Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: a Struggle for Hegemony?

Estudios Internacionales 199 (2021)–ISSN 0719-3769 • 91–114 Instituto de Estudios Internacionales–Universidad de Chile

Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony?

La diplomacia china y la batalla por la verdad durante la pandemia de COVID-19: ¿una lucha por la hegemonía?

* Daniel Lemus Delgado1

Abstract This article analyzes Chinese diplomacy during the Covid-19 crisis and the struggle for control of narratives aimed at constructing an image of a responsible nation. In this paper I assume that the emergence of COVID-19 represented a critical problem for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, forcing the authorities to fight not only to contain the spread of the virus but also to create and maintain a favorable public opinion regarding management of the crisis both nationally and internationally. It is in this context that the Chinese government launched an active diplomacy offensive, presenting itself as a responsible state through both “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy” and “Mask Diplomacy”. Based on Foucault´s approach to the Regime of Truth, I analyze the narratives and activities of the Chinese government and how diplomacy was employed in order to create a truth about the coronavirus outbreak. In addition, I review how social mechanisms and conventions were utilized to emphasize and validate knowledge linked to power systems. I conclude that if the Chi-

1 Profesor investigador de la Escuela de Ciencias Sociales y Gobierno, Tecnológico de Monterrey (México) e investigador invitado de Fudan Development Institute, Universidad de Fudan (China). Licenciado en Historia por la Universidad de Guadalajara, Maestro en Estudios Humanísticos por el Tecnológico de Monterrey y Doctor en Relaciones Internacionales Transpacíficas por la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad de Colima, México. Miembro del Sistema Nacional de Investigadores del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (México), nivel II. Correo electrónico: [email protected]. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1002-5319. Recibido: 13 de octubre de 2020. Modificado: 14 de junio de 2021. Aceptado: 30 de junio de 2021.

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nese government has the “truth” as a part of a regime, it both enhances the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and increases its power. At the same time a strong Chinese government is able to devote significant resources to spreading a discourse both nationally and internationally which is purportedly true. The point of the discourse however is to further strengthen the power of the CCP, rather than to achieve global hegemony.

Keywords: China – Covid-19 – Diplomacy – Narratives–Regime of Truth

Resumen Este artículo analiza la diplomacia china en el año 2020 durante la pandemia de COVID-19 y la lucha por el control de narrativas cuya finalidad era construir una imagen favorable de China en el escenario internacional. Así, se asume que el surgimiento del COVID-19 representó un problema crítico para la legitimidad del Partido Comunista Chino (PCCH), obligando a las autoridades a luchar no solamente para contener la propagación del virus, sino también para crear y mantener una opinión pública favorable respecto de la gestión de la crisis. En este contexto, por medio de la llamada “Diplomacia del Guerrero Lobo” y la “Diplomacia de las Mascarillas”, el gobierno chino lanzó una ofensiva diplomática con la intención de presentar a China como un Estado respon- sable ante la comunidad internacional. Basado en el enfoque teórico de Foucault sobre los Regímenes de Verdad, este artículo analiza las narrativas y acciones diplomáticas que emprendieron las autoridades chinas para crear una verdad sobre el brote de coronavirus, discutiendo cómo se utilizaron los mecanismos y convenciones sociales para enfatizar y validar el conocimiento, vinculados en última instancia a los sistemas de poder. Final- mente, se concluye que, si el gobierno chino tiene la “verdad” sobre el nuevo coronavirus, aumenta la legitimidad y con ello su poder. Al mismo tiempo, un gobierno chino fuerte puede dedicar importantes recursos a difundir un discurso sobre la verdad del origen del virus y el manejo de la crisis sanitaria, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Sin embargo, se sugiere que el objetivo de la diplomacia china durante la pandemia fue fortalecer aún más el poder y legitimidad del PCCh, en lugar de buscar la hegemonía global.

Palabras clave: China – Covid-19 – Diplomacia – Narrativas – Regímenes de Verdad

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I. The origin of Sars-Cov-2 and the challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party

On December 31st, 2019, the Wuhan Mu- a ceremony recognizing four distin- nicipal Health Commission informed the guished officials for their efforts to World Health Organization of an outbreak contain the outbreak, Xi claimed vic- of twenty seven cases of a pneumonia-like tory over COVID-19, a challenge that illness (World Health Organization, 2020a). he referred to as “an extraordinary and The Chinese scientific community initially historic test.” (Zhao and Liu, 2020) stated that the illness originated in the Hua Paradoxically, at around the same Nan fish and seafood market, in the city of time as the Sars-Cov-2 virus emerged at Wuhan (Rosenbaum, 2020). The World the beginning of the year, President Xi, in Health Organization named the new his discourse at the Central Party School, virus Sars-Cov-2 (World Health Or- warned that the security and stability of ganization, 2020b), with the Chinese China could be subjected to multiple government subsequently reporting national and international threats. He that the first known case of a patient reasoned that China had to be prepared with Covid-19 appeared on Novem- to face unpredictable events in a compli- ber 17 (Ma, 2020). Although the ini- cated international context, and that the tial response of the authorities in Hu- most important task therefore for the bei province was slow and erratic, the party leadership should be maintaining Central Committee of the Chinese political stability while simultaneously Communist Party soon took control guiding the country along the path of of the situation through a powerful development. Xi pointed out that the anti-corruption commission (Tian CCP needed to generate strategic initia- and Lee, 2020). The severity of the new tives in order to convert danger into infection was recognized by President security and transform threats into op- Xi on January 20, when he claimed portunities (People’s Daily, 2019). He that the new virus was the most se- warned senior CCP officials that they rious health problem to befall Chi- should be on high alert for two spe- na since the founding of the People’s cific types of incidents: “black swans” Republic (Zheng, 2020). He declared and “gray rhinos”. For Xi, the latter that the COVID-19 outbreak has been correspond to known risks that are the “hardest major public health emer- ignored, while the former are highly gency to contain since the founding unforeseen events. He requested that of the People’s Republic of China in party officials “be on guard against 1949”; Xi proclaimed a “people’s war” black swans, and be watchful for gray to fight this invisible enemy by mo- rhinos.” Both gray rhinos and black bilizing the force of the whole coun- swans could include social, political, try (Xinhua, 2020). Months later, at ideological, economic, scientific and

