1

PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

BENIN CONFLICT INSIGHTS

AUGUST 2021

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. www.ipss-addis.org/publications CONTENTS

SITUATION ANALYSIS 2 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 3 ACTORS 5 CONFLICT DYNAMICS 8 ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT RESPONSES 10 SCENARIOS 11 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 12 CONFLICT TIMELINE 13 REFERENCES 14

CONTRIBUTORS

MOUSSA SOUMAHORO (AUTHOR) NOTHANDO MAPHALALA (EDITOR IN CHIEF) CYNTHIA HAPPI (ASSOCIATE EDITOR) TIGIST KEBEDE FEYISSA (ASSOCIATE EDITOR)

© 2021 Institute For Peace And Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All Rights Reserved. 2 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) Conflict Insights Report Catholic-25.5% followed by 5others). and religions andRoman (majorly Muslims-27.7%- 10 groups dominated by Fon-38.4% andAja-15.1%) and strong institutions over 31years. Yet, recent political of thecommunist regime by building a democratic culture and socio-economic challenges itfaced intheaftermath Bénin. communist regime known astheRepublique Populaire du coups (in1960and1972)beingunderadictatorial 15.7M SITUATION ANALYSIS Retrieved from https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ei/1981-v12-n4-ei3007/701291ar.pdf 4 3 place/Benin 2 en/countries/profiles/BEN 1 15.7 million Africa alongsidetheGulfofGuinea withapopulation of The Republic of Benin is a coastal located country in West i United Nations Programme. Development http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BEN FIGURE 1.COUNTRY PROFILEANDDEMOGRAPHICS five unconstitutional changes ofpower was marked by political instabilities havingexperienced ex-French colonies inAfrica. Its post-independence period independenceachieved in1960similarlyto most ofthe TOGO BURKINA FASO POPULATION NEIGHBOURS Cornevin, Robert, LaRépublique Cornevin, Populaire duBénin:Des OriginesDahoméennesànosjours, Paris, Éd. G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1981,585p. securityexpert withacountry onMarch 21,2021. Interview Law, R.,Ronen, D.,Adetovi, S.,McCraken, S.&Al.(2021,March 10).“The Republic of Benin.” Britanica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/ TheUnited Nations’ Programme. Development indicators. profiles-Benin. Humandevelopment (2020).Country Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/ 4 However, Beninwas ableto overcome thepolitical 1 comprised ofdiverse ethnicities (about 3 including military includingmilitary RANK: 158/189 INDEX: 0.545 61.8 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX(HDI) LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YRS) 2 The country Thecountry territory. response into may turn the country a conflict-prone impacts currently, a default of proactive and coordinated Nigeria. Ifthespillover therefrom remains withlimited Burkina Faso, Niger-in afragile three-border region- and extremism andtransnational organised crimefrom by growing securitythreats from its neighbours: violent advancements back. Inaddition,Beninis surrounded obtuse arrests, have pushed the country’s democratic muzzle political contenders through intimidation and particularlydevelopment, therulingparty’s attempt to I $3,287 UEMOA ECOWAS CONSEIL DEL’ENTENTE CEN-SAD GDP PERCAPITA RECS nodal pointoftensions inBenin. between herdsmen and farmers constitutes a structural races. party to exclude oppositionparties from decisive electoral reforms resulted inamountingtendency oftheruling their legal status. rules withinadeadline of6monthsunderthreat to lose imposed onpolitical parties to comply withthenew for thelegislative elections in2019. only two political parties-allied to President Talon ran were rejected ofInterior. by theMinistry Boni’s Forces Cowry for anEmerging Benin(FCBE) by certain majorparties suchasformer President Yayi were localised inrural zones-OuéméandNiger Valleys withdrawn by theNational Election Commission. candidates for thelegislative elections were subsequently 20 ma. Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS). Africa report n°26.Page 9. 19 18 https://issafrica.org/iss-today/benins-booming-illicit-fuel-trade-calls-for-new-responses 17 16 15 https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2021/03/benin-opposants-et-voix-critiques-en-detention-election-presidentielle/ 14 13 posants-r%C3%A9clament-un-dialogue-national/a-57182542 12 11 10 9 https://data.ipu.org/content/benin?chamber_id=13341 8 en-scene-sa-reelection/ 7 6 5 democratic culture. peaceful elections, underpinnedBenin’s 30-year President Talon’s assumption to power in 2016, following Benin’s internal socio-politicalturmoil CAUSES OFTHECONFLICT where transhumance from Niger andNigeria iswell- Code as well as edition of a new PartisanCode aswell as editionofanew Charter. 