DOCSLIB.ORG

Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: the English Experience

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: the English Experience Michigan Law Review Volume 78 Issue 8 1980 Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: The English Experience Sir Leon Radzinowicz Cambridge University Roger Hood Oxford University Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legislation Commons Recommended Citation Sir Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual Criminal: The English Experience, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1305 (1980). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol78/iss8/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INCAPACITATING THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE* Sir Leon Radzinowicz**and Roger Hood*** EDITORS' PREFACE In this Article, Sir Leon Radzinowicz and .Dr. Roger Hood trace 150years of unsucces.iful English '!/forts to identify, sentence, and reform habitual crimi­ nal off"enders. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estellea has publicized habitual off"ender statutes in the United States. But Rummel primarily addressed the constitutionality, rather than the desirability, ofa state habitual offender statute. b This Article examines the broader policy questions common to habitual offender programs in both the United $tales and Great Britain. It describes the tension between liberal tradition and the state's desire to incapacitate those who repeatedly threaten l!fe or property. The British experience with habitual offender legislation, like that in the United States, encompasses numerous statutory formulations, commission re­ ports,· and statistical surveys. And the British experience, like that in the United States, has been one of high hopes and repeated disappointment. While there are major d!fferences between British and Americanc approaches * This paper grew out of the authors' research into the history of English criminal law and its administration in the nineteenth century, which is being generously supported by a grant from the Home Office. We are indebted to Dr. Philip Jenkins for his assistance. ** L.L.D., F.B.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, -'Ed. *** Reader in Criminology, All Souls College, Oxford; Ph.D. 1963, Cambridge Univer­ sity. -Ed. a. 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980). b. In Rummel, the Supreme Court held that a mandatory life sentence imposed under the Texas recidivist statute, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974), following the de­ fendant's third felony conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment. Rummel's third felony consisted of obtaining $120.75 by false pre­ tenses. His previous convictions involved fraudulent use of a credit card, and passing a forged check. Rummel v. Estelle, 100 S. Ct. at 1134-35. Rummel claimed that a life sentence was so disproportionate to the crimes he had committed as to constitute cruel and unusual punish­ ment. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, affirmed the sentence, noting that Texas had an interest not merely in making Rummel's third felony illegal, but also in "dealing in a har­ sher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapa­ ble of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law." 100 S. Ct. at 1140. The Court also held that a proper assessment of Texas's treatment of Rummel could take into account his possible parole within twelve years. 100 S. Ct. at 1142. Four dissenting Justices wrote that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime, and that the possibility of parole should not be considered in assessing the nature of the punishment. 100 S. Ct. at 1145- 46 (Powell, J., dissenting). , c. For a compilation of American habitual offender statutes, see Note, The Constitutional I'!finnities ofIndiana's Habitual Offender Statute, 13 IND. L. REv. 597, 597 n.1 (1980). Ameri­ can state statutes typically call for enhanced sentencing upon conviction for a third or fourth felony. Federal law requires that the "mandatory minimum penalty prescribed by law" be 1305 1306 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 78:1305 to habitual ojfenders (particularly in the degree ofsentencing andprosecutorial discretiond), the two systems share many d!fficulties. And in Britain, as in the United States, the failure to reduce recidivism has become a symbol of the larger failure of the penal system. The most vexing problem of habitual offender legislation coefronls every draftsman and special commission right at the outset: How is the habitual ojfender to be defined? Is he only the violent criminal who poses an immediate threat to public sefety, or is he also the bumbling petty thief? The authors outline a series of unsuccessful British definitions of the term; definitions that bear the clear mark ofcriminologists and legislators preoccupied with the no­ tion ofa "criminal class." Once the target ofthe legislation is dejined,furt/1er problems remain. What measure ofproof is required lo show habituality, and who decides when that burden is met? Once ident!fted and convicted, how should the habitual criminal be sentenced?: Proposals vary both in the length ofsentence and in the conditions ofimprisonment. Somefavor indeterminate sentencing, while others require a steady cumulation ofsentences. Some sug­ gest harsh co,ifinementfor the habitual criminal· others a more gentle environ­ ment geared to reforming the criminal and returning him to society. These disagreements reveal an underlying debate about how the stale just!ftes sen­ tencing habitual criminals to extendedprison terms: Is the goal lo protect the community, to rehabilitate the criminal or merely to punish him? These are perennial questions, questions that trouble twentieth century American courts and legislators as much as they troubled the English in the nineteenth century. The comparative and topical sign!ftcance of Sir Leon's and .Dr. Hood's Article needs no further emphasis. served by dangerous special offenders. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-77 (1976). q. Model Penal Code § 7 .03 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (granting court discretion to increase sentence for persis­ tent offenders and professional criminals); Model Sentencing Act§ 5 (granting court discretion to increase sentence for persistent offenders). But American habitual offender statutes have been no more successful than their counterparts in Great Britain. See L. SLEFFEL, THE LA w AND THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 155-60 (1977). Sleffel's book contains a long list of objec­ tions to the U.S. state and federal habitual offender statutes. A number of recent books and articles discuss habitual offender statutes and their implications. See, e.g., J. PETERSILIA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS (1978); Y. RENNIE, THE SEARCH FOR CRIMINAL MAN (1978); S. VAN DINE, J. CONRAD, & S. DINITZ, RE­ STRAINING THE WICKED (1979); Cook, Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning The Preventive Effects of Punishment, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 164 (Winter 1977); Dershowitz, Preventive Co'!finement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analy­ sis, 5 I· TEXAS L. REV. 1277 (1973); Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 (1972); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confine­ ment of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972); Note, A Closer Look at Habitual Criminal Statutes-. Brown v. Parratt andMartin v. Parratt, A Case Study of the Nebraska Law, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1979). d. For discussion of the divergent English and American approaches to the sentencing of habitual offenders, compare R. CROSS, THE ENGLISH SENTENCING SYSTEM 42-51 (2d ed. 1975) (describing the British sentencing of habituals) with L. SLEFFEL, THE LAW AND THE DANGER• ous CRIMINAL 4-18 (1975) (describing the harsher American sentencing provisions). In the area of prosecutorial discretion, there are marked differences between the British and American approaches. In the United States, prosecutors commonly threaten defendants with indictment under applicable habitual offender statutes in an effort to force the defendant to plead guilty to a lesser charge. See Davidson & Krause, Plea Bargaining: Limits on Prosecutorial .Discretion, 1979 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 27, 36-49. The English prosecutor is far more circumscribed in his ability to plea-bargain. See Davis, Sentencesfor Sale: A New Look at Bargaining in England and America, 1911 CRIM. L. REV. 161, 218, 221-28. August 1980) Habjtual Criminals 1307 INCAPACITATING THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL CLASSES ...••..•.• 1308 II. FIVE APPROACHES .••...•••.••.••.••.•••..••....•••••••. 1317 A. Indefinite Confinement and Preventive Policing ...... 1317 B. The Cumulative System ............................. 1322 C. Requiring Proper Proof ofHabituality ............... 1326 D. The Dual-Track Scheme ............................ 1327 E. Readjusting Controls to Categories ofHabitual Criminal . ........................................... 1328 III. FIRST LEGISLATIVE ENDEAVORS •.•••.••..••••....•••••• 1333 A. Attempts to Enforce the Cumulative Scheme ......... 1333 B. Preventive Policing . ................................. 1336 C. The Impact ofthe Habitual Criminals Legislation
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Jason D. Sinnett V. State of Indiana
    MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Jason D. Sinnett Theodore E. Rokita Branchville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana I N T H E COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA Jason D. Sinnett, March 26, 2021 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1406 v. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Jonathan M. Appellee-Plaintiff. Brown, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 29D02-1808-F5-5640 Mathias, Judge. [1] Jason D. Sinnett appeals the Hamilton Superior Court’s denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Sinnett argues that the trial court imposed an Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-1406 | March 26, 2021 Page 1 of 8 impermissible double enhancement when it sentenced him for both Level 5 felony auto theft—enhanced to a Level 5 because he had a prior unrelated felony auto theft conviction—and for being a habitual offender. [2] Concluding that the trial court did not err when it sentenced Sinnett, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History [3] In August 2018, Sinnett was charged with Level 6 felony auto theft and Level 5 felony auto theft because Sinnett had a prior unrelated auto theft conviction. Specifically, the State alleged Sinnett was convicted of auto theft in 2013 under cause number 29C01-1307-FC-5883.
