Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 15

2.2 Thematic Essays Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions Ian Johnstone

he term ‘political mission’ is not well-specified, T as the introduction to this volume makes clear. The UN’s budgetary category for special political missions covers operations that go beyond the purely ‘political’ (such as sanctions committees); many UN entities that perform political functions do not carry the label (peacekeeping operations for example); and many entities deployed by other international organizations fit the description (like Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe field operations). While exercises in definition can be a distraction, greater conceptual clarity on what political missions do is a necessary first UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon consulting with the then Assistant-Secretary- step in thinking about how to make them more effective. General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios, 21 April 2008. This Review covers field missions that engage in good offices, mediation, facilitation, political monitoring The essay is in two parts. The first considers and oversight (see sections 3 and 4 of this volume). They mandates, broken down by (i) scope and points operate at different points in the conflict cycle, from on the conflict cycle; and (ii) source of authority. prevention to peace-building. And they function at For each category, I address a number of concep- various geographic levels, from the most local to the tual issues, dilemmas and challenges. In the second sub-regional. The more than forty missions that meet part, I set out a number of guiding principles for the criteria are one of a menu of crisis response/conflict political missions. This emerging doctrine is drawn resolution options available to the UN and other from the cases as well as academic and official organizations. While they perform a range of functions, literature on mediation, peacekeeping and peace- ‘political process management’1 is at their core. This building. They are presented as a first attempt to essay elaborates on what that means by examining codify lessons learned in order to help guide the mandates and by identifying guiding principles that formulation of mandates and operational strategies are emerging from accumulated experience. in the future. 16 | Thematic Essays

Mandates its Special Political Missions as a cost effective alternative to peacekeeping operations or other Scope large field presences.4 The European Union Special Representatives tend to complement not subsume The range of mandates and functions of special the work of larger operations in places like Bosnia, political missions defies easy categorization. The Kosovo and Moldova. And OSCE missions coor- table in this chapter shows their scope. These mis- dinate with other OSCE institutions like the Office sions operate at the regional, bilateral, state and of the High Commissioner for National Minorities, sub-state levels and they intervene at every point but are seen as quite distinct. in the conflict cycle: prevention, on-going conflict, Thus the first definitional step is to conceive of peace implementation and post-conflict. Many political missions as field operations whose operate at more than one geographic level and per- principal mandate is ‘political’ in the narrow sense of good sist through the conflict cycle. Functions range from offices, mediation, facilitation and political over- monitoring (early warning of incipient conflict) sight, even if they also perform a range of other to mediation (negotiation of ceasefires and peace functions that contribute to a broader peace pro- agreements) to the far end of peacebuilding (capac- cess. This excludes peacekeeping operations with ity building for economic reconstruction). Self-evi- a substantial military and police presence, human dently, “politics” is at the heart of political missions, rights offices and monitoring missions, security sec- but that raises as many questions as it answers: tor reform missions, electoral observation missions • What distinguishes political missions from and UN Country Teams. other international organization field presences Three conceptual issues emerge from that serve a political purpose? accumulated experience of political missions • Is the political mandate restricted to what is so-conceived. First, must the political mandate be explicitly authorized, or are certain functions explicit, or can ‘good offices’ be implied? The term inherent? good offices is a loose one in UN usage. Originally • Are these missions most effective when politi- applied to the role of the Secretary-General, it con- cal process management is their sole function, notes everything the UN can do of a diplomatic or do multiple mandates provide leverage they nature to help prevent, manage or resolve conflicts. would not otherwise have? It encompasses fact-finding and investigation; The answer to these and other questions is the informal contacts and consultations with parties starting point for developing a ‘doctrine’ – a frame- to a dispute; rapid diplomatic action to prevent a work of guiding principles – for political missions. minor conflict from escalating; public statements All peace processes are driven by an over-arching designed to express international concern or to political imperative: to establish sustainable peace, coax the parties into dialogue; as well as formal defined not as the removal of all conflicts froma mediation and conciliation. Most political missions society, but when “the natural conflicts of any soci- have an explicit mandate to engage in this type of ety” can be resolved without violence.2 This has activity: the Assistance Mission implications for all dimensions of a peace process: in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations security, governance, rule of law, economic recon- Political Office in (UNPOS), the United struction and social well-being.3 In that sense, every Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Mid- peace operation is a ‘political mission.’ Peacekeep- dle East Peace Process and the Organization for ing and peacebuilding are political instruments, Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mis- as are the various ways in which governments are sion in Moldova, for example. The United Nations monitored and supported in their security, gover- Integrated Office in Burundi’s (BINUB) mandate nance, human rights and socio-economic activities. now includes a “robust political role”5 and while the Yet the term ‘political missions’ is not co-terminous United Nations Peace-building Office in the Cen- with those other instruments, let alone a catch-all tral African Republic’s (BONUCA) good offices to describe every entity in an international organi- were used more in the lead-up to the political dia- zation that serves a political function. Indeed, the logue, the subsequent United Nations Integrated UN Department of Political Affairs has described Peace-building Office in the Central African Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 17

