Chapter I: Introduction
Before you can even get off the plane in Rio de Janeiro and set foot on Brazilian soil, the heavy, intense heat permeates the airplane and strikes you. Temporarily mesmerized by palm trees, sunshine, and the sensuality and exoticism of the Brazilian culture you are immersed in, you sway along to the intoxicating samba music blaring from car windows. Your new infatuation with Brazil is quickly tempered, however, as you notice hillside after hillside covered in squalor. Beautiful high rise apartments leaning over Copacabana and Ipanema neighbor impoverished favela communities.
Despite their geographical proximity, the distinct disparities draw an invisible but powerful line between the two poles of society.
A similar experience can be encountered in South Africa. The cultural image of
Africa ingrained in the consciousness of many involves tigers, elephants, and giraffes, but one of your first experiences after leaving the airport in Cape Town is seeing first-hand the poverty and despair of the city’s townships. Structures precariously balance-barely standing, a scene which provides a powerful metaphor for the communities’ struggling residents. Once safely inside Cape Town’s symbolic fence, you are blind to the disturbing images of poverty you were only momentarily exposed to. Inside the city the shacks are gone, but their residents are equally marginalized by the dominant white society. Rio’s hillsides of favelas are replaced by the Cape Flats’ sprawling shantytowns, composing a cross-cultural, transnational, conspicuous image of the worldwide phenomena of social and spatial segregation which compose contemporary apartheid districts.
As the world has become increasingly urbanized in the contemporary globalized system, territorial segregation has significantly marked landscapes. Today’s cities are
1 visibly segregated along racial, socioeconomic, and ethnic lines, which often reflect the
promotion of inequality and marginalization of residents in poor and disadvantaged
communities. While these spatial separations are often the unfortunate outcome of
problematic social and racial cleavages, their existence hinders the hope of integration
and social equity. It is important to not only understand the factors which have contributed to the historical formation and continued prevalence of segregation in these communities, but also to understand the problematic social consequences which result
from such territorial divisions. Without recognizing the sources and consequences of
segregation there is little hope for developing new ways of bridging the gaps among
polarized populations worldwide.
Although government instituted and regulated segregation known collectively as
apartheid officially ended in 1994 in South Africa, extreme inequality and social
stratification still persists. While the term “apartheid” generally refers to the period when
the South African government instituted legally defined racist policies of segregation, the
term will also be applied more generally to describe extreme forms of segregation which
still exist worldwide. I use the term apartheid, or apartheid district to reveal the blatant
spatial segregation and the less explicit social segregation which plague these two
countries, and many other cities and countries worldwide. These forms of segregation
permeate the everyday lives of citizens and prevent the hope of future integration or
social mobility. Within this context, apartheid will be applied an as analytical term to
portray contemporary areas of segregation found in Brazil, South Africa, and worldwide.
While literature examining the prominence of spatial segregation within the
United States does exist, little research has investigated the ties between historical
2 formation of spatial segregation and its subsequent social effects on local populations in
international metropolitan centers. I seek to analyze how the development of spatial
segregation in Brazil has transcended private territorial divisions and has infiltrated
society, creating challenging new social barriers for marginalized populations.
Using Rio de Janeiro as a primary case study, I will examine the processes by
which spatial and social segregation intersect. I will integrate Rio’s historical struggle to
incorporate marginalized communities with contemporary issues concerning increased
territorial and social segregation. To understand how Rio’s segregated communities
represent a broader phenomenon I will draw upon South Africa’s contemporary struggle
in the post-apartheid era, which has not facilitated inclusion but instead has fostered the
creation of severe spatial and social segregation. The use of South Africa will be
employed to provide a comparative theoretical perspective on the global incidence of
urban segregation. The inclusion of South Africa is aimed at illustrating the international
scale of contemporary urban segregation, and is not intended to present an empirical
counterpoint to the case study of Brazil. These themes will be employed to provide a comprehensive examination analyzing the formation of stigmatized communities, the implicit and explicit government roles in the perpetuation of segregation, and the
development of extreme social schisms in Brazil and worldwide.
Within this analysis I seek to prove that social segregation is an outgrowth of
existing spatial segregation and results in increased marginalization and disparity through
a variety of factors including the development of a culture of fear, limited access to
resources, and political immobility. Combined, these factors create contemporary
apartheid districts. I will compare the historical roles of the respective governments,
3 media, and society in the continuation of marginalization and segregation in the Brazilian and South African communities, and the subsequent effects on disadvantaged communities. I will explore how these divisions echo racial, class, and economic disparities, and are intentionally tolerated by the governments and elites in an effort to maintain the current power dynamic and social hierarchy.
The processes by which segregation developed in Brazil and South Africa provide many contrasts. South Africa historically stands as a clear example of governmental role in shaping segregation, while the role of the Brazilian government in facilitating the formation of segregation is far more subtle and multi-faceted—resulting from the intersection of many complex factors. Despite the differences in the initial development of segregation, however, Brazil and South Africa provide similar examples of the existence of contemporary apartheid districts. This link connects spatial and social segregation and suggests a sense of universality. Linking the two countries within a theoretical context will allow for a comprehensive analysis and the extension of the theory that social segregation results from spatial segregation and the two combined contribute to the development of apartheid districts. Furthermore, this connection proves that the theory transcends these particular case studies and respective political discourses.
Considerable research exists regarding the socially and territorially marginalized and stigmatized residents of favelas in Rio and Brazil as a whole, but much less research exists connecting social and spatial segregation and their subsequent effects on the population. Janice Perlman’s groundbreaking work, The Myth of Marginality: Urban
Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, dramatically changed the conceptualization of impoverished favela residents, from marginalized laborers to incorporated citizens. After
4 years of living in several favelas Perlman concluded that a stigma and set of stereotypes
regarding Rio’s poor have become ingrained into society to the point that an ideology has
been formed which serves to justify the politics and practices of the elite ruling class.
Perlman argued that the stereotypes were inaccurate and that favelados were, in fact,
incorporated into Brazilian society. Contrasting her initial assertions, Perlman’s follow-
up research, “The Metamorphosis of Marginality in Rio de Janeiro,” rethinks the original argument, admitting to a recent increase in social and racial polarization. In Perlman’s more recent work, issues of exclusion, injustice, segregation, and inequality are related to
the country’s return to democracy in the 1980s. This historical relationship between segregation and the role of the government and democratization will be useful in conceptualizing these issues on a global scale.
Similarly, Teresa Caldeira advocates a theory of “disjunctive democracy” that illuminates the conflicting process during democratization in which the expansion of rights paralleled increasing social divisions.1 Cadeira connects Brazil’s transition to
democracy with increases in spatial and social barriers related to a fear of crime:
The universe of crime—including the talk of crime and fear, and also the increase in violence, the failure of institutions of order (especially the police and the justice system), the privatization of security and justice, and the continuous walling and segregation of cities—reveals in a compelling way the disjunctive character of Brazilian democracy.2
This theory is particularly useful in its application to Brazil following years of military rule, and to South Africa’s contemporary social struggles following the end of legally- instituted apartheid.
Edward E. Telles’ research specifically investigates the role of race in determining residential segregation in Brazil. Telles looks at the ideology of whitening
1 Teresa Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao Paulo (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000) 51-52. 2 Teresa Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao Paulo, 51.
5 and its role in forming racial conceptualizations which determine levels of inequality and
segregation. He concludes that by U.S. standards, residential segregation in Brazil is
relatively moderate, and that the segregation which does exist cannot be attributed to
socioeconomic status, a conclusion which had been assumed in previous literature. Telles
attributes the moderate levels of residential segregation to a lack of legal segregation
policy in contemporary history, greatly contrasting the case of South Africa. This
assertion allows for a wider comparison between government involvement in Brazil and
South Africa, and helps to develop an analytical framework which links both countries.
Teresa Meade investigates the process of Rio’s renovation and asserts the project
was aimed at sanitizing and civilizing Rio’s urban population. Meade illuminates the
Brazilian government’s deliberate attempts to both whiten the population and segregate
the racialized urban poor. Furthermore, Meade uncovers the role of the elite in
maintaining social control through unjust health, housing, and transportation policies.
This analysis highlights the ruling class’s transition from segregation based on race to segregation based on socio-economic status, inclusive of Rio’s burgeoning urban poor.
Meade’s work emphasizes the historical roles of race and class in determining levels of segregation coupled with deliberate government action.
A great deal of work can be found examining the role of race relations and segregation during the apartheid government reign in South Africa. During the country’s transition to democracy many scholarly predictions for the future were produced, ranging from democratic optimism to predictions of internal collapse. Despite the prevalence of these works, however, very little research has been conducted regarding the connection between spatial and social segregation in the post-apartheid era.
6 Gay Seidman looks at South Africa’s history of apartheid and how that legacy
shaped race relations, racial segregation, and exclusion. Seidman’s focus is on the
democratic transition and its effects on racial identity and the country’s post-colonial transformation. This analysis is valuable in its direct correlation between government
function and social issues of inequality and subsequent segregation.
Susan Parnell and Alan Mabin’s analysis, Rethinking Urban South Africa,
provides an essential study analyzing urban segregation’s inherent links to urbanization.
The study examines the urban structure of South African cities in order to understand the
prevalence of residential segregation. The authors conclude that racial division is a
reflection of a complex system of the development of urban society. Parnell and Mabin relate segregation to intrinsic structures developed in modern urban societies. Although
their work proves important in its connection between the rise of urbanization and
increased segregation, the research was conducted before apartheid officially ended,
dating the investigation and excluding the social effects the transition to democracy
produced. Despite the dated nature of the work, the study is still useful in its universal
application through suggesting a parallel between urbanization and segregation.
Like Parnell and Mabin’s study, much of the research regarding segregation
within Brazil and South Africa has become dated and less relevant within a contemporary
context. In recent decades the landscapes and compositions of cities have transformed
dramatically; with globalization and urbanization creating new forms of inequality. Brazil
has seen significant economic benefits from industrialization and has become a “semi-
peripheral” country in the global economy. This recent economic prosperity has created
even more evident divisions between the rich and poor within Brazilian society.
7 Meanwhile, South Africa has undergone one of the world’s most evident political
transformations. Research conducted before the implementation of these massive
transformations does not provide a current, comprehensive analysis of contemporary
issues.
While a great deal of literature can be uncovered on the topic of segregation, the
majority of research focuses on racialized American cities. Very little current research exists focusing on diverse international populations, especially in regard to Brazil and
South Africa. Janice Perlman pioneered research in Brazil, but her famous Myth of
Marginality from the 1970’s is severely dated. Most contemporary research conducted in
Brazil is centered on either the attempted social and economic integration of the favelas
or the argument for their eradication. Few have looked at the favelas’ existence as
segregated communities and even fewer have linked social and spatial segregation and
made a case that the continuation of these processes is intentional and politically aimed.
This topic represents an under-researched concern which I hope to bring attention to.
Little research has sought to identify the forces which create segregation while linking
social and spatial segregation and analyzing their effects. Through analyzing favelas and
impoverished Brazilian communities through the lens of apartheid districts, I seek to
expose the class, racial, economic, and political factors which contribute to creating not
only private spatial divisions, but public social distinctions.
Scholarly interest in South Africa dissipated after the transition to democracy,
burying the complex and captivating issues which still plague the country. Despite the
dissipation of the racist policies under apartheid, severe residential segregation is still
obvious. A clear division exists between the ubiquitous black townships and the elite
8 white suburbs, yet no critical evaluations sufficiently examine this phenomenon. I hope
utilizing this unique example will provide insight on the issues Brazil faces while
drawing attention to the increase in spatial and social segregation in South Africa, even
after the legally-imposed racist segregation laws were eradicated.
Furthermore, virtually no analytical evaluation exists linking the two countries.
While Brazil and South Africa obviously provide diverse examples of segregation, the
ideals and conditions which led to segregation’s prevalence in both countries are
surprisingly similar. In my analysis I seek to provide such a theoretical comparison, and
uncover the political and social factors which facilitate the development of transnational
and cross-cultural social and spatial segregation. Additionally, I plan to investigate the
detrimental effects these processes have on local populations.
Through my investigation into the development of urban segregation, I plan to
draw cross-cultural comparisons relating segregation in Brazil to similar exclusion and
isolation in South Africa. I argue that historical political attitudes in both countries
contributed to the development of severe racial and class prejudice, eventually resulting in the formation of overt societal inequality. I believe the political attitudes which fostered this inequality additionally facilitated the creation of extreme spatial segregation.
The continuation of these politically-motivated attitudes has allowed for spatial segregation’s continued existence today and for the formation of severe social marginalization. Historically, governmental policies in both countries have at times contributed to increases in spatial segregation, and the contemporary absence of integration policies inhibits the reduction or elimination of spatial and social segregation today.
9 Although the historical conditions which provided a climate conducive to spatial
segregation were similar in both countries, and while Brazil and South Africa struggle with similar integration issues today, they simultaneously provide important contrasts.
Brazil never initiated an explicitly racist governmental policy, yet a similar form of spatial segregation still formed. South Africa succumbed to extreme segregation under apartheid, yet in its absence little integration has occurred. While both countries struggle with these territorial divisions, they simultaneously strain under severe social marginalization. This phenomenon suggests a degree of universality regarding the link
between social and spatial segregation, despite differing political systems.
Theoretical research relevant to the broad theme of segregation is available through several works including Douglass Massey and Nancy Denton’s American
Apartheid, and Michael Maly’s Beyond Segregation. Massy and Denton’s work looks at the existence of racialized poverty in the U.S. and its correlation to residential segregation. The authors argue that residential segregation is structured along racial lines and contributes to the persistence of urban poverty. This assertion parallels the conditions found in both Brazil and South Africa, and while no political connection is drawn, the theoretical link between race, poverty, and segregation proves useful in conceptualizing the connections between territorial and social divisions.
Similarly, Maly looks at the relationship between residential segregation and race divisions, and argues that “The racial separateness that characterizes urban areas has been a physical, social, and symbolic indication of inequality and reflects the country’s failed promise of accommodation and integration.”3 This allegation depicts an implicit
3 Michael T. Maly, Beyond Segregation: Multiracial and Multiethnic Neighborhoods in the United States (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 1.
10 connection between government failures and racial segregation. While this assertion is
used in a broad sense, it is useful in developing an analytical framework examining the formation of segregation along racial and social lines.
Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass look at the historical social discrepancies which have aided the predominant inequality that has plagued South Africa. The authors consider the economic inequality both pre and post-apartheid, and provide a critical analysis of the economic and social effects the transition to democracy brought. Most pertinent, they examine the continued social stratification and income disparity which persisted even as apartheid’s policies began to dissolve. Unlike previous scholars,
Seekings and Nicoli argue that class, not race, played the most crucial role in facilitating inequality under apartheid, “the primary basis of inequality shifted from race to class under apartheid.”4 Additionally, the authors look at how job placement and the level of
education achieved affect inequality, although no connection is drawn between these
factors and subsequent spatial segregation.
Julio Cesar Pino examines Brazil’s economic history and the role of
industrialization in creating increased poverty and inequality among the working class.
Pino cites industrialization’s rural exodus as the driving cause of urban poverty and the
formation of favelas, “squatter settlements were the natural outcome of the
industrialization of Rio de Janeiro and the inability of industry, commerce, and the
service sector to provide enough jobs for the burgeoning population.”5 Pino’s historical
analysis of factors contributing to Brazil’s overwhelming poverty and the formation of
4 Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 236. 5 Julio Cesar Pino, Family and Favela: The Reproduction of Poverty in Rio de Janeiro (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 21.
11 squatter settlements is crucial in understanding the development of contemporary spatial
segregation. Furthermore, the implicit link between policies instituted by the government and the effect of producing increased poverty is valuable in analyzing segregation’s political roots.
