Libya's Political Culture Wars

Recent political talks to end the civil war in Libya have relied upon the flawed logic of inclusion and compromise to unify rival factions, in the belief that institutional cooperation will follow. Anas El Gomati analyses how this strategy is destined to fail, due to opposing and irreconcilable visions for the state and its political character.

LONG READ 40 MINS SADEQINSTITUTE.ORG 16TH November 2020

LIBYA’S POLITICAL CULTURE WARS

Author: Anas El Gomati Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Executive Summary

1. Since the fall of the Qaddafi regime 3. This conflict has also drawn in regional in 2011, policymakers and analysts alike military powers including Turkey and the have failed to accurately depict the near United Arab Emirates (UAE), who have decade of conflict in Libya, as either: a been drawn to Libya’s battleground for battle between Islamists and secular- more than transactional maritime deals ists; a historic regional rivalry between or the pursuit of terrorist groups. Turkey the east and west of Libya; or one that and the UAE are locked in a deep bat- is purely driven by the economic greed tle over the prevailing political culture of of the key actors. Despite numerous the region, and have forged strategic al- attempts to address and resolve these liances with the Government of Nation- conflicts through inclusive and repre- al Accord (GNA) and the Libyan Arab sentative governing arrangements, the Armed Forces (LAAF) in an attempt to conflict has continued and peace re- secure and implement their own con- mains elusive. trasting regional visions for the post-Qa- ddafi state. 2. Whilst these rivalries, conflicts and be- haviours exist, and offer some explana- 4. Current military unification talks em- tory power to aspects of the war, they ploy a language that seeks to catego- fail to explain the political lightning-rod rise the network of armed groups under moments that have sparked national the GNA as ‘militias’, whilst labelling the conflicts in Libya and crucially pin-point opposing forces, the LAAF, as a ‘regu- its principle fault lines. Since 2017, key lar military’. This framing is misleading, local players and international powers as Libya has not had a regular military alike have been locked in negotiations since the formation of the Jamahiriya by over the reconfiguration of Libya’s high- Qaddafi (1969). The LAAF itself mimics est political post, the Presidential Coun- the Jamahiriya’s tribal patronage net- cil, specifically its power and authority work designed to coup-proof Qaddafi’s over the military in its capacity as the authoritarian regime. Efforts to preserve Supreme Commander of the Armed this structure, whilst dismantling their op- Forces. The negotiations are focussed ponents, is likely to face resistance, par- on a defining feature of political culture ticularly by those who consciously sought in democratic states – military neutral- to overthrow the Jamahiriya’s system of ity and subservience to civilian rule ir- rule in 2011 and opposed it’s reincarna- respective of its political leanings. This tion in the LAAF. Neither the GNA or the power struggle is rooted in competing LAAF control a working army, and their visions over Libya’s institutional setup, armed groups are incapable of function- authority and governing arrangements ing as a regular military. Armed groups that determine the political character of under both factions should be demobi- the state in Libya, or in short, two irrec- lised, disarmed and reintegrated into a oncilable political cultures. unified, neutral and subservient military

2 force under new command. 6. Armed groups or militia under the GNA are incapable of serving as a mili- 5. Despite the establishment of a cease- tary and should be dismantled, but the fire agreement and announcement of reasons why many of these groups came elections within the next 18 months, into existence should be addressed. This the Presidential Council remains the will require the dismantling of the tribal key battleground for negotiations in- patronage structures discretely embed- tended to end the war. By unifying with ded within the LAAF in order to prevent an unreformed LAAF and including ei- this cycle of conflict from repeating itself ther its commander, Khalifa Haftar or in the future. Finally, the political talks Aguila Saleh, it’s architect and the Su- should not reward or offer the key par- preme Commander of the LAAF, in the ties to the conflict through negotiations, negotiation process to appoint a new what they could not achieve through Presidential Council the current political war – the ability to reconfigure and de- negotiations risk establishing a military termine the institutional relationships structure that is not subservient to civil- that define the political character and ian rule. Furthermore, it delays but does culture of Libya’s next state by appoint- not prevent Libya’s civil war, which could ing or including them in the Presidential be sparked by scheduled presidential Council. elections that would replace the military approved Presidential Council with a democratically-elected candidate.

There is no shortcut to resolve Libya’s conflict. The military unification talks should focus on structures not personalities. Armed groups under the GNA should be dismantled, but why many of these groups came into existence should be addressed, as should the dismantling of tribal patronage structures discretely embedded within the LAAF in order to prevent this cycle of conflict from repeating itself in the future. Final- ly, the political talks should not reward or offer the key parties to the conflict through negotiations, what they could not achieve through war – the ability to determine the institutional relationships that define the political character and culture of Libya’s next state by appoint- ing or including them in the Presidential Council.

3 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Introduction

The announcement of UN-brokered per- actors in the conflict. Success cannot be manent ceasefire in Geneva and political measured exclusively by symbolic hand- talks in Tunisia has given renewed opti- shakes between rival leaders or the for- mism that Libya’s elusive peace attempts mation of a new government. The gauge are yet again within close grasp. Despite for success of any political agreement in several high-profile international attempts Libya must be measured against an end in Moscow and Berlin (January, 2020) to of hostilities on the ground between the broker a ceasefire and restart the polit- two factions and an era of cooperation. ical process, the battle in Libya not only Libya’s UN brokered political talks and resumed, but intensified, culminating in initiatives since 2015 have for various all-out war before reaching a stalemate in reasons repeatedly failed to achieve this. June, 2020. The conflict was sparked on Examining the assumptions about the na- April 4th, 2019, when self-styled leader ture of the conflict may offer insight into of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) why the previous political talks failed. The Khalifa Haftar launched an attack on Trip- UN’s strategy to end the conflict contains oli to overthrow the internationally recog- a flawed premise which guides the pro- nised UN-backed Government of National cess; that the warring factions in Libya – Accord (GNA). The role of regional and from their armed groups to their political international powers in support of both representatives – are primarily driven to factions during the war has further en- conflict by political and economic greed. trenched positions, and added to the in- The logic of the political talks attempts to tractability of the conflict. address the rival parties’ greed through political compromise with the belief that This is not Libya’s first post-Qaddafi civ- institutional cooperation in a unified gov- il war, nor indeed the first UN-brokered ernment based on compromise will follow. peace process to fall apart. This has led to Political compromise has thus far been wildly different assumptions about what based on distributing institutional and po- drives the conflict and descriptions of Lib- litical posts equitably to both factions un- ya’s parties to the conflict; ranging from a der a new unified government in order to battle between Islamists and Secularists, satiate the greed of the rival parties to the to the battle between East and West - two conflict. of Libya’s historical regions. The critical challenge to all peace-building efforts in So why has this failed? This logic and pro- Libya since the fall of Qaddafi has centred cess identifies competition, but fails to ad- around correctly identifying the root caus- dress the irreconcilable difference at the es and drivers of these conflicts, in order centre of the conflict. A feature of all con- to design a peace process that addresses flicts is driven by greed and competition. and resolves these issues between the key A limited number of individual actors and

1 armed groups on either side have been through negotiations and exercise their engaged in years of narrow competi- power to define the political character of tion over access or control of Libya’s re- the state after the political talks.Put sim- sources; much of which the UN’s logic of ply, the peace building process address- compromise and distribution of ministe- es competition but not conflict. The polit- rial and institutional posts where these ical process does not explain how these resources are distributed may resolve. rival factions seek to exercise their power However, this competition did not spark once in a unified state, whether their vi- Libya’s conflict in 2011, nor has it drawn sions of politics and power are compat- foreign powers to Libya’s battlefield ible and whether institutional unification since 2014, and hence it will not resolve is sufficient to ensure peaceful coopera- the conflict. The principle political con- tion. The failure to address the core driv- flict that has drawn major foreign power of Libya’s conflict can explain why the ers to interfere in Libya’s conflict, shape two rival factions have repeatedly failed it’s diplomatic negotiations and mobilise to politically cooperate despite several local fighters from across the country to high profile international agreements its frontlines is inherently political. This and attempts to reach compromise. latest military battle in 2019, and the years of internationally brokered political negotiations that preceded it since 2017 have been driven by foreign and local actors alike engaged in conflict over Libya’s highest political post that determines the power and political character of the state - the Presidency - in its capacity as the head of the state and authority over the military. At the heart of this conflict are two contrasting political “Success cannot be measured visions over a defining feature of politi- exclusively by symbolic cal culture in democratic states - military neutrality and subservience to civilian handshakes between rival rule irrespective of its political leanings leaders or the formation of a and political character of the state - the Presidency - in its capacity as the head new government. The gauge of the state and authority over the mili- for success of any political tary. At the heart of this conflict are two contrasting political visions over a defin- agreement in Libya must be ing feature of political culture in dem- measured against an end ocratic states - military neutrality and subservience to civilian rule irrespective of hostilities on the ground of its political leanings. between the two factions and an The UN’s logic and political process fails era of cooperation. to address these contrasting visions and the ways in which these rival political factions seek to reconfigure institutions

2 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Contents

06 Political culture: what the political talks fail to address

10 Why economic drivers fail to explain Libya’s conflict

11 Why have ordinary Libyans taken up arms?

14 Why Libya’s last political process failed

16 ‘Plan B’: Why accommodating not addressing ideology led to war

18 The Jamahiriya – Power and ideology under Qaddafi

20 Libya’s first ideological clash – The Revolution (2011)

21 Libya’s second ideological clash – Operation Dignity (2014)

23 The LAAF’s Jamahiriya system – a tale of two armies

26 Lost in translation: How language conceals tribe and tribulations

27 Patronage in practice – the LAAF and its role in politics

29 The GNA – a government without an army

31 The rise of Burqan al-Ghaddab – the network of armed groups behind the GNA

33 Regional Geopolitics: The role and reasons behind the UAE and Turkey’s intervention

35 What is the UAE doing in Libya?

36 Why has the UAE intervened in Libya?

37 Why the UAE’s options are limited by ideology in Libya

39 What is Turkey doing in Libya?

40 Why Turkey’s options are limited by ideology in Libya

43 The UAE and Turkey’s ideological rivalry and incompatibility in Libya

44 Why the unification talks need to address power and ideology

46 Why reforming the PC delays but may not prevent conflict?

48 The pitfalls in the Military Track

49 The challenges of unification: Why the LAAF could resist reform

51 The challenges of unification: Why Burqan al-Ghaddab could resist reform

53 Conclusion and recommendations Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Political culture: what the political talks fail to address

he UN’s logic to resolve the political differences between the the power struggle ignores two factions have no bearing on the Libya’s experience of power, conflict, and will not restart the conflict it’s institutional form under once the rival factions join forces under a Tthe former regime and how this unique unified government. It is a presumption experience has shaped the ideas and that nothing but greed separates outlook of the factions who today the rival factions. That is to say, that engage in conflict. It neglects how this irrespective of what the factions do and political culture shaped Libya’s society how they behave, they are politically over decades and how it institutionally flexible, ideologically compatible, and distributed power across society under can cooperate in unified political and the former Qaddafi regime. It neglects military institutions once their greed how this experience formed drivers has been satisfied through political that led to the revolution, resulted in compromise irrespective of the future the rise of armed groups across the political character and political culture country and how this redistributed of the state. Given that Libya’s three power and reshaped society as a result. major civil wars which triggered local It neglects how this reshaping of society armed groups to form and foreign and redistribution of power formed rival powers to intervene occur specifically political factions and networks of armed at critical turning points in Libya’s groups in 2011 and shaped the fault political transition that define the line of the conflict that divides them political character of the state; power, nearly a decade later. In short it neglects it’s political form and how society is history. This process further neglects governed are relevant to the timeline new realities. The process ignores the of the conflict, and should matter to the changes to political culture across the political talks aimed at resolving them. region and how foreign powers noticed an ideological power vacuum in Libya The contrasting political visions of power after the fall of the Qaddafi regime, and are not only imperative to establishing responded in 2011 and then years since the political outlooks of the rival local by intervening militarily in the conflict as factions, but also the role of rival foreign a result. states in the conflict and illustrate Libya’s place in a bitterly divided and contested The failure to address these ideological region. Identifying what drives regional drivers and political characteristics of powers to intervene and shape Libya’s the conflict in the political talks contains a conflict, break it’s ceasefires and dangerous implicit presumption: politics undermine the peace processes when is irrelevant to the power struggle. That it fails to meet their desired political

