Universality and Particularity of Aristotelian Substances-Erman

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Universality and Particularity of Aristotelian Substances-Erman This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from Explore Bristol Research, http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk Author: Kar, Erman Title: Universality and Particularity of Aristotelian Substances General rights Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License. A copy of this may be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode This license sets out your rights and the restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding. Take down policy Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact [email protected] and include the following information in your message: •Your contact details •Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL •An outline nature of the complaint Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible. UNIVERSALITY AND PARTICULARITY OF ARISTOTELIAN SUBSTANCES A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts by Erman KAR Department of Philosophy University of Bristol November 2018 AUTHOR’S DECLARATION I, Erman Kar, declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author. SIGNED: ............................................................. DATE:.......................... ABSTRACT The primary question of this project is whether Aristotelian substantial forms are universals or particulars, or neither or both. In other words, the question is whether Aristotelian forms are peculiar to each particular being, or whether they are identical for all particular members of a kind. My position is that substantial forms are both universal and particular. I argue the primary question cannot be answered if the status of form in Aristotelian ontology is considered alone. I address the problem by looking at the ontological relation between universal and particular entities, besides their substantiality. This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first and second chapters cover the Aristotelian background to the problem. In the third and fourth chapters, I discuss some important entities of the Four-Category Ontology of Jonathan Lowe, and the relations between three of these entities: form, universals and particulars. Jonathan Lowe defends a version of Aristotelian metaphysics. Especially, Lowe claims that both particulars and universals are substantial, since the ontological relation between universal and particular is symmetrical rather than asymmetrical. Next, in the fifth and sixth chapters, I analyse, firstly, the problem of knowledge in terms of the universality of substantial entities, and, secondly, the problem of individuation in terms of the particularity of substantial entities. i ACKNOLWEDGEMENTS I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Alexander Bird and Professor James Ladyman, my research supervisors, for their patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. I would also like to thank Dr. Giles Pearson, for his advice and assistance in keeping my progress on schedule, especially for Aristotelian aspect of the work. My doctoral work has benefited greatly from their knowledge and ability to see the big picture. Our discussions helped me to formulate key ideas I defend in my dissertation. My deepest gratitude is due to my family, especially to my father, Adem Kar, and my twin-sister Ceren Dolaskan. Finally, special thanks should be given my friends, Umit Akyol, Yilmaz Aliskan, Zeynep Balaban, Ozge Koca, Fatma Korkmaz and Simon Lemon. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my beloved Mother Emine Kar. ii LIST OF FIGURES Table 1. Ontological Square ........................................................................................................................ 9 Table 2. Instantiation The Relationship Between Particulars and Universals. .......................................... 82 Table 3. Characterisation The Relationship Between Substantial and Non-substantial entities. .............. 82 Table 4. Four-Category Ontology I ............................................................................................................. 88 Table 5-6. Four-Category Ontology II ........................................................................................................ 89 Table 7. Substance in the Metaphysics .................................................................................................... 102 Table 8. Substantial Forms ....................................................................................................................... 104 Table 9. Four-fold Ontology I ................................................................................................................... 105 Table 10. Four-fold Ontology II ................................................................................................................ 106 Table 11. Kinds and Objects ..................................................................................................................... 110 Table 12. Substantial Entities ................................................................................................................... 112 Table 13. Four-Category Ontology IV ....................................................................................................... 113 Table 14. Ontological Square II ............................................................................................................... 135 iii CONTENTS AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ...................................................................................................................................... i ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................................. i ACKNOLWEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ ii LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................................. iii CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1- Formulation oF The Problem ............................................................................................................. 12 1.1.Metaphysics Beta: The Aporia - Whether Principles are Universal or Particular? ............................................ 15 1.2. De Interpretatione and The Categories ........................................................................................................... 18 1.3. The Status of Form in Metaphysics Zeta .......................................................................................................... 21 1.3.1. ForMs are Universal ................................................................................................................................. 21 1.3.2. ForMs are Particular ................................................................................................................................. 26 1.3.3. ForMs are Both Universal and Particular ................................................................................................. 30 Chapter 2 – The Problem oF Universals and Ontological Relations ...................................................................... 36 2.1. Universals in Metaphysics Beta and De Interpratatione ................................................................................. 37 2.2. Universals in the Categories ........................................................................................................................... 41 2.2.1. “Said of a subject”: The Ontological Relation of the PriMary and Secondary Substances ....................... 42 2.2.2. “Being in a subject”: The Ontological Relation of PriMary Substances and Individual Properties ........... 48 2.3. The Status of Universals: Realism and Nominalism ......................................................................................... 51 2.3.1. The Realist View ....................................................................................................................................... 52
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