Republic (BINUCA) still has the responsibility to while striving to ensure they do not work at cross- engage with all parties to sustain commitment to purposes. A multitude of UN planning and the peace process on the basis of consensus. On the framework documents stress the importance of other hand, the United Nations Mission in Nepal coordination and the role of a Special Represen- (UNMIN), the United Nations Regional Office tative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in this in Central Asia (UNRCCA), the Aceh Monitor- regard.9 When a political representative of the SG ing Mission (AMM), and the OSCE mission in is on the ground, it must be assumed that the pur- Albania do not have mandates to promote political suit of political goals (as opposed to development dialogue. Does that mean they are prohibited from or humanitarian goals, for example) has primacy. exercising good offices? Political and other goals can be but are not always The good offices authority of the UN Secretary- mutually reinforcing. Hence the importance of General (SG) is not explicitly set out in the UN coordination led by the political mission. Many UN Charter; rather it emerged from an expansive read- Special Political Missions are tasked with coordi- ing of Article 99, which allows the SG to bring to nating the work of all UN actors in the theatre (See the attention of the UN Security Council any matter Table). The EU Special Representative in Kosovo that may threaten international peace and security. promotes “overall coordination” of EU presences In 1946, Trygvie Lie dispatched an inquiry mission there, including the European Commission liai- with the tacit approval of the Council and since then son office and the EULEX rule of law mission. it has been understood that the SG must be able to Many OSCE missions coordinate with other undertake fact-finding on his own initiative in order OSCE institutions like the High Commissioner to fulfil his Article 99 functions.6 Dag Hammarsk- for National Minorities, and the Office of Demo- jold took matters a step further when he engaged in cratic Institutions and Human Rights, although the personal diplomacy to secure the release of an Amer- organization is careful to guard the independence ican aircrew imprisoned in Beijing in 1955 and went of these offices.10 Even for those where the mandate on to develop the good offices function. is not explicit, a strong argument can be made that Based on that logic – and the related ‘implied coordination is an implied function. UNMIN for powers’ doctrine7 – the Secretary-General’s special example was not established as an integrated mis- representatives (and those of other organizations sion but adopted an integrated approach, working with political mandates, like the EU, OSCE, AU closely with the OHCHR and Resident Coordi- and ECOWAS) ought also to have the inherent nator in particular but also UNICEF, UNDP and authority to engage in good offices. Thus despite the office of the SRSG for Children and Armed the conscious decision not to give UNMIN a ‘polit- Conflict. An overarching task of all EU Special ical’ mandate, it is hardly conceivable that it could Representatives is to “promote EU policies and perform its monitoring and assistance tasks without interests in troubled regions and countries,” which engaging in good offices, especially as the political requires a close working relationship with other EU process became disconnected from that mandate.8 actors.11 Thus the EUSR in Moldova works closely Similarly, the OSCE mission in Albania has a with EUBAM. mandate to promote democracy, the rule of law and Second, where a mission is on the conflict cycle human rights by providing expertise and assistance. has a major impact on the sort of political function Surely that implies using good offices when these it can/does play. Mediation of a peace agreement promotional activities meet resistance. is the ‘highest’ political function, but the United Another implied power, at least for UN missions, Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle may be coordination. It is widely understood that a East Peace Process (UNSCO) – one of the few spe- successful intervention requires a shared strategic cial political missions with an explicit mandate to vision on the part of those intervening. Sometimes do so – is unable to play much of a role given the this is formalized as an integrated strategy or even fraught politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the structural integration when all the actors from many other powerful actors involved. Below that one organization are combined in one operation. level, political functions range from rapid reaction In other cases, the approach is loose coordina- to prevent local crises from escalating; negotiating tion, respecting the autonomy of each organization humanitarian access, family visits and exchanges of 18 | Thematic Essays

Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions

Peace Prevention Ongoing Conflict Implementation Peacebuilding

Regional 1. Support capacity 1. Negotiate peace 1. Fact finding: 1. Governance/electoral building/sustainable agreements/ • Special Envoy to the assistance: development: ceasefires: Great Lakes Region • UNOWA • UNRCCA • Special Envoy to LRA 2. Support in 2. Assist in protection Affected Areas 2. Tackle organized implementing of a population: • Special Envoy to Great crime: agreements/int’l • UNSCO Lakes Region • UNOWA rulings: • UNSCO 3. Support capacity • UNRCCA • UNSCO building/sustainable 2. Support peacekeeping: 3. Provide regional early 3. Support development: • UNOWA warning: implementation of • UNOWA • UNSCO (media 3. Coordinate regional/ boundary agreements/ • UNSCO monitoring) country efforts, border management: 4. Coordination of either international or • UNOWA 4. Coordinate regional/ humanitarian bilateral: country efforts, 4. Reintegration assistance/donor aid: • Special Envoy to LRA either international or programs for former • UNSCO Affected Areas bilateral: militia/monitor arms 5. Coordinate regional/ • UNOWA 4. Develop relations with and armed personnel: country efforts, either regional organizations: • UNOWA 5. Develop relations with international • UN Special Envoy to regional organizations: 5. Monitor/Assist or bilateral: LRA Affected Areas • UNOWA demobilization/ • UNRCCA • UNSCO 5. More general withdrawal/weapons • UNSCO mediation: storage etc: 6. Monitor/Promote 6. Monitor/Promote • Special Envoy to LRA • UNOWA human rights and human rights and Affected Areas minority rights: minority rights: • UNOWA • Special Envoy to LRA Affected Areas 7. Facilitate dialogue/ more general 7. Monitor internal/ mediation: regional political and • UNSCO security developments: • UNRCCA • Special Envoy to LRA (water agreements) Affected Areas 8. Support Peacebuilding Commission/ peacebuilding efforts: • Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region

Bilateral 1. Negotiate peace 1. Support in 1. Assist in protection agreements/ implementing of a population; ceasefires; coordinate agreements/int’l support capacity regional/country rulings; support building/sustainable efforts, either implementation of development: international or boundary agreement/ • CNMC bilateral; develop border management; relations with regional monitor specific organizations; more terms of peace general mediation: agreements; monitor/ • CNMC assist demobilization/ withdrawal/weapons storage etc: • CNMC

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Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions (Continued)