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technological challenges, and even in- said that “China let the world down,” volve the CCP itself (Lam, 2019). and threatened the nation over how The emergence of a new coronavi- the virus had been handled, affirm- rus presented a significant challenge ing the country “will be held account- to the leadership of the CCP (Rezková able” for reported attempts to initially and Šimalčík, 2020). The health emer- hide information about the outbreak gency presented by the virus would (Stockler, 2020). In addition, the inter- test both the ability and leadership national context in which COVID-19 ap- skills of the Chinese bureaucratic elite. peared was highly complex. The initial The pandemic paralyzed the economy, stages of the economic reform period in restricted travel country-wide, delayed China were characterized by economic the start of classes, canceled interna- openness and restructuring, as the coun- tional events, and postponed the work try gradually entered the international of the Consultative Assembly, which is economy and become a global economic arguably the most important annual powerhouse. However, there has been no political event in the country. In ad- attempt to democratize the Chinese re- dition, the new virus gave rise to the gime (Lee, Lee and Chang, 2015), and the largest mass-quarantine in human his- international environment in the last few tory (Wright, 2020). Just a few weeks years has been characterized by growing after Xi’s speech, it was clear that the mistrust. The economic rise of China CCP was facing an unexpected event: has been accompanied by increasing a black swan. perceptions, particularly in the United On 30th January 2020, one month af- States, that the nation poses a serious ter the new virus was officially reported threat (Canrong, 2011). While geopo- by the Chinese authorities, the World litical conflicts on the edge of Chinese Health Organization declared it to be territory have increased, Chinese in- a global emergency (World Health Or- vestment in Africa and Latin America ganization, 2020c). On the same day, is increasingly being viewed with sus- the number of Chinese dead rose to picion. The election of Donald Trump 170, with 7,711 cases being reported na- as President of the United States in tionwide (Chinese Center for Disease 2016 has only served to exacerbate the Control and Prevention, 2020). An ill- differences between the two countries, ness which was originally a localized and has ultimately given rise to several problem in China began to emerge conflicts between them, in addition to as a significant global challenge, and a trade war (Bown, 2019). the international community began to More significant even than the impact judge China for the way the CCP had of the Covid-19 epidemic on the health acted in the face of what was rapidly of the Chinese population and the very becoming a global health emergency. real threat of resulting economic paralysis, The US Vice President Mike Pence was the issue of the legitimacy of the CCP.

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A poorly-managed crisis had the capacity maintaining and increasing the political to expose the limits, weaknesses, and con- legitimacy of the CCP at home. tradictions of the Chinese political system The organization of this article and could ultimately pave the way for the comprehends four sections. Firstly, I eventual collapse of the regime. Signifi- discuss the relationship between the cant questions arose over the whether or Chinese Communist Party and For- not the CCP leadership, constrained by the eign Policy. Later, I analyze Michael structures of a one-party system, would be Foucault’s concept of truth to under- able to overcome the crisis. It appeared stand how this theoretical approach unlikely that the leadership of the CCP can help analyze Chinese diplomacy. would emerge stronger after the pan- In the next section, I discuss the imple- demic had passed. mentation of “Wolf Warrior Diploma- As Xi had warned, the apparent sta- cy” and “Mask Diplomacy” to spread a bility of the Chinese regime could be global narrative portraying China as a rocked at any time. A highly unex- responsible nation. Finally, I conclude pected event such as the emergence of that the primary aim of the Chinese COVID-19 could prove to be the Achil- political elite is to strengthen the le- les’ heel of the ruling party. Within a gitimacy of the Chinese government very short period of time President by imposing a narrative on the origin Xi and the fifth generation of CCP of the virus as part of the construction leaders found themselves battling on of a concept of truth. two distinct fronts simultaneously, in a changing and complex international environment. On one hand, the goal was to contain the virus and begin the process of economic recovery. On the other hand there was the desire to win the global narrative and represent China as a nation which had acted responsibly and in solidarity with others. This article proposes that the fight waged by the Chinese government for control of the global narrative surrounding the pandemic is aimed essentially at strengthening the leadership and legitimacy of the CCP inside China, rather than being a race for world hegemony. This being the case, the diplomatic strategy followed by the Chinese authorities focused on both

