A Comparative Analysis of the Eisenhower

Administration's Responses to Two Strait Crises in 1954-55 and 1958

Motoyuki Takamatsu

The offshoreislands in the Taiwan Straithad annoyed the EisenhowerAdministration twice in eightyears. This paper aims at clarifyingwhich of the crisesof 1954-55 and 1958 had broughtthe UnitedStates to the brinkof war with China and ledthe Eisenhower Administrationto be fullycommitted to defenseof the offshore islands.For reasonsof space,my comparativeanalysis will be limited to thefollowing questions: (1) How did theEisenhower Administra- tion respond to each crisis;(2) Who took the initiativein coping with the offshoreislands issue and bringingthe crisisto an end; and (3) To what extentwas the possibleuse of nuclearweapons considered.

I. How Did the Eisenhower Administration Respond to Each Crisis?

During the whole period of the firstTaiwan Straitcrisis of 1954- 55, the Eisenhower Administration'sposition regarding the defense of the offshoreislands swung between noncommitment and fullcom- mitment. Until the 18th of January, 1955, when a Chinese Communist force of four thousand men captured the island of Ichiang, the basicassumption of the Eisenhower Administrationtoward the offshore islands was that the United States would not commit itselfto defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Within the administrationthere were intensivediscussions regarding this assumption before and after the Chinese shellingstarted on September 3, 1954. A National Security

129 Council (NSC) meeting was held on September 12 to consider a U.S. course of action in response to the Chinese attack. According to his talking paper, Secretary of State ' position was that Quemoy could not be held indefinitely without a general war with Communist China. There would be serious attack on the Administration, and a sharply divided Congress and nation, if the President sought to use his authority to order U.S. forces to defend Quemoy and Tachen, which were not demonstrably essential to the defense of Formosa. Dulles also feared that under present circum- stances a commitment to defend Quemoy would alienate world opinion and put a strain on U.S. allies1). Basically President Eisen- hower agreed with Dulles' view.. On the other hand, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were split over defense of the offshore islands. The majority view of the JCS was that initially, at any rate, the United States could provide an adequate defense of these islands with forces that were available in the Western Pacific at the present time2). However, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army, dissented from this majority view, believing that any of these offshore islands was not of sufficient military importance to warrant commitment of United States forces to hold them3). Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson had the same view as Ridgway. Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, pointed out at the 213th meeting of the NSC on September 9 that the chief uses of the offshore islands in the past had been to provide a base for guerrilla operations. There had been no guerrilla operations against the mainland for about a year. Hence, the islands no longer really served this purpose4). Because of the low importance of the offshore islands, the NSC meeting decided to bring the Taiwan Strait issue before the , based on Dulles' recommendation. Such U.S. intention to avoid a commitment to defense of the offshore islands were reflected in the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed on December 2, 1954. V.K. Wellington Koo Papers deposited at Columbia University Library indicated that the Eisenhower Admin- istration successfully resisted the Chinese Nationalists' demand for a clear statement as to American intention to defend the offshore

130 islands5). Dulles believed that this defense treaty would be able to deter the Chinese attack against Formosa and even the offshore islands. In this regard the Eisenhower Administration was and continued to be optimistic about the deterrent effect of the defense treaty until the 18th of January, 1955. The Chinese Communist's sudden occupation of the island of Ichiang was an unexpected and complete shock to all policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration. The Formosa Resolution, which would give the President authority to commit American armed forces to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, could be interpreted as Eisenhower's and Dulles' strong reaction. In particular, this incident forced Dulles to change his basic assumption regarding the defense of the offshore islands. He wanted the U.S. to be fully committed of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Therefore, Dulles would have liked to include the two islands in the Resolution. On the other hand, Eisenhower's position was between non-commitment to the defense of the offshore islands and limited commitment. The President wanted an ambiguous statement6). In the end, the Resolu- tion avoided clarfying United States intentions to defend Quemoy and Matsu as follows: "The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores." In the case of the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, the Eisenhower Administration coped with the offshore islands issue by basing itself on a different assumption, compared with the 1954-55 crisis. For the Eisenhower Administration's policy-makers, the major issue in the 1958 crisis was not whether or not the United States should defend the offshore islands, but how the islands should be defended. It is important to note that the formal position of the Eisenhower Administration toward the offshore islands had already been decided by the National Security Council on October 4, 1957. According to the newly declassified document, the NSC meeting amended NSC 5503 on "U.S. policy toward Formosa and the Govern- ment of the Republic of China" and subsequently approved NSC 5723. It clarified the American intention to:

131 Seek to preserve through the United Nations if appropriate, the status quo of the GRC-held offshore islands. Provide to the GRC forces, military equipment and training to assist them to defend such offshore islands, using Taiwan as a base. U.S. forces will be used to assist the Chinese Nationalists to defend GRC-held offshore islands from Chinese Communist attack whenever the President judges such action to be re- quired or appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus7).

Therefore, most discussion during the first two weeks of the crisis centered on the problem of to what extent the United States should assist in defending the offshore islands and what type of response should be made to the attempted Chinese invasion of Quemoy and Matsu. With respect to the above issues, there were a series of important decision at the White House, made by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high-ranking officials at the State and Defense Departments. The first important decision was made at a White House meeting on August 25, regarding military instruction from Washington to the Commanders. President Eisenhower approved a draft message to CINCPAC and the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC) proposed by the JCS. It asked for an American military buildup in the Taiwan Strait and preparation for naval escort to the offshore islands in anticipation of continued Chinese Communist attack. The message as approved contained the following points: (a) Reinforce U.S. air defense capability and prepare to assume U.S. responsibility for air defense of Taiwan; (b) Advise if augmentation from the Continental United States is needed to implement U.S. responsibility for air defense of Taiwan; (c) Prepare to escort and protect supply ships to the offshore islands; (d) Augment the Seventh Fleet if necessary; (e) Sail the U.S.S. Midway from Pearl Habor; and (f) In the event that a major attack seriously endangers the offshore islands, prepare to assist the GRC including attack on coastal air bases. It is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons to extend deeper into Chinese Communist territory if necessary8).

132 The consensus of this White House meeting was that U.S. defense should be limited to Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and the five principal islands of the Matsu group. Consequently, the decision was made to specifically exclude from the U.S. interest the Islands of Erh-tan and Ta-tan of the Quemoy group and other small islands in order to avoid full commitment9). Following the White House meeting on August 25, the Eisenhower Administration's policymakers turned their attention to the issue of to what extent the United States should participate in defending the offshore islands. In particular, they had to consider the question of what precise form the escort should take so that the Chinese Nationalists could maintain a supply line to Quemoy. Should United States ships escort all the way into the offshore islands? On August 29, President Eisenhower met with Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, General Nathan F. Twining, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and Allen Dulles, to decide the extent of the U.S. convoy operation. There were exten- sive discussions with respect to possible U.S. courses of action against Chinese attack and the extent of the American convoy operation. In the end it was agreed that escort and protection could be authorized to the extent deemed militarily necessary and beyond Chinese Nationalist's capabilities, but confined to international waters (that is, within three miles of Quemoy)10). Despite this decision to confine U.S. escorting and convoying activities to within three miles of Quemoy, it was clear that the Eisenhower Administration was moving closer toward a complete involvement in defense of Quemoy. A third important decision, to issue a formal statement of U.S. commitment to defense of the offshore islands, was made on September 4 when Dulles met Eisenhower at Newport. After meet- ing with the President, Dulles released his prepared statement. In this statement the Eisenhower Administration formally recognized. that the securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu was in- creasingly becoming related to the defense of Taiwan. It also warned that the "naked use of force" would bring widespread use of force in the Far East which would endanger vital free world positions and the security of the United States. This decision to issue the Newport statement constituted the Eisenhower Administration's serious