Peace Prevention Ongoing Conflict Implementation Peacebuilding

State 1. Governance/electoral 1. Negotiate peace 1. Support in 1. Governance/electoral assistance: agreements/ implementing assistance: • UNAMI ceasefires: agreements/int’l • BONUCA • UNIPSIL • SG Good Offices in rulings: • BINUCA Cyprus • BINUCA • UNAMI 2. Tackle organized • UNAMI • UNMIN crime: 2. More general • UNIOGBIS • UNSCOL • UNIPSIL mediation: • UNPOS • BINUB • SG Good Offices in 3. Support country • UNAMA • UNAMA Cyprus relations with • UNSCOL • UNAMI 2. Support capacity regional neighbors/ • UNIPSIL 2. Support building/sustainable international • UNPOS implementation of development: community: • UNSCOL boundary agreements/ • UNAMI • UNAMI border management: • UNAMA 3. Support peacekeeping: 4. Monitor/Promote • UNAMI • UNIOGBIS • UNPOS human rights and • UNSCOL • UNAMA 3. Support security minority rights: 3. Reintegration sector reform: • UNAMI 4. Coordinate regional/ programs for former • UNIOGBIS • UNSCOL country efforts, militia/monitor arms • UNPOS • UNAMA either international or and armed personnel: • BINUB • UNIPSIL bilateral: • UNAMI • UNPOS 4. Support legislative/ 5. Monitor internal/ • BINUCA • BINUB judicial reform and regional political and • UNAMA • UNAMA strengthening of rule security developments: • BINUB of law: • UNIPSIL 5. Support country 4. Monitor specific terms • BINUCA • UNSCOL relations with of peace agreements: • UNIOGBIS • UNAMA regional neighbors/ • BINUCA • UNAMI international 6. Support legislative/ • UNMIN • UNAMA community: judicial reform and • UNIOGBIS • UNPOS 5. Support national implementation of rule • UNAMA 5. Monitor/Assist dialogue and of law: demobilization/ reconciliation efforts: • UNIPSIL 6. Develop relations with withdrawal/ weapons • UNAMI • UNSCOL regional organizations: storage etc: • UNIOGBIS • UNIOGBIS 7. Coordinate regional/ • BINUCA • UNAMA • UNPOS country efforts, • BINUB 6. Coordination of either international or • UNMIN humanitarian bilateral: assistance/donor aid: • UNSCOL • UNAMI • UNAMA • UNIOGBIS 7. Assist authorities in investigation (i.e. collect evidence etc)/monitor court proceedings: • UNIIIC 8. Assist in the return of refugees: • UNAMI • UNAMA • BINUB

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Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions (Continued)

Peace Prevention Ongoing Conflict Implementation Peacebuilding

State 9. Support country (Continued) relations with regional neighbors/ international community: • UNIOGBIS 10. Monitor/Promote human rights and minority rights: • BINUCA • UNMIN • BINUB • UNIOGBIS • UNAMA 11. Monitor internal/ regional political and security developments: • UNPOS • BINUB • BINUCA • UNIOGBIS 12. Monitor/Train police: • BINUCA 13. Support implementation of constitutional provisions: • UNAMI • UNIPSIL 14. Support Peacebuilding Commission/ peacebuilding efforts: • UNIPSIL • UNMIN • UNIOGBIS • UNSCOL • BINUB • BINUCA

Sub-State 1. Governance/electoral 1. Support 1. Assist in protection of assistance: implementation of a population: • UNSCO (Palestinian internal boundary • UNAMI electoral assistance) agreements • UNMIN • UNAMI Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 21