2021 (PAG in French) and revision of the National Electoral including anambitiousGovernmental Action Plan2016- and forced into exile. Kouche whowere intimidated prosecutions by judiciary in presidential polls, suchasSébastien Ajavon andKomi political contenders were prevented from participating arrest. were arrested whileAmisétou Affo Djobo exiled to escape the two oppositionleaders, who ran for the2021elections Beninese political arena. cleavages andethno-regional centred rhetoric inthe in political appointments tended to revive north-south privilege merit instead of ethno-regional equilibrium Ibid. Inter Parliamentary Union.(2021).Global data onnational parliaments-Benin. Retrieved from Le MondeAfrique. (2021,April 28).Benin: met enscène saréélection. Retrieved from https://mondafrique.com/benin-patrice-talon-met- Ibid. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Report —Benin.Gütersloh:BTI 2020Country Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. Page 3. Interview witharegional Interview security expert on March 23,2021. W., Assanvo, Dakono B., Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., &Maïga, I.(2019,December). Violent extremism, organised crimeandlocal conflicts inLiptako-Gour Zounmenou, D.(2021,April21).Ibid. Zounmenou, D.(2021,April21).Benin’s boomingillicitfueltrade calls for responses. new ISS Today. Retrieved from Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Page 6. securityexpert withacountry onMarch 21,2021. Interview Amnesty International. (2021,March 31).Bénin.Opposants et voix critiquesendétention àl’approche del’élection présidentielle. Retrieved from securityexpert withacountry onMarch 21,2021. Interview Tounkara, G.I. (2021, April13).Bénin,lesopposants réclament undialoguenational. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/fr/b%C3%A9nin-les-op Ibid. Ibid. 7 13 For instance, both theCodeandCharter Additionally, thedecisionofPresident Talon to 8 Certificates ofconformity submitted 5 He initiated a range of reforms, 12 Reckya Madougou andJoëlAïvo, 14 Moreover, persisting conflicts 15 Althoughtheseconflicts 11 Since 2017,major 9 Theirlists of 6 Yet these 10 Hence, 16 - Gourma region. criminal networks and are finallysoldintheLiptako illicit items transit viaBeninwiththesupportofBeninese buyfromthey theirNigerian counterparts. Thereafter, the motorcycles, andespeciallytramadol from Benin, which the Beninesemarket whichitcovers at 80%. including oilbunkering inNigeria andalarge demandin Benin peculiarly, often fuels violent extremism as Jihadi the citizenry. socio-economic challenges letting few opportunitiesfor faced1980s whenthecountry apolitical crisiswhichbegot parks. Theillicitfuel trade for instance, dates back to the forms ofpoaching mainly),especiallyinthePenjari andW and wildlife trafficking and other innorthernBenin(ivory motorbikes, medicinesandfabrics insouthernBenin– characterised by contraband oflicitgoods suchasfuel, landscape. Organised crimeinBeninismainly are the major Achilles’ heel of Benin’s current security countries–Niger, Nigeria and Burkina Faso in particular– and therecent spillover ofconflicts from neighbouring However, organised crimeledby loosecriminalnetworks Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region. Benin is among the most stable countries of the Economic threatsSecurity Nigeria andBurkinaFaso. infiltration of terrorist groups spilling over from Niger, conflicts whichcould, andbanditry inturn,facilitate the grown, leaving them unresolved could nurture communal traffickers in Benin. are means oftransport aswell aslucrative sources for and higherprices failed to meet local demand.Motorbikes formal sector operating withlessthan500petrol stations border closures by Nigeria showed little impact asthe illicit fueltrade by theBeninesegovernment in2018and 17 Thephenomenonisfed by several factors 20 Yet, illicit commerce in West Africa, in 19 Burkinabè traffickers also get fuel, 18 Theban of - - 3 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 4 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report between Beninandits neighbouringcountries. and smallarmscross-border lightweapons trafficking other prohibited orrestricted activities suchasgold trade were reported. septentrional part where assaults against police stations initiatives exacerbates therisks ofattacks, especially inits the country’s involvement in regional counterterrorism items itgenerates. orbenefit the money Additionally, groups intheSahelare often theend-users ofillicit 22 21 Interview witharegional Interview security expert on March 23,2021. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Page 6. 21 Thissituation prompts therevival of 22

