The Ties that Bind? A History of NATO’s Academic Adventure with the Middle East

Jean-Loup Samaan and Roman de Stefanis1

On 6 December 2013, the NATO Defense matic aims and means. More than this, the College in Rome celebrated the graduation story of the NRCC illustrates the very dif- of the tenth NATO Regional Cooperation ficulties of building ties with new partners, Course (NRCC). Born five years ago from and shows how scholarship can contribute lengthy diplomatic negotiations in Brussels, substantially to such ties. This paper is this ten-week academic programme brings therefore of interest to both scholars and together officers and diplomats from NATO policy-makers. For scholars, it nurtures countries with their counterparts in Arab the ongoing debate over the challenges of States and in Israel. Meeting on a daily ba- education in a diplomatic and military en- sis for lectures and seminars, participants vironment.2 For practitioners, it provides include representatives of countries which, insights into what could become a primary in some cases, barely speak to each other instrument of NATO’s diplomatic appara- in normal international contacts. They ex- tus in the post-Afghanistan period. In other change views - and sometimes disagree, words, this story is a revealing case study or even argue – over critical issues such of interactions between academe, diplo- as the Israel-Palestine peace process, the macy, and the military world. Iranian nuclear programme, the Syrian Such is the subject matter that this re- conflict or Western policies in the Middle search paper explores. The initial question East. that drove our investigation was how an The introduction of the NRCC marked an academic course could fulfil a diplomatic unprecedented new departure for NATO, vision. In other words, how could classes an organization that scarcely looked out- in international relations help NATO reach side continental Europe a mere two dec- out to the Middle East, foster mutual un- ades ago. Looking back at the inception derstanding and, eventually, pave the way and development of the NRCC programme for practical cooperation? As the following thus means far more than an academic ex- sections show, the synergy of diplomatic ercise in institutional history, nor is the in- and academic efforts was, in the event, terest of this story confined to a relatively based less on a seamless interface be- restricted readership made up of NATO tween the two than on a constant dialectic. employees. The making of the NRCC In the end, the NRCC can be understood sheds light on an internal struggle within as a dynamic interface between NATO’s Eisenhower Paper Eisenhower Paper Research Division - NATO Defense College, Rome Defense College, Rome Research Division - NATO the Atlantic Alliance regarding its diplo- evolving diplomatic agenda and an aca-

1 Jean-Loup Samaan is a researcher of the Middle East Faculty at the NATO Defense College. Roman de Stefanis is a research assistant in the same department. Both would like to thank all the people in Brussels, Paris and Rome who offered the benefit of their knowledge. Any remaining mistakes or imperfections are the authors’ responsibility. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2 See, among others, Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America’s Military, New York, Routledge, 2012 and the con- troversial article by Jeff Dyche, “The US Air Force Academy: Elite Undergraduate College?”, AAUP Journal of Academic Freedom, vol. 3, 2012.

bruary 1 N° 1 2014 f e demic environment. The diplomatic phase. In 2005, the US delegation came to the Northern Atlantic Our research is based on various sources. Council to submit the proposal of a “train- It relies on consultation of NATO Defense ing initiative” that would engage all NATO College archives, as well as on extensive member countries with Middle Eastern interviews with officials, both in Rome and partners through a tailored course. Spe- in Brussels, who have been involved in the cifically, the course would have to take NRCC since its inception. The first section place in the region. This initial proposal of the paper is a historical survey of how was met with fierce scepticism. Some the NRCC was born. We then look at the Allies argued that the build-up of mili- various challenges which accompanied tary and diplomatic ties with Arab coun- the venture, as witnessed by the people in- tries was outside NATO’s scope. In other volved all along. Finally, in a third section, words, NATO had neither the legitimacy we look at the possible future evolution of nor the experience for such an endeavour. the programme, and of NATO educational The biggest issue, however, was the ap- practices in . parent lack of clarity on the exact content the Americans envisioned for this “train- NATO goes to the Middle ing” course. “For months, the US delega- East: the making of the NATO tion was unable to provide us with clear answers on this proposal because there Regional Cooperation Course was not even a consensus between the The idea of gathering soldiers and dip- State Department and the Pentagon on lomats from NATO and its Middle East what should and should not be included!” partners surfaced in the corridors of the explained an insider who took part in this Brussels Headquarters in early 2005. Fol- round of talks.5 lowing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, momen- To complicate matters even more, the US tum grew within the Alliance for an am- suggestion of locating the training facility bitious partnership with the Arab World. in the region itself encountered several There was nevertheless reluctance – not drawbacks. Jordan expressed its willing- only on the part of some Allies, but also ness to host the centre, under the aus- among potential Middle Eastern partners pices of its own Police Academy, but then who feared a NATO footprint in the region. Kuwait and Qatar also declared that they In 2004, NATO created the Istanbul Coop- would be ready to do so. At this stage, the eration Initiative (ICI), a partnership with question of where to locate the foreseen four Gulf monarchies (UAE, Kuwait, Qa- courses quickly turned into an unintended tar and Bahrain) which complemented the competition among the partners. The Jor- older Mediterranean Dialogue (MD).3 At danian option raised the issue of security, that time, with civil war escalating in Iraq as some NATO countries feared that the and regional angst over Iranian nucleariza- centre could become the target of anti- tion, NATO Allies saw a growing need for Western groups. On the other hand, locat- cooperation with local militaries. However, ing it in the Gulf states would have meant the forms of that cooperation still needed denying what was seen as an essential to be defined.4 factor: Israeli participation. Eventually, in the spring of 2006, ahead