In order to execute my intended analysis, I plan to use previous literature to provide historical and theoretical context. Works relating to the theme of segregation in
Brazil, including City of Walls and “Civilizing” Rio, will be applied to develop an analytical framework which will be related to the specific case studies of Brazil and
South Africa. Additionally, Perlman and Pino’s work regarding poverty and marginalization in Brazil will be used to determine possible effects of spatial segregation on injustice and inequality. These works will prove valuable in their theoretical contributions to my analysis of segregation in contemporary urban space. My analysis will draw upon the issues of race, class, and political motivations which facilitate the formation and continuation of social and spatial segregation.
Analysis regarding the specific case studies will be utilized in conjunction with field research conducted in the locations. Observations, lecture notes, and interviews will be employed to provide primary sources and personal accounts, while the utilization of ethnography and personal interviews will contribute a human aspect. These accounts will also provide crucial contemporary observations of the social marginalization resulting from territorial divisions, and allow for a current, comprehensive analysis.
The following chapter will investigate how legacies of the past have influenced and facilitated the formation of contemporary spatial and social segregation in Rio.
Additionally, theories of segregation will be employed to analyze the driving forces
12 behind the formation of more generalized forms of segregation. Chapter 3 will explore
the representation of Brazil’s poor within the media to demonstrate how an intense
negative stigma has been attached which has contributed to the development of a culture
of fear. This culture of fear places an extreme emphasis on crime, and has resulted in
increased spatial segregation through the creation of gated communities and fortified enclaves. Chapter 4 will examine Rio’s beaches as a site of social segregation. Beach culture and leisure patterns will be analyzed to prove that segregation in Rio has transcended the private, territorial sites and has infiltrated into the public sphere. Lastly,
Chapter 5 will draw on South Africa to provide a crucial theoretical comparison between
the segregated societies of the two countries while illuminating broader, global issues of
urban segregation. This chapter will compare the different processes by which
segregation formed, the prevalence of social segregation, and the effects marginalization
has on the local populations. Finally, this section will analyze any contemporary political initiatives which contribute to or hinder the development of further segregation.
13 Chapter II: Legacies of the Past: The Historical Formation of Spatial Segregation in Rio de Janeiro
Today Rio’s landscape is marked with the sprawling presence of hillside after hillside enveloped in poverty. Shantytowns as rudimentary as agglomerations of shacks built from cardboard pieced together and as complex as large cities with permanent structures, paved roads, and post offices have become prominent fixtures within the
Brazilian landscape. Arriving at the Rio de Janeiro Galeo Antonio Carlos Jobim
International Airport one of the first scenes one experiences is not of breathtaking tropical vistas but instead of the Baixa do Sapateiro favela, which has extended as close as a few hundred meters from the airport. The favela’s presence is symbolic, demonstrating the visual representation of poverty while highlighting the severe divisions
which exist between the wealthy foreign travelers and affluent residents of Rio on the one
hand, and the struggling favela residents on the other.
The United Nations Center for Human Settlements estimates that between 30 and
40 percent of Rio’s population of thirteen million lives in favelas and contemporary
calculations approximate over seven hundred favelas stretch throughout Rio.6 Established
favelas in the Zona Sul and Zona Norte have comparatively acceptable access to urban
services, while the newer and less organized communities struggle to obtain even the
most basic and essential services. In particular, the recent favelas constructed in the Zona
Oeste are currently struggling as the population grows at a rate of 400% per year. Raw
sewage flows through the streets while electricity and running water are absent. Presently
approximately 12% of Rio households lack running water, over 30% have no proper
sewage removal, and official electricity reaches only 70% of the population. Schools,
6 “A Tale of Two Cities: The Asphalt and the Favela,” Favela Faces.
14 hospitals, and transportation to the city center are equally deficient in the favelas and suburbs beyond Rio’s core.7 This lack of access to health, education, utility, and transportation services coupled with poor sanitation and the removal of the poor from
Rio’s core has created a spatial segregation which blatantly divides the favela from the asphalt.
To understand how today’s favelas exemplify the existence of spatial segregation in Rio it is important to investigate the history of the favelas and the events which led to their creation. This chapter will provide a detailed history of the favelas and illustrate how their creation and current state demonstrate contemporary spatial segregation.
Phase I: Origins
Varying accounts exist recounting how the first favela developed, although it is commonly agreed that the community was constructed in 1898 on Morro do Providencia.
One version claims that the first noticeable favela in Rio was constructed after the Rio de
Janeiro municipal government voted to demolish a housing tenement called Cabeca do
Porco (Pig’s Head) which housed over one thousand residents in the city center. At the time nearly one quarter of the city’s population resided in various tenements throughout
Rio8. To the government and elites the residents of the tenements represented the unclean and unwanted during a time of renovation in which Rio and Brazil strived to achieve
European sophistication and attract foreign investment.
After the Cabeca do Porco was demolished the dislocated residents, primarily dock and low-wage workers, occupied a nearby hill, Morro do Providencia, which overlooked the city and was located close to the downtown. New homes were constructed
7 “A Tale of Two Cities: The Asphalt and the Favela,” Favela Faces. 8 “A Tale of Two Cities: The Asphalt and the Favela,” Favela Faces.
15 from the only resources available to the displaced residents, the rubble of the old
tenement. The rubble was salvaged and combined with mud and additional abandoned
materials, and the first shantytown squatter settlement was constructed. Similar
structures followed, and like contemporary favelas, the first were the result of a shortage
of affordable housing coupled with the government’s inability or unwillingness to
provide for the city’s poor.
A second version also claims that the first favela was built in 1898 on Morro do
Providencia. Instead of resulting from a demolished tenement, the alternative version
claims the favela was founded by veterans of the Fourth Expeditionary Force who had been fighting against the separatist village of Canudos9 and the messianic rebel Antonio
Conselheiro in Brazil’s northeast. Canudos was the Bahian settlement were the followers
of Conselheiro resided in opposition to the impositions of the Republican regime.10 The
term “favela” refers to a flower common in Bahia which covered many of the battlefields
during the war11 and additionally refers to the similar types of housing which had been constructed of available materials along hillsides in Canudos.12 When the veterans
returned after years of battle they found no affordable housing and resorted to squatting
on unused land near the downtown. The shantytown on Morro do Providencia was named
“favela,” and was soon joined by dozens more following the subsequent political and
economic situation in which thousands of residents were displaced during the city’s
European-styled renovation and attempts to industrialize at the beginning of the twentieth
9 Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro: What do the Data Say?” Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE), Inter-American Development Bank (August 4, 2005). i. 10 Jeffrey Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite Culture and Society in turn-of-the-century Rio de Janeiro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 16. 11 Pino, Family and Favela, 37. 12 Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro...” i.
16 century. From their inception, favelas’ evolution coincided with industrialization, urbanization, and the social and political pressures which forced the poor from Rio’s core.
Under the administration of Mayor Francisco Pereira Passos (1902-1906), Rio’s downtown was remodeled to replicate European elegance and refinement. Passos’s own training exemplified the importance of Parisian and European influence; he had studied engineering at the Escola Militar, modeled after France’s Ecole Militaire. Following graduation Passos studied in France, where we witnessed the completion of Paris’s Great
Works transformation and was exposed to the work of Haussmann. The Great Works project had three aims: alleviating Paris’s street congestion through the creation of boulevards, eliminating working-class areas which were seen as unclean and unhealthy, and beautifying the city through architectural embellishment.13
Decades later Rio’s urban reforms were modeled after Passos’s experiences in
Paris and the influences of Haussmann. Simultaneously ports were expanded and sanitation campaigns began an effort to clean up the city in order to match Rio’s new title, “A Tropical Paris.”14 These efforts were exemplified through the Avenida Rio
Branco’s transformation into a wide and stylish avenue with Parisian influence. With the
conversion of the main street from a basic thoroughfare into a Champs Elysees- inspired boulevard came the displacement of thousands of low-income residents.15 In his
examination of carioca society at the turn of the century Jeffrey Needell emphasizes the
displacement of the poor neighborhoods during this time of renovation and sanitation,
“Much of the cidade velha’s narrow, dank, and muddled working-class world was
13 Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque, 29. 14 Pino, Family and Favela, 39 15 Kelly Graham, Field Notes: Walking Tour of Downtown Rio de Janeiro, January 24, 2006.
17 destroyed: it’s streets were widened, given light and air, and better connected by
demolishing old buildings, changing old streets, and building new ones.”16 Meanwhile,
streets were paved, sidewalks constructed, and popular sites such as the Pracas XV de
Novembro, 11 de Junho, Tiradentes, Passeio Publico, and Campo de Santana were embellished.17 Throughout the city buildings were renovated to model Parisian
architecture which completed the transformation that the elites hoped would bring
sophistication to the city.
The renovation and refurbishment of downtown property attracted real-estate
speculation, this, combined with the coffee boom at the beginning of the century, and the
high deficits from the cost of imports made space in Rio’s Centro extremely valuable.18
The blue-collar workers who resided in the previously undesirable space could no longer afford the rapidly escalating rents for the newly-renovated spaces. Quickly, thousands more workers were forced from the core to the periphery.
Passos’s renovations were not limited to infrastructure. New laws sought to civilize the poor and increase Rio’s international appeal. Passos prohibited selling food on the street, selling milk door to door from cows, spitting on streetcar floors, raising pigs within the city, continuing the wild and loud procession of Carnival, and several other customs which were seen as “barbaric” and “uncivilized.”19 These actions demonstrate
one of the first instances of explicit government policy aimed exclusively at Rio’s
population of urban poor.
16 Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque, 34. 17 Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque, 35. 18 Pino, Family and Favela, 39. 19 Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque, 36.
18 While the result of Passos’ renovations was an elegant and beautiful city center
which clearly imitated European cultural capitals, the transformation simultaneously marked the first instance when the poor were deliberately (through persuasion or force)
pushed out from the core of the city to the distant and more importantly, invisible
periphery. The elite vision of Rio and Brazil as a whole excluded the poor, and the
municipal government’s attempts to recognize this conceptualization resulted in a spatial segregation which would plague the country for decades.
Phase II: Social Marginalization/ Hygiene
In the subsequent decades the population shift from the core to periphery only accelerated. In addition to significant increases in the number of favela residents following the lack of affordable housing in the Centro, large numbers of residents began migrating to the suburbs. Meade asserts that the segregation of the poor which plagues cities worldwide is not accidental, but in fact intentional, “in most cities of what we call the ‘developing world,’ a separation of poverty from wealth and a concurrent isolation of the poor far from city services have been planned.”20 This intentional separation became
increasingly evident in Rio through the role of public transportation.
Increased use of cars and the extension of the railroad allowed residents to
commute to the downtown daily, widening the spatial gap between the rich and poor.
Rapid urbanization following abolition had caused congestion throughout Rio, with the rich and poor neighboring each other. One of the aims of the separation resulting from the
renovation was to isolate the poor and the alleged crime and violence away from the city
and away from the wealthy neighborhoods. As Meade emphasizes, the elite were not
20 Teresa Meade, “Civilizing” Rio: Reform and Resistance in a Brazilian City, 1889-1930 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvannia State University Press, 1997), 11.
19 concerned by the prominence of crime, but by the fact the alleged perpetrators were so
close to wealthy communities, “The real problem in Rio was that the city had grown so rapidly and haphazardly that congested areas brought the diverse social classes and races
into close proximity.”21 By 1950 one-quarter of Rio’s population lived in the suburbs, an increase of 326% from 1906-1950. Meanwhile, the urban core grew by 283% as new businesses moved into the newly renovated spaces.22
Post-1906 the suburbs in the North and South Zones experienced the most growth. Neighborhoods in the industrial northern sector such as Sao Cristovao, Tijuca,
Vila Isabel, and Engenho Velho grew exponentially while middle-class residential areas in the Zona Sul such as Lapa, Gloria, Flamengo, and Botafogo developed at a similar rate. Both the North and South Zones allowed Rio residents a lower cost of living compared to the downtown, however these peripheral zones, including the favelas, lacked services, including hospitals, schools, and other city services.23
Zona Sul quickly became the home of aristocratic neighborhoods like
Copacabana, Leblon, and Ipanema. These areas housed the majority of Rio’s urban
professionals and elite, and the municipal government made every effort to accommodate
the city’s wealthiest residents. President Washington Luis (1926-1930) oversaw Rio’s
first urban plan, The Plano Agache, which expanded the rapid transport system in the
Zona Sul and relocated squatters and favelas into government-built housing in the
suburbs. The urbanization plan aimed to transform the neighborhoods of the Zona Sul
into a “monumental city” which would include new building codes and housing
standards. The Plano Agache called for widespread eradication of favelas in the Zona Sul
21 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 36. 22 Pino, Family and Favela, 39. 23 Pino, Family and Favela, 39.
20 without provisions for replacement housing. The plan and eradications were never fully
implemented due to the Revolution of 1930 which protested the rise of Getulio Vargas.24
As the municipal government catered to the wealthy, the burgeoning poor struggled to survive in the favelas which lacked services and transportation to sources of employment. The working class, which was scattered along the periphery in favelas and suburbs, was distanced from the employment in the downtown and the one railroad, the
Central do Brasil, was inadequate to link the multitude of workers to the downtown. The only additional sources of transportation were the mule-driven bondes and gondola streetcars, both of which were in stages of decay.25
Placing further strain on housing and services was the state of the country’s
economy. Economic stagnation followed by Brazil’s attempts to industrialize after the
coffee boom forced thousands of migrants from the northeast into Rio in search of more
prosperous opportunities. This rural-urban exodus was accelerated by the Depression of
1929 and by the installation of the Vargas regime in 1930.26 Despite Rio’s move towards
urbanization and industrialization, the efforts resulted in less stable employment
opportunities for low-wage workers. This decrease in available work forced the
development of an informal labor market which quickly expanded among the
unemployed of the favelas. This labor force had several definitions, including “those that
‘made a living in the interstices of the economy (casual workers) … and as part of the
‘underworld’”27 and “an unorganized segment of the labor force confined to sporadic
24 Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro…” 2. 25 Pino, Family and Favela, 40. 26 Pino, Family and Favela, 21. 27 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 9.
21 participation in the job market at unskilled and low-wage work.”28 The majority of these
workers earned money by shining shoes, selling flowers, or working in the homes of
Rio’s wealthy as maids or child care providers. Other, less respectable employment
included prostitution, gambling, and begging.29 Success in the informal sector required
proximity to the opportunities within the city, preferably close to the wealthy and elite
who the workers served.
This relationship between employer and employee represented a racial dichotomy
and discrepancy. While the majority of elites and upper-class residents were white, the
workers of the informal sector who served them were primarily black or of mixed
background. As Brian Godfrey emphasizes in “Revisiting Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo,”
the social schism and spatial which divide developed at this time represents a pattern of
spatial segregation:
Although Rio de Janeiro is among the most racially heterogeneous of Brazilian metropolises, the poor are primarily nonwhite and the middle and upper classes remain overwhelmingly white. These racial disparities largely coincide with the patterns of residential segregation.30
Race was also evident in elite ideology and consequent policy. As Meade explains, the
elite used race as explanation for what were considered uncivilized aspects of society,
“the elite drew on the racist theories popular during this period to explain the apparent
backwardness of the peasantry.”31 As evidenced by Passos’ attempted social reform at the
turn of the century, Brazilian elite saw the behavior of the poor and racialized as barbaric,
which justified both spatial segregation and social stratification.
28 Pino, Family and Favela, 21. 29 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 9. 30 Brian Godfrey, “Revisiting Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo,” The Geographical Review 89 (January 1999), 104. 31 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 28.
22 Historical racism has played a substantial role in perpetuating stereotypes and consequent segregation throughout Rio and Brazil. Despite the overwhelming majority
Afro-Brazilian population, an ideology of white superiority has historically dominated
society. The significant black population was emphasized by journalist Luiz Edmundo’s
comments, in which he claimed Brazil was “more like a corner of Africa than a nation of
the New World.”32 Despite the considerable Afro-Brazilian population, there has been
little resistance to both the derogatory depictions of blacks throughout popular media and
blatant racist policies. Whitening ideals dominated in the early twentieth century, with
Congress passing Article 5 of Federal Decree N. 4247, which specifically banned black
immigrants from entering the country.33 The passing of the decree emphasized the dominant elite vision of white, European cultural superiority, evidenced by Rio’s renovation and resulting in the spatial segregation of the poor and racialized from the city.
