UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

The Rhetoric of War in the Battle of Britain

by

Chelsea Sambells

A THESIS

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DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

NOVEMBER, 2009

© Chelsea Sambells 2009

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ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the role of rhetoric in the Battle of Britain (1940). By analyzing Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, as exhibited in four specific speeches, this thesis suggests that these leaders’ rhetoric played an important, albeit unexplored, role in the unfolding of these events. Previous studies have not evaluated either Churchill’s or Hitler’s rhetoric in this manner, implying that more rigorous scholarship is required in both historical and rhetorical publications relating to the Second World War. Theoretical frameworks, based upon the works of Isocrates, Cicero, Aristotle and Pericles, explore and assert that Churchill’s improved oratory skills, when compared to Hitler’s declining persuasive capacity, assisted in the Battle of Britain’s unfolding. Although rhetoric’s degree of influence cannot be measured quantitatively, political leaders, their rhetoric and history share a unique relationship that leads to further insight into rhetoric’s role in war.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I am very grateful to Dr. Tania Smith, for her excellent and sound judgment with

this thesis. Her consistent attention to detail, her after-hours discussions and her ability to praise my work, as well as constructively criticize it, has led me to producing a thesis that

I am very proud of. Go Rhetoric! Also, I would like to acknowledge the students and other faculty members at the University of Calgary for their support, in the classroom or in Grad Lounge, with this long process. Naturally, I would like to thank my family and friends – Mom for introducing me to war movies at a young age, for proofreading the thesis and for remaining patient during my periodic outbursts of impatience; Dad, for humorously telling me to “get back to work”, even after a fourteen hour day; Richard for being interested, even if far away; and Gaela, for making me laugh at myself and reminding me to not take things too seriously. Last, but not least, to James Brewer, who spent many late nights with me, providing me with food, anecdotes to make me laugh and never ending encouragement.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...... vii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS ...... ix

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 The Relationship between Rhetorical Texts and Historical Context ...... 4 Previous Rhetorical and Historical Scholarship about Churchill and Hitler ...... 6 “Rhetoric”: A Product of Ancient Greek Society ...... 8 Research Questions ...... 9 The Criteria for Selecting the Primary Texts ...... 10 Why the Battle of Britain? ...... 12 Selection of Historical Data ...... 14 Brief Overview of Thesis ...... 15 Significance of this Thesis to Rhetorical and Historical Scholarship ...... 16 The Limitations of this Thesis’ Scope ...... 17

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 19 Reviewing the Scholarship about Churchill’s and Hitler’s Rhetoric ...... 19 Churchill: Automatic Glorification and Inconsistent Frameworks ...... 21 Hitler: Ethics, the Propaganda Ministry and Mein Kampf ...... 25 The Battle of Britain: The Best Literature for Rhetorical Scholarship ...... 32 The Ethical Challenges in Post-WWII Historical and Rhetorical Scholarship ...... 36

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS ...... 37 Dissertation Type ...... 38 Contribution to Rhetorical Studies as a Discipline ...... 39 Criteria for Selecting Classical Texts ...... 42 Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical Criticism ...... 45 Technical Qualities of Rhetoric: Aristotle’s Logos, Ethos and Pathos ...... 45 Churchill and Hitler: The Glory of the Nation and Pericles’ Funeral Oration ...... 48 Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical Biography ...... 49 iv Free Will and Determinism in the Study of Rhetorical Biography ...... 50 Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical History ...... 52 Rhetorical Perspectives upon Definitions of History, Cause and Effect and Historical Contingency ...... 53 Definition of History ...... 53 Cause and Effect ...... 55 The Contingency of Rhetoric in the Study of History ...... 58 Rhetorical and Historical Methods Combined: Rhetoric Creates History ...... 59

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IDEAL ORATOR ...... 61 Background of Isocrates and Cicero ...... 62 Education and Knowledge ...... 64 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Ethos ...... 69 Table 1: The Ideal Orator Visualized ...... 76 Figure 1: A Timeline of the Battle of Britain (1940) ...... 78

CHAPTER FIVE: CHURCHILL’S AND HITLER’S RHETORIC IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN ...... 79 Introduction to Analyzing Rhetoric in War ...... 79 Phase One: Dunkirk and the Antecedents to the Battle of Britain ...... 80 Rhetorical Analysis of June 4, 1940 Speech “We Shall Fight On the Beaches” ...... 82 “Operation Sealion” and Plans to Invade Britain ...... 91 Rhetorical and Technical Aspects of the Battle of Britain ...... 94 Phase Two: The Beginning of the Battle of Britain and the “Irrational” British ...... 99 Rhetorical Analysis of July 19, 1940 Speech “The Generous Peace Proposal” ...... 100 The “Great Battle” Against Britain: The Summer of 1940 ...... 110 Rhetorical Analysis of TheAugust 20, 1940 Speech: “The Few” ...... 113 Phase Three: The Battle of Britain as a Civilian War ...... 122 Rhetorical Analysis of Hitler’s Speech, September 4th, 1940: The “Winterhilfswerk” Address ...... 124 The Finale: Germany Loses the Purpose to Invade...... 130

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ...... 135 Policy vs. Promise-making ...... 137 Respect and Emotion ...... 138 Churchill’s Brutal Honesty ...... 139 Dilemmas of Studying Hitler ...... 140 Implications for Future Study ...... 141 Practical and Contemporary Applications ...... 142 v Significance of this Thesis and Final Thoughts ...... 144

REFERENCES ...... 146

vi LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: The Ideal Orator Visualized…………………………………………………75

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: A Timeline of the Battle of Britain ...... 77

viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS Adlertag Eagle day

Heere German Army

BEF British Expeditionary Force

Kriegsmarine German Navy

Luftwaffe German Air Force

Operation Seelöwe Operation Sealion

RAF Royal Air Force

RDF Radar Direction Finding

Wehrmacht German Armed Forces

ix 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION In 1940, the German Wehrmacht was one of the strongest forces in Europe (Lukacs, 2001, p. 8). Advancing west, the German Wehrmacht pushed the British Expeditionary Forces to the coast of Northern France (Price, 1977, p. 34). The British government began massive evacuations of the British and French forces from Dunkirk. Throughout the course of ten days, the British government evacuated over 330,000 troops across the English Channel to its southern shores (Lukacs, 2001, p. 191). On June 4, 1940, one day after the evacuations were complete, Winston Churchill, the newly- appointed Prime Minister gave a speech to the House of Commons and later on the radio, which was broadcast to the British people and international community (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 127). Churchill informed the frightened and ill-informed citizens about the dire situation of the British Empire, while invoking a sense of calm and heroism about their impending confrontation with the German forces (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 127- 129). Churchill’s speech has been lauded as one of the finest rhetorical masterpieces in western history (“Greatest speeches of the 20th century”, 2009; “Top 25 political speeches of all time”, 2008; “Top ten greatest speeches”, 2009; Roberts, 2003, p. 23). He was able to garner a belief in Britain’s national strength, regardless of the insurmountable odds they were facing against their foe. In what ways was his rhetoric considered effective? Furthermore, what role would his speech play throughout the course of the battle? Adolf Hitler, leader of Nazi Germany, retaliated against Churchill’s rejection of capitulation, by focusing his Luftwaffe’s efforts upon securing British air space, which would allow the German forces to invade the island (Price, 1977, p. 37). These attacks upon British air space became known as the “Battle of Britain” (Price, 1977, p. 81). On July 19, 1940, Hitler declared to his people at Berlin’s Reichstag that a British defeat was near at hand and that the German Reich would be victorious (Domarus, 1997,

2 p. 2042). By offering peace to the British, Hitler claimed that he was desperate to resolve the situation with the British (Domarus, 1997, p. 2064-2065). Hitler presented himself as a pacifist who was forced into war. How could Hitler’s speech have effectively persuaded his audiences? How important is oratorical proficiency to the fate of a nation at war? And, again, what role did Hitler’s speech play in the subsequent unfolding of the summer’s events? Throughout July and August, 1940, the Luftwaffe bombed airfields, ports and other strategic targets with the goal of eliminating the Royal Air Force (RAF) (Messenger, 1990, p. 13; Lukacs, 2001, p. 140). However, the RAF was not as easy to destroy as the Germans had expected. Converted automobile factories became production sites for aircraft components (Messenger, 1990, p. 23) and Radar Direction Finding towers, erected along the south coast of Britain, helped to anticipate attacks coming from the Luftwaffe’s bases in mainland Europe (Price, 1977, p. 68). Moreover, the Spitfire and Hurricane airplanes challenged the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitt 109s and Messerschmitt 110 airplanes (Messenger, 1990, p. 16-21). The RAF had greater endurance than the Germans had anticipated. On August 20, 1940, Churchill gave yet another speech, eulogizing lost pilots and crewmen, while describing the courageous spirit of the British people (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 219). In light of all the industrial and mechanical qualities each nation had under its control, could it be that Churchill’s speeches had a social impact that contributed to the success of these technological advances? And, how was Churchill using rhetoric effectively to commemorate national losses? Although civilian targets were not seen as desirable from a strategic standpoint by the German commanders (Calder, 1969, p. 152), an error made by Luftwaffe navigators on August 24, 1940 culminated in bombing London’s city center (Price, 1977, p. 22). In retaliation, Churchill ordered Berlin to be bombed (Price, 1977, p. 78). These increasing

3 night-time attacks upon civilian targets had a devastating effect. Not only were each country’s civilians becoming familiarized with the realities of war, but each government now had to grapple with the increasing loss of life and justify it to their respective nation. On September 4, 1940, Hitler gave another speech to an audience comprised primarily of social workers and nurses. Although Hitler’s rhetoric had been consistently persuasive up to this moment (Domarus, 1997, p. 2081), his speech on September 4, 1940 was a rhetorical failure. His unfocused and disorganized approach did little to calm his audience, and his treatment of the British was one of distain, rather than respect, creating an enemy that could have been viewed as unworthy of challenge. By the end of September, 1940, Hitler postponed the invasion (Price, 1977, p. 86). By the end of October 1940, the Battle of Britain had ended (Messenger, 1990, p. 104). Neither country’s air force had been eliminated, but the military objective to invade England had been lost (Price, 1977, p. 86). Could it be that Hitler’s rhetorically weak speech on September 4, 1940, contributed to the Luftwaffe’s failure to secure air space? In what ways was Hitler’s speech rhetorically ineffective? And finally, how and in what ways, did both Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric operate throughout the Battle of Britain? How important could Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches have been to the unfolding of the Battle of Britain? What correlations between Hitler’s rhetoric and the historical context can be discovered? While many of these questions may never be answered, or scientifically proven, some rhetoricians and historians suggest that there is a strong and real connection between the speeches of leaders and the unfolding of historical events. Very rarely does a WWII scholar forego to mention Churchill or Hitler without recognizing the importance of their rhetoric within their public lives (see Lukacs, 2001; Heywood, 2003; Baldoni, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Best, 2001; Gilbert, 1984; Brendon, 1984; Manchester, 1988; Clayton & Craig, 2002; Domarus, 1997). Many scholars have interpreted these speeches

4 as central to each nation’s morale and belief in their purpose. Although their frameworks and methods may be very diverse, scholars are interested in how rhetoric and history are connected, and to what extent rhetoric and history influence each other. A premise of this thesis is that rhetoric and history are not ancillary to each other, but central to each other’s development (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 30-31). This thesis will build upon this principle and examine how the speeches of Churchill and Hitler contributed to the eventual outcome of the Battle of Britain. Not only will Churchill and Hitler, as orators, be assessed for their rhetorical skills, education and aptitudes, but Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches will be examined within the larger context of the Battle of Britain. Also, each speaker was affected by the opposing speaker’s rhetorical strategies. Thus, Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches will be analyzed as products and producers of historical and rhetorical events. Although this thesis will not suggest that rhetoric was the sole reason behind British victory, it will investigate how rhetoric can wield power in military campaigns.

The Relationship between Rhetorical Texts and Historical Context

In many ways, this thesis adopts a typical early 20th century model of a rhetorical study, as it examines an oration’s internal qualities based upon classical theories of good persuasion (such as those presented by Isocrates, Cicero, Aristotle and Pericles). However, this thesis moves beyond this type of insular study to include the historical circumstances in which the speaker and oration operated. Therefore, this thesis uses historical context as evidence of rhetoric’s effect, suggesting that both rhetorical texts and historical context are integral to each other’s development in the Battle of Britain. In order to suggest that rhetoric and history have an intrinsic connection, the micro-level vocabulary of speeches and what is actually said, along with each speeches’ overall role in national and international contexts, is the essence of this thesis. Therefore,

5 classical rhetorical theories provided by Isocrates, Cicero, Aristotle and Pericles aid in performing a rhetorical criticism of each leader’s speeches as being rhetorically effective (i.e. Aristotle and Pericles) or causal and effectual forces in the historical context (i.e. Isocrates and Cicero). This thesis is not just an analysis of the dialogue between enemies or just a comparison of adversaries’ speeches, but includes the causes of history and the effects of rhetoric - or, conversely, the causes of rhetoric and the effects of history. If this thesis merely studied the speech itself, without historical context (such as Lyons, 2006), then it would indeed be impossible to investigate the impact of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric upon the historical context of the Battle of Britain. Therefore, rhetorical texts and historical context are absolutely necessary to evaluate in this thesis and must be treated as evidence of the other’s impact. A brief synopsis of how Churchill’s speech on June 4, 1940 is treated within this thesis exemplifies this approach. Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech responded to a rhetorical exigence which was fuelled by the preceding historical events, such as the evacuations at Dunkirk, the low morale of British citizens (Clayton and Craig, 2002, p. 128), and the new relationship Churchill sought to create with British citizens after his recent appointment as Prime Minister. Historical circumstances caused Churchill to create a specific type of rhetorical reaction, which was then presented to audiences in the form of a speech. Thus, Churchill’s rhetoric is evidence of history’s effect. Furthermore, Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech also affected historical and rhetorical circumstances. An example of rhetoric’s affect upon historical circumstances was when Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech appealed to the United States for military support. Churchill had hoped the United States would declare war on Germany. However, the United States rejected this appeal. But, as this thesis will suggest, this inaction still affected the historical perception that Britain was isolated during this battle. Without this speech, and the appeal to the United States, then perhaps history might have

6 been different or the perception of Britain at that time might have been different. Therefore, the fact that the United States’ rejected Britain’s request for help is evidence of rhetoric’s effect upon historical context. Finally, a rhetorical effect of Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech was the response from the Nazi Germany. Churchill’s speech expressed the national will to survive and continue fighting. The Nazis targeted the British as stupidly courageous and almost laughable. Because of this, Hitler would declare on July 19, 1940, once again, that he desired peace with the British. In turn, Hitler’s declaration of peace would provoke the British government to yet again reject capitulation. Thus, Churchill’s rhetoric affected Hitler’s, which yet again, affected Churchill’s. Therefore, rhetoric can affect rhetorical texts, such as speeches.

Previous Rhetorical and Historical Scholarship about Churchill and Hitler While many historical and rhetorical scholars suggest that Churchill and Hitler were prolific orators and that the exploration of their rhetoric would be productive (Roberts, 2003; Baldoni, 2003; Best, 2001; Brendon, 1984), very few have focused upon the Battle of Britain with a perspective that values the importance of rhetoric within that military campaign. Furthermore, the most surprising aspect of previous scholarship on Churchill and Hitler is that the scopes of previous studies have not included a comparison of both leaders’ rhetoric within one study. This thesis will not only attempt to apply a thorough and consistent rhetorical framework to both orators, but also to suggest how Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, when compared, played a significant role in the Battle of Britain. Although many historians credit Churchill for possessing superior oratory skills and a talent for courageous leadership during crises, Churchill has not often been investigated within a rhetorical framework., Although Winston Churchill’s (1874 – 1965)

7 various speeches posses great historical importance, they are not often analyzed with a rhetorical framework. As will be seen in the literature review, only two previous attempts to rhetorically analyze Churchill’s speeches could be found (Lyons, 2006; Hostetler, 1997). They demonstrate that Churchill was a major historical figure whose rhetorical actions are a site for productive contemporary inquiry. However, these studies do not suggest that rhetoric was a contributing factor to historical events. Each applies only one Classical rhetorical theory or model to the analysis of Churchill’s speeches. This suggests that Churchill’s speeches require further scholarly criticism in an effort to understand how Churchill’s rhetoric played an important role in the Battle of Britain In addition, any study of Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) is fraught with ethical and moral dilemmas. As Hitler was the primary architect behind the savage genocide of the Holocaust, any academic approaches to his actions and influence must not only investigate the facts with the utmost scrutiny and respect for all the individuals and groups that were victimized by his ideologies. Many researchers solve the ethical dilemma of trying to study a racially discriminating government by demonizing Hitler (Lyons, 2006). It is not the goal of this dissertation to demonize Hitler, nor to valorize Churchill. Instead, it is a goal of this dissertation to understand how Hitler’s rhetoric was a product of Nazi beliefs and circumstances, and the effect of that rhetoric upon the unfolding of the Battle of Britain. While scholars have studied Hitler’s rhetoric (Scanlan, 1951; Lee, 2005; Katz, 1992), studies focus primarily upon Hitler’s Mein Kampf or the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, rather than upon Hitler’s rhetorical performance. This denotes that more scholarship is required to understand Hitler as an orator, the strategies of Hitler’s speeches, and how they impacted his immediate situation.

8 “Rhetoric”: A Product of Ancient Greek Society Since this thesis investigates the role rhetoric played in history, a definition of rhetoric is vitally important. The term “rhetoric” often evokes nefarious meanings. Considered to be part of power mongering or propaganda, today’s notion of rhetoric has been relegated as a negative and deceitful term for the techniques modern politicians and corporations use to further dishonest purposes. Aristotle defined rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, trans. 2001, p. 181). Thus, effective rhetoric is dependent upon the rhetor (one who practices rhetoric, also known as the orator, the speaker), to discover the appropriate manner in which to persuade his or her audience. Although Aristotle’s definition serves as the standard, classical definition of rhetoric among academics, his approach is limited because his treatise on rhetoric focuses upon the technical qualities of a speech, not the cultural context in which it operated. Aristotle suggests that rhetorical techniques can be morally neutral and can be used in various contexts, for either good or bad purposes (Kennedy, 1991, p. ix). Since Aristotle’s theory does not focus upon adaptation to context, and because this thesis seeks to understand how rhetoric and the historical context interact, an Aristotelian approach is insufficient. Isocrates complements Aristotle’s definition to suggest that even though technical qualities are vital to the persuasive capacity of the message, rhetoric is highly dependent upon context and must be used for the maintenance of the state: “Through (rhetoric) we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is the surest index of a sound understanding and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, p. 75). Isocrates asserted that rhetoric must be used for the betterment and improvement of society. In fact, “kairos”, a rhetorical term for context or “fitness for the occasion” was coined by Isocrates (Bizzell

9 & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69). Thus, Isocrates’ definition is much different from Aristotle’s, and more appropriate for this thesis, since it argues that rhetoric is morally-laden, speaker-dependent and context-dependent.

Research Questions Based upon the definition that rhetoric is speaker-dependent while also saturated by the cultural context and morals, three research questions will be posed. First, in what ways were Churchill and Hitler effective orators with regard to their education, knowledge, character and skills? This question will be answered in Chapter Four: The Ideal Orator, in which Isocrates’ and Cicero’s theoretical concepts will be manifested as a standard by which to assess Churchill’s and Hitler’s natural aptitude, education and knowledge, as well as their performances of ethos through superior morals, modesty and humility. This chapter will help to assess Churchill and Hitler as orators without the historical distractions of the Battle of Britain, comparing these two leaders in an effort to understand their strengths and weaknesses as orators. The second research question is: What elements of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, both its internal content and its relation to historical context, likely contributed to the Battle of Britain? After exploring the potential of these speakers, one must then examine how these leaders rose to the rhetorical challenge and whether they fulfilled their aforementioned potential. By examining Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric in the context of the historical antecedents and the immediate effects, it will be explored how these leaders’ rhetoric was historically contingent and their responses to the situation were unique and context-dependent. As stated, this thesis values the relationship between rhetorical texts and historical context. The third research question is based upon the connection between Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric within this battle. How were each leader’s rhetorical strategies and content shaped by their enemy’s rhetorical performance? Throughout the thesis, the

10 interaction between these opposing forces will be recognized through the organization, which layers the perspectives of Britain and Germany.

The Criteria for Selecting the Primary Texts Two speeches were chosen from each orator in order to ensure balance between Hitler and Churchill. More than one example of each leader’s rhetoric was needed in order to examine his rhetorical adaptation over time. Choosing only four speeches allowed for sufficient depth of analysis in historical context. The four speeches were selected based upon two criteria: 1) each speech’s content dealt directly with the militaristic and historical unfolding of the Battle of Britain and 2) each speech provided new and informative insight into each government’s political policies and were not just a reiteration of previous sentiments. For example, the speech “We Will Fight on the Beaches” (Churchill, 1940a), delivered on June 4, 1940, dealt directly with the threat of future German assaults (para. 10) and provided insight into the British government’s policy of rejecting capitulation (para. 18). The policies and details provided in this speech were “most people’s first chance to hear the full details of Dunkirk” (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 128) and thus provided new information to audiences. Hitler’s speech, “A Generous Peace Proposal”, delivered on July 19, 1940 also discussed the situation regarding the impending confrontation with Britain (Domarus, 1997, p. 2057) and well as provided the German government’s offer of peace (Domarus, 1997, p. 2062). Thus, Hitler’s speech on July 19, 1940 met the aforementioned criteria. The second speech of Churchill’s to be analyzed in this thesis, delivered on August 20, 1940, “The Few”, eulogizes the British losses of pilots and crewmen that had been experienced by the nation. The major political policy that was announced highlighted the progress with the Americans (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 219) and the allotment of naval and air defense facilities for usage by the American forces (Churchill,

11 1940b, para. 43). These policies, among others, were delivered to audiences that may not have heard them in concise language and summarized as a national address. Finally, Hitler’s speech on September 4, 1940, “the Winterhilfswerk Address” also provided his audiences with new information regarding the immediate situation. In retaliation to Britain’s rejection of Germany’s peace offering, Hitler articulated his heightened desire for war, contradicting his earlier sentiment of being a pacifist, by stating outright “I now prefer to fight” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2084). He also threatened the British with further bombing in a rhetorical move that Domarus (1997) contends was to “prepare the German public for the terror attacks the Luftwaffe was to fly on British cities” (p. 2081). Moreover, Hitler announced political policies, especially regarding the internal Winterhilfswerk programs as well as long-term aims for regarding the war with Britain and other foes (Domarus, 1997, p. 2080-2090). Thus, Hitler’s final speech in this thesis also provided more detailed information about the Battle of Britain to his audiences. A number of key speeches made by Churchill during the Battle of Britain were not chosen for analysis, solely due to the time constraints of a Masters thesis and their reiteration of sentiments described in previous speeches. For example, Churchill’s speech on June 18 1940, which has been called “Their Finest Hour,” was an excellent site for rhetorical inquiry, as it addressed some of the major components of the Battle of Britain. However, it was also an iteration of many political policies Churchill had already expressed on June 4, 1940, in the speech “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” (Churchill, 1940a), which is analyzed in this thesis. Furthermore, Hitler also had a number of rhetorical addresses in 1940 that are not encompassed within this study. For example, Hitler’s speech on November 8, 1940, acknowledged Germany’s policy to continue attacks on Britain, but that it would be impossible to invade Britain in the near future. Instead, Hitler turned to Russia as a potential ally and future friend (Domarus, 1997, p.

12 2112). Although this could have also been a profitable site for rhetorical inquiry, it was delivered after the conclusion of the Battle of Britain. As stated, it is difficult to sustain academic quality within the realm of a Masters thesis by analyzing every single speech delivered by Churchill or Hitler throughout the summer of 1940. Transcripts of these speeches are used to conduct the rhetorical analyses. The Churchill Center and Museum at the Cabinet War Rooms in London provide electronic transcripts which can be accessed through the internet. Although very little historical data is provided on this website (www.winstonchurchill.org), the speeches themselves are the transcripts based on the audio recordings during that time. Therefore, the exact words said by Churchill on June 4 and August 20 are reflected in these primary texts and are more accurate than drafts of the initial speeches. Secondary historical sources have been used to place these speeches in their historical context. Since the end of WWII, many German scholars have compiled transcripts of Hitler’s speeches in their original language, with contextual data, to assist in the exploration of Hitler’s prolific career as a German dictator and politician. Since 1962, Max Domarus (1962) and Wolfgang Domarus (1987) have published four volumes of Hitler’s speeches and proclamations in German. Although originally published in German, I will use the English translations, copyrighted by the same author, Wolfgang Domarus (1997), for its evaluation. Domarus’ (1997) third volume, which provides Hitler’s speeches from 1939-1940, supplies the contextual data necessary to understand how these speeches were influential, aspects of their reception and even their initial conception and provides the primary source of Hitler’s speeches in this thesis.

Why the Battle of Britain? There are two elements of the Battle of Britain that allow a rhetorician to see a major correlation between history and rhetoric. First, the historical circumstances of the Battle of Britain, especially in the beginning phases, indicated that the British were

13 perceived to be vulnerable and susceptible to invasion by the Germans. The German forces were, by 1940, one of the strongest in Europe (Lukacs, 2001, p. 10). Since Britain had been generally regarded as a powerful and victorious military nation before Dunkirk, the potential invasion and defeat during the summer months of 1940 shook the British nation. However, the British won the battle, and it became the first legitimate challenge to the Nazi German advance westwards. Second, both Churchill’s and Hitler’s and rhetoric were under incredible pressure and were transforming in 1940. Winston Churchill, despite the insurmountable odds the

British were facing, is remembered as having given some of the best speeches of the 20th century in the summer of 1940. Churchill’s inspirational addresses have become ingrained within the national myths of Britain’s past (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 129). Moreover, works that historically examine Churchill praise him for his rhetorical capacity, especially within the summer of 1940 (Roberts, 2003; Heywood, 2003). Likewise Hitler’s persuasive abilities, which have been lauded as one of the key reasons he was able to lead the National Socialists (Evans, 2003, p. 171), transformed under the pressures of 1940. W. Domarus (1997) contends that by September 4, 1940, Hitler’s speech-making had altered and the “raging, the ill-concealed feelings of impotence” (p. 2081) characterized Hitler’s rhetoric from this point onwards. These two qualities – the vulnerability of the British to invasion and defeat by the strong German forces, coupled with the perception of Churchill’s reportedly powerful rhetoric in comparison to Hitler’s apparently declining persuasive capacity – suggests that perhaps correlations can be drawn between the unfolding of history and rhetoric. Could it be that these leaders were reacting to historical pressures? In what ways was Churchill a strong orator? Could it be that Hitler’s response to battle led to his rhetorical mistakes? What correlations between Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric and the historical

14 events of 1940 can be drawn? These are the reasons why the Battle of Britain was chosen as the historical period in which to examine the oratory of these leaders.

Selection of Historical Data Historical data is essential to this thesis. However, rhetoricians who study history often do not seek historical sources that are flawless or entirely objective accounts, but rather interpretations of events. Thus, rhetoricians may not have the same criteria for selecting sources as the scholarly historian. Because rhetoricians find meaning in perceptions of history, it can often be fruitful to include historians’ interpretive accounts. Thus, a rhetorician can gain insight into both the historical accuracy, through reputable historical sources, but also divergent interpretations. Although this presents an intensified challenge to a rhetorician studying history, it also creates a more comprehensive, rhetorical interpretation of historical events. However, this does not necessarily mean that historical sources are fictional narratives or far from the truth. It means only that they also contain the historian’s interpretations of historical data. Thus, while sources such as Clayton & Craig (2001), Messenger (1990) and Roberts (2003) may not meet the criteria of a scholarly historian, as they are interpretations to the Battle of Britain, they provide information valuable to rhetorical analysis. Since historical fact is also important to the analysis of the causes and effects of rhetoric, the works of Evans (2003), Calder (1969), Price (1977), James (2000) and Lukacs (2001) have been consulted as more accurate historical accounts of the events in the Battle of Britain. To ensure historical precision when it is needed, these types of texts are often referenced, especially with regard to the dates and statistical data and overall unfolding of the Battle of Britain.

