MASTER'S THESIS M-813
BEKKEDAHL, Clifford Lewis. INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE DANUBE RIVER SINCE 1815.
The American University, M.A., 1965 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE DANUBE RIVER
SINCE 1815
by cl' L':. BekJcedahl
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
Signatures of Committee :
Chairman: T'KxtU b J Y
/'{P ^ 6 Date: Dean of Æh School
Date AMERICAN UNIVERSITY May, 1965 l i b r a r y
The American University JliN 9 -1965 Washington, D. C. l^ASHiNGTON. D. C. PREFACE
The Danube is the second largest river in Europe and the seventeenth largest in the world. Hailed by Napoleon as the "King of Rivers," it wends its majestic way through the crazy-quilt of races, nations, and cultures of central and southeastern Europe. The river and the great valley it travels have been the stage for much of the conflict and dramatic history of Europe. It has been a silent witness to the struggles of Christendom with the Ottoman Empire— the bloody rivalries between German and Slav and the contemporary onslaught of communist imperialism. The recorded history of each generation of Eastern Europeans forms an indisputable testament to the vital importance of the Danube in the life and progress of this region.
In the twentieth century, the great strides of science, technology, sind economics have complemented and enhanced the potential of this strategic waterway. In the early post-World War II years, the development of this poten tial was stifled by the ideological and political ambitions of the Soviet Union. Recently, however, there has been mounting and unmistakable evidence that the peoples of
Danubia are challenging the sterile aspects of Soviet hegemony. Along the entire course of the river, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, there has been a resurgence of iii commerce, economic development, and physical improvement which could mark the beginning of a new chapter in Danube history. This thesis takes the form of a survey and addresses the important economic and political developments which have occurred in Danube affairs since 1815. At the Congress of
Vienna, the first public acknowledgment of the need for uniform agreement and cooperation in the utilization of international inland waterways was annunciated. While many navigable streams in Europe could be described as inter national, the Danube became a focal point of the struggle to establish these principles. The conflicts, frustrations,
and progress of this implementation will herein be developed
in terms of the formal agreements and accords fashioned by
the leading powers of Europe and, also, by pertinent dis
cussion of the broader political and economic events of the
time in which these agreements were made. The methodology
just described will prove useful until the account reaches
the waning days of World War II. The victorious Russian
armies rolling across Eastern Europe into Germany and Austria
brought to a close an era in Danube affairs spanning 130
years. From 1945 onward, the problem is best viewed in
terms of the Cold War, Soviet efforts to dominate Eastern
Europe, and the significant changes that took place within
the communist bloc in the decade of 1950. iv
Research material to satisfy the requirements of this line of inquiry are plentiful with the exception of the bleak years of Stalin’s postwar rule of Eastern Europe. The gaps in information created by the rigid and isolationist rulers of the period have been slowly filled in recent years by scholars on both sides of the Iron Curtain— at least to the extent necessary for fulfillment of this proposal. Any errors in continuity or substance lay with the author and not with the availability of resesirch material. TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE ...... il
CHAPTER
I. THE RIVER ...... - ...... 1
II. HISTORY 1815-1945 6
The Nineteenth Century ...... 6
The Twentieth Century ...... 13
Additional Factors ...... 24
III. THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE ..... 30
The Prelude ...... 30
The Conference ...... 38
The Outcome ...... 50
IV. THE DANUBE COMMISSION ...... 5 3
The Early Years ...... 53
The Middle Years ...... 62
Recent Activities ...... 72
V. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT ...... 79
Postwar Conditions ...... - 79
Physical Improvement Projects ...... 85
C a n a l s ...... 85
Hydroelectric Projects ...... 93
Iron G a t e s ...... 95
Depth Control ...... 98 vi
CHAPTER PAGE
Danube Traffic ...... 99 Recent Regional and National Development . . . 100
G e r m a n y ...... 100
Austria ...... 101
Czechoslovakia...... 103
H u n g a r y ...... 104
Yugoslavia ...... 105
R u m a n i a ...... 106
B u l g a r i a ...... 108
The U S S R ...... 108
Sta t i s t i c s ...... 108
VI. CONCLUSIONS ...... 120
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 127 LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
I. Total Traffic on the Danube for the Period
1950-1955 Ill
II. Total Traffic on the Danube by Country for
the Years 1959— 1961 112
III. Commercial Traffic on the Danube for the Years
1950—1952 by Country of Origin and
Destination ...... 113
IV. Commercial Traffic on the Danube for the Years
195 3-1955 by Country of Origin and
Destination ...... 114
V. Commerce between Countries, Excluding Cabotage,
Transported on the Danube for the Years
1959-1961 115
VI. Goods Transiting the Danube by Sectors for the
Period 1959-1961 ...... 116
VII. Commercial Traffic Transiting the Sulina
Channel in 1959-1961 ...... 117 CHAPTER I
THE RIVER
Plowing in a generally west to east direction, the
Oauiube begins its long journey deep in the Black Forest of
Southern Germany. Continuing eastward, the river then passes through or forms the boundary of seven central and eastern European nations. The river is considered commer cially navigable from Dim, Germany, to its mouths at the
Black Sea, a distance of over 1,740 miles. When discussing river shipping, one considers that the Danube consists of two sections: the fluvial Danube and the maritime Danube.
The fluvial Danube starts at Ulm; and, after passing through the southeastern portion of Germany, it enters
Austria, flowing eastward through the northern section of the country. The two major Austrian cities of Linz and
Vienna lay in its path which gives witness to the river’s importance, even at this early stage of its progress through
Eastern Europe. Entering Czechoslovakia at Bratislava, the river flows a short distSLnce and, then at Komarno, it begins to describe the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. At Szob,
Hungary, it takes departure from Czechoslovakia and, running
east for about fifteen miles, turns sharply to the south and
flows to Budapest. From Budapest, the river flows south bisecting Hungary. The Danube exits the fertile Hungarian 2 plains about ten miles south of Mohacs aind enters Yugo slavia, where it soon begins to follow a southeasterly course. The river flows for approximately 236 miles through the rich Voivodena section of Yugoslavia and at the north eastern corner of Yugoslavia, near the small city of Bela
Crkva, it begins to form the Yugoslav-Rumanian border. At this juncture, the Danube starts its run through the Balkan foothills and then through the narrow defile between the
Balkan and Carpathian mountains. This action of the river, known as the Iron Gates, is world reknown for its hazardous and narrow passage. About twenty miles south of the Iron
Gates, the river leaves Yugoslavia and forms the border of
Rumeuiia and Bulgaria. From this point onward, the river flows eastward peacefully for 290 miles through the fertile
Rumanian and Bulgarian countryside. At Silestria, Bulgaria, the river takes leave of Bulgaria; and, after a short run eastward, it turns sharply to the north and moves sluggishly through the Rumanian lowlands to the port city of Braila.
The maritime Danube covers only a short distance of the river. From Braila to Galatu, Rumania, the flow is northward; and then the river makes its final turn to the east and forms the boundary between Rumania and the Ukraine
SSR. The river breaks into three sepairate brainches prior to emptying into the Black Sea. Each of these arms presents serious drawbacks to commercial navigation. The northernmost 3 channel, the Kilia, is the deepest cut, but its mouth is extremely unstable and subject to rapid shoaling. The middle arm, the Sulina, is not in its natural state deep enough for safe navigation. Constant dredging is necessary to keep the channel open to commercial vessels. Despite the requirement for continuous maintenance, this is the channel most frequently used by sea-going traffic. The southernmost branch, the St. Georges, is the shallowest and most sinuous channel and, consequently, it is impracticable for deep draft shipping.
The entire delta is a forbidding area with marginal economic potential. The region is isolated from the Rumanian road and rail network by extensive swamp and marsh lands.
The meeting of maritime and river shipping takes place up river at the more economically-favorable locations of the port cities.
Conditions for commercial navigation vary considerably along the river. The principal factor in this variation is that of depth. In addition to the natural fall of the river bed to the sea, the water level is susceptible to depth fluctuations caused by rain, flood, drought, and ice.
Generally, the river is subject to two periods of low water and one of high water per year. Low water occurs in the late
summer, early fall and again in midwinter when ice lowers the water level. The spring rains and thaw account for the high 4 water period. Ice and other low water conditions reduce overall shipping on the Danube to an average of 302 days a year. Periods of abnormally low water in the fall can have disastrous economic effects upon the movement of the har vests in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgeuria, Up river from Budapest, traffic is frequently disrupted by seasonal low water and naturally shallow sections. The sec tion between Budapest and the Iron Gates is the most stable, being less susceptible to fluctuation and relatively easy to control artificially.
Navigational conditions in the Iron Gates section will be treated separately in a later chapter. Suffice it to say that in every respect this section has been a bottle neck to transportation for hundreds of years.
The river from Turnu—Severin to Braila is the final
leg of the Danube accessible only to river craft. Flowing along the edge and through the Rumanian plain, its slope is gentle and current moderate. Numerous islands and secondary
arms and channels are found throughout this section. Con ditions here are more suitable for navigation than any found
on the upper river. The depth generally remains in excess
of two meters and requires little control by artificial means.
In the maritime section of the river, the problem of
depth control arises only in the delta. Depths ranging from
twenty to twenty-eight feet are found all along the maritime 5 reach and ships up to ten thousemd gross tons have been known to transit these waters. Once through the Sulina channel, experienced mariners find few hazards on the re maining ninety-eight miles.
Physical obstacles and drawbacks are plentiful and much of the river's great potential is squandered in flood and drought. Nevertheless, these problems are technically manageable in the modern world. What has always been the major and insurmountable handicap is the inability of men to join hands in common exploitation of this natural resource.
It remains to be seen whether current institutions are cap able first of enduring and secondly of generating the necessary forward momentum for this purpose. CHAPTER II
HISTORY 1815-1915
The Nineteenth Century The history of international and non-riparian par ticipation in the operation and administration of the Danube
River begins at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The partici pants of this famous convention established, inter alia, a number of principles which pertained to the navigation of rivers that crossed or separated several states. In essence, they stated that navigation
shall be entirely free, and shall not, in respect to commerce be prohibited to anyone; it being understood that the regulations established with regard to the police of this navigation shall be respected, as they will be framed alike for all and as favorable to the commerce of all nations.1
The Congress gave understanding that soon after termi nation of the conference the great powers and other inter ested parties would gather to codify these principles into a treaty or body of public law. Once ratified, these acts would then apply to the various rivers not covered by 2 previously-existent international agreements. Many years
Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, United StatesDepartment of âtate. Documents and State Papers, Volume I, No. 4 (Washington: Government Printing Office, July, 1948), p. 250.
^Ibid. 7
passed, however, before this understanding was acted upon
and then only as a result of the Crimean War.
The General Treaty of Peace between Great Britain,
Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey,
signed at Paris on March 30, 1856, contained five articles
dealing with navigation on the Danube. These articles re
affirmed the principles expressed in 1815 pertaining to river navigation and stated that henceforth they applied to
the Danube and its mouths. The contracting powers agreed
that these articles were now part of the Public Law of 3 Europe and placed them under their guarantee.
The peace treaty established two commissions to carry
out the necessoury arrangements for compliance with the
intent and spirit of free navigation. The first commission,
the European Commission, consisted of representatives of
Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Saurdinia,
and Turkey. This commission was chaurged with the immediate
responsibility of clearing the mouth of the Danube and then
insuring that it remained free of navigational obstructions.
The commission was authorized to levy dues to vessels for
the purpose of supporting its activity, with the stipulation
that charges were to be equitable for the flags of all
nations. This commission was envisioned as a temporary
^Ibid. 8 organization to be dissolved at the end of two years when its residual functions would then be Absorbed by the perma nent commission of the river. The second and permanent commission had a membership consisting of representatives from Austria, Bavaria, the
Sublime Porte, and Wurtemberg. Additional members from the three Danubian principalities were accepted after approval by the Porte.The permanent commission was assigned specific duties and responsibilities relating to police functions, works projects, and rules of navigation.
The Treaty of Paris proved to be a disappointment to those interested in free navigation on the entire Danube.
Prior to the Crimean War, Russia controlled the mouth of the
Danube. By exercising the concept of free navigation and creating an international commission for its enforcement on the maritime river, the victorious powers handed the Russians
a serious political defeat. The principles of international
and non-riparian participation were established, however,
only upon the maritime reaches of the river; and, further more, the permanent River Commission, dominated by Austria, became the eventual overseer of this stretch. "In other
words, a rule which was solemnly declared to be a principle
"^Ibid., p. 251. of public law was found in practice to be applicable only at
the expense of a power which had been defeated in war
The 1856 Treaty did little to spell out, in concrete
terms, the rules, regulations, authority, and responsibili
ties of the two commissions. For the next twenty-seven
years, the great powers, along with those nations having
legitimate interests in Danube navigation, met frequently to
perfect and enlarge upon the administrative regulations of
the river. The results of these meetings were a series of
acts, conventions, and agreements which broadened the scope
of international participation in control of the river.
The first of these acts was signed at Galatz on
November 2, 1865. Called The Public Act Relative to the
Navigation of the Mouth of the Danube, it is noteworthy for
its first article which continued the existence of the
"European Commission.After giving additional life to
this former temporary body, the act went on to detail its
^H. A. Smith, "The Danube," The Year Book of World Affairs 1950 (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 19'SÏÏ), p. 205,
^The European Commission was a novel innovation of the British, designed to stymie Russian violations that would quite likely develop as the result of a normal peace treaty. The Russians could easily obstruct free navigation without providing sufficient cause for reprisal by the con tracting powers. Hence, the European Commission was devised and endowed with the power of direct action. It could carry out the function normally residing with a sovereign state. It had its own personality distinct from that of any of its creators. 10 privileges, responsibilities, and powers. The act also dealt with such matters as regulations concerning infra structure, personnel policies, neutrality of employees, 7 police powers, and the imposition of teuriffs.
In 18 71, the participants in the Treaty of Paris of
1856 signed a stipulation in London. In this stipulation, the life of the European Commission was extended for a period of twelve years. Its new expiration date coincided with the redemption date of a loan contracted by the commis sion. The signatories also recognized the right of the powers improving the cataract section of the Iron Gates to
levy dues to offset the expenses incurred in the improvement efforts.
Territorial positions were changed by the Wair of 1877.
The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 allowed the Russians to regain
Bessarabia, thereby becoming, once again, a riparian state
on the delta section of the river. At the same time, inde
pendence or autonomy conferred upon Serbia, Rumania, and
Bulgaria created three more riparians. Of these, only
Rumania was given a seat on the European Commission. In
addition to these territorial revisions, the Treaty of
Berlin prolonged the life of the European Commission and, in
Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, op. cit., pp. 254-255. 11
Article LV, charged it with the task of drafting, in coop eration with the riparians, a set of regulations governing g navigation from the Iron Gates to Galatz.
An amendment to the Public Act of 1865 was signed at
Galatz on May 28, 1881. This document served to clarify certain issues regarding navigation, police, and health authority vested in the European Commission. Both Russia and Rumania registered reservations in a separate protocol, disputing the competence of the European Commission in parts 9 of their territory. Neither of their reservations were very significant and, in a subsequent treaty, they were satisfactorily resolved.
The last of the major nineteenth century Danube agreements was signed in London on March 19, 1883. This was, with its detailed annexes, a very comprehensive docu ment, oLnd it formally introduced the competence of the Great
Powers to that stretch of river from Braila to the Iron
Gates.
The treaty began by granting an extension of the jurisdiction of the European Commission from Galatz to
Braila.Once again, the life of the commission was
®Ibid., p. 255. ^Ibid., p. 256.
^^Galatz being little more than a village, the exten sion was of minor importance. Braila has always, in prac tice, been the principal point of transshipment. 12 extended— this time for twenty-one years, with tacit pro longation for three years unless one of the signatories proposed a modification. The Russian and Rumanian reserva tions over the competence of the commission, previously the subject of a separate protocol, were satisfactorily re solved. And finally, the regulations for navigation, policing, and supervision, drafted by the commission with the assistance of Serbia and Bulgaria for the middle river, were adopted. These regulations, drawn in accordance with
Article LV of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, were attached as an annex to the basic Treaty of 1883.
The new regulations, reflecting the cumulative ex perience of the European Commission, established a new commission to administer the middle river. Called the
"Mixed Commission," its membership consisted of one delegate from Austria-Hungary, Bulgairia, Rumania, and Serbia. Join ing in all the activities of this new body was one member of the European Commission. This was a revolving position, changing hands every six months, with the exception that any member already represented in the Mixed Commission was not 12 included in the rotation system. The duties and procedures
^^The treaty returned exclusive control of the northern or Kilia branch of the delta to Russia. 12 Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, op. cTtT% pi 558. 13 of the Mixed Commission, outlined in the Treaty Annex, called for meetings to be held twice yesurly, expenses to be defrayed by member contributions on a fixed basis, and deci sions to be made on a majority vote system.
The Mixed Commission, despite its impressive begin ning, met with little success. Rumania was reluctant to submit to Austrian domination in river affairs which was virtually guaranteed by the Austrian monopoly of the post of 13 chairman.
The net result of all efforts toward internationali zation of the river prior to the outbreak of World War I was extremely limited. The entire river upstream from Braila remained subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the bor dering states. International jurisdiction, as exerted by the European Commission, was only in effect on the last one hundred miles from Braila to the Black Sea.
The Twentieth Century
Little change occurred in the administrative status of the Danube until the closing years of World War I. For a brief period of time in 1917 when the Russian Front col lapsed and left Eastern Europe to the mercy of Germany,
13 Gordon E. Sherman, "International Organization of the Danube," The Americeui Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. J^ly, 1^^3, p. 449. 14 there was an attempt by the Germans to disband the European
Commission and replace it with a body consisting of ripari ans and Black Sea states. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed Germany to succeed to the Rumanian position on the
Black Sea, and the Treaty of Bucharest compelled Rumania to agree to abolition of the old river regime in favor of the 14 German plan. In effect, this would have placed complete control of the entire river in German hands. Naturally, this ambitious program did not survive Germany's collapse; a few months later and the question of a Danube authority once again went before a peace conference.