06 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

objectives is also a reflection of the and military institutional power can limit region’s political fault lines. which political parties may participate in political life, and which ones will be The foreign policy of regional powers proscribed and fought as enemies of the and objectives of rival factions in Libya state. They also determine the nature can be measured by years of UN of civil-military relations; whether to brokered diplomatic negotiations to establish, or extinguish a socio-political determine how post conflict Libya is space that allows for a socio-political to be governed. Foreign powers who culture that challenges power through intervene militarily, have also shaped expressions of dissidence. the diplomatic process and framing of negotiations to ensure the resulting Seen from this perspective, Libya’s latest institutional setup in a unified Libyan conflict is more than a battle driven government meets their desired by local greed over political posts and political objectives; where their local military institutions. It is part of a deeper political partners are either at the helm conflict over power; specifically who of Libya’s military or have control and controls the highest political post that authority over the military at the highest governs the military institutions, how political post - the Presidency. These they seek to exercise this power and political posts and military institutions how society is to be governed in a near are not purely cash dispensers for the decade long, region wide conflict to greedy. They determine the political determine a prevailing political culture in character of a unified state and the Libya since the fall of Qaddafi. way in which the lives of Libya’s citizens are to be governed as a result. Political Libya’s conflict can not be exclusively

07 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

characterised by the greed of some of military power. This vision and rejection it’s political and armed factions and how of meaningful military subservience to they seek to distribute the spoils of war. civilian rule is rooted in an authoritarian Nor can it be reduced to oversimplified political culture. binaries such as the battle between Islamist and Secular forces. It is also not This vision is deeply incompatible with the a regional war between East vs West LAAF’s opponents, currently under the Libya. The conflict and the political GNA. The GNA is composed of a variety of failure to reach compromise is rooted socio-political forces and armed groups in two competing visions of state and who overthrew an identical authoritarian society – two irreconcilable political socio-political system to the LAAF under cultures. These political cultures are Qaddafi during the revolution in 2011. divided in their attitudes towards power These political forces are complex, and politics – specifically the military – some are in competition and even in it’s socio-political composition and it’s conflict at times, but as a whole are subservience to political authority. The brought and bound together by a fear LAAF seeks to establish a state around a and experience of authoritarianism and military that is structured and composed reject it’s latest incarnation in Haftar and of particular tribes whilst excluding specifically the LAAF. These forces seek others. Furthermore the LAAF seeks to to establish a state where the highest be managed by a political authority – political authority – its presidency – can namely the Presidency - of it’s choice and be challenged or changed by Libya’s not an authority that will tamper with it’s society democratically and not a political socio-political structures or challenge its authority that is submissive to, selected

“The UN process fails to address how these contrasting political cultures and visions of the state that not only drive the local parties to the conflict, but divides their international backers too, and how this conflict is central to the years of diplomatic and political negotiations that have failed to reconcile both sides and achieve political compromise.

08 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

by or serves its military. These forces seek The UN process fails to address how to establish a military that is inclusive these contrasting political cultures and and representative of society and not visions of the state that not only drive the narrowly structured exclusively around local parties to the conflict, but divides tribes. Most importantly, they require their international backers too, and a military that is subservient to civilian how this conflict is central to the years rule, and are willing to challenge and of diplomatic and political negotiations fight against one that isn’t. This vision that have failed to reconcile both sides and rejection of political subservience and achieve political compromise. to military rule is rooted in a democratic political culture.

09 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why economic drivers fail to explain Libya’s conflict

hilst it has become vogue conflicts only emerged as a result of the to frame the Libyan structural cavities in the Qaddafi-era conflict as being almost cheque dispensing political institutions exclusively motivated and policy of subsidies. This economic byW greed and rooted in its economic perspective argues that both of Libya’s structures, this perspective offers rival networks of armed groups and limited explanatory power where the political factions irrespective of who they national conflict is concerned. It has also are, where they and what they claim to revised Libya’s history. This perspective fight for are really driven to conflict by promotes the belief Libyans took up an identical greed and scramble to take arms with no higher political ambitions exclusive control of the state’s lucrative than to oust Qaddafi’s circle from power political and economic institutions. This over economic institutions. The conflict in perspective argues political culture Libya between rival networks of armed and historical experience are irrelevant groups and political factions is rooted to the real war in Libya – ‘the battle to as such in a battle to pillage Libya’s extract wealth by any political means or economic resources irrespective of narrative necessary’. their political or ideological disposition. This leads to a belief that Libya’s

10 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why have ordinary Libyans taken up arms?

his perspective is flawed in both networks, limited in size, and in i) and risks oversimplifying the close geographical proximity of lucrative political, ideological reasons government institutions which they and and actual drivers that trigger their business associates seek to extort Tcivilians and armed groups alike to engage particularly in the capital, ii) groups in conflict, or seeks to take the cases of a that exhibit rent seeking behaviour by limited number of groups that actually laying claim to Libya’s infrastructure engage in such economic predation as and natural resources particularly its oil representative of all groups and people fields or iii) the groups that battle over who take up arms and are engaged in human trafficking and smuggling routes conflict. This perspective should not be along Libya’s borders which they have ignored or dismissed entirely. It can be sought to exploit as a result of Libya’s useful if limited to understanding the subsidies and transnational illicit of behaviour of a small cluster of groups Libya’s subsidies and transnational illicit

11 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

economies. But what about everyone either the GNA and LAAF not opted else? What this economic perspective to cooperate and establish an even fails to help us understand is why more powerful joint force to reach tens of thousands of ordinary civilians their desired economic ends? Such a otherwise engaged in regular life disproportionate union of force would voluntarily take up arms and risk their not only outweigh and deter their lives. What drives civilians to establish smaller competitors from challenging armed groups along local lines in remote them but would expand their shared towns and cities and then triggers territorial reach and ability to exploit them to become part of a network far reaching economic opportunities and conflict along national lines? Why whether in the capital, Libya’s oil do many fighters and groups lay down facilities or its borders. This union could their weapons voluntarily and return be achieved through a pragmatic to their regular lives after the conflicts political compromise, to jointly exploit end despite the economic incentives economic opportunities and extort to remain armed? The failure to Libya’s wealthy institutions instead explain this, is a failure to explain the of engaging in lengthy ideologically drivers of Libya’s largest conflicts and driven conflict that exhausts both of triggers of mass mobilisation. It fails their human and military resources in to explain why groups on both sides the process. Local, ethnic and tribal mobilise at specific ideological turning identities are not only the names by points in 2011 and 2019 during which many armed groups choose to Libya’s political transition. Not only be known by. They are a representation does this perspective fail to explain of their own community’s history, their the behaviour of many armed groups experience of power and a powerful that return to civilian life, it also fails idea that binds them together and to explain the behaviour of powerful determines their political outlook. This armed groups who remain intact after does not mean these political drivers the conflicts end. Why have economic establish uniform behaviour. It does drivers not reshaped the national not guarantee politically constructive political conflict, induced alliances behaviour or a lack thereof, liberal between bitter rivals on either side of or conservative political views, or a the military conflict? guarantee to abide by human rights norms in conflict. Rather these drivers If the largest single driver of conflict can help us understand the present is economic, and this drives the nature of Libya’s conflict, its fault behaviour of armed groups, why lines, and the conditions that must have the largest armed groups on be addressed in a political process in either side of the political fault line not order to resolve it and not trigger their forged a pragmatic union, and chosen remobilisation. economic cooperation and political compromise over conflict? Why have the largest rival armed groups within

12 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

“Why have economic drivers not reshaped the national political conflict, induced alliances between bitter rivals on either side of the military conflict?

13 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why Libya’s last political process failed

he most high-profile political groups. This logic assumed conflict was process and attempt to reach driven by tribal, ethnic and political greed political compromise remains for power and competition to rule. The the UN-brokered Skhirat process was built on the assumption that TAgreement (2015) following Libya’s if all the parties to the conflict were to first, post-2011, outbreak of violence in simply share power through compromise 2014. This political process established and rule together inclusively, they would the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) cooperate and the conflict would end. that would establish a new Government of National Accord (GNA). The LPA Despite the UN’s efforts, the political created inclusive institutional governing process and products of this strategy of arrangements around a Presidential inclusivity and compromise failed to bring Council (PC), an executive nine-member about the desired political cooperation body to lead the GNA, whose composition and end the conflict. Boycotting was selected on the basis of inclusivity members was an early problem, but and representation that would ‘leave the LPA’s ideological framework proved no conflict line or party to the conflict to be its undoing. The institutional behind’. As a result, the U.N. appointed arrangements, distribution of power representatives from across all of Libya’s and reassigning of political authority local and regional conflicts under one over the military was the fundamental political body, to encourage their joint stumbling block to Libya’s peace process cooperation and by extension an end to and demonstrated the deep ideological all their conflicts. This resulted in Fayez incompatibility of Haftar and the LAAF al-Serraj from Tripoli being appointed as with the pluralist PC. The LPA’s Article 8– a neutral consensus figure to lead the PC transferred power over the armed force alongside eight deputies from a variety to the politically pluralist PC and in the of powerful tribes, ethnic groups, political process transformed the parties, armed factions and key interest

“The process was built on the assumption that if all the parties to the conflict were to simply share power through compromise and rule together inclusively, they would cooperate and the conflict would end.