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II. The Chinese Communist Party and Foreign Policy

My starting point to understand Chi- have changed over time, the structure nese diplomacy during the outbreak is remains intact (Larus, 2012). Founded the assumption that one of the main in 1921, the CCP has a long history and motivations of the Chinese govern- has been in power since the triumph ment is the search for political legiti- of communism in 1949 (Uhalley, 1988). macy. Consequently, the quest for this During its rule the CCP has faced for- recognition determined China’s diplo- midable challenges, some of which macy during the outbreak. To a large have called into question the legitima- extent, what the Chinese government cy of its rule. A critical factor favoring did or did not do in the international the continued rule of the party how- arena through its diplomatic channels ever is its policy of pragmatism, the has the main purpose of increasing implementation of wide-ranging and China’s international prestige. This continuous reforms, and the combi- prestige is another way to strengthen nation of force with subtle persuasion the legitimacy of the CCP within China. through the creation of convincing In other words, traditionally, the CCP narratives (Shambaugh, 2008). has wanted to maintain relatively sta- As Starr has pointed (2010), the CCP de- ble external relationships in order to fines its function as defining all the vital provide conditions for resolve China’s decisions for the present and future of Chi- internal problems, and any challenge na, which the government must then carry to this situation implies a risk for the out. The CCP has created an organizational power of CCP (Lampton, 2008). Thus, structure operating parallel of government the design and implementation of foreign bureaucracy. The party members oversee policy depend on the perspective of the the work of bureaucrats at every level, ulti- CCP, whose ultimate goal is to generate the mately blurring the line separating policy- conditions of legitimacy and stability of making from policy implementation. The the political regime. legislature, the executive branch, and the ju- China has a one-party state system diciary operate under the supervision of the characterized as “fragmented authori- party. Therefore, the success or failure of tarianism” (Brødsgaard, 2018). However, the government is ultimately a result of China remains a highly hierarchical the CCP. Therefore, the success or failure political system (Brown, 2014). The CCP of the government is ultimately a result has nearly ninety million members; of the CCP. Since its foundation, the around 70 percent of them are men; leaders of CCP established party organs in addition, 30 percent of its mem- responsible for the party members’ en- bership are farmers, herdsmen, and rollment, training, and discipline. They fishermen (Albert, Xu and Maizland, positioned party elites in crucial ad- 2020). Although the party’s policies ministrative positions in government,

96 Daniel Lemus Delgado Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony? industry, agriculture, education, and generate a favorable opinion of the the military to monopolize the power government (Brady, 2012). over the state and military (Larus, 2012). It is worth stating however that the Thus, it is virtually impossible to join style of government imposed by the China’s ruling elite without being a ruling elite does not currently, nor member of the CCP (Larus, 2012). has it ever, correlated precisely with In such a political regime, legit- the idealized vision of the Chinese imacy is not derived from a direct official inherited from Confucius, -al consultation process based on uni- though Confucian thought has been versal suffrage. Despite the enor- widely promoted by the government mous variety of autocracies, the CCP, in an effort to consolidate its cultural in common with other autocratic re- leadership (Wu, 2014). Firstly, in addi- gimes, sustains its claim to legitima- tion to coercion, the CCP also seeks cy through its effectiveness in main- to establish legitimacy through a taining order, providing the services delicate balance of persuasion, con- that every state must offer to its citi- trol, and prestige. Persuasion is based zens, and generating the appropriate on spreading the idea that given the conditions for economic progress in particular characteristics of China, a balanced way (Burnell, 2006). In the one-party system, with govern- China, this legitimacy has historical- ment decisions being controlled ly been rooted the expectation that by the CCP, is the most appropriate the ruling elite must be intellectual- method of governance. Secondly, the ly strong, capable, and efficient (Sik, government consolidates power by 2000). This vision is inspired by the controlling the population: this is Confucian model of the ideal civil achieved by both direct and indirect servant who governs by moral and observation, enabling any sign of intellectual ability and not through social discontent to be quickly neu- relationships or social origin (Fung, tralized, by the employment of state 2017). In other words, the Chinese violence if necessary. Control is fun- government’s claim to legitimacy damental to the elimination of any rests fundamentally on the favorable criticism that may destabilize the re- perception by the citizens of their gime. Thirdly, prestige is used to fos- leaders: Chinese citizens expect their ter a feeling of national pride: for the leaders to handle state affairs effec- CCP nationalism is a key ideology, one tively and use the human capital of widely used to justify party actions the nation as a force for good. Per- (Gorman, 2017). suasion is a result of taking concrete National pride is fostered through actions that benefit the population a particular interpretation of the past and simultaneously building a narra- and a vision of the present and future tive purporting to be true in order to of China that projects the country as a

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unique nation. The CCP seeks to “maxi- its legitimacy. Also, the CCP defended mize the value of national pride as a col- a particular vision of the present. This lective adhesive without succumbing vision includes how the new corona- to mob spontaneity” (Shen and Guo, virus originated and how the Chinese 2013: 135). The CCP still has a reservoir government responded. The reactions of legitimacy accumulated during and in the international arena wanted to after the rise to power, “but even the gain the respect and admiration of its deepest reservoir will eventually evapo- citizen. This way of proceeding is part rate unless regularly replenished.” (Perry, of a larger and more complex process, 2018: 16). Nevertheless, the national past which, from the perspective of the phi- is also an interpretation of history. So, losopher Michel Foucault, can be con- the CCP promotes one interpretation of sidered a regime of truth. the past as a principal way to maintain