The peace treaties of Versailles, Saint—Germain-en—
Laye, Triauaon, and Neuilly-sur-Seine established the gen eral principles which were, henceforth, to govern navigation on the Danube. The following major points regarding Danube navigation eure quoted from Chapter II of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain—en-Laye :
1. The Danube and its connecting system of navigable rivers and canals were declared "international." Article
291.
2. The nationals, property, and flags of all powers
14 Smith, 0 £. cit., p. 209.
^^Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, op. cTtTI pi 560. 15 were to be treated on a footing of perfect equality, no dis tinction being made between them eind the riparian or the raost-favored-nation. Article 292,
3. No dues of any kind were to be levied along the
river, except those charges, uniform and reasonable, for
services such as warehouses, cranes, quays, and so forth.
Article 296.
4. The European Commission réassumés the powers it
possessed before the war. Nevertheless, as a provisional measure, only representatives of Great Britain, Prsince,
Italy, and Rumania shall constitute this commission.
Article 301.
5. From the point where the competence of the Euro
pean Commission ceases, the Danube system referred to in
Article 291 shall be placed under the administration of an
international commission composed as follows: two represen
tatives of German riparian states; one representative of
each other ripsurian state; one representative of each non
riparian represented on the European Commission. Article
302.
The peace treaties represented an excellent vehicle
for expression of allied concepts of free navigation and
international control of European rivers. The treaties were,
however, merely temporaury expediencies on the subject of
Danube navigation. What was deemed necessary was a whole 16 new convention for the river, auad in 1921 a conference was called for this purpose. On July 23, 1921, an agreement was signed in Paris by
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, and the
Serb-Croat-Slovene states. Called The Convention Institut ing the Definitive Statute of the Danube, i t was hailed as a new beginning by those devoted to internationalization of inland waterways. The Definitive Statute called for crea tion of two commissions. The first was the familiar European
Commission whose jurisdiction continued to be effective from
Braila to the Black Sea. All of the powers, privileges, and responsibilities which had accrued to this body since 1856 were reaffirmed.
The second commission was called the Fluvial Commis sion. First formed in the Versailles treaties' system, it was now formally endowed with functions very neairly the same as its downstream counterpart. Membership in the two com missions remained as stipulated in the peace treaties; however, in the case of the European Commission, an innova tion was made. Article Four of the statute stated that
in the future should a European state demonstrate suf ficient maritime commercial interest at the mouth of
^^Ibid., p. 263. 17
the Danube, it could at its request be accorded a seat on the Commission subject to unanimous approval of the governments already represented.17
Another innovation was the formation of a commission consisting of the two riparians at the Iron Gates section.
Its purpose was to develop and coordinate improvement proj ects in this hazardous section of the river. This new body operated under the auspices of the Fluvial Commission and under certain conditions could be abolished or absorbed by the senior organ. Other subsidiaxy commissions could be constituted to deal with physical hazards to navigation.
Two important differences separated the roles of the
European auid the Fluvial Commissions. The European Commis sion exerted judicial cognizance both in the initiation and appeal while the Fluvial Commission did not. On the fluvial river, these rights were left to the riparian states and/or the League of Nations. Secondly, the European Commission had long enjoyed the status of a sovereign in its juris dictional zone. The Pluvial Commission found that it had to rely on the riparians for executive functions and, thus, it X8 had to be satisfied with a supervisory and corrective role.
In the body of the statute of 1921, such matters as police powers, rules of navigation, dues and tariffs, quaran tines, health, work projects, operating procedures for the
^^Ibid. ^®Smith, op. cit., p. 453, 18 commissions were clearly and carefully defined. As such, if admirably supported, the intent of the contracting powers who, in the words of Article I, desired that "navigation on the Danube is unrestricted and open to all flags on a foot ing of complete equality over the whole navigable course of 19 the river. ..." The notion of international control was all the vogue in the postwar years, and the statute of 1921 was an instrument which seemed to herald an era of unprece dented development along the Danube.
The interwar years rapidly eroded the intent and spirit of the Peiris statutes. Indeed, the only formal acts or agreements relating to the Danube came about as a result of outbursts of virulent nationalism on the part of certain riparians and the concurrent attitude of appeasement which gripped the major Western powers.
Rumania actively opposed the order of things in
Danubia during the interwar years, and eventually she at tained her objectives only to be overwhelmed by the Germans who had their own designs for Danubia. Rumania had persis tently sought to limit the jurisdiction of the European
Commission in that portion of the river from Braila to
Galatz. The question was submitted to the League of Nations
19 Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, op. cTtT% pT 263. 19 and its committee, The Technical Commission for Communica tion and Transit. The committee stated in 1925 that the
European Commission was entitled to exercise full jurisdic tion in this sector. Not satisfied, the Rumamian government, then, took the issue to the Permanent Court of International
Justice. In 1927, the Court issued an advisory opinion which reaffirmed the European Commission's jurisdiction over the portion from Braila to Galatz as it had over the portion 20 from Galatz to the Black Sea, The Rumanians did not formally challenge the opinion of the Court; however, they continued to press for revisions of the commission's power through diplomatic channels.
In 1929, after intense negotiations with Great Brit ain, France, and Italy, the Rumeinians gained their first victory. The issue of Braila was settled in favor of the commission; however, Rumania gained several concessions which weakened the European Commission. The Rumanian au thorities were given authority to draft and apply police regulations at all ports except Sulina, while the European
Commission continued to be responsible for navigation regu lations. Infringements of either set of regulations were, however, to be judged by special Rumanian tribunals. In addition, the powers represented on the European Commission
^^Ibid., p. 269. 20 renounced their right to station warships on the maritime 21 Damube. Rumania continued to press for further revisions; and, in 1938, by virtue of the political forces which were sweep ing Europe, she won an agreement from the British and French which effectively stripped the European Commission of its 22 powers. The Sinaia agreement called for the transfer to
Rumania of powers relating to navigation and sanitation, improvement works on the river, the port and roadstead of
Sulina, the levying of dues and disposing the yield thereof, jurisdiction over offenses, and finally, the use of free postal and telegraph services. These powers and duties were transferred to a newly-formed autonomous body called the
Maritime Danube Board established by the Rumanian government.
Most of the facilities of the European Commission, along with its personnel, were transferred to the new organization.
Subsequently, the non-Rumanian employees of the new body were
replaced by Rumanian nationals. In the cases remaining
under the jurisdiction of the European Commission, decisions
were reached upon majority vote; however, Rumania had to be
21 Brigadier—General Sir Osborne Mance, International River and Canal Transport (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 65. 22 Principal Treaties and Conventions Relating to Freedom of Navigation on the Danube, op. cTtTl pT 269. 21 psurt of that majority. Thus, the Sinaia agreement left the
European Commission acting principally as an advisory body, while the real authority was absorbed by Rumania.
Rumania had little time to enjoy the fruits of her efforts, for German imperialism soon engulfed the whole of
Europe. In 1936, Germany had renounced the river regimes of the Paris statutes and had withdrawn her representation.
She intended to regulate navigation along the river through bi-lateral agreements based on reciprocity. With the dis appearance of Austria in 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 1939 as independent states, their representation on the Fluvial
Commission ceased. As a further measure, Germany imposed a new regime on the sectors of the river which were included in her boundaries, thereby curtailing the commission's
jurisdiction.
Germany's next move, supported by Italy, was to de mand admission to the European Commission. Rumania was
opposed to permitting German influence to spread to the
lower Danube. Rumania acceded in this matter to the wishes
of Great Britain and France who, in line with the general
notion of appeasement, had supported Germany's demands. The
Rumanians extracted, as a price for their agreement to
German and Italian accession, further powers over the Euro
pean Commission. This expansion of Rumanian power was 22 23 embodied in the Convention of Bucharest of March 1, 1939.
Germany continued to press for a greater voice in both com missions. She demanded representation in the Pluvial Com mission and a share in the control of the middle river.
Hungary became the German stalking horse; and, while most of the German-inspired Hungarian proposals were rejected, the river commissions did agree to the tightening up of security along the river and the prohibition of transport of certain goods and types of vessels. Hungarian proposals for German representation in the Iron Gates Commission were also re jected in deference to Yugoslavisin and Rumanicin sovereignty; but, by this time, such acts were feeble gestures of defi ance and had little relevance to the march of events.
In June, 1940, Russia incorporated Bessarabia into the Soviet Union and once again became a riparian on the
lower Danube.
In the early fall of 1940, Hitler decided that it was time to call a conference for the purpose of forming a new
organization to replace the Fluvial Commission. Those
attending the conference, held in Vienna, were Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Rumania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. Within a
week the conference adopted a provisional arrangement whereby
the Fluvial Commission was terminated. In its place was
Z^ibid., p. 273. 23 substituted a Council of the Fluvial Dainube. A permanent
German director was appointed for this new organization.
The Iron Gates Commission was also dissolved, and a new com mission, consisting of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Germany, was ^ 24 formed.
In September, Russia objected to exclusion from the
Vienna meeting and declared that, due to her status as a riparian, she could not be indifferent to factors affecting shipping on that waterway. Soon thereafter (October 26,
1940), Germany and the USSR, with the concurrence of Italy, cinnounced their intent to liquidate both the Fluvial and the
European Commissions and merge both into a single Danube
Commission. The new commission was to consist of Germany,
USSR, Italy, and the riparian states. Meetings were held immediately to hammer out a set of rules and regulations satisfactory to all powers. These meetings were soon en meshed in technical details, and German-Russian efforts to reach agreement were fruitless. When war broke out between
them in 1941, the question of administration and control of
the maritime Danube remained unresolved.
Germany dominated the course of the river, using it
as a highway to support and sustain her war machine. The
sham of the Danube Commission was maintained from 1941 until
^"^Ibid., p. 274. 24
1944, when the victorious Soviet armies rolled across
Eastern Europe.
Additional Factors Relying exclusively upon the accords smd agreements pertaining to free navigation and international control risks the danger of presenting a simplistic view of what was a highly complex situation. Control of the Danube was only a small part of the larger struggle for domination of the
European continent. The apparent devotion to principle, displayed on occasion by the ruling nations, corresponded markedly with their national interest in each situation.
More often than not, the implementation of the principles of free navigation was accomplished by imposing them upon de feated enemies or patently-weaker states. In a situation where a principle threatened to impinge upon the national interests of a great power, it was the national interest that received paramount consideration.
Many nations championed the concepts of free naviga tion, but in practice it was obvious that these states were much more interested in manipulating the administrative machinery established for attainment of these goals. In a very short time, the various commissions became power sources in their own right. Because of the advantages which could be derived from control of the commissions, they became the political objectives of rival states. This blurring of 25 means and ends confused and masked the basic problems of
Danube navigation and plagued the efforts of men sincerely
intent upon developing the full potential of the important waterway.
In considering the problems of Danube control from a broader perspective, it must first of all be recalled that
the Congress of Vienna was convened for the purpose of re
storing the European balance of power. The declaration regarding free navigation was without question a progressive
act and redounds to the credit of the participants. Nonethe
less, it was couched in ambiguous terms of principle and did
not apply to the Danube for two reasons. First of all, at
that time, much of the river was still under Turkish rule;
and Turkey, being a non-Christian nation, was excluded from
the European concert. Of perhaps as much concern to the
powers was the fact that Russia, by virtue of the Treaty of
Bucharest in 1812, had incorporated Bessarabia and was,
therefore, a riparian at the river delta. Her influence
mounted rapidly in lower Danube affairs in the ensuing years.
The treaties of Ackerman in 1826 suid Adrianople in 1829
allowed Russia to continue her advance to the Sulina and St.
Georges channels. When Russia became mistress of the mouth
of the Danube in the 1830's, she began to fear that Braila
or Galatz might compete with Odessa as a seaport. As a
result, she deliberately allowed the mouth of the Danube to 26 become obstructed and even went so fair as to adopt adminis trative measures which endangered or delayed the passage of ships. Great Britain and Austria became concerned with the
Russian tactics because of their growing commercial interest in Danubia. Austrian objections resulted in a treaty with the Russians in 1840 which declared the Danube open to vessels of all nations for a period of ten years. Neverthe less, Russia continued to interrupt and delay traffic at the mouth of the river.
The Crimean War and the Treaty of 1856 marked an important turning point in Danube history. The opportunity to apply the principles of free navigation as espoused at the Congress of Vienna was at hand. Application, however, was not to be total since Austria objected to any inter ference with her portion of the river. Great Britain and
Austria had developed a flourishing trade beginning in 1838 and neither partner recognized a need for interference in the operation of the fluvial sector. The victorious powers, 25 therefore, concentrated their efforts upon coercing Russia.
International participation in control of the maritime
Danube was introduced for the purpose of countering evasion of the treaty of 1856 by Russia; to avoid Russian
^^Smith, 0 £. cit., p. 206. 27 interference with Anglo-Austrian trade; and to stymie tradi tional Russian thrusts towards the Mediterranean.
The series of agreements from 1856 through 1883 at tained, among other things, the permanence of non—riparian pairticipation in river administration. Both Britain and
France developed substantial economic interests in Danubia and the European Commission and the various fluvial commis sions provided valuable footholds for protection of these interests. By 1878, the shifting territorial scene in
Eastern Europe once again found Russia in control of Bess arabia, and also the appearance of three new states— Serbia,
Rumania, and Bulgaria. These territorial developments served to strengthen Western determination to maintain their influence in the administrative apparatus of the river.
At the outbreak of World War I, the situation
was wholly illogical and was far removed from the idealism which had inspired the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna a century before. Far from being the expression of any general principle of law, the regime of the Danube merely recorded the results of a century of conflict between the interests of many powers, both small and great.26
Austria-Hungary controlled territorially, and by state monopoly shipping companies, that portion of the river from
TJlra to the Iron Gates. The section from the Iron Gates to
Braila was nominally free to all; however, the freedom was
^^Ibid., p. 207. 28 based on a bi-lateral treaty and not an international agree ment. The 1883 treaty had tried to impose international control on this section, but Rumania had effectively blocked this attempt. The melancholy truth was that only that por tion of the river from Braila to the Black Sea was under international administration.
At the Paris Peace Treaty Conferences, the concepts of international control were enthusiastically proclaimed.
What made these declarations so bizarre was the tacit under
standing that, in practice, they would only apply in terri
tories detached from, or belonging to, defeated enemies. In
this light, the rivers of Austria-Hungary and Germany were
obvious candidates for international control. Downstream
Bulgaria and Turkey were also defeated enemies, and the
ascendancy of the Bolsheviks placed Russia outside the pale
of legitimate governments. This convenient means of avoiding
reality simplifed the tasks of the drafters of the peace
treaties and the Paris Statutes. By eliminating these
nations from consideration, the construction of an ideal
institution for control of the Danube was readily accom
plished. The folly of this approach to Danube problems was
fully revealed in the inter war years.
Rampant nationalism, German imperialism. Western
vacillation, and the unrealistic foundation of the Paris
Statutes were the principle reasons for the deterioration of 29 the Danube regimes between the world wars. This deteriora tion only mirrored the larger events which gripped the continent. By contrast, the physical improvements wrought by the European Commission were remarkable considering the environment in which they took place. Many defenders of international administration still point to these improve ments as a justification for non-riparian participation.
Such reasoning, however, lies close to the heart of the present controversies which divide the world.
The wider view of the period from 1815 to 1944 casts a different light upon such issues as "free navigation" and
"non-riparian participation." In the beginning, free navi gation was the central issue, and it was accepted by all legitimate governments. As the dominant powers cast about for mechanisms to attain this end, they came upon the notion of non-riparian participation in an international adminis tration. This method provided a number of advantages which in time became overriding issues in the continuing political struggles. The original objective of free navigation was subordinated to the national objective of gaining and main taining membership in the administrative institutions of the river. CHAPTER III
THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
The Prelude
For the duration of World War II, the Danube was a
German river helping to supply its war machine. In the closing months of the war, the Russians rolled across
Eastern Europe and gained access to the banks of the Danube from Linz to the Black Sea. For the next decade, the
Soviets exercised control of this section of the river, with the exception of the Yugoslavian stretch, to the total ex clusion of emy interests which did not coincide with their own. The Western Allies protested at every opportunity to the callous manner in which the Soviet Union exploited its advantage, but short of physical force, there was little the
West could do to mitigate Soviet hegemony.
The Western Allies tried unsuccessfully to exert their influence in Danubian affairs at the conferences and meetings held by the victorious powers at the end of the war. The Western Allies chose to approach the problem of constructing a new regime for the Danube from two differing points of view. Britain and France, who had had consider able pre-war interest in the Danube, were anxious to re establish their political and commercial positions.
Accordingly, they adopted a policy which affirmed the 31 continuing authority of the 1921 statutes and amendments thereto.
Mr. Bevin stated several times that it was unthinkable that Britain should be asked, after great sacrifices in a victorious war, to accept a position in the Danube less favorable than that which it had before the war began.1
The United States, unencumbered by pre-war involve ments in Danubian affairs, enjoyed the option of pursuing a policy with a broader base than that of legal arguments relating to former treaties. The United States chose to champion an ideal solution to Danube administration, one that would embody all the principles of free navigation, non discrimination and unbiased adjudication. This approach would benefit economic development of Eastern Europe, estab lish a firm base for administration of other international waterways, and also weaken Soviet domination in the Danubian basin.
The Soviet Union, with its satellites at heel, re sisted all Western arguments and proposals from the early
Four Power Peace Treaty talks to the final days of the
Belgrade Conference. Echoed by the satellites, the Soviets repeatedly declared that the Danube was not a fit subject for peace treaties and that the river was only the affair of those who lined its banks.
