tional players. interna - and regional competing to open field the leaving thereby revolutions, home-grown in terfere in- to reluctance a of because also and problems, ments, partly due to internal political and economic develop- contradictory these to responding culties diffi- had have US the and EU the that argue will it Winter” metaphor may lead us to believe. Secondly, contradictory than the simplistic “-Arab moreand open-ended more is landscape strategic this article will argue that the emerging political and While these trends are clearly present in the region, 2013). & Cordesmann, 2013, Brumberg Friedman, 2013, Heydemann, (see autocracy renewed and strife sectarian disorder, regional of winter a into hasturned Spring Arab the that conclude to mentators several countries in the region have led many com- lamists, and the return to old autocratic practices in Is- and secularists between divide deep the tries, coun- neighbouring and in conflict and bility insta- The Winter. Arab the into turned has Spring It has become commonplace to argue that the Arab American UniversityofBeirut Affairs), HarvardandIFIFellow (IssamFares Institute), WCFIA Fellow (Weatherhead CenterforInternational Christina MarkusLassen Copenhagen Danish InstituteforInternationalStudies(DIIS), Senior Researcher Helle Malmvig* Responses Implications andInternational The Arab Uprisings: Regional Transitions intheArabWorld *

This articlewasfinalised beforeJune2013(Editor'snote). on the army to intervene in political life. In ,In life. political in intervene to army the on calling or violence instigating as such means, eral illib- use to prepared being of signs showing also are opposition secular the of sections Some main. do- cultural and social the in particularly pression, ex- of freedom and NGOs funded internationally of freedom the curb to ready seems and sharing power- of promises original on backtracked has Ben Ali era. In , for instance, the Brotherhood turn to the autocratic measures of the Mubarak and re- a to pointing indications some are there nisia, Tuand Egypt - post-revolutionary In politics. power regional playing and discontent domestic off ing buy- of means old to resorting are monarchies rich autocratic structures intact, and in the Gulf, the oil- basic keeping while reform gradual and ratisation monarchies are using old tactics of façade democ- incumbent the that signs are there Morocco and renewed autocracy and illiberal practices. In that there are indications pointing in the direction of would obviously be premature. Yet it can be argued question this to answer Arab conclusive any individual countries, the between differences mense im- are there since and Spring, Arab so-called the intoyears two only are we Since region. the in quo status autocratic old the of restoration a to leading process reverse a see may we whether or states, Arab democratic of creation the to lead will tually been raised as to whether increasinglythe Arab uprisings even- has question the year, last the Over Disillusionment Illiberal Practices,Conflictand

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 41 Transitions in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 42 Transitions in the Arab World Keys region, which initially inspired protesters in Egypt, in protesters inspired initially which region, minished the so-called ‘demonstration effect’ in the di- Arab also evidently has the transition undergoing of states most in situation volatile highly The mocracy itselfiseasilypushed totheside. de- of issue the forces, regional rival these tween Iranian, and Salafi. Caught be- and Shia, pro-Western and anti-Western, Arab and Sunni between conflicts of lines main region’s the reflecting battleground regional a become has – people own its on down cracking regime brutal a clear today that Syria – in addition to being a tale of was by no means instigated by foreign powers, it is Syrian and grievances local of result a as erupted conflict the While powers. regional by sustained been have traditionally in militias way the to similarly regime, Assad the of fall the after even country the inside militias local own their support to continue may Gulf the in powers rival that and governments, neighbouring against turned be may massive amount of arms thatthat the has flooded into Syria risk real a is There Syria. post-conflict a dragging on for years, but also with the make-up of conflict Syrian the of prospects the with only not concerned deeply are states Neighbouring Syria. inprotesters the informed initially that values cratic demo- liberal the from cry far a ideologies, jihadist and some of these are informed by highly extremist influence, and arms for compete militias multiple present At heard. be to voices non-sectarian and peaceful for impossible to next it making position, op- the militarised and radicalised has repression, brutal regime’s al-Assad Bashar the and powers al neighbouring in balance countries. The violence in Syria, nurtured by region- political delicate and stability the for also but themselves, states the for into only evolve not consequences severe with collapse, state to threaten respects, many in ferent The situations in both and Syria, although dif- ments indemocratictransitions. ele- vital