15 Brief Overview of Thesis Following the introduction, each chapter in this thesis addresses aspects of this overarching question: What elements of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, both its internal content and its relation to historical context, likely contributed to the Battle of Britain? Chapter Two, the literature review, will expose the gaps in scholarly literature with regard to rhetoric, history and the Second World War. How have previous scholars approached the connection between Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric and the Battle of Britain’s outcome? Has rhetoric ever been viewed as having an affect on historical military campaigns?, or in what ways have Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric been studied? Chapter Three introduces the methodological tools that are needed to bridge rhetoric and history. This section will seek an answer to the question: What tools are needed to bridge rhetoric and history? Since both historical and rhetorical scholarship is often viewed as independent of each other, it can often be difficult for a rhetorician to connect these major fields in one study. Three key methods are used to investigate Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric: rhetorical biography, rhetorical criticism and rhetorical history. Chapter Four uses the first research method of rhetorical biography. Isocrates’ and Cicero’s notion of the “ideal orator” is conceptualized as a standard by which to view Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric. In what ways were Churchill’s and Hitler’s effective orators, with regards to their rhetorical skills, education and overall rhetorical development? Not only will their personalities and rhetorical styles be scrutinized, but also their education and their performances of moral character. By evaluating these leaders to an ideal standard, conceptualized by ancient rhetoricians, the rhetorical potential of Churchill and Hitler can be assessed.

16 The following historical chapter, Chapter Five, will encompass the majority of the data analysis in this thesis. In this discussion, rhetorical history is conducted and speeches are examined within three historical phases. The first phase encompasses the beginning of the battle – the antecedents, such as the evacuation of Dunkirk and political contexts, such as the newly appointed Prime Minister, Churchill, and the instability of the British Empire. The second phase is characterized by the actual attacks by Germany’s Luftwaffe upon Britain’s RAF, and the engagement of planes in combat. Finally, the third phase is typified by the involvement of civilian targets and the inability of the German Luftwaffe to obtain air superiority over the English Channel. Throughout this thesis, Aristotle’s logos, ethos and pathos theories are used as an organizational strategy for rhetorical criticism. Also, Pericles’ Funeral Oration provides a comparative model by which Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric is examined. Finally, the thesis leads to insights about the rhetorical ability, rhetorical strategies and the effectiveness of rhetoric within its historical context. The conclusion will also suggest three possible implications of this research and propose further study.

Significance of this Thesis to Rhetorical and Historical Scholarship This thesis is interdisciplinary and attempts to bridge, and contribute to, both historical and rhetorical traditions. Other interdisciplinary studies of this nature primarily use rhetoric as a lens, and history as subject matter. However, both rhetoric and history will be viewed with the rigor of a rhetorician, rather than a historian. This difference must be made clear, as both history and rhetoric will be analyzed, but essentially from a rhetorical perspective. Oftentimes, the relationship between rhetoric and history is investigated within the realm of rhetorical studies, rather than in history (Medhurst, 2001, p. 498). Rhetoricians claim that there exists an undeniable relationship between the two concepts. According to David Zarefsky (1998), “Analyzing the rhetorical dimension of history is

17 compelling not because rhetoric is somehow ancillary to history but because it is central to it” (p. 9). As Zarefsky claims, rhetoric and history are not mutually exclusive, but concepts that rely upon each other in the creation of what Karen J. Turner (1998) claims is a process of social construction (p 2). Turner (1998) suggests that viewing rhetorical history as a social construction implies two distinct meanings: First, rhetorical history is the ways in which rhetorical processes have constructed social reality and second, it suggests the nature of the study of history is an essentially rhetorical process (p. 2). The study of historical situations from a rhetorical perspective is considered highly significant to the greater academic community. Zarefsky (1998) suggests that this is the most productive avenue of inquiry for rhetorical study and the most heuristic. By studying important historical events from a rhetorical perspective, one can see significant aspects about those events that other perspectives miss. If that is so, then there is an argument not only for the place of historical studies within rhetoric but also for the contribution of rhetorical studies in the larger scholarly enterprise. (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 30-31). Zarefsky (1998) further suggests that the realm of communication studies is amply suited to a pursuit of this kind: “Communication stands poised to offer a success story of truly multidisciplinary study” (p. 31). This suggests that the endeavor to study history from a rhetorical perspective is significant to both the development of rhetoric, but also to the larger academic and multidisciplinary community.

The Limitations of this Thesis’ Scope This thesis does not examine each government’s propaganda as rhetoric, neither does it analyze the medium in which the speeches were delivered, nor does it determine the specific effects of rhetoric through audience analysis. Although the concept of

18 national morale will be occasionally referenced, morale or public opinion will not serve as a method to measure the effectiveness of rhetoric. Instead, national morale may be suggested as having possible relationship to rhetoric, though no quantitative correlations will be investigated, discussed or substantiated, except through secondary sources. Despite the existence of sophisticated communication technologies, propaganda ministries, and overwhelming archival evidence of civilian receptions, the speeches will be the focus of this analysis, viewed as arising from oratorical skill, involving rhetorical strategies, which possibly responded to and created history.

19

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Rhetorical scholarship is a vast academic field, as is History. This chapter narrows the evaluation of literature to how rhetoric has been viewed in relation to

Churchill and Hitler as well as the Second World War. This will allow for a concise and accurate portrayal of the ways in which this study further develops scholarship. It will be seen that although the scholarship provides insight into important issues and events, a study of this type has not yet been undertaken.

Reviewing the Scholarship about Churchill’s and Hitler’s Rhetoric

It must be acknowledged that oftentimes, historians inadvertently provide rhetorical information in their publications (see Roberts, 2003). As stated previously, rhetorical historians often use interpretive texts of historical periods for understanding how rhetoric operated within that event, in addition to factual historical accounts. For a rhetorician studying history, historical evidence, both interpretive and factual, is crucial to understanding the circumstances that surround the rhetorical moment. For example,

Roberts (2003) provides an excellent, historical account regarding the rhetorical charisma and oratory style of Churchill and Hitler, but his study does not provide a rhetorical framework in his analysis. Thus, this is problematic, but still beneficial, to a rhetorical scholar studying this prominent figure. The historical publications regarding

Churchill will be reviewed in detail.

Rhetorical scholarship that analyzes Churchill also contributes to the assumption that Churchill was, and is, a major rhetorical figure. Although some studies do not engage with Churchill’s wartime rhetoric, nor assert that Churchill’s rhetoric had a

20 specific role in the unfolding of history, they strengthen the underlying belief of this thesis, that Churchill’s rhetoric played a significant role in the Battle of Britain.

The historical and rhetorical scholarship about Hitler also denotes that Hitler is, and was, a productive site for historical and rhetorical inquiry. Although some studies systematically condemn Hitler, (which could be due to the ethical challenges of studying the mastermind behind the Holocaust), it does suggest that rhetoricians have found value and significance in studying Hitler. Some analyses focus heavily upon the Nazi

Propaganda Ministry, rather than upon rhetorical persuasion in speeches, while others apply rhetorical theory to Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, which is analyzed for its ideologies, rather than for its rhetoric. Unfortunately, most scholarship that focuses upon persuasion within Nazi Germany often attempts to uncover the malicious and manipulative tactics of the Propaganda Ministry, rather than to critically focus upon the speeches of the time. As stated previously, a distinction between rhetoric and propaganda will be acknowledged. While studying Nazi German propaganda is fruitful, most studies have not yet uncovered the rhetorical techniques of Hitler himself.

While historians can provide historical evidence that Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric was influential to some degree, these types of scholars do not possess the rhetorical tools to link these leader’s rhetoric to the historical circumstances of that situation. Meanwhile, rhetoricians that attempt to study Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric apply rhetorical theories and criticisms, these scholars may not view rhetoric as crucial to the historical developments and unfolding during that period of history. This thesis will single out Churchill and Hitler as the primary historical figures of this battle and will not only address many failings in previous literature, but will also produce further insight into war, rhetoric and history.

21 Churchill: Automatic Glorification and Inconsistent Frameworks

Winston Churchill (1874 – 1965) was a prolific writer, publishing a novel, two biographies, three volumes of memoirs, and several histories in addition to his many newspaper articles. Many rhetorical and historical scholars have used his autobiographical and historical material when discussing politics, war and history.

However, among all the iterations regarding Churchill’s role in British politics and war efforts, rarely does a scholar forego to mention Churchill’s triumphant speeches and successful oratory style. Almost every book that historically surveys Churchill discusses how his speeches were instrumental to gaining popular opinion, and were somehow influential during WWII (see Heywood, 2003; Baldoni, 2003; Lukacs, 2001; Roberts,

2003; Best, 2001; Gilbert, 1984; Brendon, 1984; Manchester, 1988). Although these publications suggest that Churchill was a political communicator, many fail to evaluate his speeches with a rhetorical framework. But, by providing such information, these historians have inadvertently assisted a rhetorician’s attempt to rhetorically analyze

Churchill. Thus, historical scholarship can then be used by rhetorical scholars. For example, in Andrew Roberts’ (2003) book, Hitler and Churchill: Secrets of Leadership, sections exist that focus upon Churchill’s “oratory” (p. 22-40) and “charisma” (p. 42-45) but fail to apply rhetorical theory or a consistent rhetorical framework of evaluation.

Instead, from a rhetorical standpoint, Roberts’ work, (though meant to be historical) is a dissection of Churchill’s ethos (the ethical qualities of a speaker, whereby he or she appears to have good will, intelligence and the audience’s best interests at heart) as well as Churchill’s personality that was exhibited in massive political speeches.

Other books written by historians contribute to a rhetorician’s attempt to analyze

Churchill. In a book by John Baldoni (2003), entitled Great Communication Secrets of

Great Leaders, Churchill’s leadership style is analyzed to suggest that his

22 communication styles, (whereby he would emphasize honesty, confidence and encourage ownership of situations onto British citizens) were inspirational and effective in a leadership role (p. 10-12). Although Baldoni does not attempt to analyze Churchill’s speeches for their persuasive appeal, he mentions that Churchill was a “natural communicator” (p. 10), whose speeches could halt people from “what they were doing, whether at home or at work, to listen” (p. 11). Although Baldoni’s work is geared towards focusing on Churchill’s keen leadership qualities, it also contributes to the overall understanding of Churchill’s rhetorical ethos.

Rhetorical frameworks that evaluate Churchill’s leadership and speeches are more often found in scholarly journals, such as Michael J. Hostetler’s (1997) article entitled The Enigmatic End of Rhetoric: Churchill’s Fulton Address as Great Art and

Failed Persuasion, which reviews Churchill’s famous “the Sinews of Peace” speech.

Popularly referred to as the “Iron Curtain Speech”, Churchill delivered this speech on

March 5, 1946 to an American audience. Hostetler suggests that while the speech was a rhetorically technical masterpiece, it was a persuasive failure (p. 416). By conducting a textual analysis, appraising the speech for style, arrangement as well as invention,

(which could be considered Aristotelian), Hostetler argues against previous scholarship on this speech by Hinds and Windt (1991), who claim that the argumentative qualities of the speech are overpowered by the strong metaphor the “Iron Curtain” (as cited in

Hostetler, 1997, p. 417). Hostetler displaces Hinds’ and Windt’s position, to suggest that the rhetoric in such situations must not only be analyzed at the micro-level, but that engaging the larger elements of a rhetorical situation is necessary to understanding its effect and persuasive success (p. 427). This argument is highly significant to this dissertation, as my research adopts the same position. Although Churchill’s speeches may be easily dissected with Aristotelian theory to demonstrate the superiority of

23 Churchill’s colorful language and passionate metaphors, these types of analyses fail to recognize the importance of rhetoric in a wider perspective. Although Hostetler focuses on only Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, without a comparative framework to other speeches and without much attention to the affects and effects of the speech itself,

Hostetler does acknowledge that technical elements of rhetorical moments are somewhat futile to explore if not considered within the broader context (p. 427).

Another article, entitled Winston Churchill and the rhetorical challenges of democratic statesmanship, by J.D. Lyons’ (2006), a political scientist, advocates that there are specific rhetorical challenges (such as combating a tyrant with a “good cause” or the appeal to universal justice) to democratic statesmanship that Churchill, Abraham

Lincoln and Pericles all experienced. Lyons suggests that Churchill was a great rhetor that advocated the privileges of democracy to British citizens through various methods, including the simple spoken word, leadership tactics and “greatness” (p. 4-31). Lyons’ article focuses upon the importance of the spoken word to the maintenance of the state, claiming that Pericles, Lincoln and Churchill used rhetoric to promote the ideals of civilization, democracy and victory (p. 6). Lyons asserts that by doing so, these leaders were ethically just and although their immediate situations were precarious, the goals of democracy and civilization sustained their rhetoric to become central to the maintenance of national morale (p. 12). Lyons further suggests that Pericles, Lincoln and Churchill used ethical rhetoric in a manner which had the “ability to inspire without corrupting, to elevate without destroying foundations, to lead without succumbing to the vanities of leadership” (p. 12), which is the key difference between the “statesman and the despot, the great man and the thug” (p. 12).

Lyons’ (2006) article reiterates many sentiments about Pericles and Churchill that will be developed within my thesis, such as the importance of rhetoric to the state.

24 This is highly relevant to my thesis. Although Lyons claims that this rhetorical quality is evident in Churchill’s speeches, Lyons does not extend the argument to Hitler.

Throughout his article, Lyons valorizes Churchill yet does not approach Hitler with the objective scrutiny, referring to the German politician as a “madman” (p. 7), with “insane frothings” (p. 7) and the Nazi regime as a “soul-destroying tyranny” (p. 7). Although

Lyons claims that Pericles, Churchill and Lincoln were using rhetoric for ethical purposes, he does not historically contextualize Churchill’s rhetoric, nor even Hitler’s rhetoric. If Lyons had contextualized the rhetoric of Hitler, or say, Napoleon, within the value-laden cultural frameworks in which they operated, then perhaps Lyons (2006) would have created a more fair and objective publication. As such, my thesis will develop Lyons’ claim about rhetoric’s importance in the maintenance of the state, but will engage with Hitler’s rhetoric while contextualizing it in historical details.

A fundamental flaw deriving from Lyons’ (2006) article is based upon his depiction of the British Empire. Lyons glorifies the British race as having “always stood for something greater than mere survival; it had stood for the freedom of man” (p. 8), but fails to take into account the centuries-long exception to this claim, such as the slavery that Britain encouraged in their empire. Although Lyons attempts to rhetorically analyze three major historical and rhetorical leaders, his obvious favoritism towards Britain’s wartime Prime Minister, along with inconsistent discourse analysis, contaminates the major claims and fundamental assumptions in this article. Although Lyons provides an inadequate rhetorical evaluation, this does demonstrate that the attempt has been made to rhetorically analyze Churchill’s speeches.

Although Hostetler’s (1997) and Lyons’ (2006) articles may dissect Churchill’s rhetoric, neither do so in the same manner as this thesis. Hostetler acknowledges that rhetoric should be seen within the broader context (p. 427), but this analysis does not

25 include how other speeches or mitigating factors would have harmed and/or benefited the effectiveness of Churchill’s rhetoric. Also, Hostetler’s analysis does not survey

Churchill’s wartime speeches, and naturally neglects to engage the rhetorical challenges that are specific to wartime speeches (such as the maintenance of civilian morale).

Lyons’ evaluation of Churchill takes a thematic, rather than chronological approach to

Churchill’s rhetoric, connecting Churchill’s numerous speeches under the broad headings of “greatness” (p. 11) or “courageous leadership” (p. 8). Although this article demonstrates aspects of Churchill’s rhetoric are indeed effective and memorable, it is unclear in Lyons’) article how rhetoric operates within the framework of war versus peace, or how certain aspects of political and military life (during WWII) would have harmed and/or benefited the effectiveness of Churchill’s rhetoric. My thesis will attempt to address these gaps in the literature, to include discussions about Churchill’s wartime rhetoric and how two speeches contributed to the historical events in the Battle of

Britain.

Hitler: Ethics, the Propaganda Ministry and Mein Kampf

The scholarship regarding Hitler is vast. Hitler’s impact on academic disciplines is found in, but not limited to: science, medicine, politics, history, war, ideological constructions of race, law, economics, culture, literature, education, psychology and

Germany itself. In order to study the scholarship on Hitler, one must take a thematic approach. The following research was discovered when searching for communications, rhetoric, propaganda, public speaking and oratory.

When researching rhetoric and the speeches of Nazi Germany, the now-nefarious

Propaganda Ministry, run by Josef Goebbels, is often referenced. A brief discussion about the Propaganda Ministry must be granted, in order to understand the purposes and

26 operations of this government organization, and why it is often referenced within rhetorical literature.

Although it is not the goal of this thesis to evaluate Germany’s propaganda, it is significant to note that it was pervasive in the average German’s life. Most contemporary rhetoricians value the Propaganda Ministry as an initial site of rhetorical inquiry. This is due in part to the prominent role that propaganda played in Nazi Germany in creation and commission of the literature, art and other cultural artifacts of that time, as well as the ethical boundaries regarding government information that the Ministry questioned and promoted. In 1933, when Goebbels was appointed as Propaganda Minister, the primary purpose of the Ministry was to centralize control of all aspects of cultural and intellectual life (Evans, 2003, p. 397). As Hitler declared on March 23, 1933:

The government will embark upon a systematic campaign to restore the nation’s

moral and material health. The whole educational system, theater, film, literature,

the press, and broadcasting – all these will be used as a mean to this end. They

will be harnessed to help preserve the eternal values which are part of the integral

nature of our people. (As cited in Evans, 2003, p. 397).

As Evans points out, what those values were, of course, would be defined by the regime

(p. 398). It was the goal of the Propaganda Ministry to reiterate “German” values to those individuals who had, before 1933, rejected National Socialism. By dismantling the

“cultural Bolshevism” (Evans, p. 398), or the infiltration of communist attitudes, that

Nazis viewed were prevalent in art, music and theater, Nazi authorities were able to impose traditional German values, with a strong racial dimension, into the cultural realms of Germany (Evans, p. 398). Thus, the Propaganda Ministry had a strong hold upon the cultural and social lives of many average Germans. Contemporary studies into

27 Nazi Germany’s communication practices (such as rhetoric, oratory, internal communications, marketing, etc.) often reference the Propaganda Ministry.

Moreover, propaganda also has a relationship with the rhetoric that was exhibited in speeches during this time. After speeches were delivered by Nazi officials, the

Propaganda Ministry would further disseminate them over the radio waves and publish their content in pamphlets, for example. Propaganda was highly valued as a method of persuasion by Hitler himself (see “Mein Kampf”, Hitler (1939); Scanlan (1951)). It is important to note here that, although a major difference between propaganda and rhetoric exists within this thesis, Hitler did not regularly use the term “rhetoric”, but used

“propaganda” to define any form of persuasion, including public speaking. In his book,

Mein Kampf, Hitler (1939) claims that “propaganda’s task is […] not to evaluate various rights, but far more to stress exclusively the one that is to be represented by it. It has not to search into truth as far as this is favorable to others, in order to present it then to the masses with doctrinary honesty, but it has rather to see its own truth uninterruptedly” (p.

236). As can be anticipated, Hitler makes no assumptions about the ethical qualities that propaganda must possess (p. 236), but rather asserts that truth is negligible in propagandistic settings.

Public speaking played an important role in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Scanlan,

1951, p. 431). Public speaking was a successful avenue to gain public support, as Hitler himself took to the streets in the 1920s, armed with moving speeches to recruit Germans into the National Socialist movement. Ross Scanlan (1951) researched the importance of public speaking in the Nazi regime in his article The Nazi Rhetorician (p. 430-440).

Focusing primarily upon Weimar and Nazi Germany’s concept of “rhetoric”, this academic investigated a high-ranking Nazi official called Hans Krebs, who published a guide for National Socialist speakers entitled Lerne Reden! (“Learn to Speak!”). Scanlan

28 comments that it “seems never to have occurred to any Nazi rhetorician to study classical treatises on rhetoric” (p. 431). Scanlan asserts that “in the long stretch of

German history from Martin Luther to Adolf Hitler the Nazis found few orators worthy of note” (p. 432). Thus, viewing rhetoric as having little German-specific importance,

“German scholars customarily treated rhetoric as a branch of study in classical and mediaeval languages or as the material for a philosophy of prose literature” (Scanlan, p.

432). Regardless of the lack of classical rhetorical studies in Nazi Germany, Nazi

German political activists valued public speaking and Krebs’ guide was meant to help promising public speakers become successful (Scanlan, p. 435). “German literature,

German philosophy, Germany history and the Nazis’ own brand of psychology made up the general education of a party speaker” (Scanlan, p. 437). Scanlan (1951) does not explain to what extent Krebs’ book was utilized by Nazi orators, for how long or to what extent this guide influenced their education. Instead, Scanlan’s article and Krebs’ book demonstrates that public speaking was paramount to the success of the Nazi movement and highly valued by its elite members. Also, since it has been revealed by Scanlan) that

Nazi rhetors did not receive a traditional, rhetorical education (p. 431), it sanctions rhetoricians to apply any and all rhetorical theory to Nazi rhetoric, and even allows rhetoricians to develop their own theories in regards to Nazi rhetoric.

Kenneth Burke, a famous contemporary rhetorician, developed his own theory about Hitler’s rhetoric. Burke’s (1961) rhetorical analysis of Hitler, though based upon

Mein Kampf and not a specific speech, set the tone for subsequent rhetorical scholarship dealing with Hitler (Katz, 1992; Girard, 1987; Wink, 1992). Various rhetoricians will mention and/or apply Burke’s framework when dealing with racist regimes (Engels,

2005; Lee, 2006). Also, Burke’s analysis has been used in modern, democratic settings,

29 such as evaluating Illinois Governor George Ryan (Moore, 2006) or the 2004 United

States Presidential Campaign (Spielvogel, 2005).

Entitled the Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle, Burke’s (1961) essay thematically categorized qualities in Hitler’s speeches that were unique to Nazi rhetoric. This theoretical framework became paramount to any rhetorical scholarship about Hitler after

Burke’s publication date of 1939. Burke identifies that Hitler’s rhetoric always assumes and emphasizes a common enemy, suggesting that “Men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all” (p. 165). Hitler, Burke contends, is using specific unifying principles because “the more uniformly the fighting will of a people is put into action, the greater will be the magnetic force of the movement and the more powerful the impetus of the blow” (p. 166). Burke classifies four key methods in Hitler’s unifying tactics: first, inborn dignity, which is when men possess natural tendency towards superiority; second, projection device, is a scapegoat tactic, thereby obtaining purification by dissociation (p. 174); third, symbolic rebirth proposes that a positive outcome is close at hand, and thus provides followers with a goal by which to move towards; and fourth, commercial use, which is a non-economic interpretation of economic ills, such as attacking “Jew finance” (p. 175). Burke administers a critical and scathing analysis of Hitler, suggesting that “unity, if attained on a deceptive basis by emotional trickeries that shift our criticism from the accurate locus of our trouble, is no unity at all” (p. 188). Burke’s essay demonstrates that rhetoric is integral to the success of a politician at war. Even though Hitler’s ethical foundations were questionable or arguably non-existent, Burke does suggest that rhetoric is a major contributor to Hitler’s success at achieving political objectives (p 188). Thus, Burke (1961) assists in the claim that rhetoric has social and political ramifications, and its effects can contribute to certain outcomes.

30 Other rhetorical analysis of Hitler’s rhetoric is found within recent scholarly journals, where rhetoricians attempt to analyze Hitler’s rhetoric within classical rhetorical frameworks, such as those created by Aristotle (Lee, 2005; Katz, 1992). An article by Irving J. Lee (2005) compares the principles of public speaking used by Hitler,

Aristotle and Alfred Korzybski. In his analysis, Lee determines that Aristotle and Hitler are “concerned with the means of making discourse effective, with the art of organizing statements for the settled purposes of the speaker” (p. 83). This analysis yet again evaluates Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a rhetorical artifact, indicating that Hitler’s only interest in persuasion is to achieve a specific effect (Lee, p. 82). While this analysis is productive insofar as interpreting Hitler’s beliefs as rhetorical, Lee’s scope of analysis does not include speeches or other rhetorical acts of Hitler outside of Mein Kampf, demonstrating a lack of academic literature that evaluates Hitler’s speeches. Although it may be easier for a researcher to focus only upon Mein Kampf, which is rich in Hitler’s thought-processes and values, it does not contribute to a greater understanding about how rhetoric operated during his speeches, and what effect those speeches may have had.

Another article by Steven B. Katz (1992) is a strong and thorough analysis of rhetoric that surrounded the Holocaust. Based upon the treatises of classical rhetoric

(such as Aristotle’s the Politics and the Rhetoric), Katz evaluates the role of technology in the creation of the Holocaust, suggesting that because the rhetoric of the Holocaust supported an “ethic of expediency” (p. 269), it is partially to blame for the heinous crimes committed during that time. Katz’s article is a rhetorical and ethical evaluation of various Nazi documents that iterated a reliance upon technology which Katz asserts assisted in the ethical acceptance of the Holocaust during its execution (p. 272).

Although this article is extremely well-researched and rhetorically consistent in theory and application, it’s scope in limited and does not seek to analyze the speeches of Hitler,

31 nor does it emphasize the ability of rhetoric to contribute to historical events.

However, Katz does suggest that rhetoric can support moral codes to the extent that a massive genocide may be committed (p.272) – demonstrating that rhetoric is a strong contributor to social change, whether ethical or not.

German linguists and historians have also evaluated Hitler’s speeches from various frameworks. First, Cornelius Schnauber’s (1972) book, Wie Hitler sprach und schrieb (How Hitler Spoke and Wrote), provides a rigorous discourse analysis of Hitler’s speeches based upon transcripts and audio recordings. Schnauber, a linguist, analyzes

Hitler’s and Goebbels’ speeches to determine their rhythm (p. 69-90), melody (p. 69-90), tone (p. 54-68), range of vocabulary (p. 39-44) and use of superlatives (p. 120-126) and various other elements. Although Schnauber provides a rigorous assessment of these audio-specific qualities, the scope of this book does not address the importance of context or situation in regards to each speech. As Schnauber notes in the forward, the book’s goal is to discover “wie Hitler sprach und schrieb und nicht, was Hitler sprach und schrieb” (“how Hitler spoke and wrote and not what Hitler spoke and wrote”) (p. vii). Thus, while Schnauber provides a strong analysis, this scholar does not use a rhetorical framework nor focuses upon the contents of specific speeches of Hitler’s.

In regards to the two speeches that this thesis evaluates, W. Domarus (1997) supplies excellent primary data about why the speeches are significant to study and also their placement within the larger context of the Battle of Britain, as well as the WWII in general. Although Domarus provides historical context to each speech, he approach is not to rhetorically analyze the primary texts, nor does he claim a particular stance or perspective about the purpose, delivery or impact of each speech. Domarus’ broad and general critique of the speeches, however, does provide any researcher the necessary

32 historical and contextual data to understand how each speech is significant to Hitler’s development and deterioration as a political statesman.

This review of the present scholarship on Hitler, his speeches, his rhetoric, propaganda and persuasive tactics demonstrate that Hitler has been regarded as an important and central person of the 20th century to examine academically. Three major areas of discussion seem to appear when a researcher investigates previous published material on Hitler’s rhetoric. First, since many studies of Hitler are shrouded by ethical and moral dilemmas, it is often difficult to view Hitler in an objective light. This impacts any publications about Hitler, limiting any study of him to evoke a perspective of condemnation (Lyons, 2006) or awe (Burke, 1961). Second, the Propaganda Ministry often takes the front seat to any discussion about Hitler’s persuasive tactics, as the

Ministry was so prevalent and influential during the National Socialist reign. This is often not sufficient to a modern rhetorician, as propaganda and rhetoric are differing concepts. Finally, rhetorical analyses of Hitler are often focused on Mein Kampf (Burke,

1961; Lee, 2005). Although Mein Kampf is a significant contributor to understanding

Hitler’s beliefs and values, many analyses of Mein Kampf do not provide sufficient detail about how rhetoric contributes to historical or military events. Instead, these rhetorical analyses attempt to understand Hitler’s ideas, rather than how they operate during war.

This demonstrates that rhetorical scholarship which evaluates the significance of Hitler’s rhetoric in war and how it impacted events has not been undertaken.

The Battle of Britain: The Best Literature for Rhetorical Scholarship

Although there are various publications that historically summarize the Battle of

Britain, the following texts were chosen because they generally acknowledged

Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches within the historical detail. Also, it has been noted that

33 there exists a difference between scholarly rhetorical history and pure history. As such, while some of these historical publications are interpretative, they will still be utilized as evidence within this thesis. These publications, though written for historical accuracy (which may or may not be interpretive), were chosen because they contextualize the speeches in historical detail.

The data found within the following publications was not what was reported through speeches or propaganda (unless specifically declared), but has been discerned by contemporary historians to be the true and accurate. The Battle of Britain, by T.C.G.

James (2000) is an excellent book which documents the daily sorties (missions flown by one airplane) of British planes and the German planes that were intercepted and reported shot down. James offers solid statistical data with very few embellishments or narratives, rendering it a book which is directed toward the military historian, rather than a public audience. James’ book is also forwarded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Squire, denoting that it is a respected rendering of British Air Force history.

Another book, The Battle of Britain, by C. Messenger (1990) examines the unfolding of the battle and provides a full, yet somewhat superficial account, of the major moments of the battle and the aspects that shaped a British victory. Messenger presents the Battle of Britain with a celebratory attitude, qualifying this book as interpretive. Although Messenger’s historical accuracy generally agrees with other more scholarly publications, his book also presents qualities of German and British morale.