prisoners; facilitating reconstruction assistance; and regional confidence-building. One of UNAMA’s most significant recent political accomplishments has been to position itself as the principal interlocu- tor between the Afghan government and external actors, facilitating a more unified political voice among the latter. Where a mission is on the conflict cycle also has an impact on strategy. Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed highlight the inverse relationship between the longevity of a peace process and the room for it to play an effective political role.12 This Waezi UN Photo/Fardin has been described as an ‘obsolescing bargain’: the UN SRSG Kai Eide visits Bamyan Province, Afghanistan, 24 July 2009. moment outside actors have maximum leverage is immediately after the agreement is signed, when may find it difficult to deliver tough political the local authorities are most dependent on the messages or to be trusted as an honest broker by international community to help implement a peace opposition groups. This issue arose in BINUB, agreement.13 As the peace process progresses and where extensive peacebuilding tasks (Burundi was a government rebuilds its legitimacy and capacity, one of the first ‘clients’ of the Peacebuilding Com- the need for external assistance and susceptibility mission) may have distracted from its core political to outside pressure – even in the form of mediation function. UNPOS, by way of contrast, has strug- – diminishes. At that point, discreet efforts that do gled with coordination in part because the former not threaten a government’s authority are likely to political head of the mission (the SRSG) wanted be more effective than public diplomacy, though to go beyond an ‘integrated approach’ to structural mediators must take care to preserve the political integration, with directive authority over the UN space they have.14 Thus BONUCA began by play- Country Team – a proposal resisted by humanitar- ing a prominent role in fostering political dialogue, ian actors in particular. The UN Security Council whereas BINUCA is now working more discreetly and SG’s policy committee endorsed the former to keep all parties (government, political opposition approach, but the SRSG continued to push for and civil society) committed to the peace process. the latter. Multiple mandates can also lead to a The OSCE presence in Croatia went from a broad lack of coherence and even confusion as is the case mandate to promote reconciliation, the rule of law for UNOWA, which has little sense of priorities and human rights in the aftermath of the Balkan beyond the effective good offices role it is playing. wars, to a more limited role of monitoring the A related point is the problem of inflated progress of cases before the International Criminal expectations. Some missions suffer from a limited Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. mandate but big problems to address (UNMIN and Third, giving primacy to politics can be difficult UNAMA), others from an expansive mandate with when a mission is carrying out multiple functions. limited resources (UNAMI, UNOWA, UNIOG- On the one hand, situating a political mission BIS). Benchmarking is one way of addressing within a peace-building office can provide leverage this problem, as way of generating agreement on that a small political presence alone would not have. priorities and measuring progress towards their On the other hand, political and development man- achievement. Is benchmarking of political missions dates do not mix easily as the former requires some possible? Progress towards political goals is hard to distance from the government whereas the latter measure and almost impossible to reduce to time- requires proximity. How does one balance local lines. Nevertheless, properly devised benchmarks, ownership and “support to government” with the based on the mandate and prepared in consultation impartiality and independence required to perform with national actors, can help to manage expecta- an effective political role? A mission leader that is tions of what the mission can and cannot achieve working with the government on peacebuilding either on its own or in collaboration with partners. 22 | Thematic Essays

