiser MAGDEBURG in August), decided to send • Beatty's force out of Rosyth, along with Tyrwhitt's force from the south and the six Dreadnoughts of the 2nd Battle Squadron that were

based in Cromarty, to ambush and destroy Hipper's force. But what

the Bn tish did not know was that Ingenohl deClded ta take the

entire High Se as Fleet to act as a back up for Hipper. Although

Hipper did bombard the Engl i sh coastal towns, nei ther side was ab 1e

ta engage the other, and both sides were left disappointed.

The first actual meeting between the ri val Battle Cruiser

forces occurred on Jan. 24th, 1915, at the Battie of Dogger Bank,

which was essentially a dress rehearsal for Jutland. It was the

first duel between the rival Battle CruIser cornmanders, and one 15 e that would agaln Ieave both commanders highly frustrated . On Jan. 23rd, the BritIsh were able ta decode Ge~man radio • signaIs that Hipper was going ta take out a force of four Battie .... Cruisers, the SEYDLITZ, DERFFLINGER, MOLTKE, and BLUCHER, along wi th SIX Llght Cruisers and twenty-two Destroyers to scout the

Dogger Bank. They were able ta place Hipper at a spot thi rty ml les

north of the Bank at 7:00 a.m. for the folIowlng marnlng, and plans

were made to intercept hlm. Beatty would take five of hls Battle

Cruisers, the LION, PRINCESS ROYAL, NEW ZEALAND, INDOMITABLE, and

the newly-completed TIGER, along with four Llght CruIsers, and

would be further asslsted by another three Light CrUIsers and

thirty-five Destroyers from Harwich.

Beatty sighted the German Battle CruIsers at 7:50 a.m., and •e Hipper, realIslng that he might be seriously outnumbered, wlsely /85 - opted to salI back to port. However, he had ta maintain a speed of • 23 knots because of the BLUCHER, whose slower speed threatened disaster for hlS entire force. The action started shortly before

9:00 a.m., when the LION fired at a range of 22000 yards at the

BLUCHER, which was unprecedented before this battle.

The BrItIsh shooting on thlS day was again quite poor, but the

LION managed to draw first blood shortly before 10:00 a.m.,

obtaInlng a hit on the SEYDLITZ which would prove to be a blessing

in dIsgulse for the Germans. This was the third hit on her that

mornlng, WhlCh struck her at a range of 17000 yards. The shell

struck the quarterdeck and burst in holing the 230mm barbette

armour of the sternmost turret. The shell was kept out, but armour e fragments entered, piercing the ring bulkhead, WhlCh ignlted the 280mm main and fore charges in the gunhouse and those of the lower • hOlsts and handlng room, as weIl as sorne in the magazine which alsa caught fire. The charges from the handing roam ignited and flash

passed into the superflring turret, WhlCh led ta the destruction of

sixty-two maIn and fore charges, WhlCh equalled about six tons of

propellant. It is quite certain that the ship would have blown up

were it not for the bravery of three c~ewmen who managed to flood

the magazIne, whI~h prevented the explosion of the 280mm shells

from the Intense heat. The flooding caused the shlp's draught aft

to rlse to about 11.3m, while the steering compartments had to he

abandoned for half an hour trom fumes. The hit on the SEYDLITZ

would be repeated in exact same way on four British Battle Cruisers •e at Jutland, but unfortunately for them only the LION woulJ be jH6 J6 saved .

Desplte thlS hlt, the SEYDLITZ was stIll operatlol1cl1, .md .111

• thr ee German Bdt t le Crul sers began to SCOf'e lu ts on the. LION, wh tell

was saon put out of actlon. However, Hipper WdB dble ta pxtTH:ùti'

hlmsel f from a most desperate SI tuation thanks lo a signa t tH rot on

the pùrt of the BrltIsh, who mlstakenly led thelr fo[cl's towdrr\:,

the ct'lppled BLUCHER \nstead of the othet GL'lll\dfl H,ll t 10 Cl\11Rf'1!L

Althollgh he lost the unfortunate BI.UCHER, 1I1pp12r 's tOtce llvpd ln

flght another clay. Beatty WélS cheered tor Uns vl("tory, but lin knpw

that he had lost a golden OppOltUIllty to deal wlth IhPPl'l.

Many l~~ss()ns wel'e learned from th i s pngagement., bu t l t. WdH thn

Germans who would profit the most. rrhe ne,lI'-deslruct:lon of lllt'

SEYDLJ'rZ due ta tnnet exploslon caused thf'm to 1lI0dlfy aIl 01 lhl'II'

Battle CrUl sers by ceduclng the amounts of rCddy US(~ <.... 11lI11Il 1 t IOU ,\l\d

propellant charges, as weIl as adding extril bulkheddf; ëlnd d{~('klTHJ • l " ln order to prevent the spreddl ng of the f1 ash t 0 t'h(' IIIdqd:,f, 1111.'. 'J'lu'

BrItIsh would have ta walt for Jutland for ,1 tlu:,t-h,H)rl dC(OUllt 01

the danger thlS posed tn thell Battlc Cruisers. They wei (' more

occupied by the ffiissed oppor. t url! ty to desl'roy Hl pper t hdn t hüY W(![(>

ln aSSeSf,Jng the damdge to th(~lr stllpS.

'l'here was also cons1cterable grllmbllflg about Ul(~ Br l t i!-jh

shootlng WhlCh, apart frolO th<.-> luts on the BLUCHER, obLllnnd ouly

SIX hltS on Hlpper's other SlllpS. 'l'he InstaJldllon oi <11r

fIrlng (createrl hy Admlral l'f~rcy Scott) dnc! Ti:\[)(j(-' cl()c:k~-. tu rlii

Battie CrUIsers WdS speeded up, but l t was c1p.cLCled ta use UJ(..! • Dreyer. fI re> control tdbles 1 nstead OVfH the super ior Argo Clock /87

invented by Pollen. Only the QUEEN MARY was fltted with both a

Mark IV Ar-go Clock and Mark II Dreyer 'rable, and as a resul t her

• f lrlPg proved somewhat better than the other Bri tish Battle ] 8 C .1sers.

As for the damage from the sixteen hi ts that the LION had

n~cel ved, l t appedred to most that her armour was not strong enough

to Wl thstand the German shells. Her 127mm (5-lnch) and 152mm arrnour

plate WdS repeatedly penetrated by 280mm shells, whlle the 230mm

iUffiour ltdd also been piercE'd by the DERFFLINGER 1 s 305mm shells.

However, there was no way for them ta know about the weakness of

thelr magazIne protectIon, and no Improvements were made in th18

area.

Dogger Bank proved ta be Ingenohl ' s downfall, and also ended

the 'Tlp and Run' raiels by the German Battle Cruisers. It was not • untll the spring of 1916 that the German f leet attempted anoth(~r major op~~ration.

The next op€~ration il1vol vlng the Battle Cruiser was in th(~

Dardanelles operations. H.t<1.S INFLEXIBLE went III and bombarded the

Turklsh forts on Feb. 19th élnd Feb. 25th, 1915, and returned on

Mareh 18th. In thlS last dssdult, CampbE'll wrote that her flr1ng

proved the rnost ef fecti ve. hut she suffered consi.dcrabl e damage

f rom she11 f 1 n~ and fram a mine explosIon, and as il resul t was

fOlced to 11mp away at 12 knots. She would prave to he the only

Btltlsh HattIE' CrUlser ln the war ta suffer damage trom an

unde l'Not er weapon. Campbe 11 further wrote that having used a Batt le • CIUlS('! for thlS tYPt' ()P(~ldtion was a ffii1jor mlstake. and on0 for /88 li - which she was clearly not designed. However, 1 t must be remembered • that in war many types of weapons systems are often called upon to do things which they are not des1gned to do, and the use of tlle'

INFLEXIBLE in this role as weIl as the bombardment of the Bll t1 s1l

coast by the German Battle Crul.sers deflnltely fall into thlf;

category.

Jutland. The ward itself lS almost synonymous wlth the doom 01

the Battle Cruisers. It was the only encounter between thp

respect1ve battle f!eets aÏ Germany and Great Brltaln, but from

this pOInt onwards the att1 tude towards the Battie CrUl ser woul d bp

forever altered, and Flsher's clalffi that speed equaJled protection

would prove ta be folly.

The battle was dlvlded into three phases: the f1rst phùsP

- being the Battle CruIser skirnnsh between H1pper and 8edtty; tlw • second phase, WhlCh pl tted the Grand Fl eet agalnst the H l

Fleet; and the thIrd phase, WhlCh was nIght sklrmlshes bc-twet'n th(' 20 f1eets. Beatty's force consisted of SIX Battle CrUIsers (LION,

PRINCESS ROYAL, QUEEN MARY, TIGER, NEW ZEALAND, and INDEFI\TIGABLE),

a10ng Wl th the 5th Battle Squadron, WhlCh had four of thf' QUEEN

ELIZABETH-class BattleshIps, as weIl as fourteen LIght Crulsers,

twenty-seven Destroyers, and one Seaplane CarrIer. JeJ licoe's fleet

contalned twenty-four Dreadnoughts, three 8attle CrUIsers (Hood's

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, WhICh had the three INVTNCIBLES),

elght Armoured CrUIsers, twelve Llght CrUIsers, ami f l fty-on(~

Destroyers. As for the Germans, thelr organlzatlon was as folluws: •- Hlpper's force held the Flrst and Second Scoutlng Groups, WhlCh had the flve Battle Cruisers (LUTZOW, DERFFl.INGER, SEYDL l 1'7., MOLTKE,

and VON DER TANN) and {ive Llght Cn.llsers, \\llnle Schper'~ Hl~Jh SI'.t:;

• F leet came out Wl th SI xteen Dreadnought and SIX Pr-e-Ih (h.'Hlllnll~llt t

Battlesh1.ps, as \'Vell as SlX Llght Cnnser:s, dIld both sllies h,Hi .1

total of SIX and one-ha] f Destroyer flot 1 ll

gave the BrItIsh a thrQe tu two numerlcùl advantage OVPf" tht' C1'11l1<.1tl

fleet, but thlS was mltlgated by clrcumstanct=>s WhH:h (JdVP th",

Germans several opportunl ties ta hurt the Rrt t i sh sil 1 ps.