The complete lack of affordable housing in the downtown forced many migrants to live in squalor, and led to a population explosion within the favelas. Abolition initiated urbanization in Rio, with boarding houses and collective housing structures growing exponentially in the period prior to the official end of slavery, from 1869-1888.34 In the following decades it was estimated that as many as one-quarter of the population lived in deplorable conditions including corticos (literally- “beehives”- nineteenth-century buildings run by slumlords, usually two stories and rented to dozens of families), casas de dormidas (cramped dormitories rented on a nightly basis), avenidas (alleys of working- class shacks), vilas operarias (overcrowded housing projects financed by the municipal
32 Needell, A Tropical Belle Epoque, 49. 33 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 31. 34 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 66.
23 government), and loteamentos (small houses built by the municipal government in the
1920s located in the rural suburbs far from the Centro).35
None of these options provided permanent housing to migrants and workers, and
the housing crisis only worsened. The municipal government feared increases in crime
would escalate and that the crowded conditions were both unhealthy but also promoted “a
complete absence of moral virtue.”36 The corticos became known as areas of high crime and immorality and were quickly associated with the proliferation of vice in Rio’s downtown. Meanwhile, cramped living conditions made raising a family challenging while the extensive authority given to landlords under the Municipal Code made
evictions easy and gave families little housing security. One of the only affordable
options left for the poor was to construct their own homes on unoccupied land.
President Luis’ Plano Agache of 1930 mentioned semi-nomadic populations
living along the city’s periphery. In Estatistica predial do Distrito Federal, a 1933 housing
survey of Rio, 57,889 “rustic habitations” occupied by poor residents on hillsides within
the city limits were listed, almost all between the Zona Norte and the Centro.37 The
hillsides, or morros, were unwanted by industry and real estate companies, but they
offered the poor proximity to the downtown employment. These hillside communities
additionally offered the opportunity to raise animals and grow crops to reduce food
expenses.
Living in the favelas had other advantages. The closer the residents stayed to the
city’s core, the more likely they were to receive services. The distant suburbs lacked
many basic services including transportation, which made the nearby favelas more
35 Pino, Family and Favela, 40. 36 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 69. 37 Pino, Family and Favela, 40.
24 enticing to Rio’s poor. In addition to building on unwanted land, construction on the
steep hillsides offered salvation from the municipal government and police. Under the
Rio de Janeiro Civil Code of Public Works, construction of unauthorized dwellings or additions on existing structures was forbidden.38 The favelas’ location high along the hillsides with no paved roads made police accessibility difficult—providing favelados with a degree of security and protection from eviction and police interference.
Following World War II a surge in favelas and overcrowding caught the attention of the municipal and state governments. The 1940 and 1950 censuses confirmed the visible housing crisis, concluding that the district had an occupancy rate of nearly 7
people per home and almost 3 people per bedroom.39 Low salaries, inflation, and high rents in legal housing forced more and more of Rio’s poor into the favelas which continued to expand exponentially. The government response to the surge in favelas was an attempt to restrict the construction of new favelas while eliminating existing ones.
The municipal government constructed three highly publicized public housing projects in 1942 called Parques Proletarios.40 The intention of the housing projects was
not to accommodate the urban poor, but instead to isolate and segregate them from both
the city and its wealthier residents. Each resident of the project was issued an
identification card that was required to enter the compounds’ gates. At nine o’clock
nightly the administrator of each park would lecture over a loudspeaker on issues of
38 Pino, Family and Favela, 41. 39 Pino, Family and Favela, 41. 40 Robert Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: a Tale of Two Favelas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 16.
25 morality and decency. At ten o’clock the gates would close for the night, illustrating the
state control over the poor in the public housing project.41
The Parques Proletarios were a failure and demonstrated the government and
elites’ inability to deal with the burgeoning urban poor, as Robert Gay explains, “They
were indicative of the way that local elites understood and hoped to address the problem
of urban poverty in Rio.”42 The project was seen an entirely insufficient, as far more
favela residents were forcibly removed than housing units were made available,
stimulating new favela construction. More importantly, however, the plan historically
marks another period in which the government intentionally and covertly sought to
segregate Rio’s urban poor from the rest of the city.
Favela development further intensified after new transportation routes were developed in the 1940s. Three additional railroad lines of the Central do Brasil railroad
were built—the Leopoldina, Rio d”Ouro, and Linha Auxiliar. The construction of these
new lines created more jobs in the Zona Norte, attracting workers and residents to the
area which already had a significant favela population. Furthermore, the opening of the
Avenida Brasil in 1946 generated new industries and provided additional occupants for
nearby favelas.43 While the new commuter railroad facilitated transportation, it
simultaneously facilitated segregation by providing an additional barrier between the rich
and poor.
The inequality represented through transportation was not a new occurrence.
Decades earlier, in 1904, protestors rioting against the smallpox vaccination
demonstrated their anger by targeting the transportation sector. As Meade explains, the
41 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 16. 42 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 16. 43 Pino, Family and Favela, 42.
26 neglected poor realized transportation was increasing their level of spatial and social
marginalization:
Protestors were aware that the municipal transportation lines were not playing a neutral role in the renovation/beautification. Adequate transportation service that would bring the working class in from the suburbios to workplaces on the docks, in the quarries, or in the homes of the wealthy was essential once the corticos were demolished. Since ‘civilization’s’ victims were aware that even if they worked in the downtown, they were not going to live there, they logically attacked the transportation service that was making this relocation a reality.44
In addition to the new transportation lines, sanitation campaigns launched by the
Vargas regime and his successors further facilitated the movement of the poor toward the periphery. The middle and upper classes feared that the growing migrant population would spread tuberculosis and other diseases, and the hysteria of the wealthy prompted the government to take action. While the sanitation drive forced the poor from the city and protected the wealthy, the campaign was unsuccessful at alleviating or eliminating diseases common in the favelas such as diphtheria, diarrhea, influenza, and polio.45
Under the direction of Oswaldo Cruz, director general of public health, a
sanitation and health campaign mirroring that of Paris was embarked. Cruz sought to
eliminate disease including the plague, yellow fever, and smallpox. Public health crews
moved throughout Rio killing rats, spraying disinfectant, and demolishing “unsanitary housing.”46 These measures targeted the poor areas, and went as far as to quarantine fever
victims. Only the poor were isolated, while the rich retreated to private medical facilities
or the countryside to receive treatment. This explicit segregation of the poor provides another example of unjust government action which increased levels of social and spatial segregation.
44 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 110. 45 Pino, Family and Favela, 42. 46 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 90.
27 Furthermore, the government’s action to eradicate disease from the wealthy
neighborhoods and ignore the poor sections exemplified the government’s prioritization
of elite needs over those of the poor majority.
The rural exodus out of the northeast which began in previous decades continued
throughout the 1940s and 1950s. High rents, inflation, and a shortage of affordable
housing had always plagued Brazil, but after World War II Rio became the favela and squatter capital of Brazil due to the economic opportunities and political promises of the
Vargas regime. Favela construction increased as industry moved to the periphery of the
Zona Norte where land was available to build new favelas and expand existing communities.
As more and more favelas were built a shortage of space forced the construction of new communities farther and farther from the city’s core. Improvements in transportation made accessing the downtown easier, although the frequency and quality of transportation was still in need of improvement. The administrations of Getulio Vargas from 1930-1945 and from 1951-1954 focused on working-class support, bringing campaigns aimed at improving the lives of the poor including extending the bus and railroad lines to poor peripheral areas, beginning new health campaigns to fight diseases, and allowing squatters to build new shacks despite their illegality.47 Temporarily the
expansion of the favelas represented a relationship between the municipal government, state, industry, and the poor, working class.
Despite the initial support of the urban poor under the Vargas regime, the tenuous relationship between the favelas and the government returned with an official call to
47 Brian Godfrey, Class notes, September 19, 2006.
28 eradicate the favelas under the Codigo do Obras in 1937.48 Perlman attributed this reversal of policy to the Brazilian “red scare:” “An imagined threat to the entire political and social order capped the upper sector’s traditional abhorrence of visible poverty and
the fundamental affront that squatting represents to the ethic of private property.”49 In
1947 an official Commission for the Eradication of the Favelas was created. According to
Perlman, the committee’s intent included “returning favela residents to their states of origin, committing favela residents over the age of 60 to State Institutions, and expelling from the favela all families whose income exceeded a minimum.”50 Despite the creation
of the committee the measures were never fully carried out due to a lack of resources.
Although ultimately the plan failed, its creation demonstrated the traditional sentiment of the upper class towards the favelas and consequent government policies aimed at their elimination.
In the following years little changed to improve the image or acceptance of the favelas. The presidency of Juscelino Kubitsheck was characterized by high inflation and
mass industrialization at the expense of agriculture and foreign debt.51 The number of
favela communities rose in 1960 to 147 from 58 a decade before, largely due to Vargas’s support in the early 1950s and the desperation created by the economic crisis under
Kubitsheck. According to the 1960 census the favela population was estimated at 335,
063 compared to 169, 305 in 1950 (see figures 2.1 and 2.2). At the time of the census
48 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 200. 49 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, 200. 50 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, 200. 51 Brian Godfrey, Class notes, September 19, 2006.
29 Rio’s total population was 3,307,000, which meant roughly one in ten residents lived in a
squatter favela community.52
Figure 2.1: Rio’s Spatial Transformation
Growing from merely 14 squatter settlements in 1920 to over 500 in 2000, the favelas have geographically transformed Rio’s landscape.53
For decades opposition of the favelas existed throughout Rio and Brazil, but until the military takeover in 1964 the government lacked the power and resources to apply
existing policies. In conjunction with the National Housing Bank (NHB) the military
created a special agency, Coordination of Social Interest Housing of the Greater Rio
Metropolitan Area (CHISAM), specifically to deal with the favelas. The agency’s goal
52 Pino, Family and Favela, 44. 53 “Retrato matematico,” Favela tem Memoria,
30 Figure 2.2: City vs. Favela Population
Figure 2.2 illustrates the changes in the favelas’ chare of city population along with the total favela population. It can be observed that Rio’s increase in favelas has been dramatic, rising from about 7% of the city’s inhabitants in 1950 to nearly 20% in 2000.54
was to assure that there would be “no more people living in the slums of Rio de Janeiro by 1976.”55 Despite CHISAM’s ability to choose to upgrade, urbanize, or remove the
favelas, the agency focused solely on removal. With funding from the NHB, CHISAM
began destroying favela communities throughout Rio. The agency’s goal was to remove
100 families each day, and between 1962 and 1974 almost 140,000 residents from eighty
different favelas had been forced to abandon their homes.56
One of the justifications for this removal was an argument that the favela
residents were seen as outsiders in the larger community because of their insufficient
housing. CHISAM asserted that the removal was a step toward the favelados integration
into society:
54 Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro…” 5. 55 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, 202. 56 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 19.
31 The first objective is the economic, social, moral, and hygienic reclaiming of the slum families. Likewise, the program aims at changing the slum-dwelling family’s position as squatters on other people’s property with all of the insecurity that goes with it, to that of owners of their own home. These families then become completely integrated in the community, especially in the way that they live and think.57
Furthermore, the program was seen as benefiting the larger society through beautifying
the city. The favelas’ presence was seen as a scar on the landscape of Rio and Brazil, and
their removal would consequently result in a reclaiming of public space. Neglected in
these public justifications were the more realistic viewpoints that the favelas’ removal
was motivated through a realization of the value of the land the favelas occupied. Often
located on valuable hillsides inside the city with ocean views, the removal of the favelas
would allow for the construction of more profitable housing for the wealthy.58 In
legislation passed shortly after the military coup, the NHB stated that a main aspect of
new housing policy was to create a “stimulus to the activities of the private sector.”59
Phase III: Contemporary Justifications for Removal
After decades of the constant threat of removal, the favelas began to form
Residents’ Associations to more effectively stand up against the government and demand improved services. In 1963 several of these groups joined to form the Federation of
Favela Associations in Guanabara (FAFEG). The group’s purpose was to more effectively oppose eradication and simultaneously bring aid to the communities. In response to the favelas’ unification and to discourage revolt or resistance the government increased their presence during eradications by firing weapons and threatening violence against favela residents. FAFEG leaders were even arrested and threatened if continued
57 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro, 202. 58 Lecture Notes, Rose Compans, February 3, 2006. 59 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, 204.
32 resistance persisted. The government’s threats eventually halted FAFEG’s opposition.60
This period represents a transition in which the military government began to more aggressively pursue favela eradication and even resorted to threats of violence and the discharging of weapons in order to support policy.
Under the years of the military dictatorship favela eradication continued, a process which resulted in social and economic repercussions. The lengthened commute endured by many after relocation meant a higher percentage of wages had to be spent on transportation while less time could be spent at home. Unemployment levels rose as the workforce was separated from the labor market. A 1966 study found that the relocated residents along the periphery had to travel two hours each way on public transportation and spent about one-third their wages on transportation costs.61
The relocation along the outer periphery additionally resulted in a feeling of
further segregation for favelados. The increased isolation from the city and activities of
urban life only intensified already existing spatial divisions and facilitated the expansion
of pre-existing social divisions.
After the initial push for eradication under the military, little attention was paid to
the favelas. Individual favelas were still selected for removal, although at a severely
decreased rate, while no attempts were made to combat the underlying issues or urban
poverty and segregation. Finally, in 1979 a policy of favela urbanization was introduced
partially in response to the reorganization of Residents’ Associations and their increased
political power as the 1982 elections neared.62 While the action demonstrated one of the
first times the government attempted to deal with the issues of urban poverty, it also
60 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 20. 61 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality, 213. 62 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 23.
33 represented what would become a pattern of politicians making empty promises to court
the significant favela vote.
In 1983 the Partido Democratico Trabalhista took office, replacing decades of
military control. The new government created several programs which benefited the
favelas and urban poor, including the construction of new public schools throughout the region. The schools were designed to keep children in school while providing food, recreational activities, and medical and dental care. Although a few such schools were
built in the favelas, most were constructed surrounding working-class neighborhoods. In addition to schools the PDT oversaw the construction of water pipelines which benefited seventy-four favelas, and piped sewage systems which reached fifty-one favelas. Legal right of occupation was even granted in some cases, and by September 1985 approximately 13,000 titles had been distributed.63 The PDT initiatives marked a
significant change in favela policy, a change representing a transition towards
acceptance.
The urbanization attempts of the 1980s continued into the 1990s. In 1993 a
newly-appointed Housing Secretariat proposed several neighborhood improvement projects, including the Favela-Bairro program. Implemented in 1994, the Favela-Bairro
sought to improve thirty-eight favelas in addition to providing upgrades in other informal
settlements throughout Rio. Instead of following previous methods, Favela Bairro sought
to utilize existing physical structures and social networks to improve the lives of favela residents.
This new approach represented a change in policy towards the urban poor. Ben
Penglase, a Social Anthropologist at Harvard who spent a year living in a Zona Norte
63 Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro, 30.
34 favela emphasized the change in policy, “There is a change in the attitude of officials.
There is now acceptance of these neighborhoods. Favelas are there to stay; they cannot be eradicated or ignored.”64 Instead of initiating the forced removals and relocations of years past, the government recognized the level of community and social ties within the neighborhoods, and chose to employ them in an effort to improve community conditions.
The primary phase, Favela Bairro I, focused on infrastructure, including improving water pipelines and increasing piped sewage lines. The plan also involves creating pathways which will link the favela to the formal city, a project aimed at
reducing the spatial divide between the favela and the asphalt.65 In 2000, Favela-Bairro II
was introduced, which sought to introduce educational opportunities, job training, health,
and community development.66 Combined, the two phases seek to integrate the favelas
both physically into the landscape through improvements in infrastructure, and socially
through a variety of essential services which have been deficient for decades.