133 effortto convey the American determinationto defend Quemoy11). By the way it is important to note that the original draft of the Newport statement had already been discussed at the meeting be- tween Dulles and military leaders on September 3, prior to his visit to Newport. After the White House meeting of August 29, the military leaders started to consider the contingency plan in the event of a Chinese invasion of Quemoy12). In the course of the contingency planning they came to fear that the local commanders in the Taiwan Strait area might not effectively and immediately respond to a sudden attack against Quemoy, and that this might happen at a time when the President was inaccessible for a brief period. This issue was discussed at the office of the Secretary of State between the State Department officials and military leaders on September 5, and the final decision was left to the White House meeting held the following day. A discussion paper submitted by the JCS contained the following points: (1) In the event of a major emergency arising from an attack on Taiwan and the offshore islands moving so rapidly that it would not permit consultation with the President, JCS would take the following actions on behalf of the Secretary of Defense-a) CINCPAC would be authorized to augment U.S. forces engaged in the defense of Taiwan from resources under his own command; b) all U.S. forces worldwide would be alerted; and c) oppose any major attack on Taiwan and attack mainland bases with all CINCPAC forces that can be brought to bear; (2) In the event of a major landing attack on the offshore islands, authority for the following actions would be desirable-a) approval of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force's striking enemy forces and mainland targets; and b) authority for U.S. forces to strike with conventional weapons any Chinese Communist assault of major proportions moving against the offshore islands; and (3) Use of atomic weapons and U.S. air attack in support the Chinese Nationalist Air Force in 2(a) [i.e., in case of attack only on Quemoy] above, as necessary, only as approved by the President13). After all, faced with strong demands from military leaders, Eisenhowever approved the emergency action only "under those circumstances when time does not permit securing the Presi- dent's specific approval in each case."14) This decision to delegate a

134 part of President authority to commanders in the field, for emergency action in defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands , meant that the Eisenhower Administration might be drawn into direct war with China. Looking back upon the decision-making process during the first two weeks of the second crisis of 1958, it is clear that military people played a more active role in drawing the United States into full involvement in defense of offshore islands. This point should not be overlooked in analyzing the Eisenhower Administration's response to the Taiwan Strait crisis.

II. Who Took the Initiative in Coping with the Offshore Islands Issue and Bringing the Crisis to an End?

One of the peculiar aspects of the Eisenhower Administration's response to the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-55 was that Eisen- hower's and Dulles' roles in handling it were different before and after the Chinese occupation of the island of Ichiang on January 18, 1955. For example, Dulles played a more active part in bringing the Taiwan Strait issue before the United Nations and concluding the defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. On the other hand, Eisenhower was a rather reserved player. However, these two top policymakers' roles became reversed after occupation of Ichiang island. President Eisenhower now acted as a decisive player who tried to seek for a solution to the dilemma. In particular, the evacuation of Nationalist troops from the Tachen Island was carried out under Eisenhower's strong leadership. At the White House meeting on January 21, the military leaders were against evacuation plan. Admiral Robert B. Carney pointed out the difficulties of evacuation, because a ship sunk at the entrance to the harbor would hamper the operation. Eisenhower critically replied that someone had made a grave error in allowing that situation to exist. At the conclusion of the meeting, Eisenhower still wanted to go ahead with the evacuation plan15). Further, Eisenhower's decisive effort to avoid American involve- ment in defense of the offshore islands, and bring the crisis to an end, were shown in the final stage of the first crisis. When the