The Batt.le Cnnsers \oJere to be used as c1 sen'en and lookemt

for the maIn fleet. Theil' maIn functions ln d 9pner,11 lle('l dct Ion

were ta destroy the enemyls Battle Cruisers; support th(~ J.lqht

Cruisers, poor to engaging the enerny HattIe CnllSe[S, lU pUSllll\U

home thei r reconnaissance of the enemy' s min n f If~et; 1 f no t'lIellly

fleet was present, or if the enemy fleet was destroyf~d, thf'y Wt'H! • ta act as a fast di VI si on of the f leet and ta at tack lhp ViUl nf lhf_' enemy (If lt was possIble ta attaln a sufflClently commandlnu

POSItIOn); and finally, if no enemy Battie Cn.lJ seTS WPfU present.

they could dnve al! enemy light vesseis and glve ttlP lniUn ttal_'l

the éldvantage of the full informa tIan as tot_he en(~IIIY':'" f J eet ,

whIle denYlng the enemy' s fleet all knowledge of the Bl-itu;;h /Ilaln ?-1 fleet (unless obtained by ai reraft ). It wi Il b(' l nteres t lrlU t 0 sC'P

how successfui the BrItish HattIe Crulsers were ln these tasks.

The fIrst phase was essentially a rematch betwef.'n Hipper and

Beatty. Agaln, l t was the advanced /01 ght Cru} f.i(~rs (EU!! Ne; ,md

GALATEA) WhlCh spotteçl ei1ch other, and each reported to the i T • respecti ve commanders. B€~atty kept the QlJEEN ELI ZABETHS in the n~a r /90

of hl s f l eet, and engaged Hl pper' s force wi thout having wal ted for

thesc StllpS to J0111 wlth tas Batt1e Cruisers. Beatty \<'as cr1ticlsed

• have 111S SlX tor thlS, but he must feit that ships were more than

a match for Hipper' s fi ve, and ttlat If he had wai ted for the 5th

battl e Squadron to catch up, Hlpper might have been able ta escape

yet agaln. But he pald a t.crnble price for Uns; shortly after the

Hattie CUllsers were engaged, the VON DER rANN managed to score

tn ts on the INDEFATIGABLE' s turrets at a range of about 15500 ta 22 16000 yards. The German shells penetraled the I3rltlsh armour,

caused il flash wh 1 ch detonat ed the cordj te, and th LS caused her

magazIne ta E'xplode. ThIS was shortly followed by the destructIon

of the QUEEN MARY, WhlCh was fired upon by the SEYDLITZ and

DERFFLINGER at about 14000 to 15000 yards, WhlCh was again caused 23 by a magazIne explOSIon. Beatty's LION also nearly met the salUe • tate when a shell pierced her "Q" turret, which caused a flash that nearly detonated the magazIne. She was only bare]y saved when her

magazIne was ordered flooded, and one cannot help but notice that

her predicament WdS practically identlcal ta the that of SEYDLITZ ~1 at Dogger Bank. Overall, Hipper' s handllng of hlS force at lhlS

point was nothJllg less than brilllant, as he not only sank two

Bntlsh capl .. al ShlpS (in the face of a superior force), but

succeedecl ln lunng Beatty straight lnto Scheer's hands. Hipper

sl1cceeded ln hlS asslgned raIe, but had to wait to see lf Scheer

woulcl be able to fully exp](>lt thi.s.

Much has been WI Itten about th's first phase of the battle, on • how the Germon shoot ing was m'lch superior ta the Bri tish, and how /91 e inadequate the Bri t i sh armour on the Battle Cruisers was, but that

is only part of the story. The German fire was more accurate, but • it must be noted that at thlS stage the Bntish ships were cledrly

out1ined against the sun, whi1e the German ShlpS were often covered

in the mist, which meant that they had a much easi el' task of

spotting the Brltish ShipS than the Britlsh ShlpS had in spottlng

thern. Later in the battle, it would be noted that the German finng

became considerably less accurate, while the British shootlng

seerned to improve as the batt1e progressed. But the only BritIsh

Battle Cruiser to have fired effectlvely ln thlS flrst phase was

the QUE EN MARY, whi ch was the fi rst Bri tish ship to score hl ts on

the Germans. The Germans themselves claimed that her firing had e been the rnost accu rate of Beatty' s Battle CrUIsers. As al ready mentioned, she was the only British ship in thlS force to have been • fi tted wi th bath an Argo Clock and a Dreyer Table. One can at best only speculate on what mlght have happened in the opemng phase if

the BrItish had fitted Poiien's Argo Clocks to their ShlpS.

Just as Hipper was luring Beatty in Scheer's arms,

Goodenough' s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted the Hlgh Seas

Fleet, and Beatty was informed ln time to escape annIhilation. HIS

dut y now was to 1ure the entire German force into Jelllcoe's arrns,

and to do so he had ta ensure that Hipper had ta be prevented from

sighting the Grand Fleet. The . Run to the North' phase of the

battle was Beatty's flnest moment of the battle, as hIS force

completely prevente~ the First Scouting Group from spotting -• Jellicoe. JelllcoB had sent Hood's 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in /92 - advance to support Beatty, and their arrivaI on the battle scene forced back the Light Cruisers of the Second Scouting Group, and • prevented their being able to sight the Grand Fleet. Although the INVINCIBLE, Hood's flagship, was soon destroyed (again due ta a

magazIne explOSIOn), the High Seas Fleet sailed right into

Jellicoe's arms. From that point onwards, Scheer's task was to get

back home. HIS ships suffered much damage, but returned relatively

intact, while the Bri tish were cursing that they had not been given

enough daylight that would have enabled them to destroy the High

Seas Fleet. Scheer survived, and ~nflicted greater casualties than

he h3Ù suffered, but this would prove ta be his only chance to

avert total defeat, and he lost. ASlde from a few sorties, the High

Seas Fleet never ddred to challenge England's control of the North - Sea, WhlCh in ~ffect was tantamount to conceding victory to the • Royal Navy. Because the BrItish had noc won a second Trafalgar, many in

England were qutck to point the finger of blame. Jellicoe could

have been accused of having been tao cautious, and Beatty couid

have been accused of having been somewhat reckless, but most of the

immediate blame was heaped at the Battie Cruisers. Beatty' s most

famous line during the battle was when he said to Chat field, "There

seems ta be somethlng wrong wi th our bloody ships today, " which has 25 been incorporated into the Jutland folklore. Jellicoe hirnself later

stated:

"The facts which contribute:d to the Bri tish lasses wer~. first, th~ indifferent armour protection of our Battle Cruisers, •e particularly as regards turret armour and deck plating, and, /93 e second, the disadvantage under which our vessels laboured III • regaras to the light."26 As a result, the Battle CruIsers were regarded as deathtraps.

Those who ciaimed that the British Battle CruIsers were too

thinly arrnoured felt vindicated by the results of th1S battle. Thp

German Battle Cruisers, WhlCh had been given more arrno~r, were able

to withstand much greater punishment, whereas the Brl tlsh stllp8

proved incapable of sustaining the same degree of damage. ThIS 18

one of the more popular myths of the battle, but the truth l S

entirely different. The tacts were that the British were plagued by

inadequate shells and magaZIne protection rather than thlTl armour.

Parkes noted that the BrItish 305mm shells were penetrating 254mm e armour on the German ships at about 17500 yards (19000 yards for the 343mm shel1s), while the maximum range that the German sheJls 27. • were penetrating 234mm armour was recorded as 14600 yards. The tault lies with the tact that the BritIsh shell~ werp fitted wlth

a lyddite burster, which proved tao senSItIve. The result was

that the shells ei ther detonated prematurely or broke up on lmpact,

which meant that the explOSIve force of the shells were expended

mostly outside the armour, thereby negating much of their damage 28 potential. ThIS gave the appearance that the German armour was

capable of withstanding considerable damage. Had the BrItish been

given more effective shells, the battle might have been a clear

victory for them.

As for the magazine, tests on the LION showed that her cordi te •e charges were extremely unstable. It had been assurned that the /94 e charges would merely burn rather than flash off when they were

ignited. They used a vasellne-based solvent to stabilize tl'Ie

• propellant, while the Germans used solventless cordite, which was

much more stable, and they placed the charges ln metal covers (the 29 Brltlsh placed theirs in silk bags). The failure of the British-

style cordIte would prove to be the main cause of the destruction

of the three Battle CrUIsers and the Arrnoured Cruiser DEFENCE at

Jutland. Thi s style of cordIte was also responsible for the

destructIon of the Battleships BULWARK and VANGUARD, the Japanese

TSUKUBA and KAWACHI, and the Italian BENEDETTO BRIN and LEONARDO DA .JQ VINeT.

Beatty 1 S overa.ll performance at the battle needs some further e analysis. It is true that he should have waited for the 5th Battle Squadron to jOln his ShipS befor! engaging Hipper, which would have • gi ven hirn a huge advantage over his opponent, and that he only narrowly avolded Scheer 1 s trap thanks to Goodenough 1 s

reconnaissance, which gave hlm time ta turn away. He has also beea

accused of not having kept Jell icoe weIl informed of the posi tion

of hlS ShipS and the German ShIpS, which often left hlS Commander-

in-Chief ln the dark. But despi te having been outski rmished by

Hipper, he succeeded in bringing the whole High Seas Fleet to

Jell icoe, and bath he and Hoad prevented the German scout ing forces

from informing Scheer of the trap intù which he was heading.