    [Show full text]
  • Habitually Offending the Constitution: the Cruel and Unusual Consequences of Habitual Offender Laws and Mandatory Minimums
    \\jciprod01\productn\G\GMC\28-1\GMC102.txt unknown Seq: 1 22-NOV-17 13:27 HABITUALLY OFFENDING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL CONSEQUENCES OF HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS AND MANDATORY MINIMUMS Abigail A. McNelis* INTRODUCTION Lee Carroll Brooker will die before seeing another day of free- dom.1 At the age of seventy-six years old, the disabled veteran cur- rently sits in prison, waiting out the remainder of his days, serving a mandatory life sentence for a non-violent drug charge.2 In 2011, Brooker received a life sentence for a marijuana conviction.3 As a veteran suffering from chronic pain, Brooker grew marijuana plants behind his son’s home.4 Brooker intended the marijuana only for per- sonal use.5 During an unrelated home search, police recovered less than three pounds of marijuana plants, which included unusable pieces such as stalks and vines.6 On July 20, 2011, Investigator Ronald Hall of the Dothan Police Department obtained written consent from Brooker’s son, Darren, to search the family home.7 Darren consented to the search in connec- tion with an investigation into stolen bicycles.8 While searching the house, investigators discovered a smaller growing operation in an upstairs bedroom.9 Investigators decided to search outside the prem- ises, and Brooker confirmed the presence of additional plants behind the home.10 The multiple investigators on the scene discovered sev- * Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, J.D. expected, 2018. 1 See Ex parte Brooker, 192 So. 3d 1 (Ala. 2015). 2 Editorial, Outrageous Sentences for Marijuana, N.Y.
    [Show full text]
  • Dearborn-Local-Rules.Pdf
    CRIMINAL RULES LR15-CR-1 BAIL In all criminal matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Dearborn Circuit Court, Dearborn County Superior Court No. 1, and/or Dearborn Superior Court II, in which an arrest has been made and misdemeanor, felony or murder charges are pending, the following bond schedule shall apply unless otherwise ordered by the Court. A. A PERSON CHARGED WITH ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMINAL OFFENSES IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO POST BAIL WITHOUT PERSONALLY APPEARING BEFORE A JUDGE AT AN INITIAL HEARING AND THE BOND SCHEDULE DOES NOT APPLY 1. Any person charged with Murder; 2. Any person charged with any Class A, B, or C Felony or Level 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 Felony; 3. Any person charged with a crime involving Domestic Violence which shall include the felony or misdemeanor offenses of Domestic Battery, Strangulation, Battery on a Child, Intimidation, Confinement, Invasion of Privacy or Stalking 4. Any person arrested for Resisting Law Enforcement, Battery on a Police Officer, or Escape from Home Detention Program; 5. Any person arrested for Non-Support of a Dependent Child; 6. Any person charged with Habitual Offender or is shown to have two (2) or more prior felony convictions; 7. Any person currently on probation or parole; 8. Any person currently on Southeast Regional Community Corrections Road Crew, Work Release, or In Home Incarceration; 9. Any person currently on release on bond for a Level 1,2,3,4,5 or 6; or A, B, C, or D Felony offense; 10. Any person charged with Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated who has two (2) or more prior Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated convictions; 11.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Frameworks for Detaining Terrorist Suspects
    RETHINKING “PREVENTIVE DETENTION” FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THREE FRAMEWORKS FOR DETAINING TERRORIST SUSPECTS Stella Burch Elias* ABSTRACT President Barack Obama has convened a multi-agency taskforce whose remit includes considering whether the United States should continue to hold terrorist suspects in extra-territorial “preventive detention,” should develop a new system of “preventive detention” to hold terrorist suspects on domestic soil, or should eschew any use of “preventive detention.” American scholars and advocates who favor the use of “preventive detention” in the United States frequently point to the examples of other countries in support of their argument. At the same time, advocates and scholars opposed to the introduction of such a system also turn to comparative law to bolster their arguments against “preventive detention.” Thus far, however, the scholarship produced by both sides of the debate has been limited in two key respects. Firstly, there have been definitional inconsistencies in the literature—the term “preventive detention” has been used over- broadly to describe a number of different kinds of detention with very little acknowledgment of the fundamental differences between these alternative regimes. Secondly, the debate has been narrow in scope— focusing almost exclusively on “preventive detention” in three or four other (overwhelmingly Anglophone) countries. This Article seeks to * Law Clerk to the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt. Yale Law School, J.D. 2009. I am very grateful to Harold Hongju Koh, Hope Metcalf, Judith Resnik, Reva Siegel, Muneer Ahmad, Sarah Cleveland, and John Ip for their generous advice and thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this article, to Allison Tait, Megan Barnett, and the Yale Law Teaching Series workshop participants for their helpful feedback, and to Meera Shah, Megan Crowley, and the Columbia Human Rights Law Review for their terrific editing.