14 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

balance of political power, threatening senior Haftar aide claimed they “had not the power structures under construction examined the text carefully enough” and in eastern Libya. The PC’s new authority not realised the full implications of the would replace Aguila Saleh as the LPA, until after the establishment of the Supreme Commander of the Armed PC as grounds for later rejecting the PC. Forces, the chief of Libya’s parliament Haftar’s ally in parliament, Saleh similarly the House of Representatives (HoR) refused to allow for a parliamentary vote who appointed Haftar as military chief in to endorse the LPA, only holding a vote 2015 and designed much of the LAAF. to reject the PC’s proposed government It would thus give the PC power as the – the GNA – in an attempt to delegitimise Supreme Commander of the Armed the UN political process and the LPA. Forces to remove Haftar from his position Despite the UN’s initial claim there would as chief of the LAAF. Despite Haftar essentially be ‘no Plan B’ to the LPA, initially endorsing the PC by nominating it eventually succumbed to external Ali Qatrani as his representative, a resistance in 2017 and change course.

Aguila Saleh - former Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

15 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

‘Plan B’: Why accommodating not addressing ideology led to war he UN Security Council wel- and later western before, and without comed and endorsed Haftar’s warning, negotiations were abandoned military and political backers in favour of a power grab in Tripoli on who unliterally launched a April 4th 2019. Tnew political process and negotiations first in the UAE and later France to over- Despite the UN’s five years of efforts to come Libya’s divisions. The Abu Dhabi broker peace and establish a unified and Paris talks began brokering a new government through compromise and deal through direct political talks primar- inclusivity, this process and logic failed ily between Serraj and Haftar between to address the ideological obstacles 2017 and 2019 – essentially a ‘Plan to the LAAF presented by the UN’s B’ to the LPA. The aim of Plan B was to foundational document the LPA in Libya. work around the LPA and carefully unify The UN mission to Libya, who had been the two bodies and reform the Presiden- brokering talks also failed to address the tial Council to accommodate the LAAF. ideological shift by regional and global These talks continued to aim at forging powers who had not only embraced a new institutional arrangement, and a Haftar since 2016, but were willing to reconfigured PC to ensure its political back him over the PC and GNA and how authority would not threaten Haftar’s this would impact the conflict. control of the LAAF. The deal included a ceasefire, but on the condition the Despite the UN sanctioning a local LAAF were allowed to continue its con- armed group who attacked the GNA for troversial counter terrorism campaign a month in September 2018, in a move language used by Haftar since 2014 to UN Security Council members claimed target a multitude of armed groups and was “sending a clear message from political opponents including Libya’s par- the international community that acts liament and political parties. of violence against the Libyan people will not be tolerated”, the UN Security In October 2017, Haftar and Serraj Council failed to unilaterally condemn met in Abu Dhabi, where they discussed or sanction Haftar throughout his 15 the first proposed reform of the PC into months offensive. The former UN special a smaller three-person council – that representative to Libya Ghassan Salamé would include Aguila Saleh and Haftar hinted at an ideological shift, claiming as two of its three members, in order the “international system has changed to embed the LAAF’s control over the dramatically” since the revolution, PC. As these talks continued, Haftar in an attempt to explain why the UN grew stronger, took hold of Libya’s oil sanctioned Qaddafi in 2011, a sovereign facilities and more territory into southern head of state threatening his civilians,

16 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

but failed to sanction Haftar in 2019 reconfiguration of the PC that who was both threatening civilians replaces meaningful civilian oversight and trying to overthrow a sovereign and power over the LAAF at the head of state appointed by the UN. heart of the conflict in the subsequent framework of the unification talks, The flaw in the UN’s endorsement instead it accommodates it. The Berlin of the UAE and France’s ‘Plan B’ Process and Geneva process remains strategy was failing to see the motive structured around ‘Plan B’, reforming behind reconfiguring the PC. The the PC to accommodate the LAAF, conflict resolution’s logic was based as opposed to addressing why the on the belief Haftar was seeking a LAAF is so resistant to a change in meaningful political compromise with political authority. The reason behind

Serraj, and that the LAAF would be the LAAF’s resistance to a change in subservient to a unified government political authority can be found in the and future governments once the history of civil-military relations during political negotiations were complete. Qaddafi’s reign, and how the former The reality was that Haftar was not regime designed its military and negotiating with the state, or the embedded its authoritarian structures LAAF’s submission to the state, he was into it at the grass roots level – Libya’s using negotiations to wrestle control tribes. of the state, before abandoning peaceful talks in favour of a violent power grab. The UN brokered talks have repeatedly failed to address the LAAF’s desire for an institutional

17 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

he revolution in 2011 funda- an elite and powerful ‘praetorian guard’ mentally transformed the old directly under Qaddafi’s command, and socio-political order of the the second army a lower tier tribal mili- Qaddafi regime, the system tary deeply embedded into Libya’s social Tto distribute and divide power and privi- fabric designed to coup proof the Jama- lege in society, and the ideological char- hiriya and preserve his authoritarian rule. acter of the state. Most importantly, it In essence Qaddafi’s two tier Jamahiriya established a fundamental fault line be- army was engineered in such a way as tween rival networks of armed groups to guard the authoritarian regime from over the institution- popular uprising and al structures of the social dissidence at state that predates the lower tier whilst the GNA and LAAF’s ensuring the lower conflict in 2019, but tier army itself was is central to under- too weak to chal- standing it. Qaddafi’s lenge the upper tier 42 years in power are praetorian guard often misunderstood. and overthrow the On the surface, the regime. It didn’t be- unusual and idiosyn- gin this way. After cratic ideas outlined seizing power in a in the Green Book bloodless coup in – his vision for struc- 1969, Qaddafi be- turing the state and gan to systematically organising society weaken Libya’s reg- known as the Jama- ular military (fearing hiriya are often the reference point to a repeat of the coup he staged) and be- understanding Libya’s political and so- gan quietly building his own private mil- cial system over the period of his rule. itary, a praetorian guard directly under However, behind the populist rhetoric his control. The praetorian guard would and political slogans, little is understood contain loyalist units such as the 32nd about how Qaddafi managed power brigade led by his son Khamis Qaddafi. and maintained his ideological and au- These armies were later known as Jaysh thoritarian grip over Libyan society for Mu’ammar – Qaddafi’s upper tier elite so long. praetorian guard and Jaysh Bubakar the lower tier army after Bubakar Younes Conspicuously absent in history was how Jaber, Libya’s former defence minister. the Jamahiriya’s power was established However, after an attempted military on a system of two armies; the upper tier, coup in 1993 by officers from Jaysh

18 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Bubakar who predominantly hailed from coup proof his regime. Tribal patronage Libya’s largest tribe the Warfalla, Qadd- was intrinsic to Jaysh Bubakar, not afi radically redesigned and transformed only as a means of maintaining power, Jaysh Bubakar, its ideological form and but managing and accommodating strategic purpose in society. power. The patronage system was first an entry point to establishing the In 1993, Qaddafi needed to make an clientelism of tribal chiefs and later example of the coup plotters in order embedding tribesmen into the lower to deter potential challenges to his rule tier military, purchasing tribal loyalty and began rounding up dissidents. The and establishing a tribal reliance on the army officers were executed, and their regime as a source of wealth through family members punished, but Qaddafi socio-economic kickbacks and political equally feared how this repression of the privileges to their communities. This Warfalla tribe could produce widespread served a key ideological purpose – to tribal sympathy and encourage political preserve Libya’s authoritarian system at dissidence to his regime. As a result, the local level. Any attempt to overthrow Qaddafi began working on a way in Qaddafi or the Jamahiriya – by internal which to infiltrate and subvert Libya’s coup or external dissent - would also society and bind it to the regime through directly threaten the entire tribal its tribal communities and networks. patronage network’s economic interests, He sought to purchase tribal loyalty political privileges and their way of life into his regime’s military by embedding at the local level. As a result, Qaddafi’s particular tribes into Jaysh Bubakar, in tribes were no longer merely a surname, order to act as a buffer against social bloodline or a common history of people and political forms of dissidence across in Libya’s society, they were a tool. Tribes Libya’s society. The regime established became part of a political and military the Socialist People’s Command (SPC) in re-engineering of authoritarian state 1994 under Khalifa Hneish tasked with and society, and a means of distributing establishing links into Libya’s tribes and authoritarian privilege in exchange for transforming them into ‘guardians of the maintaining authoritarian power of its regime’. This tribal patronage system people. became the hallmark of the Jamahiriya and a new way for Qaddafi to maintain his authoritarian grip on power and

“Qaddafi began working on a way in which to infiltrate and subvert Libya’s society and bind it to the regime through its tribal communities and networks.

19 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Libya’s first ideological clash – The Revolution (2011) Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya was able to whom remained armed, some of whom endure domestic challenges to its rule defected and joined the revolution, as a result of the SPC’s work in 1994 but almost all of whom were tainted by and a semblance of balance was association to Qaddafi as ‘guardians maintained. However, Libya’s February of the authoritarian regime’, and 17th revolution in 2011 would change quickly led to tensions and a conflict this. The revolution offered a powerful line between the two rival factions. The new social narrative, the promise of emergence of diverse new powerful a new political future and produced revolutionary armed groups challenged widespread social dissidence and the old regime-less tribal patronage political behaviour never before seen networks left behind in the demise of in Libya. The revolution transformed the Jamahiriya. Revolutionary change society’s political expectations. It also eroded Libya’s old socio-political sparked widespread peaceful protests order, creating an ideological power across Libyan society which quickly vacuum and laying the foundations for turned violent, drawing wide spread a new local and regional fault line. The sympathy across towns and cities that first seeds of discontent and disparate sparked others to protest and take up political cultures can be found in the arms that combined to overwhelm the weeks and months leading to Libya’s first Jamahiriya’s coup proofing mechanism. democratic elections. The tribes who had Libyans also rejected the authoritarian lost patronage from Qaddafi and their tribal foundations of the Jamahiriya control of Eastern Libya began to form and quickly dismissed tribal identity and a ‘Federalist’ camp ahead of Libya‘s first its role in politics. Militarily, Qaddafi’s elections. In their struggle to address praetorian guard was destroyed largely the power deficit,the federalists almost as a result of NATO’s air campaign and derailed Libya’s democratic transition. military assistance to the revolutionaries. Federalist militia raided polling stations and and shot down a government However, as the Jamahiriya unravelled helicopter killing an electoral official the revolutionaries who took up arms to travelling to Benghazi during Libya’s overthrow Qaddafi began to organise first democratic elections in 2012. The autonomously and establish powerful Federalists took their brinkmanship to new armed groups and saw themselves the point of shutting down Libya’s oil as the new unquestionable “guardians terminals almost bankrupting the country of the revolution” for the day after the and by the end of 2013 established regime fell. These groups, emboldened their own autonomous government but by revolutionary legitimacy challenged were too weak and ultimately failed to the deeply embedded tribal patronage take power in Eastern Libya until Libya’s network of Jaysh Bubakar, many of second war in 2014 - Operation Dignity.