For hlS part, SIr Horace Hood showed considerable bravery in

the handl ing of his squadron, but the range he engaged the German •- ShIpS, WhlCh varied between 8500 to 11000 yards, was too close for /95 - these ships. When the visiblilty changed, the German ShlPS wen:l • able to see the INVINCIBLE clearly, and she was shortly destroyed when a shell i gni ted the propellant in "Q" turret, which caused her

magazine ta explade. Like the Armoured CruIser DEFENCE, which blew

Up shot"tly before, the armour of these ships was clearly not 11 adequate when engaged at shorter ranges. UnI ike the other two

Battie CrUIsers, \tlhich were destroyed at longer ranges, the 108S of

both the INVINCIBLE and DEFENCE was the result of having placed

thern where they should not have been. Al though both Beatty and Hood

fai led in thei r main task to destroy Hipper, they did succeed in

preventing the Gerrnans from detectlng Jellicoe's arrIvaI.

Hipper's performance at the battle as been cansidered as

almcst flawless. He had faced a superlOr force, destrayed two - Battle Cruisers, and succeeded in luring Beatty towards Scheer. • Later, in arder ta prevent a total defeat, he was arderE~d ta take hiR Battie Cruisers and lead them into what was in effect a SUlcide

charge at the British fleet, in arder to cover Scheer's retreat.

His ShlpS were badly pummelled, but he suceeeded in enabl ing

Scheer's fleet to get away, and wound up loslng only one Battie

Cruiser, his flagship LUTZOW. The only part Hipper can claim

failure was his inability ta inforrn Scheer of Jellicae's approach,

and once Jellicoe was in the battle, thoughts of victory were

qui ckly replaced wi th thoughts of escape. Beatty had succeeded 1 n

luring both Hipper and Scheer towards .JellIcoe as he had been led

by Hipper towards Scheer. The only reason why the Germans did not •- have ta paya higher priee was due to the approach of darkness, the /96

InterlOrity of the Britlsh shells, a'nd the rernarkable toughness of

the~r stllpS, WhlCh were c,apable of getting back to port ètespite

• senous ponnding they took. the

In essenc€~, the BatUe CrUlsercl fulfllled thel!" role of balt

perfectly ln thlS battle, hut cOLlld Uns rol€~ have been handled by

small€!r and less expenslve warshIps? \~ould Scheel' have consldered

d fleet of Llght Cruisers as worth chasing aftet-? Probahly not. The

Bat t le Crul sers (;.md the QUEEN ELI ZABETHS) \'lTere l ndeed targets

worthy enough to chase, and proved successfui ln having brought the

mdIn fleets Into contact. But the overall pèrformaJlce of the

Sri tlsh Battle Cruisers during the war was a mixture of success and

fal1ure. HelIgoland Blght and the Falklands showed theH vi rtues,

whi] e Dogger Bank and Jutland showed thei r defects. But the role of

the scout was shown ta have been handled more effect lI!eIy by the • Llght Cnu ser. As for the threat of contlIlerce r-aiders, again despi te the fact that they were successfully used at the FaIkldnds, the

need for vesse l s of this type was made unnecessary once 1 t was

real i sed t-hat the maIn threat ta England' s shippIng was the

SuiJmarine. Overa Il, i t would seem that the war shawed that the

concept of an all··blg-gun Armoured Cruiser \Vas d mlstake, and nat

real] y needed by the Brl tlsh, but thl.s is lrrelevant v/hen pl ëJced in

context of the arms race. Once il was decided ta make the next leap

trom the Armoured Crui ser ta the Battle Cruiser, a11 that rnattered

was to mal.I\taln the lead, regardless of whether Engli:lnd truly

nC'eded thE'ffi or not. • - ~------e /97 Chapter 4: The Wartime Battle Cnp~~rf:l • Fisher's return as the F1rst Sea Lord on Oct. 30th, 1914, along with the victory at the Falklands ln December, resulted 111.

the bUIldIng of more Battle CruIsers for the En t Ish Ndvy. 'l'tlf:\

construction of these wartlme Hattl e elUI sers WOU] d resu l t 1 n the

creation of ShlpS that had Ilttle or no value as flghtlI1g SlllpS,

but would al so lead ta the bUl] ding of the most powerful warsh 1 P ) Tl

the world, H.M.S. HOOD. The first ShlpS, for WhlCh FlShE-~1 WdS

directly responsible, would push the concept of placlng J cHge guns

on a very light hulls to the extreme. In hls ffilnd they werp tlle

ul tlmate comblnatlon of fl repower and speed, WIll ch he foi l L 1 1

believed was aIl that counted in capital ships. Whatever CTlLLC1SIIlS e there were about hlS earller Battle Cruisers, there 18 no doubt that the development of the RENOWN, REPULSE, COURAGEOUS, GLOR r OUS, • and FURIOUS was a serlOUS mlstake. But after these came the HOOn, which proved to be the a major Improvement.

Shortly after the Fal k lands vi ctory, FIsher met: Wl th

D'Eyncourt to talk about convertlng two of the recently lald down

ROYAL SOVEREIGN-class Battlesh1ps lnto Battle CrUlsers, WhlCh he 1 wanted as part of his so-called "bclltlC Pro]ect'. The reason why

work on these ships was suspended was because 1 t was fel t: that thny

could not be completed ln tlme to take part ] n the war (sinee both 2 sldes belleved that i t would be a short war). But af cer the

Falklands, Fisher went ta D'Eyncourt to come up wlth a new design

for these ships. He fI rst wanted these ShlpS to mount four 381mm •e guns, but shortly afterwards changed hlS plans for what he called /98 e J the RHADAMANTHUS to having six 381mm guns. By Dec. 2lst, • D'Eyncourt and FIsher came to an agreement on the desIgn of this class of Shlp, WhlCh would become the RENOWN and REPULSE. The

essence for t~es~ ShlpS was to be able ta do 32 knots, mount six

381mm guns, and have an armour scheme comparable to the

INDEFATIGABLES. Churchill, however, was somewhat sceptlcal about

these ShlpS:

"Ta put the value of a flrst-class battleship into a vessel which cannat stand the pounding of an actIon is false pol1cy. It is far better ta spend the extra money and have what you really want. The Battle Cruiser, in other words, shou1d be superseded by the fast batt leshlp .... in SpI te of her cast. ".1

Ta this Fisher replied:

"1 fear that you have mlssed my point about the 32-knot RHADAMANTHUS! (So quick1y bu~lt and cheap!) The only vessel that can . catch', not 'keep up wi th' - she han ta catch r ! ! ! ! - the German e Battle Cruiser LUTZOW, of 28 knots, is the English TIGER, of 29 knots. (She can be counted on for 30, l' m told!) Anyhow, a few months out of dock (even a few more tons of coal) makes a superlorlty lnto an inferiority of speed in the list you gave me! • There's no 'ccmmanding persanality' in that list! ONE 'Greyhound' amongst that lot of hares wi th the characteristics of the RHADAMANTHUS would knock themall out! The bIg 5 knots of the RHADAMANTHUS 1 S wanted 'here and now' (as the SaI vation .Army poster says!) We have got ta have 3 RHADAMANTHI! "2

Others ln the CabInet and the AdmiraIt y were also l:;ceptlcal

about bUIlding more of these ShIpS, but JellIcoe went along with

Fisher's idea, and as a result ChurChIll gave his approval by Dec. 6 27th. Both ClmrchIll and JellIcoe preferred that these ships mount

eight heavy guns instead of six and suggested a return to the use

of 343mm guns. FIsher was opposed ta this; he would not hear of

mounting twa additlona1 381mm guns, which he felt would result in 7 •e 10ss of speed and an increase in draught, displacement, and cost . The RENOWN and REPULSE were bath laid dOWII on .Jan. 2~)th. L91 'J, H and consrructed by Fal rf leld Co. and :J. Brown lllld CO. l"PS(lP('\ \ VP 1 y.

• FIsher had wanted these ShlpS ta be completed wllllln f l ttt.~l'(\

months, but the REPULSE was compl(~ted on Aug. l8th, 191h, dnd

RENOWN was f lnlshed a month latcr. Neverthelt:'ss, thlS WI\S tlll

amaZl.ng dchievement for SfllpS of thf'tr 51Z(', û.~, they WPIP tilt'

longest slups yet deslgned, bel ng nearl y n 1 Il(-'!t-y t (-,pt lol\Her t heUI

the TJGER. The dlmensions for the:::ie shlI)S wprl' )4~).<)m(pp)/

260.3m(oa) x 29.5m x 8.2m(fore)j8.5m(nft) . 'l'he l t' no 1 IlId J

dlsplacement was 26500 tons (30835 tons deeplond) WdS 2000 tOut,

less thé"i'Cl the previons class, and Hns was mostly (ü 1 he (~Xp(,IUH.\ of

armour; the TIGER devoted 7390 tons towar"ds protl~etlOI\, wtnl<\ tilt'

RENOWNS had only 4770 tons. :Ln arder to reach the desjgned Il.

knats, they were given a belt that was no more thdn IS2mm lhlCk, • whtch brought them down to the ] evel of the l NDEFA'r {(jABLEr..;. R()II~1 tll Y 20~, of their dl spI acement Wl s devoted ta machine ry, wtll ch hdd two

Brown-Curtls turln nes drl vlng four screws, <.md utl 11St~d for t y- t WI)

Babcock and Wilcox 011 bollers, making t.hesp t 11(' fI rst Bat" t 1('

CrUlsers that dl.dn't use coai. Thelr II\dctllnery rf-'

unparalleled 120000 SHP, WhlCh enabh~d the stnps tu do thn 12 knol

spe2d that was sa important ta Flsher.

In terms of a.crnament, apart trom the SIX 38lrnm/42cal Mar K l

guns, WhlCh were maunted in three turrets (two i.n th(~ t ront and olle

aft), the ShI p had seventeen 102mm guns. wtll ch was p[(~ferrefl by

FIsher. Flfteen of these guns were mounted ln tnple turrets, wtllch • provcd ta be unsuccessful. The ShlpS also had lwo 76rnm A.A. qunu, /100

four 3-pounders, dnd two turpedo tubes .