However, Messenger (1990) provides more insight into the British side of the battle, rather than the German, insufficiently providing the reader with the full story.

Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain, by T. Clayton and P. Craig (2002), examines the British morale and the German responses to British speeches throughout the course of the battle. Written with a view to provide the subjective excerpts of diaries and

34 propagandistic journalism, Clayton and Craig compose a historical piece that is neither objective nor neutral, but highly relevant to gauging public opinion during the summer of 1940. Clayton and Craig generally stray from contextualizing the historical events for the reader; instead these authors assume that their audience is already well- informed about the events of 1940. Thus, this book is often treated as a reference guide to British morale, especially to the interpretations of events, rather than a source of historical accuracy.

The German perspective on the Battle of Britain is also vitally important. World

War Two Through German Eyes, by J. Lucas (1987) is an interpretive history about the most decisive moments of Nazi Germany’s reign. Lucas, a veteran of the German

Wehrmacht, includes an entire chapter which examines the German public opinion and military sentiment regarding the invasion of Britain and the battle itself. In addition,

Lucas includes extracts of archival data regarding the German militaristic operations in the Battle of Britain, such as the Sixteenth Army Operational Orders, known as Directive

Number Nine, dated on September 9, 1940 (p. 130-131).

Military histories, which are deemed scholarly and comprehensive, supplement the interpretive histories in this thesis. Blitz on Britain: The Bomber Attacks of the

United Kingdom, 1939-1945 by Alfred Price (1977) provides a historical account about the bomber attacks on Britain, as well as the operations of the defenses to counter them.

Although it is admitted by Price that not every bomber attack is acknowledged, Price has selected actions that he deemed to be representative of that time period (p. 7). Much attention is given to the summer of 1940, in order to “convey a more comprehensive picture of events than has been possible in any previous account of this much-described battle” (Price, p. 7).

35 The People’s War: Britain, 1939-1945, by Angus Calder (1969) reviews the entire war with the stated purpose of describing “as accurately as possible, the effect of the war on civilian life in Britain” (p. 15). Thus Calder’s book focuses heavily upon

British civilian participation and attitudes towards the war. As this thesis seeks to understand the immediate effects of rhetoric, it will be used as a secondary source to qualify some of the claims made in this thesis. Calder writes over 150 pages upon the

Battle of Britain, as well as the antecedent of Dunkirk, and the subsequent bombings in the Blitz. Generally, Calder’s history is informative and insightful, a scholarly work with a large, detailed bibliography to validate any interpretations made.

Finally, Five Days in London, May 1940 by John Lukacs (2001) is a focused history of five days in May, 1940, which Lukacs argues were decisive to the outcome of the entire Second World War. Although Lukacs admits this book is not a military history

(p. 46), he does suggest that the political actions of Churchill and Hitler had a major impact upon the militaristic operations of each government. Thus, political influences seem to be the greater focus in his examination. With a keen eye for detail, as well as a strong sense of context and each politician’s personality, Lukacs creates a detailed account about one of the most tumultuous and decisive moments in Britain’s history.

This book, though focusing upon May, 1940, provides facts, details and interpretations about the subsequent months that will be incorporated within this dissertation.

Other texts will be cited that are not mentioned on these short lists, since the aforementioned are the most prominent and most useful for this dissertation. Although there are hundreds of books upon the Battle of Britain, these selected texts are not only the most relevant to this study, but also the top choices for understanding how rhetoric corresponds with the historical data.

36 The Ethical Challenges in Post-WWII Historical and Rhetorical Scholarship

The aftermath of the Second World War produced a series of challenges and new avenues of exploration for historical and rhetorical scholarship. As questions arose about how a civilized society such as Germany could systematically kill over 11 million people, the study of ethics and war became the forefront of scholarship regarding WWII.

The relationship between war and ethics was not entirely new to western scholars, as even Ancient Greek philosophers, such as Thucydides (460 BCE – 395 BCE) discussed that war was about winning, whatever the costs (Bess, 2006). Even Niccolo

Machiavelli’s work, The Prince, had firmly established that during times of war the principles of morality tend to take a back seat. In Michael Bess’ (2006) book, Choices

Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II, he examines the moral questions of warfare by discussing how particular themes that were unique to WWII have emerged in historical scholarship, such as the barbarization of warfare (p. 7-9). In addition to drawing distinctions in post-war scholarship, Bess discusses how WWII was one of the most “morally unambiguous military conflicts in all history” (p. 9), literally a war between the “good” and the “bad.” However, Bess also contends that WWII was morally complex, as it was “pervaded by ambiguities, trade-offs, agonizing choices and irresolvable dilemmas” (p. 10). Due to this dichotomy, Bess asserts that historians have produced two kinds of scholarship regarding WWII and usually historians must choose one position, or wear one “hat” over the other:

One hat represents what might be called the stance of celebration: the imperative

one feels to recapture vividly the drama, sacrifice, and extraordinary

achievements that culminated in Allied victory. The other hat represents what

might be called the stance of critical scrutiny: the imperative one feels to

reconstruct the full story of what happened as accurately as possible – which

37 means, among other things, confronting forthrightly those aspects of wartime

that are controversial, ambiguous, or in some cases just plain disgraceful. (Bess,

p. 14).

Bess does not claim to appreciate one stance over the other, but rather suggests that these contradictions are significant to explore and question for the purposes of learning. This thesis rejects a celebratory stance, based upon Bess’ framework, but would rather gravitate towards a critical scrutiny of the choices and events of the Battle of Britain.

Bess claims that WWII is ethically a difficult period to study and that objective, critical scrutiny is difficult to achieve, which should be acknowledged in this study.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS

Since the selection of orations, historical period, orators and historical texts has been explained in the introduction, this chapter will outline the thesis’ analytical methods and structure and discuss the theories, methodologies, and disciplinary approaches that have shaped them. The chapter first characterizes this qualitative thesis as a specific type of contribution to rhetorical scholarship. Within a rhetorical approach, the selection of specific classical rhetorical theories must still be justified. To this end, the rhetorical appeals of Aristotle, Isocrates and Cicero, and the use of Pericles as an example of political oratory are outlined for their relevance. This chapter explains how each of these theories are used within the major methods of analysis used in the body of this thesis: rhetorical criticism, rhetorical biography and rhetorical history. Then, the fundamental assumptions, challenges, and implications of studying history through a rhetorical lens are discussed, in order to prevent misunderstandings about the nature of the claims being made about the interplay between rhetoric and history. The chapter concludes with an

38 understanding of how prior scholarship, outlined in the literature review, has shaped the thesis throughout as an examination of both Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric within history.

Dissertation Type According to Clive Seale (2004), a theorist of social science research methodology, there are four types of dissertations in the social sciences: empirical, secondary analysis, secondary sources and theoretical dissertations (p. 410). This study aligns itself with the latter two, as it is based on secondary sources and analyzes them in relation to a body of theoretical literature (the rhetorical tradition). It is important to recognize this distinction, as it qualifies what will be included within this study. If a study is based on secondary sources, then it suggests that original archival research will not be included and that the interpretation of primary sources by other authors is a challenge which must be overcome through questioning and critical analysis. Second, theoretical dissertations, such as this, will propose new approaches to a body of literature (Seale, 2004, p. 410) – in this case, the selected orations and histories of the Battle of Britain. Because it is a theoretical study of secondary texts, this thesis will be more interpretivist than positivist, more qualitative than quantitative and more subjective than objective. By gathering and analyzing qualitative or subjective data, interpretive social scientists attempt to gain understanding of specific social phenomena, which is founded upon a basic belief that understanding is the primary goal of research. As Clive Seale’s (2004) book on social research methodologies explains, this thesis contributes to: The interpretive tradition which argues that the social world is distinguished from the natural world. It is an intersubjective world of culture, consciousness and purposive action, in which relationships are organized through the ideas, values and interests of members of society, producing human action and interaction.

39 With this comes a politics of critical, relativistic inquiry into society rather than a politics of social engineering. (Seale, 2004, p. 36). Historical and rhetorical methods of critical inquiry are employed in this thesis to gain a critical understanding of how political oratory had an influence upon history, and vice versa, without attempting to create objective knowledge. Its unique contribution of theory and analysis methods attempts to contribute an original and deeper understanding of how rhetoric operated in the oratory and history of the Battle of Britain.

Contribution to Rhetorical Studies as a Discipline This thesis is situation within the discipline of rhetoric, a discipline that overlaps with communication studies as well as other fields of study such as philosophy, literature and cultural studies. Although rhetoric is still considered one of the major pillars within the modern scholarly field of communication studies, it is sometimes misunderstood, even by communication scholars. (Medhurst, 2001, p. 499). Thus, it is the aim of this discussion to amplify the unique nature of rhetorical studies and address criticisms about its limitations. Rhetorical scholars are often stereotyped as extremely traditional in their approaches and humanistic. This is innately problematic to any rhetorical scholar. According to Martin J. Medhurst (2001): “Many scholars outside of rhetorical studies still find it difficult, at times, to utilize our scholarship because we tend to classify our intellectual work in way that they find simply baffling. Our studies are neo-Aristotelian, or generic, or structuralist” (p. 499). However, because rhetorical scholars seek to analyze relatively recent communication acts and cultural phenomena in various contexts, rhetoric’s capacity as a scholarly perspective is not merely traditional. Nor is rhetoric entirely humanistic. Medhurst (2001) argues that “rhetoric is inherently interdisciplinary” (p. 499), as rhetorical scholars must adopt various foundations and perspectives: “Not only are rhetorical dimensions linked to the not-so-obviously

40 rhetorical, but there are many instances in which certain rhetorical dimensions do not even manifest themselves save through study of the ostensibly nonrhetorical” (Medhurst, 2001, p. 499). Thus, rhetorical scholars must approach, bridge and synthesize knowledge from many empirical or social scientific fields, such as communication studies, history, political science and sociology, in an effort to construct a rhetorical study. A short history of the rhetorical study of “public address” in the past century will illustrate how this thesis approaches its topic. In the early 20th century, rhetorical studies focused primarily upon the speaker, or rhetor, and how they constructed a speech (Medhurst, 2001, p. 496). Rhetoricians often applied classical rhetorical theory to speeches, in an effort to determine their potential effectiveness. Other scholars viewed the application of classical theories as inherently “old-fashioned and out of step with the times” (Medhurst, 2001, p. 496). During the 1960s, shifts in rhetorical studies occurred. According to Stewart (2004), “the emphasis changed from speaker-centered to message-centered studies” (p. 408). As new forms of communication media became prevalent within political discourses, hot topics within academic communities focused on the new media, such as the television, as a persuasive medium. According to Medhurst (2001), the renewal of rhetorical scholarship after the 1960s allowed rhetoricians to encompass genre, myth, metaphor, narrative, ideology, the philosophical and the neoclassical within their criticism (p. 497). From 1980 to 2000, according to Medhurst (2001), rhetorical scholarship, especially with regard to political communication, “began to move beyond the assumption of a monolithic, monochromatic public to the more complex notions of publics and specialized spheres” (p. 498), while repositioning rhetoric back into the center of public consciousness (p. 498). Today, Medhurst (2001) contends, rhetorical scholars perceive issues and events through a particular set of lenses, which not only

41 encompass electoral campaigns and television advertisements, but also race, gender and politics (p. 498).

In light of this history of the discipline, this thesis is speaker-centered and focuses on oratory in a way that brackets the complex issues of communication technology and does not employ contemporary communication theories. Therefore, it could be called “old-fashioned” (Medhurst, 2001, p. 496). In response to this accusation, it can be pointed out that many contemporary scholars apply twentieth-century theoretical works (i.e. Habermas, Giroux, and Foucault) to previous historical events. Reliance on modern theories can be equally vulnerable to accusations of anachronism and cultural irrelevance to the objects of study. While this thesis does apply classical rhetorical theories to assess the rhetorical situation and the effectiveness of speech, it also moves beyond the limitations typical of the early 20th century rhetorical study. The original contribution of this thesis is produced by bridging together rhetoric and history through an innovation combination of methods that is not typical of pre-1960s rhetorical studies. This thesis does not solely focus upon one speaker in one rhetorical situation, but studies two opposing speakers (i.e. Churchill and Hitler) from two cultures. It examines the role of militaristic and political antecedents upon their rhetoric, and the likely immediate effects of their rhetoric upon subsequent events in the Battle of Britain. Studying the Second World War “through a theoretical and practical lens of rhetoric” (Medhurst, 2001, p. 498) produces “a different kind of story than our friends in history, or sociology, or political science” (Medhurst, 2001, p. 498). It is also important to mention that many scholars, especially during the mass communications era that erupted after WWII, viewed propaganda and rhetoric as the same--persuasive acts by governments that were unethical and manipulative. Too often

42 scholars (i.e. Kimble, 2005; Lee, 2005) associate the words together without much acknowledgement for each concept’s very different meaning. Unlike propaganda analyses such as those by Kimble (2005) and Lee (2005), which are characterized as message-oriented studies typical of the post-1960s and attempt to quantitatively measure persuasive campaigns and their effects, rhetoric is often studied within the realm of interpretation and humanistic exploration. This, one could suggest, is due to the nature of rhetoric. Rhetoric is interpretive. Its effects are less predictable and its affect on human behavior difficult to ascertain. Although both rhetoric and propaganda share the fundamental quality of persuasion, it seems that societies always return to the rhetoric of their leaders, not the propaganda of their governments, for collective inspiration and remembrance. Rhetorical studies is capable of creating insight even though it may not employ quantitative measurements like propaganda analysis, nor social scientific methods like other communication scholars. Traditional rhetoric, is not an outmoded method of analysis, but a method which utilizes theory to generate new knowledge through modern application. Basically, traditional rhetorical studies continues to create insight, just with older and more traditional tools.

Criteria for Selecting Classical Texts For rhetorical scholars, the classical rhetorical tradition “represents an authoritative period of initial conceptual development; it serves as an unsurpassed resource for theoretical frameworks […] it is a privileged object of both admiring imitation and critical displacement for reproducing and transforming the rhetorical tradition as canon and history” (Mailloux, 2005, p. 182). Aristotle’s rhetorical theory was chosen for two purposes: first, it provides a vocabulary and structure useful in appraising the technical qualities of each leader’s rhetoric, thus allowing comparison and discussion about their immediate effectiveness

43 within their historical context; and second, it has stood the test of time as a theory that can be applied across cultures (Gross, 2005, p. 36). Aristotle (384 BCE – 322 BCE) was a philosopher, a student of Plato and a teacher of Alexander the Great (Merlan, 1954, p. 60; Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 169). Not only did Aristotle contribute to the field of rhetoric, but his definitions of its linguistic properties have influenced the studies of literature, psychology, logic and politics, among other disciplines. His book on rhetoric was written primarily from a theoretical perspective, meaning that Aristotle was philosopher of rhetoric (one who studies rhetoric at a distance) more than a rhetor (one who performs rhetoric). Aristotle is perhaps the most scientific classical theorist of rhetoric in his approach. Metaphorically speaking, Aristotle places rhetoric under a microscope and compartmentalizes its parts, labeling, defining and categorizing as he goes. His concepts of logos, ethos and pathos will be evaluated and later applied to Churchill and Hitler, because these concepts will help illustrate the formal elements of these speeches. However, Aristotle is not specifically useful when understanding how rhetoric contributes to military history. Aristotle can help a rhetorician understand how speeches were internally constructed to be effective, rather than why or what made them effective within their specific cultural context. In order to supplement Aristotle’s technical framework, Isocrates has been chosen as a source of philosophies and norms for rhetorical education and practice. Isocrates theorizes the rhetorical aptitudes, aims and training process needed by an “ideal” political orator. Isocrates was a teacher and practitioner of rhetoric in Athens during a time of much political upheaval. As a result, Kennedy (1991) notes, political themes are present throughout his treatises, as they were “the great issues of Greek society and its historical tradition, especially the need for the union of the Greek states against threats from Persia” (p. 11). Due to Isocrates’ belief in the importance of moral

44 leadership, as well as his own ideals of peace and unity, his theories have been chosen as a means to assess the rhetorical potential of Churchill and Hitler to fulfill the Isocratic ideal of community-building oratory. Cicero was chosen because his theories help to further develop the technical theories of Aristotle and educational ideals of Isocrates and apply them both to the practical challenges of oratory within a period of political upheaval. Cicero is especially unique because he was heavily influenced by the rhetorical theories of Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle but expanded their arguments to include his own political perspective (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 285). In many ways, Cicero’s theoretical debate about the formation and skills of the ideal orator bears the stamp of the instabilities in Julius Caesar’s Rome. Finally, Pericles’ Funeral Oration serves as an example of effective war oratory which can be compared to Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric. Pericles, an Athenian statesman, orator and general of Athens’ armies during the Peloponnesian Wars is recorded as performing a Funeral Oration which is considered to be “the rhetoric of boundless global mastery” (Jarratt, 2005, p. 101). This text carries within it the content and structure of a refined and apparently effective rhetorical act, in which the relationship between personal sacrifice and public good is emphasized. By using Pericles’ Funeral Oration as a comparison model, Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric can be seen as uniquely shaped by the orator’s skill and the historical context and more or less effective in creation national unity during war. The use of classical theories in rhetorical studies is “repeatedly praised for its ongoing relevance or criticized for its exclusionary narrowness […as] the classical canon is continually championed, expanded, reinterpreted, or challenged” (Mailloux, 2005, p. 182). Even the modern rhetorician Kenneth Burke (1961) assumed that rhetoric is not a

45 completed, faultless field. Further interpretation and application of classical theory contributes to the field’s enhancement and development.

Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical Criticism The primary research method is “rhetorical criticism,” in which rhetorical theories guide the analysis of an oration’s internal features and leads to arguments about its likely effects within its immediate context. For example, in Chapter Five, Aristotle’s ethos, logos and pathos theories and Pericles’ Funeral Oration are used simultaneously to perform a rhetorical criticism of the technical qualities of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric. The criticism produces insights on the orator and his rhetorical strategies, as well as connects elements of the speech to the immediate responses of the enemy and other historical events in the Battle of Britain.

Technical Qualities of Rhetoric: Aristotle’s Logos, Ethos and Pathos

As Aristotle’s three appeals, logos, ethos and pathos, will constitute the majority of the rhetorical criticism method in Chapter Five, it is necessary to explain Aristotle’s framework. Aristotle defined rhetoric as the “faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, trans. 2001, p. 181). The means of persuasion, according to Aristotle, contained three appeals, or “proofs” that were integral to a rhetor’s arsenal. Aristotle was the first person to “recognize clearly that rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral”, capable of both harm and good (Kennedy, 1991, p. ix). Thus, the three proofs a speaker could use were not based on a moral framework, but rather a somewhat value-free evaluation of the effectiveness of their rhetoric. Logos, the appeal to reason, works through argumentation and logic and was considered by Aristotle to be the most powerful of all three proofs. So long as the

46 audience was capable of being reasoned with, then the rhetor could persuade them to a specific end through syllogisms (complete arguments) and enthymemes (incomplete arguments in which the audience supplies the missing premise, minor premise or conclusion) (Griffin, 1997, p. 304-305). Aristotle presumed that a good rhetor would adapt his/her logos to the subject matter and occasion. Second, ethos is the ethical appeal of the speaker. Ethos evokes the speaker’s moral authority or the shared concerns of speaker and audience (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001). Aristotle further specified three sub-categories of ethos: perceived intelligence or wisdom of the speaker, his virtuous character and his goodwill towards the audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 306-307). According to Aristotle, audiences judge the speaker for intelligence, virtue and generally positive behavior towards the audience and their interests (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Ethos can be “intrinsic” to the speech, demonstrated by means of the orator’s skill, and/or a feature of the orator’s public character and reputation “extrinsic” to the speech. For example, before Churchill gave any war-time speech, the audience knew him as a newly-appointed Prime Minister, who was part of the Conservative party, who had been active in politics for decades, who was also a journalist, etc. These types of qualities were already known about Churchill and the audience would have already had pre-made assumptions about Churchill’s (in)abilities before he gave a speech. However, during and after the speech, Churchill’s ethos would be strengthened or reinforced by what he said, which would develop trust in Churchill’s moral and ethical character. Ethos is also both content and form-related. A speaker’s character imprints itself upon what is said and why it is said as well as how it is said. Thus, rhetoricians can evaluate ethos as integral to both content and form of a speech. Ethos will be evaluated throughout this thesis, to demonstrate that the effectiveness of a speaker’s reputation is central to viewing rhetoric as a major contributor to historical events.

47 Finally, pathos is the appeal of the speaker to the emotions of the audience, such as fear, anger or compassion. There are two ways in which pathos is demonstrated within a rhetorical act. The first appeal to pathos, according to Aristotle, related specifically to the audience’s emotional state in response to reasoning. Aristotle believed that the effective speaker must know how to stir up the various emotions of the audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 307-308) by characterizing a person, idea or situation in a way that would inspire a national or appropriate (not necessarily reasonable or ethical) feeling towards it. Aristotle suggested that humans experience six major emotions, as well as their antecedents: Anger (vs. Mildness), Love (vs. Hate), Fear (vs. Confidence), Shame (vs. Shamelessness), Indignation (vs. Pity) and Admiration (vs. Envy) (Griffin, 1997, p. 307- 8). Considered to be the first categorization of human psychology (Kennedy, 1991, p. 33), Aristotle suggested that a speaker must manipulate the audience’s emotions to suit the occasion. Second, the style and delivery of the speech, by employing colourful vocabulary, visual metaphors and passionate body language, can inspire or move the audience to feel an emotion (Griffin, 1997, p. 307). Although some rhetoricians would suggest counting metaphors or adjectives as a way in which to measure pathos, Aristotle did not theorize that pathos was created through the sheer quantity of pathos appeals. This study will only generally mention the intensity of linguistic variety and whether it was notably portrayed within Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetorical acts. For example, Hitler’s appeal to pathos was clearly demonstrated at the ends of his speeches, when he would shout and use strong body language to assist the closing of his rhetoric. Oftentimes, emotional language and imaginative descriptions impassion the audience with images of an improved political future. Although this thesis will primarily focus upon the logos and

48 ethos of Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches, pathos must not be ignored, as it was central to both speakers’ speeches and delivery.

Churchill and Hitler: The Glory of the Nation and Pericles’ Funeral Oration

A comparative aid to rhetorical criticism is offered by Pericles’ Funeral Oration. Like Pericles in Ancient Greece, Churchill and Hitler both eulogized the lost soldiers, pilots and civilians during the Battle of Britain. Pericles not only theorizes about the importance of the rhetor when eulogizing the deceased, but suggests that militaristic enterprises are heavily connected to the unity and immortality of the nation. Pericles (495 BCE – 429 BCE) was an Athenian statesman, orator and general of Athens’ armies during the Peloponnesian Wars. Pericles’ activities and speeches were recorded by the historian Thucydides (460 BCE – 395 BCE), who wrote transcripts of his speeches from memory. Pericles was not just a renowned statesman, but also an advocate of the arts and started the construction of what would become the Acropolis. He reigned during Athens’ “Golden Age” and his influence on the ancient city is well documented (Palmer, 1982). It must be noted that Pericles was fighting an offensive war, meaning that he was attacking a foreign nation, due to beliefs in specific political ideologies. Pericles’ Funeral Oration was a eulogy to the armies that had fallen during the first Peloponnesian war (431 BCE – 421 BCE). The situation and aims of Pericles parallel or contrast those of Hitler and Churchill. This will be further investigated, in detail, in Chapter Five. The opening argument of Pericles’ speech demonstrates the insight of the author1 and orator into the function and challenges of political oratory. It begins by addressing the need to praise those who fell in battle. But, as Pericles continues, he suggests that

1 According to Plato and the opinion of most scholars today, the speech was likely composed by Aspasia (470 BCE – 400 BCE), Pericles’ mistress (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 58). However, Pericles is remembered today as the orator who delivered the speech.

49 speech-making is difficult during the circumstances, because a politician might trivialize the deeds of the dead through poor oratory: Our belief in the valor of these men should not depend on whether one man’s oratory is good or bad. […] It is also not easy to find the right words when the occasion and subject of the speech make it difficult to persuade the listeners that the words are true. (Pericles, trans. 1979, p. 32). Not only does this observe the duty of the leader to speak well on such an occasion, but highlights the situational challenge of speaking credibly about what is uncertain. Since Pericles understood the political function and importance of rhetoric, as well as its situational challenges, he becomes a rhetorician who is aligned with some fundamental assumptions of this study. Occasionally in Chapter Five, the content and the structure of Pericles’ speech will be compared to Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches.

Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical Biography

The method of rhetorical criticism is strengthened by rhetorical biography, which emphasizes the agency and limitations of the orator. Rhetorical biography seeks to understand how the speaker’s upbringing and education, as well as own attitudes towards oratory, has influenced their rhetoric (Gonchar & Hahn, 1978, p. 55). This type of rhetorical analysis examines the speaker to understand how the speaker’s potential could have been cultivated before the rhetorical act, enriching the rhetorical analysis. Isocrates’ and Cicero’s theories, since they focus so often on the education of the ideal orator, will serve as a standard by which to examine Churchill’s and Hitler’s education, knowledge, character and skills explained in Chapter Four.

50 Free Will and Determinism in the Study of Rhetorical Biography

Rhetorical biographers must be cautious when claiming a direct causal relationship between a speaker’s background and actual rhetorical performances (Gonchar & Hahn, 1978, p. 55). Since this thesis suggests that Churchill’s and Hitler’s oratory is affected by their agency and free will, as well as determined by the immediate historical context, the relationship between free will and determinism must be explained as part of the methodology. Is the orator’s speaking ability and performance “determined” by his aptitude, upbringing, or the historical circumstances leading up a speech? Determinism is the philosophical concept that causal relationships have certain, rather than uncertain outcomes. Robert L. Carneiro (2000), a philosopher of history and historiography, defines determinism as a scientific concept that suggests that “Event A will occur because of the presence of a certain set of antecedent conditions […] (thus) Event A will invariably occur if and only if those antecedent conditions are present” (p. 49). If rhetoric is determined, then Churchill’s and Hitler’s agency did not influence social change. Determinism suggests that an outcome, such as oration, or an oration’s effects, will occur when those specific conditions are satisfied. Determinism’s inevitability, assuming that certain conditions are met, limits the alternatives of human beings and disregards the importance of choice in the creation of social change. On the contrary, numerous publications have been based upon the belief that human behavior arises from human choice, or free will (Simpson, 1994; Cialdini, 2001; Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001; Speer, 1970, Burke, 1969). Many historians also believe choice to be integral to historical outcomes. Aaron Gurevich (1992), a Russian historian, states that “history is a process in which freedom and necessity interrelate dialectically” (p. 15), and then he adds:

51 Historical change is the result of human choice. In any situation, however static it may appear, someone will start something unprecedented, following the promptings of freedom, however uncircumscribed. The cultivation of wild grass or the domestication of animals, the invention of working tools, sculpting of statues, devising of magic spells, composition of prayers or songs, calls to revolt, drawing up of guild statues, scientific discovery, are all the products of free will, of the activity of an individual or a social group. (Gurevich, 1992, p.15-16). Gurevich is by no means alone in with his assertion that human choice affects human behavior. This thesis is founded on the belief that the choices of Churchill and Hitler influenced their rhetoric, and the choices of individual citizens influenced their response to it. On the other hand, free will should not be misunderstood as the notion that people have complete control over their lives. Instead, free will can be viewed as human beings freely choosing their actions which are affected by biological and social forces. Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) advocated the concept that individual freedom is constrained by an idea called “thrownness”, which refers to “the fact that we are thrown into a multitude of arbitrary conditions that influence our lives and opportunities” (as cited in Wood, 2004, p. 53). Therefore, free will is tempered by thrownness and the contingent aspects of human culture and social life. Isocrates also suggested that kairos, the context of the rhetorical situation (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69) constrains the orator to act in a specific manner. Likewise, Cicero also suggests that doxa, or the community values and audience expectations also limits the strategies available to the rhetor (Leff, 2003, p. 139). While the orator operates as an autonomous individual, based upon the principles of free will, limited by Heidegger’s thrownness, kairos and doxa, there is a two way relationship

52 between the context and the speaker. In this sense, the orator has “[led] the people, bent their will, and won applause but was also led by the people, bent by their will, and dependent on their applause” (Leff, 2003, p. 139). Thus, the orator is both active and passive when making decisions and effecting outcomes. Edward P. Cheyney (1927), a historian, states that “We are controlled at every turn by the natural laws of the world in which we dwell. And yet we feel free to act much as we choose. If our action is not entirely free it simulates freedom. We are so used to our limitations that is only exceptionally that we feel them” (p. 25-26). Cheyney echoes Heidegger’s, Isocrates’ and Cicero’s beliefs about how social and cultural aspects unnoticeably limit a person’s experience, while at the same time allows individuals to feel in control of their fate. Thus, Churchill and Hitler, as agents who articulate a rhetoric that can influence social change, play an integral and crucial part in the creation of history.