Source of Authority EU Special Representatives The political missions covered in this review are all mandated by or carry the institutional imprimatur The role of the EU’s Special Representatives of an international organization. That distinguishes (EUSRs) was a source of controversy in 2010. The them from the multitude of bilateral and non- eleven EUSRs had all been appointed before the governmental missions that engage in political EU’s Lisbon Treaty came into force, providing the action. Most of the UN missions are authorized by basis for a new European External Action Service (EEAS). One feature of the EEAS is the creation of the Security Council (SC) or the General Assembly, new EU Delegations – de facto embassies – build- although a few are the initiative of the Secretary- ing on the European Commission’s pre-existing General, established through an exchange of letters network of delegations. Some European officials with the SC. The OSCE Permanent Council has questioned the need to maintain EUSRs in light of established missions, or renewed missions estab- this new system. lished by predecessor organs like the Committee However, other officials argued that many of the of Senior Officials (Moldova). European Special EUSRs had political skills and contacts that could Representatives support the work of and report to not easily be replicated by the heads of EU Del- the High Representative of the Union for Foreign egations. The role of EUSRs appeared particularly important in places – like Kosovo and Bosnia-Her- Affairs and Security Policy. They are appointed by zegovina – where the EU has an operational police the European Council on the recommendation of or military presence. In July 2010, it was agreed the High Representative. Some are double-hatted, to end the mandates of four EUSRs (in the Former for example the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, the (BiH), who is also the High Representative for Middle East and the South Caucasus) as of Febru- ary 2011. There were ongoing questions over the BiH under the Paris/Dayton agreements, and the status of the EUSR in Kosovo for political reasons EUSR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace- involving its claim to independence. donia, who also heads the European Commission delegation there.15 The OAS Mission to Support This debate was largely driven by organizational concerns – although it was complicated by the Peace Process in Colombia was established by differences between EU member states over the Permanent Council, a plenary body that reports which EUSRs should remain in place. It also to the OAS General Assembly. The African Union points to questions common to other organiza- (AU) has a mission in Kenya established by the tions responsible for envoys and political mis- Peace and Security Council. sions: should these entities be treated as distinct from ‘normal’ diplomatic or development struc- It is generally assumed that multilateral tures, or should they be integrated into a single mandates lend legitimacy to a mission. For the standardized system? UN, this stems from its universal membership, the impartiality of the mandating body and the perceived independence of the Secretary-General Proximity may not be good thing if a regional orga- and his representatives. The legitimacy of regional nization is dominated by a hegemon with a stake in organizations turns on their proximity to a conflict, the outcome of a conflict. Many of the EU’s mis- the assumption being that those who are closer to sions are ‘out of area,’ implying that the values of a problem are better-placed to get involved. It also the organization are being exported and may be turns on the values embodied in their constitu- resisted by key stakeholders, such as the EUSR ent instruments. Thus most OSCE missions are in Afghanistan. mandated to carry out their specific functions “in Multilateral mandates may also enhance the conformity with OSCE principles, standards and effectiveness of a mission. Association with an commitments.”16 In promoting EU policies and international organization can provide leverage interests, EUSRs are meant to “play an active role that might not otherwise exist. Consider high level in efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the rule mediation. The Humanitarian Dialogue Center has of law.”17 However, these assumptions should not produced a guide that lists three types of mediation be taken at face value. Not all parties to a conflict in armed conflict: facilitation, problem-solving and view the UN Security Council as an ‘impartial’ body power or “manipulative” mediation.18 On a spec- or the Secretary-General as entirely independent. trum from least to most interventionist, the first Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 23

