brief 26 Becoming an Ex-military Man Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Professionals in Eastern Europe brief 26

Contents The author

Zusammenfassung Andreas Heinemann-Grüder German summary 4 Senior Researcher, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Germany Acknowledgments 5

Introduction 6

Identity Patterns of Former Military Professionals 10 Research questions 10 Behavioral patterns: general findings 10 Identity patterns among former Ukrainian officers 11 Identity patterns among former Polish officers 13 Identity patterns among former Hungarian officers 14 Identity patterns among former officers in Latvia 16

Administrating Demobilization: Experiences in Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungary 18 Ukraine 18 Russia 29 Poland 33 Hungary 39

Summary and Recommendations 45

List of Interview Partners 48 Editing: Moira Davidson-Seger Appendix: Questionnaire for Interviews with 50 Demobilized Soldiers Cover photo: Josef Koudelka/Magnum Photos List of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations 51 Bulgaria, Sofia, 1995 References 52

2 B·I·C·C brief 26 Becoming an Ex-military Man Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Professionals in Eastern Europe

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder

B·I·C·C 3 brief 26

Zusammenfassung German Summary

nde 2001 gab es in Osteuropa, Die Reintegration erfordert gemeinsame der Planung und Durchführung von Eeinschließlich der Nachfolgestaaten Anstrengungen der Verteidigungs-, Reintegrationsmaßnahmen spielen. Teil der Sowjetunion, etwa 2,6 Millionen Finanz-, Arbeits-, Sozial- und Bildungs- der Reintegration sollte auch demokrati- weniger Soldaten als Anfang der 1990er ministerien, für die eigene scher Sozialkundeunterricht sein. Unter Jahre. Mit diesem für Friedenszeiten Koordinierungsgremien auf zentraler den interviewten Ex-Offizieren waren beispiellosen Truppenabbau wird die und regionaler Ebene geschaffen werden die Befürworter einer autoritären militärische Erblast des Sozialismus sollten. Die Umschulung von Berufsof- Herrschaft zwar in der Minderheit, wenigstens teilweise bewältigt. Am fizieren erfolgt am besten auf regionaler trotzdem ist die Enttäuschung über die stärksten von Demobilisierung und der und lokaler Ebene, orientiert am Bedarf postsozialistischen Demokratien stark Notwendigkeit zur Reintegration in das des örtlichen Arbeitsmarktes. Die ausgeprägt. Vergleichsweise hohe Zivilleben sind Berufsoffiziere betrof- berufliche Umschulung sollte bemüht Pensionsbezüge können die Passivität fen. Wie die Erfahrung der Weimarer sein, übertragbare persönliche Qualifika- beziehungsweise Versorgungsmentalität Republik belegt, birgt ein Misslingen der tionen und Fertigkeiten gezielt zu von Berufsmilitärs verstärken, da sie Demobilisierung erhebliche Gefahren nutzen, darunter auch einige der nicht genügend Anreiz für berufliche für die Stabilität junger Demokratien. militärischen Sekundärtugenden. Dabei Eigeninitiative schaffen. Die post- Der vorliegende BICC brief 26 unter- gilt: Umschulung ist nur effektiv, wenn militärischen Bezüge sollten deshalb sucht die Einstellungen und Verhaltens- sie mit gezielter Arbeitsbeschaffung flexibel nach Dienstalter und Fähigkei- muster von demobilisierten Offizieren verbunden wird. Die Reintegration ten angepasst werden und auf das Ziel sowie die staatlichen bzw. halbstaatli- sollte so eng wie möglich mit regionalen “Arbeitsbeschaffung” orientiert sein. chen Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung Strukturprogrammen verknüpft der Reintegration. Betrachtet werden die werden, die die Konversion von Ausländische Programme waren Reintegrationsprozesse in der Ukraine, militärischen Liegenschaften für die insbesondere für die Reintegration in Russland, Polen und Ungarn. Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen einbe- der Ukraine und Russland entscheidend. Welche Lehren lassen sich aus dem zieht. Kommunen können einen Allerdings hat es bisher wenig Koordi- osteuropäischen Truppenabbau ziehen? Beitrag zur Reintegration leisten, indem nation und Erfahrungsaustausch Demobilisierung und Reintegration sie Unternehmensgründungen von Ex- gegeben – dies ist jedoch für mögliche sind Teil einer umfassenden Militärs, etwa durch Steuervergünsti- Programme in den Balkanländern Restrukturierung, die die Lebensfähig- gungen oder Mietnachlässe, erleichtern wünschenswert. keit ganzer Regionen betrifft, etwa wenn beziehungsweise fördern. Um einen Truppenabbau und Reintegration haben Garnisonsstädte und andere militärische missbräuchlichen oder wenig effektiven zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des Liegenschaften freigezogen werden. Einsatz von Reintegrationsmitteln zu Sozialismus an Dramatik verloren. An Zudem verfügten die sozialistischen vermeiden, bedarf es einer unabhängi- die Stelle der sozialistischen, für einen Armeen über einen umfangreichen gen Evaluierung. Reintegrationsmittel Krieg mit der NATO trainierten Dienstleistungsapparat, dieser wird nun sollten den Ex-Militärs dabei möglichst Massenarmeen mit hoher “Kopflastig- entweder privatisiert oder gänzlich direkt zugute kommen, um den keit” treten sukzessive kleinere, mobile aufgelöst. Das zivile Personal der Aufbau kostenintensiver Bürokratien in und für internationale Einsätze präpa- Streitkräfte ist ebenfalls von Demobili- Grenzen zu halten. rierte Streitkräfte. Die zivile Kontrolle sierung betroffen. Die Verantwortung für Reintegration über das Militär wurde gestärkt und die liegt allerdings nicht allein bei staatlichen Rüstungsausgaben wurden bis Ende So hart Entscheidungen häufig sind, die Stellen. Berufsmilitärs müssen Abschied der 1990er Jahre erheblich reduziert. Die künftige Struktur und die Aufgaben der von der Vorstellung einer risikolosen osteuropäischen Streitkräfte sind mit Streitkräfte sollten so früh und klar wie Militärkarriere nehmen: Je früher sich wenigen Ausnahmen nicht mehr an möglich definiert werden. Berufsmilitärs Berufsmilitärs mental und durch einem Feindbild ausgerichtet. Gleichzei- bedürfen einer gesetzlichen Regelung Zusatzqualifikation auf eine zivile tig besteht jedoch noch ein Defizit an ihres Karriereverlaufs und der post- Berufstätigkeit einstellen, desto größer ziviler Expertise in Sicherheitsfragen, an militärischen Leistungsansprüche. sind ihre Chancen auf dem späteren Transparenz und bei der Aufgaben- Diesbezügliche Unklarheit wirkt sich Arbeitsmarkt. Umschulung sollte nach teilung zwischen den verschiedenen negativ auf die Loyalität von Berufs- Möglichkeit bereits im Militär selbst Sicherheitsapparaten. militärs aus. erfolgen. Um Offizieren eine stärkere Kontrolle über ihren postmilitärischen Lebensabschnitt zu geben, könnten Offiziersverbände eine aktive Rolle bei