135 evacuation operation from Tachens started, President Eisenhower turned attention to the problem of the other offshore islands. He gradually began to reevaluate the military importance of the offshore islands. At the meeting with legislative leaders on February 1, Eisenhower said that "if Chiang could not protect the island (Quemoy) with his troops plus assistance from American air and naval powers, then I did not think Quemoy would be worth holding."16) By early March, 1955, Eisenhower came to have a solid view on the offshore islands issue. Dulles' gloomy report on the military situa- tions around the offshore islands, after his return from an Asia trip, moved Eisenhower to call a special meeting with his top advisers on March 11. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss whether the military situation around Quemay and Matsu was really as serious as Dulles reported. At this meeting Eisenhower clarified his desire to avoid U.S. involvement in defense of the offshore islands. He decided to send his trusted assistant, Andrew Goodpaster, Jr. to Honolulu to examine the whole matter related to the offshore islands with Admiral Felix Stump17). Based on Goodpaster's optimistic report Eisenhower quickly moved to settle the offshore islands issue. On April 1 he again met at the White House with his major advisers including John F. Dulles, Charles E. Wilson, George M. Humphrey, Arthur W. Rad- ford, Herbert Hoover, Jr., Robert B. Anderson, and Andrew Good- patser, Jr. For the first time, President Eisenhower clearly expressed his idea to solve the issue. His only solution was to persuade Chiang Kaishek to withdraw voluntarily from the offshore islands, in return for the U.S. offer to deploy American forces up to a division and also an air wing on Formosa, if Quemoy and Matsu were made outposts rather strongholds and symbols of prestige18). He really wanted to avoid making the two island groups another Dienbienphu19). In the end, Arthur W. Radford and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson were sent to Taipei because they seemed to have the confidence of Chiang. The purpose of their mission was to persuade Chiang to withdraw a large portion of his troops from Quemoy voluntarily20). However, according to Eisenhower's point of view, this mission was a complete failure. He was disappointed to read telegrams from Radford and Robertson about the meeting

136 with Chiang. In his letter to Dulles , President Eisenhower express his serious disappointment:

I had hoped that the Gimo himself might have seen the wisdom of trimming the garrision on the offshore islands

down to the leanest fighting weight possible , organizing them highly, and in the meantime making the necessary public statements that would clearly set forth his determination to fight for the islands' positions, but not to make them the sine qua non of the ChiNats' existence21).

Faced with Eisenhower's decisive leadership, what Dulles did was to shift his hard-line position toward defense of the offshore islands. President Eisenhower also showed his decisive leadership to the military leaders concerning Admiral Carney's careless statement to the effect that Communist China would invade the Matsu Islands by April 15 and invade Quemoy within a month after that. Ike got angry at it and fiercely talked to Hagerty:

By God, this has got to stop. These fellows like Carney and Ridgway don't yet realize that their services have been integrated. •cThey are giving just their own service's view-

point and presenting it as the entire Administration view- point. •cI am going to Radford in half an hour, and I am going to tell him to tell Carney to stop talking22).

Is Eisenhower's strong leadership in the first crisis also evident in his handling of the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958? Prof. Stephen E. Ambrose has emphasized Eisenhower's initiative in bring- ing the crisis to an end in his recent book entitled Eisenhower: The President23). However, his illustration does not seem to tell the full story. The real fact is that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles worked cooperatively to seek for the practical solution of reducing the military tension over the offshore islands. Both suggested their own ideas and tried to integrate them into a proposal which would be presented to Chiang Kai-shek. In particular, during the month of September, after the convoy operation started, they were struggling for a way out of the labyrinth of the offshore

137 islands issue. According to Dulles' telephone conversation of Septem- ber 12, Eisenhower confessed that it was a dead-end situation: "Frankly we would be very happy if Chiang would himself of his own volition strengthen his position by withdrawing, but we have not found a way to do this without destroying the will to resist. We have been trying to for several years but have met a blank walL."24) However, by mid-September Eisenhower and Dulles gradually came to have their own idea of how to solve the offshore islands issue. For example, on September 16 Dulles called Christian A. Herter and expressed his general feeling regarding the above issue: "We should call for a cease -fire and steps should be taken to limit the provocations and reduce military forces on the islands and on the mainland opposite."25) Next day in the telephone conversation with Dulles, President Eisenhower for the first time hinted at the possible offer of American landing craft to Chiang Kai-shek in return for reducing the garrison on the offshore islands20). One week later the President presented his idea to his Secretary of State in more detail. According to his explanation, Eisenhower's thoughts were that Chiang might be sold on the proposition that he would be in a better position to realize his purpose of retaining an opportunity for returning to the mainland in the event of internal disorder, if he should acquire from the United States a strong amphibious lift capacity and simultaneously remove all or nearly all his garrison from the offshore islands27). What Eisenhower wanted was that the offshore islands should be treated as outposts and not another Dienbienphu28). On the other hand, Dulles quickly responded to the Chinese announcement of a cease-fire on October 6, 1958 and held a series of meetings with other government officials to reach a consensus over the favorable solution of the offshore islands. On the afternoon of October 8 Dulles mentioned at the meeting of the State Department officials that the United States might use its leverage to gain a reduc- tion in the size of the Quemoy garrison. Going further, he suggested that the offshore islands might be demilitarized if Chiang pledged not to seize them29). Two days after the State Department meeting, he met with the JCS and other administration officials at the Pentagon