^John C. Campbell, "Diplomacy on the Danube," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, Mo. 9 (Jauauary, 1943), 319. 32
At the urging of his political and military advisers,
President Trumaua decided to press the issue of free naviga tion on European rivers. At the Berlin Conference on August
9, 1945, he made pertinent proposals, arguing that equality of commerce on the waterways would remove one of the persist- 2 ent causes of wars in Europe. Nothing came of these pro posals, and the issue was next referred to the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
In the Council meetings of 1945 and 1946, the Western powers made little headway against the strong Soviet resist ance. Molotov intended to avoid specific commitments in the peace treaties regarding Danube navigation, arguing that they would impair the sovereignty of the riparian states.
In these debates, the Soviet—sponsored theme of the "Danube for the Danubians" emerged, and it became a recurrent slogan in the ensuing negotiations. The Soviets painted all efforts to establish guarantees of free navigation as the sinister maunipulations of imperialists bent on profiting from Eastern
Europeau weakness.
Such was the situation on the eve of the Paris Peace
Conferences in 1946. Both sides agreed on the technical
point that some sort of authority was required to administer
2 Stephen Gorove, "Internationalization of the Danube," Journal of Public L aw, Vol. 8, No, 1 (Spring, 1959), 125-153. 33 the river, but the question of what form this authority should take placed them at opposite poles. The West pro posed an international authority, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations, while the Soviets advocated a body consisting only of riparians.
The Paris Conferences were held from July 30 to October
12, 1946. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were active in obstructing efforts by the West to reach a meaningful decision regarding Danube navigation. The French finally submitted a watered-down proposal calling for a statement endorsing free navigation and for a conference to be held in the future to establish a new regime of the Danube. Two thirds of the delegates supported this proposal and thereby overrode the negative votes of the Soviet bloc. The pro posal was submitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers as 3 an official recommendation of the peace conference.
The Council of Foreign Ministers held their meeting in New York from November 4 to December 12, 1946. After intense and prolonged negotiations, the Soviets relented and agreed to the principle of free navigation as expressed by the following clause inserted in the treaties with Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary:
3 Fred L. Hadsel, "Freedom of Navigation on the Danube," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 468, Publication #31^T (June 2o% 1§48), 793. 34
Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all states, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same state.^
The second part of the Paris Conference recommenda
tion— that pertaining to the conference for a new regime—
was not read into the peace treaties. Instead, as a com
promise between the opposing views of the British and So
viets, it was agreed to issue a resolution of the Council of
Ministers on this subject. The resolution was issued on
December 12, 1946, and called for a conference within six
months of the coming into force of the peace treaties. The
membership of this conference was to be composed of the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union,
the Ukrainian S.S.R., Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia.
Many observers considered the Danube clauses hammered
out between the East and West as significant and reasonable
compromises.^ Some even went so far as to express the view
that the forthcoming meetings for the postwar regime might
harbinger a new beginning in East—West negotiations. These
views soon proved to be overly optimistic for, in reality,
the West had extracted only a vague statement of principle
^Ibid., p. 793. ^Gorove, o£. cit., p. 145. 35 and the promise of a conference in which the West was certain to be out voted.
Since the peace treaties entered into force on Septem ber 15, 1947, the outside date for the calling of a Danube conference was March 15, 1948. None of the four powers seemed to be in a hurry to convoke the meeting. Relations had rapidly deteriorated between Russia and the West, and a conference on the Danube was not likely to improve the situa tion. Nevertheless, the United States felt compelled to call for the meeting lest the expiration date pass and, by silence, so indicate a disinterest in the Danube which would hinder opening of the question at a later date. On February 27, 1948, the United States, in a note to the other Big Four Powers, called for the conference and sug gested that it be held late in 1948 in order that Austria be able to participate on a basis of equality. In a reply on
March 15, the Soviets rejected the idea of extending the date and proposed that the conference be held not later than
May, In a lengthy reply on April 12b, the United States agreed to holding the conference as soon as practicable.
The United States reiterated its concept of free navigation and its desire for Austrian participation. The United
States also suggested a preliminary exchange of views to expedite the work of the conference. On May 8a, the Soviets rejected the United States proposals and called for a 36 conference to be held at the end of that month. The United
States pointed out on May 25a that insufficient time pre cluded a meeting in May and proposed, instead, June 30a as a date for the conference. The United States again expressed its desire for Austrian participation. The Soviets agreed to the end of June as the conference date, and they also agreed to Austrian participation on a consultative basis.®
Thus, it was that on the first day of July, 1948, the repre sentatives from the Four Powers and the Danube riparian states gathered in Belgrade to grapple anew with the problem 7 of Danube administration. As a final pre—conference problem, the United States had to decide whether or not to protect its position and that of the West by a special voting procedure which would offset the seven to three advantage enjoyed by the USSR.
®Hadsel, o£. cit., pp. 793 and 797. 7 The following were chiefs of delegations: Felix Orsini-Rosenberg, Austrian Ambassador at Sofia; Professor Eugheni Kamenov, Assistant Foreign Minister of Bulgaria; Erik Molnar, Foreign Minister of Hungary; Mrs. Anna Pauker, Foreign Minister of Rumania; Sir Charles Peake, British Ambassador to Jugoslavia; Cavendish W. Cannon, American Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Andrei J. Vyshinsky, Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR; A. M. Baranowski, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R.; Adrien Theirry, French Ambassador and President of the Cen tral Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine; also Ales Bebler, Deputy Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. 37
There were a number of alternatives and ample precedent for
their use: 1. They could insist that the decisions of the con
ference were recommendations subject to confirmation or
rejection by the Council of Foreign Ministers.
2. They could follow the procedure whereby a deci
sion required a majority vote including the concurrence of
the Four Powers.
3. They could include Austria as a member of the con
ference and then apply a two-thirds rule so that a minority g of four could block decisions. The United States decided
not to press for any special voting procedures inasmuch as
it had made such an issue of the Soviet use of the veto in
the United Nations. To do so in this instance would have
undercut its argument against Soviet obstructionism in the
United Nations.
The ultimate safeguard of the West’s position was the
fact that the conference was being held to draft a treaty.
No state could be compelled to accept a treaty as binding
simply because of majority rule in the formulation process.
The United States was fully aware that it faced a majority
under Soviet domination.
Nevertheless, it was the express policy of our govern ment to enter negotiations and to attempt to find
O Campbell, og^. cit., p. 321. 38
agreement on all outstanding differences between our selves and the Soviet Union within the framework of existing international machinery.9
Two further considerations underscored United States willingness to enter into Danube negotiations. The first was that this would be the first time that the Soviets had a clear majority in an international conference and, thus, it would give the world an opportunity to see how they con ducted themselves, and, secondly, the United States had dem onstrated by previous policy its abiding interest in
European recovery. The conference would provide a platform for expression of this interest east of the Iron Curtain.
The Conference
The composition of the delegations sent by the United
States and the USSR revealed clearly the approach each bloc took towards the negotiations. The United States sent its transportation men, maritime lawyers, and other technical experts. The Soviets sent a political team led by the skilled and experienced Andrei Vyshinsky. Needless to say,
Moscow did not send Vyshinsky to Belgrade to negotiate port charges and docking facilities.
At the very outset, the Soviets made it clear that
9 Maxwell Harway, "Soviet Domination of the Danube Conference," United States Department of State Documents and Papers, Vol. I, Nos. 8 and 9 (November, December^ 1948), 488. 39 the conference would be a one-sided political contest. In the opening session, at a time normally devoted to formal amenities, the Soviets pushed through a vote excluding
English as an official language of the conference. This was a calculated affront to the Western nations and a declara tion by Vyshinsky that he intended to run this conference to suit his own ends. If there ever was any hope of serious negotiation with the Communists, it was dashed within minutes of the opening gavel.
The major issues of the conference were six in number.
For the most part, they centered about the differences be tween the Soviet draft convention and the United States draft convention. These issues involved:
1. Implementation of the principles of free naviga tion. 2. The validity of the 1921 statutes. 3. Austrian participation in the conference. 4. Non—riparian participation on the new commissions. 5. The powers of the new commissions. 6. The relationship of the commissions with the United Nations or an international judicial organization.
There were many striking similarities between the
Soviet and American draft conventions. This was because
both nations drew heavily upon the text of the 1921 conven
tion in constructing their versions. For instance, the
Soviets lifted, almost intact. Article I from the 1921 con
vention which stated ". . . navigation on the Danube shall 40 be free and open for the nationals. . . The United
States was not satisfied with simple restatements of the much-abused principles and, hence, it surgued for more specific wording to obviate discrimination. It was clear that in practice a much different environment existed along the river even while the conference was in session. Danube navigation was, in fact, in the hands of monopolistic Soviet- controlled joint companies. Freedom to navigate was a hollow concept if the freedom to trade and do business in a port was restricted.
The Soviets intended to legalize their monopoly by inclusion of Article 38 in their draft which stated that :
Vessels entering ports for loading or unloading shall be entitled to use loading and unloading machinery, equipment . . . etc. , on the basis of agreements concluded with the appropriate transportation and forwarding agencies.ii
The appropriate transportation and forwarding agencies were, of course, the Soviet-controlled companies, such as Meszhart and Sovrom-Transport. Any non-riparian shipping that found its way up the Danube would be forced to depend upon these agencies for services and facilities.
Ambassador Cannon argued strongly for the United
States version of this article which would authorize com panies engaged in Danube navigation to establish offices and
^®Ibid. , p. 499. ^^Ibid. , p. 502, 41 facilities essential to their shipping and commerce. In his rejection of the Soviet draft, the Ambassador stated:
The draft fails to prevent discrimination against shipping on the river. . . . On basic issues such as access to ports and facilities, the draft would leave the door open to a continuation of the exclusive and discriminatory practices that have been followed for the past three y e a r s . 12
It was evident well before negotiations took place for the conduct of the conference that the British and the
French held little hope of reasserting their pre-war authority in Danube affairs. It remained for the United
States to grasp the initiative in the Western camp. The
United States had expected the British and French delega tions to prepare draft conventions, but when it became known that they would not do so, the American delegation took the lead in presenting the Western case.
The principal concern of both the British and the
French was to protect their rights as parties to the 1921 convention which they held to be legally in force. The
American delegation was reluctant at the beginning of the conference to restrict their position to such a narrow and
legalistic base. The United States preferred to aim for an ideal convention founded on the principles of free naviga tion. When it became apparent that the Soviets were
12 "Rejection of Soviet Draft Convention— Statement by Ambassador Cannon," United States Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XIX, No. 479 (September 5, 194É),~?921 42 unwilling to budge from their own conception of a treaty,
the United States reluctantly resorted to the arguments sup porting the 1921 statutes.
The Soviets had prepared a broadly-based attack on
the 1921 statutes, arguing that they were void because:
1. ^ ini to, as the Soviet Union had not psurtici- pated in its conclusion; 2. By reason of the systematic violation of the convention by Great Britain and Prance in 1938 and 1939; 3. By reason of the application of the doctrine, rebus sic stanibus; and 4. As a result of the war.
The contention by the Soviets that this convention
was void ab inito because the USSR did not participate in
its formation was countered by the British representative.
He pointed out that in 1917 the Soviets had repudiated all
the Tsarist treaties and was, therefore, in no position to
object to a revision of the Danube regime. Moreover, the
Soviets could have, in accordance with Article 4 of the 1921
statutes, applied for membership after demonstrating suf
ficient maritime commercial and European interests at the
mouths of the Danube. They did not do so in the interwar
years.
Of greater legal consequence was the argument that
Great Britain and France had violated the 1921 statutes by
concluding the Sinaia agreement in 1938 and the agreement
relative to German entry into the European Commission in 4 3
1939. The Soviets contended that Great Britain and France had violated Article 42 of the statutes which stated that revision could take place if two thirds of the signatory states so requested, and specified the stipulation consid ered to be in need of revision. Supposedly, in concluding the Sinaia agreement, the British, French, and Rumanians had failed to gain the necessary signatories to the treaty.
The British and French reply was that they had acted in accord with Article 7 of the 1921 statutes. This article stated that the powers of the European Commission can only come to an end as the result of an international agreement concluded by all the states represented on the commission.
Since the commission in 1938 consisted of Great Britain,
France, Rumania, and Italy, and as the Sinaia agreement was signed by three of these and acceded to by the fourth, they claimed there had been no violation. Plainly these two articles seem to be in opposition and difficult to reconcile.
Despite whatever contradiction existed, the issue of whether or not a violation had occurred does not fully resolve the question of voiding the 1921 statutes. Simply because a treaty has been violated in respect to the details of revi sion does not in itself void a treaty. “The violation of a treaty by one party gives rise at most to a right of abroga tion in other parties; it renders the treaty voidable, not 44 void.As a further consideration, it was noted that not one of the eight states whose rights had been allegedly violated lodged any protest to the Sinaia Treaty and all continued to regard the statutes of 1921 as in effect.
The Soviet argument that the 1921 statutes were ren dered null by reason of the doctrine of “Rebus sic stanibus” was a catch-all theory. The so-called changed conditions marshaled to support this view included such things as: the
Council of Ministers* decision that a new convention was needed and that the peace treaties contained appropriate guarantees of free navigation on the Danube. It was doubt ful whether any of the issues created a new state of affairs which was incompatible with the 1921 statutes. The British
offered to submit several of these issues to the Inter national Court of Justice to determine what agreements were
in force in regard to Danube navigation. This proposal was rejected by the Soviets and her satellites.
Finally, the assertion that the 1921 statutes were
terminated by the war raised the entire subject of the
effect of a war upon all treaties. This is one of the many
local questions in which jurists do not share a unanimous
opinion. As a general rule, the effect of wars upon treaties
is handled from a pragmatic point of view. The effect of the
l^MThe Danube Conference of 1948," o£. cit., p. 400. 45 war is measured upon each treaty in itself, rather than by using a standardized or categorical rule. In the case of
Danube regimes, it was argued that they had enjoyed long histories of operation interrupted by several wars and, hence, it was reasonable to assume that the framers of the
1921 statutes intended that its new regime be permanent.
These arguments and rebuttals notwithstanding, the final Soviet draft contained a supplementary protocol which was adopted by the conference. The protocol declsured the former regime null and void and abolished the two commis sions. The newly—formed regime absorbed the assets and rejected the liabilities of the old administration.
The United States, in its pre-conference notes to the
Soviet Union, had pressed vigorously for Austrian participa tion in the Belgrade Conference and continued to pursue this objective during the negotiating sessions. The United
States draft treaty contained provisions for full Austrian participation and eventual German participation.
The position of the Austrian delegates to the Belgrade
Conference was somewhat tenuous because of their consulta tive status. On at least two occasions, the Austrian repre sentative was subj ected to violent verbal attack by Yugo slavian and Soviet delegates. While the outcome of the
Belgrade meeting was important to Austria as a riparian, its major political concern, at this time, was conclusion of a 46 peace treaty and an end to Soviet and American occupation.
Under these circumstances, the Austrians were careful not to jeopardize their relations with the Four Powers, particularly the Soviet Union.
Soviet rejection of Austria in the deliberations and decisions of the conference was significant for its contra diction of the bloc argument of “the Danube for the Danubians. “
Failure to consider Germany for future participation only sharpened this contradiction.
This issue of non-riparian participation was in it self sufficient to scuttle the conference, even if the
Soviets had shown willingness to negotiate other differences.
For well over half a century, the issue of free navigation was recognized as the concern of non-riparians as well as
Dcunubian states. The three leading nations in prewar ship ping on the maritime Danube were the non-riparians Greece,
Italy, and Great Britain.Nevertheless, the Soviets were determined to exclude all non-riparians from participation
in order to guarantee their hegemony. This objective was
achieved in Article 5 of their draft treaty which limited
membership on the new commission to riparian states. They
insisted that no one else had a right to representation in
river administration. The Russians argued that prewar
^^Campbell, o£. cit., p. 324, 47 non-riparian participation had simply disguised imperial istic activities and the exploitation of the Danubian nations. The Danube was to be the property of the states that bordered its flow and the new "Peoples Democracies" would not tolerate Interference with their sovereign rights.
To cap these arguments, the Eastern European states re peatedly stated that henceforth there could be no real equality on the river between non-riparians and riparians.
The American proposal for the composition of the new commission provided for membership of the seven Eastern
European riparians, the three Western powers, Austria, and for Germany after settlement of a peace treaty. Later in the conference, the United States offered to withdraw its membership on the commission at such time that Austria and
Germany became members and when adequate provisions were 17 made for non-riparian participation. This issue, which was raised in nearly every discussion during the conference, was finally resolved by a vote on Article 5 of the Soviet draft. The familiar array of seven to three ended Western hopes of attaining any foothold in Danubian affairs.
The commission created by the Belgrade Convention was
^^Harway, o£. cit., p. 491. 17 Statement of Walter A. Radius, United States Depart ment of S t a ^ BiaieJ^, Vol. XIX, No. 47 7 (August 22, 1944) pT ?34. 48
a weak organization with limited powers. The tributaries of
the river, the lateral canals, and two of the three mouths 18 of the river were exempted from its jurisdiction. Real
authority was left Isirgely in the hands of the individual
riparians despite all efforts of the West to sponsor a
strong commission. Two important sectors of the river, between Braila and the Sulina mouth, and the Iron Gates sec
tion, were placed under special river administrations. The
Soviet Union and Rumania formed the administration at the
Sulina mouth, while Yugoslavia and Rumania were to adminis
ter the Iron Gates. Again, the West had objections to these
special bodies; but since the Soviets had flatly rejected
even minority representation on these commissions, it was
fruitless to argue these clauses any further.