Rhetorical Methods of Inquiry: Rhetorical History

Although rhetorical criticism and rhetorical biography are fruitful to rhetorical studies, they do not necessarily lead to philosophical insights into the broader relationship between history and rhetoric. The third research method within this thesis relates to what Zarefsky (1998) denotes as the area of overlap between history and criticism, called rhetorical history (p. 21). Since “any rhetorical act is an interaction between text and context” (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 21), rhetorical history seeks to understand the rhetorical act within the larger historical context over time. In contrast, rhetorical criticism is more concerned with judging the rhetorical act, based upon principles of good strategy found in theory texts. Thus, both methods of analysis are necessary to this thesis and strength each other. In Chapter Five, criticism and history are layered into an alternating pattern. By first viewing Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric as products of rhetorical and historical

53 challenges, and then viewing them and their speeches as producers of historical events, this thesis positions history within a discussion about rhetoric, and vice versa.

Rhetorical Perspectives upon Definitions of History, Cause and Effect and Historical Contingency

Since this thesis engages with historical context from a rhetorical perspective, the thesis’ fundamental assumptions about history, historical cause and effect, and historical contingency must be addressed. This will help to explain the nature of this thesis’ rhetorical perspective upon historical scholarship.

Definition of History

Robert L. Carneiro, historiographer and author of The Muse of History and the Science of Culture (2000) has surmised that three definitions of “history” are employed by historians and academics: 1. History is everything that human beings have ever done. 2. History is the surviving record of everything that human beings have ever done. 3. History is the selection, arrangement, and presentation of certain aspects of this surviving record. (Carneiro, 2000, p. 13). This study defines history as a combination of Carneiro’s (2000) last two points, as the objects of this research are four speeches and the resultant secondary scholarship that has been produced since 1940CE. Thus, the term history in this thesis refers to surviving records of human actions (such as orations), as well as historians’ selection, arrangement and presentation of those specific moments. Therefore, the leaders who performed rhetoric, as well as the scholars who have been interpreters of their rhetoric, are granted a limited but important place of power and agency in the creation of history.

54 The relationship between rhetoric and history has been investigated by many rhetorical scholars. Rhetoric, Zarefsky (1998) asserts, is central to the creation of history (p. 30-31). Likewise, Turner (1998) claims that rhetorical situations have constructed social reality (p. 2). Social reality, in this context, can be considered as any historical or social events that have perpetuated specific cultural values. Zarefsky (1998) makes clear distinctions about the scholarly pursuit of rhetorical history. Zarefsky (1998), like Bitzer (1968) assumes that rhetoric is situational and that its assessment must be made in the context of that situation. Zarefsky (1998) places emphasis on the importance of studying history when studying rhetoric. He outlines four key areas of scholarship in rhetorical history: 1. The history of rhetoric 2. The rhetoric of history 3. The historical study of rhetorical events 4. The study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective. (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 30-31). The first category usually documents the “genealogy” and variety of rhetorical theories and teaching from Ancient Greece to the present. This approach does not portray rhetoric as a significant contributor to the creation of history – merely a theme that can be studied and taught. The second form of rhetorical history, “rhetoric of history,” is primarily concerned with how the values and persuasive qualities of a historian’s publications affect the documentation of history. The third aspect, “the historical study of rhetorical events,” documents the various rhetorical moments within history (rhetorical criticism within history), but once again, may not claim that rhetoric has a pivotal role in history creation.

55 This thesis aligns itself with the fourth category – the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective. Thus, it means that history is viewed with a rhetorical framework, emphasizing the importance of rhetoric in the creation of history.

Cause and Effect

This thesis’ methodological approach towards history presumes that Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric and other historical events caused and affected one another in a qualitative interplay of forces over time. Therefore, the relationship between cause and effect must be addressed through rhetorical and historical approaches. Within rhetorical discussions of cause and effect a controversial article by Lloyd Bitzer (1968) argued that “rhetoric is situational” (p. 3), which implies that the historical meaning-context of a situation shapes its rhetoric, the actions of the rhetor and the reactions of the audience. Bitzer thus allocates the power of the rhetorical outcome to the situation. Bitzer’s (1968) main arguments are not only that “rhetoric is situational” but that “exigence” (the social conditions that call forth speech) “strongly invites utterance” and “the situation controls the rhetorical response” and determines its effectiveness (p. 3- 14). However, Richard E. Vatz (1973) rejected Bitzer’s claim that the situation controls the rhetoric and its success. He asserted that the rhetor influences the situation and can even create exigence by being in a position to interpret and define a rhetorical situation. Vatz (1973) inverts Bitzer’s claims by saying that “situations are rhetorical,” “utterance strongly invites exigence” and “situations obtain their character from the rhetoric which surrounds them or creates them” (p. 159). This debate, much like the “chicken and the egg”, inquire what came first, or what had more influence. Did the words of the speaker create meaning in a social or historical situation? Or did the historical or social situation give the speaker’s words meaning?

56 Although this thesis does not seek to determine whether rhetoric or social reality stimulated the other, the debate is important to acknowledge. Rhetorical scholars view this debate as integral to understanding the interplay between rhetoric and our creation of meaning during documented, historical situations. Even though very few scholars today can agree on the subject, it suggests the power that rhetoric has had on the construction of social and historical realities. Turner (1998) advocates that “rhetorical history offers us the opportunity to see rhetoric as a perpetual and dynamic process of social construction, maintenance, and change rather than as an isolated, static product” (p. 4). Beyond rhetorical studies, many mass communication theorists have posited and studied how communication affects human behavior. This phenomenon was heavily studied after WWII, when leading social scientists attempted to empirically measure the effects of propaganda and communication upon citizens (Simpson, 1994). Harold Lasswell, Walter Lippman, Paul Lazarsfeld, Theodor Adorno and many others investigated the relationship between communication acts and human behavior, concluding that a connection between the two exists (Simpson, 1994). Another more contemporary psychologist Robert B. Cialdini (2001) researched the effects of various social influences (such as advertisements, speeches, technology, etc.) on people’s lives and their responses (p. 3-18). His research has suggested that political speeches which appeal to specific socio-cultural circumstances in a society can indeed have strong effects on people’s voting habits and their desire for political change (Cialdini, 2001, p. 3-18). The vast amount of scholarly literature regarding communication and human behavior generally advocates a strong and real connection, suggesting that communication is influential upon human choice. As history can be seen as a documentation of the moments when social choice has led to change for individuals and groups, it is significant to understand rhetoric’s role

57 in the creation of social change. Social choice is a concept that is very broad and not constrained to one particular cause, but rather a plethora of causes. For example, the Battle of Britain may be considered a situation in which rhetorical choices made by Churchill and Hitler effected certain immediate outcomes for upon the historical context of 1940. This thesis does not attempt to prove or measure the causal relationship between Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric and subsequent events through quantitative measurements, nor discover if their rhetoric was a decisive factor in the Battle of Britain. However, this approach to rhetorical history highlights the fact that immaterial elements of warfare – such as rhetoric - should not be overlooked or considered insignificant to war. Technocratic approaches to history may seem to suggest that steel and oil production was more important than any speech in WWII. Of course, the technical specifications of the airplanes, the role of radar in anticipating attacks, and the rate of steel and aircraft production affected the outcomes of battle. However, one must remember that without motivated and persistent workers within those factories, who are inspired and informed by their leader’s rhetoric, steel and oil production would cease to exist. It is impossible to take an experimental approach to history and re-play the Battle of Britain without the orations, or with orations using a different rhetorical strategy, to see what would result. Instead of placing rhetoric and technology in opposition or competition as causes of history, this thesis presumes that the material factors of war are dependant upon the immaterial, and vice versa. This complex relationship should be acknowledged in the Battle of Britain. Rhetoric, in this light, is no less important than any other tangible aspect of war for effecting change and the outcomes of battle, although the degree of its influence cannot be measured quantitatively.

58 In support of this view, Evans (2003), a historian, emphasizes that people’s choices in WWII were affected by context and beliefs: Things could easily have turned out very differently to the way they did at a number of points in the history of Germany […] (People acted within) conditions that included not only the historical context in which they lived, but also the way in which they thought, the assumptions they acted upon and the principles and beliefs that informed their behavior. (Evans, 2003, p. xx). Here we return to the familiar issue of free will and determinism. Although people may have been prevented from acting in particular ways by their social and cultural conditions, they still had a degree of choice to behave in certain ways, according to their thoughts, assumptions, principles and beliefs.

The Contingency of Rhetoric in the Study of History

Finally, beliefs about historical contingency must be addressed as a key methodological assumption when studying history. Historians often view “contingency” as the “what ifs” of history (which provokes historians to entertain the existences of other plausible histories). However, rhetorical historians view contingency in a different manner. The historical perspective on contingency will be dealt with first. According to the historiographer Carneiro (2000), historical contingency has “a direct and profound bearing on the way historians have seen and interpreted the course of history” (p. 72). The fascination with the chance elements of history, and the “seductive belief that they outweigh its irregularities, patterns and trends is characteristic of […] traditional historians” (Carneiro, 2000, p. 72). However, these chance elements of history, and their importance in the historical outcome, are only significant to a historian who possesses complete knowledge about all the facts and data, a situation which is rare, if not impossible. If a historian ever had the fortunate position of hindsight and almost complete knowledge, then the contingencies of history would seem highly fascinating.

59 Although historians are not omniscient, thy have the ability to judge previous events with much more complete knowledge than a historical figure had at their disposal. In hindsight, scholars know more about what choices Churchill and Hitler should have made in order to achieve victory. Rhetorical contingency does not operate in this manner, since rhetoric takes the perspective of the orator and audience. Churchill and Hitler, though well-informed, did not possess the same knowledge about their situation as historians do today. During the immediate situation, these rhetors were limited by the context in which they operated. Rhetorical historians value the limits, pressures and uncertainties, in order to understand the reasons why a rhetor performed in a certain manner. Especially when conducting speaker-oriented studies, rhetoricians view the uncertainties of history, the contingent choices made available to rhetors, as a gradual process of interaction between a leader’s choices, their rhetoric and history. In summary, rhetorical history seeks to understand the interplay between free will, cause and effect, and contingency, in what Stephen J. Gould (1992) called was a “revolving board of alterable history”: “We are not pawns in a grand chess game played by inexorable natural (and social) laws, but effective rooks, knights, bishops, kings and queens on a revolving board of alterable history with no set outcome” (p. 21).

Rhetorical and Historical Methods Combined: Rhetoric Creates History

As this discussion has outlined, there is still much debate about the relationship between history and rhetoric. Some rhetoricians claim that the context affects rhetoric, others claim that rhetoric affects context. The combined methods of my thesis acknowledge these debates by balancing and layering the approaches favored by each side of the debate. The combined approaches of rhetorical criticism, rhetorical biography and rhetorical history assist in the exploration of the Battle of Britain as not only a historical

60 conflict, but a rhetorical one as well. By employing rhetorical theories to Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, such as Isocrates, Cicero, Aristotle and Pericles, the Battle of Britain is seen from a new and fresh point of view. Ultimately, the method of parallel examination of Churchill and Hitler appears within each and every chapter, adding the element of comparison and the interplay between two rhetorical opponents. As the literature review in the next chapter will illustrate, the unbalanced and partial perspectives within rhetorical and historical scholarship has greatly contributed to the choice of this underlying method.

61

CHAPTER FOUR: THE IDEAL ORATOR

This chapter will examine Churchill and Hitler’s rhetorical potential, without the distractions of historical context. This discussion will seek to answer one of the principle research questions in this thesis: In what ways were Churchill and Hitler effective orators with regard to their education, knowledge, character and skills? Four major themes will be discussed with reference to Isocrates’ and Cicero’s concept of the

“ideal orator”. First, an “ideal orator” must have natural aptitude that is strengthened through practice and application. Second, an “ideal rhetor” must demonstrate knowledge.

Third, an “ideal orator” must have a strong intrinsic ethos, which is performed through modesty and humility. Finally, an “ideal orator” must have a reputable extrinsic ethos, which is fuelled by superior moral actions that occur outside of the rhetorical act.

Isocrates and Cicero suggested that rhetors, or orators, act within a series of contingent factors. This is very different that other philosophers, such as Plato and

Socrates, who assumed that there was universal, morally-correct avenue of action

(Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69). Although Isocrates asserted that rhetoric should be used for responsible government and moral actions (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69), he acknowledged that rhetors are overcome with issues of “kairos” (adaptation to time, place and context) as well as issues of “doxa” or the community values and norms

(Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 184). Due to these overarching themes present within a rhetor’s life, they are bombarded with rhetorical choices and their rhetorical success relies upon their specific context and audience values. Thus, such historical figures as

Hitler, however contemptible in retrospect, will be evaluated with respect to the context in which his character and rhetoric operated.

62 Background of Isocrates and Cicero

To remain consistent with the research methods chapter, Isocrates’ and Cicero’s backgrounds and their primary theoretical works will be reviewed before an analysis of the ideal orator takes place.

Isocrates (436 BCE – 338 BCE) was a successful teacher of rhetoric in Athens.

Having grown up in a wealthy family whose estates and income were lost during the

Peloponnesian War, Isocrates was forced to earn a living. Opening the school of rhetoric in Athens established his fame as a mentor to many important political leaders (Bizzell

& Herzberg, 2001, p. 67). Isocrates was a strong advocate of rhetoric, who believed that rhetoric should not be used for self-motivated reasons or to encourage abstract philosophical thoughts, but, rather to serve the community and bring about political unity and strength (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69). Isocrates argued that education, in which rhetoric should be central, should form men who are capable of serving the state (Bizzell

& Herzberg, 2001). Due to this conviction, Isocrates became a famous mentor to politicians, educators and even generals such as Timotheus (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 70). Isocrates took a very “hands on” approach and believed that practical applicability of rhetoric to civic service was central to its success.

Isocrates is highly applicable to modern societies, as he emphasized the role of political rhetoric in the maintenance of the state (Atwill, 2005, p. 82). Not only will this thesis emphasize the importance of community values, but that Isocrates’ definition of rhetoric (as stated in the introduction) suggests that rhetoric can cause social change and improve society. Thus, Isocrates should be appreciated, not only in this thesis, but also in other contemporary contexts.

Isocrates’ treatise, Antidosis, fictionally placed Isocrates in a courtroom situation, defending himself against a charge of “corrupt(ing) young men by teaching them to

63 speak” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 30). In this, Isocrates rejected his reputation as a

Sophist, suggesting that although he was paid for his mentorship, he was encouraging the pursuit of discussion in political philosophy and education, and not in fanciful discourse typical of the Sophists (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 69-70). In this essay, Isocrates’ described the character and education of the ideal orator that one can use to evaluate

Churchill and Hitler.

Cicero developed and strengthened Isocrates’ concept of the “ideal orator.”

During the reign of Julius Caesar, Cicero was an active politician and outspoken proponent of democracy. Cicero (106 BCE – 43 BCE) was a successful Roman lawyer, orator, consul, philosopher and political theorist. After becoming a successful lawyer in

Rome, Cicero traveled extensively throughout Greece and Asia Minor, absorbing and learning the philosophies of Ancient Greek academics. Upon his return, Cicero became heavily entrenched in politics, employing his natural oratory skills and eloquence to overcome social barriers and was elected into series of offices, culminating in the highest, that of consul (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 284). Due to his strong stance against dictatorship regimes, Cicero left Rome many times for his safety. Eventually, a quarrel with Marc Antony led to Cicero’s assassination when he was aged 63 (Bizzell &

Herzberg, 2001, p. 285).

De Oratore or “On Oratory” was a treatise primarily about rhetoric. De Oratore was also a fictional dialogue between Crassus, Antonious, Mucius, Sulpicius and Cotta, in which they discussed rhetoric (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 287). Cicero was considered a “high-minded patriot” (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 285) who practiced rhetoric daily and his treatise was not a detached or abstract philosophical work, but a practical and applicable guidebook to effective oratory during tenuous times.

64 Both Isocrates’ and Cicero’s philosophies about rhetoric will be utilized to examine Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetorical potential without regard to the Battle of

Britain in the following discussion.

Education and Knowledge

First, Isocrates and Cicero discussed the importance of natural aptitude in rhetorical education. Education, Isocrates suggested, begins with the mind: “the mind comes first and is of greater worth […] the body (is) to be servant to the judgments of the mind” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 180). Based on this argument, Isocrates further claimed that “the teachers of philosophy impart all forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 183). Teachers, Isocrates advocated, refine the methods of articulating the beliefs that exist in the mind of the pupil. Thus, teachers were central to cultivating the skill of oratory and must encourage their students to meet three educational conditions in order to be successful:

They must, first of all, have a natural aptitude […] secondly, they must submit to

training and master the knowledge of their particular subject […] finally, they

must become versed and practiced in the use and application of their art; for only

(under) these conditions can they become fully competent and preeminent in any

line of endeavor. (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 187).

This suggests that natural aptitude, training and application will create the most successful rhetor.

Cicero also argued that natural aptitude, which was developed through education and practice, was integral to an ideal orator. Cicero stated that “natural talent is the chief contributor to the virtue of oratory; and indeed […] it was not the principles and method of oratory […] but inborn capacity” (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 25). Cicero furthered his

65 belief in natural talent by suggesting that “good abilities may through instruction become better […] in some measure, quickened and amended” (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 25). Although formal rhetorical education has not been historically recorded as eminent within either Churchill or Hitler’s life, they became self-educated in rhetoric, however informally or unaware of doing so.

Andrew Roberts, a historian who wrote Hitler and Churchill: The Secrets of

Leadership (2003) suggests that Churchill was actually not a natural-born speaker.

Suffering a harsh stammer in his childhood as well as a lisp, Churchill practiced the phrase “The Spanish ships I cannot see for they are not in sight” well into his adulthood

(Andrews, 2003, p. 36). Overcoming the stammer did not insulate him from having devastating public-speaking episodes. At age thirty, Roberts (2003) argues, Churchill had a “disastrous experience trying to address the Commons entirely from memory […] he abandoned the practice. Instead he would sometimes spend ten to fourteen hours preparing a single speech” (p. 31). Although the speeches Churchill delivered in 1940 portray Churchill’s cultivated talent, it is important to acknowledge that Churchill was not naturally gifted as an orator. However, the lengthy time period Churchill spent working on his oratory reflects Churchill’s own beliefs that “rhetorical power is neither wholly bestowed nor wholly acquired, but cultivated” (as cited in Roberts, 2003, p. 32).

Hitler also, as Andrew (2003) suggests, was not natural orator. Instead, Hitler’s inadequate rhetorical talent was advanced by studying the performances of a “Bavarian comedian named Weiss-Ferdl in order to learn how to captivate an audience” (p. 30).

Much like an actor, Hitler would “endlessly practice his poses and gestures in front of the mirror in his shabby room in Munich’s Thierschstrasse” (Andrews, 2003, p. 30).

During the early days of Hitler’s political career, his persuasive charisma was demonstrated through his techniques of an unblinking stare to the crowd and obvious

66 self-confidence, making his audience spell-bound (Andrews, 2003, p. 43-44).

Although it is a documented fact that Hitler and his Nazis received little classical rhetorical education (Scanlan, 1951, p. 431), Hitler’s style was successful, even if theatrical. During his career as Germany’s Chancellor, Hitler was very theatrical and used dramatic lighting, martial music and “seas of flags” (Andrews, 2003, p. 30). These types of innovations assisted Hitler’s persuasive appeal and many hours of practice in front of a mirror helped to enhance his deficient natural aptitude.

Practice, Isocrates argued, can assist in perfecting rhetorical appeal: “Men with little natural talent can still become skilled orators through practice and work” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 191). Based upon Isocrates’ and Cicero’s framework of educational conditions of a successful orator, it can be affirmed that both Churchill’s and Hitler’s meager natural aptitudes were self-cultivated by practice and rehearsal, manifesting decent rhetorical skill and potential.

The second criterion that Isocrates and Cicero believed was central to the ideal orator was the possession of knowledge. Isocrates emphasized the importance that situation and community values plays upon knowledge:

When [teachers] have given them (students) experience and detailed knowledge

of these (forms and models of speech), they again exercise the students and make

them accustomed to hard work, and then force them to synthesize everything they

have learned in order that they may have a more secure understanding and their

views (doxai) may be better adapted to the right moments (kairoi). It is not

possible to learn this through study, since in all activities, these opportune

moments elude exact knowledge (episteme), but in general those who are

particularly attentive and can understand the consequences most often apprehend

them. (Isocrates, trans. 2000, p. 184).

67 Although Isocrates asserted that teachers can educate students through practice and synthesis, he admitted that it was impossible to have complete knowledge, appropriate for every rhetorical situation, since each situation arises from particular exigences, based upon doxa and kairos. Isocrates placed greater value upon the rhetor’s ability to adapt his/her capacity for knowledge to the rhetorical situation, indicating that complete or precise knowledge (episteme) was not as essential to effective oratory.

Cicero echoed Isocrates’ position, but further suggested that rhetors, whom possessed knowledge, must portray those facts in a stylistic manner which was relevant and powerful:

The good speakers bring, as their peculiar possession, a style that is harmonious,

graceful, and marked by a certain artistry and polish. Yet this style, if the

underlying subject matter be not comprehended and mastered by the speaker,

must inevitably be of no account or even become the sport of universal derision.

For what so effectually proclaims the madman as the hollow thundering of words

– be they never so choice and resplendent – which have no thought or knowledge

behind them? (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 12).

Cicero asserted that knowledge of the facts was central to the persuasive success of the orator.

Churchill knowledge in speeches was often portrayed through facts and numerical information. On May 4, 1925, Churchill was the Chancellor of Exchequer and gave a speech to the House of Commons, promoting a return to the pre-war “Gold

Standard” of currency (Heywood, 2003, p. 35). When discussing the federal debts to the

United States, Churchill relied upon numerical facts to denote the influence of the US over Britain:

68 “We pay every year our £35,000,000 of war debt to the United States (and) we

have to buy from the United States the greater part of our cotton, tobacco and a

large proportion of our raw materials and wheat. We purchased last year

£240,000,000 of goods from the United States. Whether on a gold standard or on

a managed currency or on any other scheme which can be conceived, her

fortunes are bound to sway and influence ours whenever she booms or slumps”.

(Churchill, 1925, para. 40).

Churchill’s use of numerical data, as well as a general understanding about the larger federal purchases by his government, demonstrated that Churchill was an informed individual who either was knowledgeable, or performed knowledge. Thus, Churchill met

Isocrates’ and Cicero’s expectations of knowledge in the ideal orator.

On the other hand, Hitler portrayed knowledge in a very different manner than

Churchill. Isocrates and Cicero did not specify that knowledge must be portrayed through statistical information and or other specified means, but that the “ideal orator” must have a strong understanding of the fundamental knowledge in that context, in order to be rhetorically effective. Hitler possessed a theatrical style, and thus was more likely to use figures of speech rather than numerical facts to portray the circumstances. For example, on January 30, 1939, Hitler recalled the Treaty of Versailles to a Reichstag session in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin (Domarus, 1997, p. 1436). He stated:

“We had to live to see how, at the end of the war, after hunger and destitution had

killed more than 800,000 children of our Volk, because of the gruesome articles

of a Diktat (Treaty of Versailles) which the democratic, humane world apostles

had forced on us in the guise of a peace treaty, nearly a million dairy cows were

driven from our barns”. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 1448).

69 Although Domarus (1997) acknowledges that Hitler’s numerical facts regarding the dairy cows are exaggerated (p. 2188), it denotes that Hitler performed that he had knowledge. Whether manipulative, or inadvertently false, Hitler depicted himself as possessing an intact memory, elevated use of vocabulary, and a decent knowledge base, so that even the number of dairy cows from an event twenty years previous was mentioned. Thus, Hitler possessed Isocrates’ and Cicero’s quality of a knowledgeable rhetor.

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Ethos

While both Isocrates and Cicero suggested that the ideal orator must possess a strong ethos (the ethical character of the speaker), which was fuelled by the performances of, modesty, humility and superior morals, they did not emphasize

Aristotle’s distinction of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” ethos. This distinction is essential to assessing Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetorical capacity, as both leaders demonstrated strong ethos, but in very different manners.

Aristotle claimed that intrinsic ethos relates to how well the speaker portrayed ethical character within the speech itself, without regard to the reputation or actions of the speaker beyond the rhetorical situation. He stated:

The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a

manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a

greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to everything in

general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, our

confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not

to any preconceived idea of the speaker’s character. (As cited in Williams, 2009,

p. 240)

70 Aristotle acknowledged that the ethos of the leader can be established within the speech, and provided stylistic and technical guidelines for ways in which a speaker can be viewed as effective. When relating Aristotle’s notion of intrinsic ethos to Isocrates and Cicero, both theorists suggested that one there are many ways to develop one’s intrinsic ethos. The performance of modesty and humility within a speech act has been chosen as one such example of intrinsic ethos.

The third criterion that Isocrates and Cicero both argued was crucial to the ideal orator was the portrayal of diffidence and humility. Although neither theorist specified whether humility and modesty should be portrayed within the content of the speech, or merely upon its delivery, this analysis will assume the latter and analyze Churchill’s and

Hitler’s style of delivery.

Isocrates stated that good orators “must consider carefully how they can be seen by others to say and do everything graciously and benevolently, for those who give little thought to these matters appear to their fellow citizens to be rather difficult and intolerable” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 132). In addition to this, Isocrates stated that

“the stronger a man’s desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honorable and to have the esteem of his fellow-citizens” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para.

278). Thus, an orator who wanted to effectively persuade will achieve the esteem of his citizens by appearing gracious and benevolent.

Cicero emphasized Isocrates’ position by focusing upon humility and modesty in a rhetor’s speech. Although Cicero did not decipher the difference between humility and modesty, it will be assumed that they are interchangeable concepts without a great difference in meaning. According to Crassus’ dialogue, humble and modest orators were often the most rhetorical appealing:

71 Even the best orators, those who can speak with the utmost ease and elegance,

unless they are diffident in approaching a discourse and diffident in beginning it,

seem to border on the shameless, although that can never come to pass. For the

better the orator, the more profoundly is he frightened […] of the anticipations of

an audience […] for it is not by feeling shame at what is unbecoming, but in not

doing it, that we must escape the reproach of shamelessness. (Cicero, trans. 2001,

para 26).

Consistent with the majority of Cicero’s arguments, the audience’s reactions were taken into account. If an orator did not perform humility in the speech, then the audience will assume they are arrogant in that rhetorical situation. By appearing arrogant, Cicero argued, the audience may not forgive the speaker for their lack of shamelessness and thus, may not agree with their rhetoric (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 26). Thus, appearing arrogant can make rhetoric ineffectual.

Churchill has been criticized for a lack of humility in speech-making. According to Andrew Roberts (2003), Churchill’s “grand, old-style idiom did not impress everybody; some found it insincere, other pompous, yet other derided him as a cross between a ham actor and a music-hall turn” (p. 33). Referring to the Abdication Crisis of

1936, when Churchill advocated to the House of Commons that King Edward VIII should marry a divorced woman and still retain Kingship, Churchill was shouted down and criticized for unpatriotic behavior and considered pompous (Roberts, 2003, p. 33). It can be suggested that in the two British speeches which will be addressed in this dissertation, Churchill retains a reserved, objective perspective upon the crises at hand.

But this “grand, old-style” (Roberts, 2003, p. 33) did not emphasize his modesty or diffidence. By these standards of the “ideal orator,” Churchill did not meet the requisite of humility. Instead, Churchill’s approach was dry and monotonous.

72 On the other hand, Hitler was reputed for his simple and modest approach in speech making. According to Cicero, “the better the orator, the more profoundly is he frightened of the difficulty of speaking, and of the doubtful fate of a speech” (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 26). Albert Speer (1970), Germany’s Minister of Armaments from

1942-1945, documented in his autobiography Inside the Third Reich that by 1932 Hitler was a renowned politician, emblazoned with swastikas and surrounded by propaganda

(p. 44). However, the first speech of Hitler’s that Speer attended demonstrated that the

Nazi leader presented himself modest and humble, and not a swastika-ridden celebrity:

He was wearing a well-fitted blue suit and looking markedly respectable.

Everything about him bore out the note of reasonable modesty. Later I learned

that he had a great gift for adjusting – consciously or intuitively – to his

surroundings. As the ovation went on for minutes, he tried, as if slightly pained,

to check it. Then, in a low voice, hesitantly and somewhat shyly, he began a kind

of historical lecture rather than a speech. To me there was something engaging

about it – all the more so since it ran counter to everything the propaganda of his

opponents had led me to expect: a hysterical demagogue, a shrieking and

gesticulating fanatic in uniform. He did not allow the bursts of the applause to

tempt him away from his sober tone. Hitler’s initial shyness soon disappeared; at

times now his pitch rose. He spoke urgently and with hypnotic persuasiveness.