20 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Libya’s second ideological clash – Operation Dignity (2014) The ensuing power struggles between affiliate, but also Libya’s revolutionary all of Libya’s rival armed groups pro- armed groups that emerged in 2011 duced years of instability, simmering po- defined together ideologically as litical tensions and local intercommunal ‘terrorists’. Despite many of Benghazi’s conflicts. However, the ideological fault revolutionary groups and fighters line of Libya’s latest conflict, and it’s po- demonstrating their opposition to tential to trigger and mobilise groups terrorist forces when they fought Ansar- across the country only became appar- Al Sharia at the scene of the US consular ent upon the establishment of the LAAF attack on September 11th 2012, facing in 2014. Despite the often repeated indiscriminate and simultaneous attacks myth that Haftar first emerged in post by Haftar’s forces, these revolutionary revolution Benghazi to fight Islamists groups would form a military coalition a who sought to oppose Libya’s demo- month after Operation Dignity in June cratic elections in July 2014, Hafter 2014 – the Benghazi Revolutionary first re-emerged in Tripoli in February Shura Council (BRSC) that included 2014, claiming to have established his Ansar Al Sharia. Whilst much of Ansar own army and subsequently attempted Al Sharia “defected” to Islamic State, to overthrow Libya’s first democratical- some its members remained within the ly parliament at the end of their term. BRSC. This coalition split the opinion of The army never showed up and Haftar’s Benghazi residents many of whom were coup failed. Haftar escaped an arrest the families of the revolutionary armed warrant in Tripoli to Benghazi where groups that joined the BRSC and claimed he established the self-styled LAAF on the operation was there to oppose May 15th 2014 under the guise of a Haftar from returning the country to counter terrorism operation ‘Dignity’. military rule. However, Haftar claimed Operation Dignity was a call to arms to he did “not seek power”, and the LAAF’s Qaddafi’s tribal patronage network and supporters claimed the revolutionary their armed groups to establish a new armed groups’ military cooperation with military under Haftar’s command that Ansar Al Sharia was sufficient grounds sparked a war months before the results to designate these groups as terrorists. of Libya’s second democratic elections The BRSC did not pledge its allegiance were announced in late July 2014. (bay’a) to Al Qaeda, a requirement of the Salafi Jihadist group and later after Operation Dignity would fight Islamic the emergence of Islamic State in Libya, State, Ansar Al-Sharia an al Qaeda the BRSC as a whole were labelled as

21 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

“apostates” by the Islamic State’s emir revolutionary groups and the conflict in in Libya for their belief in democracy. Libya. Gradually, the BRSC were simply Despite being rejected by Islamic State, referred to as “Jihadists” and Operation and not sharing the same Jihadist Dignity exclusively as a counter terrorism ideology as Ansar Al Sharia, Benghazi’s campaign despite a second attempt revolutionary groups did share the same at the beginning of the operation to frontlines in a battle against Haftar and overthrow Libya’s firstdemocratically this understandably changed how many elected parliament and government in Libyans and internationals began to view Tripoli in May 2014.

“ Hafter first re-emerged in Tripoli in February 2014, claiming to have established his own army and subsequently attempted to overthrow Libya’s first democratically parliament at the end of their term.

22 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The LAAF’s Jamahiriya system – a tale of two armies

Former Libyan leader Muammar Al Qaddafi alongside former Defence minister

ehind Haftar’s counter-terror- Sheikhi in 2014 tasked with coordinating ism rhetoric is also a discrete the LAAF’s relationship to eastern tribes, attempt to resurrect the Ja- in particular Bedouin tribes that had lost mahiriya’s authoritarian system their exclusive patronage, privilege and Bof rule. First, by reconstructing a lower power from Jaysh Bubakar under the for- tier LAAF using Qaddafi’s broken tribal mer regime. Sheikhi cultivated personal patronage structure, and later by estab- relationships with Bedouin tribal elders lishing his own elite upper tier praetorian who encouraged their youth to join the guard to keep it in check and preserve LAAF. Haftar’s military leadership re-es- his power. Haftar established an identical tablished relationships with the former re- SPC tot hat of the Jamihirya under Beleid gime’s forces, but also recruited and con-

23 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

structed new Bedouin led tribal armed Libya from the Arabian Peninsula in the groups. 11th and 12th century and historically resided on the coastal outskirts of Beng- Eastern Libya has a diverse tribal compo- hazi or smaller towns and villages across sition and its demographics and divisions the east. are critical to understanding the construction of the LAAF as a patronage network. They are both tribally and ethnically dis- The majority of eastern Libya’s residents tinct. The majority of Benghazi’s residents live in its largest city Benghazi, but are who hail from Misrata in Eastern Libya descendants of Misratans, who migrated are of Ottoman descent, owing to the in- to Eastern Libya from the Western city termarriage of Ottoman janissaries and of Misrata over several hundred years, Libyans who settled across Libya, but in turning the eastern city into an important particular Misrata. urban and regional centre. The second largest social grouping in eastern Libya Eastern Libya’s tribal divisions and demo- hail from Bedouin tribes who migrated to graphics are important to understanding

Name Position Tribe

Khalifa Haftar Field Marshall Furjan

Abdelrazaq Nathurj Chief of Staff Al U’rufa

Saqr Al Juroushi Head of Airforce Al Qabayil

Abdelsalaam Al Hassi Head of Tripoli Operations Al Hassa

Ahmed Mesmari Spokesman of LAAF Al Masamir

Adel Marfou’a Head of LAAF counter terrorism in Cyrenaica Al Awaqir

Faraj Qa’aim Head of LAAF counter terrorism force Al Awaqir

Faraj Al Sousaa Military prosecutor of LAAF Al Bara’ssa

Salah Hwedi LAAF Criminal Investigation Department Al Awaqir

Fathi Younes Hassouna LAAF foreign affairs bureau Al Dressa

Al Madani Al Fakhry Chairman of LAAF Military Fawakhir

A sample of the General Command leadership of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces and its tribal patronage network (accurate as of 2019), all of whom are considered Bedouin tribes.

24 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

the construction of the LAAF. Despite Haftar’s attempt to resurrect the descriptions of the LAAF as “the closest Jamahiriya system is not limited to the thing Libya has to a ‘regular’ force”, and tribal re-engineering of the lower tier claims tribal influence is “a threat and a LAAF using the SPC. Haftar has also tried challenge to Haftar’s project” the LAAF is to mirror Qaddafi’s regime maintenance actually an irregular force, reliant on tribes system through establishing his own and designed to embed tribal influence upper tier elite praetorian guard. These within its military structures not exclude brigades are designed to protect it. The LAAF’s senior commanders, and Haftar’s power from any political or strategic leadership in the east of Libya military challenge to his authority and are exclusively drawn from Bedouin tribes, to ensure his own primacy over the without representation from the majority LAAF. This elite force is better equipped of eastern Libya’s population or its social than the LAAF and composed of and ethnic groups who originate from exclusively loyalist military brigades non-Bedouin tribes: These structures such as the 106th and 166th led by were designed in coordination with Haftar’s son Khaled Haftar and son in Aguila Saleh, the Speaker of the HoR law Ayyub Forjani. Despite establishing parliament and the LAAF’s Supreme and empowering the LAAF, Haftar has Commander of the Armed Forces. Saleh faced major challenges to his authority is key to the rise and structure of the from his lower tier army. Haftar has LAAF. He appointed Haftar in March deployed the praetorian guard to arrest 2015, and by his own volition designed a key dissenting LAAF commander Faraj much of the LAAF’s tribal command Qa’aim in 2017, who issued Haftar an structures in order to purchase Bedouin ultimatum to leave eastern Libya within tribal loyalty into the LAAF. 48 hours.

Haftar’s attempt to resurrect the “Jamahiriya system is not limited to the tribal re-engineering of the lower tier LAAF using the SPC. Haftar has also tried to mirror Qaddafi’s regime maintenance system through establishing his own upper tier elite praetorian guard.

25 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Lost in translation: How language conceals tribe and tribulations

he LAAF’s construction of of Bedouin tribal elders ahead of a tribal patronage network the BRSC’s last stand in Benghazi’s and the resulting ethno-tribal Ganfouda neighbourhood in 2017 divisions caused by the war are used similar descriptions but went even Toften concealed by counter terrorism further. Sheikhi stated that Ganfouda’s rhetoric designed to appeal to the West. residents including non-combatants, These divisions are often missed in English women and children above the age of language commentary by observers and 14 “would not exit (Ganfouda) alive”. journalists alike who adopted simplistic The LAAF later published videos of language in their description of the their fighters in Ganfouda mutilating the battle and belligerents such as ‘army’, corpse of a 75 year old woman on social ‘islamists’ or ‘terrorists’. An example of media, in an incident being investigated this is how Operation Dignity’s battle as a war crime. against Benghazi’s revolutionary groups was often described by LAAF These divisions and crimes are often commanders as the Libyan ‘army’s war lost in translation, and rarely makes it on terror against “Islamic State” in English into English language commentary in to Western journalists but in Arabic by favour of counter terrorism language pro LAAF media as a battle against that appeals to Western policy maker’s “Turks and Jews”, an often repeated slur eager to see progress in the global war against Benghazi’s armed groups and on terror. The consequences have been residents of Misratan heritage and their disastrous for dissidents of Haftar who perceived ethno-tribal ancestry. remain in Benghazi’s, often rounded up by the intelligence services and The LAAF’s own commanders routinely police as “terrorists sympathisers”, and used this ethno-tribal framing of the 100,000 civilians displaced from Bedouin instead of ‘army’, and Turks Benghazi to Western Libya according instead of ‘terrorists’ to define the to the UN, who the LAAF spokesman battle in Benghazi. Khaled Bulghib, has dismissed as ‘families of terrorists’ a commander in the LAAF in a video who ran away from Benghazi. circulated on social media in 2015 appealed to the “Libyan Bedouin to burn the homes, confiscate the businesses and displace the Turkish Misratans” from Benghazi during Operation Dignity. Beleid Sheikhi, the head of the LAAF’s SPC in a meeting

26 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Patronage in practice – the LAAF and its role in politics Despite the early popularity of Haftar’s graffiti that readthe “ army is a redline” operation amongst parts of eastern signed by a brigade loyal to the LAAF. society, and belief it would be secular and neutral, the LAAF has become Despite clear ‘early popularity’ from parts deeply involved in daily political life and of the east in 2014 who credited the transformed the socio-political dynamics LAAF for fighting terrorism, the very acts of eastern Libya, establishing a deeply of terror that led to Operation Dignity in authoritarian environment as a result. 2014 – mysterious assassinations - are Haftar has openly claimed Libya “is not now common practice since the end of the ready for democracy”. The LAAF has conflict under the badge of the LAAF. The routinely replaced democratically elected corpses of civilians kidnapped by the LAAF municipal officials across eastern Libya from their homes lay mysteriously strewn

The“ most high-profile case is the disappearance of Benghazi’s elected member of parliament Seham Sergewa in July 2019.