are which of both dialogue, and clusion in- precluding sides, both on fear-mongering and stereotyping as well as Islamists and secularists between divide deepening anda seeing are Tunisiawe Egypt both In confrontation. and by tensions marked been has government Troika the opposition and secular the between relationship the the opposition leader Chokri Belaid, and ever since, Islamist extremism led to the tragic assassination of fifties and sixties. Thus also Islamist parties, such as the in and tounity Arab of terms had in speak leaders Arab that way the to comparable political actors must relate to and speak in terms of, main all that framework discursive of kind a stitutes con- now Democracy norm. regional a as emerging gradually is itself democracy that argue might one future, near the in states Arab democratic ty-two Although we do not predict the emergence of twen- Re-Politicisation andNormalisation Democracy asanEvolvingRegionalNorm, tion offoreignpolicy. normalisa- the and politics domestic of reopening the norm, a as democracy of emergence the here: outpointed be will changes main Three region. the in occurred already have changes positive portant im- that stressed be also should it direction, ative While these developments arguably point in a neg- ian opposition. and from the fighting over (UAE), the leadership of the Emirates Syr- Arab United the in Brotherhood Muslim the with affiliated be to deemed Egyptians of arrest recent the from evident also is backers al influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its region- the with concern The societies. their on have may pro-democracy movements elsewhere in the region that effects the with than Crescent,’ Brotherhood ‘Muslim so-called a of prospects the with cerned con- more now are they that argue even Gulf the democracy. inand officials bility government Some sta- between dilemma old the into playing reforms, democratic than expedient more as posed be can concerns security immediate –, neighbours with rivalries groups, terrorist jihadist grievances, tarian sec- refugees, of influx an – face regimes these of many situation security complicated the given and, revolts, Arab the of consequences negative the to back burner all together. Incumbents can now point the on reforms put to or change, political of pace the down slow to regimes authoritarian incumbent for easier become has it as just demonstrations, and protests on embarking before hesitate to gion caused pro-democracy groups elsewhere in the re- have may Syria in crackdown brutal the as insofar effect, negative a about talk even may one fact, In Libya and Syria to emulate the Tunisian experience. hr nw as r itoue t hl govern - hold to introduced are ways new and where parties, political and associations networks, in new debated fiercely is politics where leaders, political its of policies the with disagrees it when is culture political vibrant emerging, where the opposition takes to the streets new A survived. has itself protest public diminished, arguably has 2011 in shared protesters enthusiasm and joy the While posed outsideorder. im- an Islam; with incompatible and/or region, the for unfit concept Western distinct a was mocracy de- that argue to groups Islamist some and ments govern- authoritarian for common still was back. it Then, years few a only region the in reigned that situation the from different markedly is framework democracy has that emerged as the fact preferred discursive very the But means. democracy what of ferent political actors have different understandings dif- the that clear will is it as just end, the in materialise democracy that guarantee no give obviously arenas domestic and regional the in endorsements ian people for freedom” These verbal(30.08.2012). Syr- the of demands the reflects that rule of system democratic a build people the help op- pressors...and their against “fight their in people Syrian the ident at the same time urged all countries to support years 30 to mend relations in over with Iran, the Egyptian Pres- time first the for Tehran to went Morsi when Similarly, democracy. and dignity freedom, have – both been League carried out with reference to principles Arab of the from Syria of expulsion the and Libya in intervention military the – region the in events significant recent two level: regional of being non-democratic. This can also be seen at a cratic, and who is not, each side accusing the other demo- is who over but not, or democracy be to is sia and Egypt, the conflict is not over whether there Tuniin - collide parties Islamist and secularist when words, other In 2013). al. et Malouche Lust, stead, (Ben- principles democratic to according function should State the that believe both they but ligion, re- of role the about disagree might secularists and Islamists for. voted they whom of regardless ment, govern- of form best the is democracy that agree (DEDI) Institute Dialogue shows that 80% of Tunisians and 90% of Egyptians Egyptian Danish the and Al-Ahram by study recent A state. cratic-civil demo- a endorsing are Syria, and Egypt in erhood Tunisiain Broth- party Muslim Ennahda the the and aig nnedd osqecs t h regional the at consequences unintended also having is this world, Arab the in