    [Show full text]
  • Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Habitual Offender's Life Sentence Without Parole Is Disproportionate Elizabeth M
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 74 Article 11 Issue 4 Fall Fall 1983 Eight Amendment--Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Habitual Offender's Life Sentence without Parole is Disproportionate Elizabeth M. Mills Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Elizabeth M. Mills, Eight Amendment--Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Habitual Offender's Life Sentence without Parole is Disproportionate, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1372 (1983) This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/83/7404-1372 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 74, No. 4 Copyright C 1983 by Northwestern University School of Law Printedin US.A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT--CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: HABITUAL OFFENDER'S LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE IS DISPROPORTIONATE Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). I. INTRODUCTION In Solem v. Helm,' the Supreme Court, for the first time, held a sen- tence of imprisonment to be cruel and unusual because it was dispropor- tionate to the crime committed. The Court overturned a life sentence without parole imposed under a recidivist statute on a defendant who had been convicted of seven relatively minor felonies. The Court held that the sentence was disproportionate and thus violated the eighth 2 amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
    [Show full text]
  • VIII. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention
    HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER CHINA’S SHADOW Mistreatment of Tibetans in Nepal WATCH Under China’s Shadow Mistreatment of Tibetans in Nepal Copyright © 2014 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-1135 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights of people around the world. We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring offenders to justice. We investigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect international human rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org MARCH 2014 978-1-62313-1135 Under China’s Shadow Mistreatment of Tibetans in Nepal Map of Nepal ....................................................................................................................... i Summary ..........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Habitual Offender Laws: a Reconsideration
    Buffalo Law Review Volume 21 Number 1 Article 5 10-1-1971 Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration Daniel Katkin University at Buffalo Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 99 (1971). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol21/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS: A RECONSIDERATION DANIEL KATKIN* I. HISTORY AND PURPOSE ecidivism is a comparatively new social problem. Prior to the movement for penal reform in England (1750-1833) even the most trifling offenses were punishable either by hanging or by imprisonment which was considered to be only a slightly more protracted death.' Thus, while there were unquestionably hab- itual criminals, there were few whose careers were not ended by a first conviction. By the end of the nineteenth century this unexpected conse- quence of reform-the presence of the habitual criminal-was clearly recognized and attention was focused on the resultant issues of social protection and deterrence.2 The concept of pre- ventive detention for repeated offenders was initially suggested in the Gladstone Committee Report of 1895,3 which is generally regarded as a landmark in the history of progressive penology.4 While the Committee urged the acceptance of rehabilitation as a goal of the penal system,5 it was skeptical about the capacity for reformation of recidivist offenders: There is evidently a large class of habitual criminals-who live by robbery and thieving and petty larceny-who run the risk of comparatively short sentences with comparative indifference.
    [Show full text]
  • Germany 2020 Human Rights Report
    GERMANY 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Germany is a constitutional democracy. Citizens choose their representatives periodically in free and fair multiparty elections. The lower chamber of the federal parliament (Bundestag) elects the chancellor as head of the federal government. The second legislative chamber, the Federal Council (Bundesrat), represents the 16 states at the federal level and is composed of members of the state governments. The country’s 16 states exercise considerable autonomy, including over law enforcement and education. Observers considered the national elections for the Bundestag in 2017 to have been free and fair, as were state elections in 2018, 2019, and 2020. Responsibility for internal and border security is shared by the police forces of the 16 states, the Federal Criminal Police Office, and the federal police. The states’ police forces report to their respective interior ministries; the federal police forces report to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the state offices for the protection of the constitution are responsible for gathering intelligence on threats to domestic order and other security functions. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution reports to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and the state offices for the same function report to their respective ministries of the interior. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over security forces. Members of the security forces committed few abuses. Significant human rights issues included: crimes involving violence motivated by anti-Semitism and crimes involving violence targeting members of ethnic or religious minority groups motivated by Islamophobia or other forms of right-wing extremism.