4 B·I·C·C acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

he empirical findings of this study United Kingdom; Dr Ksenia Gonchar Kuffel helped me to translate Polish Tare based on the project of the IMEMO Institute of the texts, located relevant literature and “Demobilization of the Armed Forces Russian Academy of Sciences in systematically fed BICC’s electronic in Eastern Europe”, conducted by the Moscow; Lt Colonel Stanislavs archive. Tatiana Vorsmann diligently author at the Bonn International Center Voicehovics, Chief of the Military assisted in computing interview data for Conversion from late 1999 to Personnel Division at the Ministry of and in conducting searches in diverse September 2002 and supported by the Defense, Republic of Latvia; and PhD electronic archives. I am very grateful to German Federal Ministry of Higher candidate Janis Keruss of the University Michael Brzoska and Kees Kingma for Education and Research. The project of Riga, Department of History. having read the whole manuscript. Their researched the post-socialist build-up of Otfried Nassauer and Dr Arend critical remarks are appreciated. My armed forces and demobilization efforts Wellmann of the Berliner Informations- thanks also go to Moira Davidson- in the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, zentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit Seger, for the quick job she did editing and Ukraine, supplemented by a case (BITS) were helpful at an early stage of the text, and to Katharina Moraht and study on the demobilization of the this project by providing empirical data Svenja Bends for their reliable and fast Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) after on force structures and reductions in the layout work, despite pressures of time. June 1999. 1990s. I furthermore benefited from Finally BICC and the author would like unpublished reports by the Danish to thank DCAF (Democratic Control of This study could not have been journalist Jorgen Dragsdahl on Armed Forces, Geneva) for generously completed without the support and demobilization in Poland during the supporting this publication. All cooperation of partners in the respective period 1989–1999, by Dimitar remaining insufficiencies and errors are, countries. Among the many people Dimitrov’s writings on the restructuring of course, mine. who contributed, I would particularly of Bulgaria’s armed forces, and by like to thank professor Dr Lech Gustav Urbani’s accounts of the Andreas Heinemann-Grüder Giermakowski and Dr Tadeusz Keson Hungarian military reforms. Maciej August 2002 of the Government Center for Strategic Studies/Department for Defense Affairs in Warsaw; Dr Lech Koscielecki, former Director of the Department of Social Affairs at the Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw; Dr Ferencz Molnar The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) of the Miklos Zrinyi National Defence was established in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government. The University in Budapest and Dr Lajos Centre encourages and supports states and non-state governed institutions in their Keresztes of the Eötvös Loránd efforts to strengthen democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces, University in Budapest; Dr Janos Szabo, and promotes international cooperation in this field, initially targeting the Euro- former Hungarian Vice-Minister of Atlantic regions. To implement these objectives, the Centre: Defense; Colonel Aleksander S. Shikalov, Chairman of the National collects information, undertakes research and engages in networking activities in Coordinating Center for the Social order to identify problems, to establish lessons learned and to propose the best Adaptation of Former Military practices in the field of democratic control of armed forces and civil-military Servicemen at the Cabinet of Ministers relations; of Ukraine (NCC); Dr Anatoliy provides its expertise and support to all interested parties, in particular Grytsenko and Dr Leonid Polyakov of governments, parliaments, military authorities, international organizations, non- the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and governmental organizations, academic circles. Political Studies in Kiev; Dr Frank Jacobi, EU TACIS long-term project Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) manager in Ukraine; Jack Hemsley of Rue de Chantepoulet 11 the Russian Resettlement Project, P.O.Box 1360 Directorate for Central and Eastern CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland Europe at the Ministry of Defence, Tel: +41 (0)22 741 77 00 Fax: +41 (0)22 741 77 05 E-mail: [email protected] URL: http://www.dcaf.ch

B·I·C·C 5 brief 26

Introduction