138 to discuss how large a garrison at Quemoy was necessary. The meeting concluded with a general consensus that it would be wise to wait until the artillery fire "quieted" and then withdraw at least two thirds of the Chinese Nationalist troops from Quemoy30. According to Goodpaster's memorandum of a conference with the President, dated October 15, Eisenhower was pleased to hear that his people had reached a consensus about getting out troops without loss of face in the offshore islands area31). The final task of integrating two U.S. top policy-makers' ideas into one proposal was left to Dulles. He also assumed the difficult responsibility of persuading stubborn Chiang to accept a partial reduction of his forces at Quemoy. In order to prepare for the meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Dulles wrote a talking paper outlining his thought on what the Chinese Nationalist policy should be. After attending the funeral of Pope Pius XII at Rome, he arrived at Taipei on October 21. He held three meetings with Chiang. At the second meeting Dulles read to Chiang the full text of his talking paper which he had prepared and strongly pressed him to create a peaceful image and make clear its willingness to accept any solution of the offshore islands problem. He urged that forces on the offshore islands should be revised to make them more mobile and that the Republic of China also should accept any solution of the offshore islands problem that would not turn them over to the Chinese Communists32). At the third meeting Chiang Kai-shek stressed that there was a need to strengthen the Quemoy garrison with more guns. Dulles replied that the United States was considering supplying more guns in return for a reduction of 15,000 to 20,000 troops. However, he denied the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons because they would kill most of the people on Quemoy by fallout33). Based on points agreed at the Dulles-Chiang meeting, negotia- tion continued between the head of the U.S. Army Military Assistance advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalist Chief of Staff, with respect to how much to reduce the garrisons at Quemoy and Matsu and the amount of U.S. military aid in its return. On November 17 a formal agreement was signed that provided for an increase in artillery for the offshore islands and withdrawal of not less than 15,000 men. The target date for com-

139 pletion was to be June 30,195834). As described above, it is fair to say that in the final stage of the second Taiwan crisis Dulles displayed a more realistic and pragmatic attitude toward seeking for the workable solution of the offshore islands issue.

III. To What Extent Was the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons Considered?

In the first Taiwan Straight crisis of 1954-55 there were no extensive discussions within the Eisenhower Administration with re- spect to the possible use of nuclear weapons. As far as the available documents are concerned, we have not known the existence of a contingency plan in defense of the offshore islands based on the assumption of the possible use of nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower Administration had once discussed the problem of using nuclear weapons only after Secretary Dulles returned from his trip to Asia in early March 1955. At the National Security Council meeting on March 10, Dulles raised the question of the possible use of nuclear weapons in his gloomy report on the military situations around Quemoy and Matsu. He emphasized that a decision should be made on whether atomic weapons would be used tactically in defense. The need for such use, to make up for the deficiency in conventional forces, might outweigh the repercussive effect of such use upon free world nations in Europe and the Far East, especially Japan, where attempts might be made to immobilize U.S. forces35). In response to the Dulles' argument, Eisenhower had called the specially meeting on the afternoon of the following day to discuss the military situation in the offshore islands; the meeting was attended by John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Arthur W. Radford, Nathan F. Twining, Robert B. Carney, Andrew Goodpaster, and Robert Cutler. At this meeting the issue of using nuclear weapons was also raised. Strangely, Dulles' view was completely different from what he emphasized at the NSC meeting the day before. He now cautioned that atomic weapons, if possible, should not be used during the ensuing 40-60 days and the United States also should do its best