opened have bate de- and contestation political for spaces new As posturing hasbecome lessimportant undergoing transition,foreignpolicy debate intheArabstates offthedomesticpolitical been taken discussion. Yet, asthelidnowhas used tofeignrealpolitical foreign policyposturingcouldbe rule, limited underauthoritarian With domestic debatebeingrather the 2011uprisings.] to prior context Arab) (and Syrian a in of unheard series, Goon Top much-acclaimed the and graffiti, litical satire, being “dethroned” in cartoons, posters, po- intense of objects become have circle inner his Egypt, but also to Syria, where Bashar al-Assad and Tunisiato only not applies [This societies. Arab and ready have lost, their traditional sacrosanct status in al- cases some in and of, verge the on are leaders Arab how show also they but Mubarak, and Ali Ben obviously have been unthinkable during the reign of would accountable government Such holding inoffice. of means days 100 first the with comparing promises promises, election President’s the of Meter’‘Morsi called trackkept similarly has website so- the Egypt In country. the in outcry public a ing widespread non-attendance in the Assembly, caus- the and work their of providing nature the for documentation Assembly, Constituent Tunisian the of watchdog NGO – has monitored the slow progress new ways. For instance, in Tunisia, Al Bawsala – a new in accountable held be can leaders Arab that also but uprisings, Arab the of result a as exploded has test do not only serve to show that political life itself dog groups are flourishing. These new forms of pro- media, where blogs, twitter, and web-based watch- demonstrations, strikes, and street art, and in social of form the in e.g. level, street at opponents their from ridicule and debate criticism, fierce to posed ex- are governments (new) the where Tunisia and Egypt in evident most is This accountable. ments

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 43 Transitions in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 44 Transitions in the Arab World Keys olh n Ire’ cl wr eeos no hot a into develops cold ’s and bollah Hez- if or Iran, on attack military a launch instance, for Israel, should change could This societies. and governments Arab between gap legitimacy tional tradi - the exploit to able less are they and 2009, to in Movement addition Green the on down crack own in Iran’s Syria, in repression brutal gime’s re- Assad the with involvement deep their of result a as popularity lost have Hezbollah and Iran cult. diffi- West,more the become to now ance has this lar causes such as the Palestinian issue and resist- popu- around societies Arab mobilise to able were uprisings the before and Hezbollah Iran, as ver, whereas regional powers and movements such Moreo- US. the and EU the with relations retain to sued very pragmatic foreign policies, and are eager pur- now until have they but – positions Western anti- Gaddafi’s given Libya for case the less being their foreign policies than their predecessors – this inindependent more as seen being of cautious are governments Islamist new the Certainly uprisings. the of aftermath the in debate political domestic the in role marginal a only played have West the with relations and Israel Palestine, as such issues become hasless important. In Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, posturing policy foreign transition, dergoing the domestic political debate in the Arab states un- off taken been has now lid the Yet,as discussion. policy posturing could be used to feign real political being rather limited under authoritarian rule, foreign tics and societal grievances. With domestic debate oric, in order to divert attention from domestic poli- tionally used foreign tradi- policy as a stage for high rhet- have governments Arab politics. domestic withmore and posturing policy foreign with cupied preoc- less are Libya and Tunisia Egypt, in ments govern- elected newly the as insofar trend, verse re- a of indications see fact in may we But conflict. Arab-Israeli the and West the with relations ple, exam- for on, positions policy foreign radical more forway the pave will this that and decisions, policy foreign making when account into opinion public take to have now governments Arab that argued have commentators Many level. policy foreign and 3 2 1 for democracyandsharedprosperity withtheSouthernMediterranean,Brussels8March2011.COM(2011) 200final. Response toaChanging Neighbourhood:Areviewof European NeighbourhoodPolicy, Brussels,25May 2011.COM(2011)303final. Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, European the and Policy Security and Affairs Foreign for Union the of Representative High the by Communication Joint Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Therelativelymutedresponsetothe uprisinginBahrainbeingonenotableexception. Commission. 