he military legacy of socialism put a career often implies the loss of security Under socialism, the military had Theavy burden on the transition and social prestige which affects self- represented an interest group with economies and their societies at large. esteem, one’s sense of purpose and, last significant power over the allocation of When socialism came to an end, the but not least, the position of the male resources, an institution isolated from armed forces became a part of the head of the family. Demobilized officers incursions by the social environment, transition process—both objects and are forced to adjust their secluded group protected by its pivotal role in subjects at the same time. During norms and values to the prevailing preserving the political system as a transition, the military was affected by patterns of civil society discourse. whole and bolstered by exceptional shifts in political, economic and financial benefit packages. Not only did the priorities. Not only did its role in the The study did not aim to provide an military protect socialism, it embodied political system alter from being a empirically encompassing overview— its key features: the command system; a cornerstone of socialism to being either in terms of covering the whole of cult of masses and leadership; merely one of the many competing Eastern Europe or of presenting uniformity and collectivism instead of bureaucratic and social interest groups, country studies which give full coverage individualism; secrecy and the absence but most military functions that had over a set period of time. Due to highly of transparency; a disregard for human emanated from this Cold War role were heterogeneous data provided by the rights; a lack of respect for the devalued. Thus, while the Central national Ministries of Defense as well as environment; fixation on the Soviet Eastern European countries have been the national project partners, not all center; and, ideological integration forced to reduce their armed forces questions could be systematically dealt through images of the enemy. In short, dramatically over the last decade, changes with and compared in a cross-country the military was the nucleus of the in the composition of armed forces fashion. The country data nonetheless socialist system. must be seen as part of an overarching allow a list of indicators to be compiled restructuring process. which the initiators of future At the same time the military as an reintegration programs may wish to institution symbolized statehood and Goals bear in mind. The study is exemplary in state power. It therefore survived the nature, focusing on the institutional collapse of socialism in contrast to the The following report concerns only one prerequisites of demobilization and on former state planning apparatus or the aspect of this transition however: the behavioral patterns of those making Communist Party. In other words, for Eastern Europe’s management of the transfer from military to civilian life. the government elite, national armies reintegration of military servicemen into turned into a symbol of statehood, civilian life. It looks particularly at the The military and national independence and power experiences gathered in Ukraine, Russia, transition projection capacity. Poland and Hungary after the demise of socialism. The prime goal is to There were a variety of factors which led The downsizing and reintegration of to the restructuring of armed forces in generalize experiences, identify military personnel is an under- Eastern Europe, important among shortcomings and to ascertain which researched aspect of post-socialist aspects of integration policy are essential them: cuts already initiated by the transition. Previously transition research Warsaw Pact during the second half of and should be recommended. The has homed in on the replacement of the 1980s; the treaty on Conventional report is thus an attempt to evaluate the old by new institutions but rarely on the design and implementation of Forces in Europe; the dissolution of adjustment of old institutions to a new the Warsaw Pact; changed threat reintegration policies, analyzing the environment. From the perspective of perceptions; the ensuing shift from causes for failure or success in exiting transition research, the story of the military roles. mass armies to smaller, more mobile downsizing and reintegration of armed forces; the closure of military bases forces is interesting in two respects: originally designed for attacks from the Demobilization and reintegration ‘How does the military as an institution involve finding new social roles and West; and, last but not least, financial cope with the task of downsizing?’ and restrictions. The capacities and the networks, a new professional ‘How do its actors adjust?’ The political will to sustain a permanent war orientation and overcoming transformation of the socialist mass psychological stress. Thousands of economy were exhausted. Particularly armies is indicative of an underrated the downsizing in the 1990s—one officers have had to exit their former aspect of transition at large—the impact aspect of restructuring—was a logical roles—a staged process, successful for of institutional inertia. The military as some, for others not so. The shift from conclusion following on from the an institution had first and foremost a closure of bases which had lost their a military profession to a post-military vivid interest in self-preservation, often at the expense of the social costs incurred.