140 to avoid intervention of any kind on Quemoy and Matsu . Eisen hower agreed that we could not use atomic weapons during this period without an adverse impact on the Western European Treaties which were to be ratified36). The two top policymakers' unwillingness to use nuclear weapons for political reasons was also supported by the technical assessment by Allen Dulles, the CIA Director. According to the Hagerty Diary on March 29, Dulles explained to him that the very nearness of Quemoy to the mainland would make it difficult to use such weapons without risking the result that Quemoy itself would be caught in the fallout pattern if the winds were wrong37). As far as the issue of using nuclear weapons was concerned, the Eisenhower Administration's response to the second crisis of 1958 was totally different from that to the first crisis of 1954-55. Most serious consideration was given during the first two weeks of the second Taiwan Strait crisis. For example, with Eisenhower vacation- ing at Newport, a heated discussion occurred at the meeting on September 2 when Dulles and the entire members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff met. Attendants' views were split regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons in the crisis. According to the State Department Memorandum of Conversation of that day cited in Halperin's research paper, General Twining and Admiral Burke strongly urged that it would be necessary to strike at Chinese Communist airfields and shore batteries with small atomic weapons. In particular, Twining declared that the use of conventional weapons would mean protracted U.S. involvement in another Korean-type conflict. Two military leaders thus were against the idea that the U.S. should depend initially on conventional forces. On the other hand, General Maxwell D. Taylor of the Army disagreed with the extensive reliance on the use of nuclear weapons in the crisis. Whether the United States had to use nuclear weapons would depend upon military situations around the offshore islands. He distinguished between three types of attacks or situations: (1) a clear Chinese Communist amphibious attack on the offshore islands; (2) a protracted shelling operation threatening a breakdown in morale of the Chinese Nationalist defenders; and (3) heavy and continuing air bombardment. In terms of the first situation, Taylor

141 argued that it could be beaten back by the Chinese Nationalist with conventional weapons and assistance from the United States. In case of the second situation, Taylor agreed that a dramatic decline of Nationalist morale would require nuclear weapons. Finally, in terms of the third situation he also admitted that seven to ten kiloton air-burst nuclear weapons would certainly have to be used. Among attendants, Dulles' view was rather close to that of Taylor. He warned that a strong U.S. stand, including the use of nuclear weapons, would probably lead Japan to demand withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan, and that consequently they would request cessation of U.S. support operations. Dulles' position was that, although it was not necessary to use nuclear weapons immediately, they would have to be used ultimately against a determined enemy in the case of prolonged Chinese conventional operations. This reflected the general consensus among the participants38). That same pattern, developed at the meeting of September 2, repeated itself in the course of drafting the contingency plan. After the White House meeting on August 29, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to consider a contingency plan in the event of a Chinese invasion of Quemoy. The original draft of the Joint Staff proposed: "If the fact of U .S. participation does not cause the Chinese Com- munists to resist from invading Quemoy, it is inevitable that we will use atomic weapons against air bases on the Chinese main- land." The Air Force agreed to this draft, arguing that there would be a need for an immediate counterattack with atomic weapons in the event of an invasion. On the other hand, the Army made a counterproposal that American participation in defense of the off- shore islands should be gradual, and that initial action should be also conventional. It strongly urged that atomic weapons should be used "only as a last resort." Eventually, on the morning of September 6, JCS-2118/110 was approved with the compromise statement on nuclear weapons which indicated: "it is most probable that atomic weapons would be used."39) Despite minor change, this statement clearly reflected military leaders' belief that nuclear weapons would have to be used very quickly in the event of a Chinese Communist attempt to invade Quemoy. As described above, although the duration of the second Taiwan

142 Strait crisis of 1958 was short in comparison with the crisis of 1954-55, the United States was fully committed to the defense of the offshore islands, and was dangerously drawn to the brink of war with China, because of the military leaders' active role in coping with the crisis.