The last of the major issues raised by the United
States was the establishment of a relationship between the
new Danube Commission and the United Nations. Western
efforts for this purpose were bitterly resisted by the
Soviet bloc, and the final Belgrade Convention completely
ignored the existence of the United Nations. The American
proposals were somewhat vague as to how a relationship would
be effected. Their draft referred to the United Nations in
*1 O "Proposed Convention Regarding the Regime of the Navigation on the Danube," United States Department of State Document and State Papers, Vol. I., No.’s 8 and 9 (November and December, 1948)~ 4^9. 49 its preamble and later proposed that the commission should exchange documentation and information with the United
Nations and also allow United Nations observers at its meetings.
The Soviets, echoed by the satellites, denied United
Nations concern with the administration of the Danube. They replied that the United States proposal was a guise for bringing the river under the control of the United Nations.
In the course of the United Nations dispute, the issue of creating machinery for adjudication was raised.
The United States hoped that either the United Nations or the International Court would be recognized and accepted as the court of final authority. The Soviets, consistent in their denial of outside participation, refused to acknowl edge the interests or concern of non-riparians. Vyshinsky, in one of his many bitter attacks upon Western proposals
. . questioned the right and competence of jurists from
Mexico, Egypt, China, San Salvador . . . to pass on the 19 problems of the Danube."
Article 41 of the Soviet draft specified that dis putes which could not be resolved by direct negotiations would be referred to a special commission consisting of one member of each country party to the dispute and one member
19Harway, o£, cit., p. 493, 50 designated by the chairman of the commission. The decisions of this panel would be final and binding.
The Outcome The record of the Belgrade Conference clearly reveals that the Soviet Union came to the meeting with the firm in tention of imposing its own administration upon the river ; not once in the course of the conference did they indicate a willingness to negotiate the differences that divided the
East and West. Mr. Vyshinsky’s approach to the conference is illustrated by the following quotation:
I would say in general that what is acceptable in the United States draft can be found in the Soviet draft and what is not in the Soviet draft cannot be accepted. It cannot be accepted either by the Soviet delegation or by the riparian s t a t e s . 20
During the twelve-day period in which the draft con ventions were discussed, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France offered a total of twenty-eight amend ments. Not one of the amendments was accepted by the Soviet bloc. Only one amendment was offered by the satellite countries. In all, there were 129 proposals adopted by the seven vote Communist majority.
The final vote on the entire convention found the
United States voting against, while the British and French
20 United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIX, No. 477 (August ^2, 1948), 219. 51 abstained on the grounds that the whole proceedings were illegal. The new convention was signed, with appropriate ceremony and in the absence of the Western delegates, on
August 18, 1948. The convention came into force upon the 21 ratification of six signatories.
The extent of the Soviet triumph was not as great as it first appeared. Essentially, the Russians had attained a semblance of legality to the control which they had been exercising in the Danube basin since the war. This legality was only recognized by the satellite nations. Outside the
Iron Curtain, the free nations continued to recognize the existence of the 1921 statutes. The new commission could not exert its authority on the upper Danube in those parts of Austria and Germany occupied by the United States.
Finally, the Yugoslav-Soviet rift, which had been kindled prior to the Belgrade Conference, was soon to burst into open conflagration. Some elements of this feud would find expression in the operation of the Danube Commission and physical strife would take place in the Yugoslavian section of the river. The West found little of comfort in the out come of the Belgrade Conference. The traditions and prin
ciples which they had defended were trampled upon merci
lessly by the Soviet majority. For whatever consolation it
2 ] Harway, cit., p. 493 52 offered, the Western delegations issued notes of rejection which reiterated their affirmations of legality of the 1921 statutes, their dissatisfaction with the absence of adequate guarantees for free navigation and for the lack of adequate means of resolving disputes.
The United States felt that it had gained some propa ganda value from its reasoned and diplomatic conduct in com parison with the steam roller tactics of the Soviet Union. CHAPTER IV
THE DANUBE COMMISSION
The Early Years The first meeting of the Danube Commission was held in November, 1949. This fifteen—month lag was a poignant expression of the importance assigned to the new administra tion by its Soviet master.
The Soviet draft convention was not designed solely for the purpose of excluding Western influence in Danubia.
This, of course but a concomitant purpose, was to shape administration of the waterway to conform to their control pattern for Eastern Europe. The Soviets imposed a set of relationships upon the satellites wherein the individual states conducted a minimum of bi-lateral relations among themselves. Instead, these states would deal with or through the Soviet Union. As the center of intra—bloc affairs, the
Soviets could exert their hegemony almost effortlessly. The old maxim of divide and conquer found new application in the
Communist satellite system.
A second, and very important, factor which influenced
the convocation and conduct of the Danube Commission, was
the Soviet-Yugoslav rift. This struggle was growing in magnitude and intensity with each passing month. The iron
clad unanimity which the Soviets had enjoyed at Belgrade 54 was weakened by Yugoslavian defiance aind independence* The
Yugoslavs continued to endorse the Belgrade Treaty, but they resisted all efforts of the Soviets to shape the commission to their will. The Yugoslavs took the position that:
In place of a Damube Commission which represents, first an international body of representatives exclu sively from socialistic states, and which respects as a principle, the equality of peoples, Soviet diplomacy is governed by revisionist politics of the leaders of the USSR. A pre-conceived plan is materializing at the conference of Galatz, in order that the administra tion of navigation of the Danube fall to the USSR, and at the expense and detriment of all remaining Danubian countries . . . the Soviet delegation . . . is striving to obtain that position, which earlier was held by the large imperialist powers. 1
Thus, the shape of the Yugoslav— Soviet struggle within the Danube Commission was defined. The Soviets recog nized their first task which was to reduce or eliminate
Yugoslavian influence within the commission.
The Yugoslavs received their initial taste of Soviet power at the opening session of the first meeting. The
Rumanian representative, Teodor Rudenco, temporary chairman, called for elections of representatives to a number of minor sub-commissions which would initiate work projects for the commission. The Yugoslavs were pointedly ignored in the
David T. Cattell, "The Politics of the Danube Com mission under Soviet Control," The American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. XIX, No. ~3 TOctober, 1960) , 304. 55 nominating and election of these minor, three-member bodies.
In the formation of the final sub-commission, the Yugoslav representative moved for creation of a six—member committee in order that they attain membership on at least one of the sub—commissions. The other members calmly denied the need for a six-man committee, proceeded to nominate representa tives from Hungary, Rumeuiia, and the USSR, and then voted 2 down the Yugoslav motion five to one. The die was cast for
Yusoslavia, and this prejudicial treatment was destined to continue until the death of Stalin.
The Russians tightened their grip on the commission in the first two sessions by gaining approval of their draft of the Rules of Procedure. Yugoslavia fought the Soviet draft and offered amendments and counter drafts ; all to no avail.
The next link in the Soviet chain was election of their representative to the post of Secretary of the commis sion. In most Communist organizations, the secretary had direct control over the administrative apparatus and can initiate action and sign correspondence without counter signature from senior officers. The Secretary of the Danube
Commission was under no obligation to communicate his
2 % Procès—Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Premier Session, Galatz Rumania, Tome 1, No.'s 1-10 (November 11-17, 1949), 150. 56 decisions to the other members. The rules of procedure did not provide for permanent sub-committees. Instead, they allowed the Secretary to appoint sub-committees at his dis cretion between regular sessions of the commission. Selec
tion for committees, like selection of the permanent staff, was free of provisions for equality or geographic distribu
tion. As a consequence, the Yugoslavs received four minor billets on the permanent staff— the highest of these being 3 that of assistant bookkeeper.
The Soviet draft budget proposed expenditures only in
general terms and, here again, the Secretary was allotted
the privilege of rendering specific decisions
In all discussions and debates on rules of procedure, budgets, and work proposals, the Yugoslavs were in opposi
tion to the Soviet proposals. The Yugoslavs offered amend
ments and counter drafts and argued vigorously for their
convictions, but, in each instance, they were voted down by
the other members of the commission.
With an iron grip on the commission and their control
of the Joint Shipping Companies, the Soviets enjoyed a
crushing advantage over the Yugoslavians. The only hole-card
^Ibid. , p. 195.
'^Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Deuxième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome 2, No. 13 CMarch 24, 1950), 144 57 held by the Yugoslavs was control of the Danube flowing through their territory and the need for river shipping to use the traction locomotives on their side of the Iron Gates passage. On several occasions, the Yugoslavs were forced to threaten disruption of traffic in order to relieve some of the pressure exerted by the Soviets on their shipping.
The Yugoslav position became increasingly difficult from 1949 onwards. The Secretariat of the commission ig nored Yugoslavia as much as possible, letters from Yugo slavia went unanswered, commission agendas were sent only a few days before a meeting, adequate documentation was not provided for meetings and projects, and similar harassing activities were carried out.
Outside the commission, the Yugoslavs suffered other indignities in river affairs. Their crews were often roughly handled in satellite territory, and their work was delayed and obstructed. In 1950, one after another of the
Communist riparians closed their shipping agencies in Yugo slavia, leaving only the Soviet agency. This left satellite traffic in Yugoslavia under the monopolistic control of the USSR.^
At the fourth session of the commission in May and
5 Ernst Halperin, "Belgrade View of Danube River Problems," Swiss Review of World Affairs, Vol. I, No. 9 (December, 1951), 17-1Ô. 58
June of 1951, after heated arguments over proposed uniform rules for navigation, the Yugoslavs decided to walk out of g the meeting. The repeated attacks upon her shipping and the complete refusal on the part of the commission to listen to her amendments forced the Yugoslavs to take this drastic measure. ,
The walkout, with its implied threat of permanent withdrawal, had a salutory effect upon the Soviet-controlled commission. Although no important concessions were made to
Yugoslavia, efforts were made to gain her approval on non- controversial aspects of the recommended codes of navigation,
Yugoslavia soon after found herself included in a number of work—groups. At meetings of the commission, the Yugoslavs were given the floor to present their draft rules and were heard in controversial discussions. Still, the object of diatribes and invective at the meetings, the Yugoslavs
found, nevertheless, that no new attempts to gag them would be made.
The truce inspired by the walkout was short lived and
relations again deteriorated. In October, 1952, in retalia
tion against Soviet attacks and discrimination, Yugoslavia
seized all the Iron Gates installations on her side of the
^Procès—Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Quatrième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome 4, No. 32 CJune 2, 1951), 262, 59 7 river and began separate collection of tolls. The commis sion, at its seventh session on December 24, 1952, condemned g this illegal and unilateral action of the Yugoslavs. The resolution sparked a violent diatribe by the Yugoslavs, and the remainder of the meeting degenerated into a propaganda battle of the lowest order.
The end of the seventh session marks a low-water point, so to speak, in the activities of the Danube Commis sion. The record of this period reveals the lack of purpose and desorth of initiative on the part of its members. More accurately, the first seven sessions form an indictment of
Soviet exploitation and repression of the riparian states.
This indictment is amply illustrated by the following ex cerpts from the official records.
It was not until the third session in December of
1950 that a commission—sponsored effort was made to expedite the clearing of sunken vessels and debris from destroyed bridges. The decision reached in this matter called for individual states to take note of the situation and clear 9 the navigation channels as quickly as possible.
^Cattell, 2E" cit», p. 387. ^Procès—Verbaux de la Coimnission du Danube, Septième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome No. S’7 CDecember 24, 1952), 406.
^Procès—Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Troisième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome 3, No. 31 TJanuary 2, 1951), 354. 60
At the fourth session in June, 1951, the commission accepted a set of fundamental and uniform rules of naviga tion for the Danube.These rules were put forward as recommendations by the commission, and the riparians were urged to enact them into their Public Law in order that a semblance of uniformity be created.
In the fifth meeting of the commission, the snail- pace of progress continued with turgid discussions about customs, maintenance of channels, rules of supervision, etc. In each case the final decision would be to charge the Secretariat with drafting a proposal which, as it devel oped, might or might not receive attention at subsequent meetings.
The sixth session was highlighted by decisions to assign the Secretariat the task of drafting a grand plan for navigation, coordinate hydrometeorological data, and to con sider changes in the rules of procedure as recommended by the Yugoslavs.
The seventh session, as already noted, was a propa ganda struggle between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs,
10 Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Quatrième Session, op. c i t ~ pi 504.
^^Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube. Cinquième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome~3 (Decerniber 10-19, 1951), 367. 61 precipitated by Yugoslav seizure of the Iron Gates facili ties, The only decision reached at this meeting was on a resolution condemning the Yugoslav action. Adding a splen did note of irony to the proceedings was the submission of a report dealing with the commission's accomplishments from
1949 to 1952.^^ The authors of this report had little choice but to chronicle the meager results of this period.
By 195 3, only the most rudimentary steps had been taken to systematize navigation along the Danube. The uni formity of conditions in existence was accomplished solely for the convenience of the Soviet shipping agencies who carried the bulk of Danube cargo. No attempts were made to initiate physical improvement except in the sense that the commission encouraged riparians to keep the channels clear.
Prewar projects, particularly at the mouth of the river, were neglected or terminated.
The bi-lateral commissions called for in the Belgrade
Convention had not been formed, and the mouth of the river and the Iron Gates section were administered in an ad hoc fashion.
As a further measure of domination, the Soviets kept clear for navigation only that delta channel which was
12 ^ Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Septième Session, op. cit., pp. 365-385. 62 exclusively under their control. On one pretext or another, the Russians prevented vessels of the other riparians from using their facilities and, therefore, cargo was shifted to
Soviet bottoms for external shipment.
Finally, through her monopolies, the Soviets discour aged the building up of river fleets by the satellites.
This was especially true in the case of sea-going vessels.
What little shipbuilding did take place in the former bus- 13 tling river shipyards of Hungary and Czechoslovakia was earmarked solely for Soviet ownership and use.
The Middle Years
The year 195 3 stands as a watershed in postwar Danube
River affairs. Within the period of one year, the repres sive policies of Stalin were totally reversed. This change was signaled by a series of meetings, held between Rumania and Yugoslavia for the purpose of creating the special admin istration for the Iron Gates. The meetings began in April of 1953, and on May 31 the two countries announced the signing of an agreement which covered navigation and admin istration of this sector.
13 For information on Hungarian shipbuilding in the decade following the Belgrade Convention, see Stephen C. Stolte, "Moscow Regulates Traffic on the Danube," Bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR, May, 1960, ppl 126-27. 14 Chronology of International Events and Documents, Vol. IX, No. 9 (April l6-May 6, 1953), 292; and Vol. IV, No. 10 (May 21-June 3, 1953), 346 (London; Chatham House). 63
Shortly after this agreement, an extraordinary meet ing of the Danube Commission was held in Bucharest. At this meeting, Yugoslavia continued its drive for changes in the rules of procedure, particularly the make-up and powers of the officers of the commission. Continued resistance to
Yugoslav proposals was demonstrated by the Soviets and their obedient bloc, but at the close of this meeting, the Soviets are reported to have offered a proposal which was strikingly similar to that of the Yugoslavs.
At the eighth regular session of the commission, held from June 26, to July 3, 1953, the recent agreement between
Rumania and Yugoslavia was announced to the commission. The
Yugoslav recommendations for changes to the rules was re ported out of committee and discussed by the representatives.
A revised set of rules was accepted by the commission which, while not meeting basic Yugoslav demands, did provide a framework for fundamental change.
The new rules divided the authority of the Secretary among the President and the individual directors of various activities and committees. The Secretary no longer enjoyed
^^International Organization, The Danube Commission, Vol. VIII (1954), 417.
^^Procès—Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Huitième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome 8, (June 2é-July 3, 1953), 365. ' 64 exclusive right to appointment of working committees.
Henceforth, the commission itself and, between sessions, the
President and Secretary, shared this task. In addition, all member states were able to name their own representatives to 17 fill the billets allotted to them by the nominating agent.
In July of 195 3, Russia and Yugoslavia exchanged ambassadors for the first time since 1949. The new Soviet policy was manifest by this démarche and, soon thereafter, the satellites began to settle their differences with
Yugoslavia.
The December meeting in 195 3 was marked by active cooperation between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. All mem bers agreed in full with Yugoslavia's position on measures for equalization of the powers and privileges of the commis sion. The commission also agreed with the Yugoslav proposal to move the organization's headquarters from Galatz to
Budapest. As a final act of goodwill and cooperation, a new slate of officers was elected even though the incumbents were entitled to two more years in office. Mr. Endre Sik, the Hungarian representative, was elected President of the commission, Mr. Gueorgui Vasilev Guenov, a Bulgarian, was elected Vice President, and the all-important post of
^^Ibid. 65
Secretary was given to the Yugoslavian representative, Mr. 18 Dragoje Djuric. This new wave of equality benefited the other satel lites as well as Yugoslavia, and many key positions were opened to their representatives. No longer were the bloc representatives to be considered only as obedient extensions 19 of the Soviet policy. A further example of the new role of the Danube states was the agreement between Rumania and the
Soviet Union pertaining to the administration of the mouth of the Danube. The initial agreement gave the Rumanians the major share in administration of the delta and, subsequently, the USSR abandoned all claim to control of the international mouths.
The final note of the seminal year of 195 3 was sounded by the new Secretary of the commission, Mr. Djuric.
In a public announcement on December 30, he stated that the
Danube was now open as an international waterway to the shipping of any country. Technical conditions existed for a
1 Q Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Neuvième Session, Galatz, Rumania, Tome 9, No. (December 15, 1953), 211. 1 9 From 1953 to 1956, no Soviet citizen was included in the elected officers and, in the elections of December, 1956, the USSR assumed only the post of Vice President. 66 considerable increase in river trade and the principle of 20 free navigation was being applied throughout.
This sweeping change in Danube policy did not mean
that the Soviet Union was disposed to forego its control
over the commission. Rather, it was a change in approach, designed to use the commission as an instrument of economic development and cooperation. Its former role as a political device to isolate and subdue the satellites was abandoned.
Instead, the commission became a forum for multi-lateral
exchange and cooperation among the Danubian states.
In the larger arena of Eastern European politics, the
Soviet-Yugoslav rift was being patched and, consequently,
the commission was no longer a platform for their propaganda
attacks and ideological squabbles.