The mood he cast was much deeper than the speech itself, most of which I did

not remember for long. (Speer, 1970, p. 44).

Speer, a self-proclaimed Nazi, is obviously biased in his recollections. However, Speer’s

(1970) memories of Hitler are also validated by Evans (2003), a scholarly historian, who suggested that Hitler would start speeches on a modest note, rising in pitch and rhythm as they continued (p. 171). Cicero suggested that this was an effective way to persuade,

73 whereby the rhetor began carefully and slowly, and then raised the emotional appeal, until a climax was reached (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 44). Although it is difficult to determine if the exact same approach was employed during the summer of 1940, within the speeches to be analyzed, it has been suggested that Hitler’s modesty in the beginnings of speeches was habitual, especially when the content began with the history of Germany (Speer, 1970, p. 44; Roberts 2003, 47; Evans 2003, p. 171), such as in both of Hitler’s speeches during the summer of 1940.

Hitler manipulated his rhetorical presentation by performing modesty and humility. Since Isocrates’ and Cicero’s concepts of modesty and humility are interpreted as stylistic qualities, it can be suggested that Hitler performed humility through style, so that the audience was more compassionate and receptive to his messages. Churchill, on the other hand, might have demonstrated modesty behind closed doors when practicing or writing speeches, but Churchill’s delivery did not indicate that much humility exists.

Therefore, by Isocrates’ and Cicero’s standards, Hitler portrayed the strongest forms of intrinsic ethos, by way of performing modesty and humility, while Churchill’s detached and pompous style was not the ideal characteristics of the most effective orator.

Finally, “extrinsic” ethos, or the ethical character of the speaker which exists outside of, or beyond, the speech itself, was considered vital to the ideal orator. The reputation of the speaker, the actions of the speaker before, or without regard to, the speech itself, constitutes extrinsic ethos. Isocrates stated that “those who wish to engage in public life and be well liked must choose the best and most useful deeds […] they must consider carefully how they can be seen by others” (Isocrates, trans. 2001, para.

132). Thus, how the speaker was “seen” by the audience, based upon their “deeds” was paramount to their ethos. Likewise, Cicero also valued the extrinsic ethos of the orator,

74 by suggesting that the audience’s “feelings are won over by a man’s merit, achievements or reputable life” (Cicero, trans. 2001, para. 43).

Isocrates suggested that extrinsic ethos can be demonstrated through superior morals. Isocrates claimed that “it is not conceivable that he (the ideal orator) will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not rather those which are great and honorable, devoted to the welfare of man and our common good”

(Isocrates, trans. 2001, para. 275). Therefore, the ideal orator will have superior morals that will be portrayed through honorable actions, which are devoted to the welfare of others.

Both Churchill and Hitler can be analyzed for their extrinsic ethos, as denoted through their reputation for superior morals. In 1909, Churchill was an active liberal politician, proposing strong a revision to the federal budget, called the “People’s

Budget” (Heywood, 2003, p. 4). Churchill promoted this budget that would increase taxation on the wealthy, in order to fund social programs for the poor (Heywood, 2003, p. 4). In a speech delivered on January 29, 1909 to a public and political audience in

Nottingham, Churchill targeted the Conservative Party’s inappropriate budgeting by claiming it was a “conspiracy”:

Such is the great conspiracy with which the British democracy is now confronted

[…] an attempt to place the main burden of taxation upon the shoulders of wage-

earners and not on income-drawers, a disastrous blow at the prosperity, the

freedom, the flexibility, and the expansive power of British industry, and a

deadly injury to the purity of English public life. These will be the consequences,

momentous and long enduring, of a tariff victory at the general election; and

remember it has been said that it takes ten years to carry a tariff, but it takes a

hundred years to abolish it. (Churchill, 1909, para. 21).

75 Churchill, before 1940, adamantly stood behind policies that he believed were necessary and purposeful to enhancing the lives of commoners. Not only did Churchill demonstrate that a Tory budget would cripple the common Englishman, but that it also inhibited British trade. Although qualities of ethos and ethical rhetoric in the Battle of

Britain will be analyzed in detail later, it can be assumed for the moment that Churchill’s performances of superior morals to a public audience met Isocrates’ and Cicero’s second criterion of an ideal speaker.

While Hitler performed superior morals to audiences in several instances, his

“good” intentions exhibited through intrinsic ethos did not mirror his extrinsic ethos. For example, on February 10, 1937, Hitler gave a speech at the Berlin Sports Palace and his public audiences about the history of the Nazi Party since 1919 (Evans, 2003, p. 323).

By retelling the circumstances of inflation, the impoverishment of the peasantry and the rise of unemployment, Hitler explained his intentions:

“Just as I have taken this office, so I shall leave it. I have done it neither for

salary or wages. I cannot divest myself of the faith of my people, cannot

dissociate myself from my love for this, my people, and I cherish the firm

conviction that the hour will come at last in which the millions who despise us

today will stand by us and with us will hail the new […] German kingdom of

greatness and power and glory and justice”. (As cited in Evans, 2003, p. 324).

Hitler’s performance of superior morals – the selflessness, the love of others, the empathy – all denoted that Hitler at least performed the act of morality to his audiences.

However, Hitler’s actions, even during this 1937 excerpt, did not reflect his intentions in speeches. Not only were there boycotts on Jewish businesses and goods a regular occurrence in Nazi Germany, but Hitler’s revolutionary evening on June 30,

1934, called the “Night of the Long Knives” had occurred, resulting in some hundreds

76 being killed (Bergen, 2003, p. 70-71). Furthermore, Hitler’s Germany in 1936 had forced six hundred Gypsies out of Berlin into detention by a sewage dump, in preparation for the international spotlight of the 1936 Olympics (Bergen, 2003, p. 76).

Although the concentration camps were not public knowledge, Germany was becoming increasingly discriminatory and violent. Thus, it can be interpreted that Hitler’s demonstrations or performances of superior morals, though perhaps satisfied in his intrinsic ethos, were not developed in his extrinsic ethos. Thus, Hitler did not meet

Isocrates’ and Cicero’s notion of a good extrinsic ethos, as demonstrated through superior morals, which weakened his rhetorical potential.

Table 1: The Ideal Orator Visualized

QUALITIES CHURCHILL HITLER

Previous Education Yes Yes

(developed through practice and application)

Knowledge Yes Yes

Intrinsic Ethos, Modesty No Yes and Humility

Extrinsic Ethos, Superior Yes No

Morals

“Table 1: The Ideal Orator Visualized” depicts how Churchill and Hitler have been compared as ideal orators. According to the standards set out by Isocrates and

Cicero, it can be suggested that both leaders had comparable rhetorical skill, even though

77 their strengths and weaknesses differed. Although Churchill depicted an arguably detached and cold approach, he also was capable of demonstrating calm and resolve – superior characteristics that could become useful in crisis. On the other hand, Hitler’s unethical actions did not mirror the moral beliefs that were performed in his speeches.

However, Hitler did perform modesty and humility, which could have contributed to the

German people’s belief in his compassion and sincerity.

Both leaders had basically equivalent rhetorical skill. Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric during the Battle of Britain will now be investigated with theories of Aristotle and the comparative model of Pericles’ Funeral Oration to understand how their rhetoric affected the historical outcome.

78

Figure 1: A Timeline of the Battle of Britain (1940)

JUN 4: JUL 19: AUG 20: SEP 4: Churchill’s Speech Hitler’s Speech Churchill’s Hitler’s “We Shall Fight on “The Generous Speech “Winterhilfs- the Beaches” Peace Proposal” “The Few” werk” Address

PHASE ONE PHASE TWO PHASE THREE

MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV MAY 10: JUN 22: AUG 13: AUG 25: OCT 14/15: Churchill France signs “Adlertag” Bombs Most intense appointed armistice with commences, first dropped on bombing on as Prime Germany major offensive Berlin London Minister by Luftwaffe JUN 3: AUG 24: SEP 15: OCT 31: Final day JUL 10: Bombs RAF overpower Greatly of Dunkirk Battle of dropped on Luftwaffe; decreased air Evacuation Britain begins London Proclaimed “Battle activity, Battle of of Britain Day” Britain ends

79

CHAPTER FIVE: CHURCHILL’S AND HITLER’S RHETORIC IN THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Introduction to Analyzing Rhetoric in War

In order to fully understand the rhetorical importance of Churchill’s and Hitler’s speeches during the summer of 1940, the Battle of Britain must be evaluated as a historical conflict. By analyzing the social, political and military antecedents of each rhetorical act, this chronological overview will emphasize the importance of rhetoric in each specific instance. By employing the rhetorical theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3, it will be argued that the rhetorical aspects of four speeches helped to shape and determine the course of the battle, further suggesting that rhetoric played a significant role within the Battle of Britain. Aristotle’s logos, ethos and pathos will help to illustrate the technical qualities of the logical arguments, moral character of the rhetor and the style of the speech itself. Pericles’ Funeral Oration will provide a comparative framework, by which the structure and content of the speech will be analyzed, to determine whether Churchill and Hitler emphasized the role of sacrifice in constituting the nation, and the immediate effects of such a claim. Isocrates and Cicero will be mentioned periodically to add further comparison of Churchill and Hitler’s rhetoric with the Ancient Greek standard of the “ideal orator.” As stated within the research methods chapter, both rhetorical history and rhetorical criticism are alternated within this chapter. This enables one to focus upon the content of the speeches and the ramifications those rhetorical acts may have had upon the decision-making processes of each government regarding their military action.

80 Phase One: Dunkirk and the Antecedents to the Battle of Britain

When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany two days later. Britain’s international prestige and great power status were fuelled by its strong Royal Navy and historical ties to many affluent nations. However, during the months that followed, Germany succeeded in occupying the majority of Western Europe, which threatened Britain’s survival. On May 10, Germany commenced the campaign in Western Europe, called Operation “Gelb” (“Yellow”) and, although the German forces had a weaker numerical force than their adversaries, they had demonstrated “a singleness of purpose and a flexibility in action that had brought them victory in fewer than six weeks” (Lucas, 1987, p. 122). The German armed forces were now considered the mightiest in Europe (Lukacs, 2001, p. 10). In the early days of June, 1940, the armies of France and Britain were in a precarious position. 330,000 British and French troops were trapped on the shores of Dunkirk, France (Lukacs, 2001, p. 191), while the German Army advanced, leaving them vulnerable, basically defeated and with little opportunity to survive. Not only was this huge population of British and French forces overpowered, but it was also a symbolic loss of British strength. Operation “Dynamo” was put into effect by the British government, whereby the Royal Navy evacuated 220,000 British and 120,000 French troops to the nearby English coast (Calder, 1969, p. 108). Over the course of eight days, the British operation was able to remove the Allied fighting forces (Messenger, 1990, p. 12) that would not occupy the coast of France until the Normandy landings of 1944. Unfortunately for the Allies, the evacuation did not allow the transport of heavy equipment and weapons. Also, the Royal Navy lost some 200 ships and the Royal Air Force (RAF) lost 170 planes in an effort to keep the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) from attacking soldiers waiting on the beaches (Messenger, 1990, p. 12). June 3, 1940 was the last day of the evacuation of Dunkirk. Although the British suffered severe losses of

81 heavy equipment, ships and aircraft, the evacuation was considered highly successful. But, the evacuation also indicated to the international community that Britain was incredibly vulnerable (Calder, 1969, p. 107; Clayton and Craig, 2002, p. 128). Two major changes in military power occurred for the Britain during the following months. First, for one of the few times in Britain’s history, the country was susceptible to defeat by an advancing adversary, suggesting to the international community that not only was Britain in danger of defeat, but the German forces were stronger and far more ambitious than initially considered (Clayton and Craig, 2002, p. 128; Calder, 1969, p. 107). Thus, Britain’s retreat indicated to Germany’s enemies that they must not be overconfident in gaining victory, but cautious and vigilant when dealing with German forces. This cautious approach was reflected in Winston Churchill’s speeches and influenced the manner in which he dealt with the Battle of Britain. Second, the evacuation caused the British government to turn to the RAF as the pillar of the nation’s defense. According to T.C.G. James (2000), author of The Battle of Britain: The general effect of the German occupation of Western Europe upon the air defense of Great Britain was to extend the area that was open to air bombardment and to intensify the scale of attack that was to be expected. The counter-measures that were taken can thus be described under two heads: first, the extension of the air defense system to the newly threatened districts; second, the expansion of the fighter force and the associated defenses to meet the increased scale of attack. (James, 2000, p. 3). Although the expansion of the RAF’s role required major economic revisions to the British government’s war-time policies, the RAF’s ability to defend the island became absolutely critical to maintaining the sovereignty of Britain. This heightened attention to

82 the RAF’s importance would be further illuminated in Churchill’s speeches (Calder, 1969, p. 110). On June 4, 1940, one day after the evacuation from Dunkirk were complete, Winston Churchill addressed the House of Commons in Britain with his speech “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” (Churchill, 1940a). This speech, described below, has become one of the most famous of the 20th Century, as it approached Britain’s near- defeat with a surprisingly optimistic, yet rational, attitude. Churchill accomplished many tasks in this speech. First, he supplied the British people with official details about the evacuation of Dunkirk. Second, he expressed the government’s policy which rejected capitulation to Germany. Third, he made a public declaration for assistance to the Commonwealth countries, as well as the United States. Finally, he outlined the steps the government would take in the event of further attacks by the Germans and a full out invasion. Naturally, when a government is at war, a leader must take the necessary steps to inform his citizens about the government’s position regarding the crisis. However, it is how Churchill framed these facts and policies which made it incredibly effective and rhetorical.

Rhetorical Analysis of June 4, 1940 Speech “We Shall Fight On the Beaches”

A rhetorical analysis of Churchill’s speech, based upon the Aristotelian framework of ethos, logos and pathos as well as Pericles’ Funeral Oration, will aid in determining how Churchill’s approach helped to reinforce unity and civilian morale during a tenacious moment in Britain’s history. By first evaluating Churchill’s ethos, or moral authority and ethical character, it will help to establish the audience’s perceptions of Churchill before and throughout the speech, while also clarifying his role as a rhetor within this crisis.

83 After Neville Chamberlain resigned as the Prime Minister in May, 1940, Churchill was appointed as Prime Minister. Although Churchill had the confidence of the three major parties, many were not convinced that Churchill’s position as Prime Minister would ensure survival, nor a victory, against the Germans (Lukacs, 2001, p. 13-14). After the evacuations of Dunkirk in June, 1940, it was imperative to the stability of the British government that Churchill made the correct decisions, whether by speech-making or policy-making. Before rising to his feet in the House of Commons on June 4, 1940, Churchill was a well-known journalist and politician who was out-spoken, witty and determined. However, it was unclear whether Churchill was going to rally public opinion or follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, Chamberlain, and generate further political instability within the British government (Lukacs, 2001, p. 12). According to T. Clayton and P. Craig (2002), authors of Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain, Churchill’s speech on June 4, 1940 was paramount to the maintenance of civilian morale, as many had been left to speculate about defeat, implied by the evacuation, and national morale had been very low (p.128). Indeed, a national pessimism had arisen (Lukacs, 2001, p. 197). However, many British people would hear Churchill’s speech. According to Angus Calder (1969) some seven out of ten people in Britain heard Churchill’s five radio-broadcast speeches throughout this summer (p. 97). Therefore, the speech on June 4, 1940, along with others Churchill would deliver, was instrumental to invoke a fresh and informative relationship between the newly-elected Prime Minister Churchill and British citizens (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 128). Churchill’s ethos and, in particular, his virtuous character, was developed in the speech by exhibiting traits of honesty and objectivity. Whereas other political leaders might shy away from brutal facts that illustrate the vulnerability of the state, Churchill met this information head on. Even more so, Churchill (1940a) emphasized that judgments must be made upon the receipt of factual data:

84 I asked the House a week ago to suspend its judgment because the facts were not clear, but I do not feel that any reason now exists why we should not form our own opinions upon this pitiful episode […] The enemy attacked on all sides with great strength and fierceness, and their main power, the power of their far more numerous Air Force, was thrown into the battle or else concentrated upon Dunkirk and the beaches. (Churchill, 1940a, para. 6). Honesty, a key aspect of ethos, which is highly valued within western society, was exhibited by Churchill when he confronted the brutal truth of the crisis. This honesty, albeit brutally truthful, was consistently exhibited within the speech, further suggesting that Churchill’s relationship to his citizens was formed on the basis of reliable and unswerving statement of fact and truth. An additional aspect of Churchill’s virtuous character was how he treated his enemies. Griffin (1997) suggests that by being charitable to your enemy, you appear good, honest and even respectable (p. 306). This was a major component of Churchill’s ethos that Hitler lacked. Although Churchill (1940a) could have easily attacked or ridiculed his enemy, he did not and instead treated his enemy with the utmost respect by calling the Germans a “very brave race” (para. 10) and referring to Hitler as “Herr Hitler” (para. 14). When Churchill critiqued Hitler or Germany, he claimed that Germans are similar to a powerful machine, which was led blindly into battle: Behind this armored and mechanized onslaught came a number of German divisions in lorries, and behind them again there plodded comparatively slowly the dull brute mass of the ordinary German Army and German people, always so ready to be led to the trampling down in other lands of liberties and comforts which they have never known in their own. (Churchill, 1940a, para. 2). Churchill implied that the German people can only be humanized by liberty and comfort – qualities which their country has disallowed them. Churchill’s critique was more

85 compassionate than disrespectful. Churchill could have easily described the Germans as an evil and inhumane race, but he did not. This poetic treatment of Britain’s enemy demonstrates sympathy for the foe that was prohibited from liberty. This level of sympathy demonstrated Churchill’s virtuous character. Another aspect of ethos is the goodwill of the speaker, which demonstrates that the speaker has the best interests of the audience at heart (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Churchill has been critiqued for being overly pompous and grand, rather than sensitive to his audience’s needs (Roberts, 2003, p. 33). Whereas Hitler appealed to the uneducated, lower class audiences by appealing to compassion in simple language, Churchill’s detached stance and high level vocabulary have been named as his major persuasive failing (Roberts, 2003, p. 33). In the speech of June 4, 1940, Churchill only slightly portrayed his goodwill and it was not a heavily developed aspect of his ethos. When Churchill (1940a) stated “I take occasion to express the sympathy of the House to all who have suffered bereavement or who are still anxious” (para. 12), Churchill was directly addressing the interests of his audience. His empathy was evident throughout the speech, but Churchill never suggested that he was only thinking of the citizens and their plight. Instead, Churchill’s rhetoric was more consistently directed towards the deeds of the pilots and aircrew and how Churchill’s government will help support their military efforts. The audience’s ability to perceive intelligence in the speaker is the third aspect of ethos, and this was apparent within Churchill’s speech. As Griffin (1997) suggests, perceived intelligence “has more to do with practical wisdom and shared values than it does with training at Plato’s Academy” (p. 306). Churchill reminded citizens that Britain was capable of victory during the most tenuous times. By reminding the audience of the great triumphs of British history, including the Round Table and the Crusaders, Churchill rejected the fear caused by a vulnerable position and embraced the hope bound within the

86 victories of a historic, national past. Clayton & Craig (1999) interpret that Churchill “began to make his listeners feel a part of history themselves” (p. 129) and that “hope and heroics were being offered to a nation starved of both” (p. 129). This evocation of the national history, albeit slightly mythical and valorized, demonstrated shared values and historical wisdom that Churchill was able to capitalize upon, in order to develop his ethos and the audience’s unity. Logos, or the appeal to reason, was considered by Aristotle to be the strongest of the three proofs of persuasion (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 4). Logos does not equate to intelligence of the speaker. Instead, logos must demonstrate that the speaker has a rational argument. The very fact that Churchill rejected national capitulation, given that Britain was on the brink of defeat, was targeted by Hitler as “irrational” in his future speeches. But, if one follows Churchill’s reasoning behind his government’s “never surrender” policy, it was based upon the foundation that Britain would survive insurmountable odds as it had done in the past: I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone. (Churchill, 1940a, para. 18). Based upon the belief that Britain could endure war because of its legendary ability to survive, this denotes that the argument was based upon the merits of the British people and history. If British citizen’s were to disagree and suggest that they cannot survive, then they are disagreeing with the aforementioned British history and British legacies. Therefore, Churchill’s argument was problematic to oppose. Because if one did, then he or she was unpatriotic and obviously did not understand the ability of the British will. Although this could be advantageous to evoke unity within the British people, this also

87 inhibited any dissent from the audience and could be considered unreasonably hopeful. Even today, historians argue that this position is “incredibly optimistic” (Heywood, 2003, p. 89), given the dire circumstances of the British. Pathos, the emotional appeal of the speaker, is demonstrated during the invention of the speech and upon its delivery. Not only does pathos relate to the figures of speech and varied linguistic properties, but pathos also relates to the tone of the speaker’s voice and the delivery of the message (Griffin, 1997, p. 307-308). As this thesis will not analyze the audio recordings of the speeches, this analysis is limited to the text itself. The linguistic technicalities of the speech itself demonstrate that Churchill had a full command of the English language and a colorful array of metaphors at his disposal. For example, when Churchill (1940a) discussed the opportunities for Britain’s youth at war, he memorialized them as “The Knights of the Round Table, the Crusaders” (para. 11). Or, Churchill (1940a) personified the British Army as an organism, suggesting that the country operated and experienced as a whole: “The whole root and core and brain of the British Army, on which and around which we were to build, and are to build […] seemed about to perish upon the field or to be led into an ignominious and starving captivity” (para. 4). Churchill (1940a) also used repetition throughout the course of his speech, which was best demonstrated near the end, when he repeated the phrase “we shall” eleven times (para. 18). By using repetition, vivid adjectives and a high level of vocabulary, Churchill varied his message through creative linguistic means. The emotional state of the audience is also a key aspect of pathos. According to Griffin (1997), “Aristotle believed that the effective speaker must know how to stir up the various emotions of the audience” (p. 307). As stated previously, Aristotle suggested six key emotional states and their antecedents, which characterize the primary emotions an audience could feel. In this speech, Churchill’s pathos exhibited both a desire for fear and its antecedent, confidence. For example, the majority of Churchill’s speech focused upon

88 the severe military losses, in both men and material, which had been experienced in France. By enumerating the failures that had led to near-defeat, Churchill “salt in the wounds” of the British people. Just when the situation could not get worse, Churchill pointed out yet another weakness in the British defenses. This tactic, Aristotle would suggest, was evoking an image of fear, demonstrating that the occurrence of tragedy was possible (Griffin, 1997, p. 308). However, at the very last moment of the speech, Churchill changed his tactic and reiterated that Britain can survive, as they have done in the past, and that they will continue to fight, despite the depressing odds. This contrasting position was climactic and portrayed an emphasized sense of confidence, which could not have been as effective if confidence had been the theme of the entire speech. Instead, by suggesting that danger was highly possible, but that surrender was impossible, Churchill (1940a) roused his audience’s confidence and hope by saying: We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old. (para. 18).

Aristotle’s theoretical framework of ethos, logos and pathos assists in exploring what type of technical qualities were employed to make this speech rhetorically effective. Although this analysis only focuses upon such technical qualities, it does suggest that

89 Churchill solidly portrayed a developed ethos (even if good will was not overly emphasized), that Churchill’s logos was based upon a belief in his citizen’s historic ability to overcome and Churchill’s pathos evoked, then dismissed, fear in a nation which, when forced to see the brutal reality of the situation, also became confident and hopeful. Churchill’s speech on June 4, 1940 must also be compared to Pericles’ Funeral Oration. By emphasizing the link between personal sacrifice and public glory, it further solidified the relationship between civilian and government, and suggested that war was necessary to the maintenance and legacy of the nation. Similar to Pericles, Churchill eulogized the deceased soldiers and military personnel in this speech. Although eulogy was not the primary motivation of Churchill’s speech, the importance of sacrifice to the nation was mentioned. Upon discussing the fighting at Boulogne and Calais, Churchill praised the soldiers who fought, yet had to surrender. Churchill (1940a) stated: Only 30 unwounded survivors were brought off by the Navy, and we do not know the fate of their comrades. Their sacrifice, however, was not in vain. At least two armored divisions, which otherwise would have been turned against the British Expeditionary Force, had to be sent to overcome them. They have added another page to the glories of the light divisions. (para. 3). Due to the personal sacrifice of individuals, Churchill offered them glory in the legacies of their units. Therefore, their personal loss was a national gain. This sentiment was reflected in Pericles’ speech, which illustrates the relationship between military losses and national glory: They gave their lives for that common good and for themselves they won praises that will not grow old, the most distinguished of sepulchers – not the sepulchers in which they now lie, but where their glory is laid down in everlasting remembrance. (Pericles, trans. 1979, para 43).

90 Churchill, like Pericles, ascertained the connection between the individual and the nation. This maintained the belief that war was necessary and that sacrifice was inevitable. By making this distinction, Churchill was effectively persuading listening soldiers that their actions would be remembered and absorbed into the legacy of the nation. Overall, Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech was an immaculate and surprisingly astounding testament to the power of rhetoric in war. The negative or disappointing aspect of rhetoric found in Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech regards the position that he placed his audience. With defeat considered highly probable, surrender impossible and survival imperative, Churchill forces his audience into a unique position. If they disagree, then they were revolting against a consistent national theme which dictates that the British survive against all odds. Thus, disagreement with Churchill was a violation of British history and character. However, Churchill’s speech was powerful and persuasive, given Britain’s dire situation. Not only did he inform his citizens of the truthful facts with brutal honesty, but he was capable of framing these enumerable failures as antecedents to a victorious outcome. Indeed, records of national sentiment denote that the British populace believed they would triumph eventually, but the contradictory belief that Nazi invasion was possible also began to surface in May, 1940 (Lukacs, 2001, p. 36-37). Regardless, Churchill maintained respect for the enemy, referring to them as a “brave race” (para.10) and pitied their collective mentality of following their leader into war. Churchill reiterated the British nation’s ability to survive and focused upon British history as a source of motivation and reassurance, creating a positive relationship between the British government and citizens, based on facts and a common national legacy. Instead of coming straight across the Channel after the BEF as many British had expected, the Germans concentrated on finishing off France (Calder, 1969, p. 110). By

91 June 14 the German Army had entered Paris, and on June 22, the French had signed an armistice with the Germans (Calder, 1969, p. 110). The German forces now viewed Western Europe as theirs. According to J. Lucas (1987), a veteran of the German Wehrmacht and author of World War Two Through German Eyes, “The German soldiers who had fought their way across Flanders and then through the Dunkirk perimeter to the beaches (witnessed) the vast material losses that the Allies had suffered […] they knew their army had gained a great victory” (p. 123). The surrender of France was significant to Hitler’s vision of the future. He had hoped that the fall of France would bring Britain to her senses and that she would make peace (Calder, 1969, p. 140), “thus enabling him to concentrate on the overthrow of Russian bolshevism” (Messenger, 1990, p.12). The fall of France had serious ramifications to Britain. Italy was an ally of Germany and, with France eliminated from fighting, Britain stood alone – only Britain’s empire overseas and the exiles from occupied Europe could support her. With the surrender of Paris, Britain’s isolation was now complete and her vulnerability to attack, both through military and rhetorical means, was intensified.