across roads in Benghazi’s outskirts. with their own military appointees. LAAF commanders commit public The LAAF has also reactivated the executions of handcuffed and blindfolded ex-regime’s intelligence apparatus prisoners. They also employ social media establishing a ‘police state’ in order to as a tool to intimidate opponents and monitor and quell social and political dissidents; torturing and desecrating dissidence that it deems threatening. The bodies and promoting these war crimes LAAF is particularly allergic to political on Facebook for likes and shares. It dissidence. The most high-profile case is has resulted in the LAAF becoming an the disappearance of Benghazi’s elected authoritarian tribal-members only club, member of parliament Seham Sergewa that anyone is free to support, some are in July 2019. Ms Sergewa disappeared encouraged to join, but those living under from her home in Benghazi after publicly it are unable to challenge or demonstrate criticising the LAAF’s attack on Tripoli. dissent resulting in a deeply repressive The armed groups that kidnapped the authoritarian environment. parliamentarian, defaced her home with

27 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Seham Sergewa - Benghazi elected’s member of parliament

28 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The GNA – a government without an army

he LAAF’s opponents that of the institutional vacuum, political op- serve under the GNA’s army portunism and lucrative economic op- - in contradistinction are not portunities to exploit in 2011. The ab- bound by tribal bonds, pa- sence of a post-Qaddafi unified national Ttronage or personal political loyalty. military gave many of these new groups Despite the GNA’s claims, they are also opportunities to establish their grip on not an “army”, but a complex network the nascent post Qaddafi military and of armed groups without strict political security institutions. loyalty to the GNA, many of who formed during the revolution in 2011. Whilst, these armed groups are of a diverse social and political disposition, Protestors took up arms and began to many used their shared revolutionary establish armed groups along local com- legitimacy in a way that led to a wide- munal lines that broadly rejected Qa- spread belief of militia rule, leading them ddafi’s authoritarian rule and sought to to become a focal point of grass-roots end the Jamahiriya in all its forms. The social and political dissidence. Some of social and political composition of these these armed groups began to undermine groups differ from one to the other, with Libya’s first democratically elected gov- some having hardline revolutionary val- ernment by interfering in politics, most ues, secular or Islamist views to those notably in May 2013 when a number who simply established armed groups to of armed groups entered parliament to represent their cities or local neighbour- force through a political isolation law to hoods against Qaddafi’s forces during ban Qaddafi era politicians from holding a period of insecurity. They also contain public office. Today, some armed groups armed groups who emerged as a result under the GNA are also guilty of arrest-

“Whilst, these armed groups are of a diverse social and political disposition, many used their shared revolutionary legitimacy in a way that led to a widespread belief of militia rule.

29 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

© New York Times ing and shooting protestors during re- armed groups, but not the entire network. cent anti-corruption demonstrations, To further complicate matters many which led to armed groups engaging of these armed groups have dissolved, in conflict with each other. With such a been subsumed by larger coalitions divergence and difference amongst the or their fighters returned to civilian armed groups under the GNA and the life after the revolution, thus changing absence of a clear patronage network the composition of armed groups and like the LAAF, it is difficult to determine factions over time. Whilst a portion of what binds the GNA’s network of armed armed groups remain searching for groups together. economic opportunities to exploit, many have become professionally trained units These groups have emerged at different that loyally serve under the GNA and periods in Libya’s transition, evolved fought under the banner of a successful over time exhibiting wildly contrasting US-backed counter ISIS campaign in behaviour. Interference in politics and Sirte in 2016. economic predation is behaviour that can only be attributed to a limited number of

30 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The rise of Burqan al-Ghaddab – the network of armed groups behind the GNA more effective way to country from an amalgam of ethnic, categorise the armed groups tribal and politically diverse groups under the banner of the to defend Tripoli from Haftar’s power GNA is understanding what grab on April 4th 2019. The nature triggersA their mobilisation and why of the threat even served to mobilise they fight. What is often neglected in civilians who had never taken up arms contemporary discussions of categorizing and fought before to join the coalition. armed groups in Libya, is the trigger This rejection of authoritarian rule is for mobilisation. Not only why regular not only the key driver of the conflict civilians take up arms, but why they form and trigger to pick up arms, but key networks, and why many choose to fight to understanding the GNA’s military only at specific turning points in Libya’s power and the current ideological fault political transition. Today, the latest form lines in Libya. The surge of forces under of this network of armed groups who Burqan al-Ghadab that mobilised to mobilised to fight under the banner of Tripoli goes beyond any surface level the GNA’s military operation to defend rejection of Haftar or embrace of Serraj. Tripoli since April 2019 are Burqan al- It is rooted in a fundamental rejection Ghadab. The Burqan al-Ghadab network of authoritarianism, a deep memory cannot be categorised by any unifying and experience of the Jamahiriya, and tribal or ethnic composition like the rejection of its latest incarnation of LAAF and does not possess a rival SPC Haftar’s LAAF. to establish tribal bonds. They adhere to the GNA’s military chain of command The deeply embedded ideological but are not bound by a personal loyalty drivers within these rival networks and to Fayez Serraj, with some having fought structures of armed groups are both each other, or indeed having fought the source of the GNA and LAAF’s the GNA itself in the past. The critical power on the ground, and the political centre of gravity that binds these groups fault line that divides the country. These ideologically, triggers their autonomous structures remain deeply incompatible mobilisation and establishes their at a structural level and irreconcilable formidable unified power on the ground, at an ideological level, an issue the has been the threat of authoritarian rule. current UN-led political talks and military unification fails to address. This ideological threat is the vital political lightning rod that crucially led to the mass-mobilisation of forces across the

31 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

“It is rooted in a fundamental rejection of authoritarianism, a deep memory and experience of the Jamahiriya, and rejection of its latest incarnation of Haftar’s LAAF.

32 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Regional Geopolitics: The role and reasons behind the UAE and Turkey’s intervention

he local networks of armed ware and ammunition on the ground. groups and actors are not These rival foreign states are no longer alone in their ideological in- playing a supporting role, they are in compatibility, this also ex- the driving seat of the conflict. Foreign Ttends to their international backers and powers may dictate the frontlines and their respective political projects in Lib- ceasefires of conflict as much as the ya. The April 4th 2019 civil war is not local factions, but they can also shape only a critical chapter for Libya’s rival the diplomatic processes that estab- factions, but the unveiling of a decade lish peace and determine the political long geopolitical battle sparked by the outcome as a result. Turkey, co-spon- revolution in 2011 and its latest ideo- sored the Moscow political talks where logical fault line as international players they hosted Serraj and Haftar in Janu- squared off in direct military combat ary 2020 days prior to the Berlin talks. against one another in Libya for the first The UAE have also convened Serraj time in April 2019. The LAAF’s power and Haftar for UN brokered talks in Abu grab was supported by the UAE and Dhabi in February 2019 in an attempt conversely the GNA’s defence of Tripo- to unify the GNA and LAAF in political li was supported by Turkey, and as the talks prior to the offensive. The degree conflict has developed the ideological to which the rival international players differences to the rival local factions are directly involved in shaping both and foreign sponsors alike have become conflict and peace, illustrates the signif- more pronounced. icance of the final political outcome in Libya. Libya’s local factions have received years of military support that influenced Foreign actors have been drawn to Lib- the conflict dynamics, but the role of the ya for a variety of economic motives international actors has dramatically and geo-strategic reasons, but little is changed in recent times and surpassed written about the deeper underlying levels that could be described as assis- ideological objectives that have drawn tance. Both Turkey and the UAE have foreign sponsors to exclusively support invested and deployed ground troops, either of the two rival political factions drone forces, air defences, armoured and their networks of armed groups in personnel vehicles and violated the Libya. arms embargo to supply military hard-

33 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Turkey and UAE intervention within Libya

“The LAAF’s power grab was supported by the UAE and conversely the GNA’s defence of Tripoli was supported by Turkey, and as the conflict has developed the ideological differences to the rival local factions and foreign sponsors alike have become more pronounced.

34 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

What is the UAE doing in Libya?

he LAAF has received offensive and capture control of eastern backing from France, Russia, Libya in 2016. They went on to establish Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but the first foreign military base at Al the UAE remains its largest Khadim in 2016, a sign of their military Tand longest serving military sponsor. commitment to Libya, and the first foreign Its political motivations for doing so are military base in the country’s history since complex and not readily identifiable. Qaddafi expelled the US military from Libya is thousands of kilometres away Wheelus airbase (now Mitiga airport) in from the UAE and shares little more than 1970. It is often believed that the UAE’s language and elements of Arab culture. foreign policy is exclusively motivated Nevertheless, the UAE have been deeply by counter terrorism. This belief posits invested in Libya and supported Haftar’s the UAE’s political and military support rise since he first established the LAAF for Haftar and the LAAF as exclusively in 2014, and attempted to overthrow driven by a desire to establish a “secular” Libya’s first democratically elected force in Libya through counter-terrorism

parliament. The UAE’s motives are not and a fear of ‘Islamist dominance’. personal, and not tied to the personality This policy has come under scrutiny for of Haftar, but is at the deeper structural Haftar’s overt anti-democratic political and ideological level of the LAAF. The objectives, but also the role and rise UAE has provided years of essential of the LAAF’s Salafi-Madkhali armed military support and supplies to first groups. These Salafi armed groups have establish and empower the LAAF but deeply held religious views they seek to also encourage its expansion across promote across Libya’s society, a rigid Libya’s vast territory since its inception. anti-democratic outlook, and have According to the Pentagon, the UAE exponentially grown in number and secretly deployed F-16s to LAAF power as a result of the UAE’s support affiliated brigades in Tripoli in 2014. to the LAAF as a direct contradiction of They delivered the first drones in Libya’s this policy. civil war to assist the LAAF’s ground

35 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why has the UAE intervened in Libya?

he UAE’s policies in Libya are promotes a culture of dissidence through rooted in a deeper fear that free speech and protest. It is this combi- goes beyond single Islamist ac- nation of an emerging political culture tors and extends to the impact that topples authoritarian regimes and Tof the Arab Spring on Libya’s political a plethora of political parties waiting to culture. The source of the UAE’s political replace the authoritarians that has de- anxiety towards Libya’s revolution was termined the UAE’s political outlook since the uncompromising belief and speed at the Arab Spring. This political culture which it’s revolutionary adherents tore challenges the UAE’s own domestic au- down authoritarian regimes under the thoritarian view of a silent and submissive guise of democratisation. The UAE con- society and its ability to maintain a hold ceals its fear of democratisation behind on political power. an exclusive fear of Islamists and justifies its aggressive foreign policy engagement This fear is the driving force behind the in Libya and anti-democratic policies at UAE’s shift in domestic and foreign poli- home by framing them as ‘counter terror- cy, and their use of counter terrorism as ism’. a justification. The UAE has come to define terrorism both at home and overseas This fear extends beyond Libya or specif- in a way that severely limits freedom of ic political parties, but is rooted in a fear expression and limits challenges to its au- of how “the UAE may be infected by the thoritarian power. In August 2014, the Arab Spring”. Firstly, it is how political UAE passed a domestic anti-terrorism parties of all ideological shades - liber- bill that gave the Emirati authorities the al or Islamist - sought to establish a new power to prosecute its own citizens and competitive democratic space in order to residents as terrorists and punish them take power through elections by toppling under the penalty of death or life impris- authoritarian regimes. Secondly, it is the onment for actions defined as undermin“ - emergence of new grassroots forces, and ing the stability, sovereignty, or security of the socio political culture of dissent that the state” and “undermining national uni- emerged as a result of the Arab spring ty and social peace”. This legislation also and how these groups and this culture gave the Emirati authorities the ability to challenges the authoritarian social con- imprison anyone who “publicly declares tract and political environment that is his animosity or lack of allegiance to the even more threatening. The formation state or the regime”. This new ideologi- of new civil society actors and socio-po- cal definition of terrorism has become the litical movements has reshaped how so- central tenant of domestic regime main- cieties organise themselves across the tenance and their foreign policy in Libya region. How they view their relationship since 2014. with authoritarian power structures and