By 1954, it was clear that the Soviet Union was a
prime mover in resolving outstanding technical problems
which had languished for many years in the backwaters of
sub-groups and committees of the commission. For the first
time, it could be said that a uniform system of aids to
navigation and regulations for navigation, inspection, sani
tation, and customs were in force. The various riparian
states reported, in 1954, that the draft regulations devised
20 Chronology of International Events and Documents, op. cit., Vol. X, No. 1 (December 17-June 6, 1954), 3é. 67 by the commission had been incorporated into their national 21 laws.
In 1955, the concept of a "Grsmd Plan" for river development was raised anew. This time the states were desirous of a forthright and specific program and not another propaganda vehicle. The USSR, anxious to stimulate intra-bloc trade, placed its influence behind a comprehen sive program of development and improvement. At the June meeting in 1955, the Soviet representative urged that the long-range development plans of the individual states be coordinated into a "Grand Plan" for the whole length of the river. As an added feature, the efforts of a transportation committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) were made available to the Danube Commission. Czecho slovakia and Hungary, taking their cue from the prevailing policy, began working on a joint project to develop the hydroelectric potentials in their sectors of the river. 22
The enthusiasm displayed by the Soviet Union for large-scale improvements of the river was not shared by the other riparians. By and large, they were reluctant to be come involved in heavy commitments of resources in this
21 Procès-Verbaux de la Commission du Danube, Dixième Session, Budapest, Hungary, Tome 10, No. 7? (June 12, 1954) 209-217.
^^Cattell, _o£. cit., p. 391. 68
economic sector. To a great extent, this attitude was derived from both a sense of nationalism and natural skepti cism. The major source of resistance, however, was lodged
in economic considerations. The riparians were reluctant to
make expensive improvements which would benefit their neigh bors and then find that their neighbors had not piade compar
able improvements in their sectors. Furthermore, the
Communist governments had carefully planned the employment
of their resources and the introduction of a new program
would seriously strain, if not deny, realization of targeted
objectives. As a final element in satellite resistance to
grandiose river projects, the bloc nations viewed the pro
posals with a suspicion born of postwar experiences with the
USSR. After having suppressed all activity in the field of
river development from 1948 onward, the Soviets should not
have expected a ready acceptance by the satellites of a
sweeping policy reversal and the large investments it en- 23 tailed.
The varied satellite responses to the entire question
of a Grand Plan became academic as a result of the Hungarian
revolution. The revolt in itself provided a dramatic
23 For further development of this argument, see David T. Cattell, "Multilateral Cooperation and Integration in Eastern Europe," Western Political Quarterly, XIII (March 1960), 65. 69 demonstration of the limitations and drawbacks of acceler ated multilateral development in Eastern Europe. After this tragic event, discussion of a Grand Plan was seldom heard.
Another major change which survived the political up heavals of the mid-fifties was the opening of the commission to outside agencies from the non-communist world. Denial of
Austria and Germany as importamt riparians was, from the outset, an unreal and narrow policy. The Communists, once committed to a program of technical and commercial develop ment, were obliged to gain the cooperation, if not the full participation of these two Western-oriented states. Prob lems of water flow, water levels, hydroelectric projects, etc., required the joint efforts and participation of all riparians.
The opening overtures to the West were low key. In the spring of 1956, the Danube Commission took part in
several international meetings involving inland water trans
port. From January to Meurch of 1956, the commission had
representatives in Geneva attending a conference for stand
ardization of an inland waterway contract. At the same time,
representatives were in Bale participating in a study for
standardization of navigation signals. In May of the sauna
year, delegates from the Danube Commission attended a 70 meeting of the commission on Inland Transportation of the
Economic Council for Europe (ECE).^^ A more positive step was taken in June of 1956 when a member of the ECE attending meetings of the Danube Commission as an observer. The following year, 1957, both Austria and
Germany were invited to send experts to observe the meetings and participate in the working committees. The attendance of these observers became a permanent feature in the Danube
Commission,
While the technical cooperation was slowly developing in 1956 and 195 7, commercial activity mushroomed. Austria had always had a flourishing down-river trade, and she was anxious, after the war, to renew this commerce. In the immediate postwar years, traffic between the American and
Soviet zones was non-existent. This was because the Soviets had threatened to seize, as war booty, any vessels of the large Austrian river fleet impounded by the Americans, which ventured into her zone.
In June of 1952, the Soviets finally agreed to end restrictions to Austrian traffic on the Danube and allowed shipping to move downstream from Linz into the Russian zone of Austria.
24- Cattell, "The Politics . . . ," o£. cit., p. 393. 25 Chronology of International Events and Documents, Vol. VIII, No. 12, June é-18, 1952, p. 1362. 71
In 1953, Austria began negotiations to reopen trade and transport with the satellites, A series of bi-lateral agreements were signed beginning in May, 1953, with Hungary, followed by Yugoslavia in October, 1953, then Bulgaria in
November, 1954, and finally, in 1955, Rumania and Czechoslo- 26 vakia joined in the commercial agreements with Austria.
After a delay of two more years, an agreement was reached with the USSR on June 14, 195 7, dealing with technical and 27 commercial conditions for navigation on the Danube. Thus, by mid-195 7, Austria was engaged, through a series of bi lateral treaties, in a flourishing trade with the Soviet bloc and, further, by her status as an observer, participating to a limited extent in the work of the Danube Commission.
The events of 195 7 mark it as a convenient terminal date for the second phase of postwar Danubian affairs. In this period, Europe witnessed the end of the Stalinist policy of enforced stagnation, the beginning of economic and technical development, and the opening of the river and its activities to the observation and limited participation of non-communist nations. Obviously, the Danube Commission
2 6 Sequence of Austrian river traffic agreements ex tracted from issues of Chronology of International Events and Documents from 1952-1^55. 27 Friedrich Wlatnig, "Danube Navigation Problems— As Seen from Vienna," Swiss Review of World Affairs, Vol. IX, No. 1:4 (April, 1959), p. 4. 72 was not the central point of focus for Soviet policy in
Eastern Europe; however, it did mirror faithfully many of the twists and turns of this policy.
After 195 3, the commission was relatively free of the bombastic propaganda battles which had raged in former days between the Soviets and Yugoslavs. Despite the worsening of relations between these two in 195 7, the Danube Commission was not reconstituted as the form for their quarrel. In stead, the Soviet and Yugoslav delegates continued to work together with the other representatives in relative harmony.
Recent Activities
The activity of the Danube Commission in the years
since 195 7 is best expressed in terms of the economic and
technical achievements it has realized. These efforts are
extensive and will be treated sepsurately as part of the fol
lowing chapter. The remainder of this chapter will deal with
the accession of Austria to the Belgrade Convention and its
consequent assumption of membership on the Danube Commission.
This decision by the Austrian government was reached after a
profound and thorough evaluation of its national objectives
and interests. The problems which the government of Chan
cellor Raab had to wrestle were essentially the same as
those which faced the West in Belgrade, in 1948.
Prior to World Waur II, Austrian fleets handled the
major share of the cargo shipped on the upper Danube. A 73 greater part of this trade had been downstream to Central and Eastern European states. The wax and the subsequent
Soviet takeover of this area severely restricted Austrian trade and commerce. One of the policy objectives of the
Austrian government, constituted in 1955, was to reopen this lucrative downstream market. This objective came a step closer to reality in 1960 when Austria attained membership on the Danube Commission, Assured of a voice at the meetings, and, more important, a vote, the Austria government has opened the way for additional non-communist participation in the regime of the river.
The Austrian road to membership was not an easy one.
In 1945, a divided Austria found its river fleets subject to the pressures of the East-West struggle. The bulk of their fleet was located in the Linz-Regensburg sector of the river under American control. The Soviets considered these craft to be German assets since they had been operated by the
Germans from 1938 to 1945. Accordingly, they demanded that
the Americans turn the vessels over to them as part of war reparations. The United States refused this demand and, as
a result, the Soviets threatened to seize any Austrian ves
sels that ventured across the zone boundary. In 1952, quite
unexpectedly, the Soviets relented and allowed free naviga- 28 tion for Austrian vessels up to the Hungarian border.
pp Ralph W. Johnson, "The Danube Since 1948," The Year 74
The right to extend their shipping downstream was denied the Austrians until the bi-lateral treaties of the late 1950's. The series of bi— lateral treaties, previously noted, between Austria and the Eastern European satellites conformed, in general, with the spirit of the Belgrade Con vention. They guaranteed reciprocal treatment and equality for the signatories, A departure from prewar practices, which was included as a clause in the treaties, stipulated that cargoes originating in the countries of the contracting parties would be distributed equally between vessels of both countries. In prewar days, a vessel could carry all the cargo it could entice into its hold regardless of the ves sel's nationality.
In July of 1958, Austrian Chancellor Raab, while on a visit in Moscow, announced that Austria would accede to the 29 Belgrade Convention. Before reaching this decision, the
Austrian government drafted a statement on three of the most vexatious legal questions standing in the way of joinder.
This statement, presented to the Austrian Parliament, covered the following points: the status of the Paris sta
tutes of 1921 and the Treaty of St. Germain; the question of
Book of World Affairs, 1963 (New York: Frederick A. Praeqer, 19 ^ ) , p. 247. 29 Embassy Dispatch, Vienna, to the United States Department of State, No. 1129, April 13. [Air pouch. Un classified. ] 75 the "Supplementary Protocol" to the Belgrade Convention re lating to the assets and liabilities of the former regimes and, finally, the effect of joinder upon Austrian neu— 30 trality. The first question posed, that of the validity of the
1921 statutes and the Treaty of St. Germain which had com pelled Austria to agree to the Danube regimes, was resolved in the negative. This question had been one of the focal points of controversy at the Belgrade meeting, eind it is worthwhile noting the Austrian views of 1957-1950. The
Austrian position was that the Treaty of St. Germain was still in force and that it bound Austria to recognition of the 1921 Convention only so long as it existed. They went on to claim, however, that the regimes of the 1921 statutes had passed out of existence. To support the claim, they argued that those countries attending the Belgrade Conven tion must have considered the former regimes ended or they would not have attended the meeting from the outset. Added to this, the Austrians cited the familiar arguments regard ing Germany's repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, the 1938
Sinaia agreement, and the effect of the war upon the treaty.
The second problem, that of the supplementary proto col, troubled the Austrians from the aspect that accession
^^Johnson, o£. cit., pp. 248-250. 76 to the treaty might constitute approval of the alleged con fiscatory protocol. Again, their study arrived at a nega tive conclusion. First, because the Protocol had power to act only once and, having acted, it was thereby exhausted, having no more effect, especially in 1960. Secondly, the
Protocol was not part of the 1948 Convention, but rather a separate document; and, finally, in joining, Austria was accepting the regime as it existed in 1960 and in no way indicating approval of its previous acts.
The final issue, Austrian neutrality, was readily resolved. All of the nations party to the convention had full knowledge of Austria's legally-established neutrality, either through their participation in the Austrian State
Treaty or through the individual navigation treaties which they had made with Austria. These river treaties required navigation to be conducted in accordance with the national laws of the territorial sovereign. Since the neutrality laws formed a part of Austrian national law, the other states were bound to recognize and abide by them. Therefore, since the Belgrade Convention did not specifically eschew neutrality, it was held proper to consider it read into the treaty by the other members of the commission. ^
The absence of any real protest by the United States,
Great Britain, or France from Austria's joinder is a reflec tion of the change in attitude that has occurred in these 77 countries since the stormy summer of 1948, When the intended accession was announced in 1958 by Chancellor Raab, the
United States issued a querulous statement purporting to see no persuasive economic reason for the act. The United States contended that Austria already enjoyed full use of the water way as a result of its numerous bi-lateral river agreements.
In November of 1963, the Federal Republic of Germany notified the United States that it would accede to the Danube
Convention of 1948 and take full part in the activities of the Danube Convention. The Germans did not specify a date for this step. The West Germans were prompted by the eco nomic benefits which will accrue to its river fleets and the desire for a voice in river administration. Participation will help stabilize the employment of its fleet since member ship in all Danubian conferences and pools will assure its fleets a share of the homeward-bound cargo from ports in the lower Danube.
West Germany discussed its intention to accede to the convention with representatives from the United States,
Great Britain, Fraince, Belgium, and Italy at a meeting in
Bonn on December 6, 196 3. 31 No opposition was expressed to the course of action being considered by the Germans. The
British, French, and Americans reiterated their interests in
31 Embassy Dispatch, Vienna, loc. cit. 78 protection of non—riparian rights, establishment of closer ties between the Danube Commission and the ECE, and the creation of an acceptable method of appeal to an inter national judicial body. Germany promised to pursue these objectives once she attained membership, but she did not hold out much optimism for immediate results.
From the point of view of the Communist bloc nations, the acceptance of Austria and, eventually. West Germany in volves economic and political gains which outweigh any breaches in ideological solidarity and control. Both Germany and Austria have developed importcint and expanding commercial ties with the Eastern European states. River shipping has been increasing at a great rate and the participation of Ger man and Austrian fleets has played a substantial part in this growth. Both nations are wealthy and can be expected to pro vide much-needed capital for river improvement projects. In addition, their cooperation will be needed if any substantial water level control projects are to be realized.
In the political context. Communist control of the com mission is hardly threatened by inclusion of two non-communist nations. If any threat to Communism is constituted, it is in the nature of creating a window to the West. In sum, the economic benefits gained by all parties are sufficient to
submerge the long-standing political and ideological differ ences which, in the past, prevented riparian cooperation. CHAPTER V
ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
Postwar Conditions In 1945, physical conditions for navigation along the
Danube were in a chaotic state. The river was littered with more than three hundred sunken vessels, many bridges were down, their rubble obstructing the channels, and aids to navigation, such as, channel markers, buoys, ranges, lights, etc. , were either missing or in a state of disrepair.
The closing years of the war had brought an end to normal maintenance of channel depths because of shortages of dredging equipment, repair parts,- and experienced crews.
Little capital improvement had been initiated due to pri ority demands on resources for prosecution of the war.
A postwar inventory of the river fleets determined that there remained some twenty-five hundred ships and barges, of which seven hundred were in the hands of the
American occupation forces in Austria and Germany. All of these vessels were in a poor state of repair, having suf fered from prolonged use without adequate maintenance and upkeep.^
^Nicolas Spulber, "The Danube— Black Sea Canal," Economic Geography, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July, 1954), 237. 80
The Soviet occupation forces had but one objective along the Danube and that was to use it as a highway for the eastward flow of war booty. No reliable statistics are available indicating the kind and amount of goods sent to
Russia via the Danube. Most authorities agree that the quantity was extensive. For example, it is estimated that eight hundred thousand to one million tons of oil were taken 2 from the Zisterdorf fields in Soviet-occupied Austria.
Since their initial intentions were solely exploitative in nature, the Soviets were willing to make only those repairs
absolutely essential to navigation. As political conditions brought about development of the satellite system, the
Soviets integrated this transportation artery into their pattern of satellite relations. The repair and renovation
of the river was left to the weak and disorganized riparians,
Lack of coordination and differing economic priority delayed
full restoration of navigation in some areas until as late
as 1957.
After the first wave of plunder, under the guise of
military operations and occupation, the Soviets altered
their methods of exploitation. The distinction between
former enemy states, such as Austria and Hungary, and those
nominally allies, such as Yugoslavia, forced the Soviets to
2 Dita Guri, "The Red Danube," World Affairs Inter preter (Spring, 1953), p. 95. 81 conduct their relations along the lines of recognized inter national practice. Also, the creation of the so-called
Peoples Democracies significantly changed the conduct of re lations of the Eastern European states with the Soviet Union.
In the economic sector, the Soviets began to create the
"Joint" or "Mixed Companies." The satellite nations of
Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia were forced to join with the USSR in forming mixed companies devoted to Danube trans portation. In addition, a mixed transportation company was formed in the Russian zone of occupation in Austria.
Broadly defined, these companies were partnerships between the Soviet Union and a foreign firm or government.
The Soviets owned at least 50 per cent of the stock and insured control by placing one of their agents in a key executive position. The Soviet contribution to the capital
assets of these companies was, in the case of Danube trans port companies, the ships, barges, piers, loading-unloading
facilities, warehouses, etc., which the Soviets had seized
as German assets at the end of the war. The participating
governments would contribute facilities, liquid assets,
special privileges (tax allowance exemptions) and provide
funds for overhaul and operation of the facilities and
equipment. In this way, the Soviet capital investment in
volved no transfer or contribution of Russian resources.
These joint undertakings were deeply resented by the 82 satellite nations. Yugoslavia was particularly strident in her objection and, after the break in 1948, made public the prejudicial details of these companies. The only real com pensation flowing to the junior partners was the fact that the Soviets ceased their practice of confiscating capital equipment and then allowing it to rot on a railroad siding somewhere between Eastern Europe and Moscow.
The Soviet-Hungarian company formed for Danube river transport was called MESZHART. The Soviet contribution to this undertaking consisted of some German shares and some former Hungarian vessels retaken from the Germans. Hungary provided the new company with port facilities, warehouses, and other buildings. At formation, MESZHART consisted of about one quaurter of the prewar Hungarian Danube fleet, some 3 30,500 tons of various types of barges and tugboats.
The Rumanian—Soviet transport company was formed very much like the Hungarian-Soviet company. The Soviet contribu
tion to the formation of SOVROMTRANSPORT was a large number
of Rumanian vessels (186 vessels, total tonnage 118,694) 4 seized as war booty. The Rumanian contribution consisted
of facilities, piers, and warehouses.
3 Nicolas Spulber, "Soviet Undertakings and Soviet Mixed Companies in Eastern Europe," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XIV (July, 1954) , No. 2., 15 7.