Havlng placed such a heavy armament on such cl light hull

• proved tu be d ITllstake. After her flrst flring trial, the RENOWN

was so stralned that she héid ta go back ta the dockyat-ds. She and

the REPULSE were under snch constant repal r after they were

cnrnmlssloned ttlat the two sll1ps were nlcknamE.'d REPAIR arld REFIT.

Thf-! cost- ta bUlld these ShlpS was considerable; the RENOWN's camp

1.0 L2, 962,578, wlul e the REPULSE' s came to L2, 627,401. RENOWN would

undergo three major refl ts ln her career (the REPULSE underwent '3 two), WhlCh Increased the priee on these ships conslderably.

The folly ln having built these ShipS Iles mostly with Flsher,

but the CabInet and the AdmiraI ty must share il. meaf-'iure of the

blarne. He had wanted ShlpS ta have a llght dr.auHhi.., which was

Sllghtly more than 8.2m for the two ships, to be able to bEl usect • tOI hl s Bal t l C venture. Regardless of the tae1:1cal ment of Flsher' S plan, h(~ would have been better served by havlng ulstead

bllllt MonItors, whlch cost cl mere fractIon of what it cost to build

these Shlpti. The two ships would gain sorne redemptJon by thelr

postwar conv2J"slons, wlnch transformed them Into much better

waIshlps. But whatever fallure these ships may have represented, It

was qUlckly er:llpsed by the other ShlpS that Flsher deslgned.

The COURAGEOUS-elass shi.ps were never officlally regarded as

Battle Crulsers 1 but will nevertheless be Included ln this essay.

'l'hese wen~ the so-called . Large Llght Cruisers' 1 which is an

,lceuldte descl"l.ptlon of what they were. These would prave to be • f<:.nlures on a grand seale. They were essentially large guns plaeed /101 e on Llght CrUIser hulls, WhlCh is as much of a contradIctIon as on0 • could posslbly get, but they were supposed ta be the core ShlpS for the Baltic campaign he was preparing. Fisher knew that the CabInet

would be unwilling to sanct Ion the construct ion of more capl ta 1

ShipS at thlS tIme, but got around this by declarlng thc'lt thL-'SP

would ln fact be large Llght CrUIsers, dnd rnanaged ta get approva 1 10 for their constructIon ln January, 1915.

Because of the shallow Ddnlsh waters, FIsher wanted ships that

had a very small draught, but which still had ta carry l~rge guns

and do at least 33 knots. Churchi Il dld seern interested 1 n open l ng

another front that would relleve the pressure on RussIa, but Mackdy

pOInts out that FIsher was never actually commltted ta the Baltlc

project, and slmply used 1 t as the off l cial excuse to bu l l ct thcse l1 ShlpS. Hi s Interest ln ships Wl th a shailow draught was most 1 i kf~ J Y - 12 • because It would enable the ShlpS ta steam faster. Regarctless of what hlS reasons were for buildIng them, 1 t must be sald that thcs("~

ships are a testimony ta Fisher 1 s ab1l1ty ta get almost anythlng hp

wanted ln terms of ShlpS design.

Fisher flrst broached the idea of these ShlpS with Churchill

on Jan. 25th, 1915, when he wrote:

1I0ur North Sea expenences clearly Ind1cate that a CrUIser of 32 knots speed and 22.5 feet draught of water, carrylng four 1') inch guns, associated wlth groups of 4-lnch guns on turntabl(~s for deallng with Destroyers, would as completely knocJt Ollt ,:)11 the German Light CrUIsers as the INVINCIBLE knoc:ked oul thf-;! SCHARNHORST. It would be a repetltlon of the old argument tbat tho big gun and hlgh speed, besides givlng you certaIn vlctory. dVOld having any killed or wounded. But chlefly 15 thlS type of vessel imperatl vely dernanded for the Bal tIC, where she can go through the international hlghway of the Sound owing ta her shallow draught." L~ •e ------_.-----

/102

FIsher wanted these sJ'llpS constructed wlthin a year. HIS

tlminq for the proposdl of these ShlpS could Ilot have been better.

• Desplte the offIcIal praise for the engagement, the Admirait y was not totally pleased wlth the Battie of Dogger Bank. FIsher Iater

Informeel PrIme Mlnister ASqUIth that thiS engagement showed that 14 England needed a large numeIlcai superlorlty of BattJe Cruisers. Dy

the 8nd of Febrllary, the deslgns for the flrst two ShlPS of thlS

class, the COURAGEOUS and GLORIOUS, were cornpleted by D'Eyncourt.

On March 5th, FIsher demanded the construction of four more

"Large Llght CrUIsers' of the COURAGEOUS-type. The maln dlfference

between these and the eariler ships was that they would carry two

4~7mm (18-lnch) gllns Instead of four 381mm guns, a10ng wlth sorne 15 chdnges to the secondary armament. The fact that he got approval

for even one of these, WhlCh became H.M.S. FURIOUS, a]ong with the • COURAGEOUS and GLORIOUS, clearly shows how much influence Fisher had. He more often than not got his way by threatenlng to resign,

and bath the AdmIraIt y and Cabinet were loath ta let him go.

This was essentially admitting that FIsher was indispensable.

H.M.S. COURAGEOUS was laid down on March 28th, 1915, while the ~§. GLORIOUS was started on May lst. Bath were completed January, 1917,

WhlCh was again a remarkable achlevement ln shipbullding. The

FURIOUS was laid down on June 8th, but because of her later

l converSIon to a "Semi-Carrier , she was not flnished untll June

26th, 1917. The dlmenslons for the flrst two ships were

241m(pp)/257.8m(oa) x 26.6m x 6.9m(fore)/7.2m(aft), for a deSIgn • dlsplacement of 18600 tons (22690 tons full load). The original

- ••_._ ~_ - ___1 /103

olmensions for the FURIOUS were supposed ta be 241m(pp)j ~~7.9m(o~)

x 28.9m x 6.7m(fore)j7.1m(aft), for a legend dlsplacPITIent ot lqlOO

• tons, tmt the draught became 6. 4mt tore) / 7. 9m( lit t) dnct t h(! dlsplacement raised to 19513 tons (22890 tons deep load) when shc

was converted ta a ·Semi-Carrler'.

AlI three ShlpS were fltted wlth elghte(-~n smalt tuh(~ hOllt'f';,

WhlCh were geo(~ré:\lly resQtved fOI regut,\r L19ht C:T\11S(~1~, hut 1t

was deClded ta try these out on ù larger hull. These Wl~l (~ the t l lst

capl.tal ships to have smali tube boilers Installen, "nd WE:.'re lilS(l

the first large ShlPS wlth aLl-geared turblnes, havlnq four sh(dtB

for the double h('lical geared tUI'bines. Altogether, tlwy W('f('

capable of generatlng 90000 BHP (whl1e i t took forty-two I,'\rge tulle

bOlIers in the RENOWNS ta glve them 120000 SHP), enahllng them lo

do 32 knots. • The armour on these ShlpS was comparable' to the Brltish Liuht' Cruisers. The INVINCIBLES had devoted 20% of thelr displrlcement ta

armout:', whlle these ships devoted about 17%. WillCh dop~:; no! dpPPdI

ta be that great a difference. However, while thelr turrets had (it

sorne pOints 330rnm (13-1nch) of armour platlng, lheir maIn belt

bulkheads were at thelr maXlmum only 76mm thick, WhlCh WrtS haIt of

the INVINCIBLES. FI sher wanted speed at the cost of armour, d'Hi

these ShlpS are a testlmany ta his viSIon.

'l'he armament of the hrst two ships were fOUI 3Hlnun quns,

eighteen 102mm guns (again maunted in triple lu["n~ts), two 76mm

guns, and two submerged torpedo tubes, al though t:wo pal rs of ab()v(~ • water tubes were later mounted. The FURIOUS was on ginail y S\lPPOBN} ------

/104

e to have two 457mm guns (which could be replaced by four 381mm guns

like the first two ShlpS), but with the addition of a flight deck, • 17 she only had one of these massive weapons. Her secondary arœament

shlfted from the triple l02mm turrets, and she instead had eleven

140mm (5.5-~nch) guns, aIl of which were single-mounted, as weIl as

two 76mm guns, four 3-pounders, and two (later six) torpedo tubes.

Overall, it was needless to say that as warships, their use was

almost non-existent.

The Second Battle of Heligoland Bight on Nov. 17th, 1917, was 18 the testing ground for these wartlme Battle Cruisers. The

engagement had the REPULSE, which was serving in the lst Battle

Cruiser Squadron, while the COURAGEOUS and GLORIOUS were attached e to the lst Cruiser Squadron (which was aIL but annihilated at Jutland, which was the main reason these ships were placed ln this • force). The action pitted these ships mainly against light units of the German fleet, much llke the first battie. However, the results

were qUlte unlike the 1914 battIe; REPULSE and COURAGEOUS were able

to only make one hit with their main guns on the German Light

Cruisers, while the German 150mm shells were able to cause quite a

lot of damage to the COURAGEOUS. In short, these 'Large Light

Cruisers' were not even a match for regular Light Cruisers. It

proved possible to modernize the RENOWNS, but the latter classes

were beyond hope as a capital ship. However, the FURIOUS showed the

way of the fature for these ships, as aIl three would be fully

converted lnto Aircraft CarrIers. •e It is unfortunate that these ships wouid prove to be Fisher' s /105 - last hurrah. Later tLat Spring, he came up with the plans for what would be the largest and most heavily arrned ship in the world, • li which was given the tentative name of H.M.S INCOMPARABLE. In May,

Fisher had asked D'Eyncourt about the posslbilltles of building a

ship that was 1000 feet long, with a displacement of 40000 tons,

and be armed wi th six 508mm (20-inch) guns. However, before any

commi tments could be made, Fisher had tended his reslgnatlon as

First Sea Lord after several dIsputes over the Dardanelles

carnpaign. He had threatened to reslgn prevlously, but thIS tlme hIS

bluff was called and hlS resignation was accepted, WhlCh ended his

delusions that he was the be-ail and end-ail of the Royal Navy. HIS

second tenure as First Sea Lord lasted barely UIX months, in WhlCh

time he saw the vindication of hlS belief in the Battle Cruiser - with the victory at the Falklands, but the unfor:unate side was • that because of this victory, he wound up building ships WhlCh were practically useless.