6 B·I·C·C introduction

purpose, voluntary discharge from the servicemen making it impossible to successful conclusion of reintegration forces, a shortening of the period of ascertain exact figures on the success of amounts to. The absence of open military service, and the emergence of former servicemen on the civilian job revolt, organized social unrest or more attractive positions for qualified market. Hence figures in this brief political instability due to young man on the civilian market. indicating whether reintegration was demobilization could be taken as a successful or not mainly refer to direct minimal definition. Applying this Nevertheless, only after a decade of job placements or to the direct creation minimal measure, reintegration in ‘muddling-through’ did the of jobs by the agencies involved in Eastern Europe would appear to have downsizing of armed forces begin to be reintegration measures. been successful. A medium yardstick steered by conscious design. The might be a situation where former absence of sufficient conceptual and Despite the fact that associations of servicemen willing and capable of legal frameworks for the defense professional soldiers exist in all Eastern reintegration can enjoy civilian systems in general and the armed forces European countries, servicemen are occupations without being in particular had a negative impact on usually poorly organized. Professional discriminated against on the grounds of the process. The nationalization of soldiers have thus rarely contributed their former military profession, where armed forces after the dissolution of the substantially to reintegration in a post-military occupations correspond to Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union did grassroot fashion. Obviously the long qualifications, and where the ex-military not automatically lead to a new duration of service time reinforced employment-unemployment ratio conceptualization of the role of the hierarchical thinking patterns, reflects the average for society at large. armed forces: the post-socialist mindset paternalism, the idea that the Among the countries covered in this remained heavily influenced by prior government owed the officers study, Hungary seems to come closest socialization, while the military something, an unrealistic sense of to such a definition. A maximalist establishment—lacking proper political infinite security and expectations of position would entitle military guidance in crucial years—displayed an privileged entitlements. Both the closed professionals to lasting preferential interest in self-preservation. corporate nature of the military treatment in terms of pension rights, community and the frequent lack of civil housing support, retraining and other It is hardly possible to provide exact qualifications often discouraged social advantages. This latter position figures on the structure of the conscious role-exit strategies. does not appear to hold true, however: downsizing of professional servicemen part of the transition agenda seems to for each Eastern European country, The effects of downsizing on the labor be that the military must say goodbye to partly because the figures provided for market or on the target group itself are a self-image of above-average the 1990s by the Ministries of Defense not unequivocal. Reintegration success entitlements. Seen in this perspective, vary to the extreme. Whereas depends on qualification levels, age, reintegration requires a modernization led to the reduction of goal-oriented retraining and, most of reconceptualization of the military as many professional posts, new positions all, on the absorption capacity of the one profession among many, implying opened up in the wake of the regional economy. Thus the urgency of similar demands, risks, insecurities and restructuring programs, though the reintegration measures and support the need for life-long learning as in number of new positions was lower depends above all on the varying other professions. Such a departure than that of those abolished. As the absorption capacities of the labor from maximalist criteria requires public attractiveness of a life in uniform had markets, with Hungary at the upper and dialogue and must call political parties largely dwindled and with the social Ukraine and Russia at the lower end. and the media into action. prestige of the armed forces in decline, Yet, the urgency of support programs many professional officers—mainly the in Ukraine and Russia was de facto only younger, more qualified and more recognized by the national Ministries of ambitious—left the armies on their Defense once EU TACIS funding or own volition. This even held true for funding by NATO countries loomed countries with strong patriotic on the horizon. Often the Ministries of undercurrents such as Poland and the Defense produced ‘moral noise’ around Baltic States. As a rule, the Ministries of the demobilization issue without taking Defense did not keep track of post- action. military employment of their former After a decade of downsizing, the urgency for reintegration is now in decline, though this is not the case all over Eastern Europe. There are no consensual criteria defining what the