^Ibid., p. 162. 83
The Soviets did not enter into a river transport partnership in Bulgaria, Prior to the war, the Bulgarian river flotilla was negligible, consisting of less than ten thousand tons. In the postwar years, the bulk of Bulgarian commercial river transport has been carried by Rumanian vessels (SOVROMTRANSPORf).
The Soviet undertakings and joint companies estab lished in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were based upon the
German assets seized in these ex-enemy states. In Yugo slavia, the Soviets established a river transport company without the benefit of German assets. The Yugoslav-Soviet
Danubian shipping company, JUSPAD, was founded in 1947 and liquidated in 1949.^ This arrangement was the familiar con tribution of one half of the capital for stock in the com pany. Each country agreed in this situation to contribute their share in the form of equipment. By 1948, the Soviets had only contributed 9.8 per cent of their share while the
Yugoslavs had paid up over 76 per cent. At the time of liquidation of JUSPAD, the Yugoslavs had pooled 137 of their best craft (hand picked from the Yugoslav fleet by Soviet experts). The rest of their river fleet was left to the
Yugoslav State River Shipping Company.
The Soviet-controlled companies were not content to
^Ibid., p. 166. 84 contain their influence within the boundaries of the partner state. The five Danube river companies^ entered into a num ber of practical agreements which amounted to cartel arrange ments. This monopoly exercised broad cooperation in tug- boating, mutual assistance, port services, and tariff consultation. The mutual agreements frequently acted against the interests of other state-owned shipping companies as il lustrated by the following example. If JUSPAD were unable to provide tugboat services for a specific job, it would call for help upon one of the companies with which it had exchanged agreements rather than upon the Yugoslav State
River Shipping Company. Yugoslavia would, therefore, lose the income to the Joint Company of another state while the
Soviets profited by being partners with all other states.
The discriminating agreements of these five companies extended into freight rates, and the Yugoslavs complained at the liquidation proceedings that the cost of transport of 7 Yugoslav goods was almost twice that of Soviet goods.
The parasite joint companies were a flagrant example of Soviet exploitation of the Eastern European economies.
^(1) The Soviet Danubian State Shipping Co.; (2), MESZHART; (3) DDSF (Soviet-Austrian Shipping Co.); (4) SOVROMTRANSPORT; and (5), JUSPAD. 7 Spulber, "Soviet Undertakings and Soviet Mixed Companies in Eastern Europe," o£. cit., p. 167. 85
They sapped the desperately—needed resources of the host countries and provided another level of control for the
Soviet Union. The Belgrade Convention meshed with the Joint
Companies to forge an unbreakable hold over river transport.
It was not until after the death of Stalin and the reversal of the exploitative policies that economic and technical improvement became possible.
Physical Improvement Projects
Canals. Nations enjoying vast and complex systems of public highways and rail networks are prone to overlook the advantages of inland water transportation. Quite the con trary is true in Greater Europe. For hundreds of yeans, the exploitation of these natural waterways has been an economic and military necessity. To maximize the efficiency of these arteries, the Europeans have engaged in many efforts to con trol water flow, maintain depths, and reduce or eliminate natural obstacles. Principal among these efforts has been
that of canalization. Throughout Europe, particularly
Western Europe, there is an extensive system of canals link
ing the navigable streams.
Joining the Danube to the existing European waterways
has long attracted the efforts and imagination of men and
nations. The subject has a history which reaches back to
the eighth century. Each generation produces men fascinated 86 by the technical complexity and the economic potential of effecting these links. Since World War II, several of these canal projects have been either launched or subject to seri ous study on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Foremost among these development schemes are: the
Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, the Oder-Morava-Danube Canal; the
Danube—Black Sea Canal. The first of these projects is currently under construction and, when completed, it will link the North Sea with the Black Sea. The Oder-Morava-
Danube project, which is still in the planning stage, will join the Baltic with the Black Sea. The third project is a canal running from Cernovoda, Rumania, to the Black Sea,
This project, presently suspended, will, when completed, reduce the river transit distance on the Danube by nearly
220 miles.
A number of lesser projects gain periodic considera tion but, for political or economic reasons, have failed to reach the construction state. They are: the Elbe—Oder-
Morava-Danube Waterway; the Danube-Prut-Dniester-Vistula
Waterway; the Danube-Aegean Waterway.
The Rhine-Danube Canal project has a long history.
Charlemagne caused excavation to begin on a canal joining the Regnitz, a tributary of the Main, and the Altmuhl, a tributary of the Danube. The project was abandoned after a series of construction disasters. In the following 87 centuries, the project was periodically considered; but it was not until 1836 that King Ludwig of Bavaria, the "Canal
Constructor King," gave the order for work to begin once again. Under his supervision, the canal was completed but proved to be an economic failure because of its shallow depth.
A state-controlled joint stock company was formed in
Germany in 1921, called the Rhine-Main-Donau A. G. Company.
This company was to reconstruct the link between the Main and the Danube. Today the company is controlled by the West
German government, and it is canalizing the Main from
Aschaffenberg to Bamberg and the Danube from Kehlheim to
Passau. In addition, it is constructing the canal proper g between Bamberg and Kehlheim.
This waterway is being constructed to handle barges and craft from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred tons full load displacement. Hydroelectric installations, which will help underwrite the cost of construction, are included in this project. The estimated traffic capacity of the canal system will be 12.5 million metric tons annually on the basis of a 14-hour day for 280 days a year. On an
g Anthony Prigrada, "Danube Waterway," Mid-European Studies Center, 5 (November 30, 1953), 2. (Mimeographed Series.) 88 around-the-clock schedule, the estimated traffic capacity 9 will be close to twenty million metric tons per year.
Because the canal will be of considerable importance not only to Germany but also to many other European coun tries, concern has been expressed by Austria, Switzerland, and France, that work on the waterway is proceeding slowly.
The French, in particular, are impatient to resume Danube traffic under their own flag. This will be possible when the big Rhine port of Strasbourg is connected directly with the Danube. At the present time, French vessels of the government-owned SFND are chartered pairtly to the Austrians
and partly to the Rumanians. Optimistic observers believe
that the canal project may be completed around 1972. A much
longer construction period must, however, be assumed on the basis of remaining cost, four hundred million dollars, and
the small sum being afforded by the German government in
recent years (not more than twenty million dollars per year).
It is generally believed that the slow rate of con
struction reflects opposition to the waterway on the part of
important railroad and seaport interests in Germany. The
^Ibid. , p. 4.
^^For further discussion of current French interest in Danube navigation, see: "Sur le Danube, le Pavillon Français affirme le caractère International du Fleuve," by Y. Ferraton, Revue de la Navigation Intérieur et Rhénane, Vol. XXIX, No. 7 (April 10, 1957), 240-^46. ' 89
latest actual completion report of the Rhine—Main—Donau A,
G. is that the section of the canal up to Bamberg is now complete. Some question exists within the membership of the
German Rhine-Main-Danube Canal Association as to whether completion of the Bamberg-Nuremberg stretch will ever be assured. Total costs for this section were estimated to be
less than $140 million;but the Federal Government, which
had promised to lend the very modest amount of five million dollars a year from 1963— 1966, has failed to meet this com mitment.^^
The Oder-Morava-Danube Canal is an ambitious project
designed to link the Baltic and the Black Sea. It calls for
extensive canalization of the Oder from Kozle, Poland, to
Prerov, Czechoslovakia, and, thence, canalization of the
Morava River to its termination in the Danube at Deven, 13 Czechoslovakia. The total length would be 309 kilometers.
This project remains at present in the planning stage, how
ever ; its proponents see economic developments of great
import to the Eastern European nations if it is completed.
All the Danubian states would be brought into waterway con
tact with the Moravian-Silesian industrial area. Soviet
^^United States Department of State, Bureau of Intel ligence and Research, "Research Memorandum, RES—8," March 18, 1964, p. 5.
^^Ibid. ^^Prigada, 0£. cit., p. 17. 90 iron ore from Krivoi-Rog in the Ukraine could be shipped directly to Ostrava, the center of this industrial complex.
Swedish ores could also be brought to Ostrava, and the cost of transportation of Polish coal to the Danubian states could be greatly reduced. Optimistic calculations by the Polish
Ministry for International Maritime Shipping envisions the movement of sixty million tons of goods annually through such a canal by 1970.^^ The plein is to construct the water way so that barges and craft of one thousand tons full-load displacement can navigate in all clear water seasons.
Hydroelectric projects are also being considered in conjunc tion with this project.
The Cernovoda-Black Sea Canal is a project designed to shorten the navigational course of the Danube by some 220 miles. The Danube passes within thirty miles of the Black
Sea at Cernovoda, Rumania, as it makes its final northward run towards the maritime stretch and the Soviet—Rumania delta mouths. Striking east from Cernovoda, the canal plan follows in the valley of the small river called the Carasu to the town of Medjedra, thence to the town of Porta Alba where the canal would turn northeast and finally meet the
Stefan C. Stolte, "Moscow Regulates Traffic on the Danube," Bulletin Institute for the Study of the USSR (May, 1960), p. 29. [Current Polish policy towards this project is in doubt,) 91
Sea at Navadau, a small town twenty miles north of Con- 15 stanza. The canal will be an open-cut canal with two sets of locks. The difference in water level from the Danube down to the Black Sea is thirty-six feet. The total length of the canal would be sixty kilometers, and its dimensions will be approximately sixty meters in width and six to eight meters in depth. The latter dimension means that the canal will be able to accommodate vessels up to five thousand tons displacement.
The canal was started in 1949. Rumanian administra- I tors, technicians, and engineers experienced in work of this magnitude were obviously in short supply as the project suf fered numerous technical and mechanical failures. To add to the problems, the government poured thousands of political prisoners into the project as forced labor with little or no preparation in terms of shelter, food or medical care— thousands lost their lives and tens of thousands paid with their health.The Soviets, realizing the strategic value of this project, sent belated assistance in the form of
Spulber, "The Danube-Black Sea Canal," o^, cit. , p. 243, Figure 2.
"The Danube-Black Sea Canal," Correspondent, The Economist (December 12, 1953), 828. 92 machinery, but this was apparently insufficient to stem the tide of ill fortune which plagued the project.
In 1951 and 1952, two big trials were staged to pro vide the necessary scapegoats for the accumulated failures.
Bucharest had to face the fact that only three of the sixty kilometers would be completed by 1955, the date originally scheduled for completion.
A group of Swiss engineers were brought in to survey the entire project, and they uncovered additional faults with the scheme, mainly in terms of water-level calculations 17 and sub-soil composition.
All work stopped on the project in the spring of 1953, and the surviving political prisoners were given amnesty or transferred to other labor camps. Since then, only engineer ing studies and maintenance work have been conducted.
Despite the cessation of work on this canal, it should not be ignored or passed off as another Communist failure.
The feasibility from an economic and technical standpoint has never been challenged. The Rumanians would gain signifi cant advantages if they were able to exercise exclusive con trol of a maritime access to the Danube. The completion of the Cernovoda canal would not mean the immediate loss of use
17 Ibid. 93 of the northern delta, but given time, the latter would be bound to wither as an economic entity.
The final canal project worthy of note is the Danube—
Tisa-Danube Canal which was begun in 1958. The canal, when completed about 1970, will be 258 kilometers long and 20 to
40 meters wide, with depths varying from 2.5 to 5 meters.
It will leave the Danube at Bezdan, not far from the
Hungarian-Yugoslavian frontier, and it will reach the Tisa at Betsche. Heading towards Zren Janin, it will regain the
Danube at Banatska-Polanka in the neighborhood of the
Rumanian-Yugoslavian border. The canal will shorten the transit on the Yugoslavian Danube by one hundred kilometers.
Its achievement is planned in two steps which will total a
period of twelve years. The project has a threefold purpose
and, in addition to commercial navigation, it will provide
for agricultural irrigation and swamp control.
Hydroelectric Projects
The Danube River in its middle and lower reaches does
not lend itself to the construction of hydroelectric plants. By and large, the river is too wide and the surrounding land
too flat to construct the large dams needed to generate
electric power. A striking exception is the cataract sec
tion of the river that passes through the Balkan and Car
pathian mountain ranges. Commonly known as the Iron Gates,
this section has long been a bottle neck to navigation with 94 its narrow stream, swift currents, and rocky bed. These same characteristics provide an ideal setting for a dam and associated hydroelectric facilities. Since improvement of this section has been given such high priority by Rumania and Yugoslavia in recent years, it will be dealt with sepa rately in subsequent pages.
At the present time, there are only eight hydro- 18 electric plants along the Danube. All of these installa tions are located along the Danube in Austria and the Federal
Republic of Germany. The combined annual output of these 1 9 generating plants is 2.6 million KWH.
Austria and Germany have proposed and, in some cases, begun construction of twenty-nine additional hydroelectric plants (nineteen in Germany and ten in Austria). The German and Austrian projects are closely tied to flood control and depth control systems. 20
Downstream from Austria there are only three projects in the planning stage. The first two are being planned jointly by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the third is the
Iron Gates system. Of the two cooperative ventures, one is to be located at Nagymoros, about forty—five kilometers up
stream from Budapest, and the other will be situated between
1 fi U.N. Document, F/ECE/360, p. 1. 1 Q on Ibid., pp. 4-5. ^^Ibid., p. 5. 95
Bratislava and the end of the backwater pool of the Nagymoros project. The annual output of these two generating facili— 21 ties will approach 3,200,000,000 KWH.
Iron Gates By far the most formidable of the many obstacles to navigation on the Danube are those in the Iron Gates sector.
This is the gorge of the Yugoslav-Ruraanian border extending
for about seventy miles from Turnu-Severin to Moldova Veche.
It is extremely difficult to navigate and extensive improve
ments have been necessary to make it usable. Fully—loaded
1,000—ton barges with a draft of 2 meters can pass through
the entire sector for 260 to 300 days of the year, but no
navigation is possible at night. The problem of navigation
derives from two conditions; namely, the increasing fall of
the river with the accompanying greater velocity of the cur
rent and the narrow, rocky and irregular character of the
river bed.
Efforts to cope with these two problems have involved
the construction of longitudinal dikes and the blasting of
any irregularities in the channel. This type of regulation
has had no effect on the high velocity of the current, and
it has been found necessary to provide especially powerful
21 ■^Ibid. 96 tugs to aid upstream traffic. In addition, a locomotive is availsLble on the Yugoslav side of the channel to assist in towing barges against the powerful currents.
The Belgrade Convention called for a special Iron
Gates administration, composed of representatives of Rumania and Yugoslavia, to administer development projects and navi- 22 gation in this area. After long deliberation, the two governments reached a preliminary agreement on June 12, 196 3, for the construction of hydroelectric and navigation facili— 23 ties at the Iron Gates. On November 30, the agreement was finalized at Belgrade by Tito and Gheorghiu-Dej during the letter's formal visit to Yugoslavia. Work is to start in
1964 and to be completed by 1971.
The hydroelectric portion of the project calls for the construction of a 177-foot dam to be built at the lower end of the Iron Gates in order to form a long, narrow lake.
This lake will inundate several Yugoslav villages and their population of about twenty—five thousand will have to be moved. Two power stations will be built at the base of the dam to generate an expected 10.7 billion KWH of electricity annually which will be share equally by the two countries.
22 See Article 21 of Belgrade Convention.
^^The New York Times, October 20, 1963.
^"^Ibid. 97
The navigation part of the project involves the con struction of two locks which, when completed, could increase the volume of traffic fourfold, from the present level of twelve million tons to over forty-five million tons. The new shipping channels will reduce passage time from its present four and one-half days to approximately thirty-two hours. Other advantages to shipping will be slower water speeds due to damming, an increase in depth to 3.5 meters upstream, navigation at night, greater safety for shipping, movements by normal haulage methods, the crossing of convoys, 25 and an end to the splitting of convoys.
In October of 1963, an extraordinary meeting of the
Danube Commission was called to discuss the project with the other riparians. Commission members favored the initiative taken by the two governments, and many pointed out the ad vantages which would fall to all riparians. According to the Austrian representative at the meeting, the enthusiasm of the other members towards the project did not extend to a willingness to share in its cost. Rumania and Yugoslavia are said to have proposed that the cost (estimated four hundred million dollars) be recovered in twenty-five years through the levy of a charge of fifty-seven cents a ton on all shipping. Thereafter, the charge would drop to
25 Research Memorandum RES-8, op. cit., p. 6, 98
forty—nine cents a ton. The Soviets, who conducted about 40
per cent of the shipping through this sector, were surpris
ingly restrained in their reaction; however, this was not so
in the case of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria, Bul
garia sided with the majority, complaining of lack of infor mation as to the effect on its water supply. The upstream riparians were adamant on the subject of tolls, arguing that
it would set a dangerous precedent affecting future improve ments; and the Austrians threatened to collect tolls in
areas they had improved. The Austrians were also fearful
that this would pave the way for charges on the Rhine-Main—
Danube Canal. No vote was taken, and the participants
agreed to meet again when more information was available 26 from Yugoslavia and Rumania.
Depth Control
In the impressive five-year improvement plan prepared
by the Danube Commission in 1958, a program for deepening
the Danube from an average of two meters to an average of
three and one—half meters was scheduled. The project was
not completed by 1953, due principally to cost and severe
weather conditions. The project was trimmed down consider
ably at the twenty-first session of the commission in
^^Ibid., pp. 7-8, 99
February, 1963. It was decided, at that time, to deepen the river to three and one-half meters from Vienna eastward by
1980, while the depth between Vienna and Regensburg was to reach two and seven—tenths meters. At the same time a depth of two meters was to be guaranteed on the whole river be— 27 tween Vienna and Braila. Completion of this program would, undoubtedly, be expedited if Western financial assistance were forthcoming. If Germany carries through her intent to join the commission, she will be expected to share in this project.
Danube Traffic
Since World War II and especially in the last decade,
Danube shipping has been growing at a great rate. Trade between riparians, with the West and with the other nations of the world, plus a pronounced increase in petit cabotage, has played a significant part in Eastern European growth.