The last Battle Cruiser to be bUllt by the Royal Navy was ln

fact the fusion of Fisher's concept of the Fast Battleshlp and the

heavily armoured QUEEN ELIZABETHS: H.M.S. HOOD. As a Shlp she was

definitely in a league of her own, being faster, better protected,

and more powerful than any other warship ln the world.

The reason for the construction of the HOOD came when lt was

learned that the Germans had laid down in 1915 four new Battle

Cruisers that were improvements on the DERFFLINGERS, and armed wi th 20 381mm guns. The Admirait y had wanted to construct an experimental •e Battleship that was simllar to the QUEEN ELIZABETHS in terms of /106

SliP, armament, and armour, hut lt was declded that what the Navy

needed were 30-knot Battle Cruisers ta respond ta Germany's • ~1_ MACKENSEN-class ShlpS. Two designs were submltted on Feb. lst,

lqJ~, WhlCh showed a ShlP armed with Blght 381mm guns, twelve

140mm guns, an 230mm maln beit and 230mm for the barbettes,

~nd c~p~ble of generatlng liOOOO SHP. The flrst deslgn was shawn

havlng large tube bOlIers, WhlCh would enable the Shlp to do 30

knots. This desjgn gave a length of 273.8m(pp)j290.1m(oa), a beam

ot J4.1m, and cl draught of a.5m, for a total dlsplacement ot 39000

tons. The second deSIgn was fltted with smaI1 tube bOlIers, had a

length ot 259m(pp)/275.4rn(oa), the sarne wldth of 34.1m, and a

draught of 8. 2m. for a tota l displacement of 35500 t.ons, which 22 would enable h~r ta do 30.5 knots .

Four more designs were submitted on Feb. 17th, and the only • slmilarltles ln the deSIgns was that they would aIl have twenty- four Yarrow small tube boilers, twelve 140mm guns, two torpedo

tubes, 1200 tons of fuel (4000 tons maximum) 1 and th.e same 203mm ~J. belt and 230mm barbettes. DeSign #3 had a dlsplacement of 36500

tons, her dImensions were 265.6m{pp)j282m(oa) x 34.1m x a.5m, armed

with elght 381mm guns 1 and would generate 160000 SHP that would

allow her ta do 32 knots. Design #4 was a smaller deSIgn, being

only 232.8m(pp)j248.2m(oa), with the same width and draught of

Design #2, and had a displacement of 32500 tons. Her main armament

was placed at four 457rnm guns, and her machinery was designed ta do

120000 SliP, winch would put her speed at 30 knots. Design #5 was • dlmost ..111 ImItatlon of DeSIgn #2, wlth the same displacement, / t 07

speed, machinery, and was only ten feet short, but her main

armament was six 457mm Instead of eight 381ml1l guns. As tor the 1 ast

• desIgn, !ler proportIons were claser ta DesIgn #], and whl1e beln~l flve feet shorter ln length, the Shlp had a dH;placement of .1ql)OO

tons, WhiCh was 500 tons more than the flrst design. Ber lIIùchllH'ry

and speed were also the same as the flrst design, but hec éllllkloment

was not; she was shawn havlng no less than elght 457mm guns, WhlCh

would have enabled her ta fire a broadside whase welght was nearly

double that of the QUEEN ELIZABETHS (about 28800 lbs.).

DeSIgn #3 WdS selected as the mast SUI table deSIgn ior the npw

ShipS. There were two mare verSIons of this deslgn thélt. W(') ,

submitted on March 27th, the flrst which called for an Increase of

two additional torpedo tubes (giving her a tatal of four), and th0

second WhlCh called for an lncrease of four addltionaJ 140mm gut\s

(gIvlng a total of sixteen of these gun5). The Board went with ttH'

• second version, and fInal approval for thlS deSIgn was given un 24 AprIl 7th, 1916. Three ShipS were lmmediately ordered: HOOD was to

be bui 1 t by J. Brown, wh! le the contracts for IIOWE and RODNEY were

glven ta Cammell Laird and FairfFdd respectively. The Admjralty

a1so approved the construction of the fourth ship of thlS class,

H.M.S. ANSON, ln July, and gave the contract ta Armstrong. Of the

four ships only HOOD was completed. She was laid down on May 31st,

1916, the day wh en three British Batt1e Cru1sers met with tiery

deaths due to magazine explosions, which was belleved to hava been

brought on by an Inadequate armour scheme. As a result, work was

suspended until they came up with another deSIgn, WhiCh wOllld have • m /108

25 a heavler emphaSlS on protection. The other three ships were ta be • contlnued only after the completion of the HOOD, but once lt was learn~d ]n 1917 that work on the MACKENSENS had stopped, the 26 Adrnlralty deClded to cancel these d.;d only build the HOOD.

The AdmiraIt y at flrst only wanted to add an additional 1200

tons towards extra armour, but it was decided that this was stIll

not enough prqtectlon. The First Bea Lord and Control 1er asked

D'Eyncourt for four new designs in July, and he came up wlth ships . that were armed wi th from eight ta twelve 381mm guns. On August

8th, 1916, the Board approved on a variation of Design A, which had

a displacement of 37500 tons, which was only 1200 tons more than

the design that was appraved on Apri 1 7th. The armament remained

the same, and the only difference between thlS and the previous

armour scheme was for additional armaur in the turrets. Once this • design was approved, the HOOD was laid dnwn for a second time on Sept. lst, 1916.

While work on the HOOD was started, D'Eyncourt came up with

addltlonal proposaIs which would transform the ship from Battle ~1 CrUIser to an ultra-hard Fast Battleship. The emphasis was to

1 nCI ease the pnnclple thl ckness of the armour by about 50% (except

for the deck platlng), which would add an additional 3700 tons ta

her dlsplacement, WhlCh became 41200 tOLS. However, her draught

would onl y 1 ncrease by three feet (9. 2m forward and 9. 5m aft),

WhlCh was sti Il two feet less than the QUEEN ELIZABETHS, and her

loss of speed would only .')e about 1 knot. The only change to her • armament was to add two additionai 102mm A.A. guns (giving her a - a•• *w_. zr." = 514a= .... /lOI)

total of four), and her torpedo armament was increased ta two

submerged and elqht above-water tubes (although four of these were • later removed). Her machlnery would still bp able to do 144000 SHP,

ma~lng her the greatest power plant afloat, enabllng hel to do JI

knots. But the real dl fference was in her armour; 3000 tons of

armour plating was added to her, WhlCh brought her protectIon fro~

Cruiser to Battleshlp league, and it was also d~cided ta try out a

new concept on her. Her mal.n bel t went from 203mm ta 305mm, and the

ne\i' ldea was for this armour to be ~ loped outward from betaw, WhlCh

resulted ln greatly increaslng the armour's r-eslstance, sinee

shells would not be able to hi t wi th normal impact. Ex tré\ drmoUI

was a1so glven ta her barbettes (ralsed fram 230mm ta ]05mm),

conning tower (280mm), turrets (381mm maximum), bu lkheads (bf!twü(ln

102mm ta 127mm), and even the deck armour was raised from 64mm to

76mrn, which was still somewhat thin. When compared wlth the first • Battle Cruiser, the INVINCIBLE, whose armour protectIon was

20% of her displacement, the HOOD's armour now repr'~sented 33.5~, of 28 her total dlsplacement. ThIS design was approve~ on Aug. 30th,

1917, and wou1d prove ta be the a most successful one on

D'Eyncourt's part.

H.M.S. HOOD was 1aunched on Aug. 28th, 1918, and wOüld be

completed on March 5th, 1920. Her overall cost reached an ~9

astonlshlng L6 t 025,000. Her crew complement was llsted at 1477 men

WhlCh was 500 more than ln the QUEEN ELIZABETHS. There js no doubt

that thlS Sh1p was the most powerful warship of her tlme. Although

Fisher mlght have sneered at her heavy armour scheme, he probably • /110 - would have been pleased about her armament and speed. He died only four months aftf>r the HOOn was completed, and i t is worth • mentionlng that this ship would be the Iast official Battie Cruiser to be completed by England. In truth, the HOOD was a Battie Cruiser in name only. Just as the Armoured Cruisers evolved to the point where they were as large and almost as powerful as Battleships, she evolved the Battleships to the point where they were as fast as Cruisers. She was truly a Fast BattIeshlp. The ships that England proposed to build after her (the four G3's which would have displaced 48400 tons and armed wi th nlne 406mm guns, wi th a 356mm main bel t and 32 knot design speed) could be rated as Fast Battleships, but these were replaced 30 e by the slow Battleshlps H.M.S. NELSON and H.M.S RODNEY. There were ships built by other natlons, such as the German SCARNHORST-class, • the American LEXINGTON-class, the Japanese AMAGI, and the French DUNKERQUE-class (which were constructed to counter the German Pocket Battleships, the true up-gunned Armoured Crul.sers) that were

rated as Battle Cruisers, but even sorne of these fit more closely II to the description of Fast Battleships. But with the HOOD's creation, the concept of the fast and lightly armoured Battle Cruiser died in the Royal Navy.

•e /lI l

Conclusion

The Battle CruIser, like the Dreadnought, was the product of • the arms race. The questIons of whether or not they were good warshlps, or even If BrltalI1 should have bUllt them ln the first

place seern ta matter less ln thlS context. England deClded thdt It

wouid take the lead ln the arms race, and the Hattle Cruiser was

the logical development ln the evolution of the Armoureti CnllS(~I..

There 15 no doubt that this ship blurred the dlfferences betwp~n

the Battleship and the Armoured Crulser, but the evolutlon of the81~

vessels showed that these lines were already quite blurry. In

short, leap from Armoured Cru1ser ta Battle CruIser was not much

greater than the leap from Pre-Dreadnought te O--eadnought.