26 benin-votes-in-presidential-election-opposition-sidelined 25 24 https://data.ipu.org/content/benin?chamber_id=13341 23 out ofthe83parliamentary seats inthe2019elections. UP itself isacoalition of80smallergroups. Itwon 47 in French) andtheRepublican Bloc(BRinFrench). The coalition. Itmainlycomprises theProgressive Union(UP The Beninesegovernment designates thecurrent ruling and oppositionpoliticalactors The Government of Benin(Gov Benin) FIGURE 2.ACTORS MAPPING ACTORS coalition. an absolute parliamentarian majorityto theruling seats whichcombination withUP’s 47seats secures The BR,second party ofthecoalition, has gathered 36 Sébastien Ajavon-3rd at the 2016 presidential elections– figures ofthecurrent Beninese political landscape, are compact entity. Hence, amongthe prominent opposition interests andgoals althoughFCBE could beseen asamore circumstantially gather to defend marginal orachieve figures rather thanstrong political parties. Smallparties WANEPandindependent securityexperts’ response to aquestionnaire shared viagoogle form onApril 2,2021. Aljazeera. asBeninvotes (2021,April11). Oppositionside-lined inpresidential election. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/11/ Ibid. Inter Parliamentary Union.(2021).Global data onnational parliaments-Benin. Retrieved from 24 Opposition in Benin is represented by political 23

Hunters defence andsecurityforces. Contrarily, itholdscollaborative relationships with following theadoption ofthebilln°2017-41 December The police andthegendarmerie were dismantled to handleinternal securityissuesfaced by thecitizenry. the police andthegendarmerie to someextent, are meant coping withvarious threats. Thesecurity forces, mainly which isincharge ofdefending thecountry’s borders, Defence forces designate the Forces (DSF) Defence andSecurity and obtuse prosecutions undertaken by President Talon. these political contenders outof2018exclusive reforms party. The government hasstrained relationships with Boni, andReckya Madougou-Leader oftheDemocrats’ Komi Kouche, former minister offinance underPresident 26 Key Forces Armées du Bénin (FAB) Informal/ Intermittent Alliance Discord/Conflict Links/Close Relationships 25

5 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 6 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report human rights among others. struggling against corruption andimpunityprotecting significant role inholdingthegovernment accountable, that 12 002CSOs were operating inBenin. mapping, of formal andinformal, led in2012-2013 revealed estimated at only 12% in 2018. particularly inrural zones where securitycoverage was a potential improvement relations, incivil-military forces, underthenameofPolice Républicaine suggests security. The subsequent creation of a paramilitary 29, 2017to allow for infulfillinginternal furtherefficiency 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 mapping/index.php 30 au%2026%20juin politique/benin-une-nouvelle-tentative-de-coup-detat-dejouee/#:~:text=Une%20nouvelle%20tentative%20de%20d%C3%A9stabilisation,du%2025%20 29 28 27 field. actors, suchasreligious leaders, occupy thepolitical wherelevel chieftaincies, nobilitiesand other non-elected Political enclaves still exist inBenin,especiallyat thelocal Local leaders in diverse sectors. federation oforganisations covering theentire territory Beninese civilsociety isadynamicandheterogenous The CivilSociety by 55% ofcitizens whorequested for assistance. rampant corruption andlowwere service alsoexpressed 2020. coups plot against President Talon’s regime were foiled in spotlight. Indeed,theBeninesegovernment saidthat two ruling party mightbringback thesecurity forces into the persistence of anti-democratic actions undertaken by the influence onthepolitical arena. However, aneventual recededthe military to thebarracks andhave limited the decay. indicates the growing risk of the Beninese civil society’s the co-option oftheirleaders by thecurrent government, anti-Yayi civil society movement-into a political party and transformation oftheCitizens’ Alternative-the most vocal parties since President Boni’s rule(2006-2016). members are increasingly beingco-opted by ruling role ofthe civil society isgradually undermined astheir representatives. deepens thedisinterest ofpopulations towards elected andlimited presencedelivery ofstate institutions. This Interview witharegional Interview security expert on March 23,2021. W., Assanvo, Dakono B., Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., &Maïga, I.(2019,December). Ibid. Page 9. TheGlobal Initiative against Organised Crime.(2019).Africa Organised CrimeIndex. Retrieved from https://ocindex.net/country/benin Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. MaisondelaSociété Civile.(2021).Les OSCauBénin :Delanécessité delacartographie fonctionnelle. Retrieved from: https://www.mdscbenin.org/ JeuneAfrique. (2020,June29).Bénin:unenouvelle tentative decoup d’État déjouée.Retrieved from: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1008281/ Ibid. Gninafon, H.(2019,May9).Les forces desécurité auBénin:L’expérience et laconfiance mitigée descitoyens. Afrobaromètre. Dépêchen°204.Page 3. Republique Populaire duBéninwas disbanded, 35 29 Thisismore critical inrural zones facing poorservice 34