3 The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 and includes Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Israel. 4 For a comprehensive account of NATO Middle East policies during this period, see Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Un viag- gio politico senza mappe: fra diversità e futuro nel grande Medio Oriente, Rome, Rubbettino, 2013; and Florence Gaub, Against All Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region, Carlisle, US Army War College, 2012. 5 Interview with the authors, October 2013.

2 of the scheduled Summit of Heads of nel Giuseppe Clemente, responsible for State and Government in Riga, the Allies the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul reached a consensus. First, confronted Cooperation Initiative, Cooperation and with the ambiguity of the “training” idea, Regional Security within the Military Com- International Staff suggested rebranding mittee. the whole project and making it an edu- The Riga Summit held in November 2006 cational initiative. This meant that diplo- was the very first time the idea of the course mats and officers from both sides would was officially mentioned. Paragraph 17 of convene to discuss international security the Summit Declaration states: issues, not operational or tactical con- siderations. In other words, the objective […]Through an evolutionary and would be more diplomatically and strate- phased approach building on exist- gically oriented. Second, as the search ing structures and programmes, we for a location proved to be much more dif- will set up to the benefit of our part- ficult than expected, a compromise was ners and NATO nations an expanding found: the programme would temporarily network of NATO training activities. An be run in Europe, with a possible subse- initial phase will include […] the estab- quent move to an unspecified location in lishment of a Middle East Faculty at the Middle East. Neither the timeframe for the NATO Defense College. As a sec- this process nor the future location were ond phase, NATO could consider sup- specified. Several places were suggest- porting the establishment of a Security ed: Brussels, where the course could be Cooperation Centre in the region, to close to decision-making circles; Ober- be owned by the MD and ICI coun- ammergau in Germany, where the NATO tries, with regional funding and NATO School had been operating since 1953; assistance.6 and, finally, the NATO Defense College in Rome. The academic phase. The next step was After another series of talks, Rome was se- to translate this diplomatic enterprise into lected as the venue. It is argued by some concrete guidelines. This is where strategic representatives in Brussels that the Italian matters met with bureaucratic constraints. influence, in particular through its handling The NATO Defense College certainly had of the Middle East partnership portfolio at considerable experience in military educa- NATO Headquarters, played a decisive tion, generations of NATO officers having role in this decision. Although the Italian of- attended its Senior Course in the half-cen- ficials interviewed for our research down- tury since its inception. But in Brussels, played the relevance of a national agenda the team close to the Secretary General on the topic, all key positions on NATO feared that the College lacked the diplo- Middle East policies were at that time matic and cultural awareness to design held by Italians: Ambassador Alessandro and conduct an educational course for an Minuto Rizzo, Deputy Secretary General; extremely diverse target group - on the one Mr Nicola de Santis, Head of the Mediter- hand, NATO nations like the US, France ranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation and Italy; on the other hand, MD and ICI Initiative Countries Section in the Public members like Israel, Mauritania, Egypt and Diplomacy Division; Dr Alberto Bin, Head Bahrain. The result was the creation of a of the Regional Affairs and Mediterranean specific body called the “Middle East Fac- Dialogue Section, NATO Political Affairs ulty”, to be staffed by civilian advisors with and Security Policy Division; and Colo- specific Middle East expertise who could