It could be argued that the creation of the Battle Cruiser ln

England caused more problems than it solved. The crIes that It was

a bad concept were revived on May 25th, 1941, one week before the • silver anniversary of Jutland, when the HQOD's magazine blew up, destroying thlS mighty Shlp .ln the same way as the oUler three

Battle Cruisers at Jutland. Al though the exact cause of he!

destructIon has never been solved, it 18 clear that her deck armour

was not strong enough ta wlthstand plunging flre, which may have

been the reason that led ta her loss. As such, the Battle Crulser's

reputation suff~ied again as it did fallowing Jutland (even thaugh

she was ln fact a Fast Battleshlp, and not a Battle Ccuiser).

The epi logue ta thb whole Armoured Crulser-Batt le Crui ser

questIon, as weIl as the fate of the Fast Battlesh1p ln England,

was settled in the WashIngton Naval Treaty of 1922. From this pOlnt e·

ai ".'A'4 II es" "I,,'II,$!) ,"1 • • - • /112 , onwards, Heavy Cruisers (the new designation for Armoured Cruisers) were to be limlted to a dlsplacement of 10000 tons, and would carry 1 guns no larger than 203mm. Ships over the 10000 ton limlt were to be classified as capital ships, and new capital ships were to be Ilmited to displacernents of 35000 tons. The result of this was the scrapping of the G3 Battle Crulser design, and building lnstead the slow Battleshlps NELSON and RODNEY. The 48000-ton design had to be rnodified to 35000 tons. The armarnent of nine 406mm guns was

ret:=}.ined, WhlCh ~neant that armour or speed had to be reduced. Wi th no hesitation, the speed was sacrificed, and the instal1ed power was cut from 160000 SHP to 45000 SHP, which would allow them a ~ speed of only 23 knots. ThlS was not as bad as it seemed, since the two ships would be two knots faster than the American COLORADO- class Battleships, and only two knots slower than the Japanese 1 ]. NAGATO-class. However, England would never again build the world's fastest Battieships (or Battie Cruisers for that matter). In many ways, H.M.S HOOD marked the end of the Fisher Era.

The Washington Tr~~ty was supposed to put an end to the arms race, but sorne nations found ways around thlS as weIl; sorne tried to upgun the number of 152mm guns on the Light Crulsers to flfteen (such as the American BROOKLYN-class) or cheated on displacement to ! obtaln more armour (the German HIPPER-class). The cycle of the arms race appeared to start again with the construction of the German 'Pocket Battleships'; the French response to these large-gunned Cruisers was the building of the DUNKERQUE and STRASBOURG. , The British Battle Cruiser was criticised for having been /1 \]

expensl ve and too thinly armoured. Nevertheless, lhey were the nf:>xt

loglcal step ln the evolutlon of the hrmoured CruIser deslgIl, ~nd

• ln thlS respect can be consldeced a success. They werp ranter, d~f0

powerfu lly armed, and rnaintalnect the sarne armour schemf~ ot the current Armoured Cruisers. Thus was bUllt a Lister, more powerlul type of warshlp that did not sacrIfIce protectIon, and cost only

Sllghtly more to build than contemporary Armoured Crulsprs. But rlS tlme went on, it became necessary for the BrItIsh to bUlld larger, faster, more powerful and more expensive versions of these ShlpS, WhlCh was the necessary price ta pay for any nùtion ln an arms

race. As has been shown in thls essay, it was the Battle Cruiser,

and not thp. Dreadnought, t 1lat was central ta Fisher's stnpbulldlllg pollcles. There lS no doubt that he preferred these fastpr, llghtl Y armoured ships over the slower and more heavlly armourec1 • Battleshlps. Fisher wanted ta bui Id the u! tlmate warshl p that wou 1ct give Englard a complete advantage over the other fleets of aIl the other nations, and tried to build ships that were cdpable ol

performing the dutles of the Shlps-of-the-Llne and the Frigates. He

al so fel t that 1 f he could bui Id one type of ship that cou Id perform aIl of these tasks, not only would it give the BrItIsh Navy an edge, but i t would al so be more economj cal. Why bui Id two different types of ships when they could be merged as one? The lines between the Armoured Cruiser and the Ddttleshlp were éilteil

blurryenough, why not slmply build ShlpS that had the best vlrtues

of both? ThIS certainly made sense ln theory, but Fisher was 80 • /114

obsessed wi th speed that he was willing to give his ships 1 practically no protectlon l.n order to achieve an advantage in thlS. By the time he built the COURAGEOUS-class ships, he had clearly

pu shed thls concept too far.

It has been said that the Dreadnought was inev1table. Was it

so wlth the Battle Cruiser? If England had not built the

INVINCIBLES, would other natlons have built all-big-gun Armoured

Cru1sers? Probably not. Even after England built the INVINCIBLES,

only Germany immediately replied with its own versions, which were

built malnly because Britain had them. The war showed that most of

the functions of the Battle Cruisers could have been handled by

1ess expenslve warships. In essence, it was because of the arms

race, and England's need to take the lead in th1S race, that these 1 ships came into being. Whatever flaws they had, once the British chose to build them, there was no turning back.

, /115 1 Endnotes: IntroductIon 1. Oscar Parkes, BRITISH BATTLESHIPS, p.492-493; Anthony Preston, BATTLESHIPS 1856-1919, p.36; V.E. Tarrant, INVINCIBLE, p.19-22; Ruddock Mackay, FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, p.325; N.J.M. Campbell, BATTLE CRUISERS: THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH AND GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAH EHA, p. 6-7, and Peter C. Smith, BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS, p.ll 2. Arthur J. Marder, FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW, Vol.I, p. 44-45. 3. Jon Tetsura Sumida, IN DEFFNCE OF NAVAL SUPREMACY, p.38-39, p.l00, ~.3l6-3l8, p.115-l38, and the artlcle "BrItIsh CapItal Shlp Design and Flre Control ln the Dreadnought Era: SIr John Fisher, Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the Battle CruIser", from the JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY, 1979, p.205-230 4. Marder, FDSC, Vol.l, p.p.60-70, and THE ANATOMY OF BRITISH SEJ\ POWER, p.536-537, and Robert K. MassIe, DREADNOUGHT:BRITIAN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF THE GREAT WAR, p.487-489 5. Diagrams and data about these ShIpS are shown in Slegfrled Breyer's BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS, 1905-1970 (translated by. Alfred Kurti), p.194-196 and 331-332, and Tony Gibbons' THE COMPLETE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS, p.173, 180-181, 185, and Antony Prestan's BATTLESHIPS OF WORLD WAR l, p.195 and 237. , 6. Preston, p.195, and Breyer, p.331.

Chapter 1:

1. Paul Kennedy, THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, p.205-237 2. Parkes, p.492-493; Preston, BATTLESHIPS 1856-1918, p.36; and Tarrant, p.19-22. 3. DIScussions on naval stategy ln this perlod are shawn 1n Stephen Rosklll's THE STRATEGY OF SEA POWER; AdmiraI Sir Herbert Richmond's SEA POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD; Julian Corbett' s SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY; DREADNOUGHT TO POLARIS: MliRITIME STRATEGY SINCE MAHAN, edited by A.M.J. Hyatt; and D.M. Schurman's THE EDUCATION OF A NAVY. 4. James Henderson, THE FRIGATES, p.15-20 5. Parkes, p.234-238. 6. Ibid, p.222-229. 7. Ibid, p.238-243. 8. Ibid, p.307-313. 9. Quotatlon by AdmIraI Sir John Commerell, clted ln Parkes, p.309 lU. S1r William Laird Clowes, THE ROYAL NAVY, p.31 Il. Campbell, p.1-2, and Clowes, p.38 12. Edward L. Attwood, WAR-SHIPS, p.158-160, and Wlillam Hovgaard, , MODERN HISTORY OF WARSHIPS, p.467-468. /116