Until recently, a meaningful appraisal of this growth by the
West has been hampered by a lack of statistical and related economic information. The Communists chose to treat this type of information as state secrets, often to avoid criti cism and exposure of shortcomings. In 1958, the Danube
Commission reversed this policy and began to publish annual
^^Ibid., p. 4. 100 statistical bulletins of the traffic and trade on the Danube.
The attendance of Western participants and observers at the meetings of the commission, undoubtedly, played a part in the decision to publish this material. Currently available are four bulletins— one for the period 1950 to 1955, and three annual bulletins for the years 1959, 1960, and 1961.
Pertinent sections of these statistical documents are herein reproduced or extrapolated for the purpose of illustrating significant changes in Danubian navigation. In addition, several searching studies have been published in trade journals by German and French transportation experts. These studies, in combination with the published material of the
Danube Commission, shed a great deal of light upon recent trade and traffic patterns.
Recent Regional and National Development
Germany. The navigable sector of the German Danube is only 158 kilometers long. Petit cabotage is minor and the bulk of German traffic is destined for southeast Europe.
The principal trading partner in this respect is neighboring
Austria. Over half of the total trade of Ratisbon, the principal German port, is with Austria, and 80 per cent of 28 this is German and American coal and coke bound for Linz.
28 p. Feuerstein, "Le Danube," Revue de la Navigation Intérieur et Rhénane, No. 9 (May 10, 1959) , 308. 101
The remaining half of German trade is with Hungary (fuels, cereals, minerals), Yugoslavia (cereals, bauxite, lumber, 29 coal, nitrates), and Russia (coal, fuels, and cereals).
Trade with both the Soviet Union and with Austria is under going a marked increase. The German Danube navigation com panies are rapidly expanding their fleets, and the port cities of Ratisbon, Passau, and Deggendorf are constantly expanding and improving their shipping facilities. The com pletion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal and German accession to the Danube Commission are two events bound to reshape
German river navigation.
Austria. In the past twenty years, the section de fined by the Linz-Vienna axis has been heavily industrial ized, and currently over 55 per cent of Austrian industrial production is carried out in this area. This production constitutes close to one third of Austria's exportations, whereas, by comparison, it constituted only 8 per cent in 30 1937. Most of this production consists of metallurgical and chemical products. These two industries employ 20 per cent of the Austrian working force and account for 12 per cent of the total volume of exports. The industrial develop ment of this area was predicated upon the import of coal products from Germany via Ratisbon and the Danube River.
29 30 ^^Ibid., p. 311. Ibib., p. 310. 102
Finished products were expected to move east and west via the river. When the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal is opened, west bound products will be carried almost entirely by water.
Another factor affecting Austrian navigation is the rebirth of trade between the East and West. The Soviet
Union is one of the principal agents in this trade, espe cially with Austria. The Soviets provide raw materials and coal, and the Austrians export finished and semi-finished steel products, sheet metal, piping and structural material.
In 1958, Austria and the USSR concluded a trade agreement in which Austria would receive 380,000 tons of coal (350,000
tons shipped on the Danube), 200,000 tons of iron ore and
500,000 tons of hydrocarbons. Transportation of the material was subject to the terms of the agreement. Primarily, Soviet vessels would be used; however, specified amounts were to be
hauled by Austria, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and 31 Germany.
The two most important and growing ports in Austria
are Linz and Vienna. The brisk development of steelworks in
Linz has resulted in extensive construction of port facili
ties; such as, docks, loading/unloading equipment, ware
houses, etc. The handling of coal and coke represents
approximately one half of the material received by water in
^^Ibid., p. 312. 103
Linz. A recently-constructed petroleum facility has the 32 capacity to handle 1,200,000 tons per year. As an inter mediary between East and West, Austria has since 195 3 oper ated a custom-free zone in Linz. The facilities of this free zone are a large warehouse, a refrigerated storage warehouse, and ample open ground storage. The cold storage facilities have played an important role in egg exports to the West by Bulgaria, Hungeury, and Poland, and also meat exports of Yugoslavia. 33
Vienna has long enjoyed the status of a major river port; however, the recent competition by Linz has given rise to a spate of port improvement and expansion projects by the
Viennese. In precise terms, Vienna as a river port consists of the port facilities of four adjacent towns. Each of these towns has a port specialty (e.g.. Lobau handles petro leum and is the terminal of pipelines from the oil fields;
Alvern is a cereal port having a number of grain elevators and mills). Vienna has been badly used by Soviet occupation forces and has been slow to rebuild. In recent years, how ever, efforts have been redoubled, and Vienna once again is playing a leading role in Austrian river commerce.
Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia uses the Danube to a much greater degree today than it ever did prior to World
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 313. 104
War II. Since 1947, the port facilities of Koraarno and
Bratislava have been either improved or renewed. Czecho
slovakia river trade consists of imports of grain and raw materials from Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Her exports consist of finished products, machinery, and metal products.
Czechoslovakia has been developing a modest but expanding trade with nations of the mid and far East, such as Syria and Burma, and much of this commerce transits the Danube.
The Czechoslovakian fleet was decimated by half during World War II. Today the fleet is estimated to be in 35 the neighborhood of 120,000 to 150,000 gross tons.
Hungary. Hungary exports via the Danube iron and
steel products, chemical fertilizers, oil, coal, and wheat.
These products are mainly in exchange for Russian cereals
and raw materials; however, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria
share in this intercourse.
Hungarian river traffic operates from the port of
Budapest-Csepel which has been a free port for thirty-six
years. The Hungarian government hopes to revitalize the
role of the free zone in order to increase the downstream
traffic. Currently, Hungarian vessels travel downstream
empty enroute to Soviet ports to pick up raw materials. The
government has ambitious plans for improvement and
^^Ibid., p. 316. 105 enlargement of the Csepel facilities over a period of twenty- five years. These plans call for additional piers, harbor 3 6 canals, storage areas, and modern handling equipment.
In 1946, the mixed company, MESZHART, was formed with the Soviet Union. The company was dissolved in 1954 by the
Soviets on the condition that the Hungarian government pur chase the Soviet stock. The new company became known as
Mahart and holds a monopoly on Hungarian Danube navigation.
In 1954, Mahart launched an extensive building program, and they now operate 120 to 130 barges, half of which ajce 500 tons capacity or larger. Among the newer craft are twenty barges of one thousand tons capacity, six tanker-barges, several passenger boats, fourteen tugs (five constructed in
1958), and a total of thirteen maritime vessels ranging in size from five hundred to thirteen hundred tons. The total tonnage of the Hungarian fleet now exceeds one hundred 37 thousand tons.
Yugoslavia. The Danube has never played a leading role in Yugoslavian transportation. The few ports that are sprinkled along the Yugoslav banks are poorly equipped and rely heavily upon raw manpower for loading and unloading 38 operations.
^^Ibid., p. 316.
^^Ibid. ^®Ibid. 106
In 1955, river traffic in Belgrade reached a total of
1,320,000 tons. The bulk of this traffic (71 per cent) was 39 in the form of sand and gravel. The second largest Danube port in Yugoslavia, Vukovar, handled a total of 189,000 tons of traffic consisting primarily of bauxite bound for
Ratisbon.
The government has decided to increase the usage and capacity of its Danube ports and has drawn up plans for improvement of the facilities of Belgrade, Vukovar, and
Prakovo. These plans involve increased warehouse and stor age space, more and better piers, and a considerable amount of loading/unloading equipment. The Yugoslav government hopes that in the improvement process Belgrade will become the trading post between Southeast and Central Europe.
Included in the improvement plans are measures for expanding the river fleet. In the five-year period which began in 1960, the Yugoslavs hoped to add to their fleet 14 tugs, 122 barges and tanker-barges, 3 self-propelled oil 41 carriers, and a small number of miscellaneous'craft.
Rumania. The Danube has historically played an im portant role in the Rumanian economy. Flowing a total distance of 1,075 kilometers along and through the territory
^^Ibid. "^°Ibid. , p. 317.
^^Ibid, 107 of Rumania, the Danube has been a highway to the west for the products of Rumanian fields, forests, mines, and wells.
In prewar days, the Rumania river ports left a good deal to be desired. Facilities and equipment were inade quate for modern shipping practices. In 1945, the slow process of reconstruction and modernization began on the ports of Giurgiu, Braila, Galatz, and Constanza. By 1948, fluvial traffic had increased two and one-half times over that reported in 1944. In June of 1948, navigation on the
Danube became the monopoly of the state, and the government commenced a systematic reorganization of navigation. At the
same time, the shipyards of Turnu-Severn, Constanza, Galatz,
and Braila began construction of a new fleet of tugs, self- 42 propelled barges, and common dumb barges.
In 195 7, the mechanization of loading and unloading
facilities exceeded the 1950 level by 250 per cent. Pro
ductivity in these ports rose 35 per cent from 1951 to 1955,
while, at the same time, river traffic increased 462 per
cent.. 43
In recent years, the traditional flow of materials to
the West has been re-established with shipment of fuel to
Austria and corn to Germany.
The Rumanian river fleet is estimated to be in excess
^^Ibid., p. 318. ^^Ibid. 108 of 150,000 tons, which would make it first in size among the
Danubian fleets. Bulgaria. Primarily an agricultural nation, Bulgaria relies upon the Danube for exportation of its farm products upstream and receipt of manufactured goods from industrial
Europe. I
Bulgaria has three ports along the Danube— Rousse,
Videne, and Lorn. These ports are primitive, lacking modern facilities and equipment; and, to date, there is little evi dence of extensive improvement.
USSR. Soviet activity along the Danube has been dis cussed extensively throughout this presentation and requires little or no repetition at this point.
The two river ports of Reni and Ismail have been refurbished since the war, and they currently handle in excess of one million tons of cargo per year.
The Soviet fleet consists of all types of carriers, and its size is estimated to be in excess of one hundred thousand tons.
Statistics
The foregoing discussion of economic and technical development indicates a definite commitment by most of the riparians to the expansion of river commerce. While there is often a wide gap between stated intentions and actual 109 accomplishments, there is little doubt that conditions for navigation along the Danube have improved markedly. The
Danube Commission has enlarged its role in river affairs and acts as a positive influence in Danubian economics. Large-
scale projects, such as the described canals and the river depth control programs, represent major commitments for most of the river states.
The decision to commit national resources to long- range and expensive programs must, in large part, be based upon reliable economic facts. In the case of a waterway,
the traffic statistics and their interpretation in the con
text of overall economic development represents one of the most valid instruments for reaching these decisions. In the
case of the Danube, the postwcir patterns of Eastern Europe
have taken definite shape and, to a large degree, these
patterns can be seen in the Danube traffic statistics. The
broad outlines of the new trade system already discussed in
the brief country survey and the published statistics of the
Danube Commission for the periods 1950— 1955, 1959-1961, seem
to bear out the announced intentions of the riparian govern
ments. The statistics issued by the commission must be
treated with caution since, in some cases, their accuracy 44 has been called into question. They are, nevertheless.
44Hungarian domestic traffic made an enormous increase 110 valuable indices of the trends and activities in river com merce. The statistical bulletin of the Danube Commission is
composed of six sections. The first is a table showing
total traffic on the Danube for each state plus the ton-
kilometers carried by the riparian fleets. The second table
shows the traffic for the year by country and by the ports.
The third section deals with the international traffic on
the Danube. Traffic in transit along the various sectors of
the Danube and the direction of the traffic constitutes the
fourth section of the bulletin. The last two tables indicate
the traffic through the Sulina channel at the south of the
river and an accounting of the traffic through the Iron
Gates section.
The following selected tables are drawn from the
statistical bulletin for the indicated periods, with the
occasional addition of prewar figures for comparison.
Items not extracted from the statistical bulletin of the
Danube Commission will be appropriately noted.
(fivefold) in 1960 and 1961, when compared with 1958. The increase conflicts with independent estimates of Hungarian traffic, see Table VI, infra, p. 116. Ill
TABLE I
TOTAL TRAFFIC ON THE DANUBE FOR THE PERIOD 1950-1955 (In thousands of tons, and percentage based on the year 1950)
Total Year AB C % A+B+C 1950
1950 3,715 3,104 153 6,973 100
1951 4, 716 3,671 63 8,450 121
1952 5,812 4,265 18 10,095 145
1953 6,573 4,263 156 10,992 158
1954 6,753 4,081 96 10,930 157
1955 7,335 5,039 193 12,557 180
NOTE: A = The total quantity in thousands of tons of goods leaving Danube ports. B = Cabotage in thousands of tons. C = Goods arriving in Danubian ports from non-Danubian countries. CM 00 1—1 «ef M 3 un M3 M rH • «• •• t « nJ lO rH LD o i> CM 'Cf 'd' O 0) en r H CM rH > h H + + + + + 1 1 en n~t O 1—( en 00 00 'd' c o ••« # « • • •H l£> U-» en 'ef 0 0 c- Tf M 3 un OO XI en r H r H C M rH rH 01 iH + + H- + H- + + + + u 112 0> CM en 0 0 00 o CM M en 0 •« 0 ««# OiLO eo CM 00 00 en 00 1—1 o O en rH 1—l 1— t CM rH rH ^ H + + + + + + + S H- 1 0> CO C' CM 1—1 en OO rH O t—I >1 1—1 CM en 1—t 1—1 en 00 in CM (D eo r H in 00 sC •d" o OO •ef OO m en en • kO * rH ejD fO rH O O •M* CM rH rH c\J 7.S * CM O 0 \ T3 * P ^ to 0) » eo o un M 3 rH 00 en [" C M 0 0 en u r H O 00 en 00 O OO en en F-1 H (U (d eo 00 00 OO rH O O 0 0 M3 rH u +) en #> •s ftJ ^ co C l, o rH O O 1—ï O O rH CM 1—1 00 - H r-l Eh CM t> nJ (ti -P u“ o s en CM O r H M 3 un M3 ro iH O en C M rH 00 0 0 1—1 0 0 00 O en W Eh XI in CM UO OO OO O un 00 M3 00 O M H 00 !>- H CM un ir> 1—f CO 01 •»- rH O H 01 * I—!■H Ot( ca rC * O rH M3 CM 1—1 un un I O Q K H U U co en r H CM 1 1 •d* en rH un 1 1 eu • rd 1 1 H P 0) — X p U fd en CM ■M* M 3 un r- CM +J in rH 00 1 t" 1 1 O fd c e n > L C rH 1 sf 1 1 L' •iH fd r H CM m oj I—1 > Q u CQ g M u O O un en o 'd* en efj Q) fd rH 00 CM en en U£3 M3 i> en -P X •rH p a eo en 0 0 o 0 0 0- M 3 rH O' X CM ■r- «s r U P en fs 0 rH X CM rH r O OO en A fd -d' LA rH •rH P 0) > CM < Su | * l> CM o 0 0 M 3 un en 1—! OO X w * O M3 1—1 M 3 M 3 o 0 0 en o LA f f • r. m co CM [>- o 0- en un p I—1 L-- C eu •HUD en fd rH u c p rH rH HCMOO rH CM Q fd tH rH 44 en 0 rH IT) § u O M3 M 3 OO •M* 00 UO un P LA a i H en UO 0 0 O r—1 0 0 •M* CM in un •H k n M 3 0 0 O M 3 un o 1—1 c • #». fd k X3 en fd fd e n •ri 1— 1 H H CM OO rH 1—i eu •rH OO V 1 § 1—1 1—1 E-t w X M) fd p e n > 0 0 0 0 C— r- rH en r-- 'd* C.0 CO 1— 1 rH P 0 en O M 3 en 0 0 1—I i> H p fd rH eo LD un un OO r- CM CM [> 0 p en en 0 1 e o O H 00 rH 1—1 rH en P C e n X 8 c u H CM o P 00 un M 3 un rH 'Cj* 00 en - C LU OO M 3 00 1 1 * o — CM OO O o M3 • IM < eo un 00 OO L' 00 un en UD eu E *• U 1—1 00 rH O 0 0 I— l rH en •rH Sh u n • Vs • Hn P 130 CM CMCM OO OO un O eu iH rH VO en O en 1— 1 CM 1—! un un M3 LA P LA ro LD M3 00 00 00 un CM 3- en r -P fd X u 0 0 U - p 1— 1 CM P o rH rH [> 0 o 0 4h ♦> A a >-i fd > 9 X X fd e CA u •H G U u H rH fd >1 (d > fd U fd fd P IH <0 •rH fd >H 1 tH fd rH rl 6 P II II II X C H-> •rH y 1— 1 P 0 M •r) fd rH M < fd o P g S w fd jp fd UU A 0) Eh < m u EH 0 : P œ rd en o p u > 4J (ü P P O * • «* 0 eo E rH en G m 0 (f) XI LOj rl •» * U 3 PP N rH 3 (U LU UU_| • * P oi m X P u LA < Ch ai O * 113 TABLE III
COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC ON THE DANUBE FOR THE YEARS 1950-1952 BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION (In Thousands of Tons)
Destination
a a 05 a s i 05 05 05 u o Eh M CO H P to P CO CO N to X g Origin Year p CQ X U § 05 O Total 1950 "356" 125 22 89 2 ^ 823 USSR 1951 391 129 9 221 489 10 1,249 1952 454 47 57 246 468 1 1^27 3 1950 471 19 ~ T ^ 74 1,640 Rumania 1951 575 1,108 18 83 250 2,048 1952 1 ,369 20 105 206 12 609 2,402 1950 94 122 123 72 29 448 Bulgaria 1951 69 216 60 108 25 16 497 1952 144 236 97 122 16 31 654 T95F 939 "TT 102 1,112 Yugo slavia 1951 870 180 1,050 1952 937 76 l_i_013 1550 443 7 — T 729 4 13 1,203 Hungary 1951 504 7 17 940 30 4 1,502 1952 595 10 8 857 2 2 1_^474 1$S0 "2? JT Czecho T3ÏÏ 1951 slovakia 37 29 60 20 46 1952 6 56 134 107 303 igSTT TÏÏÜ" n r 5 — g - m 4 1 7 ^ Austria 1951 142 5 64 50 192 17 470 1952 240 6 212 192 379 8 1^037 T55ÏÏ ^ 2 1,091 7 1,180 RFC 1951 52 1,337 36 1,425 1952 142 1,559 120 lj_821 1950 3 153 Other 145 1951 Countries 1 61 63 1952 10 18 T53ÏÏ 1,494 1,111 215 1,021 1,012 SW 1,122 TÏÏ6" 256 6,975 TOTAL 1951 1,681 1,282 295 924 1, 368 998 1,408 433 61 8,405 1952 1,445 1,484 471 1,079 1,624 798 1,763 603 728 9,995 114
TABLE IV
COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC ON THE DANUBE FOR THE YEARS 1953-1955 BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION (In Thousands of Tons)
Destination
a> a O,a CO aX 05 o 5# Eh CO p M O CO P CO 3 N P k Origin fear p CQ X U CO § 05 Total 1953 458 51 74 170 "74^ 1,499 USSR 1954 703 2 99 332 755 1,891 1955 793 2 155 45 415 539 4 19 2,072 r5sT 775 1, 2 é 5 ~ T 5 T07 T s T IS" T 17 T 7395 Rumania 1954 423 979 236 1 141 324 21 90 2,215 1955 285 1,356 254 32 196 427 43 16 122 2,731 Bul 1953 145 3T3 92 T 5 T W 7 "W 758 garia 1954 127 316 88 124 15 4 61 735 1955 95 258 125 72 4 1 46 607 1953 107 Yugo 85T 903 slavia 1954 1,046 199 1,245 1955 1,255 281 1,543 1953 579 IT 11 ~9ÏÏW T o 16 1,607 Hungary 1954 467 36 8 8 0 8 36 59 3 1,417 1955 258 73 11 826 27 56 76 1,327 TT Czecho 1953 57 31 86 103 289 1954 slovakia 18 20 36 124 153 351 1955 11 19 55 171 166 422 1953 150 11 283 306 183 701 10 1,644 Austria 1954 144 11 265 264 166 411 66 1,327 1955 248 9 207 366 285 522 94 1,731 1953 72 1,503 106 1,681 RFG 1954 50 1,498 105 1,653 1955 7 95 1 , 744 95 1,941 Other 1953 4 12 28 112 156 Coun 1954 5 27 38 26 96 tries 1955 13 7 50 125 193 1953 7,123 1,397 533 928 1,616 1,471 1,746 923 169 10,992 TOTAL 1954 1,887 1,064 744 1,097 ,1,634 1,653 1,759 722 370 10,930 1955 1,710 jl,463 792 1, 339 (l,864| 1,825 |2,136 991 442 12,567 115
TABLE V
COMMERCE BETWEEN COUNTRIES, EXCLUDING CABOTAGE, TRANSPORTED ON THE DANUBE FOR THE YEARS 1959-1961 (In Thousands of Tons)
Destination
> >H a X z CO X ftj 0 1 g u CO 0 wH 0 CO 0 X CO g N P Em EH Origin Year p X 1 e X U CO 5 X 0 Total 195^ —— 128 365 267 592 60 7 615 —— 28 2,602 USSR 1960 — 145 404 358 627 715 1,149 —— 40 3,438 1961 — — 147 471 364 566 728 1,141 — — 1 01 3,518 1959 113 —— 364 63 19 105 77 2Ô 51 812 Rumania 1960 97 — — 454 107 32 112 151 84 525 1,562 1961 90 —— 441 160 46 442 87 64 268 1,598 160 — — —— 1 75 492 Bul 1959 15 176 52 19 1 6 48 6 — — 385 garia 1960 163 36 125 1961 277 — — 3 1 0 2 80 34 9 2 507 1950 43 -..T — — 23 11 2 O 214 — — 313 Yugo 1 —— 10 30 341 1 416 slavia 1960 27 3 3 1961 25 51 2 — — 23 6 19 240 1 367 1959 25 l2 34 8 —— —— l07 So 57 3È3 Hungary 1960 40 24 33 5 —— — — 115 91 17 325 1961 1 19 22 8 — — 15 179 226 27 497 1959 20 62 163 9 107 È6 4 122 515 uz0 cno— 111 5 177 S JLO va.KXcL 1960 13 234 39 93 59 731 1961 27 133 258 9 157 — — 54 3 90 731 1959 35 8 50 70 293 242 —— 559 - 1,257 Austria 1960 33 4 10 109 304 233 —— 611 — — 1,304 1961 63 6 6 107 275 199 — — 559 - 1,219 1959 1 1 79 17 37 — — 1,255 —— 1,450 RFG 1960 —— 5 27 28 25 — — 1,423 —— — — 1,508 1961 2 21 3 61 — — 1,190 - 1,277 Other 1959 172 14 36 — — 5 477 704 Coun 1960 191 6 2 1 15 525 740 tries 1961 192 5 — — — — 15 601 — — — — — — 813 1959 5Ô9 225 1,093 509 1,246 1,494 2 , 1 2 1 8,878 333 8,468 TOTAL 1960 564 297 1,167 683 1,224 1,601 2,975 1,138 760 10,409 1961 679 363 1 , 2 2 1 654 1,245 2 , 0 2 1 L2 , 704 1 , 1 0 1 489 10,527 116
TABLE VI
GOODS TRANSITING THE DANUBE BY SECTORS FOR THE PERIOD 1959-1961
Sector Upstream Downstream Total
Rumanian/Bulgarian 1959 2, 563 303 2,866 1960 3, 390 308 3,698 1961 3,415 238 3,653
Yugoslavian 1959 2, 759 669 3,428 1960 3,595 728 4,323 1961 3,915 679 3,594 1
Hungarian/ Czechoslovakian 1959 966 321 1,287 1960 1,809 216 2,025 1961 1,594 212 1,806
Austrian 1959 319 185 514 1960 527 85 612 1961 542 87 629 ------117
X OO p p CO 00 00 ro p 00 UO X 00 X p X CM d CM d CO CM (Ü p CO t" CD X 1—1 1 1 X d* o C" ro UO CO ro CM C" t X X w X CM tn ^ 1 1 1—1 1—1 1 X) o o w Eh 0 a p o X 4) rH X •rl CM rH CO X CM o X 00 p o CO d d* CO o o CD CM UÛ 0 o X X 00 "d* CM X 1—I 1 1 1 X CM CO X OO 00 1—1 1—1 1 IH 1 X X P o U 1 1 1 1 1 rH >hO O 1 X r. CO P •H 1—1 un X P C p u (—! (tJ •H tu CO 00 oO p CM X OO p I'' r- CM ro 00 UO CD d CM d P X 00 OO OO OO 1 I rH 00 00 o X CM CM 1 1 1 S a p (M en 'cT 1 i I— 1 1 1 1 HM P U 1—1 ^ 00 p UO o C'' •d* CM CO X 0" IH CM o d CD o o CM X OO UO S (d «d* 00 CO p en CM 1 1 CM p o CO d* p t> X 00 00 1—1 1—1 00 CM CM z X ■c^ o CO 1 1 CM CM < w 0 r a tA EH 1—1 u •H p X 0 < CO X 4) 3 •H ro 00 00 00 CO OO CM p d* CD d^ 00 p en CD p UO CD CM CO X CM H X o X r" ^ 00 CM X 1 1 rH •d o CM CM "d 00 1—1 1—1 XXX P 0 o U CM en 00 1 1 1—1 1—1 P o O to P p p Sh EH d ‘H 4J X UO CO C" 'd' -d* CM ro d< UO 00 p OO UO 00 IH UO d UO CM OO U 0 X ro o 00 •d* CM X 1 1 X d* o 00 CM -d OO 1—1 1—1 l X 1—IX P EH P CM UO OO 1 1 1—1 1—1 1 e3 S U H a Eh H 1—1 to (dr- ro CO X UO CO CO -d* X d* 1—Il— 1 CD X 00 rM p IH CD UO X X p CD 'Z X OO CM •vl' UO 00 (O CM CH 00 OO CD p 00 1—1 1—1 2 (A o CM UO 'd' I— 1 1—1 p2 a Eh EH •rl X u CO 4) H •rl UO CD CM C" OO CD CM CM p OO 00 CD ■d UO IH X 00 p ro m X CD d OO k X X OO CD 00 r-' -d* 'd ro ro CD 00 -d d* Pm o L X CM CM < o 2 Sh CO Eh m P "g u < (U CM t'- ■d* CM o ■d* CM CM X ro UO CM CD X X CD 00 OO CM en UO 00 H X X UO UO X >d* d* X d'd* CD OO d* d* 1 U p X CM CM 1 X M W Sh p o X p o X p o X p o X PCX p o X p o X p o X O ro UO CD CO UO CD CD UO CD CO UO CD CD UO CD CD UO CD CD UO CD CD UO CD CD u 4J p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p X 1—il—Il—11—Il—IX 1—1 1—I 1—1 1—Il—Il— 11—1 1—1 1—1 1—Il—Il— 11—1 1—1 1—11—1 1—1 1—1
ro ro > id •rl >1 1 x U •rl Sh ro Sh o ro X p ro 1 tH ro X ro •rl 'rl p X ro p o > p o > X) A p CO e X p ro CJ (D o 0 ro o o CO 0 p p X 0 N X ro Sh a u p X m >H (A X 1 u lA CO < X 118
on o CD CO C» o o in co on on 'd' o\ m CM r H C D CrH M cn CM o on CTi CM 00 C M t > 00 CO cn C M C M iH o r-H I—I rH 0 0 C M C M CM CM O C D C M C M CM O CD CM in in C M 0 0 O ID in CO C D CM H on CM H C M pH c m I— I rH QI Di w H EH Mh o in C M C D I—Il—Il—Iin GO H on o o in in m O 0 0 onrH pH pH § o I—I U H H > CM CM o on in in m 5 OQ g in Oh on CM 00 CM CM in rH O CM I—I I— I r H I—I in CO in CM CM CD I—I m on in in on on onCM in pH CM rH M* CM in CD CM i> cn on on m in cn cn rn CM in cr> o rH CTi O H in CD CD in CD CD cTi ON cr> cn cn CT> r-i i—i I—i rH pH rH rH I—I 119 rH rH O m rH en (—I I—I [~- en oo eo I—I o rH O O >iO ■H rH rH m I—I CM O en o eo CM rH I—I rH CM IT) Q in rH en O oo W rH rH CM Mh o o o i o § u I—I LO en OH 00CM G "ri H H I—I > en H en CM o m g m CM CD CM CM co m CM CM CM rH en o- eo LD 00 ^ eo eo CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS The importance of the Danube River in the life of Central and Eastern Europe is clearly illustrated by its tumultuous history and in its constantly expanding role in contemporary affairs. The great nations of Europe have made concerted and continuing efforts to exert their influence over the opera tion and administration of this waterway. In attempting to reach this objective, they have employed methods ranging from crude force to creation of elaborate multi-lateral administrative institutions. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the concept of free navigation of international inland waterway was first announced. The advantages to be derived from this novel and progressive idea were quickly recognized, and all nations joined as one in applauding the principle. The unanimity in principle was not, however, matched by a corresponding unanimity in its interpretation or application. The differences which stemmed from the latter became the focal points of the frequent struggles which have engulfed Danubia since the beginning of the nineteenth century. At the Crimean War peace conferences, the victorious powers were concerned with preventing the defeated Russians from renewing their eastward and southward advances. The 121 mouths of the Danube were placed under international control as one of the measures designed to thwart a Russian resur gence in this area. The participating powers quickly recog nized the economic and political advantages this foothold in Eastern Europe afforded them, and they began continuing ef forts to prolong the life of the administrative body and expand its authority. In time, the notion of non-riparian participation became an important element in the Eastern European policies of the great powers, and they resisted any measure which threatened their unique status. The Paris Convention of 1921 represented a high-water mark for the concept of non-riparian and international con trol of the river. The Western allies were presented with a rare opportunity to tailor a new administrative organization for the entire course of the river. Exclusion of most of the riparians because of their ex-enemy status from the delibera tions served both to facilitate the creation of the new organ and also bring about its eventual downfall. Born in the political vacuum following World War I, the frailities of the new accords were quickly exposed in the crush of inter war politics, German, Soviet, and Rumanian political machina tions, encouraged by policies of vacillation and appeasement from the West, spelled an end to hopes for free navigation on the Danube. The post-WorId War II period was a confused era for 122 Western policy makers. The drastic changes which were tak ing place throughout the world were not fully understood, and the uncertainty of the West was reflected in its falter ing policies. As often as not, the response to Soviet ini tiatives would be predicated upon status quo ante bellum. Where these responses lacked in inspiration, they compen sated in rigidity. Thus, it was at Belgrade in 1948 that Great Britain and France, satisfied with their own interpre tation of postwar political realities, stubbornly and futilely demanded recognition of the validity of the 1921 convention. The United States, unencumbered by prewar in volvements in Danubia was free to approach the conference from a wider point of view. United States sincerity and willingness to arrive at a reasonaLble agreement was genuine but, unfortunately, irrelevant since the Soviets were determined, and had the wherewithal, to impose their own regime upon the river. The Belgrade Convention, as adopted and ratified by the Soviets and their satellites, was a barren document. As another instrument for implementing the Soviet control pat tern over Eastern Europe, it contained many ambiguities and divisive airticles which in later years hampered the genuine attempts of the signatories to advance economic development of the river region. The record of the Danube Commission is a colorful and 123 revealing facet of Soviet—satellite relations. In the Stalinist period from 1948-1953, the commission was an in strument of Soviet control and exploitation of Eastern Europe. It is notable more for its role as a forum for the Stalin-Tito feud than for any concrete improvements in the river or its economy. After the death of Stalin, the commission, at first hesitantly and then with increasing authority, began to con tribute positive influence in the economic development of the area. It standardized rules of navigation, encouraged and coordinated development projects, drafted regulations involving tariff, customs, and health, and accomplished many other beneficial programs. In 195 7, the commission opened its doors to Western riparian observers and, soon thereafter, invited observers from the United Nations, In 1960, Austria formally acceded to the Belgrade Convention and began active participation in the affairs of the commission. It appears that West Germany will soon follow in Austria's footsteps and become a member of the commission. The acceptance of the two non-communist riparians is a logical step in the overall development of the economic potential of the river. The scale of improvement projects underway and planned programs demands the cooperation and contributions of resources; and, while some of these efforts 124 may be pared to meet economic reality, the fact remains that most of the riparian nations are embarked on a determined effort to exploit the potential of this great river. If and when such projects as the Rhine—Main—Danube Canal, the Iron Gates project, and the depth control program are realized, the transportation patterns of both East and West Europe will be dramatically altered. Not only would inland traffic be affected but also deep sea commerce of all Europe as well. As the nations of Central and Eastern Europe continue their long march towards a modern industrialized society, they will find that the Danube will serve not only to facili tate the transit and exchange of goods but also it will help erode the national and ideological boundaries through which it flows. Ever since the mid-1950's, there has been increas ing evidence of this phenomenon. Today we find the Federal Republic of Germany on the verge of acceding to the Belgrade Convention, while in the wings France awaits the opportunity to resume shipping and commercial activity along the river. The increasing independence of the Eastern European communist countries from Soviet domination has been accompanied on their part by expanded relations and trade with the West. Encouragement of this trade and friendlier contact has be come a fixed feature of Western foreign policy and ". . . the United States actively seeks . . . [in the words of 125 President Johnson] . . . to build more bridges to the east.” These new developments in European politics are pregnant with possibilities for the Danube, its administrative insti tutions, and the nations linked to it by navigable waters. As a final consideration of Danube administration, it seems appropriate to reflect upon the present dimensions of the gulf that separates East and West as compared to that of the summer of 1948. The years since the coming into force of the Belgrade Convention have tempered or washed away many of the issues which were once non-negotiable. Problems of navigation, standard and non-discriminatory regulations and reasonable levies have been resolved to a great degree. This is graphically apparent in the growing statistics for non-communist vessels plying the Danube. The joinder of Austria and, in the near future. West Germany, to the Bel grade accords has removed the stigma of a closed communist corporation from the Danube Commission. The cooperation and interchange of information and observers with other inter national bodies by the Danube Commission plus the regular publication of statistics and similar material further denotes its open character. The growing trade between all riparians suggests that discriminatory practices are at least within reasonable bounds and that adequate services and facilities are available. The dissolution of the notorious mixed companies and their cartel airrangements was 126 a positive step in returning economic rationality to the operation of the waterway. It has been a number of years since the Danube Com mission has cast a political shadow. The Soviets, while still a powerful element in the administration and operation of the river, have deliberately assumed an unobtrusive role in the normal activities of the Danube Commission. Of the remaining issues which divided the East and West in 1948, perhaps the most perplexing and critical which would stymie renewed negotiations would be that of the validity of the 1921 convention and the issue of settlement of disputes in an independent international forum. Each of these points involves a number of ramifications which are basic to the East-West conflict in its wider context. The problems of repudiation of treaties and other international obligations and the competence of international juridical bodies or similar agencies of the United Nations are a con tinuing source of disagreement between the East and West. The Danube mirrors these differences in a microcosm. Nevertheless, the foundations of international "bridges" are most often economic, and the rich potentials of the Danube could provide incentive for the builders of the East and the West. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY A. PRIMARY SOURCES Commission du Danube. Album des Types de Bâtiments Naviguant sur le Danube. Budapest, 1959. "Traffic-marchandise sur le Danube pour la Période 1950-55, 1959-60, 1961, Bulletin Statistique de la Commission du Danube. Edition du Secretariat de la Commission du Danube. Budapest, 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1961. 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