2011. piig, oty ouig n cnmc develop- economic on focusing mostly uprisings, the to response American the presented he which in 2011, May, 19 on speech Obama’s President in funds considerable pledged also States United The 2013. in established finally was and proposed, also transition, in countries the assist to measures technical economic and different of range a detailing nounced, an- was response EU’s the on Commission EU the and joint Representative High a the from 2011, Communication March By (ENP). Policy bourhood Neigh- EU’s the of review on-going the accelerated and Tunisia to funds emergency granted mediately im- EU The high. equally was transition in countries On the economic side, the willingness to support the behind.” from “lead to chose States United the while States, Member EU individual by driven largely was 2011 March in initiated Libya in operation military TO-led NA- The support. EU’s the declare and to fell, Ali Mubarak Ben after Cairo, and to dispatched quickly was Ashton Catherine Representative High EU’s the and purpose, same the with declarations of number a issued EU the down, step President to Mubarak urged and phones the worked Obama President months: initial the in role active an played even though it meant giving up on old allies. old on up giving meant it though even protesters, the with sided US the and EU the sion confu- initial some after surprise, by States United the and Europe took uprisings Arab the Although EU andUSResponsestotheArabUprisings the Arabuprisings,aswillbearguedbelow. to cautiously and reactively rather responded have US the and EU the that surprising less also haps re- lates. In light of these metaphor contradictory trends, it is per- Winter Spring-Arab Arab the than ments in the region constitute more of a mixed bag develop- that prove trends these together Taken its traditionalsoft-powertools. use to able less is axis resistance old the But one. 3 A new EU Endowment for Democracy was Democracy for Endowment EU new A 2 olwd y h EP eiw n May in review ENP the by followed A Partnership 1 Both A New A all new appropriations difficult. Most recently, Con- mental scepticism of the foreign aid issue rendered funda- Congress’ and ground the on situation ing dle East Response Fund. But the constantly chang- Mid- a in resources available together pull to made similarly were efforts quick US, the of case the In ation isthereforenotalwayspresent. cooper- technical for requirements EU complicated fulfil to motivation the and EU, the in membership southern Med­ the However earlier. years twenty tries coun- European Eastern and Central the the been for case had as Europe, to ties closer and racy democ- for aiming primarily were transition in tries coun- the that assuming sense, made ENP the of EU’s relationship with the region. The continued use the of rethinking complete a than rather framework ENP the within programmes existing the on ance reli- a to led response EU rapid a for pressure nal out to be limited. On the EU’s side, the strong inter- turned programmes and policy in changes actual the clear, was challenges the of scope the While an urgetolettheuprisingsremainhome-grown. and help, outside any without achieve to managed protesters the what for capitals Western in spect re- genuine a been have to appears there However, unfolding in the region may be somewhat surprising. events the to humility with reacted Washington and Brussels which to extent the East, Middle the in US the and powers European of role historic the Given Old PoliciesforaChangingRegion A NewfoundHumility,ProblemsatHomeand reacted socautiouslytotheuprisings? not ambitions high original achieved, and why have the the EU and the United States were why is: tion ques- The programmes. old of repackaging a extent, assistance either did not materialise or was, to a large matic role has been limited, and much of the promised diplo- and political Their marginal. been has opments ity of the EU and the United States to influence devel- abil - the years, two last the at back looking However, Fund forTunisia andEgypt. Enterprise billion $2 a and Egypt to loans and relief debt large of prospect the including trade and ment 4 BarackObama,SpeechontheMiddle East,(speech,Washington, D.C.,19May2011). traen ate Sae ae o loig for looking not are States Partner iterranean 4 that impeded the initial ambitious rhetoric. For the For rhetoric. ambitious initial the impeded that ed States was also affected by a number of factors Unit- the different, are circumstances the Although events intheregion quickly overshadowedStates in bothEuropeandtheUnited Western domesticrealities capitals, enthusiasm fortheuprisingsin Despite theinitialeuphoriaand southern MemberStates. EU’s the from Democracy for Endowment European ference is reflected in the lack of support for the new dif- of This south. the with favour relationships longer-lasting in argued and important less approach conditional the found have States Member southern some while promotion, democracy on focused and stance tough a advocated have countries European northern general, In obvious. been not has principle EU among unity Member States about the toughness in assistance, applying this for criteria the more” was for “more of principle the while time, same the At policy. immigration open more a designing or funds, new allocating markets, opening for room much leave not does crisis eurozone the where EU has been rather limited. This reflects the reality of the “Ms” the of each on progress result, a As crisis. of times in particularly on, deliver to EU the for difficult are components its But interest. real a neighbours have would Mediterranean southern the which in deliverables on premised was – Mobility and Money Markets, “3Ms”for the – efforts EU’s the for slogan catchy The region. the in events overshadowed ly realities in both Europe and the United States quick domestic Westerncapitals, in uprisings the for asm enthusi- and euphoria initial the despite Moreover, low-up oninitialpromises. fol- limited and programmes old of repackaging a sponse has to a large extent been characterised by re- US the EU, the for case the is as Thus, Spring. post-Arab region the to assistance US of flagship the been have to was which Fund, Incentive East Middle new a for request a down turned has gress -