It is important to note that Favela-Bairro was developed at the regional level. The
federal response to housing needs for decades had been minimal as evidenced by the
failed NHB’s initiatives. The NHB’s efforts were largely regarded as failures because
they never addressed the housing needs of the urban poor, and often exacerbated the
housing crisis through their support of removals and eradications. The large-scale urban
renewal project is funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the
European Union, with additional funds from the city of Rio.67
64 Susie Seefelt Lesieutre, “From Favela to Bairro: Rio’s Neighborhoods in Transition,” ReVista-Harvard Review of Latin America, Winter 2001 < http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/revista/articles/view/530> (March 2007). 65 Lesieutre, “From Favela to Bairro: Rio’s Neighborhoods in Transition.” 66 Fabio Soares and Yuri Soares, “The Socio-Economic Impact of Favela-Bairro…” 3. 67 Lesieutre, “From Favela to Bairro: Rio’s Neighborhoods in Transition.”
35 Although favela acceptance and subsequent urbanization is generally regarded as
positive, I developed my own opinions while touring several favelas in the spring of
2006. I had previously studied the Favela Bairro-Project, and initially applauded the
efforts to bring increased services and opportunities to the historically ignored communities. Touring several favelas, however, altered my opinion of the project, which
I now believe is aimed at bringing enough improvements to keep favelados living in their existing communities, and preventing them from integrating into greater society, both spatially and socially.
The first favela I visited which had been targeted by Favela-Bairro was Santa
Marta in Botafogo (see figure 2.3). During my visit Juan, a young leader in the community attending a local college part-time, was my guide. In his free time he participates in a community development program, Grupo Ecco, and teaches residents computer and job skills. He showed me how the construction of formal stairs had been underway for several years, although for about six months the construction had been halted without explanation. A tramway connecting the upper and lower levels of the hillside was planned, and cables marked the beginning of construction, although residents were critical of the plan. In an interview he explained the neighborhood’s perspective on
the construction, “Probably it will not be built. There are a lot of promises, but nothing is
ever finished.”68 Despite the eleventh year of the Favela-Bairro program, little change
had been carried out in the community. To many of the community’s residents the
unfinished stairs and tram symbolized another era of the government’s broken promises.
68 Graham, Field Notes: Santa Marta, February 1, 2006.
36 Figure 2.3: Favela Santa Marta
Homes precariously balance on the side of a hill in Santa Marta. The brightly-colored homes at the top of the hill represent the few which have received aid from Favela Bairro.69
Hundreds of power lines ran through the streets, the result of illegally tapping power (see figures 2.4 and 2.5). The urbanization program includes providing light and power, but like the other objectives, they have yet to be completed. Juan explained the effect of the dangerous live wires running through the community, “The kids like to fly kites and play with marbles, but they can’t do it in the favela because it is dangerous with the wires.”70
The second phase of Favela-Bairro aims to increase social services, although Juan explained that the public schools are still of a low quality, “it is difficult to get higher
69 Photograph, International Honors Program, Indlela student slide show, Spring 2006. 70 Graham, Field Notes: Santa Marta, February 1, 2006.
37 Figure 2.4: Power Lines Running Through Santa Marta
In favela Santa Marta power lines run dangerously close to homes, weaving between the tightly-packed structures.71
education because our schools are so bad. There is little social mobility and the favela
schools have a stigma.”72 It was not the government, but the church that helped to
improve social services in the community, helping to start a daycare center and raising
funds to build a soccer field for the children. According to Juan, the state prioritizes infrastructure over social services, and while some improvements are cosmetically made
to the community, little has been done by the government to improve existing social issues.73
71 Photograph, International Honors Program. 72 Graham, Field Notes: Santa Marta, February 1, 2006. 73 Graham, Field Notes: Santa Marta, Februar 1, 2006.
38 Figure 2.5: Power Lines Stretching Between Buildings in Santa Marta
Power lines run between buildings throughout favela Santa Marta.74
Another community I visited was Cidade de Deus, or City of God. The community became famous after Fernando Meirelles’s film which depicted the violent life of drug dealers in the community. At the Communitarian Committee of the City of
God it was explained that the community was created after the forced removals from
1961-1990s. The residents I spoke with emphasized the removals were not aimed at improving the lives of favela residents, as it was often claimed, but were in fact intended to satisfy the middle and upper classes in the Zona Sul.75
The community is home to approximately 65,000 residents, although the census claims a population of only 39, 016. The 28, 984 residents invisible to the authorities are not considered when aid for programs like Favela-Bairro is allocated. Residents feel this
74 Photograph, International Honors Program. 75 Graham, Field Notes: Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006..
39 inaccuracy is another deliberate government attempt to marginalize the favelas by
neglecting to provide adequate improvements and services. The unemployment rate in the community is 22.3%, while 26.2% live in what is categorized as “misery.”76 A study
recently showed that of 946 children who began school only 181 made it to the eighth
grade, and only twenty-eight complete high school. The community has thirteen public
schools, but only one high school. Residents perceive the lack of educational opportunities, especially higher education, available in the community as a deliberate government attempt to keep the favela population as uneducated service workers and prevent spatial and social integration (see figure 2.6).77 Like Santa Marta, the residents of
Cidade de Deus have seen little change a decade after the inception of the famed Favela-
Bairro project.
Despite Favela-Bairro’s alleged attempts to bring improvements to the favelas, a
recent increase in discussions advocating for favelas’ removal began following the major
drug wars of 2004. The renewed strength of the campaign for removal is largely
attributed to the environmentalist argument put forth by development companies, Globo,
Brazil’s dominant media group, and various environmental agencies. This argument will be further explored in the following chapter. The campaign for removal stresses the favelas’ environmental degradation, including increased pollution and deforestation.
Interestingly, these campaigns are focused in the Zona Sul, prompting critics like
Rose Compans, author, urban planner, architect of the City Government of Rio de Janeiro and professor of the Post-Graduation and Research Nucleus (NPPG) of the Bennett
76 Graham, Field Notes: Cidade de Deus: Communitarian Committee of the City of God, February 2, 2006. 77 Graham, Field Notes: Cidade de Deus: PEM, February. 2, 2006.
40 Figure 2.6: Income Tied to Years of Schooling
This figure illustrates the correlation between educational opportunities and household income in Brazil, demonstrating the detrimental impacts the lack of educational opportunities in the favelas has on local residents. 78
University Center, to conclude that the real reason behind the arguments is the devaluing of land surrounding favelas.79
The renewed arguments for eradication combined with the Favela-Bairro’s
controversial results assert that the real aim of the government and various agencies
involved is not to foster integration, but to instead sustain and even increase the current
levels of segregation. By bringing limited improvements and services to the favelas under
Favela-Bairro, residents are more likely to stay in their communities and not attempt to
integrate into Rio. Basic services such as water and sewage are being provided, while the
78 Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), National Household Survey,
41 necessary social services promised such as education and health care have been
neglected. This pattern suggests that integration is not the intent. Furthermore, the large-
scale international funding and lack of results questions the true destination of the funds.
Conclusion
Following abolition in 1888 there has been a severe push to segregate the
racialized poor away from Rio’s wealthy downtown neighborhoods. Arguments for the
removal and relocations of the favelas and other communities have taken various forms
over the decades, demonstrating a repetitive pattern of segregation.
The initial justification for favelas’ removal was based on racial prejudice
following the centuries of slavery and elite economic, political, and social concern after
abolition. This early rationalization set a precedent which would dictate consequent years
of spatial segregation and social discrimination.
The subsequent phase was based on an argument of social inferiority coupled with
hygienic concerns. This period was epitomized by Perlman’s Myth of Marginality which
sought to disprove the dominant elite ideology that was polarizing the population. During this chapter the discriminatory attitudes of the elite began to transcend the previous boundary of race and include the burgeoning population of urban poor. The poor were represented as criminal, marginal elements of society, and government politics and elite practices sought to “civilize” their barbaric and unruly conduct. It was during this phase that spatial segregation most notably began to transcend into social marginalization and severe discrimination.
The new arguments advocating for eradication follow historical attempts to remove the urban poor from the wealthy neighborhoods, such as the Zona Sul, an ideal
42 which would further segregate the population both spatially and socially. This new attempt incorporates aspects of previous arguments, based on the danger of disease, fear of crime, and accusations of environmental degradation; creating a repetitive pattern of segregation. In reality, these contentions are based on class prejudice and racial stereotypes. The contemporary sustainability argument is merely another attempt at increasing the levels of spatial segregation between the wealthy neighborhoods and poor communities.
The recent levels of favela improvement through the Favela-Bairro program have only marginally enhanced infrastructure in the communities. Social services, which provide necessary components in facilitating social, political, and economic integration, have been neglected and are still deficient. This deliberate neglect is an attempt to stabilize the communities without providing an opportunity for integration.
Consequently, life in these communities is improved marginally without affecting or improving the existing social structure, a tactic which will increase both the spatial segregation and social marginalization in Rio. Furthermore, the insufficient results of the program continue a repetitive, historical pattern of neglect and isolation of the urban poor.
43
Chapter III: The Media’s Role in the Facilitation of Social Segregation
The previous chapter demonstrated how the formation of hillside favela communities allowed for degrees of spatial segregation to develop in Rio. This chapter will illuminate how media representations of the favelas and those who reside in them have facilitated the formation of contemporary social segregation in Rio and on an international scale.
For decades films featuring a ubiquitous presence of drugs and violence set to the backdrop of Rio’s and Sao Paolo’s favelas have facilitated the expansion of a negative stigma of favela residents internationally. These films and documentaries not only exploit the favelas, but also aid in the spreading of stereotypes surrounding drugs, violence, and criminality worldwide. The most prominent of these films are Hector Babenco’s Pixote and Fernando Meirelles’s City of God. These films provide vivid and often gruesome portrayal of life in Rio’s economically, socially, and racially segregated favelas.
This negative and detrimental portrayal is not limited to films, Rio and Brazil’s urban poor are consistently depicted negatively throughout media, inclusive of local and international newspapers, tourist materials, and international government warnings.
While the multitude of portrayals highlight varying depictions, a common representation is formed which stigmatizes the urban poor. This overwhelmingly negative portrayal has become so destructive to the lives of residents that local communities, non-governmental organizations, and non-profit organizations are embarking on grassroots campaigns to change the perception of their communities, using the internet as a primary tool to change the views of both local and international audiences.
44
Part I- Film and Television
Pixote
Based on the book A Infancia Dos Mortos by Jose Louzeiro, Pixote chronicles the
lives and criminal activities of abandoned children who live in the streets of Rio and Sao
Paolo. The film creates a powerful depiction of a violent and gruesome world of deserted
children set to the background of a city incapable of offering salvation to the desperate
population of urban poor.80 Released in 1982, the film became the third-most
commercially successful movie of the time, representing the start of what would become a phenomenon of exaggerating the lives of Brazil’s urban poor for a profit with severe social consequences.81 Furthermore, Pixote represents an important precedent in the
historical process of popular media’s violent depictions of urban youth in Brazil through
film, a trend which would be repeated decades later with another internationally-popular
film, Cidade de Deus.
In Pixote, Babenco used seven real street children in his cast, including eleven-
year-old Fernando Ramos da Silva, who played the lead role. Although da Silva was not
an abandoned street child, he did grow up in dismal poverty in Diadema, an industrial
district of Sao Paolo.82 The limited training of da Silva and many of the other actors
combined with a focus on improvisation created spontaneous and moving scenes
throughout the film, which for many created the illusion of mirroring reality.
80 Hector Babenco, director, Pixote, 1982. 81 Donald F. Stevens, Based on a True Story: Latin American History at the Movies (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1997) 201. 82 Stevens, Based on a True Story, 203.
45 The opening scenes of the film focus on the issues of social inequality which have
historically plagued Brazil. Babenco narrates several statistics illustrating the low quality
of life for many of Brazil’s poor while highlighting the serious issue of child
homelessness. While Babenco emphasizes the poor living standards, he simultaneously
attempts to accent the human quality of life in the favelas, stressing the strong work ethic
and important family ties of many residents.83
In the film the lead character, Pixote, is taken to a city jail after he and several
other suspects are singled out by police following a gruesome crime. The subsequent
depiction highlights the arrogance, corruption, and violence of the police while
emphasizing the dismal conditions in Brazil’s detention centers. This representation
covertly critiques the Brazilian government during a time of censorship under military
rule, and portrays a pessimistic perception of how the poor, abandoned children are
doomed to a lesser life compared to the city’s wealthier residents.
The gang of abandoned children travels to Rio where they engage in petty crime,
which eventually escalates to selling cocaine. When the film concludes Pixote has killed
three people, sold illegal drugs, and pimped women, although he is still a child. The film
ends with Pixote walking down a set of railroad tracks with a gun in his pocket. His friends are dead, he has been rejected by the mother figure, and is portrayed as destined for a future of crime and violence.84
While Babenco explicitly emphasizes the social, political, and economic
disadvantages the poor, abandoned children face in Brazil, his resulting depiction
contributes to the formation of stigmas and stereotypes regarding street children and
83 Babenco, director, Pixote. 84 Babenco, director, Pixote.
46 residents of the favelas. The excess of violence throughout the film and Pixote’s own evolution from a petty thief to a dangerous murderer contribute to a broader phenomenon of generalizing and stereotyping against the urban poor in Brazil, a perhaps unintentional
dichotomy considering Babenco’s consistent critiques on the state and systems within
Brazil in the film and throughout his career as a director.
In a strange irony, da Silva’s real life began to parallel that of his character in the
film. After his initial fame dissipated, he became involved in petty crime and was arrested
twice. He publicly chastised the police, claiming they were intentionally targeting him
because they were unable to distinguish reality from his film role. When da Silva was
nineteen, he was shot to death by police in a controversial encounter in Sao Paolo. Some
have called da Silva’s death an execution, although the police claim he and another boy
were caught while trying to rob a pedestrian.85
Six years after da Silva’s death, police vigilantes killed homeless children
sleeping near the entrances of Rio’s Candelaria Church and Modern Art Museum.86 The
continued targeting of poor street children by the police, evidenced by da Silva’s death
and the Candelaria massacre, illustrates the inability for the public to separate the stigmas
and exaggerated images of Brazil’s poor from reality. Furthermore, the film demonstrates
the start of a pattern of stereotyping through film which has resulted in the formation of
extreme social discrimination, marginalization, and segregation of Brazil’s urban poor.
City of God
The initial images of the film City of God are brutal and shocking and
demonstrate an erasure of any existence of humanity or remorse from the characters, a
85 Stevens, Based on a True Story, 209. 86 Michael J. Mitchell and Charles H. Wood, “Ironies of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality, and the Challenge to Democracy in Brazil.” Social Forces (The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 8.
47 theme which proves to be representative throughout the narrative. While many aspects of
the film indeed serve as an interpretation of reality, several facets are over-exaggerated, facilitating the creation of an intense stigma plaguing real-life communities in the aftermath of the film’s release. This stigma prevents real-life residents of City of God and favelas from obtaining jobs, loans, and even bank accounts, demonstrating how Rio’s segregation transcends the spatial and in recent years has evolved into an omnipresent
social divide comparable to that which existed in South Africa under apartheid.
The first time I watched City of God was two nights before I left for Rio. I was
startled by the film’s depiction of “reality,” and questioned how accurate it truly was. In
my second week in Brazil I discovered I would be visiting the actual City of God, or
Cidade de Deus. While I eagerly awaited the opportunity to experience the famous City
of God first-hand, I was unable to shake the visions of ten-year-olds waving pistols in the
air and recklessly murdering anyone who entered their path. The day of the visit I
emptied my backpack, I didn’t even bring a camera for fear it would be stolen. While I
did encounter residents struggling through unspeakable hardships, I was relieved to
discover my own reality in City of God, one which greatly contrasted that of the film.