13. Marder, ANATOMY, p.274-276 , 14. Ibid, p.283. 15. Rear-Admiral Fournier's "La Flotte Necessaire", cited in Marder ANATOMY, p.275, note 2. 16. Marder, ANATOMY, p.285 17. Clowes, p.36, ArchIbald Hurd, THE FLEETS AT WAR, p.76-77, and Fred T. Jane, THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET, Vol.2, p.lOl 18. Marder, ANATOMY, p.275, note 2. 19. Cited by Marder, ANATOMY, p.285 20. Hurd, p.75-76, and Jane, Vol.2, p.103-107 21. Hurd, p.74, and Jane, Vol.2, p.l09 22. Hurd, p.72-74, and Parkes, p.44l-450 23. Parkes, p.426, 442, 477, and 492 24. Ibid 25. "Extracts from Confidential Papers: Medi terranean Fleet, 1899- 1902", p.89, cited in Sumida, IONS, p.42 26. Ibid, p.75, cited in Sumida, IONS, 42-43 27. Cited by Parkes, p.486 28. Ibid 29. Fisher to AdmiraI Sir Beauchamp Seymour, Sept. 12th, 1882, cited in Marder's FEAR GOO AND DREAD NOUGHT, Vol.l, p.llO-lll 30. Sumida, IDNS, p.38-39 31. Mackay, p.322 32. THE PAPERS OF ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FISHER, ed. Lt. Comm. P. K. Kemp, Vol. 1, p.41-42 33. Ibid, p.87 , 34. IbId, p.42 35. Sumida, "British Capital Ship Design", p.210 36. Fisher to Earl of Selbourne, Oct. 19th, 1904, cited in Marder, FGDN, Vo1.l, p.330-332, and the FISHER PAPERS, Vol.l, p.199-200 37. FISHER PAPERS, Vol.l, p.20l 38. Mackay, p.270 39. Hurd, p.83 40. Col. Vittorio Cuniberti, "An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet", cited in Jane, Vol.2, p.134-146 41. Preston, p.173 42. IbId, p.191 43. THE POLLEN PAPERS, 1901-1916, ed. Jan Tetsuro Sumida, p.1-2 44. Cited in Parkes, p.466 45. IbId, p.468 46. Packenham to Admirait y, Aug. 11th, 1904, cited in FISHER PAPERS, Vol.l, p.2l7-2l8 47. Packenham to Admirait y, Feb. 12th, 1905, cited in Marder, ANATOMY, p.531 48. Packenham to AdmiraIt y, Jan lst, 1905, Ibid, p.53l-532 49. FISHER PAPERS, Vol.l, p.21S 50. Ibid 51. FISHER PAPERS, Vol.1, p.45 52. Parkes, p.489 53. Ibid, p.212 1 54. Ibid, p.285-289, and Parkes, p.489-490 /117 55. Ibid, p.288-289, and Parkes, p.490-491 56. Comm. P.M. Rippon, THE EVOLUTION OF ENGINEERING IN THE ROYAL 1 NAVY, Vol.l, 1827-1939, p.67-68, and F.P. 1 Vol.I, p.233-243 57. Ibid 58. AdmiraI Sir Reginald H. Bacon, THE LIFE OF LORD FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, p.284 59. Rippon, p.67-68, and F.P., Vol. l, p.233-243 60. Sumida, IONS, p.58 61. Campbell, P.4-l2; Parkes, p.492-496; Breyer, p.115-l17: Gibbons, p.172; Preston, p.l19-121; and V.E. Tarrant, INVINCIBLE, p.15-19 62. Sumida, IONS, p.58-61 63. Cited in Sumida, IONS, p.58 64. "Reports of the Navy Estimates Committee", p.14-15, Ibid, p.59 65. Minutes, "Naval Necessi tles IV", Ibid 66. "Report of Commi ttee appointed ta consider the Quest i on of the Provisions of a Parent Vessel for Coastal Destroyers, the Utilization of Mercantile Cruisers, and the FUSIon Design of Armoured Vessels", in "Navy Estimates Committee 1906-1907", Jan. 10th, 1906, which is summarized ln Sumida, IDNS, p.60 67. Ibld 68. Ibid 69. Cited by Mackay, p.325-326 70. Filson Young, WrTH BEATTY IN THE NORTH SEA, p.27-28 1 Chapter 2: 1. Marder, FDSe, Vol. l, p.60-70, and ANATOMY, p.536-537, and Massie, p.487-489 2. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, lst Session of the 28th Parliament, March 5th-16th, 1906, p.224 3. Marder, FDSe, Vol.l, p.62-64 4. Mackay, p.338, and Marder, FDSC, Vol.I, p.64 5. Cited in Marder, FDSC, Vol.I, p.56 6. Ibid 7. Marder, FDSC, Vol.I, p.56 8. Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Reflections, Historie and Other,

Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea" 1 from PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE, Vol.XXXII, June, 1906, p.447-47l 9 • Sir William White, "The Cult of the Modern Warship", from The 19th CENTURY AND AFTER, Vol. 63, June, 1908, p.903-925 10. Bacon, FISHER, p.260 Il. Marder, ANATOMY, p.538 12. Parkes, p.497; Marder, DREADNOUGHT, Vo!.l, p.126; and Sumida, IONS, p. 60 13. "Speed of Warships", from ENGINEERING, May 26th, 1905, p.675- 676 14. Ci ted in Sumida, IONS, p. 58 15. FIGHTING SHIPS, 1906, p.57 /118

16. R.H. Williams, "Arthur James Balfour, Sir John Fisher, and the , Politics of Naval Reform, 1904-1910", from HISTORICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 60, #141, Feb. 1987, p.80-101 17. Ibid 18. Mackay, p.357-358 19. Fisher to Tweedmouth, Sept. 26th, 1906, in Marder, FGDN, Vol.2, p.91 20. R • H. Will i arns , p . 87-9 0 21. Campbell, p.4-12; Parkes, p.492-496; Breyer, p.115-117; Gibbons, p.172; Preston, p.119-121; Tarrant, p.15-19; Smith, p.8-12; and CONWAY'S ALL THE WORLD'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1906-1921, p.24-25 22. Ibid 23. Massie, p.490 24. BRASSEY'S NAVAL ANNUAL, cited in Parkes, p.492 25. Cited in Parkes, p.495 26. Campbell, Table 4, p.6 27. "Board Meeting ta Consider the Details of the Armament and Construction of the two Vessels intended for the 1907-1908 Programme", Ci ted in Sumida, IONS, p.114 28. "Armament of Cruisers: Statement by Rear-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, when Direct"r of Naval Ordnance, on the subject of the Armament of the Cruisers for the 1908-1909 Programme", Ibid, p.114 29. Sumida, "Bntish Capital Ship Design", p.205-230 30. Ibid , 31. Holger H. Herwig, "LUXURY" FLEET, p.45 32. C.!mpbell, Table 2, p.3 33. Herwig, Table 7, p.268 34. Campbell, p.19-2l; Preston, p.68-70; and Breyer, p.269-270 35. Campbell, Table 8, p.20 36. Fisher ta Watts, Sept. 17th, 1908, cited in FGDN, Vol.2, p.195-196 37. Campbell, p.22-26; Preston, p.72-73; and Breyer, p.27-272 38. Mackay, p.386-387 39. Fisher ta Watts, Sept. 17th, 1908, in r

------/120

9. Beatty to Balfour, June 21, 1916, cited ln FDSF, Vol. 2, p.52 1 10. For a full account of the Falklands Battle, see Corbett, Vol. 1, p.414-436; Marder, FDSF, Vol.2, p.118-l29; and Richard Hough, THE GREAT WAR AT SEA, p.99-120 ll. Campbell, p.9 12. Admlral-of-the-Fleet Lord Fisher, MEMORIES, p.88 and Marder, FGDN, Vol.3, p.41-44. 13. Goldrlck, p.159-63 14. Goldrlck, p.189-226, and Marder, FDSF, Vol.2, p.130-l48 15. For an account of the Dogger Bank Batt1e, see Corbett, Vol.2, p.82-102; Goldrlck, p.247-310; Roskill, p.l07-119; Marder, FDSF, Vol.2, p.156-175; Hough, p.121-143; and for a flrsthand account, Fiison Young, p.191-265 16. Campbell, p.44 17. Goldrlck, p.287 18. Rosklll, p.167 19. Campbell, p.1l-12 20. For an account of Jutland, see Corbett, Vol.3, p.313-441; RoskIll, p.149-188; AdmIraI Relhard Scheer, GERMANY'S RIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR, p.133-202; AdmiraI of the Fleet the Earl Jellicoe, THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916: ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT & WORK, p.306-392; Marder, FDSF, Vol.3, p.3-232; and Hough, p.21l-297 21. Extracts from the Grand Fleet Battle Orders in force on the eve of Jutland, cited in the JELLICOE PAPERS, Vol.1: 1893-1916, p.249-252, and Marder, FDSF, Vol.3, p.25-26 1 22. Campbell, p,18 23. Ibld, p.34 24. IbId, p.30-31 25. Chatfield, p.143 26. THE JELLICOE PAPERS, ed. A.Temple Patterson, p.286 27. Parkes, p.640-641 28. IbId 29. IbId, and Rosklll, p.190-191 30. Antony Preston and John Batchelor, BATTLESHIPS 1856-1918, p.55 31. Campbe Il, p. 12

Chapter 4:

1. Marder, FGDN, Vol.3, p.44-47 2. Parkes, p.608 3. MaurIce P. Nort~cott, ENSIGN 8: RENOWN AND REPULSE, p.1-2 4. Winston ChurchIll, Vol.1, p.132 5. FIsher to ChurchIll, Dec. 7lst, 1904, and Marder, FGDN, Vol.3, p.104 6. See FIsher ta Rear-Admirai Frederlck C.T. Tudor, Dec. 27th, 1904, IbId, p.113-114 7. Flsher to Jelllcoe, Jan. 22nd, 1914, IbId, p.143-144 1 /121 , 8. Northcott, p.I-4; Campbell, p.61-64; Parkes, p.608-617; Breyer, p.155-l59; Preston, p.154-156; Smith, p.36-38; and CONWAY'S, p.38-39 9. Breyer, p.156, and Smith, p.68-69 la. Mackay, p.485 11. Martln Gllbert, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, Vol. 3, 1914-1916 - THE CHALLENGE OF WAR, p.225-227 and Mackay, p.462-464 and 472-473 12. Mackay, p.462-464 and 472-473 13. Fisher ta ChurchIll, Jan. 25th, 1915, FGDN, Vol. 3, p.145 14. JellIcoe ta FIsher, quoted in Fisher to Asqulth, Jan. 28th, 1915, cited in FGDN, Vol.3, p.148 15. Clted ln Sumlda, IDNS, p.293 16. Campbell, p.65-67; Parkes, p.618-624; Breyer, p.160-168; Gibbons, p.220-221; Preston, p.I57; Smith, p.42-43; and CONWAY'S, p.39-40 17. Campbell, p.68; Parkes, 618-624; Breyer, p.160-l68; Gibbons, p.220-221; and Preston, p.158-159 18. Corbett, Vol.5, p.164-l77 19. Gibbons, p.214 20. Campbell, p.58-59; Breyer, p.282-284; Glbbons, p.222; and Preston, p.88 21. Campbell, p.69, and Breyer, p.168 22. Campbell, p.69, and John Roberts, THE BATTLE CRUISER HOOn, p.7-l2 23. Roberts, p.7-12 1 24. Ibid, p.1l 25. Ibid, p.8 26. Breyer, p.168-169 27. Roberts, p.8 28. Parkes, p.646 29. Ibid, p. 644 30. Ibid, p. 651-659 31. For detalls of these ships, see GIbbons, p.232-233, 234-235, and 246-247

Conclusion:

1. Roskl11, p.310 2. Parkes, p.654-659, and Antony Preston and John Batchelor, BATTLESHIPS 1919-77, p.6-7 3. Preston and Batche1or, IbId, p.7 4. For details of the~e ShIpS, see JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1944-45, ed. FranCIS E. McMurtrIe, p.223 and p.476 1

1 /122 , Bibl iography: Primary Sources:_ -PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, March 5th-March 16th, 1906 and March 8th-March 26th, 1909

-FIsher, AdmIraI of the Fleet Lord John: -MEMORIES, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1919 -RECORDS, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1919

-Kemp, Lt. Conunander P. K. (ed. ), THE PAPERS OF ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FISHER, Navy Records SocIety, London, Vol.1: 1960, Vol.2: 1964

-Lumbly, E.W.R.(ed.), POLICY AND OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, ]912-1914, Navy Records Soc1ety, London, 1970

-Marder, Arthur J. (ed. ), FEAR GOD AND DREAD NOUGHT: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET LORD FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, Jonathan Cape, London, VoI.1: THE MAKING OF AN ADMIRAL, 1854-1904, 1952; Vol.2: YEARS OF POWER 1904-1914, 1956; Vol.3: RESTORATION, ABDICATION, AND LAST YEARS, 1914-1920, 1959

-Patterson, A. Temple(ed.), THE JELLICOE PAPERS, Vol. 1, 1893-1916, Navy Records SocIety, London, 1966

-Ranft, B. Mcl.(ed.l, THE BEATTY PAPERS, Vol.I, 1902-1918, Navy 1 Records SocIety, London, 1989 -Sumida, Jon Tetsuro(ed.), THE POLLEN PAPERS, 1901-1916, Navy Records SocIety, London, 1984

-Young, FIlson, WITH BEATTY IN THE NORTH SEA, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1921

Secondary Sources:

-Attwood, Edward L., WAR-SHI PS: A TEXT-BOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION, PRGl'ti:CTION, STABILITY, TURNING, etc., OF WAR VESSELS, 6th, edn (f 1 rst pubilshed in 1904), Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1917

-Bacon, AdmIraI SIr RegInald: -THE LIFE OF LORD FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, Hutchinson, London, 1929 -THE LIFE OF JOHN RUSHWORTH, EARL JELLICOE, Cassell, London, 1936 -FROM 1900 ONWARD, Hutchinson, London, 1940

-Breyer, Slegflred, BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISFRS, 1905-1970, translated from German by Alfred Kurti, Macdonald and Jane's, 1 London, 1973 /123 , -Campbell, N.J.M., BATTLE CRUISERS: THE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH AND GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR ERA, Conway Mari time Press, London, 1978

-Chaimers, Rear-Admi raI W. S., THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF DAVID, EARL BEATTY, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1951

-Chatfleld, AdmIraI of the F1eet Lord, THE NAVY AND DEFENCE, Wi l11am Helnemann, London, 1942

-ChurchIll, Winston, THE WORLD CRISIS, Vo!.l, Scribner, New York, 1923

-Clowes, SIr Wl111am LaIrd, THE ROYAL NAVY: A HISTORY FROM 'l'HE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE DEATH OF QUEEN VICTORIA, Vol. 7, Sampson, Law, Marston and Company, London, 1903

-Corbett, SI r Jullan: -NAVAL OPERATIONS, Vol. 1-5, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1920-1931 -SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1911

-Gibbons, Tony, THE COMPLETE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BATTLESHIPS AND BAT'l'LE CRUISERS, Salamander Books Ltd., London, 1983 1 -Gilbert,Martin(ed.), WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, Vol.3: 1914-1916 - THE CHALLENGE OF WAR, Houghton Miffin, Boston, 1971, and Randolph ChurchIl1(ed.), COMPANION VOLUME II, 1907-1911, Houghton MlffJn, 1969

-Go1dnck, James, THE KING'S SHIPS WERE AT SEA, Naval Instltute Press, Annapolis, 1984

-Henderson, James, THE FRIGATES, Dodd, Mead & Company Inc., New York, 1970

-Herwig, Holger H., "LUXURY" FLEET: THE IMPERIAL GERMAN NAVY 1888- 1918, George Allen & UnwIn, London, 1980

-Hough, Rlchard: -THE GREAT WAR AT SEA, Oxford UnIverSIty Press, 1983 -ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET: THE LIFE OF JOHN FISHER, MacmIllan New York, 1969

-Hovgaard, WillIam, MODERN HISTORY OF WARSHIPS: COMPRISING A DISCUSSION OF PRESENT STANDPOINT AND RECENT WAR EXPERIENCES, Conway Mantlme Press, London, 1971 (first pubilshed ln 1920)

-Hurd, Archibald, THE FLEETS AT WAR, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1 N. Y., Toronto, 1914 /124

-Hyatt, A.M.J.(ed.), DREADNOUGHT TO POLARIS: MARITIME STRATEGY 1 SINCE MAHAN, The Copp Clark Publlshing Company, Toronto, Montreal, Van couve r, l 973

-Jane, Fred 'l'., THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET: ITS INCEPTION AND GROWTH THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES TO THE PRESENT DAY, Vol. 2, Library Press Ltd., London, 1915

-JellIcoe, Adm1.ral of the Fleet Earl, THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916: l TS CREA TI ON, DEVF.LOPMENT & WORK, Casse Il , London, 1919

-Kennedy, Paul M., THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY, Charles Scnbner's Sons, New York, 1976

-Maekay, Ruddoek F., FISHER OF KILVERSTONE, Oxford UnIversIty Press, 1973

-Marder, Arthur J.: -THE ANATOMY OF SEA POWER: A HISTORY OF BRITISH NAVAL POLICY IN THE PRE-DREADNOUGHT ERA, 1880-1905, Archon Books, Connect 1 eut, 1964 -FROM THE DREADNOUGHT TO SCAPA FLOW: THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE FISHER ERA, Oxford Unlversi ty Press, London, Vol.1 THE ROAD TD WAR, 1904-1914, 1961; Vol. 2, THE WAR YEARS: TO THE EVE OF JUTLAND, 1914-1916, 1965; Vol.3, JUTLAND AND AFTER, May 1 1916-Deeember 1916, 1966 -MassIe, Robert K., DREADNOUGHT: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE COMING OF THE GREAT WAR, Ballantlne Books, New York, 1991

-Northcott, Maurlce P., ENSIGN 8: REPULSE AND REKNOWN, Battle of Bri taIn Pnnts, London, 1978

-Parkes, Oscar, BRITISH BATTLESHIPS, Seeley Servlce, London, 1966

-Patterson, A. Temple, JELLICOE, Macmillan, London, 1969

-Pres~on, Antony, BATTLESHIPS OF WORLD WAR l, Arms and Armour Pres!:, London, 1972

- Preston, Antony, and Batehelor, John,: -BATTLESHIPS 1856-1919, Phoebus Publlshing Co/BPC Publlshing Ltd., London, 1977 -Battieships 1919-1977, Phoebus Publlshing Co/BPC Publishlng Ltd., London, 1977

-Rlppon, Commander P .M., EVOLUT_ON OF ENGINEERING IN THE ROYAL NAVY, Vol. 1: 1827-1Q39, Spellmount Ltd., l_ent, 1988 1 ~ 1125 • -Richmond, AdmiraI Sir Herbert, SEA POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD, Reynal & HItchcock, New York, 1934

-Roberts, John, ANATOMY OF THE SHIP: THE BATTLE CRUISER HOOD, London, Naval Institute Press, 1972

-Roskill, Stephen: -ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET EARL BEATTY: THE LAST NAVAL HERO, Collins, London, 1980 -THE STRA'l'EGY OF SEA POWER: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION, Coll ins, London, 1962

-Scheer, AdmIraI Reinhard, GERMANY' S HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORI.D WAR, Cassell, London, 1920

-Schurman, D.M., THE EDUCATION OF A NAVY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGIC THOUGHT, 1867-1914, UnIversity of Chlca~o Press, Chicago, 1960

-Sm~th, Peter C., BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS, Almark PubJIshlng Co.

Ltd., Great Br i taIn 1 1972

-Stokesbury, James L" NAVY AND EMPIRE, Morrow, New York, 1981 e -Sumida, Jan Tetsuro, IN DEFENCE OF NAVAL SUPREMACY: FINANCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, 1889-1914, UnWln Hyman, Boston, 1989 • -Tarrant, V .A., INVINCIBLE, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1986

Periodlcals

-CONWAY'S ALL THE WORLD'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1906-1921

-ENGINEERING

-HISTORICAL RESEARCH

-JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS

-JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY

-NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

-THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

-THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER •e -PROCEEDINGS OF 'rHE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE /126 e Articles:

-Cuniberti, Col. Vittorio, "An Ideal Battleship for the British • Fleet", from Fred T. Jane, THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET, Vol.2, p.134-146

-Duncan, A. E. Jr., "The Armoured Crui ser", from the NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS #85, July, 1959, p.86-101

-Mahan, Capt. Alfred, "Reflections, Historie and Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Sea of Japan", from PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE, Vo1.XXXII, June, 1906, p.447-471

-Sumida, Jan Tetsuro. "Bntish Capital Ship Design and Fire Control in the Dreadnought Era: Sir John Fisher, Arthur Hungerford Pollen, and the Battle Cruiser", from the JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY, 1979, p.205-230

-"Speed of Warships", fram ENGINEERING, May 26th, 1905, p.675-676

-White, Ensign Donald G., "The Mlsapplicatian of a Weapon System: The BattIe Cruiser as a Warship Type", from the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE e REVIEW, Vol.22, Number 5, January, 1970, p.42-62 -White, Slr Wliliam, "The Cult of the Monster Warship", from THE • NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, Vol.63, June, 1908, p.903-925 -Williams, R.H., "Arthur James Balfour, Sir John Fisher, and the PolltlCS of Naval Reform, 1904-1910, from HISTORICAL RESEARCH, Vol. 60, #141, Feb. 1987, p.80-99 e•