Conclusion

What kind of conclusion can be drawn from the above compara- tive analysis? The first conclusion relates to the recent revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower presidency. As classified documents of the Eisen- hower Administration including the Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries became available to researchers in the late 1970s, American his- torians began to portray Eisenhower as an active president, em- phasizing his strong leadership in dealing with difficult issues. For example, Prof. Ambrose's recent book on Eisenhower is typical of such an illustration. However, the sudden positive reappraisal of the Eisenhower presidency has led to an underestimation of Dulles' role in the decision-making process. However, my comparative analysis of two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55 and 1958 shows that a revisionist one-sided illustration which stresses Eisenhower's leadership does not tell the full story regarding the Ike-Dulles relationship. The real fact is that Eisenhower and Dulles depended on each other in coping with difficult issues and making critical decisions during each crisis. Without his Secretary of State, Eisenhower could not have acted as an active president. On the other hand, the importance of Dulles as Secretary of State in implementing foreign policy was strengthened by both his close relation with the President and Ike's unshakable trust in his Secretary of State. The second conclusion is concerned with the issue of who played an important role in making critical decisions during each crisis. During the eight years the Eisenhower Administration had made several critical decisions including the military non-intervention in the First in 1954, the U.S. refusal to finacially assist in building the Aswan High Dam, dispatch of American Marine Corps to Lebanon in 1958, and etc. Past studies of the Eisenhower Administration's foreign policy have tended to illustrate its decision-

143 making process during each crisis as the exclusive show of the top policymakers, while neglecting the role of military leaders. However, it is important for us to note that most of the critical decisions like those during two Taiwan Strait crises had a military dimension as well as a purely diplomatic one. Therefore, it was unavoidable for military leaders including members of the JCS to become involved in the decision-making process each time. As the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 showed, the military played a more crucial role than Secretary Dulles by defining the options presented for Eisen- hower's consideration. In addition, we should not overlook the fact that there were continuing tensions between Eisenhower, who would always seek for a middle course of action during each crisis, and military leaders who were in favor of drastic solutions. In this regard students of the Eisenhower Administration should pay more attention to the triangular relationship between Eisenhower, Dulles, and the military than simply to the Ike-Dulles one.

NOTES

1) U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952- 1954, Vol. XIV, China and Japan, Part I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1986), p.611. 2) Ibid., pp. 587-88. 3) Ibid., p.586. 4) Ibid. 5) See the memorandum for the record of a conference on the negotiations of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty between K.C. Yeh, and V.K. Wellington Koo, and Walter S. Robertson on November 4, 1954, Wellington Koo Papers, Columbia University Library. 6) Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), p.232. 7) Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 338th meeting, October 2, 1957, Folder of Record of Actions by NSC 1957 (3), Box 2, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File (Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953-1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas). 8) Morton Halperin's research paper entitled "The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis", Rand Memorandum. RM-4900-ISA, for the Assistant Secretary of De- fense, December 1966, p.113. This paper was declassified in 1978, but some portions still remained classified. Five years ago I happened to