6 Riga Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm

3 fulfil this need for cultural awareness. In tween ICI countries and NATO: “NATO is other words, the course would be conduct- keen to share more widely with interested ed within the NATO Defense College, but ICI partners our unique expertise in train- would be strictly separated from its other ing military forces – to help them to build activities.7 forces that are more effective and more interoperable with those of the NATO Al- In 2007, while work on the logistic aspects lies.”10 of the project was in its very early stages, the North Atlantic Council and the Military Again, the Italian footprint was important: Committee in Brussels decided to launch for the next three years (2008-2011), the a “trial course” for what would become the two most influential persons in Brussels NATO Regional Cooperation Course. This dealing with development of the NRCC first two-week course was attended bya were Italians: Deputy Secretary General small group of ten participants: six from Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, and the MD and ICI, the other four from NATO. Chairman of the Military Committee Admi- This ratio of 60:40 was to be retained as ral . This certainly con- the target when the NRCC proper was tributed to the close coordination with the born two years later, as a way of ensuring NATO Defense College. an appropriate balance of views. Although Both in Brussels and in Rome, American the trial course was designed by a team of officers and officials also played a officers from the NATO Defense College, it role. By request of NATO HQ, it was de- was closely overseen by officials in Brus- cided that the NRCC would be under the sels. The inauguration speech was given direct supervision of the Dean, a position by Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, created in 2001 and traditionally held by an then Deputy Secretary General, while American.11 In addition, the first Director of graduation diplomas were awarded at the the Middle East Faculty (with responsibility end of the course by the Chairman of the for the inaugural NRCC) was a US Marine Military Committee, General Ray Henault.8 Colonel, Sandy Guptill. During the period Ambassador Minuto Rizzo came again for concerned, Italian and US commitment to the second trial course in November 2007. the project provided all-important synergy, In 2008, a further two trial courses were ensuring that the initiative received appro- run and the format was extended, first to priate backing in terms of political will. three weeks and then to four. The Middle East Faculty, which was slowly On 28 January 2008, during a conference taking form within the College, would be jointly organized by the NATO Public Di- in charge of planning and running the plomacy Division and the Qatar Center NRCC. Following talks with Brussels, the for Military Strategic Studies in Doha, new programme was to be a 10-week course Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisog- on the security challenges of the Middle niero underlined “progress towards the East and North Africa region, with a cur- establishment of a dedicated faculty at the riculum geared to the interests of NATO, NATO Defense College in Rome”.9 Like his MD, and ICI nations. Western and Middle predecessor, he highlighted the promising Eastern scholars would be invited to de- scope offered by education and training liver lectures on strategic issues and run with a view to practical cooperation be- exercises for participants from the MD, ICI

7 Phone interviews with the authors, October 2013. 8 “The year in review”, NDC Annual Report 2007, p. 10. 9 Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero at the Conference on “NATO’s Role for Stability and Peace”, 28 January 2008. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080128a.html 10 Ibid. 11 This situation changed in 2013 with the selection of a Dean from a European member state.