III. The Chinese Communist Party, Covid-19 and the Regime of Truth

Regarding the CCP, to be an effective tool truth that favors a positive assessment for legitimacy, persuasion, control, and of the national and international per- prestige are part of a larger phenomenon, formance of the Chinese government called truth regime (Foucault, 1995, 2000). in the face of the pandemic. The truth Under this perspective, Chinese foreign has its origin in the knowledge and the policy during the pandemic has reflected possibility to propose this knowledge the hidden desire to support building a as a superior. This situation is possible regime of truth. So, the Chinese govern- because those who present the truth ment using diplomatic channels to spread have specific power to disseminate and its version of the truth concerning the impose their truth. Specifically, CCP government’s responsibility for the origin, spreads, through diplomatic means, its expansion, and containment of the new truth about the origin of the Sars-Cov-2 virus. The construction of a regime of and the correct and responsible govern- truth is not an exclusive task of the mental actions in response to pandemic State, nor does it happen only at a challenges (Lemus, 2020). particular moment in history. On the Foucault affirms that power and contrary, this is the product of a broad knowledge are closely related, and historical and social context in the in- that they both support and depend on stitutions that support certain “truths” each other (Foucault, 1981). Foucault over others. In this way, diplomacy is suggests that all knowledge is pur- just one more instrument that, based porting to be “universal,” “pure,” “neu- on certain circumstances, results in a tral,” “disinterested,” or “free.” However,

98 Daniel Lemus Delgado Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony? economic and ideological demands not simply seek more efficient methods influence knowledge. In addition, to combat the new disease. Also, the power and knowledge are mutually discourses promote truths that impact constituted (Foucault, 1980). As Devatk the legitimacy of the government’s ac- (2009) has pointed out, knowledge is tions in the face of the pandemic (Le- never unconditional, and therefore it mus, 2020). This reality was present both is impossible for truth to be seen as nationally and internationally. something separate from power; on For Foucault, regimes of truth of- the contrary, power systems are need- ten have several distinct criteria. These ed to produce the truth, and, in turn, include techniques for distinguishing the truth gives rise to power (Foucault, true and false declarations; how true 2000). and false are authorized, and the sta- For Foucault, each society has its re- tus accorded to those who speak what gime of truth, its general politics of truth; is recognized as truth (Weir, 2008). that is, the types of discourse it accepts The battle “for the truth”, or at least and makes function as true (Foucault, “around the truth” therefore does not 1998). Regimes of truth are the conse- mean the set of true things that must quence of discourse and institutions, and be discovered or accepted, but rather they are strengthened or redefined con- the set of rules according to which tinually through the education system, the truth is distinguished from fiction the media, and the diffusion of ideolo- and linked to the true political effects gies. The fight for truth therefore is not of power (Foucault, 1980). Foucault for some absolute truth that can be dis- also argues that regimes of truth are covered and accepted, but rather a battle not primarily occupied as champions about the rules by which truth and un- “in favor” of the truth, but instead are truth are distinguished and how specific involved in establishing the status of effects of power are attached to the truth truth and the economic and political (Foucault, 1984). In this sense, the “battle role it plays (Foucault, 1980). for the truth” is not one for some absolute In contrast to the arguments of Foucault, truth that can be discovered and accepted Weir (2008) theorizes that regimes of truth but rather a battle over the rules govern- in contemporary societies are composed of ing how truth and untruth are separated. multiple truth formulae, not simply scien- It is a battle over the state of truth, and tific and quasi-scientific truth. Consequent- with it, the economic and political role ly, all types of discourses, including diplo- that said truth plays in a given social con- matic narratives, contribute to creating a text (Rabinow, 1984). regime of truth. In this way each society In the face of the grave health crisis has its regime of truth, that is, the types experienced due to Covid-19, the Chi- of discourses that it welcomes and makes nese case shows that the speeches pro- function as true; the mechanisms and in- moted as true by the state leaders do stances that make it possible to distinguish