The reality which I found made me aware of the harsh real-life effects residents suffered
in the aftermath of the film’s release. City of God’s international release introduced the
exaggerated and violent storyline to millions, and the media’s representation of life in the
favelas increased the existing spatial segregation while facilitating the formation of social
marginalization.
While City of God quickly became revolutionary in several capacities, it
simultaneously brought immense negative attention to both favela communities and
48 residents throughout Rio. The cinematic genius of the film made it an international hit,
while the disturbing content publicly exposed corruption and violence within Rio’s police
force. The depiction of life in Rio’s slums revealed the extreme social crises afflicting the
marginalized poor in Brazilian society. Initially seen as a “paradise” for Rio’s homeless
and destitute forcibly removed from other parts of the city, the harsh realities of neglected life within City of God became blatantly apparent in the film.
Thrown into a community rife with crime and violence and devoid of electricity, paved roads, and transportation, citizens of the community were forced into desperate situations to survive. Isolated on the periphery, City of God provided the government a dumping ground for the poor and unsightly following the forced removals from 1960-
1990. By relocating the underprivileged, these “ugly” elements of society became invisible, absent from the famous post-card images of Rio. This was emphasized by the
1891 Health Inspector Souza Lima, who admitted the removal of working-class neighborhoods exemplified the ruling class’s attempts to erase visible poverty from the city when referring to the destruction of the downtown corticos, “in the interest of freeing the central city from vice and visible poverty.”87 While the interests of the elite were
served with the elimination of working-class neighborhoods from Rio’s downtown, the
film accurately depicts the reality of relocated residents being forced into a life without
services and government support.
The film depicts hoards of uneducated street children forced into a predetermined
life of crime, a cycle represented with little optimism for change. Unable to read or write,
they are able to operate a wide range of weapons and commit unspeakable violence
87 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 74.
49 before entering their teens.88 While Brazil does struggle with large numbers of orphaned
children who find street life the only option, the film’s emphasis exaggerates the reality
behind the situation and makes every child growing up in the favelas seem like a
criminal.
In reality, City of God and favelas throughout Rio are thriving communities, with
children who strive to bring change to their community. In an interview with high school
students in Cidade de Deus I asked what types of professions the students hoped to
pursue. The answers varied, but many hoped to be doctors, lawyers, teachers, or work in
the military.89 Although these students, who have continued their education into high school, are not the majority, they represent one of the many positive aspects of
impoverished communities absent in the popular media’s representation. Instead, the
media chooses to depict the violence and crime which sells more movies, newspapers,
and draws in more viewers to the nightly news. This bias to emphasize negative elements
was stressed by Fabio Catarcion, a Brazilian who moved to the U.S. from a neighborhood
outside Rio, “Bad news sells more than good news; they have a tendency to only show
the bad.”90
Lost in these depictions are the extreme negative consequences for the residents
of these communities and the social segregation which develops as a result. The film City
of God is only one such example which vividly depicts the negative portrayal of life in
Rio’s impoverished communities.
While the role of drugs is central in the film, its function in reality is two-fold.
Although crime and violence often accompany the presence of drugs, the gangers and
88 Fernando Meirelles and Katia Lund, directors, Cidade de Deus, 2002. 89 Field Notes, PEM, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006. 90 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007
50 drug lords typically bring stability and security to the neighborhoods. Represented
through Lil’ Ze’s harsh punishment of “The Runts,” the reduction in petty crime reduces
the police presence and increases the drug dealers’ ability to do business.91 This in turn
brings a sense of safety and security to the community. In the real City of God, it was
also explained that drug lords provide leadership and look out for members of the
community. Because the favelas are often neglected by local and regional government
policies, services can be difficult to obtain. The drug lords yield a great deal of power,
and have the capacity to bring electricity, cable, medicine, and other services into the
peripheral communities.92 Fabio explained how this aspect of the film is grounded in
reality, “The drug lords give protection, it’s a problem that’s been going on, there is no
government. There are politics inside (the favelas) they (drug dealers) are very smart.”93
City of God and other media representations neglect the positive elements of the drug trade and instead choose to focus on the violence and crime it creates. This tactic shifts the focus away from the government’s inability to provide for residents and instead blames the residents of the favelas for the crime and violence which plagues Rio and
Brazil as a whole.
While City of God depicted many aspects of the drug trade, the film neglected to illustrate how the majority of the drugs are consumed by middle and upper class residents. Favela residents are typically unable to afford drugs, and Rio’s wealthy provide the dealers with their largest markets. The film does not show drugs within wealthier communities, portraying the problem as localized in the favelas. Rose Compans argues that the Zona Sul is the leading consumer of drugs in Rio and provides the largest market
91 Meirelles and Lund, Cidade de Deus. 92 Field Notes, ASPA, Rocinha, February 1, 2006. 93 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007.
51 for drug dealers. However, whenever arrests are made during drug transactions, it is
always the slum resident, or seller, that is caught, never the wealthy, privileged buyer.94
The film makes Rio and Brazil’s drug problem appear isolated in the favelas and neglects the larger economic system within which the drug trade operates and further criminalizes the residents of the favelas, increasing both the stigma and the prevalence of social segregation.
An intriguing element of the film regards the role of race. Several white characters, such as Carrot and Tiago, play central roles in the typically racially- marginalized slums.95 These white characters demonstrate how the stigmas and
stereotypes in Rio and Brazil are moving beyond race alone and now transcend class and
socio-economic status. Historically the favelas have been predominately composed of
black or of mixed race residents, arising in conjunction with abolition in 1888.96 The
spatial and social divides which historically existed were principally drawn across racial
lines. Bases on my contemporary observations, I argue that today Rio’s segregation is
based on more than a racial hierarchy and also includes class and social status. Favela
residents, black or white, lack these elements and are prevented from entering the higher
echelons of Brazilian society. As result, they are spatially segregated and socially
marginalized. This shift from segregation based on race to class follows a similar pattern which occurred in South Africa under apartheid. Seekings and Nicoli argue that it is in fact class, not race, which played the most important role in facilitating segregation under apartheid, “the primary basis of inequality shifted from race to class under apartheid.”97
94 Lecture Notes, Rose Compans, February 3, 2006. 95 Meirelles and Lund, Cidade de Deus. 96 Brian Godfrey, Class Notes, September 14, 2006. 97 Seekings and Nicoli, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa, 236.
52 This connection suggests a current global trend of social hierarchy and subsequent social,
spatial, and political exclusion based more on class and status than race. This exclusion prohibits social mobility and traps the urban poor in a cycle of continual poverty without government assistance.
In my discussion with teenage students, I encountered a far different perspective for the future of children in City of God and favelas in general. Outraged at the depiction of their community in City of God, the students filmed their own video in an effort to show the positive elements of their community. An official community center, Programa de Educacao Pelo Movimento (PEM), was formed which aimed to empower children through capoeira (a form of martial arts originating from Africa) and educational lessons after the end of the traditional school day. When asked what their hopes were for the future, almost all the students responded that they hoped to leave City of God and escape the economic and social marginalization and depression they are currently trapped in.
The majority want to pursue jobs in law, theater, medicine, biology, education, and the military.98 While this perspective provided an optimistic contrast to City of God, it made
me question whether the goals were realistic. Only three percent of children from City of
God complete high school. Only one high school exists in the entire community of
65,000 residents (official government statistic according to census is 38,016).99 The local
perception for this severe discrepancy asserts that the lack of educational opportunities is
a deliberate governmental effort to keep the slum population as uneducated service
workers.
98 Interview Notes, PEM, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006. 99 Communitarian Committee of the City of God, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006.
53 The release of City of God had severe repercussions for the residents of the real-
life community. Immense negativity surrounded the film, and the self-esteem of the entire
community plummeted. An image of a violent and dangerous community circulated
throughout Brazil and the world. It became increasingly difficult for residents to obtain jobs, as an intense stigma encompassed the community’s residents. The hardships encountered following the film resulted in the collaboration of twenty separate institutions to form the Communitarian Committee of the City of God, which engages in an effort to raise the community. The group was formed in 2001, united in the collective struggle to transform both the actual and perceived realities of City of God. Their slogan
became “We may never leave this place, but we want to change the world.” Furthermore, a movie is in production, Morro Mulher, which depicts a more realistic vision of the community based on residents’ own experiences.100
City of God exposed many issues of social inequality, injustice, and corruption
which were deeply rooted in reality. Although many of the aspects portrayed in the film
were based in reality, the exaggeration of violence and criminality combined with the
absence of positive elements of the community made the overall depiction of favelas and
the poor extremely detrimental. The impact of the film on the real-life community of
Cidade de Deus and favelas across Brazil caused an irreversible stigma to attach to the residents who were already struggling to survive on the margins of the city, society, and
economy. The film is representative of the popular media’s exploitation of the favelas
and the deliberate efforts to depict negative aspects of the communities. These negative
depictions have resulted in an increase in the existing spatial segregation and have
allowed segregation to transcend into the social sphere.
100 Communitarian Committee of the City of God, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006.
54 City of Men
The international media attention resulting from City of God’s success brought
global intrigue and curiosity surrounding Brazil’s favelas. Worldwide audiences were
shocked by the violence and poverty depicted in the film, but still wanted to see more. To capitalize on the international interest in the favelas, Fernando Meirelles developed a spin-off television series, City of Men. The series gives a gritty, although more human depiction of Rio’s favelas seen through the eyes of two children, Acerola and Laranjinha.
Like City of God, the series of short episodes is filmed in the favelas and uses local children as actors. Similarly, it emphasizes the role of violence and crime in the everyday lives of favelados, perpetuating the negative stigmas and increasing the social marginalization and segregation of residents of Rio’s impoverished communities.
Furthermore, the series provides an example of how popular media capitalizes, exploits, and emphasizes the negative aspects of life in the favelas for material gain, giving little regard to the consequences for those who live in these communities.
City of Men follows two young boys through their daily lives, lives which are often interrupted by crime, violence, and drug dealing in their favela in Rio. Unlike City of God which focused on the role of drugs and violence in the community, City of Men focuses on daily life and illustrates how drugs infiltrate the lives of most residents.
Watching the first episode, “The Emperor’s Crown,” it is hard to ignore the emphasis and obsession with violence. While at school the boys are taught about Napoleon’s attack on
England, although the only interest in the lesson regards weapons, guns, and how many people were killed in the effort. A familiarity with weapons is quickly demonstrated when one boy asks the teacher what kind of guns Napoleon used, listing pistols, rifles,
55 and AR-15’s in his question. The focus on violence peaks when Acerola is violently
mugged and robbed in his own community by a group of boys about his own age.101 This
event portrays that no one is safe in the favelas, which are so overridden with crime and
violence that even the residents are not safe.
Aside from the exaggeration of violence and crime the series plays off many more
stereotypes which only emphasize the existing stigmas and marginalization of the poor.
At the school the children are depicted as uneducated, undisciplined, and unmotivated.
Although some of the students are in their early teens, no one has ever heard of Napoleon
or the countries he conquered. The only way the students understand history is through
making parallels between Napoleon and the drug dealers’ turf wars. Furthermore, the
students are rowdy and will not listen to their teacher who tirelessly and ineffectively
struggles to gain the respect and attention of her class. The young children constantly
shout obscenities, showing no discipline or respect for one another. None of the students
show any interest in obtaining an education and only become interested in their lesson
when they hear a field trip outside the favela is planned. Finally, within the all-black
classroom an interest and familiarity with sex is demonstrated at a very early age.102
These depictions greatly contrast with my own observations in several favela communities. The students I observed and spoke with believed obtaining an education was their only hope of ever leaving the favela, and greatly valued their opportunity to learn. Additionally, they emphasized that despite the existence of drugs, the favela is a neighborhood with strong values and community ties.103 Students and community
101 Cesar Charlone, director, Cidade dos Homens: A Coroa do Imperador, original air date October 15, 2002. 102 Charlone, Cidade dos Homens: A Coroa do Imperador. 103 Interview Notes, PEM, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006.
56 members also voiced frustration over the media’s representation of their community, explaining that only negative events involving drugs, crime, and violence get press coverage, when positive aspects are consistently neglected.104 These positive elements are blatantly absent from both of Meirelles’s portrayals, illustrating how the popular media’s representation of poor communities facilitates the formation of a negative stigma surrounding the urban poor, which has consequently helped to form social segregation.
Favela Rising and Bus 174
Recent documentaries have attempted to defy the patterns of negative and violent representations of favelas. While to a degree the favelas are still being exploited through these films, the more just representation helps outsiders understand there is more to these communities than drugs and violence, and that there is a reason behind criminals’ violent ways.
Favela Rising chronicles a drum, reggae, dance group and demonstrates how their existence becomes a transforming social movement within their community. While the film shows the reality of violence it simultaneously depicts the prospects of hope for the future through the community’s children.105
Bus 174 recounts the dramatic four hour hijacking of a Rio bus which captivated
Brazil in June of 2000. The film is based on in-depth research including stock footage from the incident, interviews, and official documents. The film tells two stories, one of the hijacking and another of the hijacker’s life. The film uncovers that the hijacker was a typical Rio street kid who transformed into a violent criminal because he was denied by
104 Interview Notes, ASPA, Rocinha, February 1, 2006. 105 Mike Mochary and Jeff Zombalist, directors, Favela Rising, 2006.
57 society. While the film certainly focuses on violence, it looks at the hijacker in a humane
light, and blames Brazilian society’s marginalization for the man’s violent behavior.106
These two films help to defy popular media’s historical depiction of the poor.
Blame is placed on society, not the individuals and residents of the communities. These types of representations could assist in changing how favelas and favelados are viewed,
and may help to reverse the marginalization these communities currently face.
Part II- Press
The media’s negative representation of the favelas which has contributed to the
formation of social segregation is not limited to film and television. Brazilian and
international press are equally responsible for the perpetuation of violence through only
reporting the negative and violent events in the favelas and in Brazil as a whole.
The press’s negative representation of the poor began shortly after the abolition of slavery. Newspapers serving elite interests advocated for the removal of beggars from the streets after abolition and the subsequent economic stagnation forced many former slaves into homelessness. Through the newspapers, it was proposed that police remove these visible indicators of poverty from the ‘well-traveled’ streets, where they would not be as evident to visiting dignitaries, businessmen, and travelers.107
The negative depiction of the poor has continued locally with O Globo and TV
Globo, which control the majority of press in Brazil. The media giant has historically been accused of aligning with the government and propagating an agenda instead of presenting an objective view. These accusations led Simon Hartog and the BBC to create a documentary in 1993, Beyond Citizen Kane, illustrating Globo’s dominance and
106 Jose Padilha and Felipe Lacerda, directors, Bus 174, 2004. 107 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 37.
58 subjectivity in Brazil. The film criticizes the media’s group’s power and influence over
Brazilian politics and society and claims Globo intentionally manipulates news to
influence public opinion.108 Globo’s founder, Roberto Marinho, came under particular
criticism, being compared to the fictional character Charles Foster Kane in the film
Citizen Kane. The rights to the film were purchased by Marinho’s family, who owned
Globo until his death in 2003. The family has refused to license the film to broadcasters
or allow for its distribution, in effect silencing the criticisms of Globo.109 Pirated copies
are available on the internet through peer-peer networks, and copies have been known to
be distributed amongst political parties, although there is still no official distribution of the film.
Through interviews I conducted it was made clear that both the residents of the favelas and general public feel Globo negatively represents the poor in Brazil by only giving press coverage to the to violent stories relating to crime and drugs from the favelas and exaggerating the crime which does occur. When discussing whether crime in Brazil is a real or imagined threat, Selma Barone, former resident of Gloria in Rio and current owner of New York City’s Ipanema Girl Brazilian market, responded, “Crime does
happen, but a lot of things are made up, like Globo.”110 In a separate interview I asked
Marcos Viana whether he thought Globo depicted an accurate account of reality to which
he responded, “It’s half and half. They use their own imagination; if it’s good for TV they
show it. They show a lot of bad things in the favelas, no good. They only show the
negatives, the violence, the drugs, they only show the negatives even though there are
108 John Ellis, “Visionary fighter for unpopular causes, Obituary: Simon Hartog,” The Guardian (August 20, 1992). 109 “Brazil: Beyond Citizen Kane,” Worldcat < http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/37070991> 110 Interview, Selma Barone, January 10, 2007.