36 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why the UAE’s options are limited by ideology in Libya

his ideological driver is key to flict. However, the overwhelming majority understanding what has drawn and most powerful in this network - Bur- the UAE to Haftar as a partner qan al-Ghadab - mobilised as a unified who shares their ideological force under the GNA in clear ideological Tview, and the LAAF as the socio-political opposition to Haftar, the LAAF and the foundation and structure of their ideolog- UAE’s ideological vision for Libya on April ical project. The GNA as a political and 4th 2019, as they did in February 2011 military force conversely is ideological- during the Arab Spring. This ideologically incompatible. The PC’s structure and ly incompatibility not only renders these nine member pluralist composition ren- groups incapable of the UAE’s support, ders it incapable of representing a single but means they are the target focus of ideological view, but would also capa- the UAE’s military force and foreign policy. ble of holding a military to subservience. The UAE’s ideological role and vision in However, it is the GNA’s complex network Libya is also crucial to understanding the of armed groups that are the clearest UAE’s engagement in Libya’s political uni- obstacle and root of this ideological in- fication talks and their desired outcome. compatibility. A small number of armed The UAE has on occasion engaged the groups have defected from the GNA to GNA’s Prime Minister Serraj since 2016, the LAAF in the past several years of con- but only insofar as it may use negotiations

“The UAE is ideologically not personality driven. The UAE is more invested in the survival of the LAAF as a structure and institution through which to carry its ideological vision in Libya than it is to Haftar’s own personal political survival.

37 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

as a means to unify the LAAF (considered politically illegitimate) with the GNA who possess international political legitimacy. Whilst this would help their preferred partner Haftar and his political career, the move would be short lived. Haftar at © The New York Times the age of 76 would become legitimised by the process, but the LAAF would be institutionally legitimised beyond his life and political career. The UAE is ideologically not personality driven. The UAE is more invested in the survival of the LAAF as a structure and institution through which to carry its ideological vision in Lib- ya than it is to Haftar’s own personal political survival. The UAE has prioritised the preservation of the LAAF’s integrity and territory in eastern Libya through military force in order to preserve and prepare it for political talks and unification, even at Haftar’s expense.

The UAE strategically dropped its support from the Tripoli offensive operation in Tripoli, causing the offensive to collapse at significant personal cost to Haftar. However, the UAE did not withdraw all together from Libya, but shifted its military focus from Tripoli to the city of Sirte, the gateway to eastern Libya and the LAAF’s stronghold where they have drawn a redline using their Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed drone force to block the GNA’s military advance. Had the GNA advanced through Sirte, the LAAF may have been weakened through military force or destabilised by the potential of internal defections that emerge during conflict. The UAE’s most recent military strategy has demonstrated the LAAF’s survival as a higher ideological priority than Haftar’s own political survival ahead of the UN’s talks.

38 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

What is Turkey doing in

he UAE’s principal interna- presence of all other international par- tional rival in Libya is Turkey, ties despite Qatar and notably Turkey. who are the GNA’s main mil- The forced absence from the talks, and itary sponsor. Turkey like the the GNA’s continued presence at them TUAE are drawn to Libya for more than illustrates Turkey’s distance from and po- just economic incentives, but ideological litical irrelevance to the GNA prior to the reasons too. Turkey have only recently April 2019 war. Nevertheless, Turkey in- established themselves in the past 18 tervened to support the GNA during the months as a key player in Libya despite conflict and has since forged a strategic their long-standing history during the relationship with the Libyan government Ottoman Empire with the country and as a result of a maritime memorandum years of military involvement. Turkey had of understanding signed in November previously joined the NATO campaign in 2019. On the surface this strategic re- 2011 to topple the Qaddafi regime, but lationship is deeply transactional and was reluctant to do so, coming months opportunistic. Turkey offered the GNA a after the UK, France and US-backed op- military lifeline deploying Turkish backed eration and resulted in them only playing Syrian mercenaries and drone technol- a minor military role. Turkey has often ogy that took them from the brink of been accused of playing a role in Libya collapse into a formidable political and since Haftar’s emergence in 2014, with military force. In exchange, Turkey has suggestions they supported Haftar’s po- received the GNA’s blessing for new mar- litical and military opponents – often la- itime demarcation lines between Libya belled as Islamists. However, this asser- and Turkey that challenge Greece, Cy- tion fails to establish with whom Turkey prus, Egypt and Israel in the extraction has had a clear strategic relationship of lucrative gas reserves in the eastern with. Turkish foreign policy had been Mediterranean. However, whilst geo- lost for years, and their relationship with strategic and economic motives have the GNA was virtually non-existent until drawn Turkish foreign policy to Libya, it Haftar’s April 4th offensive. In fact, dur- does not explain what has drawn them ing the last major diplomatic talks be- to the GNA’s survival and their network tween Serraj and Haftar in Italy prior to of armed groups as a strategic partner the April 2019 civil war, Haftar arrived and why for years they have been resist- and refused to participate in talks unless ant to Haftar, or the LAAF especially as Turkey’s and Qatar’s - the UAE’s princi- the MoU according to Turkey is a ‘bind- ple opponents since the Arab Spring and ing obligation of the state’ irrespective early players in Libya’s revolution - for- of which government is in power, or eign ministers were excluded from talks. whether the GNA is overthrown. Serraj continued the political talks in the

39 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why Turkey’s options are limited by ideology in Libya

urkey’s ruling Justice and Turkey’s civil society and democratic Construction party (AKP) are political parties of resisting military rule often labelled as Islamists, a over four military coups between 1960 designation the party public- and 1997. The AKP has held firmly to Tly rejects, and one often at the centre of the widely held Turkish political position attempts to understand Turkish foreign of military subservience to elected civil- policy in the region and in Libya. Whilst ian rule, and is part of a broad consen- conservative in outlook, the AKP up- sus amongst Turkish political parties and holds the belief in secular rule maintain- society that reject military interference ing a political engagement less defined in politics. The latest example of this was by theology as they are by their histor- Turkey and the AKP’s own personal ex- ical experience of Turkish democracy perience of an attempted military coup and civil-military relations. For the AKP, in 2016, rejected across Turkish society it is electoral democracy and their ina- and by the majority of political parties bility to contest political power through despite their fierce opposition to the any other ideological setting or political AKP. This recent experience has left a space that is key to understanding their mark on Turkish society, not least for the foreign policy engagement and who they resulting purge across civilian and mili- work with in Libya. The AKP’s experience tary institutions led by the AKP, but also forms part of a deep tradition across because the party has hinted the coup

Recep Erdoğan - AKP leader and President of Turkey

40 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

was funded by the UAE, marking a de- policy to Libya and the need to establish terioration in relations between the two a deep political relationship with powers since 2016. Libyan political actors and strategic relationships with institutions in order to For Turkey’s AKP the most recent fulfil this economic promise. However, attempted coup in 2016, decades of Turkey’s own political culture, and experiencing military coups since 1960, Libya’s own ideological divisions limit and regional examples of military coups the available options for engagement. such as Egypt in 2013 and Libya in 2014 have established a deep ideological Despite Serraj’s own personal proximity fear; The AKP and Turkey’s democratic to the UAE until five weeks prior to parties fear and reject military rule, the offensive, Haftar and the UAE’s cannot exist in a political system where attempt to overthrow the GNA by force the military interferes in politics, and established the first ideological entry are uncomfortable in a region where point for Turkey to forge a political militaries rule. This democratic political relationship with Serraj and a strategic outlook has become part of a wider relationship with the GNA’s military ideological battle across the region forces in Burqan al-Ghadab. between the UAE and Turkey, and has led to a collision in Libya. This strategic relationship with the GNA is not only economically lucrative, but a The UAE’s cultivation of military rulers means of opposing the UAE’s ideological that mirror their ideological outlook project in Libya through Haftar and the across North Africa has directly targeted LAAF. The LAAF and its leadership’s both Turkey and specifically the AKP. The desire to play a political role in Libya UAE’s cultivation of a particular brand of make it ideologically incompatible with authoritarianism and partnership with Turkey’s political vision in the region, its actors and institutions that restricts domestic culture of military subservience political participation under the guise of to elected rule and hence an unsuitable counter terrorism and anti islamism, and local partner. The GNA whilst not even anti Ottomanist rhetoric has limited democratically elected, is a pluralist Turkey’s ability to find suitable political civilian body and ideologically a better fit partners to engage and ideologically for Turkey and its desired vision in Libya. compatible states with whom they can On the surface Turkey’s military assistance establish strategic relationships in Libya to the GNA was transactional, but its and the region. Libya’s divided political offer to construct the GNA’s network of actors and rival network of ideologically armed groups Burqan al-Ghadab into driven armed groups perfectly illustrate a ‘regular military’ is both strategic and Turkey’s options in a binary ideological ideological. Turkey’s defence minister has landscape where the options are largely pledged to construct the GNA’s military limited to military or civilian rule. institution and transform this network of armed groups into a “regular army”, a The presence of huge potential move that would undoubtedly construct economic opportunities in reconstruction a militarily consistent with Turkey’s own and geo-strategic maritime interests political culture and compatible with has naturally drawn Turkish foreign Ankara’s vision in the region.

Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The UAE and Turkey’s ideological rivalry and incompatibility in Libya urkey’s foreign policy and po- rival military institutions, structures and litical vision in Libya is rooted oversight mechanisms are irreconcilable, in its geopolitical rivalry and and their ideological outlooks incompat- deep ideological incompati- ible at the most basic level. Tbility with the UAE’s foreign policy and contrasting ideological vision in Libya. Ideology is important for both actors. For Turkey’s construction of a regular mil- the AKP and Turkey’s political parties in itary requires a deconstruction of any the absence of a democratic space they tribal networks or personal political loy- would cease to exist as a political force. alties to ensure its subservience to civil- For Turkey’s ruling AKP, their own politi- ian rule, neutrality and immunity to po- cal survival is inextricably linked to elec- litical interference. In contrast, the UAE’s toral democracy and democratic struc- project relies on it. The UAE’s support for tures in a way that for the UAE’s ruler the LAAF is constructed around political Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed his privilege and tribal loyalty in the military own regime maintenance is inextricably to establish authoritarian rule and stifle linked to authoritarianism and authori- grass roots dissidence. The LAAF’s mili- tarian structures. The UAE and Turkey’s tary is not subservient to civilian rule but drones and mercenary forces are in a subservient to Haftar, or specific political stalemate at the central city of Sirte di- personalities like Aguila Saleh who have viding Libya geographically between worked behind the scenes to construct East and West, as well as ideologically. the LAAF. The LAAF is kept inline by a Their strategic ideological relationships praetorian guard built around personal and contrasting visions of the state are and religious loyalty to Haftar, not the neglected by the UN’s proposed frame- state, to ensure it preserves the author- work for dialogue ahead of the military itarian ruler in case of a political change unification talks that could lead to a re- or military challenge. The UAE and Tur- turn to conflict after any political deal. key’s support of and long term design of

“The UAE and Turkey’s support of and long term design of rival military institutions, structures and oversight mechanisms are irreconcilable, and their ideological outlooks incompatible at the most basic level.

43 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why the unification talks need to address power and ideology he GNA and LAAF’s tribal and regional logic of inclusivity unification process has begun used in the LPDF’s selection and Skhirat’s after military representatives consultation process to select and form of the rival factions under a new government at a later stage with Tthe auspices of the UN announced a different participants. What is notable permanent ceasefire in Geneva. The about the scheduling of the LPDF as next steps of the formal unification the first phase of the political process is process will begin using the dialogue that it is almost identical to the political framework agreed in Berlin – the 5+5 process in the days leading to Haftar’s process. The process will conclude assault on Tripoli on April 4th 2019. The with a new unified government, unified UN scheduled a similar dialogue - the economic institutions, unified military but National Conference for April 15th 2019 also the establishment of a reconfigured – to convene actors from across Libya “functioning Presidency Council”. The for consultations, schedule elections two most important negotiation tracks and ceremonial agreement to end the that should address the ideological transitional period in parallel to Haftar’s concerns that lead to renewed conflict final round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi are the military unification talks and the to reform the PC and unify the LAAF negotiations to establish a new PC. with the GNA until Haftar abandoned talks in favour of an offensive on Tripoli. The unification track has already begun The LPDF, like the National Conference to employ the UN’s previous political is similarly designed to bring together a logic of compromise through inclusivity diverse range of political and civil society and representation in Skhirat in 2015 actors whose consultation by the UN in its consultations, but they remain is a means of also acquiring a broad at the margins of the key negotiations base of social and political legitimacy over the PC. The UN will convene 75 to the unification process and end Libyans in the Libyan Political Dialogue the transitional period. However, the Forum (LPDF) on November 6 in Tunisia consultations are separate and parallel “based on the principles of inclusivity, to political negotiations over a new PC fair geographic, ethnic, political, tribal, sparked by Serraj’s resignation from the and social representation” for wide PC in September. The LPDF dialogue ranging consultations. Whilst these and consultations are an essential specific participants are asked to ‘refrain opportunity to discuss institutional from holding high institutional post or arrangements, but they are distinct position’ until elections, in all likelihood and separate to the negotiations over the process and selection of the next the most fiercely contested institution transitional government of national unity of power that led to the conflict - the will employ the same political, ethnic, PC – and its reconfiguration that along

44 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

with the military track will determine the ideological fault line at the centre of ideological character of the state. Given Haftar’s attempt to overthrow the PC the role and composition of the PC as prior to the April 2019 war, its absence Supreme Commander of the Armed from the LPDF’s remit should be cause Forces has been Haftar and Saleh’s for concern. primary grievance with the GNA, the focal point of diplomatic negotiations between 2017 and 2019 and the

“What is notable about the scheduling of the LPDF as the first phase of the political process is that it is almost identical to the political process in the days leading to Haftar’s assault on Tripoli on April 4th 2019.

45 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Why reforming the PC delays but may not prevent conflict?

t is likely to assume the political of the LAAF is often overlooked given process to reconfigure the PC Haftar’s notoriety. However, Saleh not will return to the UN’s ‘Plan B’ only appointed Haftar as the LAAF’s approach established during the chief and legitimised his counter IParis and Abu Dhabi talks between terrorism Operation Dignity but ‘formed 2017 and 2019 in order to overcome the LAAF’s key structures such as the the ideological hurdle of the LPA by General Command and General Staff’, reconfiguring the PC in a form the does the key structures within the LAAF which not challenge the LAAF. formally established and embedded the LAAF’s tribal patronage network. The Berlin process’ has left the criteria His criteria for a ‘functioning’ PC and for a ‘functionable reconfiguration’ Supreme Commander of the Armed ambiguous. Given the framing of past Forces will likely have the preservation negotiations over the PC and its rejection of these structures in mind. It is unlikely by Haftar and Aguila Saleh in his the first Abu Dhabi proposal of October capacity as the HoR’s chief, a functional 2017 for a reformed three person PC PC will likely need to meet Haftar or to include the HoR’s chief and the head Aguila Saleh’s criteria before it can be of the LAAF would be acceptable. accepted. Saleh’s role in the construction However, Saleh proposed an eight-point

46 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

proposal to end the transitional phase in control and authority of the LAAF, April with a reformed three-person PC to but how this very same obstacle will represent Libya’s three historic regions – undoubtedly return in the near future Tripolitania in the West, Cyrenaica in the and resume a new conflict along East, and Fezzan in the South. Saleh’s the same old fault lines. If a political proposal appears as a given each region track and peace deal negotiated in would decide its own member of a Geneva in 2020 is conditional upon the mutually agreed PC. However, it proposes formation of a new PC and institutional that Libya’s informal and unelected tribal setup acceptable to the LAAF’s chief forces play a central role in voting to architects and the LAAF itself, how determine each region’s representatives will the LAAF respond to scheduled of the PC instead of a ballot system that presidential and parliamentary elections lets its citizens choose, ensuring the that will replace the negotiated PC and LAAF’s tribal network in Eastern Libya are replace Aguila Saleh and the HoR? able to nominate a variety of candidates The negotiations are aimed at ending in the PC to preserve the LAAF. Secondly, one conflict over institutional control the initiative proposes the LAAF as the of the highest position of power in the military and that “no party will undermine state and its ability to tamper with them in any way”, in a move that would the LAAF’s structure or authority, but rebuff attempts to reform or restructure ignores how near term democratic the LAAF. Thirdly it gives the LAAF elections will change this setup, or considerable power beyond the PC - to how the LAAF may seek to undermine nominate a Minister of Defence to the elections if the process produces an government, whilst the HoR remains in unfavourable candidate. This is the key its capacity as the parliament to decide ideological obstacle in the design of the to accept or reject the government as it UN brokered negotiations over the PC, has for six years. This proposal promotes and its unification talks, ensuring that tribal networks cultivated by the LAAF’s the longevity of military subservience SPC or linked to the former regime’s to civilian rule irrespective of the civilian authoritarian patronage structure to or military chief in charge. It is also determine the composition of the new the reason why democratic change PC. It placates the LAAF’s desire to through Presidential and parliamentary be an autonomous military, without elections in 2021 poses the highest risk interference or challenge by any party to peace and a return to conflict in Libya and managed by a designated minister along the same ideological lines as the of their choice in a new cabinet. current negotiations if the outcome of elections is unfavourable to the LAAF. Including Saleh or Haftar in negotiations over the PC is an essential component to ending the conflict, but at what future cost for Libya’s state? The current negotiations to determine a new PC and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces not only fails to address the reasons behind years of political resistance in relinquishing

47 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The pitfalls in the Military Track

Berlin declaration in January 2020 This same strategy of resistance to any that threatens their tribal composition structural change over the authority and ability to function as a patronage of LAAF in the PC, is likely to return network. Politically loaded language in during the negotiations and process the Berlin declaration in January 2020 of implementation in the military track. and articles of the Geneva permanent The LAAF accepted participation in ceasefire agreement released in October the unification track in Geneva as a are signs of this strategy. It is this use of result of a process that offers them vital language that will likely embolden the institutional and political legitimacy LAAF resistance to structural reform and culminates with the lucrative UN of its patronage network and the international recognition of the GNA as a weaponization of the language in the result. However, in the implementation of process to dismantle their opponents the process that unifies the rival military who rejected the LAAF’s power grab on networks the LAAF leadership will likely April 4th 2019. rebuff attempts at structural reform

48 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The challenges of unification: Why the LAAF could resist reform

he Berlin declaration calls for ‘regular force’ with a regular command a “comprehensive process of structure. This reluctance to reform is demobilization and disarma- based on the fear that dismantling their ment of armed groups and mi- forces could destabilise the LAAF’s and Tlitias in Libya”. The Geneva permanent erode the tribal glue that holds its au- ceasefire and 5+5 committee agree- thoritarian patronage network together, ment in its declaration in October has and crucially weaken the future source of also stated it will “Immediately start iden- their political and military power. There tification and categorization of armed are a small portion of armed groups groups” in preparation for their disman- within the LAAF that would likely be sac- tling irrespective of their status. A disar- rificed to demonstrate their participation mament, demobilisation and integration in the implementation. Informal move- programme is essential to establishing a ments and subgroups that contain crim- unified military, but the term ‘militia’ is a inal elements such as the ‘avengers of politically loaded term used regularly by blood’ group whose human rights abus- the LAAF to categorise and delegitimize es have attracted embarrassing inter- armed groups not within their network. national scrutiny on the LAAF are likely The term lacks such little meaning that to be sacrificed in order to demonstrate pro Haftar media outlets labelled Tarhu- constructive engagement with the pro- na’s armed group the 7th force a ‘mili- cess. However, powerful armed groups tia’ in 2018 until they switched political like the Saiqa special forces, considered allegiance to Haftar in 2019, and were a regular armed group, whose members henceforth referred to as the ‘army’. The are wanted by the international criminal Berlin declaration and permanent cease- court in The Hague for war crimes are fire agreement unwittingly reinforces this politically loaded language, which could be weaponised in its implementation on the ground. A disarmament, demobilisation The LAAF and their supporters will resist “ attempts to dismantle the core network and integration programme is of their armed groups once the process essential to establishing a unified of de-militiafication is in motion by insist- ing (as they have) that the LAAF are a military, but the term ‘militia’ is a politically loaded term used regularly by the LAAF to categorise and delegitimize armed groups not within their network.