B·I·C·C 7 brief 26

1990–2001 otal change Ministry of Where Defense taken. was figures from the e and cuts in recruitment levels. rall troop reductions in former socialist countries (OSCE or the ACDA was used. Official was figures on troop strengths are or the ACDA highly 33.2 33.2 33 26 27 17 -18 Military Technology , National Ministries of Defense and BICC files Military Technology 41 41 41 41 41 41 54 3494 22 87 27 74 27 74 27 74 -14 71 64 56 54 52 50 49 -45

1990 1991 1992n.a. 1993n.a. n.a.n.a. 1994 n.a. 20 1995 n.a.n.a. 43 21 1996107 102 n.a. 43 1997n.a. 45 102 106 60 1998 56 n.a. 60175 92 99 1999 60 87n.a. 103 150 90 57 52 2000n.a. 70 103 n.a. 146 70 2001 57 85 80 n.a. T 50 80 98 2 67 57 82 86 35 60 92 2.5 72 93 53 83 35 95 40 3.2 64 73 70 42 81 102 35 40 3.4 58 65 70 102 42 78 33 40 3.4 56 62 60 81 65 +22 3.5 38 53 59 +17 80 4.3 -37 34 53 54 78 5.4 58 -26 52 5,4 -29 -45 48 5.4 -127 +.,4 Authors compilation of data from IISS, ACDA, Officers, NCOs and recruits are As a rule, the lowest figure excluded. included, civilian provided employees by the respective

Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia- Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czechoslovakia/ Czech Republic Estonia Georgia Hungary

Figure 1: Strengths of the regular armed forces in former socialist countries Figure 1: Strengths of the regular armed forces in former socialist countries Figure 1: Strengths of the regular armed forces in former socialist countries (OSCE members), 1990–2001 (OSCE members), 1990–2001 (OSCE members), 1990–2001 In thousands In thousands In thousands Source: Notes: Ministries of Defense were contradictory the lowest or otherwise unreliable, estimate by IISS, unreliable, though the reporting culture improved slightly at end of 1990s. The computed figure (2,647,500) for ove members) between 1990–2001 is an approximate estimate. Most of the reductions were achieved through a shortening service tim n.a. not available

8 B·I·C·C introduction 2,647.5 4.16 4.1 4.1 -1.9 2,600 2,300 1,900 1,685 1,430 1,200 1,159 1,004 1,004 977 -1,623 780 600 510 517 453 400 387 346 311 303 303 -477 n.a.n.a. n.a.n.a. n.a. 44n.a. n.a. 12n.a. 44 n.a. 2.2n.a. 12 n.a. 40 10314 5 n.a. 10 9 40126 10 305 6.5 9n.a. 10 201 7 270 10 40 6.6n.a. 11 n.a. 172 10 270n.a. 35 9 7 n.a. 167 7 11 10n.a. 270 n.a. 55 n.a. 9n.a. 4.5 9 200 12 263 n.a. 10 15 65 47 12 199 n.a. 4.9 10 221 12 3n.a. 15 12 64 50 28 200 11 242 9180 11 n.a. 19 3 45 8 64 200 25 228 169 12 n.a. 11 9 16 180 3 8 187 39 +20 137 20 13 40 11 9 16 140 137 191 39 5 18 10 12 45 9 130 16 140 178 45 -3 10 18 7 40 +2 103 127 8 -136 45 +6 10 17 8 45 114 -23 38 10 18 -1 65 8 114 33 18 9 114 80 8 18 109 -14 74 8 10 18 98 59 12 -7 70 -10 58 +9 -110 +18