“Operation Sealion” and Plans to Invade Britain

Hitler was reluctant to focus all German efforts on Britain, and his decision to invade Britain did not come easily (Calder, 1969, p. 119). Hitler wanted to focus his attention on Russia because of his innate desire to rid Europe of Bolshevism while simultaneously wanting to expand his empire for the appropriation of “living space” (Lucas, 1987, p.151). Nevertheless, Hitler chose Britain due to a number of reasons. A major contributor to Hitler’s choice to invade Britain was based upon a study called Directive Number 9, which had been conducted in November 1939 by the Directorate of Naval Operations in Germany. The study had already assembled a plan for invading Britain, thus providing Hitler with researched avenues of action for any Channel

92 landings (Lucas, 1987, p. 126). Directive Number 9 was revisited in 1940 by Hitler’s top staff, and concluded that a successful invasion of Britain would only occur if the attacker had both naval and air superiority (Lucas, 1987, p. 126). Naval superiority was not easily obtained, as Britain’s Royal Navy was one of the finest and largest in the world (Calder, 1969, p. 119). In fact, the German navy (“Kriegsmarine”) opposed the invasion of Britain (termed “Operation Seelöwe”, Operation Sealion) because its Navy did not have enough ships to protect a land invasion, and there were no specialized landing craft available (Lucas, 1987, p. 126). Therefore, unless the German forces possessed air superiority and could thus neutralize the RAF and Royal Navy, “Sealion”, or the invasion of Britain, would not succeed. In light of this fact, Hitler reluctantly agreed to focus Germany’s efforts on continuing the war with Britain and invading the island. The planned invasion of Britain was rhetorical because it influenced the propaganda strategies of the Nazi government and targeted British weaknesses in speeches. Pictures from Dunkirk which portrayed beaches littered with abandoned helmets and artillery and masses of wounded soldiers were utilized to raise the morale of German people (Lucas, 1987, p. 123). Moreover, Churchill’s pledge to “never surrender”, coupled with the absolute isolation of Britain was targeted as “ridiculous” by German officials (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 191; Domarus, 1997, p. 2065). Not only was Britain rhetorically attacked, but Germany’s distain of Britain’s refusal to surrender began a discourse between the adversaries, permitting both Churchill and Hitler to critique each other within their significant speeches during the summer of 1940. Herman Göring, a major Nazi leader, became central to the military and rhetorical strength of Operation Sealion. Hitler appointed Göring, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to create and supervise the attacks on the RAF. On June 30 1940, Göring issued the General Directive for the Operation of the Luftwaffe against England which reiterated Directive No 9 of the November 1939 report – suggesting that Britain’s

93 economy would be best destroyed by severing her overseas trade (Messenger, 1990, p. 14; Lucas, 1987, p. 126). This strategy was manifested as focused attacks on trade barges coming and going through the English Channel. Moreover, Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) wrote that “an attack upon Great Britain had to be the next logical step […] Britain’s will to resist would have to be broken by force” (Lucas, 1987, p. 129). Jodl further suggested that an invasion could begin as early as August 1940 because the Luftwaffe would have gained ascendancy in the air (Lucas, p. 129). Also, Göring’s rhetorical ethos, his reputation, moral character, and intelligence became a symbolic rallying point for German success. Although Hitler will be the primary source of rhetorical analysis, it is important to mention Göring, as he was an integral aspect to the battle and his actions had direct consequences in the outcome. Göring (1893-1946) was a veteran of the First World War who became a national hero through his successful career as a pilot. Having joined the Nazi Party in 1922, Göring was one of Hitler’s oldest associates and was appointed president of the Reichstag in 1933. Göring’s celebrity status was fuelled by his flamboyant relish in luxury and excess. He was also an ambitious schemer and vicious infighter. Although his fiery personality preceded him, Göring was considered a powerful and clever man by the German public (Bergen, 2003, p. 40-41). Hitler trusted him as well, believing in Göring’s promise that the RAF could be defeated (Lukacs, 2001, p. 42). The significance of choosing Göring to lead the attacks on Britain was advantageous to the Nazi cause. As Göring was a popular war hero, educated in military strategy and also politically active, his reputation brought confidence and prestige to the operation. Britain became the primary military target and central to the future victories by the German government. The island adversary was the most significant challenge to any future Nazi successes in Western Europe and she was entirely alone, defeated from the

94 shores of Dunkirk and ill-prepared for offensive air strikes and invasion. Hitler’s Germany was ready for war, as plans to invade were settled, the Reich’s Air Force was led by one of the most popular men in the country and Germany’s Propaganda Ministry was systematically reinforcing the public’s distain for Churchill. Moreover, historians now suggest that it was believed by the British that Hitler would not fail, if an invasion could be gotten underway (Lukacs, 2001, p. 6-7). From a rhetorical standpoint, Hitler was stronger and more unified than ever before. Conquering France took only six weeks and Britain, it was thought, would not take much longer. By July 19, 1940 Hitler’s confidence was manifested by unifying Britain’s vulnerability with German success. Britain’s assured downfall was intricately tied to a German victory.

Rhetorical and Technical Aspects of the Battle of Britain

The acknowledgement of the technical elements in the Battle of Britain, such as the numerical advantages or disadvantages of types of aircraft, assists in the exploration of rhetoric’s role in the unfolding of the battle itself. Technology and military strength did play a major role in this battle’s outcome. From a purely technical standpoint, some historians perceive that the German forces could have more likely won the Battle of Britain (Price, 1977, p. 37), although scholars continually dispute this claim (see Calder, 1969). Germany had more experienced pilots, possessed a statistically higher number of well-equipped aircraft that rivaled the famous British Spitfire, was led by the reputed Göring and was more prepared for an offensive strike than the British military defenses. As mentioned previously, could it be that rhetoric was one such factor that contributed to the battle’s outcome? In order to investigate the role of rhetoric in the Battle of Britain, the technical aspects must first be evaluated to illustrate how technology and numerical strength can influence battlefield events. Although historians admit that most numerical facts about the Battle of Britain are consistently disputed (Calder, 1969, p. 160; James,

95 2000, p. 1), this thesis hopes to find consensus among scholars regarding specific facts presented in this thesis, by using various scholarly historical sources. To begin, the state of each country’s air forces at the commencement of battle was significant. The Luftwaffe had noteworthy advantages. First, Germany had 2,800 aircraft readied for battle while the British possessed as few as 650 fighters (Calder, 1969, p. 141; Fawcett, 2006, p. 250). Also, the Germans had occupied France and the Low Countries, as well as Norway and Denmark, allowing a multitude of bases from which to prepare for battle (Fawcett, p. 250). German aircrews were also highly experienced, having participated in airborne attacks along the Western Front, in Poland and even Spain (Fawcett, p. 246; Messenger, 1990, p. 15-16). Moreover, there were a large number of German pilots who had been well-trained, even if they had never seen battle (Messenger, p. 15-16). And finally, the Luftwaffe had an assortment of single and twin-engine fighters, medium bombers and dive-bombers at its command, including the Messerschmitt 109 Emil (Me109E), a highly maneuverable fighter plane, equipped with machine guns and a fast rate of climb, considered to be a “formidable aircraft” (Messenger, p. 18). Although these noteworthy advantages existed, there were also some disadvantages to the Luftwaffe’s aircraft and offensive capacity. For example, the Me109E, while a formidable aircraft, also had a very limited operational range that would prove a critical disadvantage in operations over southern England. Moreover, historians also suggest that the Luftwaffe was more suited to provide air support to an advancing army, rather than as an entity which could launch successful offensive air strikes against land targets (James, 2000, p. 318). Although these disadvantages existed, Göring’s own perspective valued the strengths of the Luftwaffe and was best illustrated when he stated shortly after the fall of France “My Luftwaffe is invincible […] And so now we turn to England. How long will this one last – two, three weeks?” (As cited in Stone, et. al.,

96 2007, p. 83). With such confidence exuding from the Luftwaffe’s leader, it is understandable that Hitler viewed the Battle of Britain as already won. Britain, on the other hand, was numerically weaker and less prepared for a mid- Channel battle. The Air Officer-in-Chief of Fighter Command was Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, who had been in charge of Fighter Command since its inception in 1936 (Messenger, 1990, p. 18). The RAF’s pre-war plans gave priority to the bomber over the fighter (Messenger, p. 19). Until the 1930s, fighters still utilized the wooden structure and biplane design of the First World War, with a slow climb rate – a huge disadvantage when incoming attacks were only visually or aurally detected, preventing the slow fighters from intercepting air attacks promptly (Messenger, p. 19). Hawker Hurricane fighters that entered RAF service in 1938 could not compare to the Me109 in speed and maneuverability but were superior to Messerschmitt 110’s (Me110) or Stukas, as would be proven (Calder, 1969, p. 141; Price, 1977, p. 12). However, the RAF possessed the Supermarine Spitfire, which could match the Me109 in most combat scenarios and became vitally important to defending Britain (Calder, p. 141). Usually, Hurricanes were relegated to attacking Luftwaffe bombers, while Spitfires engaged Me109s (Price, 1977, p. 40). A major problem for the Luftwaffe, as would be demonstrated in the coming months, was that the Me109’s did not possess sufficient fuel to engage in long combat scenarios, leaving Luftwaffe bombers sometimes unescorted and thus, more vulnerable to RAF fighter attacks. However, Britain did not have a sufficient number of pilots and to fully train a pilot took almost a year. C. Messenger (1990) suggests that pilots were of major concern: “The training organization had not expanded at sufficient pace to cope with the share rise in aircrew losses during the French campaign and there was a worrying shortfall. It was pilots, rather than aircraft losses, which concerned Dowding more during the coming battle” (p. 23). It would not be until July 1940 when the British Commonwealth Air

97 Training Plan (BCATP) would be implemented in Canada and elsewhere in the Empire whereby trainees would receive “crash courses” in piloting fighter planes. However, this training strategy did not produce any pilots that saw service in the Battle of Britain (James, 2000, p. 7). However, historians acknowledge that there were three major advantages that the British had: production of airplanes was sufficient, radar stations could anticipate attacks and the RAF’s strategy played on the Luftwaffe’s weaknesses (Messenger, 1990, p. 21- 30; Price, 1977, p. 15; James, 2000, p. 13). By April 1940, before Churchill came to power, fighter production exceeded its monthly target through the creation of a system of “shadow factories”, converted automobile and technical production sites that were manufacturing airplane components (Messenger, p. 23). Lord Beaverbrook, Britain’s minister of aircraft production, concentrated on producing 7,300 aircraft between January, 1940 and May, 1940 (Stone et al., 2007, p. 103). However, the lack of trained pilots meant that the full utilization of all planes manufactured during this period never occurred during the Battle of Britain. Radar stations erected along the southeast coast of Britain were integral to the early warning system developed in the 1930s by a Scottish scientist, Robert Watson Watt (Messenger, 1990, p. 21-22). His innovation was a pulsed radio signal from a powerful transmitter which could ascertain aircraft at a range of up to 100 miles, including bearing and height. Named the “Chain Home network”, a series of radio direction finding stations (RDFs) were erected along the coasts of England (Price, 1977, p. 15). This technological development was crucial to obtaining minute-by-minute accounts of German air location and attacks. Also, the radar stations themselves were resilient to air attacks and did not often require massive repair (Messenger, p. 21-22). According to Calder (1969), “had the radar chain not existed, Fighter Command would have wasted its strength ineffectually in standing patrols; as it was, the British planes could rise relatively late to anticipate the

98 intruders” (p. 143) and thereby, concentrate their limited resources on the main German attacks. Therefore, radar was essential in this battle. Finally, the RAF’s strategy was significant. At the beginning stages of the planned air attacks against Britain, the Nazi decision to bomb British ships and convoys was not only to eliminate trade in the Channel, thereby cutting off Britain from overseas imports, but also to provoke the RAF into sending fighter pilots to protect the ships, exposing them to mid-Channel combat against the Luftwaffe fighters (Messenger, 1990, p. 30; Fawcett, 2006, p. 251; James, 2000, p. 13). Thus, by ‘drawing out’ the RAF fighters, the Luftwaffe could have a chance of attacking their enemy over the Channel, where anti-aircraft guns did not exist, the Luftwaffe’s numerical presence was not visible and the German fighters were closer to bases and fuel sources, allowing longer time engaged in combat. However, throughout the coming months, the RAF strategy was to remain close to home, thereby capitalizing on their local fuel sources in order to create longer combat times. This tactic would also prove useful for aircrew that had been shot down, as aircrew could return to nearby bases and fly in new aircraft almost the next day. From a primarily technical standpoint, it can be suggested that the German Luftwaffe was better prepared to undertake offensive maneuvers over the English Channel, while the RAF, though possessing RDF, Spitfire and Hurricance aircraft, was less prepared for a major offensive strike against their Island home. Since there were so few pilots, the RAF could rarely commit its whole strength against any one wave of Luftwaffe bombers, and therefore, the RAF’s pilots were often outnumbered (Calder, 1969, p. 142). With this in mind, it seemed highly unlikely that the battle would end with a British victory. Perhaps rhetoric was one significant factor in this battle that reconciles this disconnect – perhaps it was the strength of British rhetoric that would assist in the battlefield outcome, as well as the lack of persuasive rhetoric that would hinder Germany’s efforts.

99 Phase One, the origins, planning and preparation for the battle was completed when the Battle of Britain opened on July 10, 1940.

Phase Two: The Beginning of the Battle of Britain and the “Irrational” British

The Battle of Britain began on July 10, 1940 with a mid-Channel collision between reconnaissance planes which culminated in the involvement of over 100 German and British aircraft (Calder, 1969, p. 140). During this afternoon battle, one ship was sunk and one damaged at Portland, in southern England (James, 2000, p. 26-27). After this initial collision, the coming months culminated in a bombardment of devastation to both Britain and Germany. Britian would suffer the majority of damage and deaths as the battle was no longer confined to air supremacy, but directed against civilian targets. The Luftwaffe tactic of “drawing out” the RAF fighters over the Channel, in order to expose them to mid-Channel combat, if employed consistently, could be advantageous for the Luftwaffe forces, since they would eliminate the economic strength of Britain and at the same time, destroy her air forces. Although this strategy seems to have been later forgotten by Germany’s commanders, Hitler’s confidence in this strategy, his belief in his Luftwaffe and his excitement about achieving a German victory, were conveyed to his citizens. On the evening of July 19 1940, Hitler gave a speech which was considered by the German press as the “most enormous presentation ceremony in the history of Germany” (Domarus, 1997, p. 2043). Summoning the Reichstag (parliament) to convene at seven o’clock in the evening at the Kroll Opera, this speech served the purposes of promoting 12 officers to the prestigious rank of Field Marshal and offered a peace proposal to the British government which, if accepted, would culminate in Britain’s total surrender.

100 Rhetorical Analysis of July 19, 1940 Speech “The Generous Peace Proposal”

Hitler’s speech of July 19, 1940 requested peace from the British. This speech also depicted the British government in a demeaning manner, using name-calling and ridicule to advance the claim that Britain’s illogical and unreasonable leadership would lead to Britain’s downfall. Furthermore, this speech rhetorically placed the audience, through pathos, in a position of hatred and confidence. Finally, Hitler solidified the relationship between private sacrifice and public glory through a method similar to Pericles, strengthening the reasons for engaging in combat with Britain. Once again, Aristotle’s concept of ethos will be operationalized to evaluate Hitler’s rhetorical strength and whether he exhibited the positive traits of goodwill, virtuous character and perceived intelligence. By this juncture in the war, Hitler’s Germany was an unbelievable success (Lukacs, 2001, p. 10). France had fallen, Poland had fallen, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway were occupied, Spain was neutral but sympathetic and fascist Italy was their friend and ally. In addition to this, Germany had an illustrious Luftwaffe within their successful Wehrmacht, which was fuelled with motivation and belief in its own strength by a Propaganda Ministry that had been operating since the late 1920s (Calder, 1969, p. 141; Evans, 2003, p. 168). Hitler was an accomplished politician, whose country had followed his national socialist policies to become an international power to be reckoned with. Therefore, before Hitler even stepped up to the podium on the evening of July 19, 1940 his ethos, based upon his reputation and character, was already well-developed. Hitler’s ethos was also strengthened within the speech itself. Goodwill, an important aspect of ethos, demonstrates that a speaker has the best interests of his audience at heart (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Hitler simultaneously portrayed goodwill to three audiences, which were: the entirety of Europe, his defeated enemies and his country. For example,

101 Hitler claimed that the solution for the German nation was to return Danzig, the “ancient, purely German city” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2044) back to the Reich, because Hitler felt an innate sense of responsibility: “If Mr. Churchill or any other warmongers but had a fraction of the sense of responsibility I felt toward Europe, they could not have played so perfidious a game” (as cited in Domarus, p. 2044). With such a view, Hitler demonstrated concern and responsibility for Europe as a whole. Furthermore, Hitler had his audience’s best interests at heart when referring to Poland’s rejection of peace in 1939; Hitler suggested that he had “then also directed an appeal to reason to the men responsible in the enemy states and to their peoples. I warned against further pursuit of war, the consequences of which could only be devastating” (as cited in Domarus, p. 2044). Hitler also portrayed his goodwill in regards to the German people, by regretting any sacrifice they must make in the future. After condemning Britain’s resolve to continue waging war, Hitler stated: “I regret the sacrifices it will demand. I would like to spare my Volk. I know the hearts of millions of men and boys aglow at the thought of finally being allowed to wage battle against an enemy who has, without reasonable cause, declared war on us a second time” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2062). This speech was scattered with evidence that Hitler has the best interests of his audience at heart, be it Europe as a whole, his conquered enemies or his own German people. Virtuous character, another key aspect of ethos, was not well demonstrated throughout Hitler’s speech. Relating specifically to the speaker’s goodness and honesty, it can often be associated with being charitable toward enemies and optimistic about the future (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). This was Hitler’s major rhetorical failure, because he did not treat his enemies with a reasonable amount of respect. Although it was suggested earlier that Hitler felt responsible for his enemies’ interests, and thus revealed his goodness, he did not express respect when discussing their leaders. The following labels

102 are used when describing Churchill, Britain as a nation and other British, Canadian and American political leaders (as cited in Domarus, 1997): “cold-blooded politicians” (p. 2045), “policy-making warmongers” (p. 2045), “ill-informed” (p. 2049), “blind, stupid or simply vile scoundrels” (p. 2060), “scum of the nation” (p. 2060), “British warlords” (p. 2060), “propped-up heads of state without thrones; statesmen without subjects; and generals without armies” (p. 2060), “British statesmen are chronically slow in their comprehension of almost everything” (p. 2061) and “so-called leaders in Canada” (p. 2062). The wrath of Hitler’s tongue was consistently scornful and cold, considering that Hitler’s primary enemy, Churchill (1940a), referred to the Germans as a “brave race” (para. 10) that should be pitied more than anything. Hitler’s name-calling was routinely demonstrated throughout the speeches in the summer of 1940 and from a rhetorical perspective was a major flaw in his ethos. If Hitler had referred to the British leaders and people as brave and courageous, Hitler’s rhetorical ethos would have been strengthened as a leader who truly cared about everyone – including his sworn enemies. Moreover, if Hitler had treated his enemy with respect, then perhaps fighting Britain would have been viewed by German soldiers and pilots as a valuable and worthy cause. Finally, the last aspect of ethos, perceived intelligence, is best demonstrated when a speaker displays practical wisdom and an appreciation for shared values with his audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Similar to Churchill, Hitler appealed to nationalistic qualities (freedom, valor, etc.) that depicted him as a sensible person who was acting in the name of Germanic values. He even suggested that he, himself, was revolted by war, but was only committing evils in order to create a strong German culture: “Believe me, my Deputies, I feel an inner disgust at this type of unscrupulous parliamentarian annihilators of peoples and states […] It was not my ambition to wage wars, but to build up a new social state of the highest culture” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2062). This demonstrated that Hitler perceived himself as not a warmonger, but a leader who was

103 keen to act in the name of building a worthy German state. Furthermore, Hitler even makes reference to shared values which appealed to German citizens. For example, Hitler referred to the war in Poland by claiming that “The war had to be pursued in the name of culture, humanity, good fortune, progress, civilization, and – Good God! – even in the name of sacred religion” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2046). Again, Hitler refuted any label as a war-maker, claiming instead that he was a freedom fighter, who was acting on behalf of his precious country. Logos, or the rational argument of the speaker, was apparent in two major claims that the national socialists used throughout their reign. First, that the Treaty of Versailles victimized the German nation and second, that the Jewish race sabotaged any internal efforts to become a truly Aryan, successful, wealthy nation, among other things (Evans, 2003, p. 197). Beginning the speech with a scholarly discussion about the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler ridiculed Britain, France and the Jewish race by reiterating that: It was thus that the joint British-French endeavor to portray the Versailles Treaty as some type of international or higher justice must have appeared to every honest German as nothing other than an insolent usurpation. The supposition that British or French statesmen of all people were custodians of justice itself, or even of human culture, was a stupid effrontery […] The National Socialist Movement has, besides its delivery from the Jewish-capitalist shackles imposed by a plutocratic- democratic, dwindling class of exploiters at home, pronounced its resolve to free the Reich from the shackles of the Diktat of Versailles abroad. The German demands for a revision were an absolute necessity, a matter of course for the existence and the honor of any great people. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2043). Based upon this argument, overthrowing the British and French, who were co-creators of the Treaty of Versailles, was a matter of honor. Hitler situated his audience in a difficult

104 position. If they disagreed with Hitler, then they were suggesting that the Treaty of Versailles was a fair contract of higher justice and that Wilhelm II’s Germany, the Germany of their ancestors, was in the wrong. Furthermore, to disagree with Hitler would be to agree that the Jews in Germany were not sabotaging any efforts of the German government. These arguments, among others that Hitler advocated, have been central to various investigations about Hitler’s ideologies and arguments (see Evans, 2003). However, it is not the goal of this thesis to determine the core principles of Hitler’s arguments, nor why they were even considered acceptable. Rather, it is only significant to this study to suggest that Hitler’s arguments in this speech were generally rational and reasonable to the audience. Another key argument that Hitler conveys, directly regarding Britain, was based upon Hitler’s claim that Germany desired peace. Since Churchill, in his June 4, 1940 speech, rejected capitulation, Hitler was now “forced” to make war with Britain. Just after the speech climaxed with the appointment of twelve officers to the rank of Field Marshal, (which were highly prestigious positions in the military hierarchy), Hitler closed with what has been considered a “peace offering” by historians (Stone et al., 2007, p. 106; Domarus, 1997, p. 2064). Hitler appeared conciliatory and focused upon his own reasonable actions as a testimony to his peace-making, not his war-mongering. Hitler stated: A great world empire will be destroyed […] In this hour I feel compelled, standing before my conscience, to direct yet another appeal to reason in England. I believe I can do this as I am not asking for something as the vanquished, but rather, as the victor, I am speaking in the name of reason. I see no compelling reason which could force the continuation of this war. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2062).

105 To many in the audience, it could be assumed that this peace-offering strengthened his logos, as Hitler repeatedly requested that the British surrender. Many might think: Considering the powerful state of the German Luftwaffe and Heere, Hitler could easily overtake Britain – so why not just surrender and save oneself from such death and destruction? Hitler’s speech portrayed himself to be a logical, realistic commander who was confident in his Luftwaffe forces and also a proponent of generating peace. According to M. Domarus (1997), Hitler’s “generous peace proposal” required a complete and unquestioning subjugation by the British to his will, whereby he would prove his “generosity” by permitting Britain to remain unscathed (p. 2064). Hitler’s offering was considered fair and acceptable by most nations, including the United States, which had refused to intervene in Europe on France and Britain’s behalf on June 15, 1940, a month earlier than Hitler’s speech (Stone et al., 2007, p. 98). Therefore, from an Aristotelian framework, Hitler’s logos was not lacking, but consistent, strong and portrayed him as the National Socialist leader who rejected the Treaty of Versailles, the “capitalist” Jewish race and the continuation of warfare. Hitler’s pathos, his emotional appeal to the audience, was also not lacking. As the linguistic delivery of the message is vital to emotionally stirring up the audience, pathos relates to the linguistic elements of the rhetoric. Hitler was perhaps not as colorful with his metaphors or adjectives as Churchill, but still maintained varied language and strong expressions. Although this analysis is dependent upon W. Domarus’ (1997) translation, it can be determined that linguistic variations are still evident. Words found in Domarus’ (1997) translation, such as “zealousness” (p. 2060), “unscrupulous” (p. 2062), “gruesome” (p. 2045) and “lunacy” (p. 2042) are vibrant adjectives and nouns which assist Hitler’s other superlatives to demonstrate his mastery of climactic prose, such as “most daring undertaking in the history of German warfare” (p. 2042), or the “most massive sequences of battles in world history” (p. 2042) or the “greatest and most

106 glorious victory of all time” (p. 2042). Hitler’s pathos was evident in his linguistically vivid language and superlative structure. The other key element of pathos relates to how the speaker can move the audience to experience certain emotions. As stated previously, there are six key psychological states, and their antecedents, that a speaker can aspire to create in his/her audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 307). Hitler’s speech demonstrated that he advocated unity through hatred and confidence, by dismissing the idea that danger is near. Hatred, according to Aristotle, is best achieved by advocating that a common enemy exists. Not only does hatred of a common enemy manifest the audience’s emotions against that entity, but as Griffin (1997) states “a common enemy can be used to create solidarity” (p. 308). Hitler achieved this in his speech. Not only did Hitler proclaim the Jewish race was an obvious enemy (“pitiful, corrupt political creatures and greedy financial magnates” {as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2044}), but his negative descriptions of Britain also demonstrated his hatred. As claimed previously, Hitler’s distain of British people and British leaders was obvious and culminated in vivid and angry language. Also, Hitler advocated that confidence in Germany’s military capabilities was reasonable, as danger was so far removed from the future of Germany. By advocating that Germany was in a strong position, Hitler employed pathos to assure the German people that Germany was in the best position. Hitler claimed: The Reich today stands stronger militarily than ever before. You have seen the losses, individually surely heavy, though as a total relatively low, which the German Wehrmacht has suffered in battle with the past three months […] The cause lies – besides with the, on an average, excellent leadership – with the outstanding tactical training of the individual soldier and of the units. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2058).

107 Hitler brought attention to his own capacity as a leader as a source of self-assurance to the German people. Moreover, he went so far as to claim total victory and a prophet- like stance that his predictions will transcend all obstacles: “We shall reign supreme no matter what happens” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2059). He continued: Mr. Churchill should make an exception and place trust in me when as a prophet I now proclaim: A great world empire will be destroyed. A world empire which I never had the ambition to destroy or as much as harm. Alas, I am fully aware that the continuation of this war will end only in the complete shattering of one of the two warring parties. Mr. Churchill may believe this to be Germany. I know it to be England. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2062). This type of confidence, however powerful as a rhetorical tactic, was devastated by the failure to achieve victory in the Battle of Britain. Hitler was so convinced that danger was far removed, that he claimed victory even before the battle was fully underway. This promise-making would be disastrous to both Hitler’s ethos and future rhetorical speeches if proven wrong. Even Churchill, during the summer of 1940, did not claim victory, but survival as the only achievable aim. Thus, although Hitler used a highly precarious measure to instill confidence, he still was, at this moment, exhibiting a strong and reasonable pathos. Hitler’s speech, like Pericles’ Funeral Oration, eulogized the soldiers and aircrew who had been lost in the previous ten months of the war. It is important to acknowledge that Pericles is perhaps better suited as a comparison to Hitler than Churchill. This is due to the fact that Pericles was in the same position, militarily, as Hitler, where “we fight on enemy soil against men who defend their homes” (Pericles, trans. 1979, para. 39). Since Churchill was fighting a defensive war for survival, he perceived the British as possessing the ethical higher ground. On the other hand, Hitler and Pericles repeatedly

108 endorsed their political actions as justified and ethically superior. Rhetorically, this means that Hitler must reiterate the importance of personal sacrifice to the public glory. This July 19, 1940 speech was perhaps the most significant eulogy that Hitler made throughout the course of the Battle of Britain. Although it was not Hitler’s primary purpose to eulogize the soldiers, it seemed to come naturally during the closing of the speech. Hitler drew a clear relationship between the sacrifices of the dead and living soldier and the glory of the state: I now wish to conclude in mentioning all those nameless men who have no less done their duty. Millions of them have risked life and liberty […] They stand as a symbol for all those hundreds of thousands of musketeers, anti-tank gunners and tank gunners, pioneers and artillerymen, soldiers of the Navy and the Luftwaffe, men of the Waffen SS, and all those other fighters who stood for the German Wehrmacht in the struggle for the freedom and future of our Volk and for the eternal greatness of the National Social Greater German Reich. Deutschland – Sieg Heil! (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2063). Hitler suggested that the men who have died in war and those who were alive and enlisted are contributing to freedom, the future of Germany and the eternal greatness of the Reich. Pericles issued the same belief, claiming that sacrifice to the state “is the prize and the wreath the city offers, both to the dead and the bereaved, for the ordeals they have faced. For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there you will also find the best citizens” (Pericles, trans. 1979, para. 46). Even though Hitler and Pericles were fighting an offensive war, and thus acting on the belief that their political ideologies were of great worth, they were capable of justifying the loss of life by suggesting that personal loss was symbolically tied to national glory and valor. Overall, Hitler’s July 19, 1940 speech was rhetorically strong and reasonably argued. The weakest point in Hitler’s rhetoric was when he declared that victory was

109 imminent and that his promises would undoubtedly come to fruition. This failing would only become transparent when Hitler’s Luftwaffe was legitimately challenged in the coming months. However, at this moment, Hitler’s speech was considered an excellent climax to the recent victory in France, for which twelve officers were promoted to the rank of Field Marshall and Britain was offered a “generous peace proposal” (Domarus, 1997, p. 2064). The British response to Hitler’s offer was one of disdain (Calder, 1969, p. 140). Within an hour after Hitler’s speech, a Daily Express journalist, Sefton Delmer, announced on the BBC radio: “Let me tell you what we here in Britain think of this appeal of yours to what you are pleased to call our reason and common sense. Herr Führer and Reichskanzler, we hurl it right back at you, right in your evil smelling teeth” (Clayton & Craig, 1999, p. 191). The British government’s official rejection of Hitler’s peace proposal was broadcast on July 22, 1940 by Lord Halifax in which he claimed: “We will see this fight through, even if it takes everything we have. Nobody entertains any doubts that, if Hitler should succeed, this would signal the end of all that makes life worth living” (as cited in Domarus, 1997. p. 2067). The British rejection of Hitler’s offer apparently distressed Hitler, as he had hoped that the British would surrender and he could then focus his army and Luftwaffe upon the Eastern Front (Domarus, p. 2065). The British sentiment towards Hitler’s speech remained consistent in the coming weeks. On August 1, 1940, an English translation of this speech was printed upon green and yellow leaflets and were scattered by the Luftwaffe over Hampshire and Somerset (Calder, 1969, p. 141). This speech was, once again, rejected by the British, who collected the leaflets and auctioned them successfully for the Red Cross (Calder, p. 141). Although it appeared that Britain was courageous in its rejection of Hitler’s terms, many outsiders believed the British to be genuinely “crazy”. William Shirer, an American CBS correspondent, was inside the German High Command’s radio headquarters with

110 High Command when the British ridiculed “their Führer’s words” (Clayton & Craig, 2002, p. 191). The Germans, according to Shirer, thought the “British were crazy” (as cited in Clayton & Craig, 1999, p. 191). According to J. Lucas (1987), the Germans viewed the British as crippled and unable to continue fighting; any type of retaliation by the British was ridiculous and a display of martyrdom (p. 136). Alexander Hofer, a German rifleman during July 1940, stated after the end of the war that “The enemy was as good as defeated anyway; weak in number and in morale. The English […] were a badly armed army which had been shattered at Dunkirk” (as cited in Lucas, p. 136). Therefore, many believed the British to be irrationally courageous at a time when their forces were devastated by the loss of France and the evacuation of Dunkirk. Hitler’s belief in the German military and air forces’ success had been demonstrated and his confidence was not without foundation, as the Germans had a stronger, more experienced and better-equipped Luftwaffe than the RAF.