4 and NATO nations, whilst promoting the Security Bureau in Kuwait. outreach objective of mutual understand- ing. In March 2009, the first official NRCC began. The challenges of a diplomatic- The creation of the Middle East Faculty academic enterprise did not, however, mark the full achieve- The NRCC was from the beginning the re- ment of the envisaged end state. In retro- sult of competing visions, both within the spect, the creation and consolidation of the Alliance and among its partners. It was to programme depended upon the role of a be both an academic programme with lec- few key decision-makers in Brussels and tures, workshops and political exercises, Rome, who involved themselves person- and a forum for stakeholders involved in a ally. “When you look back at the very be- common military partnership. On the one ginning of the talks at the HQ, it is a real hand, the course is - still today - meant to miracle that this programme exists today,” strengthen the Alliance’s bonds with MD explains a former high NATO representa- and ICI countries. On the other hand, it aims tive.12 For the leadership of the NATO De- to develop in-house expertise within NATO fense College, at that time Commandant on Middle Eastern affairs. In other words, Lieutenant General Wolf-Dieter Loeser the NRCC could not be simply assessed and Dean Dr Grant Hammond, the priority as an academic course run for solely edu- became to promote the course, in particu- cational purposes; it also had a diplomatic lar in the Levant and the Gulf. Throughout dimension, which would eventually define that period, Hammond and Loeser trav- its success. This balance between edu- elled extensively to areas where the NATO cation and policy understandably engen- Defense College had never been before, dered challenges from the outset. meeting officials who barely knew anything about the College in Rome. In less than twelve months, between 2008 and 2009, The diplomatic-academic balance. Aca- Hammond travelled to Tunis, Abu Dhabi, demic standards frequently conflict with Amman (twice), Tel Aviv, Doha, Cairo, Ku- policy purposes. The gap between scholarly wait, Manama and Casablanca. Loeser security studies and public policy agendas remembers vividly his trip to Kuwait: “I is all too familiar, and the NRCC is no ex- travelled to Kuwait in early 2010. We were ception to this phenomenon. Inside depart- struggling to get Kuwaiti Course Members ments of international relations, theoretical to come to the College. I met with Sheikh discussions usually prevail over practical Thamer Ali Al-Sabah [Deputy Director of recommendations. This has sometimes Kuwait’s National Security Bureau] and he been depicted as the “cult of irrelevance” was extremely candid, telling me that they inside the academic world.14 Although the needed to know personally the leadership idea of the course was conceived at NATO of the College, to create ties.”13 Following Headquarters in Brussels, its content was Loeser’s trip, Sheikh Thamer visited the designed in Rome by scholars. Interest- College in March 2010 to deliver a keynote ingly, both parties (practitioners and schol- speech to the third NRCC. Since then, Ku- ars) told us in interviews that NATO HQ waiti officers and civil servants have regu- never specified any guidance in terms of larly participated and relations with the content. “I did see the first curriculum that NRCC are handled directly by the National was brought to me, but I did not want to

12 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 13 Phone interview with the authors, October 2013. 14 See Michael Desch, “If, When, and How Social Science Can Contribute to National Security Policy”, Paper presented during Security Studies Program Seminar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 17 March 2010.

5 interfere and only emphasized the need to cited by the interviewees whose comments be as rigorous and ambitious as possible were collected for this article, admittedly at academic level,” explains former Deputy had predictable consequences. To organ- Secretary General Minuto Rizzo.15 ize a course on Middle Eastern affairs for an audience that did not systematically share An overview of the syllabus supports this the same view of history proved demand- claim. The first NRCC curriculum provided ing. How was it possible to discuss Israel’s a broad introduction to the world of interna- wars with its Arab neighbours in an objec- tional affairs: actors, dynamics and global tive and open way, bearing in mind that issues. Each week, the participants were Course Members’ lives and careers had required not only to make a critical read- often been shaped by these conflicts? How ing of classic articles by such authors as could the Gulf War of 1990 be mentioned, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama or without generating heated exchanges be- Joseph Nye, but also to focus on questions tween Iraqi and Kuwaiti participants? All related to NATO and relevant strategic con- ten courses to date have involved clashes, cepts. Participants discussed topics like with Course Members interrupting (or even prejudice, misconceptions and culture in screaming at) lecturers and occasional- international affairs. In addition, the history ly walking out of the auditorium to make and dynamics of institutions such as the their position clear. One participant even European Union, the United Nations, the threatened to write to the NATO Secretary African Union, multinational corporations, General and demand the resignation of a and non-governmental organizations were Faculty Advisor. For NATO personnel, this examined throughout the course. Topics emphasized a simple reality: mutual un- included the values and political systems derstanding did not automatically portend of the MD and ICI countries, as well as the mutual agreement. When exchanges be- religious and cultural differences within the came heated, there was a real possibility region. An entire week was dedicated to of a diplomatic incident. This actually oc- understanding NATO. Participants learned curred once, when Morocco expressed its about the Alliance’s history, its engage- discontent following a lecturer’s reference ments, its structure, its partnerships, and to “Western Sahara”. In this case, the Mo- its transformation. The course also ad- roccan representation in Brussels alleged- dressed global challenges: climate change, ly met Deputy Secretary General Bisogni- national identity, pluralism, resource scar- ero and threatened to withdraw their forces city, demography, terrorism, and weapons from all partnership activities with NATO. In of mass destruction. Regional challenges such a scenario, the balance between the in the Maghreb, the Mashreq, and the Gulf NRCC’s twin priorities is obviously under were also covered. The course ended with severe pressure, with diplomacy outweigh- exercises in asymmetric warfare, multilat- ing scholarship. When all is said and done, eral decision-making, and crisis manage- the NRCC’s five-year history has taught us ment. Through this ten-week course, par- that academic freedom ends when (real) ticipants became familiar with NATO and diplomatic crises start. its concerns, and learned how to detect the elements that constitute a crisis, differenti- ate the symptoms from the causes, distin- guish the stakeholders and their respec- tive interests and goals, and communicate their strategy. The principle of academic freedom, often