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true or false statements, the way of sanction- the triumph of the Communist Party. This ing one or the other; the techniques and regime ultimately supports the idea that procedures that are valued in obtaining the only communism can save China, and truth, and the status of those charged with only communism can restore the leading saying what works as true. role that China once played on the inter- The State is not the only actor that national stage. In a conscious and icon- builds the regimes of truth, nor is diplo- ic way, Chinese diplomats generate dis- macy the only way to create these regimes courses that underpin this truth. From this of truth. From Foucault’s perspective, the perspective, it is not essential whether Chi- concept is much broader. This concept nese diplomacy tell the “truth.” The truth illustrates how each society constructs about the realities of China regarding the truths and mechanisms from which these management and control of Covid-19. The truths establish a symbiotic relationship most important is how diplomacy is one between power and knowledge. Thus, more piece in the complex machinery of the elites have a more significant oppor- the PCC that for years has implemented a tunity to generate their regimes of truth. regime of truth about the political system, To the extent that this happens, the elites the role of the PCC, and the future of China reinforce their power. The historical ex- and the world. perience suggests that in contemporary Finally, in common with other nations, China, the elite clusters around the Com- China uses specific social and historical munist Party are fundamental to creating contexts to establish the veracity of cer- truths and mechanisms to disseminate tain narratives and employ knowledge in these truths to strengthen its prestige and specific ways. For example, this same fact power. Therefore, being a member of the is present in China’s main rival, the United party makes it possible to generate dis- States. US diplomacy, based on notions– courses that have a greater chance of being beliefs–about so-called universal values considered trues because the party has the such as democracy, freedom, and human strength and the means to do it. To the rights, are equally refined constructions of extent that the population accepts these “truths,” with ambitions both hegemonic discourses as truth, it reinforces the party’s at the international level and for legitima- power and its legitimacy to govern. Chi- cy at the domestic level. In the next section, na’s bureaucratic elite responsible for de- I analyze how Chinese foreign policy uses signing and implementing foreign policy a combination of traditional and more is embedded in a particular context that contemporary diplomatic approaches as has gradually built a regime of truth since a tool to build a truth regime.

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IV. Covid-19, truth regime, and Chinese diplomacy

A broader context that includes the prin- in asserting China’s priorities” (Nien- ciples of foreign policy and the particu- chung, 2016: 82) lar characteristics of the vision of inter- This shift in foreign policy is primarily national relations during President Xi a discursive shift during the Xi administra- Jinping have framed the Chinese diplo- tion. The elements that define this discur- macy during the crisis of Covid-19 in the sive turn comprehend a highlight a strong year 2020. In this sense, the speeches of sense of China’s civilization achievements Chinese diplomats reflect a paradigmat- and historical experiences, the intent of ic approach to China’s role in the inter- showing the foreign policy differentiated national scenario. Traditionally, the Five from the Western model of diplomacy Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Chi- based on values of liberal democracy, and na’s foreign policy have guided Chinese the emphasis on building “a new type of foreign policy. These principles include international relations” distinguished by mutual respect for sovereignty and ter- confrontations between blocks as during ritorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, the Cold War, a more pragmatic approach non-interference in each other’s inter- to disregard political and ideological dif- nal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, ferences among countries in order to and peaceful coexistence (Ministry of pursue common economic benefits in Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of defense of economic globalization (Poh China, 2014). and Li, 2017). However, each generation of com- The transformation of Chinese munist leaders has imprinted its charac- foreign policy during the regime of teristics on the foreign policy according Xi corresponding to a new era in the to their particular context. Today, Pres- history of China. In the report to the ident Xi, under the premise of rejuve- 19th CCP Congress, highlighted three nating the Chinese nation, has taken a development stages of China since significant turn in foreign policy. Thus, 1949. First, “China has stood up”. Sec- the cautious and low-profile approach ond, “China has grown rich”. Finally, to foreign affairs, which shaped the ini- China has entered a new era of “it is tial transformation of China during the becoming strong”. Thus, Xi asked for ‘80s and ‘90s, has been replaced with a “major country diplomacy with Chi- more confident and active approach nese characteristics in order to build to befitting China’s re-emergence as a China into a great modern socialist significant player on the global stage power in the world by the middle of (Nien-chung , 2016). Consequently, Chi- the 21st century” (Hu, 2019: 1). nese diplomacy “has a more activist in- After Xi came to power in 2012, Chi- clination, forming a broader strategy na’s bureaucratic elite also joined in the “battle for discourse.” (Semenov

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and Tsvyk, 2021). In this way, at the Situation and China’s Foreign Relations Third Plenary Session of the 18th Cen- on 11 December 2020 in Beijing. He es- tral Committee of the Communist tablished that “Facing the devastating Party of China in November 2013, the impact of COVID-19 and an increasing- CCP adopted “The Decision on Major ly complex international environment, Issues Concerning Comprehensively China was among the first to contain Deepening Reforms,” accentuating the virus, to carry out international co- the need to strengthen opportuni- operation against COVID-19, to reopen ties for the propagation of informa- the economy safely, and to restore eco- tion overseas, establishing a system of nomic growth” (Wang, 2020). From this entitlement/power to foreign policy perspective, the Chinese government has discourse and endorsing the access of taken proactive steps to stay ahead of the Chinese culture into a broader world. changing circumstances, “in an effort to (Semenov and Tsvyk, 2021). This vision serve the country and contribute to the shaped Chinese diplomacy during the world.” According to Wang, the Chinese Covid-19 crisis in 2020. government fought at the same time To understand speeches and the against novel coronavirus and the “po- specific diplomatic actions during litical virus” as well as made new contri- the pandemic outbreak. In that case, butions to safeguarding national interests it is necessary to officially consider and global stability (Wang, 2020). the general framework of Chinese To Wang, in different ways, the Chi- diplomacy during this period. This nese diplomats made different efforts framework helps us explain how Chi- and achieved important achievements nese diplomacy during the Covid-19 cri- during these troubled times. First, the sis was focused on winning the battle of diplomats have carried out robust inter- narratives, establishing its truth, and pro- national cooperation against COVID-19. moting an image of China as a responsi- Second, they have further expanded ble nation. Chinese diplomacy, dictated opening-up and mutually beneficial by the Politburo at the core of the CCP, cooperation. Third, they have provided should therefore be seen as part of a larg- strong support for global stability. Fourth, er strategy that has the ultimate goal of they have made solid progress in build- strengthening and legitimizing the rule ing a community with a shared future of CCP (McGregor, 2010). with neighbors. Fifth, they have protect- A good example to examine the rela- ed and expanded the shared interests of tionship between official statements and the developing world. Sixth, they have diplomatic discourses and actions to pro- actively participated in the reform of the mote a Chinese truth about Covid 19 is global governance system. Finally, they the participation of Wang Yi, State Coun- have served the Chinese people through cilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, at diplomatic work (Wang, 2020). the Symposium on the International