36 Thus,local communities are keen to 30 Acivilsociety organisations’(CSOs) 32 Nevertheless, theoversight Nevertheless, 27 Frustrations borne out of 31 They playa They 28 33 Since The terrorist groups threatening Benin. counter suchalucrative source that potentially sustains effective reaction isneededfrom Benineseauthorities to with Jihadigroups intheLiptako-Gourma. to nurture relationships withindividualswhocollaborate socio-economic context. However, thosenetworks seem income-driven, beingfocused inahardened onsurvival the porous Benin-Nigeria border. Theiractivities are licit goods’ contraband. groups whoare involved infuel,motorbikes andother Smugglers in Beninare loosenetworks ofindividuals or Smugglers elected officialsare accepted ornot. oftrustthe level andcollaboration dependsonwhether and thegovernment can bedescribedasintermittent as leaders. At present, therelationship between local leaders on theground andallows smooth interactions withlocal local Thisfacilitates level. elected representatives’ mission government to maintain apolitical equilibrium at the on collaboration at thelocal helpstheBeninese level more effective services. Leadership coexistence based turn to local leaders (customary andreligious) whodeliver economic holdonthe area. Indeed,these poachers the current situation to strengthen their territorial and W for several years andwhohave taken advantage of Beninese poachers whohave beencirculating inParc broken ranks withtheirstates intheseareas, suchas the establishment ofconnections withgroups that have The establishment ofjihadist groups inthearea facilitates play. combination ofpolitical andcriminalinterests mightbeat of northernBenin.Theirmotivation remains unclear asa armed confrontations inseveral withthemilitary areas During the2019and2021elections engaged they in informal paramilitary groups withsophisticated weapons. associations, have organised they themselves into 2019 and2021electoral violence. Originally hunters’ The hunters armedgroups have played apivotal role in Poachers groups armed andhunters 39 37 They mainlyoperate They alongside 38 Aprompt and 41 40 sanctuaries inwoody areas ofnorthernBenin. ability to support them strategically and constitute their groups whomightseethemassuitable partners withthe are mainlytargetedand huntingreserves by terrorist also benefittheJihadiincursions, since natural parks dedicated to wildlife’s protection. to confront theBeninesearmyandparamilitary forces have organizedeven themselves into armed groups Poachers from neighbouring countries (Benin, Nigeria) of Jihadigroups, isnoticed inmanyprotected areas. said, a revival of poaching, certainly linked to the arrival Ibid. Ibid 41

40 That 7 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 8 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report President complied withthedecisions. and 2018).Both rejections were fairly accepted andthe constitutional revisions from President Talon (2017 the Parliament, inparticular, rejected attempts of their solidityfor more than three decades. Recently, Beninese democratic institutions have demonstrated CONFLICT DYNAMICS bly of the union twenty-fourth ordinary session bly oftheuniontwenty-fourth ordinary 49 48 47 46 45 44 https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2021/03/benin-les-individus-et-ong-nont-plus-acces-direct-a-la-cour-africaine/ 43 42 designation of“Talon’s affair”. President Boni. Thefact iswell-known inBeninunderthe in 2014,whenhewas accused ofcomplotting against shares at ’s portfrom whichhehadbeenevicted transparent biddingcompetitions. Herecovered market whose markets’ attributions procedures donot follow His companies are involved inseveral economic sectors between President’s Talon’s rule and his businesses. Additionally, there conflict isanevident ofinterest constitutes another obstacle to sustain apeaceful The persistence ofcriminalnetworks inBeninalso illustrates thethreat onBenin’s stability. of the2019legislative elections by oppositionactors central Benin,inApril2021,followed by anactive boycott protestors andBeninesesecurity forces insomeareas of Demonstrations aswell asviolentconfrontations between country. African CourtofJustice for humanrights violations inthe that allowed individualsandNGOsto directly seize the the ’s HumanRights andPeople Charter withdrew Beninfrom theadditionaldeclaration to and international opinions.Inaddition,Talon’s regime perception ofgrowing authoritarianism amongnational arrests around thepresidential elections, reinforce the in key institutional positions, combined with seriesof 2018, opaque nominations ofacquaintances andfriends consequence oftheadoption electoral of anew in policy of the unicoloured parliamentary elections, a direct at weakening seriouscontenders. Thecircumstances code in2018,indicate theruling party’s agenda aimed in a6-monthdeadline andtherevision oftheelectoral legal status uponincapacity to comply rules withthenew accompanied by athreat for certain parties to losetheir practices. Theadoption partisan ofanew charter developments showed aregression inBenin’s democratic TheAfrican Union. (2015).African initiative for education for peace through anddevelopment Muslim-Christian andinter-religious- dialogue.Assem Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Ibid. Page 6. witharegional Interview securityexpert onMarch 23,2021. W., Assanvo, Dakono B., Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., &Maïga, I.(2019,December). Ibid.Page 9. securityexpert withacountry onMarch 23,2021. Interview Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Page 3. Amnesty International. (2021,March 26).Bénin.Les individuset ONGsn’ont plusaccès direct àlaCourafricaine. Retrieved from Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Ibid. Page 33. 43 44