The “Great Battle” Against Britain: The Summer of 1940

Now that the rhetorical stage had been set and each government had proclaimed that war was the only option, it was up to the military endeavors of both governments to decide whether Hitler’s promises of victory, or Churchill’s determined belief that British survival would be fulfilled. The skirmishes over the Channel continued from the initial attack on July 10, 1940 until August 10, 1940, whereby RAF bases were bombed, convoys attacked and mid-Channel air battles occurred (Messenger, 1990, p. 30-41). However, “Adlertag” or “Eagle day” (August 10, 1940) was the first highly coordinated attack upon the RAF by the Luftwaffe, with the sole purpose of destroying RAF Fighter Command. Adlertag was postponed due to bad weather until August 11 and its climax occurred on August 13, 1940 (Calder, 1969, p. 144; James, 2000, p. 71-80).

111 During this phase of the battle attacks by the Luftwaffe were aimed solely at military and air force bases while civilian targets were not considered advantageous and were strongly discouraged by Göring and Hitler (Price, 1977, p. 22). Although the avoidance of civilian targets was central at the beginning of the battle, it would not last for long. It must be noted that Adlertag, or “Eagle day,” appealed to nationalistic qualities and could have helped to unify the German pilots under one patriotic symbol, thus possessing rhetorical significance. Eagles were often on the coat of arms in Germany and were considered a highly patriotic symbol. Also, the eagle symbol was appropriate for air force strategies, as the eagle itself was a bird of prey which flew to find its victims. Thus, naming the first highly coordinated attack on Britain, Adlertag served the rhetorical purpose of promoting unity among the fighting forces. The good weather experienced on August 13, 1940 did not ensure victory. Instead, Adlertag was neither a success nor a failure for either side. On the morning of August 13, 1940 the skies were cloudy and while Luftwaffe bombers were being escorted over the Channel by Me110 fighters, Göring radio messaged the squadrons, calling the attack off until a later day because of the cloud cover (Lucas, 1987, p. 139). The Me110 fighters received this message, but the bombers did not, and continued to attack, although the RAF was able to intercept and five Dornier Do17s were shot down and another six badly damaged (Lucas, 1987, p. 139-140). It was not until later that afternoon that the main attack was launched, because of decreased cloud cover (Calder, 1969, p. 145). However, the Luftwaffe High Command had not realized throughout the encounters during July, 1940, that the RAF was not “rising to the bait of Stukas bombing the Channel convoys” (Lucas, 1987, p. 139). The Luftwaffe had initially hoped that by drawing out the RAF fighters, the former would gain air time to fight, as they would have enough fuel reserved for the flight back over the

112 Channel to home bases in France (Messenger, 1990, p. 30; Fawcett, 2006, p. 251; James, 2000, p. 13). However, as the RAF was not taking the bait, the Luftwaffe had very limited windows of opportunity to engage in combat, which rendered the Luftwaffe more vulnerable during a mid-Channel fight (Lucas, p. 139). However, on August 13, 1940, Adlertag, almost 300 Luftwaffe aircraft assembled mid-air and attacked RAF’s Number 10 Group in Southern England as well as Southampton in southern England, whereby 22 aircraft were destroyed on the ground at Detling airbase and the station commander killed (Messenger, p. 52). During the evening, German bombers attacked a Spitfire factory at Birmingham and the Short Brother’s factory in Belfast, causing moderate damage to the production sites (James, 2000, p. 71-80). RAF losses reported three pilots and 13 aircraft lost, while at the same time the British Air Ministry claimed that 78 German aircraft had been shot down (Messenger, p. 52). However, the Germans reported a 5:1 kill ratio in their favor, which Messenger denotes as “party propaganda” (p. 52). These conflicting reports demonstrated that Adlertag was not a one-sided victory for either party. Adlertag and the following days were meant to be victorious for the Germans, as it was the first highly coordinated attack, in which the reputed Luftwaffe could demonstrate its technical and military superiority over the British RAF. Instead, the RAF’s performance on Adlertag demonstrated that the RAF was stronger than initially predicted and that the tactic of drawing out the RAF over the English Channel was not successful. Rhetorically, Adlertag, though not a British victory, encouraged the British civilians and government that the RAF would prevail – a position that Churchill iterated in his next speech. The days following Adlertag were intense for both governments. On August 15, 1940, every single pilot and plane at the disposal of the RAF, including all reserve squadrons, was engaged in combat. General “Pug” Ismay spent the day in RAF headquarters, observing the unfolding battle, and recorded that “There had been heavy

113 fighting throughout the afternoon and at one moment every single squadron in the group was engaged; there was nothing in reserve, and the map table showed new waves of attackers crossing the coast. I felt sick with fear” (as cited in Messenger, 1990, p. 55). Indeed, historians suggest that the Luftwaffe flew between 1800 and 2119 sorties (each sortie is one mission by one airplane) that day (Calder, 1969, p. 144) and, although it had been predicted that total annihilation of the RAF would take four days, the RAF was demonstrating strong resistance to the Luftwaffe’s attempts (Fawcett, 2000, p. 256). On August 18, 1940, the RAF experienced the most difficult and tragic day of the whole summer (Messenger, 1990, p. 59). Although the losses were similar to those suffered on August 15, 1940, the damage to RAF Fighter Command’s infrastructure was much greater, with the airfield at Kenley bombed from 12,000 feet and Biggin Hill subjected to the same treatment (Messenger, p. 59-60; James, 2000, p. 119-120). August 18, 1940 was considered the closest the British came to defeat. But cloudy weather over the following four days allowed a reprieve and time for Churchill to discuss this momentous crisis.

Rhetorical Analysis of TheAugust 20, 1940 Speech: “The Few”

The intense fighting emphasized two major characteristics about Britain’s position that influenced Churchill’s rhetoric. First, the RAF was stronger than initially thought. By overcoming huge aircraft and pilot losses, the RAF was still capable of defensive maneuvers. Second, Britain’s position was extremely vulnerable. The vulnerability manifested in losing air bases, along with pilot losses, inspired Churchill to recognize that Britain was in a unique position, albeit a seemingly weaker position. Churchill’s rhetoric denoted that even a weaker position can be strengthened by remembering what was lost and what can be gained.

114 The internal crisis that Churchill found himself in on August 20, 1940 was dissimilar to the international crisis of Dunkirk. Churchill had already committed his nation to a war against Germany that some believed to be “ridiculous” (such as the United States) and now, after intense fighting, Churchill had to grapple with how he would justify the extreme losses of pilots and aircrew to his citizens and the international community. Churchill’s speech to the House of Commons that day was limited by a national need to rationalize the acute military losses to the families of British citizens, while simultaneously bringing an optimistic perspective to a country that seemed to be on the edge of defeat. This speech, like Churchill’s June 4, 1940 speech, served the purpose of announcing a variety of political policies, including Churchill’s rejection of sending food and supplies to the civilians in France, in case those supplies were absorbed into the German war effort. Also, Churchill (1940b) praised Lord Beaverbrook for his infrastructure changes that led to an “astounding increase in the output and repair of British aircraft” (para. 28). Furthermore, Churchill announced that with the continuation of this battle the British government aimed to restore French sovereignty (para. 34) and that the United States was permitted to use British facilities for their own naval and air defenses in the western hemisphere (para. 43-44). These statements demonstrated that the British government was still determined to continue the aerial fight against German. Churchill’s ethos in this speech was much stronger than his ethos of June 4, 1940. Before Churchill said one word on August 20, 1940, his ethos was strengthened by the British capacity to survive through the summer. Churchill’s declaration in June to not surrender and to fight amid high probably of defeat had been viewed as irrationally courageous. However, since Britain was still standing and Churchill’s aim to “survive” had been since fulfilled, Churchill was more likely viewed as a courageous man who was

115 not unreasonable. Churchill’s ethos followed through with the promises he made, thus demonstrating a strong ethical character. In regards to the speech itself, Churchill’s virtuous character, perceived intelligence and goodwill towards the audience was consistently exhibited. Churchill’s virtuous character, meaning his demonstration of goodness and honesty, with respect for his adversaries (Griffin 1997, p. 306), was best depicted after Churchill claimed the British would prohibit sending food supplies to France. He explains his reasoning behind the decision: “if the Germans use these commodities to help them to bomb our women and children, rather than to feed the populations who produce them, we may be sure that imported foods would […] be employed to relieve the enemy of the responsibilities he has so wantonly assumed” (Churchill, 1940b, para. 14). Churchill was claiming that imported food would directly assist the German war effort. However, Churchill demonstrated honesty, goodness, empathy and respect for his enemy when he explained that the prohibition behind sending food reserves will be terminated upon the end of the Nazi reign: We shall do our best to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held up before the eyes of the peoples of Europe, including - I say deliberately - the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace. (Churchill, para. 15). Churchill demonstrated a high level of empathy towards his enemy by intentionally claiming that help will be given when the Nazis are destroyed. Churchill could have easily taken an alternative approach and suggested that no help would be offered to the two primary nations that supported the National Socialists. Instead, Churchill’s desire to deliver food and aid to the victims of the Nazis portrayed him as an empathetic and respectful leader.

116 Churchill’s perceived intelligence, another key aspect of ethos, which demonstrates shared values with his audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 306), was also strongly manifested in this speech. Churchill encouraged the belief that the war with Germany was suited to British character. He proclaimed: There seems to be every reason to believe that this new kind of war is well suited to the genius and the resources of the British nation and the British Empire and that, once we get properly equipped and properly started, a war of this kind will be more favorable to us than the somber mass slaughters of the Somme and Passchendaele. If it is a case of the whole nation fighting and suffering together, that ought to suit us, because we are the most united of all the nations, because we entered the war upon the national will and with our eyes open, and because we have been nurtured in freedom and individual responsibility and are the products, not of totalitarian uniformity but of tolerance and variety. (Churchill, 1940b, para. 6). This direct appeal to the best characteristics of the British nation, whether true or not, demonstrated that Churchill was confident in the impending conflict. Moreover, he deliberately appealed to the shared values of a nation, encouraging strong identification and unity among the British citizens. Finally, Churchill’s ethos, in regards to the good will he demonstrated towards his audience’s best interests, was also portrayed. Unlike the speech of June 4, 1940, in which Churchill lacked a level of sympathy for his audience, Churchill now engaged with the disadvantages of the current situation in regards to the average citizen, rather than focusing only on the country as a whole. He acknowledged that in every aspect of life, war was being fought: The whole of the warring nations are engaged, not only soldiers, but the entire population, men, women, and children. The fronts are everywhere. The trenches

117 are dug in the towns and streets. Every village is fortified. The front line runs through the factories. The workmen are soldiers with different weapons but the same courage. (Churchill, 1940b, para. 5). This indicated that Churchill was very aware about the average British citizen’s role in the war, while also hinting that a person need not be engaged in combat to be participating in the war effort. At the end of the speech, Churchill empathized with the British people’s current state: “We are still toiling up the hill; we have not yet reached the crest-line of it; we cannot survey the landscape or even imagine what its condition will be when that longed-for morning comes” (para. 41). Churchill’s empathy towards the average British citizen’s plight was obvious. Dissimilar to his June 4, 1940 speech, Churchill recognized the difficult tasks of average citizens and empathized with their toils. Logos, or the rational appeal of the speaker, was evident in Churchill’s speech. The argument in his June 4, 1940 speech, which suggested that ensured survival was based upon British history and British character, was more developed in this speech. Since the British people have entered this war with their “eyes open” (Churchill, 1940b, para. 6), they shall not only survive but become victorious. Churchill argued “we have both the will and the means, not only to go on indefinitely but to strike heavy and unexpected blows. The road to victory may not be so long as we expect […] Be it long or short, rough or smooth, we mean to reach our journey’s end” (para. 9). Churchill now declared that offensive strikes are possible, as well as victory. This was a very different attitude than what was exhibited on June 4, 1940. But, Churchill was careful when arguing for these goals, as he did not claim a time period or method; instead he was declaring, in a very general manner, that survival will continue, victory was achievable and offensive war will occur. From a rhetorical standpoint, this vagueness allows Churchill time to achieve these goals through whatever means he can. Instead of

118 declaring certain particulars, such as Britain will win the aerial battle by the end of the summer 1940, Churchill strayed from such promises. This type of policy-making, rather than prophesy-making, was vastly different from Hitler’s. Moreover, if Churchill became capable of offensive war to the extent of victory, then rhetorically, he was a hero and fulfilled his promises. Another aspect of Churchill’s logos was exhibited when he discussed the difference between the First World War and the current crisis. By using numbers and statistics, Churchill argued, at the very beginning of the speech, that the losses experienced since September 1939 were significantly lower in comparison to the first year of the Great War. Churchill claimed: “The British casualties in the first 12 months of the Great War amounted to 365,000. In this war, I am thankful to say, British killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing, including civilians, do not exceed 92,000, and of these a large proportion are alive as prisoners of war” (1940b, para. 2). Churchill maintained that these numbers denoted hope and stated: “There seems to be every reason to believe that this new kind of war is well suited to the genius and the resources of the British nation” (para. 6). Churchill asserted that the deaths thus experienced could actually be viewed as positive. Although a little strange for a politician to rhetorically capitalize on the numerical losses of his nation, Churchill helped citizens recognize that if they survived the last war, then their chances of surviving this one is greater. Finally, the emotional appeal of Churchill, pathos, was also consistently exhibited by means of linguistic variety. Metaphors, personification and overall strong and vibrant adjectives sprinkled Churchill’s (1940b) speech: “prodigious slaughter” (para. 1), “potential springboards of invasion” (para. 16), “undismayed against disaster” (para. 18), “conviction of final victory burning unquenchable in our hearts” (para. 17), “kindle again the spark of hope” (para. 24), and “blood-curdling threats and lurid accounts trumpeted”

119 (para. 26). These phrases were a testament to Churchill’s emotional appeal, as his speech was not dry but fluid and colorful, sparking the imaginations of the listeners. Churchill put forward specific conditions in order to emotionally stimulate the audience. Of the six key emotions and their antecedents that Aristotle outlined regarding pathos (Griffin, 1997, p. 308), Churchill portrayed confidence throughout the course of this speech. Although Griffin states that confidence is best portrayed by suggesting dangers are far removed (p. 308), Churchill did not suggest that Germany was weak or incapable of causing harm. Instead, every time Churchill stated Germany was strong, he also pointed out strengths in the British forces. For example, Churchill (1940b) turned his discussion to aircraft production: “The enemy is, of course, far more numerous than we are” (para. 27) and followed up by stating: “But our new production already, as I am advised, largely exceeds his, and the American production is only just beginning to flow in” (para. 27). Churchill perhaps best described the reasoning for focusing upon British strength by claiming that “the dangers we face are still enormous, but so are our advantages and resources” (para. 23). Unlike his June 4, 1940 speech, which relied upon the history of Britain as a reason for confidence, Churchill now turned to solid fact about the economic strength of Britain as a source of confidence. Churchill’s speech on August 20, 1940 was surprisingly similar to Pericles’ Funeral Oration. It must be reiterated that, because Churchill was fighting a defensive war on the grounds of mere survival, he only needed to boost the confidence of the nation so that survival would be achieved. Unlike Hitler, Churchill had the ethical “higher ground” as he was reacting to provocation and defending himself, rather than acting on political ideology, without provocation. But in eulogizing the soldiers that had died in his August 20, 1940 speech, Churchill encouraged the relationship between private sacrifice and the public good. Rhetorically, it was not necessary for Churchill to do so. Survival, in a defensive war, needs very little explanation. Instead, however, Churchill added another

120 rhetorical element to his speech, strengthening the relationship between private and public, further justifying the necessity of war and the importance of victory. Pericles’ Funeral Oration and Churchill’s August 20, 1940 speech employed the same structure. There was an obvious element of time in both speeches. This urged the audience to recognize the temporal spectrum wherein their current tasks lay and how their legacy will be fulfilled. Churchill began his speech with a discussion about the past. He not only addressed the previous year, but also the Great War. Then, his discussion moved into the present, whereby he argued that the British “genius and the British nation” (Churchill, 1940b, para. 6) were well suited to the present conflict. Finally, he discussed the future of this battle and how it related to the legacy of the nation. Pericles’ Funeral Oration follows the exact same structure. First, Pericles discussed the ancestors and how their plight had been inherited into the present. Then he outlined the current state of affairs in Athens and in what way the government was strong. Finally, Pericles discussed the legacy of the nation and how it was constituted by her citizens’ sacrifices. The similarity between Churchill’s and Pericles’ use of temporality assisted the listeners to feel like they were part of a larger national enterprise. The historian Jablonsky in S. Heywood’s (2003) book Churchill suggests that “by dramatizing their lives […] as acting appropriately for a great historic moment, Churchill transformed the British people into a collective, romantic and heroic whole” (p. 88). Churchill also eulogized the loss of pilots and aircrew since the beginning of the war. Much like Pericles, Churchill (1940b) argued that the British Empire had stood their ground, however difficult it may have been: “The British nation and the British Empire finding themselves alone, stood undismayed against disaster. No one flinched or wavered; nay, some who formerly thought of peace, now think only of war” (para. 18). Churchill’s praise of British courage was curiously similar to Pericles. Pericles stated: “They preferred to stand their ground and to die, rather than to yield and save their lives

121 […] and they stood the brunt of battle” (Pericles, trans. 1979, para. 42). Again, by praising the soldiers who did their duty with courage, there was a strong relationship cultivated between these heroic actions and the maintenance of the state. Furthermore, Churchill climactically intertwined the RAF pilots with the British civilians. This was not an unknown occurrence, as Pericles had instilled the same connection in Athenian citizens by stating: “Such then is the city for which these men nobly fought and died deeming it their duty not to lose. It is only fitting that every one of us, who survived those men, will want, for Athens, to continue the toil” (Pericles, trans. 1979, para. 41). The association between the dead, the living and the state was also reflected in the climax of Churchill’s speech, when he stated: The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. (Churchill, 1940b, para. 30). Churchill’s words were adopted in later years to label those who fought in the Battle of Britain as “the Few”. This statement linked together the civilian efforts with the sacrifices of the RAF, suggesting that civilian populations were eternally indebted to the self- sacrificing aircrew. Indeed, Clayton and Craig (2002) interpret that Churchill’s particular attention to the RAF’s aircrew raised their status in the larger context of the Battle of Britain and emphasized that the RAF were incontrovertible to the battle’s victory (p. 219). Churchill’s August 20, 1940 speech was an excellent testament to the influence of rhetoric at war. With the rhetorical evaluation of ethos, logos and pathos, as well as the comparison to Pericles, it can be suggested that Churchill’s two speeches were

122 surprisingly powerful during that summer. Churchill did not promise victory, but encouraged survival. It seemed that Churchill never made any promises which could not be kept. Furthermore, he treated his enemy with the utmost respect. Churchill’s ethos had increasingly grown more powerful with each rhetorical act. The historical proof that Britain was on the brink of defeat during this summer, assuming that Churchill knew of Britain’s weakened military position, suggested that these speeches were courageous attempts at retaining a calm and determined perspective in times of great adversity. However, even after this speech, the Battle of Britain was not a certain British victory. The British citizens, military and government still had to survive the Luftwaffe attacks. From a rhetorical standpoint, Churchill was doing the absolute best he could and had exhausted the rhetorical means at his disposal. Hitler, on the other hand, needed one final rhetorically-strong speech. Since the Luftwaffe’s technical and numerical strength was still superior to that of Britain’s, a strong speech would reinforce the Luftwaffe’s purpose, unity and contribute to a German victory. Unfortunately for Hitler, the navigational error by Luftwaffe pilots, which led to civilian war, was not addressed sufficiently in his next rhetorical act. Instead, Hitler’s speech on September 4, 1940, was his first in a long line of rhetorical failures throughout the entirety of the Second World War (Domarus, 1997, p. 2081).

Phase Three: The Battle of Britain as a Civilian War

The final phase of the war was characterized by the involvement of civilians. It should be emphasized that neither the British nor German forces wished to include civilian causalities. However, due to a Luftwaffe navigation error, civilian targets became of significant rhetorical importance. Since Göring had boasted earlier in the war that no British bomber would ever bomb Berlin (Messenger, 1990, p. 67), the consequent

123 bombings of Berlin detracted from the belief in German invincibility. Also, Hitler would use German casualties to provoke his citizens during speeches. By mid-August, Göring was furious that the RAF was fighting so strongly. From August 15 until August 19, 1940, Göring summoned senior commanders to Karinhall, his country retreat, and fumed that the RAF had not been destroyed (Price, 1977, p. 37). During these meetings, Göring instituted other measures to ensure that the Luftwaffe’s primary objective, the total destruction of the RAF, would be achieved, including the deployment of bombers and fighters together, so that the latter could provide continuous protection to the former. He also ordered that only one commissioned officer would be assigned to each German bomber due to the extreme losses over the previous months (Messenger, 1990, p. 65). Although Göring thought that the performance of the Luftwaffe thus far had been weak and unacceptable, he felt that these measures would guarantee success. However, four days after Churchill’s “The Few” speech, a navigational error by German pilots changed the entire course of the battle. Although Göring had given strict orders that London was not to be attacked without his permission, Luftwaffe pilots lost in stormy weather dropped their bombs on London’s city center on August 24, 1940 (Calder, 1969, p. 152). The following evening, on Churchill’s express orders, RAF Bomber Command attacked Berlin for the first time (Fawcett, 2006, p. 254). Although only 29 of the 81 RAF airplanes sent reported dropping bombs, it nonetheless disproved Göring’s “proud boast” that no British bomber would ever get through to Berlin (Messenger, 1990, p. 67). These attacks on each nation’s capitals changed the course of the battle from being an exclusively air force conflict to becoming a war of indiscriminant bombing with high civilian causalities. Göring focused the majority of the Luftwaffe’s efforts from then on, on civilian targets (Calder, 1969, p. 153). Also, these night air raids were favorable to

124 day attacks, as the Luftwaffe was best protected at night. Night air raids proved increasingly devastating civilian targets (James, 2000, p. 220-222). On August 31, 1940 Liverpool in northern England was badly bombed, with no less than 160 fires being started in its commercial center (Calder, p. 154). From that time onward, the RAF continued to bomb other German city centers for the duration of the Second World War. Since Britain was seen as a near-beaten enemy, Berliners were astounded that the RAF had both the resources and resolve to attack the Reich’s capital city (Calder, p. 153). The German government documented public opinion during this time and was astonished to learn on August 26, 1940, the following sentiment of recorded public opinion: “Die Einflüge englischer Bomber weit in das deutsche Hinterland und ihre Flüge sogar bis Obertialien wurden überall mit grossem Erstaunen zu Kenntnis genommen. Man beginnt sich auch zu fragen, wie viele Flugzeuge die Engländer denn noch leistungsfähig sind” (“The approach of English bombers far into German territory and (English) flights even into Italy were noticed everywhere with large astonishment. One begins to ask himself how many airplanes the Englishmen still have in reserve, if they are still efficient after so many hard-felt losses”) (Meldungen aus Dem Reich, 1968, p. 110, translated by author). Regardless of the surprised and questionable German morale, Hitler used this situation to his advantage; this abrupt, unplanned and highly intense bombing on civilian targets became a rhetorical tool, whereby Hitler suggested that Britain acted without provocation to cause extreme civilian causalities.

Rhetorical Analysis of Hitler’s Speech, September 4th, 1940: The “Winterhilfswerk” Address

On September 4, 1940, Hitler staged a “Volk Rally” at the Berlin Sportpalast where he appeared greatly agitated, nervous and edgy (Domarus, 1997, p. 2081). His

125 audience was mainly social workers and nurses, a population that had first-hand experiences of civilian causalities. The speech itself contained a scattered array of themes. At first, it appeared that Hitler would focus the entirety of his speech discussing the war with Britain, but then he concentrated on the failures of British propaganda to legitimately portray the strength of Germany’s assault and the British military defeat at Dunkirk. The speech climaxed when Hitler threatened to drop an increasing number of bombs on British targets. He continued further and discussed the importance of Germany’s Winterhilfswerk (Winter Relief Organization) that operated during the reign of the Nazis and provided food and fuel to German civilians. Finally, Hitler ended the speech with an unfocused discussion about the importance of volunteering and education. Throughout the speech it seems that Hitler’s passion lay with discussing the British, but he was forced, due to the presence of the audience, to focus on topics which appealed to social workers and nurses. Virtuous character, a significant element of ethos¸ was poorly demonstrated throughout the course of Hitler’s speech. Virtue deals primarily with appearing good and honest, as well as charitable towards your enemies (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Hitler’s goodness, honesty and charitable nature were demonstrated, at best, by his reiterating that he advocated peace, not war with Britain, but that Churchill had refused. Hitler stated: “So often I have extended my hand for an understanding with the English people. You know it yourselves: it was my foreign policy program. I have recently done so for the very last time. I now prefer to fight” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2084). Although it was true that Hitler offered peace, it was at the cost of total submission of his adversary and under terms of tyranny. Any belief in Hitler’s charitable nature towards his opponents was automatically sabotaged by his repeated efforts to ridicule and scorn his enemy. One particular sentence

126 stands out: “The blabbering of a Mr. Churchill or a Mr. Eden2 - to speak of the old Chamberlain good taste forbids – this blabbering leaves the German Volk cold, and, at best, elicits laughter” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2085). Similar to Hitler’s July 19, 1940 speech, his rhetoric portrayed consistent efforts to demonstrate the stupidity and failings of British politicians. For example, Hitler directly ridiculed Churchill but also sabotaged his own ethos at the same time. Hitler stated: British politicians attempt to portray the situation: that the British Army, tearing at its reigns like a wild horse, is aflame with the desire to finally be unleashed, to hurl itself at the German enemy. It was surely close enough to us to satisfy this ‘desire’ without much ado. It withdrew from our vicinity, and thus it is its lot to portray these pitiful retreats as great victories. And this is what all its ‘successes’ look like! (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2082). Hitler was obviously boastful of his nation’s previous victory over Britain’s Expeditionary Forces. However, Hitler was not demonstrating respect in discussing his enemy, a rhetorical failing that Aristotle would suggest was detrimental to a leader’s ethos. This inability to be respectful could also have detrimental effects upon morale, as it may have contributed to overconfidence when fighting an “unworthy” enemy. Hitler’s perceived intelligence, whereby the speaker appears to have practical wisdom and shared values with the audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 306), was demonstrated when Hitler claimed that Germany was a tolerant and unbiased country when compared with the Germany of the past. Hitler maintained: “Whereas once the highest distinction was accorded only to officers, today a valiant non-commissioned officer or private may equally well earn it. The walls of a world of prejudice have been torn down” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2089). Although Hitler had concentration camps and the Nuremberg

2 Robert Anthony Eden (1897 – 1977) was the British Foreign Secretary for a time under Chamberlain and appointed by Churchill as Secretary of State during WWII.