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An important aspect, according to Under this vision, the diplomatic ap- Wang, was the fact that the diplomats have proach was directed towards denying firmly safeguarded the national interests accusations of ineptitude or bad faith and dignity of China. He said: “Over on the part of the Chinese government the past year, by staying committed and how they had managed the crisis, to an independent foreign policy of and showing a positive and friendly peace, we have firmly safeguarded the image of China. In addition, diploma- path and system chosen by the Chi- cy was employed as a privileged vehicle nese people and upheld our country’s in the refutation of several conspiracy sovereignty, security and development theories which maintained that SARS- interests. We have taken a clear-cut Cov-2 was a lab-engineered virus inten- position against any politicization tionally created and spread as a part of or stigmatization of COVID-19 and the Chinese Grand Strategy to rule the held back the global spread of the world (Van Beusekom, 2020). “political virus”. We have pushed back From a long-term perspective, the against slanders and smears against diplomatic response was manufac- China’s system and path and reso- tured not only to “save the face” of Chi- lutely defended the security of politi- nese officials but to contribute to the cal authority and system of the Party consolidation of a regime of truth. In and the country. We have forcefully the first instance, the principal objec- defeated the attempts to interfere in tive was to proclaim the effectiveness China’s internal affairs by external of the Chinese government in con- forces through issues related to Tai- trolling the outbreak of the epidemic, wan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, and, when circumstances allowed, to and upheld sovereign independence render assistance to other countries and territorial integrity of our coun- during the health emergency. In ad- try. With justice on our side, we have dition, recognizing more recently that denounced various types of disinfor- a positive image on the international mation and laid bare the attempts of stage is essential for the stability and scapegoating and blame-shifting in a legitimacy of the Chinese political re- bid to present and put on record an gime, the CCP has used diplomacy to objective and truthful historical narra- manufacture a favorable international tive. We have taken firm countermea- environment (Shullman, 2019). It can sures against unilateral sanctions and be seen therefore how even during the the so-called long-arm jurisdiction in pandemic Chinese diplomatic strategy the name of national security and safe- has been devoted to strengthening the guarded our national dignity and the relationship between truth, knowledge, legitimate rights and interests of our and power in line with the regime of companies and citizens.” (Wang, 2020). truth proposed by Foucault.

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Diplomatic strategy during the out- it soon became apparent that this was break was expressed in two distinct a challenge which required significant ways: one was aggressive, while the pragmatism. other employed public diplomacy, China’s more proactive diplomatic was more subtle, and oriented more stance became known as “China’s Wolf towards persuasion. These responses Warrior Diplomacy.” The concept is derived showed the profound change which from a Chinese action movie in which Chi- had taken place from the days of Deng nese soldiers, led by an American merce- Xiaoping’s China, which focused on nary, fight against enemies of their nation, keeping a low profile and “peace and and somewhat predictably emerge victo- development” (Keith, 2018). Contem- rious (Hughes, 2020). In essence, this film porary Chinese diplomatic strategies is combines the Hollywood-style movie have moved away from Deng´s vision superhero genre with Chinese-style patrio- of a nation which “hides our light and tism (Buckley, 2107). The concept describes bides our time”, and concentrated on often-confrontational offensives by Chi- keeping a low profile while develop- nese diplomats designed to defend national ing strength (Wong and Deng, 2020). interests (Zhu, 2020). The type of diplo- The transformation of Chinese for- macy involved mainly consists of Chinese eign policy has been a process modi- officials issuing “hawkish, painfully direct, fied by the visions of each generation and sometimes untrue statements in an of leaders. These visions of a Chinese attempt to rally people around the Com- future have recently become charac- munist Party and undermine critics abroad.” terized by a more proactive attitude as (Ma, 2020: 1). a result of the arrival of Xi and the fifth The origin of this diplomatic style is generation leaders (Stenslie and Gang, rooted in growing Chinese nationalism, 2016). Xi has promoted China’s new in turn fostered by the continuous pro- role on the international stage based motion of the four confidences by the on a great national revival (Economy, CCP: “in our chosen path, in our political 2018). As Loh (2020) has noted, Xi has system, in our guiding theories, and in made foreign policy one of his polit- our culture.”(Zhu, 2020). An additional ical aims and a fundamental perfor- reason stems from explicit instructions mance target, tying his performance from President Xi calling on diplomats and legitimacy together. The success to show more fighting spirit (Zhai and of both rests on the ability of Chi- Tian, 2020). The constantly growing con- nese diplomats to deliver on his ex- frontation with the US under the Trump pansive foreign policy goals. The out- administration provides fertile ground for break of COVID-19 therefore posed a the new-style diplomacy. Wang Yi, Minis- significant challenge to Xi’s relatively ter of Foreign Affairs, is quoted as referring young presidency and his stated aim of to a Mao Zedong slogan which states: “We transforming Chinese diplomacy, and will not attack unless we are attacked…