is essentially an enabling role whereas the last uses There is a caveat, however. Hammarskjold’s political authority and military or economic power negotiation of the release of the American aircrew in to pressure the parties towards an agreement. Special China gave birth to the so-called ‘Peking formula’: political missions, by definition, do not have mili- in order to be effective the SG must sometimes tary resources at their disposal although some are distance himself from political bodies.19 Secretary- deployed alongside military forces. The EU mission General operated on the same basis in Kosovo, for example, benefits from NATO’s mil- when he went to Iraq in 1998 to negotiate a memo- itary presence. UNAMA is co-deployed with ISAF, randum of understanding for the return of weapon which creates both opportunities for and obstacles inspectors. While he had the blessing of the Secu- to political action. The United Nations Special rity Council, he deliberately avoided getting explicit Coordinator in Lebanon (UNSCOL) benefits from terms of reference, not wanting to appear a mere the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s “letter carrier” (a fate that befell Perez de Cuellar in (UNIFIL) high profile, based on a clear division 1990).20 The calculus may be different for enduring of labor between the two missions. BONUCA/ missions as opposed to one-off diplomatic efforts, BINUCA, on the other hand, has not really ben- but it does suggest that political micro-management efitted from the presence of the better resourced by the authorizing body can be detrimental. This is MINURCAT in part because the leadership of the especially true when micro-management is subject two missions do not coordinate well. to sharp differences among powerful states in the The authority that comes with UN Security organization or, conversely, is seen as the hand of Council backing is the principal source of leverage a single powerful state with a national interest in a for UN missions. How much leverage this provides particular outcome. depends on the unity and the attentiveness of the Council. This has been a source of contention in respect of missions established by an exchange of Guiding principles for political letters between the SG and the Security Council, missions like UNRCCA. The five countries in the region wanted a political facilitator, but the wider UN While developing doctrine for political missions at membership was not enthusiastic about a center this stage would be premature, it is not too soon to for preventive diplomacy. Ultimately established begin codifying best practices. The principles below through an exchange of letters with the SG, some are a first attempt, motivated by the sense that there SC members see it as essentially an SG initiative, is enough accumulated wisdom and experience to contributing to a disconnect between the Coun- identify some basic lessons to help guide the forma- cil and the center. Other missions established in tion of mandates and operational strategies. As with the same way — UNOWA, UNSCOL and the peacekeeping,21 peacebuilding22 and mediation23 CNMC — do not suffer from that problem. The principles — and military doctrine for that matter — influence of EUSRs depends in part on the extent these are rules of thumb, to be applied flexibly and to which the EU is unified behind their man- tailored to context. date (consider Kosovo, where different attitudes towards Kosovo’s declaration of independence has created divisions within the EU). OSCE offices 1) Implied Mandates are often in a delicate position based on diver- Mandates given by intergovernmental bodies tend gences between Russia and the West, for example to set out the core tasks of a political mission in in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regardless of for- broad terms, leaving considerable discretion in how mal authority, the central point is that political to fulfill those tasks. At least some functions should missions have little more than diplomatic and per- be seen as implied, that is “conferred upon [the mis- suasive power to rely on and so the extent to which sion] by necessary implication as being essential to they can point to the strong backing of an inter- the performance of its duties.” 24 A political mission national organization (and the diplomatic power could not succeed in any of its enumerated tasks that resides there) the more influential they are unless it is understood to have at least the following likely to be. powers, regardless of whether expressly conferred 24 | Thematic Essays

in the mandate: good offices, coordination and parties, other influential domestic actors and the engagement with key stakeholders. The manner population at large. Individual ‘spoilers’ can be in which those implied powers are exercised must sidelined, entire constituencies cannot.28 Effective be context specific, but they can serve as a valuable political process management also requires ongoing check against efforts to deprive a mission of politi- engagement with key regional players and inter- cal space. national actors – both those who can play a con- structive role and those likely to be disruptive. How inclusive the process is will depend on the stage of a 2) The Instrumentalization of Politics conflict cycle: it may be necessary to start with those The good offices and mediation role of a political who hold power and expand as calm is restored and mission is the means to multiple ends – the achieve- the institutions of government are being built. ment of sustainable peace in the long run, but also the many dimensions of that peace, from security sector reform and transitional justice to economic 5) Integrity, if not Integration reconstruction. This instrumentalization of politics The first dictionary definition of integrity is turns on its head the adage that humanitarian and adherence to a set of values; a second definition is development functions should not be instrumental- the state of being complete or undivided.29 Politi- ized for political purposes. In fact, these other func- cal missions must demonstrate both. They should tions often cannot be achieved without a political seek to uphold the norms of the organization and mission to create the necessary conditions. That international law, for example by sitting down with requires proactive leadership and attentiveness to alleged human rights abusers when necessary but political relations at every level: with and between not endorsing amnesty deals for the most egre- the parties to a conflict, important domestic gious crimes. Integrity in its second sense implies constituencies, other countries with a stake and an integrated approach. Multiple mediators should external actors on the ground. not be played off each other; political, development and human rights actors should work in harmony. In some circumstances, this may require structural 3) Impartiality in the Best Interests of the Process integration, but ‘form should follow function.’ What A political mission cannot be seen as serving the matters is unity of purpose and a shared strategy; agenda of any party to a conflict, outside actor, or the best institutional arrangements for carrying out special interest. As with peacekeeping, impartiality that strategy will vary. does not mean neutrality in the sense of passivity or equal treatment of all parties in the face of abuses. It should be understood as impartiality in the “best Conclusion interests of the process”25 and in accordance with fundamental international norms. The principle The purpose for setting out these five principles relates to one of the prerequisites for successful here – implied mandates, instrumentalized politics, mediation: trust. Only by gaining trust as an impar- impartiality, inclusiveness and integrity – is not to tial intervenor can a political mission function as an suggest a template for political missions but to deepen honest broker among all parties and deliver tough understanding of what they do and how well they do messages when necessary.26 it. The deployment of political missions, before, after or instead of heavy peacekeeping is a growing field of practice. Like peacekeeping, the techniques have 4) Inclusive Political Process been improvised and lessons learned through trial An effective political process requires inclusive and error. Either through a rational application of engagement with all stakeholders: national and those lessons or the inertial force of precedent, prac- international. The starting point is the identifica- tices – both good and bad – have been carried over tion of capable and legitimate partners within the from mission to mission. Codifying best practices in host government.27 Because it may take time for the a set of guiding principles helps to design mandates host government to acquire legitimacy, a political that build on the successes and to develop strategies mission must also typically engage with opposition that avoid the mistakes. Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 25