59 good people who live there.”111 When I asked Fabio his opinion about Globo’s depiction
of the poor he responded, “They only portray the negative. There are a lot of nice people,
I know there are a lot of good things in the favelas, the bad guys are the minority. They
(Globo) play it politically.”112 Fabio echoed a similar sentiment regarding Globo’s
representation through novellas, popular Brazilian soap operas:
They (Globo) manipulate everything. You can see it in the novellas, everyone watches the novellas, especially the people in the favelas. The lower class is manipulated through them; you can see the division in society very clearly. The elite always dominate over the lower classes on novellas, and the rich are the actors, there are never poor people as actors.113
Favela residents I met with were outraged by Globo’s historical stance to
eradicate the slums, and many felt that Globo’s continual negative reporting was a
deliberate political effort to sway public opinion against the poor. Recently, Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez has attacked the media giant, even calling the organization an
“enemy of the people.”114 In a speech given at the Rio de Janeiro state legislature in
January Chavez attacked Globo, claiming “They want to distort me, but they are the
distorted ones.”115 At the speech supporters chanted “Chavez we’re with you” and booed
Globo reporters present to the extent that they were prompted to take off their Globo
media badges for fear of harassment. Citizens at the speech claimed Globo had political
aims in their deliberate portrayal of Chavez, “They want to convert Chavez into a demon
so that they will reject him,” one supporter emphasized.116
111 Interview, Marcos Viana, January 10, 2007. 112 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007. 113 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007. 114 Jeb Blunt and Katia Cortes, “Chavez Calls Brazil’s Globo ‘Enemy of the People,’” Bloomberg
60 Echoing a similar sentiment, Rose Compans recently presented research at the
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro regarding Globo’s alignment with environmental
agencies and development companies, and the coalition’s efforts to advocate for the elimination of favelas in Rio. According to Compans’ research, Globo and several major development companies recently aligned with environmental agencies and are currently
arguing that favelas should be eradicated based on claims the communities are
detrimental to the environment. The argument states that deforestation combined with
dumping and inadequate sewage not only make the favelas dangerous to the environment,
but also reduce the quality of life for surrounding tax payers and devalue nearby property.
Proponents claim that eliminating the favelas and relocating the residents would alleviate this social, economic, and environmental strain. The development companies argue that the prime real estate made available through the eradication of the favelas could be used to construct luxury condominiums, which are more sustainable and safer for the environment than the existing favelas.117 When I asked Fabio whether he had heard about
this argument he replied:
I have heard things like this. There’s a contrast between the expensive land and the favelas. Several years ago land in Ipanema was the most expensive per foot in the world, and then right next door is the favela. It happens more in the Zona Sul because the rich don’t like the poor next to them. Even if you gave people in the favelas nicer housing somewhere else most of them wouldn’t want to move because it is a community and they like it.118
This argument is primarily targeting favelas in wealthy areas, particularly the
Zona Sul, where the majority of favelas are better organized and well developed with
adequate services. In all, the public ministry has requested that thirteen favelas be
removed due to their threat to the environment. Currently favela removal requires
compensation to residents, although a proposal to rewrite the law to exclude
117 Lecture Notes, Rose Compans, February 3, 2006. 118 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007.
61 compensation has been advised. In lieu of eradication some have proposed building walls around established favelas, like the infamous Rocinha, allegedly the largest favela
community in Latin America, with a significant drug trafficking distribution center (see
figure 3.1).119
Figure 3.1: Favela Rocinha
Paved streets, legal power lines, and permanent infrastructure demonstrate Rocinha’s establishment as one of Rio’s most developed favelas.120
This argument continues a historical pattern in which various arguments have
been made to advocate for the favelas eradication. The environmentalist approach is only
the most recent of these assertions, following claims of disease, race, and crime in
previous decades. Furthermore, Globo’s extensive, negative media coverage emphasizes
the subjective role of Brazil’s dominant media group.
119 Lecture notes, Rose Compans, Februrary 3, 2006. 120 Photograph, International Honors Program.
62 International press has also played a significant role in asserting stereotypes of the
poor through solely reporting negative and violent stories. Favelas come up in passing
many times in articles relating to Rio or Brazil in New York Times articles and other
publications, where the definition given is “dangerous” and “crime-ridden slums”121 or
“modern-day fiefdoms.”122 The only positive aspect of some of the descriptions is the
inconsistent inclusion of the word “neighborhood,” which infers the existence of some
type of community. The continual correlation between the favelas and violence
negatively impacts the communities’ residents, the vast majority of whom are not
involved in the drug trade or criminal acts (see figure 3.2). Residents I spoke with
estimated that between eighty and ninety-five percent of favela residents are unconnected
with the drug trade, emphasizing that the stereotypes are based on an imagined threat
rather than reality.123 In particular, the travel warnings to avoid these communities give international travelers a bias against these neighborhoods, which is only reinforced by
Brazilian public opinion. The spread of the stereotyping and stigmas against the poor has reached an international scale in contemporary times, and has allowed social segregation to form locally in Brazil. This has been particularly evident with the 2007 Carnival celebrations and the anticipation of hosting the Pan American games in July of 2007.
Although the BBC was prompted to make a documentary chronicling Globo’s slanted presentation of facts, their own coverage of events in Brazil and in the favelas has been overwhelmingly negative. The majority of news regarding Brazil involves violence, typically originating in the favelas. Two recent headlines in BBC stories were “9 Killed
121 Jason Bracelin, “A Second Opinion,” Phoenix New Times < http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2004-01- 01/news/a-second-opinion/> January 1, 2004. 122 Sam Logan, “A Thin Veil of Beauty Shrouds Reality in Rio de Janeiro,” In Motion Magazine, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/opin/slogan2.html> September 28, 2003. 123 Field notes, PEM, Cidade de Deus, February 2, 2006.
63
Figure 3.2: Press Headlines
Article titles from a selection of internet and printed sources illustrate how local and international media representations perpetuate stigmas and stereotypes, facilitating spatial segregation and social marginalization of the poor in Rio and Brazil.124
124 Kelly Graham, Media Representations Collage, April 2007.
64 in Rio slum Shoot-out”125 and “Rio slums blighted by gun crime.”126 The violent nature of news from Brazil leads the international audience to regard Brazil as a dangerous and violent country, and additionally causes the general public to believe this violence is caused by favela residents, who are characterized as criminals and drug dealers. In addition to the travel warnings and negative depictions, the international press’s coverage offer few positive stories to portray contemporary efforts to increase community development and neighborhood action within the favelas. This one-sidedd portrayal contributes to the formation of social and spatial segregation which affects the everyday lives of the urban poor.
Part III: Travel Guides
Travel guides and tourism books additionally contribute to the perpetuation of stereotypes through offering daunting warnings about crime and violence to prospective tourists. The materials recommend avoiding the favelas and poor communities where the threat of violence and crime is sited as high to foreigners, and warn travelers of “gangs” or groups of teenagers, street children, and beggars. While crime rates throughout Brazil are high, they are comparable to some of the most violent U.S. cities such as Washington
D.C. and Detroit. The average murder rate for Brazil is lower than the cities of
Washington D.C., Detroit, and Baltimore.127 Crime rates, especially murder and homicide
rates, are often inflated, which results in an over-exaggeration of the reality of crime and
125 Steve Kingstone, “Nine killed in Rio slum shoot-out,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6352759.stm Februrary 12, 2007. 126 “Rio slums blighted by gun crime,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4338652.stm October 21, 2005. 127 Celia Landmann Szwarcwald, Francisco Inacio Bastos, Francisco Viacava, and Carla Lourenco Tavares de Andrade, “Income Inequality and Homicide Rates in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,”American Journal of Public Health, (December 17, 1998), 846.
65 contributes to what Caldeira refers to as a “culture of fear,” in which a fear of the lower
classes is established based on a real or imagined threat of violence.128
The phenomenon of exaggerating crime was particularly evident in a recent BBC
article, ironically aimed at highlighting Rio’s reduced murder rate. Titled, “Rio murder
rate slashed,” the article does acknowledge a severe decrease in Rio’s murder rate, from
78 per 100,000 in 1994 to approximately 50 in 1999. The article concludes, however, by
claiming the current murder rate is still five times that of New York City.129 Statistics cite
New York City’s murder rate at 16.8 per 100,000130, and Rio’s at 37.8.131 While Rio’s
murder rate is still considerably higher than that of New York City, it is no where near
five times worse, nor is it near the 50 people per 100,000 sited in the BBC article. This
severe exaggeration carried out by international media contributes to the formation of a
culture of fear and increases the social marginalization of people living in the poor
neighborhoods where the threat is claimed to be so high. These exaggerations
additionally facilitate segregation’s transition from existing spatial realms to social forms
by categorizing all favelados as criminals, afflicting residents who seek job opportunities,
bank accounts, and government services.
In addition to exaggerating statistics, travel guides prominently display advisories
to prospective travelers with warnings of violent dangers, particularly targeting poor
neighborhoods and groups of the urban poor. While these warnings contribute to the
formation of stereotypes and stigmas against the already-disadvantaged poor, they
128 Caldeira, City of Walls, 10-11. 129 Steven Cviic, “Rio murder rate slashed,” BBC News < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/323708.stm> (April 20, 1999). 130 “The United States of Murder,” BBC News
66 additionally contribute to a greater association between Brazil and crime internationally.
One such example was recently posted on the Fodor’s “Rio Safety Tips” section on their
website. The message warns travelers of theft and describes specific tactics, “Another
member of the gang may strike from behind, grabbing your valuables and disappearing
into the crowd.”132 Despite this violent description, an earlier passage in the article
advocated that crime can happen anywhere and that many people feel crime is
exaggerated in Brazil, “Despite Rio's reputation, crime is no more likely than in any large
city, and many cariocas feel that the city's safety is unfairly portrayed by the media.”133
Many other travel sites offer similar warnings, highlighting alleged increases in violent crime, gang activity, and police corruption. The World Travel Guide posted this advisory to travelers, “Most visits are trouble-free. However, levels of crime and violence are high, especially in major cities. Visitors should be vigilant, especially when going out after dark.”134 The advice was based on information provided by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, representing foreign governments’ role in
perpetuating the threat of fear and stigma against the poor.
The U.S. Department of State also offers a variety of warnings for potential
travelers to Brazil, including the threat of violent crime and rape. In the Consular
Information Sheet a warning to specifically avoid the favelas is even given, “Very poor neighborhoods known as ‘favelas,’ such as those located at steep hillsides in Rio de
Janeiro, are found throughout Brazil. These areas are sites of uncontrolled criminal
132 “Rio Safety Tips- City Safety,” Fodor’s
67 activity and are often not patrolled by police. U.S. citizens are advised to avoid these unsafe areas.”135 These broad generalizations characterize all favelas as dangerous and threatening and exaggerate the levels of crime actually found in these neighborhoods.
This type of oversimplification has contributed to the prevalence of contemporary stigmas against favela residents and has been a substantial factor in the social segregation
Rio’s urban poor currently face.
The negative representation through various tourism companies greatly contrasts the efforts of local tourism agencies to exploit the favelas for their purported exotic, vibrant, and sometimes dangerous lifestyle. Favela tours have become a popular feature in Rio, where travelers can pay to be toured through several favelas to experience the
“culture.” One company, Exotic Tours, even has a message on their website to emphasize the favelas are safe for visitors, “Be assured this in an absolutely safe tour as the locals
136 welcome tourists and visitors alike.”
Critics have called the tours exploitative of the poverty in these communities, despite the income it brings to the local neighborhood. The tour companies claim the tours are aimed at changing the perception of the communities, however many also stress the aspect of danger and adventure. Other agencies recommend venturing into the favelas only to experience the acclaimed samba schools, especially during the preparations for
Carnival. These agencies are exploiting the cultural elements of the favelas while still warning of the danger of crime and violence, which contributes to the negative representation of the poor.
135 “Consular Information Sheet,” U.S. Department of State
68 Although many sources offer warnings about crime, with specific advisories regarding the favelas, their presence is absent from most local and tourist maps. Despite the overwhelming fear they create, the Brazilian government and local tourism agencies make every effort to make favelas invisible to outsiders. (see figures 3.3-3.5) This tactic is representative of how residents of the favelas have been treated and depicted historically; outsiders are warned of their presence while residents are treated as if they didn’t exist.
Figure 3.3: Sheraton Hotel Map of Rio I
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the Sheraton Hotel’s attempts to visually erase the favelas which sprawl along the landscape of the hill directly behind it in the Zona Sul. Two of the most notorious and populated favelas, Rocinha and Vidigal, which are home to hundreds of thousands of residents, are located alongside the hill depicted as green space in the two maps. 137
137 “Rio de Janeiro Map,” Asociacion Latinoamericana de Transporte Aereo,
69 Figure 3.4: Sheraton Hotel Map of Rio II
Similar to figure 3.3, the favelas Rocinha and Vidigal are blatantly absent from this depiction.138
Figure 3.5: Google Earth Image of Rocinha and Vidigal
Contrasting the depiction of the Sheraton Hotel maps, this Google Earth image clearly depicts the presence of the two favelas south of the Ipanema and Cocacabana beaches.139
138 ”Sheraton Towers Hotel Rio de Janeiro: Hotel Location,” AsiaRooms.com
70 The attempts to keep favelas off of official maps are also evident through analyzing satellite images and maps of Rio’s international airport (see figures 3.6 and
3.7).
Figure 3.6: Tourist Map of Rio, Rio International Airport
In this image the area next to the airport is depicted as empty, when in reality the Baixa do Sapateiro favela is located in this space.140
140 “Rio de Janeiro Map,” Berndtson City Streets 1:13,000, Berndtson & Berndtson, 2003.
71 Figure 3.7: Google Earth Image of Rio’s International Airport
In this Google Earth image, the Baixo do Sapateiro favela is clearly visible east of the airport.141
Part IV: Changing the Perception of the Poor
In an attempt to reverse the negative and detrimental portrayals perpetuated by the media, many local organizations have recently embarked on projects to improve the images of favelas and of the communities’ residents. Websites such as Favela Faces are attempting to change the public’s conceptualization of favelas, while organizations including Favela Painting and Catalytic Communities aim to enhance the sense of pride in the communities while improving the favelas’ image to the outside. Together, these contemporary attempts at community development have the potential to temper the decades of negative portrayals which have left favela residents spatially and socially segregated.
141 Image, Google Earth.
72 Favela Faces is a bilingual website in both English and Portuguese which utilizes
photographs and video interviews to tell the stories of four residents of Rio’s favelas and
surrounding neighborhoods. The website describes the intent of the portrayals, “These
four stories relate the problems facing favela residents, the ways in which they are
working to overcome them, and how they have and continue to improve their
communities with the limited resources available to them.”142 The descriptions
accompanied by pictures of the residents and communities offer visitors a genuine
introduction to the reality of life in the favelas. While violence and drugs are occasionally
mentioned, the resident’s daily struggles to survive in an environment offering little in
return take most importance. The depictions explain the history of the residents and the
circumstances driving them into life in the favelas, including the government’s forced
removals.
Favela Painting is a project which began in November of 2006 and seeks to
improve the image of the favelas and lives of residents by enhancing and beautifying the
communities. The project realizes that an important factor in improving the lives of
favelados is changing public opinion, “In order for the lives of people living in the favelas to improve, the popular perception of their neighborhoods must improve. The core of our idea is to help this happen by painting an entire hillside favela.”143 The project
aims to first improve the structure and quality of each home, and then paint it in
meticulous coordination with the surrounding homes to create a giant image visible from
prominent locations outside the community. The project is one of the few that addresses
142 “The Story of Four People in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas,” Favela Faces. 143 “Favela Painting Project,” FavelaPainting < http://www.favelapainting.com/> (March 2007).