104 Daniel Lemus Delgado Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony?

but if we are attacked, we will certainly is the sharing of text messages on the counterattack.” (Wang in Zhai and Tian, Twitter social network, along with inter- 2020). Minister Wang further declared to views published in the international me- the press at the annual meeting of the na- dia. Press conferences specifically orga- tional legislature that Chinese diplomats nized to refute some accusations about “never pick a fight or bully others, but we China’s behavior prior to and during have principles and guts… We will push the COVID-19 outbreak are another back against any deliberate insult to commonly-employed diplomatic tac- resolutely defend our national honor tic. The irony behind the employment and dignity.” (The Economist, 2020). of Twitter to put forward the Chinese One of the aims of Wolf Warrior Di- argument is that this network is actually plomacy is the preservation of Chinese prohibited within China itself. honor in the face of media attacks in Gui Congyou, the current Am- the US and elsewhere. It is a mindset bassador of the People’s Republic of expressed openly by diverse members China to Sweden, is just one exam- of the ministry of foreign affairs, par- ple among many of the energetic and ticularly by younger diplomats, who threatening tone Chinese diplomats have grown up in a more self-confident are taking to defend the image of Chi- China. (Kuwahara, 2020). Among these na abroad, even beyond the handling younger diplomats three Foreign Min- of the COVID-19 crisis. Ambassador istry spokespeople in particular stand Gui pushed back abruptly on Swed- out for their manifestation of this diplo- ish criticism of alleged Chinese hu- matic style: Hua Chunying, Zhao Lijian man rights abuses, warning in an in- and Geng Shuang. They have impressed terview with a Swedish newspaper of the public with their distinctive style severe consequences if the fault-find- and have many supporters, particular- ing didn’t stop. He said: “The Chinese ly amongst Chinese Generation Z citi- government absolutely cannot allow zens, who have a strong sense of national any country, organization or person identity and pride (Huang, 2020). While to harm China’s national interests. Of in the Western Hemisphere, diplomats course, we must take countermeasures,” from countries such as the United King- he said, mentioning likely disruption dom and the United States are facing to Swedish cultural exchanges with questions at home over their handling China. “Economic and trade relations of international affairs, in China diplo- will also be affected.” (Detmer, 2020: 1). mats who have shown less conciliatory The other side of the coin is so- positions when expressing their point called mask diplomacy. One of the first of view seem to enjoy great popular and most pressing problems that coun- support. tries faced with the sudden emergence The main communication strategy of of the new coronavirus was finding the so-called Wolf Warrior Diplomacy medical supplies. This was particularly

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true in the case of face masks, which have used the pandemic as an opportuni- experienced a significant rise in price ty to forge international connections and due to competition between nations project and disseminate aid with the inten- to acquire them, mostly as a result of tion of winning allies and creating a favor- evidence that mask-wearing impeded able impression among the international the spread of the virus. China there- community. Finally, Wong (2020) suggests fore decided to donate both masks and that a critical dimension of China’s mask other medical equipment, in addition diplomacy is its three-faceted moralizing to sharing key scientific knowledge discursive traits. The first of these is criti- about combating the Sars-Cov-2 virus cism by China of US “disengagement” and as soon as it became available. Both aid “abdication” of global leadership, mainly in and medical assistance subsequently terms of failing to heed WHO advice or offer became known as mask diplomacy. At aid to European nations. The second trait is the beginning of the outbreak, China the manifestation by China of its intention received this type of aid, particularly to become a global leader in health coopera- from Japan (Li and McElveen, 2020) tion by sharing knowledge, information, ex- and South Korea (Alton, 2020). Once periences and resources. The third and final countries began to experience some trait can be seen in how China is reframing success in containing the virus, this both internal pressures and the domestic type of help became increasingly im- measures adopted to control the outbreak, portant in the theater of international and grounding these in the interests of the relations, with mask diplomacy being global political community. practiced not only by China but also One of a number of strategies em- Vietnam and Taiwan. ployed by the Chinese government in According to Wong (2020), Chinese order to create a narrative favorable to mask diplomacy is defined by four the CCP administration is the dona- characteristics. Firstly, this diplomacy tion of medical supplies to countries emphasizes the distribution of vital affected by the pandemic. The CCP is resources as a means of securing mass employing such strategies in order to coverage of the population. Secondly, generate a positive image of China the donation of supplies to ailing hos- both inside and outside the country pitals and local charities are pivotal and engender a feeling of national in creating a positive image of China. pride and trust towards the political Thirdly, this diplomacy contributes to authorities, with the ultimate aim of the creation of long-term dependence strengthening the legitimacy of their relations and patronage networks. The regime. In addition, this type of di- fourth characteristic highlights the willing- plomacy–both through the narrative ness of Chinese civil society to cooperate it promotes and the acts that accom- with others and shows the friendly face pany the narrative – further legiti- of China. Some Chinese multinationals mizes the Chinese political regime