49 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

likely to be preserved. The LAAF has a personal protection. These forces are vested interest in sacrificing groups and primarily led by Haftar’s family who are movements whose informality has no im- bound to him through familial loyalty, pact on the core structure of the LAAF. and many of their Salafi-Madkhali forces under their control that are bound However, it is the tribally inspired and by a fatwa issued by a Saudi cleric religious groups, whose presence demanding their loyalty to fight under within the LAAF’s structures serves an Haftar’s command. How will the military ideological and authoritarian purpose unification talk and implementation that are likely to be beyond reproach and address the Pretorian guard? How will any post-unification efforts to dismantle it reform each structure’s discretely them as militia. The most difficult embedded ideological loyalty to either structures and armed groups to reform tribe, father or fatwa into a neutral are Haftar’s praetorian guard, who are military, loyal to a new unified state? designed, led and structured around his

50 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

The challenges of unification: Why Burqan al-Ghaddab could resist reform he GNA’s network of armed from the GNA to the LAAF 24 hours groups under Burqan al- prior to the April offensive on Tripoli. Ghadab also possess a However, much of the Burqan al- number of groups with tribal Ghadab’s network’s fighters will likely Torientation, religiously inspired and even reject the unification and return home criminal background worthy of the label or fiercely resist the implementation militia. GNA ministers have even gone as of the unification. Any post-unification far as to use the term militia to describe process that de-facto weakens and armed groups under their own control. delegitimises Burqan al-Ghadab’s forces These groups should be dismantled, and from the outset as a band of ‘militia’ it is likely that many of these armed groups requiring dismantling and conversely will be sacrificed in any implementation strengthens and legitimises Haftar’s of the Geneva talks. However, the bulk of tribal patronage network as an ‘army’ Burqan al-Ghadab’s network of armed worthy of preservation will likely be groups are not a tribal authoritarian rejected. Many powerful groups and patronage network constructed and commanders in Burqan al- Ghadab who bound along ideological, tribal or fought Islamic State in 2016, refused religious lines like the LAAF. It is an to participate in Egyptian brokered amalgam of forces that mobilised and reunification talks in 2018 that had cooperated militarily as a national force the same goal as the Geneva military under the GNA to reject the LAAF’s unification. These same commanders tribal patronage network and a return to may feel the same about the current military rule. The core ideological fear of process. The primary obstacle to any this network is the return of military rule unification will be based on structure and the resurrection of the Jamahiriyya and subordination of the rival groups. system. Many of these groups may The LAAF’s director of mobilisation accept a surface level unification with Maj General Khaled Mahjoub claimed the LAAF if they believe a new unified on television on September 28th that state can bring the LAAF to heel under an agreement had been reached for civilian oversight as they were promised unification under“ the banner of the during years of negotiations between LAAF’s General Command,” the strategic the GNA and Haftar. A minority of the command structure that governs the GNA’s transactional or economically LAAF’s tribal patronage structure. This driven groups may even be inclined to conflict over the command structure in co-operate or join the LAAF, like in the a unified military could be one of several case of Tarhuna’s forces who defected factors that leads to resumption of the

51 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

conflict. The process mandates that sought a route back to regular civilian Libya’s ‘militias’ particularly those under life. The number of fighters in Burqan al- the GNA must be disbanded. However, Ghadab are much lower, but many will given that many of Burqan al-Ghadab’s likely follow suit and return to their civilian armed groups may demobilise and lives irrespective of what the Geneva return to civilian life without waiting to talks offer them. There is no guarantee be disbanded and without voluntarily however that they would not return to handing over their weapons. If they do, conflict along the same ideological lines the armed groups and conflict lines in as in 2011 or 2019 should the threat of Libya may lay dormant, until awoken by authoritarianism return. Many of these a political lightening rod moment as they fighters and groups in Burqan al-Ghadab were on April 4th 2019. There is a history will keep a close eye on the political talks of armed groups in Libya who have and measure the results of the unification followed this pattern of demobilisation talks to ensure it addresses the reasons and dissolved. Shortly after the revolution, they picked up arms. Many could be the Libyan programme for reintegration prepared to take up arms again if it does and development vetted over 200,000 not. fighters who participated in the conflict and identified 162,702 former fighters who did not want to join the military and

“Any post-unification process that de-facto weakens and delegitimises Burqan al-Ghadab’s forces from the outset as a band of ‘militia’ requiring dismantling and conversely strengthens and legitimises Haftar’s tribal patronage network as an ‘army’ worthy of preservation will likely be rejected.

52 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

Conclusion and recommendations

he UN brokered unification history of resistant to structural reform in October 2020 talks fail to could spark a return of hostilities after address the ideological differ- the announcement of a new PC and ences and rival political cul- during the implementation of the mili- Ttures and visions for the state between tary unification agreement. the rival factions at the political and military level that have been at the heart of Finally, the political unification talks will Libya’s conflict and have resumed it sev- conclude with a reconfiguration of the eral times since 2011. PC that in all likelihood accommodates the years of demands by Saleh and Firstly, the military track is sequenced Haftar, and their international backers and designed in a way that may be since 2017. If as in previous years this weaponised and offers political as a re- new configuration of the PC as the Su- ward for participation in the talks, but preme Commander of the Armed Forc- not its successful implementation. The es is aimed at replacing the highest ci- implementation is framed in a way that vilian authority and check on military preserves the LAAF and structured in a power for managed or meaningless way that will likely take many months if oversight by the LAAF’s own appoin- not years to successfully disarm Libya’s tees, there is serious risk of a return to armed groups, particularly those who conflict. Not only does the unification either reject the LAAF and return home, talks’ new political reconfiguration of or resist and potentially face coercion by the PC contradict the democratic prin- this new force. However, the reassign- ciple and doctrine of military subservi- ment of institutional legitimacy and its ence to civilian rule, it disregards Libya’s political designation is not based on the long term democratic future to for the unification’s implementation. It is based short term illusion of peace. The end of on the announcement of a political deal hostilities and peace will likely be short that will likely conclude before the end lived in the event of presidential and of 2020. This sequencing strategical- parliamentary elections scheduled for ly shifts legitimacy to an unreformed 2021 that will replace the LAAF’s ap- LAAF without addressing how this may pointed delegates and authority in the affect their political behaviour after PC and the HoR. they receive it. The LAAF’s leadership may simply resist institutional efforts at The unification efforts offer the promise reforming their authority, command or of peace but no guarantees to ensure it. tribal structure after receiving a new Its mechanisms fail to address the con- lease of political life and legitimacy. The trasting political cultures and visions of offering of legitimacy to an LAAF with a the rival factions, their discrete loyal-

53 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

ties, and power structures that induce term. Reconciliation requires remorse, authoritarian behaviour and trigger ci- but it also requires remedy and judicial vilians to take up arms and resist it that redress that holds all parties to the has led to years of protracted conflict. conflict accountable for their crimes. The reconfiguration of the PC and unifi- In a unified Libya, no one, or one party, cation of the LAAF is a delicate balanc- unified or divided should be above the ing act of tribal inclusion and recycled rule of law. institutions, managed in a way that preserves the LAAF and ensures it remains Secondly this paper recommends that in power as both a military and author- the military unification efforts prioritise itarian patronage network resistant to and focus on the long term establishment subservience of elected civilian rule. It and construction of a neutral military potentially leaves the conflict dormant institution over a short term unification at the structural and social level that that will freezes the conflict or reframes could be triggered by democratic elec- the conflict lines through reassigning tions or by a refusal to reform to the de- legitimacy. This long term process mands of new institutional structures. should aim at comprehensive structural The UN has done tremendous work to reform and the progressive dismantling agree a permanent ceasefire in Ge- of armed groups on both sides. The neva. Everyday that the ceasefire and military unification process in article 4 peace is upheld is a day that a life in Lib- of the permanent ceasefire agreement ya has been saved, and their hard work already aims to reform and dismantle in achieving this should be congratulat- the network of armed groups under ed. However, the real challenge in Libya the GNA in order to later reintegrate is in achieving enduing peace beyond individual fighters into a new single the unification talks. institutional framework. The unification process must do so in parallel to the Firstly, this paper recommends that a LAAF. The unification talks are in reconciliation process is established in jeopardy of being weaponised by order for Libyans to heal the divisions groups in the LAAF who will resist at the social and political level after reform by claiming they are a regular years of conflict that has ravaged army or by rival groups who claim they Libya’s social fabric including the must protect the revolution from this former Qaddafi regime. Libya’s political irregular army. The only way forward and armed factions have committed is through a comprehensive process crimes against one another that date that dismantles both rival networks back long before April 2019, and and restructures and reconstructs include the former regime’s crimes, a new long term replacement. The but also crimes committed against the LAAF’s tribal patronage and command regime’s supporters. These divisions structure – the General Command and remain Libya’s single most lethal General Staff should be immediately weapon in the hands of those who seek dismantled and replaced by a unified to undermine unification, and only a and neutral command structure. comprehensive reconciliation process The LAAF’s predominantly tribally that addresses these grievances can composed armed groups should not immunise Libya from conflict in the long be classified or categorised as regular

54 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

armed groups, but also be dismantled new President through negotiations. and reintegrated through vetting on Attempting to purchase the short term and individual basis as per article 12 loyalty of political factions and interest of the Berlin Declaration. The GNA’s groups who seek ministerial posts and powerful armed groups should be positions as a result of their participation dismantled in parallel, in order to in the conflict has been tried before in demonstrate good faith by both sides. Skhirat and does not respond to the Without dismantling the command root driver of the conflict. The single structures and discrete local, tribal, most important conflict has been over religious and political loyalties of Libya’s the reconfiguration of the Presidential armed groups under both the GNA Council, and it’s ability to operate and and the LAAF, the conflict lines may be function as a meaningful civilian check engendered within a unified institution – on military power. Reconfiguring the unified in name alone. The conflict may Presidency to appease the chief of the continue from within a unified military, LAAF and its chief architect and ally in or return as legitimacy shifts hands as the parliament will only engender the a result of the political process. The UN conflict in a unified state or delay the should avoid offering or designating conflict until Libya’s next elections. There political legitimacy to a unified ‘work is no easy fix for this problem. If the rival in progress’ force until this dismantling factions are given a role in determining and reform process is completed. the Presidential Council, it should be The process should be overseen by a contingent on their participation and UN taskforce able to vet the armed progress being made in the reform and groups, commanders and establish the reconstruction of Libya’s unified armed basis for a neutral command & control forces. Presidential, parliamentary structure and assist the construction of and constitutional elections that a neutral armed forces. replaces Libya’s temporary political and institutional custodians should be Finally the political process must scheduled as soon as possible, but if this address these irreconcilable political era is to mark a new political chapter cultures and visions for the state and era of peace, the key protagonists and specifically in the negotiations in the conflict should be replaced – the reconfiguration and role of the by a reconstructed neutral force Presidential Council. Irrespective of how subservient to civilian rule, irrespective one chooses to view and address the of the parliament or president Libya’s conflict and it’s drivers, the rival political people choose. factions are not responsible custodians of Libya’s state institutions and should not be rewarded with selecting a

55 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

“Finally the political process must address these irreconcilable political cultures and visions for the state and specifically where they are in conflict – the reconfiguration and role of the Presidential Council.

56 Libya’s Political Cultural Wars

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. For permission requests, write to the publisher, addressed “Attention: Permissions Coordinator,” at the address below.

[email protected]

sadeqinstitute.org