73 both the infrastructural needs of the community in conjunction with the need to change
popular perception to allow for increased social acceptance and integration.
Catalytic Communities, or CatComm, is an internet network founded in Rio
which showcases community-generated solutions to everyday problems in impoverished
neighborhoods. The organization describes itself as a tool for community support,
“Catalytic Communities uses technology to link grassroots community groups so they can learn from each other's successes, and support one another's work.”144 The website deals with a variety of issues worldwide, including HIV prevention, encouraging economic growth, educational suggestions, and community organization.
Since it’s inception in 2000, CatComm has facilitated over 130 projects in nine countries, with many new projects currently in progress. The program’s founder, Theresa
Williamson, emphasizes how the inspiration for the organization came from the positive elements she witnessed in the favelas, “The idea for Catalytic Communities (CatComm) came about thanks to direct observation of positive things that were going on in our communities here in Rio de Janeiro. Small projects and actions - sometimes one resident working to support a small number of neighbors - but these individuals, together, have a great potential to transform society.”145
This image of social transformation through small, positive change on the
community level is continually lacking from popular media’s representation of the urban
poor. Despite the absence of these positive portrayals, there is hope for a change in the perception of the urban poor through the efforts of the many non-profit organizations and
community groups currently struggling to improve the image of their neighborhoods.
144 “What We Do,” Catalytic Communities < http://www.comcat.org/novo/sobreacomcat.asp> (March 2007). 145 Catalytic Communities
74 Conclusion
Historically the urban poor in Brazil have suffered severe negative representations from various forms of media. Beginning at the turn of the century, newspapers represented the opinions of the wealthy, advocating for the removal of poor neighborhoods and erasing visible indicators of poverty from the downtown by ridding the streets of beggars. This subjective and detrimental representation has continued today, with the media highlighting crime and violence in the favelas, a tactic which criminalizes the poor and facilitates the formation of stigmas and stereotypes negatively impacting the everyday lives of the poor. Furthermore, these portrayals have played a substantial role in both the development of spatial segregation and social marginalization.
While the various media depictions demonstrate different emphases, there is a common, negative representation of the urban poor in Rio and Brazil. Films and print media often dramatically sensationalize the drugs and violence in the favelas, while tourism creates an ironic dichotomy by emphasizing the threat of crime while exploiting the neighborhoods for their “exotic” culture and favela tours. International government agencies also contribute to these negative representations by advising citizens to stay away from impoverished neighborhoods and stressing the danger of Rio and Brazil to foreigners.
While these negative representations have diverse aims and incentives, they reinforce and enhance the existing spatial and social divisions. Through decades of detrimental representation, a culture of fear has been created in which Brazil’s rich fear the poor. This phenomenon has created a severe level of social marginalization and segregation of the urban poor throughout Brazil, especially in the metropolitan centers.
75 Although many communities and non-profit organizations have responded to the years of negative representations by attempting to purport their own depictions, it is difficult to reverse the image ingrained both locally and internationally. The resulting level of segregation classifies Rio and other areas of Brazil as contemporary apartheid districts.
76 Chapter IV: Rio’s Beaches as a Site of Public, Social Segregation
The previous chapter illustrated how the transition from spatial to social segregation has been facilitated by the media’s negative portrayal of the urban poor in
Rio and Brazil. This chapter will utilize Rio’s beaches to contradict Gilberto Freyre’s theory of racial democracy and evidence the social marginalization and segregation which blatantly polarizes the population.
For decades it was largely argued that a racial harmony existed in Brazil despite the country’s long history of slavery and racial diversity. During slavery an estimated three and a half million Africans were imported into Brazil, accounting for one third of the total slave trade in the Western Hemisphere.146 Following Princess Isabel’s edict of the abolition of slavery in 1888, the majority of the former slave population became vagrants, homeless, and jobless.147 This large population visibly represented Brazil’s pre- existing racial and class divides until sociologist Gilberto Freyre introduced the theory of racial democracy in the 1930s. Freyre asserted that Brazil’s racial diversity could be looked at as a positive attribute, contrasting the previous negative depictions which had been prominent since abolition.
In his publication Casa-Grande & Senzala Freyre claimed that the racial mixing prevalent post-abolition was not detrimental to society as had previously been argued, but was in fact enriching Brazil’s culture. He argued that it was not race which created the extreme social inequalities in Brazil, but instead the poverty which led to class divisions.
146 Brian Godfrey, Lecture Notes, September 7, 2006. 147 June E. Hahner, Poverty and Politics: The Urban Poor in Brazil, 1870-1920. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 70.
77 According to Freyre social classes were determined by economic, not racial disparities.148
This assertion echoes Seekings and Nicoli, who prioritize class over race in determining levels of segregation in South Africa.149
Freyre’s philosophy may have temporarily helped facilitate tolerance and gradual acceptance for mixed races in Brazil. Peace was achieved despite the rapid increase of socioeconomic and cultural divides across race and class lines. The perception of racial harmony which resulted was idealized in Brazil and throughout the world. While I agree
with Freyre’s assertion that economic disparities contribute to levels of social acceptance,
I do not see a racially or socially democratic Brazilian culture. The racial and class
tensions which hid behind the guise of harmony and democracy for decades are now
exposed through the blatant spatial and social segregation. Today, Brazilians are
beginning to realize race and class affect every facet of life, both public and private.
One of the strongest contemporary arguments advocating for the existence of a
racial democracy in Rio and Brazil is the democratic use of public space. Roger Putnam
argued that urban public space can function as a site of discursive democracy globally by having a leveling effect on all tiers of society.150 Putnam models his theory after the
boulevards and cafes of European cities, where citizens are seen to be equal on the street.
While Rio was architecturally and socially modeled after a similar European ideal, the
public reproduction of the discriminatory social hierarchy negates the existence of any
democracy, and in fact promotes the extension of segregation, from the private, spatial
sphere to public and social realms. This phenomenon contradicts Putnam’s conclusions
148 Gilberto Freyre, The masters and the slaves [Casa-Grande & Senzala] A study in the development of Brazilian civilization (New York: Knopf, 1946). 149 Seekings and Nicoli, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa, 236. 150 Roger Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6.
78 and is best exemplified by the blatant segregation amongst Rio’s beaches. Racial and class divides transcend the previous boundary of the favela and the asphalt and are replicated in a variety of public spaces, most prominently, the beaches. This assertion that little social harmony exists in Rio and that the reality is far more socially divided was emphasized by Fabio:
There is a separation between the rich and poor. There is a perception that only bad people live in the favelas, even outside of the country- when probably eighty percent of the people are good, working people. People in other countries know about the favelas, everyone thinks they are bad people there and no one wants to interact with them.151
I had been in Rio for less than 12 hours when I found myself seeking the famous
beaches. The host family I was staying with had an eighteen year old daughter, Naira,
who had grown up in Rio. Her mother was a novella (soap opera) actress, and she had
grown up in an elite, celebrity world which included attending an exclusive private school, visiting relatives in the United States, and hosting weekend parties for friends.
The morning after our arrival she offered to take my roommates and me to Ipanema for
the day. We were living in Urca, a wealthy section in the Zona Sul reserved for Rio’s elite. Our house was on Avenida Joao Luiz Alves, overlooking the Guanabara Bay with
views of the renowned Cristo Rendentor statue visible in the distance. Our home had a
high wall surrounding it, with video surveillance, an alarm, and a neighborhood security
guard stationed outside, a perfect example of what Calderia refers to as “defensive
architecture” and the “aesthetic of security.” Caldeira argues that the walls and fences are
not only for security reasons but also intentionally contribute to segregation by becoming an elite status symbol, “All the elements of security become part of a new code for the
151 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007.
79 expression of distinction, a code I shall call the ‘aesthetics of security.’”152 It seemed like a lot of security to us, but our host family explained it was necessary in a city with “so much poverty and so much crime.”153
There was a small beach steps from our house locally called “Urca Beach” (see image 4.1). We asked our host mother, Yaca, about the beach, to which she quickly replied, “Do not go there. That is where the poor people come from the favelas. They bring their own food, it is very dirty, we never go there.” I would later learn an important social distinction between those who buy food at the beach at the variety of barrequeiros and those who bring meals and snacks in worn coolers. The favelados chose Urca beach because it was much closer to their homes than the hours-long bus ride to the cleaner and more popular Copacabana and Ipanema beaches. Some still see the poor transportation available to the favelas as intentional to create further segregation, Fabio explained, “It could be on purpose. Because of the violence I don’t think they want people coming in and out.”154
Before we left to meet the bus to Ipanema our host mother warned us of the dangers of the beach, “Be very careful with your cameras and money. The people from the favelas will steal anything. If you want to swim someone has to stay and watch your things.” Finally, she instructed Naira to make sure no one stole our belongings, and suggested we go near Posto 9, where the young and trendy cariocas congregate.
Walking to the bus stop I could see people already gathering at Urca Beach, taking advantage of the morning sun. As buses pulled up families filed down the stairs and onto the sand, carrying coolers, mini grills, umbrellas, and beach chairs. The water
152 Caldeira, City of Walls, 291-2 153 Graham, Field Notes: Rio de Janeiro, January 23, 2006. 154 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007.
80 Figure 4.1: Urca Beach
Urca Beach packed with families from the favelas on a warm Sunday, children and adults swim in the murky and polluted waters of the Guanabara Bay.155
line was marked with the trash and debris which had washed ashore (see figures 4.2 and
4.3). Several workers in matching jumpsuits maneuvered rakes in an attempt to pile the litter into a corner, but just as soon as the beach was cleared more trash would appear with the crash of another wave. Despite the visible pollution children splashed in the water from Guanabara Bay and adults swam out into the deeper water. On the warm and humid morning the stench from the polluted bay was overpowering, yet fisherman still lined the sidewalk catching small fish. Some put the tiny fish in icy coolers while others turned them into an immediate snack by placing them on smoking grills. Noticing our surprise at the abundance of activities in the blatantly polluted bay Naira commented,
155 Photograph, International Honors Program.
81 “They know it is dirty, they don’t even care.” Her use of “they” made the clear
distinctions between us and them even more evident.
Naira didn’t want to take the bus, she preferred the privacy and comfort of a car but today her dad was taking the pet dog for grooming and we were forced to endure the adventures of Rio’s public bus system. In the absence of air conditioning all the bus’s
Figure 4.2: Trash on Urca Beach
Garbage and debris collects alongside Urca Beach. 156
windows were open, and as the bus raced through the narrow streets the hot, moist air
blew violently through the space. Naira had warned us of pick-pockets on the buses, and in our paranoia we all clutched our bags closely despite the bus’s emptiness. The few passengers glanced at our skin pale from the North American winter in curious intrigue.
Noticing the eyes fixed on us we became increasingly defensive, evading eye contact and avoiding speaking in an attempt to conceal our identities.
156 Photograph, International Honors Program.
82
Figure 4.3: Urca Beach Debris
Trash litters the sand at Urca Beach.157
Descending the bus and arriving in Ipanema I was struck by the activity and excitement. The quiet residential streets of Urca were replaced by bustling and energetic sidewalks passing by storefronts, bars, and restaurants. Tropical music escaped from bars’ open windows as tourists and locals blended into the vibrant atmosphere. On the way to the beach we stopped at the Hippie Fair, a local crafts fair held every Sunday in
Ipanema. Other Americans and foreign tourists meandered through the fairs many stalls, attempting to negotiate the inflated prices. As we wandered through the fair Naira warned us of thieves who prey on oblivious tourists. When she noticed a particularly suspicious person, usually black or of mixed race whose clothing did not match those of the upscale clientele, she would point them out with a nod of the head or intentional nudge. Vendors
157 Photograph, International Honors Program.
83 made desperate attempts to solicit our business, shouting flattering comments in English, while many local shoppers were ignored.
When we arrived at the beach we walked south for several blocks. Flags marked
different territories in the sand; a large rainbow flag demarcated the gay tolerant area,
flags from different soccer teams signaled fan areas—with the rival Flamengo and
Fluminense fans separated, and a big Brazilian flag attracted tourists. Barroqueiros
guarded their coveted territories with giant awnings and roped off seating areas. Many
had the names of their stands printed on umbrellas, beach chairs, and homemade signs.
We spotted a vacant area in the sand near Posto 8 and veered off in its direction, but
Naira quickly told us it was too close to “where the homosexuals and poor people from
the favelas are,” and we continued towards Posto 9.
It was a long walk in the hot sun before we reached Posto 9, and it was
significantly more crowded than areas we had passed on the way. It was nearing noon
and already beachgoers were tightly packed together (see figure 4.4). We struggled to
spread out our blankets in the small space, the music and cigarette smoke from adjacent
groups infiltrating into our plot. Sweat was running down my face from the unfamiliar
heat, and my roommates and I quickly prepared for a swim. Naira said she would guard
our things, again blatantly pointing out the threat the poor people near us posed.
When we came back Naira was talking to Henri, one of the workers from the
barroqueiro nearby. He was setting up a large umbrella and several beach chairs. Naira
ordered several sodas and snacks, and Henri yelled our order to another worker waiting in
the barroqueiro. He quickly rushed over with the drinks and snacks, opening the soda
cans and inserting straws for us. When they left I was confused because I didn’t see Naira
84 Figure 4.4: Ipanema Beach
Locals and tourists crowd Ipanema where the water and sand are significantly cleaner than Urca Beach.158
pay. She explained that they would keep a tally for us and we can pay at the end.
Meanwhile, individual vendors made their way through the hot sand, selling everything from cold sandwiches, to roasted cheese with oregano, to ice cream. The vendors collected money immediately from their customers, although I noticed none of them solicited our plot. I asked Naira why none of them came to us, and she explained if we want something we tell Henri and he gets it for us. Recognized as wealthy visitors to the beach, we had the luxury of having a barroqueiro worker get our food and let us pay later.
I had always seen people drinking from coconuts on the beach in travel shows and movies, and I asked Naira if we could get some. She signaled to Henri, who quickly came over. After she told him what we wanted he sprinted across the sand and out of sight.
158 Photograph, International Honors Program.
85 Moments later he returned with sweat dripping down his forehead, carrying a handful of the coconuts. Over the few hours we spent at the beach we sampled almost every cuisine we saw, from grilled shrimp to corn on the cob.
In addition to the multitude of food vendors, other types of items were sold on the beach, from clothing and futbal jerseys to sun screen and Brazilian flags. I wanted to get a futbol jersey, but when I asked the price it seemed very high. Naira tried to negotiate in
Portuguese, but she explained he wouldn’t lower the price since he recognized us as
American tourists. Weeks later I eventually bought a shirt after fifteen minutes of intense
negotiating by means of writing numbers in the sand. I was able to reduce the price from
the original fifty reais to a reluctant twenty-five.
At one point during the afternoon one of my roommates wanted to go for a walk,
and I decided to join her. We walked along the water towards Posto 8 and Copacabana.
As we walked we could see obvious groupings along the sand separated by transitional
areas with few people. Once we passed Posto 8 we noticed a clear distinction, there were
no food or clothing vendors catering to the people in this section, many of whom were darker in complexion, wore shorts in t-shirts instead of bathing suits, and sat next to big
coolers filled with snacks and drinks. Children ran across the sand chasing soccer balls
while adults mingled with each other in the shallow water. The beach was recreational for them while it was leisurely back at Posto 9. More importantly, it was very divided, with a
clear social and racial distinction. As my friend and I passed by people stared at us, making us feel even more out of place. We eventually turned around after we felt
threatened by the blatant tension, and wandered back toward the familiarity of Posto 9.
86 In subsequent visits to the beach I began to notice more and more the social, class,
and racial divisions across the sand. As white tourists, we were catered to, whether we
wanted an umbrella, a chair, or something to eat, while others were completely ignored.