15 Interview with the authors, October 2013.

6 The civil-military balance. Usually, war of a compromise between scholarly dis- colleges tend - with varying degrees of cussion and demands from the military for success - to emulate the model of civil- concrete findings. The fact that the NRCC ian academic institutions.16 In the case of was included in the 2006 NATO Training the NATO Defense College, however, ci- Cooperation Initiative did not dissipate the vilians remained marginal in the structure ambiguities over its pedagogical purpose.20 until the 2000s. The College reports to the In her studies on military education, Joan Military Committee, not to the International Johnson-Freese shows how conflicting Staff. Its main course does not rely on in- are the notions of education and training: house scholars who teach in the classic “Education, then as now, requires thinking sense of the term, but on military advisors and reflection, which takes time. Training who facilitate discussions among Course has right and wrong answers which allow Members. The civilian position of Dean immediate progress measurement; educa- was introduced only in 2001. Within such tion is incremental and involves grappling an institution, the very creation of a faculty with ambiguity.”21 with its own scholars understandably cre- While an academic discussion on Iran and ated a clash of cultures. In addition, our in- the Gulf would mean exploring the percep- terviews show that the involvement of the tion, history, and distribution of alliances NATO International Staff and its push for a to evaluate any patterns involved, officers uniquely autonomous Faculty were clearly (whether from NATO or from partner coun- perceived as interference in the College’s tries) tend to look directly for solutions to business. A former member of the Middle the problem. Whereas academics like to East Faculty explained to us bitterly that, highlight complexities and paradoxes, of- when discussing financial issues at a Col- ficers are in need of clear assessments lege meeting, his comment to the effect and options. Within the NRCC, a clas- that “We are in the same boat” prompted sic illustration of this gap has repeatedly the following reply from one representative been seen in discussions over the drivers of the managerial team: “No, we are defi- of conflict: with many Course Members of nitely not in the same boat.”17 the opinion that religion plays a primary Institutional transformation and resistance role in Middle Eastern conflicts, officers to change are classic concepts in the so- find themselves at odds with scholars who ciology of organizations.18 In the context of argue that Sunni-Shia tensions are essen- the NRCC, however, these became mixed tially a political narrative and that religion 22 up with the perception of a “civilian and as itself is only an instrument. politician [sic] inception.”19 In addition, it But again, mutual understanding being the has already been mentioned that the initial initial objective, education is a means rather idea suggested by the US was a training than an end. This became even more sali- course as the precursor of a fully fledged ent following the Arab upheavals of 2011, educational programme, and that the intel- as these confronted officers and diplomats lectual content of the NRCC was the result attending the course with new realities to

16 See John Hattendorf, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the US Naval War College, Rhodes Island, Naval War College Press, 1984. 17 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 18 See the seminal study, Michel Crozier, Erhard Friedberg, Actors and Systems: The Politics of Collective Action, Chi- cago, Chicago University Press, 1980. 19 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 20 Fritz Rademacher, “The NATO Training Cooperation Initiative”, NATO Review, Spring 2007. 21 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later”, Orbis, Winter 2012, p. 138. 22 On this issue, see the analysis by Emile Hokayem, “A simplistic sectarian lens magnifies extremist agenda”, The National, 30 July 2012.