    [Show full text]
  • Preventive Detention Draft 1
    Volume 14, No. 1 2010 TOURO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 128 EXTREME MEASURES: DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED PREVENTIVE DETENTION TO COMBAT DOMESTIC TERRORISM? By Diane Webber Preventive detention: “an extreme measure which places the individual wholly under the control of the state, not as a punishment for a proven transgression of the law but rather as a precautionary measure based on a presumption of actual or future criminal conduct…” 1 ABSTRACT This paper deals with preventive detention in the United States, i.e. the detaining of a suspect to prevent a future domestic terrorist offense. Two recent events are examined: the Fort Hood shootings; and a preventive arrest in France, to consider problems in combating terrorist crimes on U.S. soil. The paper demonstrates that U.S. law as it now stands, with some limited exceptions, does not permit detention to forestall an anticipated domestic terrorist crime. After reviewing and evaluating the way in which France, Israel and the United Kingdom use forms of preventive detention to thwart possible terrorist acts, the paper proposes three possible ways to fill this gap in U.S. law, and give the United States the same tools to fight terrorism as the other countries discussed in the paper, within the boundaries of the Constitution. Diane Webber, Solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, LL.B. University College London, LL.M. Georgetown University, Candidate for SJD Georgetown University expected completion in 2014. I would like to thank Professor David P. Stewart for all his help and guidance, and my family John Webber, Daniel Webber and Katie Hyman for their unwavering support and encouragement.
    [Show full text]
  • Alternative Report About Torture Situation in Peru by the Group Against Torture of the National Coordinator of Human Rights
    ALTERNATIVE REPORT ABOUT TORTURE SITUATION IN PERU BY THE GROUP AGAINST TORTURE OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS I.- Presentation: The National Coordinator of Human Rights (CNDDHH) is a human right’s collective which groups 79 non-governmental organizations dedicated to defend, promote and educate in human Rights in Peru. It is also, an organization with a special consultative status in the Social and Economic Council of United Nations (UN) and is credited to participate in activities of the Organization of American States (OAS). The present report was developed by the Work Group against Torture of the CNDDHH, specifically on behalf of the Executive Secretariat of the CNDDHH, the Episcopal Commission for Social Action (CEAS), the Center for Psychosocial Care (CAPS) and the Human Rights Commission (COMISEDH). This report expects to report the human rights situation in our country, dealing specifically with problems regarding torture, taking as starting point the information delivered, on behalf of the Peruvian State, in the document called: “Sixth Periodical Report that the State parties must present in 2009, submitted in response to the list of issues (CAT/CPER/Q/6) transmitted to the State party pursuant to the optional reporting procedure (A/62/44, paras. 23 and 24). Peru” dated 28 th July 2011. The information delivered will regard issues that the Committee against Torture (CAT) has formulated to the Peruvian State, taking into account the information we have according to the lines of work of each institution which took part developing the present report. II.- Information regarding the Conventions articles ARTÍCLE 2º 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Three Strikes and You're Out: the Implementation and Impart of Strike Laws
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Three Strikes and You’re Out: The Implementation and Impart of Strike Laws Author(s): James Austin Ph.D. ; John Clark ; Patricia Hardyman Ph.D. ; D. Alan Henry Document No.: 181297 Date Received: March 6, 2000 Award Number: 96-CE-VX-0009 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT” THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF STRIKE LAWS Submitted by James Austin, Ph.D. John Clark Patricia Hardyman, Ph.D. D. Alan Henry -,, . ...’, ... b ;. .., 1. - ..., This project was supported by Grant No. 96-CE-VX-0009awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What? Richard S
    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 2005 Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What? Richard S. Frase Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Frase, Richard S., "Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?" (2005). Minnesota Law Review. 668. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/668 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality"Relative to What? By Richard S. Fraset Introduction .............................................................................. 572 I. A Short History of Prison-Duration Proportionality in the Suprem e Court ..................................................... 576 A . R um m el v. Estelle .................................................... 577 B . H utto v. Davis .......................................................... 578 C . Solem v. H elm .......................................................... 579 D. Harmelin v. Michigan .............................................. 581 E. Ewing v. California.................................................
    [Show full text]