127 Laws in place by this time, his ideological nature chose to ignore those atrocities. Rather, he suggested that due to his involvement in Germany’s political and social policies, Germany was a more tolerant nation. To those who had not, up to that point, seen the concentration camps or were willingly anti-Semitic, Hitler’s ethos may have appeared wise and desirous of positive and constructive values. Hitler revealed a sense of goodwill towards his audience. Sympathy for your audience’s sacrifices and implying that you have their best interests at heart creates effective rhetoric (Griffin, 1997, p. 306). Hitler demonstrated that those who give their time and money to the Winterhilfswerk program were: Making sacrifices. The one makes a sacrifice in donating, the other in administering this donation and in doing so voluntarily […] For all of us, in one way or another, are burdened with the heritage of the past, our descent, our social standing, our profession, and so on. We have the choice of making do without millions of men, who are irreplaceable in their national work and economic activities. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2088). Hitler recognized the plight of his audience and deliberately acknowledged the sacrifices they made. Logos, or the rational appeal of the speaker, was developed through various arguments. Not once did Hitler acknowledge the navigational error by Luftwaffe pilots, but instead treated the RAF bombings on Berlin with a sense of German victimization. This argument was not an unfamiliar justification for Hitler to employ, as most discussions involving the Treaty of Versailles followed the same pattern. In suggesting that the Berlin bombings were committed without provocation, Hitler argued that he, himself, was a peace-maker who was now forced into war. He asserted: I find it insupportable that a nation of eighty-five million should be at the mercy of another people at any time – whenever it suits the plutocrats in London. So

128 often have I extended my hand for an understanding with the English people […] I now prefer to fight to finally arrive at a clear decision. This decision can consist only in the removal of this regime of pitiful and base warmongers and in a situation being established in which it will be impossible for one nation to tyrannically run all of Europe in the future. (As cited in Domarus, 1997, 2084). Hitler’s resolve to fight, it appeared, had come with reluctance and hesitation. Moreover, he dismissed the British as a regime of “pitiful and base warmongers” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2084) that were desirous of tyrannical power. In retrospect, these words seemed more appropriate if uttered by Churchill. However, this was another example of how Hitler used logos to effectively persuade his listeners. A major failure in Hitler’s speech was that the pathos he employed did not help to evoke any positive emotional state from the audience, such as love or confidence. Instead, Hitler primarily promoted hatred. Similar to his July 19, 1940 speech, Hitler advanced hatred by addressing the dissimilarities between Britain and Germany through ridicule. Hitler’s scornful treatment of his enemy culminated in a climactic threat against the British. He declared: And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand, or four thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will now drop 150,000; 180,000; 230,000; 300,000; 400,000; yes, one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities! (As cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2086). If any audience member had been unsure about his or her regard for Britain up to this point, then that person would have certainly recognized that hatred of the enemy, rather than love or pity, was integral to Hitler’s regime. However, this can still be thought of as effective, since the dissemination of hatred can often create solidarity and unity in the audience (Griffin, 1997, p. 308).

129 Although it was obvious that Hitler’s primary purpose in this speech was not to eulogize the deaths experienced by Germany, he thanked all those men, women, workers and volunteers who assisted the National Socialist cause. It would have been rhetorically effective in this speech if Hitler accentuated the relationship between the death of citizens and the state. Instead, Hitler limits his acknowledgments to mere appreciation, rather than glorification. As demonstrated by Pericles’ Funeral Oration, focusing on this relationship would have rhetorically strengthened and persuaded citizens that Hitler’s war against Britain was politically sound and justified, even if an offensive, rather than defensive, war. Perhaps Hitler’s audience, comprised mostly of those professions that exist to help the living, rather than remember the dead, influenced his choice to avoid eulogy. It could appear that way, because Hitler also tended to focus more on a woman’s role in war than in other previous speeches. Hitler’s speech of September 4, 1940 lacked many characteristics that could have made it a strong example of rhetoric. Hitler’s disorganized approach, his ridicule of his enemy, his thematically scattered treatment of topics and his underdeveloped ethos depicted Hitler as a very confused and angry speaker. Unfortunately for Hitler, the fact that Berlin was bombed by enemies that Hitler had previously sworn were not in a position to do so, was severely detrimental to his ethos as a promise-maker. This disconnect between what he promised and what actually happened was not addressed sufficiently. Although Hitler may have appeared sympathetic to his audience, while also arguing that victimization induced legitimate retaliation, his speech lacked the appropriate characteristics that would have strengthened the German people and the Luftwaffe. If Hitler had suggested that the bombings on London were far from accidental, then that military action could have served a rhetorical purpose. If Hitler had exaggerated the importance of confidence, in addition to or by replacing hatred, then the German people might have felt more optimistic and unified. Finally, if Hitler had breached the

130 topic of war with Britain in a more consistent manner, rather than with a disorganized and scattered approach, perhaps his citizens might have felt that their leader was organized and prepared for battle. The Battle of Britain was the first opportunity for Hitler’s rhetoric to decrease in its effectiveness. Domarus (1997) suggests that this speech was the first in a series of similar addresses that he would deliver through the coming years, characterized by “raging, the ill-concealed feeling of impotence which only augmented his fury [and] the false prophecies of pending victories” (p. 2081). Hitler was desperate to unite his fellow Germans under one banner of eternal strength through unity. By appealing to the numerical force of Germany’s armed forces, Hitler closed his final speech by stating: “People who set forth on paths separate from one another could be broken. But eighty- five million men who have one will, one resolve, and who are prepared to act – no power on earth can break them!” (as cited in Domarus, 1997, p. 2090). Hitler’s speech attempted to unite the Germans and turn their full attention to Britain, at a time when Göring claimed that the RAF had been reduced to its last reserves (Calder, 1969, p. 153)

The Finale: Germany Loses the Purpose to Invade

The final days of the Battle of Britain were difficult for both parties, as the destruction of civilian targets increased, and the hope for a peaceful conclusion decreased. The RAF Fighter Command was in a poor state, having lost a total of 295 aircraft and over 171 seriously damaged from August 24 through September 6 1940 (Price, 1977, p. 76). Meanwhile, during the same period, the Luftwaffe lost somewhere between 300 (Price, 1977, p. 76) and 545 aircraft (Messenger, 1990, p. 72), due partly to a growing trend called “Channel Sickness” whereby two or more missions were flown in one day by most Luftwaffe pilots, causing stress and exhaustion (Messenger, 1990, p. 72). Luckily for the British government, British people were largely unaware of the growing crisis, as

131 the newspapers were highly optimistic about the daily scores of aircraft shot down and the bravery of the fighter pilots was widely acknowledged and circulated (Messenger, 1990, p. 70). On September 7, 1940 Hitler told Göring that London could become the primary target of the Luftwaffe’s efforts (Calder, 1969, p. 156). With his Führer’s permission, Göring began a series of raids aimed at Britain’s capital, with the express purpose of exacting revenge for the bombing of Berlin (Price, 1977, p. 78). On September 7, 1940, 350 bombers and 600 Luftwaffe fighters attacked London (Price, 1977, p. 78) resulting in continuous attacks between the hours of 2100 and 0300 on the night of September 7-8. According to Price (1977), Wing Commander John Hodsoll, who had been watching the RAF from the War Room, stated that the aircraft above were “just visible”: “Above it all, just visible, was the maze of tiny dots with their white of vapor, high up in the sky; and here and there were signs of combat, of weaving trails, as our fighters did their best” (p. 79). The sounds of ambulances and fire engines filled the streets of London with the 430 civilian casualties and 1000 injured (Calder, 1969, p. 158). The Luftwaffe lost ten bombers and twenty two fighters, but had not obliterated Fighter Command (Price, 1977, p. 79) The bombing of London’s city center continued until the end of the Battle of Britain – it would never cease. By mid-September 1940, Londoners discovered that the Underground provided them the safety and quiet from night raids and many would remain there every night for the rest of the fall (Messenger, 1990, p. 81). It is important to note that Londoners were particularly resistant to low morale caused by the repeated bombings. This has been evidenced in publications which examine British public opinion specifically (Calder, 1969, p. 158; Mackay, 2002, p. 76-79; Messenger, p. 80). For example, on September 7, 1940 east London was badly hit and the next day, Churchill visited a shelter in the East End, the poorest area of the city, where forty people had been

132 killed the previous night. According to Messenger, the Eastenders were delighted to see him and said to Churchill: “We can take it. Give it ‘em back” (p. 80). Meanwhile, Operation Sealion, the plan to invade Britain, which had been planned for August, 1940 was set back until September 24 and it was consequently postponed again until September 27, 1940 to allow Göring’s air force time to prevail (Calder, 1969, p. 159). The Germans considered the month of September, although notorious for bad flying weather, would allow continuous air campaigns. On September 15, 1940 another daytime attack by Luftwaffe bombers and fighters was intercepted by RAF fighters. The British won the scuffle due to the limited range of the German fighter planes (Calder, 1969, p. 160; James, 2000, p. 261-262). Churchill proclaimed this the “Battle of Britain Day” and British morale was high. From September 15 until September 25, 1940, there was reduced Luftwaffe activity with the majority of bombing executed against suburban factories. In October, the Luftwaffe resorted to sending over mostly fighters by day, while its bombers attached London and other centers by night (Calder, p. 162). Some of the heaviest bombing of London occurred on the night of October 14 and morning of the 15, but by October 31, 1940, there was no air activity. Although the Blitzkrieg (lightning warfare) would continue until May 10/11, 1941, many historians (Calder, p. 162; Messenger, 1990, p. 104-108; Fawcett, 2006, p. 256; Lucas, 1987, p. 146) have suggested that the Battle of Britain ended with the greatly reduced demands on the RAF in October 1940 because of lessening offensive strikes by the Germans, as well as Hitler’s abandonment of the plan to invade Britain – Operation Sealion. The Battle of Britain did not result in the end of conflict. Rather, the German military objective to invade Britain was not achieved (Messenger, 1990, p. 108; Fawcett, 2006, p. 255; Ray, 1994, p. 174-175). Operation Sealion was “pinched to death” (Calder, 1969, p. 160), the invasion could not be launched because Fighter Command remained

133 unvanquished. Although the Blitzkrieg on London continued for another eight months after the official ending of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe and RAF survived throughout the Second World War and the Luftwaffe continued to bomb British ports, cities and bases (Ray, p. 175). The failure by the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority has been blamed on a number of aspects of the battle. First, some of the strategies that Göring implemented have been questioned by historians. One of the most important was that Göring did not correctly estimate the British advantages of having a defensive position in the air, such as the increased combat time due to localized fuel sources (Fawcett, 2006, p. 256). The Luftwaffe, whose Me109 fighters had limited fuel load to start with, had to refuel aircraft at bases in France, further limiting their time engaged in combat. Because the Luftwaffe was not designed to operate against an enemy air force, but to provide support to an advancing army, many Luftwaffe aircraft (such as the Me109) were not designed for long range combat, while the bombers were only lightly defended by their own defensive armament and vulnerable to enemy fighters. Göring’s tactic of “drawing out” the RAF over the Channel seemed to also be forgotten. As stated, if Göring had kept this tactic, then Luftwaffe aircraft could have engaged in longer combat scenarios with RAF fighters, over the Channel where they could have also consistently destroyed ports and shipyards. Second, the benefits of radar in the strategic planning of airborne battles helped to anticipate the attacks of the Germans on British soil (Fawcett, 2006, p. 256). Finally, T.C.G. James (2000) asserts that the failure by the Luftwaffe was due to a loss of purpose. Their purpose was initially tied to the invasion of Britain, but as the battle progressed, the objective to invade Britain was lost, as was the will to fight (James, 2000, p. 402).

134 However, the role of rhetoric and its ability to solidify civilian sentiments through rhetorical means must not be overlooked. The Battle of Britain was of such a design that it seemed inevitable that the British would lose to the numerical strength, preparedness and high morale of the Luftwaffe forces. However, the rhetoric of each nation contributed to its respective victory and downfall. Two major flaws are prevalent in Hitler’s rhetoric that are not apparent in Churchill’s. First, there is a vast difference between policy-making and prophesy-making. Churchill used his speeches to announce political policies and any promises, if made, were done so with a vagueness which allowed Churchill to follow through without time constraints or particular means. However, Hitler proclaimed himself as a prophet whose predictions would come true through specified techniques. When Hitler could not follow through, the validity of his rhetoric was questioned. Second, respect for one’s enemy is necessary in warfare. Churchill had the utmost respect for Hitler’s Germany and even expressed pity at their situation. Hitler, on the other hand, used a large portion of his speeches to ridicule and scorn his enemy. Although this tactic can often lead to unity against a common foe, it may not have had this desired effect all the time. Instead, Hitler’s ethos was self-sabotaged by his deliberate effort to rhetorically undermine his enemy. During the Battle of Britain, Churchill’s rhetoric was increasingly more effective to unify and rally his forces, while Hitler’s rhetoric was progressively more detrimental to his ethos and in the end, was ineffective. Since the battle’s result was the opposite of what military force and technological assets alone would suggest, the speeches by each government cannot be overlooked as having a significant effect upon the outcome of the battle. Instead, rhetoric should be viewed as another significant reason for affecting the Battle of Britain’s outcome.

135

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This thesis has investigated the correlations between the historical circumstances of 1940 and Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, showing how these leaders’ rhetoric transformed significantly within this summer. The literature review suggested that a research design of this type had not yet been undertaken--Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, as well as their rhetorical potential and skills, had not been compared prior to or within the context of the Battle of Britain. By combining rhetorical criticism (based on Aristotle and Pericles), rhetorical biography (based on Isocrates and Cicero), and rhetorical history (conducted by investigating the historical antecedents and immediate effects of these leaders’ rhetoric upon the Battle of Britain), this thesis has attempted to deepen our understanding of how leaders, rhetoric and history interact. Furthermore, the use of classical rhetorical theory to examine the rhetorical skills, performances and education of Churchill and Hitler provided further insight about their rhetorical potential, while also validating classical texts as applicable and relevant in modern military conflicts. The comparison of Churchill and Hitler as orators, and the comparison of their speeches, has led to insights about their strengths and weaknesses that could not have otherwise been claimed if only one military side of this battle had been investigated. Meanwhile, these speeches were situated within the historical facts and events, which needed to be interpreted as affecting and effecting rhetorical strategies in order to discover how Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric responded to the historical crisis. Overall, this thesis has covered not only abstract rhetorical philosophies, but has synthesized and applied them to leaders, their rhetoric, and a major historical conflict. The following series of paragraphs outlines within a narrative the argument of the preceding chapters:

136 The Battle of Britain (1940) was one of the few moments in history where a nation that seemed weaker and ill-prepared for battle won against a stronger and mightier force. However, it seems that the rhetoric of each nation contributed to its respective victory and downfall. Both Hitler and Churchill brought to this crisis comparable rhetorical skills. After the evacuation of Dunkirk, it seemed highly likely that Britain would easily be defeated by Germany. Britain appeared to be very vulnerable and even the United States did not wish to become entangled in Britain’s defense. However, in response to this historical circumstance, Churchill was not prepared to see Britain surrender. To inspire in his people the same resolve, his speech explicitly asserted that Britain would fight on, regardless of the insurmountable odds they were facing. Hitler planned and prepared to invade the island nation—a goal that could only be attained if air superiority was guaranteed. With Göring at the helm of his Luftwaffe, Hitler attacked with full force, while using rhetoric to more fully convince the German people of their invincibility. After months of battle and the notable assistance of many speeches delivered to civilians and soldiers, Churchill’s RAF endured. The Luftwaffe, desperate to win, and Hitler, desperate to invade, were alarmed when a navigational error resulted in London’s bombing. In retaliation, Churchill bombed Berlin. The perception of German invincibility was shattered and Hitler’s external ethos did not recover in subsequent speeches. Bombing each nation’s city centers resulted in harsh realities for the unfortunate citizens living in their national capitals. Ambulance sirens and fire fighters were commonplace and homelessness soared. People now felt the acute pains of war and likely sought not only physical aid but rhetorical comfort and hope. While Churchill seemed to remain calm and detached in his speeches, thus steadying his people’s emotions, the building pressure on Hitler and his unfolding military failures were saturating his rhetoric. Hitler was no longer in control of his

137 situation or his rhetoric. By the end of October, 1940, the military purpose to invade Britain was lost and the Battle of Britain was over.

Policy vs. Promise-making

Theoretical findings can be distilled from these chapters, providing further insights into the rhetorical dynamics of battle. One of the initial research questions was: What elements of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric, both its internal content and its relation to historical context, likely contributed to the specific military outcome? It is the purpose to now discuss major elements of Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric which were discovered within the content of the speeches as well as revealed by their relationship to the historical context. First, the difference between policy-making and promise-making in war demonstrates how rhetoric can be beneficial and detrimental to a rhetor’s ethos. Churchill made policies while Hitler made promises. Churchill’s policy to “never surrender”, backed by a claim that survival was achievable, was fulfilled by Churchill in the coming months. Churchill avoided claiming victory in a specified time-period. Instead, Churchill’s ethos would be reinforced so long as a British citizen could survive, and not surrender, within the coming months and years. On the other hand, Hitler made promises to his citizens that, when unfulfilled, was detrimental to his ethos. Hitler promised victory, forthcoming from the Luftwaffe, within a few months. He promised that Britain would be defeated and wiped from the annals of history and that Germany would emerge victorious. Naturally, when this did not happen, Hitler’s rhetorical ethos was damaged because he could not keep promises. Although Göring boasted that no British plane would ever drop a bomb on Germany, Berlin suffered nighttime bombing raids throughout August, 1940. It is no wonder that German citizens as well as the Luftwaffe began to lose their sense of purpose (James, 2000, p. 402). The difference between policy-making and promise-making has not been studied within the realm of rhetorical

138 scholarship. Although it is highly likely that Aristotle, Isocrates, Cicero and others would deem unfulfilled promises as detrimental to the ethos of a leader, this has not been a well-studied phenomenon.

Respect and Emotion

The second key rhetorical feature that was made evident in the Battle of Britain is the demonstration of respect for one’s adversary. While Churchill’s rhetoric reflected respect, admiration and sometimes pity for his adversary, Hitler’s rhetoric was angry and boastful of the significant advantages the Germans claimed they possessed. Name-calling and the rhetorical ramifications of that approach can again lead to damaging both the ethos of the speaker, and also the pathos of an audience. Hitler’s scornful treatment of his enemy demonstrates that he was not seeking peace, but instead war. Hitler’s promise of being a peace-maker was thus undermined by such actions, damaging his ethos. Also, the audience’s emotional state or pathos became limited to becoming a nation fuelled by hate, rather than love, indignation rather than pity. Not only would it be productive to explore if correlations exist between specific emotional states in audiences and their reactions to crises, but also to investigate what emotional states are provoked when respect, or disrespect, for one’s enemy is exhibited by a speaker. Another rhetorical quality made apparent in this analysis is the importance that emotional delivery plays in war. Churchill was cold and disconnected while Hitler was passionate, arousing and demonstrative. As depicted within the Battle of Britain, Churchill’s cold approach seemed to be beneficial while Hitler’s impassioned stance was detrimental. It has been argued that Churchill’s emotionally detached manner of voicing his policies helped to solidify the resolve of the British people. This tactic, expressed through flowery language and advanced vocabulary, cultivated high-mindedness within his audiences, almost mythologizing a nation into a timeless legacy. On the other hand, Hitler’s erratic and stimulated approach meant to unify the people through emotions, but

139 it seemed to sabotage the determination and calm of the German Luftwaffe and people. When bombings of urban centers occur regularly, one can assume that those inhabitants require a calm leader, not an emotionally disorganized prophet. Thus, one can draw the conclusion that when at war, a politician should handle such conflict with emotional detachment and analytical, unaffected emotion. It is important to note, however, that Hitler’s emotional tactic was incredibly effective when campaigning in pre-war Germany. Hitler invoked an emotional state of excitement and enthusiasm within German audiences when he was merely the leader of the National Socialist party. Hitler was renowned as a very persuasive speech-maker (Evans, 2003, p. 171). However, Churchill never ran for Prime Minister, but was appointed by Chamberlain in 1940. When Churchill ran for Prime Minister of Britain in 1945, he was not elected. One begins to wonder whether Churchill was, rhetorically, the optimal Prime Minister at war, while Hitler was, rhetorically, the optimal campaigning politician in peace. How important are emotions to a war-time leader’s persuasion?

Churchill’s Brutal Honesty

The issue of honesty in a politician’s rhetoric is problematic, especially if the government is at war. Churchill is often remembered for his ability to explicitly describe, through facts, the state of the nation. In Chapter Four: The Ideal Orator, it was argued that Churchill’s honest portrayal of statistical and numerical data, demonstrated that he possessed a broad and complete knowledge-base that Cicero claimed was essential to the effectiveness of an “Ideal Orator.” This was again raised in Chapter Five, especially when analyzing his June 4, 1940 speech “We Shall Fight on the Beaches” (Churchill, 1940a). Churchill’s brutal honesty, however depressing it may appear, was consistently portrayed in this speech, reinforcing and establishing his ethos as a virtuous politician. These two arguments, when combined, suggest that Churchill’s ability to present himself as both a knowledgeable and honest rhetor, has a significant impact upon the audience’s

140 belief of a politician’s capacity to virtuously lead a nation. More specifically, it could be argued that citizens and military personnel may not trust a politician who approaches a crisis with superficial accounts or incomplete knowledge of the circumstances. Although Churchill was taking a chance by revealing information that could have depressed his already-frightened audience, it had the reverse effect. Instead, Churchill’s brutal honesty demonstrated courage and faith in a nation’s capacity to survive. What balance must a war-time leader possess, which is truthful to audiences but still discreet enough for enemies, to be effective?

Dilemmas of Studying Hitler

Another prevalent theme that was raised repeatedly is in regards to the ethical challenges of dealing with Hitler. As was the goal of this thesis, Hitler must be treated with cautious objectivity rather than automatic condemnation, especially if one wishes to garner some understanding of Hitler as an exceptional, albeit murderous, statesman. A major challenge when discussing Hitler is when he is evaluated with a non-National Socialist perspective. In Chapter Four: The Ideal Orator, Isocrates mentions that rhetors must be judged by the values of the community in which they operate. This type of moral relativism is easier said than done. Even if one views Hitler through his own core values, or tries to compare him to another non-Nazi individual (such as Churchill), the values of that non-Nazi comparison, or the bias of any non-Nazi scholar will undoubtedly filter into their research. However, this thesis devised a method by which to evaluate Hitler, which hopefully overcame some of these ethical challenges. In Chapter Four: The Ideal Orator, Isocrates’ and Cicero’s standard of an “ideal orator” meant that Churchill and Hitler had to be evaluated against almost unattainable criteria. Instead of directly comparing Hitler to Churchill (although that did occur in Chapter Five), Chapter Four was an attempt to evaluate Hitler, as a rhetor, within the community values of Nazi Germany. While this analysis would never achieve perfect objectivity, it has, at least,

141 attempted to provide a method by which Hitler (a morally degenerate and horrible historical figure) can be appraised for his rhetorical skill.

Implications for Future Study

The interdisciplinary significance of studying the role of rhetoric in history, with specific attention to political history, leads to further avenues of inquiry. It would be fascinating and advantageous to not only study Churchill and Hitler within the Battle of Britain, but also within different contexts during the Second World War, such as during the invasion of Poland or in the last year of the war. Also, the rhetorical similarities between tyrants, such as Hitler and Stalin, could also be fruitful. It could also be constructive to rhetorical scholarship to study the medium in which rhetoric is transmitted, beyond the original speech given. For example, the role of communication technologies (such as radio, television and the internet) upon rhetorical messages and their dissemination would be rewarding to explore. Furthermore, it could be productive to rhetorically analyze modern crises that are not specifically war-related, such as economic crises or crises that affect social programs, such as health care. By suggesting that rhetorical frameworks can be established in various types of scholarship, it demonstrates that adaptability and highly applicable nature of rhetoric. Rhetoric is not merely a concept for political persuasion, but also for economic and social persuasion. If one adopts the viewpoint that rhetoric interacts with historical events and/or social change, then it is possible to study this phenomenon in any context in which changes in society have occurred. Finally, it would be beneficial to rhetorically analyze war speeches and their effects in one study. This is a possible avenue for further academic exploration. Studying the effects of such speeches in World War Two would be advantageous for historically understanding the mentality and psyche of civilians and military personnel. Even conducting similar studies in contemporary battles would be appropriate. Although a

142 soldier’s morale has been studied in various contexts (Heinecken, 2009; Massie, 2008; Steele, 2008), it has not been studied with regard to the impact of political communication. To what extent does political rhetoric affect the morale of a soldier or citizen? How can this relationship be strengthened and/or weakened? By focusing on the relationship of political rhetoric to contemporary morale of citizens and soldiers, it bridges the gap between political science studies, communications studies, rhetorical studies and military studies. And, if a comparative framework which analyses the connection between political rhetoric and morale was employed with a historical lens, then further conclusions about what has occurred and what is occurring could take place.

Practical and Contemporary Applications

Although the purpose of the thesis was limited to historical analysis, some of the findings mentioned earlier can be related to modern politicians at war. The difference between policy-making and promise-making in wartime speeches is not only evident during WWII, but also during America’s present-day war in Iraq. For example, George W. Bush’s rhetoric could be analyzed for claims of policy or claims of peace. When waging war in Iraq, was Bush committing to promises that he could not keep, or was he making vague policies that could be fulfilled? What affects did this have upon Bush’s ethos? How was he regarded by the public? This concept might be of use to contemporary rhetoricians, as the Bush Administrations’ desperate attempts to find Iraq’s “weapons of mass destruction” seemed to become a glorified mission, based upon a lack of evidence. By studying the difference between policy-making and promise-making, modern rhetoricians could assist today’s world leaders, in the Canadian and international contexts, to maintain a leader’s fully-developed ethos, rather than an ethos that is damaged by unfulfilled promises. Respect for one’s enemy, especially at war, also has contemporary significance. Sun-Tzu states in The Art of War (2003): “Humble words, coupled with increased

143 preparations, are a sign of impending attack; Strong words, coupled with an aggressive advance, are a sign of impending retreat” (as cited in Minford, 2003, p. 56). Although the belief that one should always uphold respect for one’s enemies is an ancient concept, advocated by the oldest of historical and mythical figures, it appears that name- calling is still evident within modern communication. The rhetorical effect of respect arguably originates in Aristotle’s categorization of the six main human emotions (and antecedents). If a leader appears respectful to their enemy, it not only strengthens their ethos, but also helps the pathos of the audience to feel love of their enemy and admiration of their leader. This tactic evidently worked well for Churchill. One could apply this concept to modern day nations at war, but also to national political parties (such as Canada’s Conservatives and Liberals), in an effort to reduce infighting and national division. By refraining from denigrating one’s enemy, a leader even in today’s world, will have greater respect of their own people and their ethos will be even more persuasive. Finally, a politician who can use emotional evocation when campaigning, but can “turn off” the emotional switch when at war, would be rhetorically the most effective. This would be a very interesting finding to explore in other contexts, to evaluate the most eminent modern leaders. For example, Barack Obama might fit this “mould”. When campaigning, Obama was renowned for his impassioned and emotional stance. However, Obama’s rhetoric when dealing with crises, such as the economic recession in 2009, or the Swine Flu in 2009, has been approached with a cold and almost analytical manner. Not only could this argument serve as a new approach by which to view modern leaders, but it could also inform the type of pathos, or emotional rhetoric, that is necessary to effective persuasion during modern crises.

144 Significance of this Thesis and Final Thoughts

While historians and military academics study the strategies, political policies and numerical strengths of each participant in war, they often fail to notice another perspective that rhetoricians can offer. As David Zarefsky (1998) states, “by studying historical events from a rhetorical perspective, one can see significant aspects about those events that others miss” (p. 30). When recounting the Battle of Britain from a rhetorical perspective, Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric becomes another factor which is affected and effects historical events. Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric was not necessarily a whimsical or manipulative tool for propagandistic purposes, but can be viewed as another significant contributor that political leaders require in order to fulfill political or military goals. While Churchill’s and Hitler’s rhetoric has been viewed as a contributor to the Battle of Britain, its effects (upon morale, for example) are intangible and cannot be measured quantitatively. Therefore, rhetoric cannot be assessed as the primary reason for the British victory. Rhetoric acts within a spectrum of choices, which are dependent upon the community values, norms and the context in which it operates. Rhetoric will undoubtedly always operate upon a landscape of shifting values and varied contexts. It is best to study the effects of rhetoric after the rhetorical situation has passed. By studying history from a rhetorical perspective, however advantageous as a scholarly standpoint, one must remember that rhetoric is not a predictable, measurable factor in social reality. Nevertheless, general principles of rhetoric can still limit and guide causes and effects, making it not totally random. As investigated, Churchill exhausted the rhetorical means at his disposal to infuse his audiences with hope and determination. Meanwhile, Hitler’s rhetorical appeals were not able to maintain an appropriate level of trust in his ethos, nor an appropriate emotional pathos in his audience. While Churchill’s rhetoric was on the incline, Hitler’s

145 was on the decline. If rhetoric can be viewed as having significant effects within the historical events of the Battle of Britain, rhetoric should be entertained within future academic studies as another productive avenue of inquiry into historical and modern wars and crises.

146

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