7 address. The case of Egypt is emblematic ture of the transition is proof that the NRCC here. From a Western perspective, the evo- is now a routine part of the NATO partner- lution of discussions with Egyptian officials ship programme. However, this organiza- in the committees was fascinating, reflect- tional achievement should not overshadow ing as it did the initial disarray when the the importance of assessing the successes Mubarak regime was toppled, the climate and shortcomings of the initiative rigorously. of suspicion after Morsi’s election, and the The paradox of participation. Early on, it subsequent support for the “second revo- was decided that an average of 25 partici- lution” of July 2013. In these exchanges, pants should attend each course. The ini- what really mattered for NATO was not tial concern to attract delegates from Mid- to deliver a perfect appraisal of Egyptian dle Eastern partner states led to frequent events, but to understand the way poten- travel by the College leadership, as well tial local partners perceived them. as intensive promotion of the programme by officials in Brussels during diplomatic meetings. The challenge varied from coun- Lessons learned from the NRCC try to country. Specifically, six out of the experience seven members of the MD (all but Israel) After five years and ten courses, what were granted subsidization for the duration seemed at first to be an odd adventure for of the course. The real problem, therefore, NATO - into academic cooperation with was to attract Course Members from Israel Middle Eastern partners - seems to have and the Gulf countries. In both cases, a consolidated itself as a stable, institutional- look at the evolution of participation shows ized enterprise. At a human level, the whole no clear pattern. For instance, after declin- of the management team that built up the ing to send students, Saudi Arabia sent course is now gone, and the seamless na- six Course Members in the fall of 2012

Fig. 1 NRCC participation from Course 1 to Course 10.

8 and then stopped again in 2013.23 On the liance’s stated commitment to educational whole, though, partners’ level of participa- cooperation with partners in the regions it tion has grown steadily and, in some coun- is engaged in.24 The problem is sometimes tries, the programme has become a widely attributed to budget constraints or, in some acknowledged initiative which is now inte- cases, an explicit lack of interest. “It is an grated into the career path of officers. endless process: the course needs to be promoted to all NATO nations all the time,” The real issue has actually been participa- insists Ambassador Minuto Rizzo.25 “There tion from NATO itself: the average NATO has always been a kind of prejudice on the participation rate in the NRCC for the past NATO side that we were offering it to the 10 courses has been 27%. This means Middle East, not the other way around,” that only two out of ten NRCCs have adds Guptill, first Director of the Middle achieved the desired 60:40 ratio between East Faculty.26 MD/ICI and NATO countries (NRCC-3 in 2010, and NRCC-7 in 2012). This prob- Another explanatory factor might be the lem was identified at the very outset by problem of finding the right target - audi those planning the trial course. In the sub- ence. Let us take the case of the French sequent annual reports of the NATO De- military. France is among the most active fense College, it was made clear to the European NATO members in the region, authorities in Brussels that such a limited with historical ties with most of the MD NATO footprint was at variance with the Al- and ICI Partners. Every year, half a dozen

Fig. 2 NATO and non-NATO participation (NRCC 1 to NRCC10)

23 See Annex II on details of participation. 24 “Statistics on course participation”, NDC Annual Reports, from 2009 to 2012. 25 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 26 Interview with the authors, October 2013.

9 French officers are trained in Arabic and question, on that occasion, regarding the then go to war colleges in the Gulf or the future of the programme. As the official ti- Middle East. However, conversations with tle “NATO Regional Cooperation Course” several of these officers indicate that they does not circumscribe the course geo- have never heard of the programme. “I graphically to the Middle East and North am not a NATO guy, I am seen as an Ori- Africa, it could be enlarged to include other entalist,” specified one interviewee, as if partners. the course’s target audience within NATO The reform of NATO partnership policy in- were limited to those set to take on respon- troduced after the 2010 Lisbon Summit em- sibilities at Alliance level.27 phasized the idea of opening all activities The low level of NATO participation seems to all partners.29 In that perspective, over paradoxical, since it was taken almost for the next few years the NRCC could be- granted that a NATO initiative like this would come a meeting place for representatives attract participants from within NATO. This of NATO nations and their Partners across leads some observers to portray the course the Globe. However, such an evolution as a “catastrophic success,” meaning that might dilute the initial aim into too broad a the objective of reaching out to the Middle scope. “You need time to understand each East has been achieved, but without the other, ten weeks is already a period too envisaged commitment on the NATO side. short to better apprehend the Middle East. In the long term, serious thought should be If you add Asia, Africa, you suddenly lose given to this issue, as it might affect Arab touch with all regions,” argues a former countries’ willingness to engage in a NATO representative at NATO HQ.30 initiative on which NATO itself is present But if the NRCC itself is unlikely to turn only to a limited extent. into a global regional course, its experi- ence might be worth contemplating for other initiatives. As the US announced its Extending the NRCC model to other re- pivot toward Asia during the first Obama gions? Over the five years of its existence, presidency, it may be tempting to envision the NRCC has focused almost exclusively a NATO-Asia cooperation framework that on NATO partnerships in the Middle East. could rely on similar instruments. In recent However, it is worth noting that that Course years, NATO has developed relations with Members from Pakistan and Moldova have Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and attended the course, while potential partici- Australia in the field of military coopera- pation from Afghanistan and India has also tion. These ties were primarily born out of been envisaged. Issues such as South the Partners across the Globe initiative in Asian security and Gulf-Asia relations the wake of the September 2001 terrorist have been introduced into the curriculum attacks against the United States. At the in recent years. In his speech for the 60th 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, some Al- anniversary of the NATO Defense College, lies tried to institutionalize these relations Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmus- through the framework of a “global partner- sen stated, “I could even imagine a new ship forum,” but it was opposed by other generation of officers from a democratic, NATO nations which considered that the post-Gaddafi Libya, attending courses on relationship should be limited to practical civil-military cooperation.”28 This led to a