144 obtain the xeroxed copy of his paper without any exempted portions . My paper is based on it. See the first quarterly microfiche collection of the 1979 Declassified Documents Reference System . 9) Memorandum of Conference with the President of August 25, 1958, dated on August 29, 1958, Folder of Formosa 1958 (3), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File . 10) Memorandum of Conference with the President, August 29, 1958, Folder of Formosa 1958 (3), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File . 11) Statement by Secretary of State Dulles at U .S. Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island, September 4, 1958, Folder of White House-Meetings with the President, July 1958-December 31, 1958 (7), Box 7, White House Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers (Eisenhower Library) . 12) Halperin's research paper, p.279. 13) Discussion Paper (no date), Subject: Authority for emergency action on defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands, Folder of Formosa 1958 (2), Box 10, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 14) Halperin's research paper, pp. 285-86. 15) Ann Whitman's memo of the meeting with the President, January 21, 1955, Folder of Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 16) Hagerty Diary, February 1, 1955 in James C. Hagerty Papers, Eisenhower Library; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Diary of James C. Hagerty: Eisen- hower in Mid-Course, 1954-1955 (Indiana University Press, 1983), p.183. 17) Robert Cutler's Memorandum for the Record, March 11, 1955, Folder of Formosa Visit to CINCPAC 1955 (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 18) Memorandum of Conference with the President of April 1, dated April 4, 1955, Folder of Conference on Formosa, Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 19) Hagerty Diary, February 1, 1955; Ferrell, op. cit., p.224. 20) Memo on the purport of a conversation between Eisenhower and Under Secretary of State Hoover, April 21, 1955, Folder of Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 21) Eisenhower to Dulles, April 26, 1955, Folder of Formosa (2), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 22) Hagerty Diary, March 28, 1955; Ferrell, op. cit., p.218. 23) Ambrose, op. cit., pp. 482-85. 24) Dulles' telephone call to the President, September 12, 1958, Folder of Memoranda of Telephone Conversation-White House, August 1, 1958 to December 5, 1958 (3), Box 13, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers (Eisenhower Library). 25) Dulles' telephone call to Governor Herter, September 16, 1958, Folder of Memoranda of Telephone Conversation-General August 1, 1958 to October 31, 1958 (3), Box 9, Telephone Calls Series, Dulles Papers.

145 26) A telephone call from the President, September 17, 1958, Folder of Memoranda of Telephone Conversation-White House, August 1, 1958 to December 5, 1958 (3), Box 13, Telephone Call Series, Dulles Papers. 27) Memorandum, DDE to Dulles, October 7, 1958, Folder of Goodpaster Briefings September 1958, Box 36, DDE Diaries Series, Ann Whitman File. 28) Halperin's research paper, p.507. 29) Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Highlights of Discussion in Secretary's Office on Future Moves in the Taiwan Strait Situation, October 8, 1958, cited in Halperin's research paper, pp. 504-6. 30) Department of Defense Record of Meeting, October 10, 1958, cited in Halperin's research paper, pp. 506-7. 31) Memorandum of Conference with the President on October 13, 1958, dated October 15, 1958, Folder of Staff Notes October 1958, Box 36, DDE Diaries Series, Ann Whitman File. 32) Draft in Dulles' handwriting in Section IX (Subject File), File of "Rome- Taipei Trip 10/17/58 to 10/24/58", Dulles Papers (Princeton University); Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: The Role of the Republic of China in the Free World, October 22, 1958, 10:30 a.m., cited in Halperin's research paper, p.524. 33) Draft of State Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Communique Defense of Quemoy Use of Nuks, October 22, 1958, 7:00 p.m., cited in Halperin's research paper, pp. 526-27. 34) Halperin's research paper, p.542. 35) Memorandum for the Record at the NSC meeting on March 10, 1955, dated March 11, Folder of Formosa Visit to CINCPAC 1955 (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 36) Robert Cutler's Memorandum for the Record at the White House meeting on March 11, 1955, Folder of Formosa Visit to CINCPAC 1955 (1), Box 9, International Series, Ann Whitman File. 37) Hagerty Diary on March 29, 1955, Hagerty Papers; Ferrell, op. cit., p.220. 38) Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Taiwan Strait Situation, September 2, 1958, cited in Halperin's research paper, pp. 260-67. 39) Army Flimsy, Subject: Taiwan Situation, JCS 2118/110 (U), OPS PLIT/ 52283, September 3, 1958; Memorandum to the Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force, Subject: Taiwan Straits Situation, JCS 2118/110, September 5, 1958; Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, Sub- ject: Taiwan Straits Situation, JCS 2118/110, September 7, 1958 cited in Halperin's research paper, pp. 279-81.

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