42 45 However, other

and displaced more than1,500pastoralists. five people dead, including two children of 10 years old, Benin, inJuly2018,anattack ontheFulani community left Africa-Sahel region, to recuperation by violentgroups. In pastoral communities inBenin,aselsewhere intheWest the free pastoral movement. Thismarginality exposes communities, withauthoritiesgenerally opposedto confrontation withagricultural andagropastoral marginalised which places itinapattern ofsystematic the Fulani pastoral communities are, to someextent, countries (especiallyTogo andGhana).Inthesestates, social positionoftheFulani communities inneighbouring existing communal herders-farmers conflicts, could bethe vector ofterrorist infiltration inBenin,andthat could fuel purpose critical instruments for thosegroups. Another increase armstrafficking asarmsare inthe multi- country Niger andBurkinaFaso. Suchagearing system mightalso to theLiptako Gourmathree-border region spanning Mali, be repeated by terrorist groups inBeninaswell, similarly historically usedby armedgroups intheregion. Thismight activities (contraband andwildlife trafficking) hasbeen and operations. Thestructures andnetworks ofcriminal income that would critically supporttheirsubsistence groups whocan potentially selltheitems to generate source oflogistic supply (fuelandmotorbikes) for terrorist terrorist attacks. Inaddition,thisconstitutes animportant the borders withBurkinaFaso–have recently beenunder point inBeninwhere police stations–in NorthBenin,at coastal countries, such collaborations could be their entry demonstrated by SahelianJihadigroups inWest African the Sahelwere highlighted in2019. potential (indirect) collaborations withJihadigroups in fabric, medicines,motorbikes andwildlife trafficking, to the1980s,especiallycontraband activities suchasfuel, atmosphere inBenin.Albeitthephenomenondates back clerics. information that revealed amountinginfluxofIslamic proved proactive in combating radicalisation following prevails amidethnic andreligious groups. Thegovernment Yet, radical Islamremains limited inBeninandtolerance Union (AU). religious dialogsince 2015,beingsupported by theAfrican Initiative for Peace Education andDevelopment by inter- 48 Furthermore, hashosted thecountry theAfrican 49 Ithasalsoestablished aplatform to foster 46 Regarding theinterest 47

brought to over thepubliceye thelast decade. the secularNorth-South ethno-regionalism hasbeen tensions andhandlecurrent divergences, especiallywhen are critical opportunitiesthat could helpdefusegrowing 50 https://archives.au.int/bitstream/handle/123456789/900/Assembly%20AU%2019%20%28XXIV%29%20Add%2010%20_E.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 2015,Addis Ababa,30 -31January Ethiopia. Retrieved from and consolidate national inter-religious dialog. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020Country. Ibid. Page 7. 50 These 9 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 10

Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report the Republic. settlement ofnomadicherders underthePresidency of 16, 2021,to create commission ahigh-level onthe In addition,thegovernment issued adecree onJune undertaken inareas underthreat ofJihadiinfiltration. and Imonlèdé led to thearrest ofseveral suspected terrorists) in2019 and police operations–operations Djidjoho terrorism andfinancialoffenses cases. Several military des Infractions Economiques et duTerrorisme–CRIET ) to try established aspecialcourt (known aslaCourdeRepression of theirlegal framework (thecriminalcode mainly)and counterterrorism. proceeded They withtheimprovement government recently adopted anational planfocused on to efficiently counter growing securitythreats. In fact, the The Beninesegovernment hastaken aseriesofactions The Beninesegovernment RESPONSES ASSESSMENT OFCURRENT 60 59 58 57 https://africanlii.org/article/20201209/benin-taken-task-african-court-charter-failures-%E2%80%93-not-even-constitutional-court Retrieved from 56 55 as-risks-its-hard-won-reputation/ 54 53 https://matinlibre.com/2021/02/10/operation-imonlede-a-ouesse-et-a-kalale-les-forces-armees-beninoises-renforcent-la-paix-et-la-quietude/ 52 tion-djidjoho-de-presumes-djihadistes-arretes/ 51 elections experts. bodies, civilsociety, think-tanks andindependent Pan-African Parliament, African election management team comprised of40members drawn from theAU, the announcement ofelections results. The2016observation thevoting,missions particularly observed counting and credibility of the presidential and legislative elections. The (STO) missions in Benin to monitor and report on the Commission deployed short-term election observation and judicialissues.In2016,20192021theAU In Benin,theAU’s were interventions focused onelectoral Union(AU)The African andECOWAS and terrorism persist andtend to grow inBenincurrently. criminal activities, herdsmen-farmers communal conflicts Yet, the impacts ofthegovernment are still limited as protracted conflict between herdsmen andfarmers. . that onlycovered voting stations inCotonou and Ibid. Kwarkye, S.,Abatan E.andMatongbada M.(2019,September 30).CantheAccra Initiative prevent terrorism inWest African coastal states? Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2020,March 6).Ibid. Ibid. Rickard, C.(2020,December 9).Benintaken to task by African court for charter failures –not constitutional even court escapes censure. African Lii. Ibid. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2020,March 6).ECOWAS RisksIts Hard-Won Reputation. Retrieved from https://africacenter.org/spotlight/ecow - securityexpert withacountry onMarch 23,2021. Interview Opération «Imonlèdé»ÀOuèssè et ÀKalalé:Les Forces ArméesBéninoises Renforcent LaPaix et LaQuiétude. Retrieved from DOGUE,D.,P. (2019,April24).Opération «Djidjoho»:Deprésumés djihadistes arrêtés. LaNation. Retrieved from https://lanationbenin.info/opera- 55 TheAfrican CourtonHumanandPeople’s Rights 53 52 Thedecree was meant to helpdefusethe in2020(focused onintelligence)–were 54 The2021team included16members 51 (which border operations military to sustain border security. and intelligence personnel; and conducting joint cross- information andintelligence sharing;training ofsecurity inter-state cooperation. Itleans onthree pillars including to facilitate jointcounterterrorism and interventions development. as well astherightto economic, socialandcultural of People andHumanRights (ACPHR) to information, ACHPR, this constituted a violation of the African Charter financial constraints. It isofficiallyfunded by member countries inspite of Mali andNiger joinedtheInitiative in2019. asobservers in initiating recent changes in theconstitution. acquaintances andfailing to involve more consultations court independence, thehead ofState nominating (ACHPR) underlinedtheviolation ofBenin’s constitutional been limited. is little known about the Initiative and its impact has borderlands. However, four years since its creation, there transnational organised crimealongsidememberStates’ spill over ofviolentextremism from theSahelandcounter d’Ivoire, BurkinaFaso, Ghana,Togo andBeninto prevent a Though theAccra Initiative was launchedin2017 by Côte The AccraInitiative other leaders to distort democratic norms. (APSA) principle ofsubsidiarity) opens apandora’s box for actor aspertheAfrican Peace andSecurityArchitecture from ECOWAS (whoissupposedto betheregional lead were dismantledordisregarded. have largely stood by asessential democratic principles those elections aspeaceful, noting sporadic violence, they 2016, 2019and2021.WhiletheAU andECOWAS hailed ECOWAS alsoparticipated theelections of inobserving 59 57 Ithasbeenset asaflexible framework

58 Thisinaction, especially 56 For the 60

SCENARIOS the porousness ofthe country’s borders. crime would continue to challenge Benin’s stability due to Burkina Faso andNiger aswell astransnational organised landscape. Additionally, terrorist incursions inBeninfrom and subsequentlywrinklethecountry’s socio-political In turn, frustrations would be nurtured among the citizenry laws (the constitution, the Electoral Code among others). towards political contenders, andopaque reforms ofState This would be manifested detentions in assaults, blurry bloc (coalition) would maintain tactics. theirexclusionary The status quowould besustained asthegovernmental Most likely scenario organisations. among partisans of marginalised parties and civil society result in low voter turnout in future elections or protests andtheState.the citizenry Thisdisillusionmentmay turmoil inBeninwould strain relationships between populations. Moreover, the persistence of the political incursions orattacks against securityforces andlocal to happenandwould bemerely limited to sporadic programmes inWest Africa andtheSahel,thisisunlikely countries. Regarding initiatives and counterterrorism and seize a strategic point in West African entry coastal an advantage to expand themselves the Sahel beyond Their interactions withcriminalnetworks would be Niger andBurkinaFaso), would destabilise thecountry. groups inBenin,especiallyat theborderlands (with failureAn eventual to prevent theanchorage ofterrorist Worst-case scenario initiatives, actions oroperations would alsobecritical. European Union (EU). Their support to counterterrorism as thecountry’s international partners–France andthe scenario would rely onpressure from ECOWAS, AU aswell frustrated by thecurrent rule.Therealisation ofsucha restore thestate’s legitimacy amongamajorityofBeninese effective response to violent extremism threat would of multiparty democracy inWest Africa. Inaddition,an democratic achievements andmaintain itasthevanguard thecountry’sBenin. Itwould helppreserve 30-year inclusion of opposition actors and parties would benefit A cessation ofauthoritarian methods andfurther Best-case scenario 11 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 12

Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report Initiative andECOWAS. andwithinregionallevel institutions suchastheAccra would require theState to bemore active at thenational in accordance withregional andinternational norms.This Further reinforce its national counterterrorism framework would bekey instruments to supportsuchactions. ECOWAS Protocol onDemocracy andGoodGovernance, on Democracy, Elections andGovernance aswell asthe Charter ofPeople andHumanRights, theAfrican Charter and actors to defusethecurrent tensions. TheAfrican addition, dialog should be fostered among political parties starting pointto foster anational socio-political dialog.In Inclusive frameworks ofdialogset by CSOs would bea to cope withthecurrent political tensions inthecountry. Rely onexisting internal conflict management mechanisms To theGovernment of Benin STRATEGIC OPTIONS Good Governance amongothers). Governance andtheECOWAS Protocol onDemocracy and Rights, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and regional (TheAfrican levels Charter ofPeople andHuman and political instruments adopted at thecontinental and African Court in light of relevant governance, democracy protocol allowing individualsandNGOsto directly seize the Charter ofPeople andHumanRights’ complementary securing thereturn ofBeninassignatory to theAfrican Be proactive inpreventing political tensions inBeninand To theAU andECOWAS military operationsmilitary to sustain border security. personnel; andconducting frequent jointcross-border intelligence sharing; training ofsecurityandintelligence Strengthen theiractions interms ofinformation and ground. public comprehension of their actions and impacts on the Communicate ontheessence of theinstitution to allow a countries To theAccraInitiative member Benin. issue mightbethehotbed ofinsurrections innorthern and seriously, andresolve itwithouttaking sidesasthis Consider theissueofherders-farmers conflicts impartially contagion inWest African coastal countries. or technical supportthat would helpprevent jihadi extremism andorganised crime.Thiswould befinancial Support Beninintheirefforts in countering violent 2021 -President Talon won unicolour presidential pollsafter oppositionfigures. side-lining asked theirsupporters to protest by boycotting thepolls. The country’s mainoppositionparties were effectively barred from fielding candidates by eligibilityrulesand tough new were given thechoice to select their 83 members ofparliament from two parties both alliedto President Patrice Talon. 2019 -ThepeopleofBeninvoted for parliament anew butwithoutasingleoppositioncandidate to choosefrom. Voters 13 inGhanalast week inajointanti-terror andsecurityoperation inBurkinaFaso, Ghana,BeninandTogo. 2018 -TheBurkinaFaso announced military that 52individualswere arrested inBurkinaFaso, 42inBenin,95Togo and Patrice Talon amidgrowing unease withhisgovernment’s economic reforms. 2017 - Over a thousand people took to the streets of Benin’s economic capital of Cotonou to protest against President against businessmanPatrice Talon (24.8%)inasecond round ofpresidential elections. leaving 33candidates to viefor power inthesmallWest African country. PMLionelZinsou(28.4%)willface arun-off 2016 -Beninheldanelection to chooseasuccessor to President ThomasBoniYayi whoisstepping down after two terms, ’s President Teodoro ObiangNguemaat theAU summitmeeting intheEthiopian capital. 2012 -BeninPresident ThomasBoniYayi was elected theAfrican UnionChairman,taking over theone-year post from thousands ofeligiblevoters leftoff voter rolls. Pres. Boni Yayisoughta2nd term against 13 candidates. 2011 -Beninopenedpollsfor atwice-delayed presidential election after alast-minute scramble to register hundreds of more than$130 million.Thesystem was controversially endorsed by President Boni. were jailedfor mountingfraudulent system based onPonzi’s scheme.At least 130 000Benineselost atotal amountof 2010 -InBeninInvestment Consultancy andComputering (ICC) Services was forcibly closed.Amajorityofits employees 2009 -Beninannounced discovery ofoiloffshore at theNigeria-Benin border. 2006 -Political newcomer Yayi won therun-off Boni,runningasanindependent, vote inpresidential elections. 2004 -Benin,Nigeria agreed to redraw theirmutualborder. 1996 -Mathieu Kerekou won presidential elections. dissidents. reform andmulti-candidate presidential elections was reached following discussionsbetween President Kerekou and 1989 -Anti-government strikes anddemonstrations took place, continuing until1990.Agreement onconstitutional 1975 -Renomination whichbecame ofDahomey thePeople’s Republic ofBenin. 1972 -Mathieu Kerekou (Major)seized power after amilitary coup. He remained inpower untilbeing voted outin1991. whofailedDahomey) to respond to thetheneconomic Republic crisistheDahomey (currently Benin)was facing. 1963 -Coupd’état staged by Christophe Sogloto prevent acivilwar. Heoverthrew HubertMaga (first President of 1960 -Independence from France (currently andadmissionofDahomey Benin)to theUnited Nations. 1960-2021 CONFLICT TIMELINE 13 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report 14

Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report https://issafrica.org/iss-today/benins-booming-illicit-fuel-trade-calls-for-new-responses Zounmenou, D.(2021,April21).Benin’s boomingillicitfueltrade calls for responses. new ISS Today. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BEN The United Nations’ Programme. Development indicators. profiles-Benin. Humandevelopment (2020).Country Retrieved from The Global Initiative against Organised Crime.(2019).Africa Organised CrimeIndex. Retrieved from https://ocindex.net/country/benin Rickard, C.(2020,December 9).Benintaken to task by African court for charter failures –not constitutional even court escapes censure. Maison delaSociété Civile.(2021).Les OSCauBénin:Delanécessité delacartographie fonctionnelle. Retrieved from https://www. https://mondafrique.com/benin-patrice-talon-met-en-scene-sa-reelection/ Le MondeAfrique. (2021,April28).Benin:Patrice Talon met enscène saréélection. Retrieved from Law, R.,Ronen, D.,Adetovi, S.,McCraken, S.&Al.(2021,March 10).“TheRepublic ofBenin.” Britanica. Retrieved from https://www. Kwarkye, S.,Abatan E.andMatongbada M.(2019,September 30).CantheAccra Initiative prevent terrorism inWest African coastal states? Inter Parliamentary Union.(2021).Global data onnational parliaments-Benin. Retrieved from https://data.ipu.org/content/ https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2021/03/benin-opposants-et-voix-critiques-en-detention-election-presidentielle/ Gninafon, H.(2019,May9).Les forces desécurité auBénin:L’expérience et laconfiance mitigée descitoyens. Afrobaromètre. Dépêche Robert, LaRépubliqueCornevin, Populaire duBénin:DesOriginesDahoméennesànosjours, Paris, Éd. G.P. Maisonneuve et Larose, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Report —Benin.Gütersloh:BTI 2020Country Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020. W.,Assanvo, Dakono B.,Théroux-Bénoni, L-A., &Maïga, I.(2019,December). Violentextremism, organised crimeandlocal conflicts in https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2021/03/benin-opposants-et-voix-critiques-en-detention-election-presidentielle/ Amnesty International. (2021,March 31).Bénin.Opposants et voix critiquesendétention àl’approche del’élection présidentielle. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2020, March 6). ECOWAS Risks Its Hard-Won Reputation. Retrieved from https://africacenter.org/ REFERENCES not-even-constitutional-court African Lii.Retrieved from https://africanlii.org/article/20201209/benin-taken-task-african-court-charter-failures-%E2%80%93- mdscbenin.org/mapping/index.php britannica.com/place/Benin benin?chamber_id=13341 n°204. 1981, 585p. Retrieved from https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ei/1981-v12-n4-ei3007/701291ar.pdf Liptako-Gourma. Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS). Africa report n°26. Retrieved from spotlight/ecowas-risks-its-hard-won-reputation/ as thoseundergoing negative developments. actors. Thereports willcover African countries showing positive signsaswell countries aswell ascritical appraisals by various ofinterventions African and critical analyses ofthestate ofpeace andsecurityindifferent African tanks andresearch institutes. TheResearch Unitat IPSS provides brief benefit from anumberofanalytical andperiodicreports generated by think warning reporting systems, makingwithintheseinstitutions policy also Although key continental andregional institutions have theirown early Reports Security and Peace 15 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) BENIN Conflict Insights Report