27 Interview with the authors, October 2013. 28 Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the NATO Defense College for the 60th anniversary meeting, 20 May 2011. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_74535.htm 29 Heidi Reisinger, “Rearranging Family Life and a Large Circle of Friends: Reforming NATO’s Partnership Programmes”, NATO Defense College, Research Paper n. 72, January 2012, p. 4. 30 Interview with the authors, October 2013.

10 cooperation. Depending on future politi- Conclusion cal resolve, the NRCC experience could The history of an academic initiative like the be a relevant source of inspiration for a NATO Regional Cooperation Course gives first step towards closer relations between texture to some key questions for NATO the Atlantic Alliance and Asian Partners. partnership policy - for example, how best It would help build personal ties and en- to use education as an instrument to pro- hance awareness within NATO on Asian mote greater cooperation, and how to strike security issues. the right balance between educational and Another potential use of the NRCC experi- diplomatic priorities. As explained above, ence could be in Africa. The African conti- this learning process is still in its prelimi- nent matters for NATO, for two main rea- nary stages. Five years and ten courses sons. The first is the enduring presence of afford a sufficient basis for an appraisal, terrorist cells of organizations such as Al- but it is still too early for a definitive evalu- Qaeda or Al-Shabaab, that regularly target ation. It is, however, time for a deeper and Western interests (tourist locations, foreign broader discussion of NATO’s partnership companies). The second security chal- policies and of the role to be played by ed- lenge is the piracy phenomenon along the ucation in developing them to best effect. shores of the continent, mostly in the Gulf At the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO of Aden, because of the collapse of Soma- Heads of State stressed the importance of lia.31 In both cases, piracy and terrorism, expanding education and training, espe- one of the root causes appears to be the cially within the context of the Connected weakness of statehood in Africa, and more Forces Initiative. Indeed, the educational specifically the inability of the authorities to role of NATO is increasing substantially, contain such criminal activities. Any NATO as shown by the growth in recent years of role here is likely to be limited to training the Alliance’s Defence Enhancement Edu- initiatives, through its cooperation with the cation Programme for its Partners across African Union (AU). In fact, NATO’s rela- the Globe.33 With the withdrawal of NATO tionship with the AU has been on the rise forces from Afghanistan in 2014, this trend in recent years. Since 2005, at the request is likely to become the key pillar of NATO’s of the AU, the Alliance has been provid- relations with partners. In such a perspec- ing support for AU missions and capacity tive, the experience gained by the Alliance building: provision of airlift for the AU Mis- through its Middle Eastern adventure is - sion in Sudan, strategic airlift, sealift and and will continue to be - precious. subject matter expertise for the AU Mission in Somalia, assessments of the operation- al readiness of the African Standby Force brigades.32 As NATO assists the AU in the operational realm, it might make sense in the future to see this cooperation extend- ed to the strategic level. Under these cir- cumstances, a NATO-Africa programme inspired by the NRCC model could prove relevant.

31 Jonathan Stevenson, “Jihad and Piracy in Somalia”, Survival 52 (1), 2010. 32 Brooke Smith-Windsor (Ed.), AU-NATO Collaboration: Implications and Prospects, Rome, NATO Defense College, Forum Paper n. 22, February 2012, p. 18. 33 Aaron Willschick, “In Too ‘DEEP.’ NATO as an Institutional Educator”, Atlantic Council of , 22 February 2013.

11 Fig. 3 NRCC: Timeline

12