When we were done with our sodas the barroqueiro worker would come collect our trash,
while others jut threw their waste into the sand, where it would eventually be blown away
by the breeze. Fabio echoed a similar sentiment in his description of Rio’s beaches:
Ipanema attracts a class of people. People from the favelas come in buses, they make a big mess with their food, chicken, all kinds of stuff and they don’t clean it up. The rich in Ipanema complained because they didn’t want the poor people all around them at the beach, they are already their neighbors. Along the beach they are divided in sections, the locals go to one place, you can see just by walking along. 159
More subtle than the visible divisions was the fear of crime among the wealthy
cariocas and foreign tourists. Coinciding with Caldeira’s assertions, I found that a culture of fear divided the city:
Violence and fear are entangled with the processes of social change in contemporary cities, generating new forms of spatial segregation and social discrimination … different social groups, especially the upper classes, have used the fear of violence and crime to justify new techniques of exclusion and their withdrawal from traditional quarters of the cities.160
It became apparent to me that the wealthy live paralyzed in fear both privately in their gated homes and publicly, at the beach. In its most severe form this apprehension even prohibits them from engaging in public activity. This fear was also apparent in what people brought to the beach; those at Posto 9 brought very little, only a blanket and some oil or sun screen. In my interview with Fabio it was emphasized that the elite’s fear is reflected in this behavior, “People think the people from the favelas will steal. The rich won’t wear jewelry or expensive things.”161 They will buy food, as it was seen as both a
159 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007. 160 Caldeira, City of Walls, 1. 161 Interview, Fabio Catarcion, March 22, 2007.
87 luxury and marker of social class, but will only bring limited money for fear it would be
stolen. When we brought cell phones, cameras, and Ipods we often attracted attention.
One day a woman even approached us and told us to be careful because, “the poor people
will come steal your expensive things.”
James Freeman highlights the social and racial polarization evident at Rio’s
beaches, asserting that public space is merely a representation of the larger politics of
social interaction. He discounts Putnam and other theorists who have tried to advocate
that public space is a unique classless, race-less sphere of egalitarian relation, “Rio’s
beaches only confer a sort of marginal citizenship … they are not the location of
discursive democracy … nor are they the classless and color-blind spaces mythologized
by the Brazilian elite.”162 Freeman’s assertion that Rio’s beaches are instead a site of
unequal, unjust social interaction is more representative of reality than Freyre and
Putnam’s allegations.
The segregation which eclipses the private, spatial sector and is evident publicly
and socially is not limited to the beach. While shopping at craft fairs and at the wealthy
Rio Sul mall, class and race distinctions were particularly evident. In my interview with
Selma Barone the class divisions in Rio were made clear. She recounted how on a recent
trip to Rio she was ignored at the Rio Sul mall because she was wearing Havainas, a
popular Brazilian brand of flip-flops:
If you wear flip-flops they think you are poor, from the favela, and they will not help you. I even asked for help, but the people in the store, they just ignored me. They look at what you wear and decide if you have money, if not, they don’t care about you. They think you are bad because you are poor.163
162 James Freeman, “Danger and Democracy on the Beach,” Space and Culture vol. 5 no.1 (February 2002), 9. 163 Interview, Selma Barone, January 1, 2007.
88 I asked Selma why the people in the favelas are targeted, why they can’t get jobs
and bank accounts.
“Because of the crime and violence and drugs.”164
I asked if the people living outside the favelas are afraid of the people living in the favelas.
“The people in the favelas will talk to each other and know each other, but if you live outside the favela there is no communication. People don’t want to have relationships with people who live in the favelas because people think they are all criminals.”165
In my interview with Marcos Viana I asked why people are afraid, “A lot of it is
racial, there are no jobs for black people,” He then continued and compared the stigma
and segregation of favelados to a similar stigma which exists of people from the
Northeast (he is from Forteleza). He attributed a lot of it to race, saying that it was similar
to the stigma of the Northeast because a lot of the migrants are black. He also said it was
related to crime.166
Conclusion
Fabio, Marcos, and Selma’s sentiments mirrored many of my own observations over the weeks I spent in Rio. While an obvious stigma surrounds the favelados, it is debatable whether it is based on race or class, a real or imagined threat of fear. I believe the media’s perpetuation of violence and negativity surrounding the favelas has helped forms of social segregation permeate public space, evidenced through the social and spatial divides at the beaches and shopping centers. My experiences amid Rio’s public space contrast both Freyre’s concept of a racial democracy and Putnam’s philosophy of
164 Interview, Selma Barone, January 1, 2007. 165 Interview, Selma Barone, January 1, 2007. 166 Interview, Marcos Viana, January 11, 2007.
89 democratic use of public space. My reality mirrored Freeman’s assertions that Rio’s beaches are a site where the existing, unjust social order is reproduced publicly. There is
nothing democratic about the negotiation of public space in Brazilian society. The
segregation of the poor has eclipsed both the historical spatial and racial facets and now
includes public, social segregation of the urban poor.
90 Chapter V/Conclusion: A Theoretical Comparison to South Africa
Today Brazil and South Africa provide examples of countries engulfed in various
forms of contemporary urban segregation which transcend spatial divisions and infiltrate
the public sphere. In both countries stigmas initially based on race have surpassed
previous boundaries to include the larger population of urban poor. While the two countries have experienced different legal frameworks and cultures of race, their parallel
disjunctive democracy and dismal prospect for future integration creates a similar
situation of segregation of the urban poor. This phenomenon has created severe social
polarizations which eclipse the private, spatial realm and permeate every facet of
contemporary society.
Historical divisions formed following Brazil’s abolition based primarily on race
have been altered to include the broader and burgeoning population of urban poor.
During this decades-long process the poor were driven from Rio’s center and forced to the periphery where access to services was, and still is, inadequate. This spatial divide coupled with social discrimination has created a new form of contemporary urban segregation.
Following the formation of blatant spatial partitions throughout the city, social stigmas based on race, class, and a fear of crime followed. The public and social segregation which has resulted in Rio combined with both deliberate and covert government actions draws a direct parallel to the conditions in South Africa under apartheid and in the failed post-apartheid struggle towards integration. Today both countries face uncertain futures in their insufficient attempts to increase equality and decrease the divides which threaten greater class conflict. While the case studies are
91 specific, these two countries are not isolated in their struggles with urban segregation.
Brazil and South Africa provide contemporary examples of a phenomenon which is occurring in countries and plaguing cities worldwide.
Superficially South Africa and Brazil may appear to be separated historically, spatially, and politically. A closer examination, however, elucidates surprisingly similar historical comparisons between the two countries which have fostered the development of parallel issues of inequality, racism, and segregation. Both countries endured centuries of oppressive rule as European colonies after their “discovery” in the fifteenth century.
Portuguese explorer Bartolemeu Dias first sailed around the Cape of Good Hope, discovering South Africa just over a decade prior to the Portuguese discovery of Brazil.
While it was the Portuguese who initially discovered South Africa, it was the Dutch who colonized it, setting up a supply station in 1652 which eventually evolved into the Cape
Colony over the subsequent two hundred years. During these formative years European migrants clashed with indigenous Africans, beginning a centuries-long struggle for political power and cultural survival, a process corresponding with similar conflicts in
Brazil.167
In the Eighteenth century the British took control of the African colony, fearing
Napoleon’s conquest would transcend European borders and take control of the important shipping route. The British later temporarily relinquished control of the colony to the
Dutch, only to reoccupy the area from 1814 until an independent Union of South Africa was formed in 1910. During this time the expanding numbers of European migrants increasingly clashed with natives over land tenure, resulting in casualties and fatalities on
167 Lecture Notes, “A History of South Africa,” Professor Sally Rosenthal, The University of Cape Town, March 8, 2006.
92 both sides. Simultaneously the remaining Dutch settlers struggled to obtain land rights,
eventually migrating to the less populated interior to set up self-governing territories.
These early conflicts based on political power and cultural domination set the stage for
later racial, ethnic, and class divides which to this day afflict the country.168
Brazil and South Africa both provide examples of countries with vibrant multi
cultural pasts and contemporary ethnic diversity. From an early stage, however, these
levels of diversity divided the countries through the development of a rigid hierarchy, incorporating elements of race and eventually class. As these hierarchies solidified, levels
of spatial and social segregation increased, at times aided by explicit government policies
and implicit government actions in both countries. The role of the respective
governments combined with the expansion of the existing hierarchies and urbanization following democratization facilitated the formation of severe urban segregation.
Ironically it was democracy which increased inequality in both countries. After cutting ties with European colonists both Brazil and South Africa began processes of rapid urbanization (see figure 5.1). These post-independence attempts to industrialize and urbanize served to divide the interests of the racially stratified rich and poor. In both countries the white, European descendents began to monopolize business and government, excluding the racialized poor from decision-making and job opportunities.
Skilled jobs were reserved for the minority middle and upper-class white workers, while the poor and racially marginalized majority were forced to seek unskilled labor and participation in increasing informal labor markets. This early period following democracy marked the exclusion of the marginalized majority in both countries and symbolized the beginning of a process which led to more severe spatial and social divisions. Caldeira
168 Lecture Notes, “A History of South Africa,” Professor Sally Rosenthal
93 Figure 5.1: Urbanization Statistics for Brazil and South Africa
Figure 5.1 illustrates the rapid rates at which Brazil and South Africa urbanized (ranked 4 and 29 on the chart, respectively).169
emphasizes this correlation between the rise of democracy and parallel failure of social justice in her theory of disjunctive democracy:
…in Brazil political democracy has brought with it not respect for rights, justice, and human life, but the exact opposites… In fact, the universe of crime indicates the disjunctive character of Brazilian democracy in a double way: first because the increase in violence itself erodes citizens’ rights, and second because it offers a field in which reactions to violence become not only violent
169 “Level of Urbanization and Urbanization Rates for the Countries with the Largest Urban Populations, 1950 to 2030,” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision, 2005.
94 and disrespectful of rights, but also help destroy public space, segregate social groups, and destablilize the rule of law.170
Caldeira’s approach is particularly useful in the conceptualization of segregation
in both Brazil and South Africa. Her association between the end of oppressive military
rule and the incongruous increase in unjust social politics elucidates the role of
democratization and urbanization under corrupt governments in fostering forms of
segregation. This paradoxical segregation echoes issues of race, class, and a culture of
fear. Furthermore, Caldeira’s commentary on defensive architecture illuminates the
defensive urbanism entwined in contemporary forms of segregation worldwide.
Through this analysis Freyre’s concept of racial democracy in Brazil is negated,
and replaced with a discourse of segregation, marginalization, and discrimination.
Freeman’s examination of public space in Brazil correlates with this theory, arguing that
Rio’s beaches are not egalitarian classless, color-blind spaces, but in fact are a
representation of the reproduction of unjust social hierarchies. Needell and Meade also
assert that the dominant social hierarchy and enduring structures have been re-enforced
historically. Meade claims the renovations at the turn of the century were aimed at
separating the classes and stopping social democracy:
It was this overlap—this relative democracy of shared raucous entertainment, all-night cabarets, and , during carnival, the wild pranks, or entrudos, and street dances—that the renovations would destroy. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, almost all the cabarets and bars where the popular classes occasionally rubbed shoulders with the elite … fell under the ax of Mayor Pereira Passos’s renovations.171
These attempts to segregate and civilize the population reveal the elite intention of
eliminating the “barbaric” elements from society. These reforms have been driven by both racism and class prejudice, and continue today. This public, social marginalization is
170 Caldeira, City of Walls, 52. 171 Meade, “Civilizing” Rio, 43.
95 a demonstration of the prevalence of new forms of contemporary segregation which can
be classified as a category of apartheid.
Political and social exclusion led to spatial segregation via forced removals in
both countries. Similar to Rio’s elimination of the poor from the downtown under Mayor
Francisco Pereira Passos at the beginning of the twentieth-century, Cape Town began a
campaign of forced removal to the periphery in the 1960s.172 This process was
particularly evident with the destruction of District Six, a multicultural and distinct
neighborhood which was home to nearly one-tenth of Cape Town’s population. The
neighborhood, which was composed of residents of black, white, Asian, and coloured backgrounds, paralleled the multi-ethnic communities in Rio preceding the forced removals from the downtown. District Six was declared a whites-only area in 1968 under the Group Areas Act, and in the following years 60,000 residents were relocated to the
bleak and depraved Cape Flats along the city’s periphery.173
The forced removals in Rio and Cape Town which resulted in the formation of
spatial segregation symbolized larger social and political schisms. The public government
support and military involvement in both instances represent the polarities which openly
discriminate against the non-white, poor majority. Government involvement, through
both legislation and action, demonstrates the degree to which the white minority control
the larger marginalized population. Furthermore, the government withdrawal from the
favelas and Cape Flats after the forced removals illuminates the intentions of the
government and minority in control, making it evident that the elite seek to remove the
poor, racially diverse elements of society from the city without providing adequate
172 Lecture Notes, “A History of South Africa,” Professor Sally Rosenthal. 173 Lecture Notes, “A History of South Africa,” Professor Sally Rosenthal.
96 services and resources. In effect, these actions are aimed at cutting off the racialized poor from the city, in an attempt to create a segregated, upper-class, white ideal within the city center. While these actions are specific to the two case studies, similar spatial and social isolation based on race and class have been prevalent in countries and cities worldwide.
The conditions and lack of resources in the favelas and Cape Flats both during their creation and currently demonstrate the explicit government refusal to provide for the cities’ poor. These conditions contribute to the existing forms of segregation and evidence the accurate label of “apartheid district” to illuminate Rio’s social and spatial divides while highlighting Cape Town’s lack of integration and progress following the end of government-instituted apartheid. While Cape Town’s apartheid was government- instituted and Rio’s was not explicitly a du jure segregation, the government actions in both cities fostered the development of similar conditions of discrimination and segregation.
The persistence of government withdrawal and negligence in both cities illustrates the continuation of discriminatory public policy. Access to services and living conditions in the favelas and Cape Flats are astonishingly similar. Comparable to “the favela and the asphalt” analogy in Rio, a distinct separation is found in Cape Town where the pavement ends and the expansive dusty Cape Flats begin. While some townships have electricity and running water, others do not. Healthcare, schools, and job opportunities are limited, and transportation to the downtown is dangerous and unreliable. Drugs and crime consistently plague the communities which have no police force or authority. These conditions parallel similar discrepancies between wealthy and poor neighborhoods worldwide, illuminating broader political, economic, and social schisms.
97 The conditions in both the favelas and Cape Flats are inadequate, yet there is no
substantial government presence unless media attention is drawn to the area, in which
case police, military, and para-military groups raid the communities to temporarily satisfy criticisms. This type of limited police action has recently been illustrated in both cities with increased government attention resulting from development projects and international sporting and tourism events. Rio is famous for its Carnival celebrations annually, and in 2007 the anticipation to the festival was met with a severe police
presence and an attempted crackdown on crime in the favelas. Furthermore, the Brazilian
government has recently enlisted the assistance of the federal military forces to ensure
stability in the city during the much-anticipated Pan-American games this summer.
Similarly, the NII Infrastructure Gateway Project in Cape Town, an internationally-
funded development project aimed at improving the troubled townships, has caused the
government to increase access to services and police support in surrounding areas in an
effort to improve the city’s international image. The NII Gateway Project and the Favela
Bairro project in Rio have met similar criticisms from critics and community residents.
Although funds were made available and plans were created, the lack of tangible results
has prompted claims of corruption.
The inconsistent government action and inadequate use of development aid
question the true motivations of the respective city and state governments. The lack of
consistent assistance and widespread improvements in living conditions elucidates the
governments’ unwillingness to provide for the urban poor, perpetuating the existing
social and spatial segregation. Furthermore, segregation’s transcendence from the private,
spatial sector to a much more prominent public, social sphere has validated both cities as
98 apartheid districts while illuminating a broader worldwide phenomenon of contemporary urban segregation.
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