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 45 Transitions in the Arab World Keys IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 46 Transitions in the Arab World Keys mrig oes uh s hn ad vn India even and China as such powers emerging new well-known, are East Middle the in interests Russia’s Whereas means. military even and nomic trying to exert their influence through political, eco- are powers external other Moreover, negotiated. than the $4.8 billion IMF loan that is currently being spectively in loans and grants to Egypt, much more re- billion $5 and billion $4 offered have example, countries in the region. and Qatar, thefor for relationships trade and assistance nomic eco- attractive offer can powers regional these of new alliesinthecountriestransition,andseveral in particular, are vying for influence among potential United States. Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iran, reserv锓domaine the longer no theand Europe of Finally, it is increasingly clear that the Middle East is speech in2011. low-up to the promises made in President Obama’s fol- limited been only has there now for and ings, upris- the to response economic American robust dered the task easier for those who wish for a more ren- not have countries foreign transition some of in NGOs treatment the and discrimination Christians apparent against parties, Islamist of rise The Benghazi. in compound US the and Tunis in Embassy US the against attack the after Libya and Tunisiato also but particular, in Egypt, to sistance great difficulty obtaining Congress approval for as- in a time of budget cuts, the administration has had assistance foreign on spending already towards sceptical Congress a In materialised. have region the for funding new suggested the of parts limited onlyand considerable, been has Congress in ance resist- transition, in countries the to pledgefunds greater to administration the of part the on ness willing- real a been has there while Moreover, ya. the of acceptance Lib- in Yemenlead in European lead the GCC and US the with along example, en- diplomatically gaged in the region – Syria being the most notable or militarily become to tance reluc- a into translated been has policy This East. Middle the in engagement military US the end to administration Obama the from wish clear a been has there particular, In abroad. than rather home regional partners and spend its energy rebuilding at to responsibility delegate should States United the that signalled clearly very has who President a and Congressin paralysis political cuts, budget of time a with coincided uprisings Arab the States, United F C B B References opportunities forengagementandinteraction. new with US the and EU the providing cy-making; between state and people and in Arab foreign poli- ready created profound changes in the relationship al- have uprisings Arab the that fact the shadow over- not should they Yet US. the and EU the for powers. These developments pose new challenges region is the gaining greater regional autonomy vis-à-vis outside as time same the at influence, and access for the emerging competing are actors new East, in Middle that fact the of reflection a also is This policies. old revising mainly and region the EU have been reacting to the changing dynamics in the and US the strategies, grand new devising or events shaping proactively than Rather result. a as is clear that EU and US influence has been reduced and balanced approach; while on the other hand, it cautious a for cause been hand one the on have, region the in trends contradicting many The gate. two navi- to actors outside for difficult been have years last the of developments roller-coaster The Conclusion Arab uprisings. the to reactions appropriate the to comes it when not do necessarily see eye to eye with Europe and the US latter the that illustrates Brazil, and India by supported tacitly are positions China’s and sia Rus- where Council, Security UN the in Syria over disagreement The role. political a play to seeking and opportunities for looking also are Brazil and rie enstead rumberg ordessman the ArabDecade,CSISreport,2013. New York Times , 9April2013. 1, 2013. Issue East: Middle the in Architecture Security New Diplomacy,” Spring: US for Arab Challenges the and Authoritarians al ary ,2013 Obstacle” the Aren’t d man Toa. Te rb ure Century,” Quarter Arab “The Thomas. , , Daniel and L. , Anthony. , L ust , E., H M eydemann h Aa Srn becomes Spring Arab The al , 14 Febru- 14 Affairs, Foreign ouche , D. et al., “Islamists Sthephen, “Glob- h Changing The