106 Daniel Lemus Delgado Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony? and highlights the benefits it can helped them to confront the health cri- bring. Once China had apparently sis pre-equipped with tens of millions come through the most severe phase of masks and millions of testing kits. of the pandemic, the CCP authorities In addition, China’s role as a world played a role in showing China to be leader in the manufacture of medical a reliable ally by sharing not only equipment allowed the nation to gift material resources to help contain 1,000 ventilators to the city of New outbreaks in other countries, but by York (Hornung, 2020). One year be- sending medical personnel to dis- fore the beginning of pandemic, 44% seminate information and share ex- of the world’s exports of face masks perience about the virus. As part of originated from China, with the next this effort, China has provided medical largest exporters, Germany (7%) and aid and sold ICU facilities, ventilators, the US (6%), playing a comparatively masks, gloves, testing kits and medi- minor role (Fuchs, et. al., 2020). cines (Verma, 2020) to other countries. In Europe, China provided 30 tons of This type of diplomacy seeks to dis- medical supplies to Italy, while Huawei tance China from being recognized offered to help fight the virus by setting as the source of the outbreak and up cloud computing facilities for Italian instead cultivate a reputation as a hospitals in order to facilitate the rapid responsible and benevolent global sharing of information. Serbian President leader in times of crisis (Chen and Vucic went to Belgrade airport to receive Molter, 2020). 16 tons of medical aid from China, kiss- According to Alton (2020), China has ing the Chinese flag and pledging to im- offered aid in four distinct ways during plement the Chinese virus-containment the Covid-19 crisis. Firstly, by govern- model. Prime Minister Viktor Orban of ment-to-government donation of medi- Hungary praised China for its assistance cal equipment to 82 countries in the WHO and for the provision of medical supplies and African Union. Secondly, through (Verma, 2020a). Poland received 20,000 sending seasoned expert medical teams masks, 5,000 protective suits, 5,000 sets of to affected areas and cooperating on medical goggles, 10,000 single-use medical health technology, including sharing di- gloves and 10,000 shoe covers, with Greece agnostics and therapeutics and holding receiving 550,000 masks as well as other pro- videoconferences with medical experts. tective gear (Alton, 2020). In addition, the Thirdly, through sub-national support tycoon Jack Ma promised to donate from local Chinese authorities, and fi- 2 million masks for distribution in nally through non-governmental assis- European countries including Spain, tance from Chinese corporations and Italy, Belgium, and France, with Hua- NGOs. wei offering a substantial amount of China has therefore provided aid to personal protection equipment to Ire- a significant number of countries and land (Wong, 2020). Oppo, Xiaomi, and

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other Chinese smartphone companies also sent thousands of masks to Eu- rope (Verma, 2020b).

V. Conclusions

The response of the Chinese govern- kind and supportive face through “mask ment during the first few weeks after diplomacy” or a more severe countenance the appearance of the virus was inter- as exemplified by “wolf warrior diploma- preted critically by the international cy”, the intention is the same: to strengthen community. However, once the CCP the image of China and thus increase the began to experience some success in prestige of the CCP. containing the crisis it began a diplo- This is how Chinese diplomacy matic campaign to improve the image during the COVID-19 world crisis has of China on the international stage. become an integral part of the strat- These diplomatic activities however egy to win truth narratives. China of were frequently viewed with suspicion, course is not the only country that and presumed to be part of the Chi- promotes its narratives and pushes for nese desire for world hegemony. One their international acceptance. The im- positive result of this initiative how- position of a truth manufactured by ever has been to improve the image the Chinese state is also viewed as a way of Chinese state principally within of strengthening a regime of truth re- the country itself, which in fact may lating to the legitimacy of the CCP. The have been the principal motivation. bureaucratic elite generates and com- In other words, the main concern of municates a narrative about China’s the CCP has been strengthening the le- past, about what the Chinese nation is, gitimacy of its claim to rule a vast and and about how China has made critical complex country, with foreign policy contributions to the world. They have viewed as one way of achieving this. highlighted how, at this moment in The COVID-19 outbreak accelerated the history, fraught with difficulties and transition of Chinese foreign policy from in the middle of a sea of uncertainty, one which was humble, quiet and discreet, the Chinese government and its peo- to one which was considerably more active. ple have made valuable contributions The new foreign policy stance took place in to helping overcome the crisis. At the an environment where the Chinese econo- same time however it should not be my was gradually opening up, and, as a re- forgotten that the benevolent face of sult of this, foreign policy took on a broader Chinese diplomacy is accompanied by dimension and was more focused towards both coercion and threats, and while consolidating the vision of a rejuvenated strong government has given China Chinese nation. Whether by showing a significant material capabilities, the

108 Daniel Lemus Delgado Chinese Diplomacy and the Battle for Truth During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Struggle for Hegemony? same strong government is respon- goal. Finally, the CCP’s chosen methods sible for spreading a discourse both of communicating with the world about nationally and internationally, that it the COVID-19 health crisis, in addition would like to be considered as true. to its national and international response, This truth however is only designed have been governed by its overwhelm- to strengthen the legitimacy of the ing desire to both legitimize its rule and CCP and consolidate its grip on power: consolidate its power within China itself. world hegemony is not the ultimate

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