notes

1 This term is borrowed from Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation,” in Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 10. The authors used it to describe the political functions of the head of a peacekeeping mission. 2 United Nations, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc., S/2001/394, (New York: United Nations, 2001), 2. 3 These sectors have been described as the “end-states” of a peace process. United States Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 14. 4 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Annual Appeal 2010, 5. 5 Security Council resolution 1902 (2009). Prior to then, the political mandate of BINUB was circumscribed by the government’s reluctance to accept proactive external involvement in governance matters. 6 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1998), 175-76. 7 The implied powers doctrine holds that the legal personality and degree of autonomy of an organization is granted implicitly by the functions to be performed. As stated by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations Case, “under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided by the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (1948- 1949), Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949 , ICJ Rep. 1949. 8 See the UNMIN chapter in this volume. 9 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (New York: United Nations, 2008), 50–51.; United Nations, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, (New York: United Nations, July 2009); United Nations, Integrated Mission Planning Process, (New York: United Nations, 2004); Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karen von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, (New York: United Nations, 2005); United Nations, Report of the Secretary- General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. UN doc. A/63/881–S/2009/304, (11 June 2009); United Nations Integrated Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June 2006. Approved through Decision 2006/26 of 14 June 2006. 10 See The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/about/13510.html. 11 European Union, EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet: EU Special Representatives (EUSR/4), http://www.eusrbih.eu/ gen-info/?cid=283,1,1 ( July 2007). 12 Brahimi and Ahmed, 12. 13 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 309. See also, Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, Robert Orr, eds., Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997). 14 Brahimi and Ahmed, 12. 15 EUSR fact sheet. 16 See, for example, the mandates for Albania, Montenegro and Serbia on OSCE website (www.osce.org). 17 EUSR fact sheet. 18 Hugo Slim, A Guide to Mediation: Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts, (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007), 13. 26 | Thematic Essays

19 In the case of the airmen, the General Assembly had issued a statement harshly condemning China and the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet veto. The GA resolution included language asking him to do what he could and, to the surprise of many, visited Peking not as an emissary from the Security Council but in his own right as SG. Brian Urquhart, “The Evolution of the Secretary-General” in Secretary or General? Simon Chesterman, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-13; James Traub, “The Secretary-General’s Political Space” in Simon Chesterman, ed., 187. 20 Ian Johnstone, “The Role of the Secretary-General: the Power of Persuasion Based on Law,” Global Governance, Vol. 9(3), (2003), 444. 21 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008) 50–51. 22 United States Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 14. 23 Hugo Slim, A Guide to Mediation: Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts, (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2007). 24 International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (1948-1949), Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Rep. 1949. 25 Slim, 37. 26 Brahimi and Ahmed, 14. 27 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 50–51. 28 Brahimi and Ahmed, 16. 29 “integrity.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary- 10th ed. (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 1996), 608.