Kazakhstan Kyrgystan Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Moldova Poland Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan Yugoslavia reductions Total 1990–2001

B·I·C·C 9 brief 26

Identity Patterns of Former Military Professionals

Research questions To be specific, we were interested above Whereas some were able to make use of all in the following: reasons for skills acquired in the military, especially n order to establish how former demobilization; patterns of adjustment those who took on jobs in security Iofficers and NCOs adjust to post- to civilian life; forms of assistance companies, very few individuals actually military life, we conducted standardized received from governmental agencies; acquired additional qualifications after face-to-face interviews, promising the and general political views. We linked leaving the armed forces. Not interviewees anonymity. In July 2000, these answers to personal data on age, surprisingly, age and the duration of the 15 interviews were conducted with duration of military service and military military service were the key factors in discharged officers in Latvia; in rank as well as to levels of professional determining post-military job December 2000, 29 with former officers skills. It was expected that certain links opportunities. But, next to age, whether in Hungary, in February 2001, 34 with could be established between levels of the soldier had left the forces voluntarily, former officers in Poland, and in June/ success, protracted difficulties or failure the related level of activity and the July 2001, 43 with former officers in to adjust to civilian life on the one hand acquisition of dual-use qualifications Ukraine. We were mainly interested in and skills, behavioral patterns and during service time proved to exert the officers who were younger than 55 years political identities on the other hand. most significant impact on reintegration of age at the time of dismissal, success. Not all those who left the preferably in the age group 35–50. The Behavioral patterns: armed forces voluntarily were successful reason was simple—this was the age general findings and some even regretted their decision, group which would be forced to find a but, all in all, control over one’s own life appeared to be essential if a sense of post-military career and which was likely The findings of the interviews allow for to have significant problems in satisfaction was to be reached. Based on some cross-regional observations as the interviews, a significant link between reintegrating. The former officers came well as tentative conclusions relating to rank and reintegration success could not mostly, but not exclusively, from the implications for reintegration policy. be established. capitals (Riga, Budapest, Warsaw, and Officers were often taken unawares by Kiev) or the surrounding regions—a the sudden need to find a post-military There are certain qualifications whose bias that may actually mean they were job. As they often did not start looking privileged in comparison to laid-off acquisition during service increases the for alternatives in time, they lost control chances of successful post-military officers in economically depressed over their own lives. A negative adjustment, namely learning of foreign regions. assessment of the transition period languages, especially English; computer appeared to be linked to a sense of skills; administrative and management Each questionnaire contained 25 victimization that was at least partially skills. On the positive side, it should be questions translated into the native self-inflicted. For most interviewees, the language of the former officer (see noted that most former officers were military represented an institution able to integrate their past military Appendix). Naturally the answers can associated with job security, an attractive experiences into their new life (for a only give a rough picture of the benefit package and a decent income, behavioral factors affecting ‘success’ or psychological statement on biographical while ideational attachments or political synthesis, see Erikson, 1973, esp. p. 106 ‘failure’ of reintegration, and it would motivations were comparatively weak. ff.). It is assumed that a collective sense be inappropriate to generalize these It was therefore more the long seclusion findings for the rest of Eastern Europe. of radical estrangement would have led from the norms, habits and normal to more hostile expressions of However, it is nonetheless possible to risks of civilian life rather than the disappointment and to the discern certain patterns and to formulate military vocation itself that complicated linkages between socio-biographical development of hatred and aggression. post-military adjustment. Interestingly, Instead of collective and organized fora models and the success or failure of those laid-off officers who voiced a of demobilized officers with common post-military adjustment. strong attachment to the military as a provider of norms and values were the ones most frustrated with their post- military life.

10 B·I·C·C identity patterns

interests, we were met with up to 20 years, 9 up to 25 years, and 12 actual experience. Of the 43 individualization, often even social more than 25 years. During their interviewees, 20 had left the armed ‘atomization’, adding to a widely spread military career, 29 had received training: forces voluntarily, while the rest had left sense of disempowerment vis-à-vis 25 as engineers, 4 in another technical due to health reasons (5), according to governmental agencies. orientation and the rest as economists, schedule (8) or as a result of early psychologists, administrators, managers dismissal. The interviews did not lend any or sociologists. support to the fear that disappointment Asked what they had expected from had translated into some form of We asked all laid-off officers about what civilian life, only 18 were able to give extreme nationalism or active had prompted them to join the armed reasons at all—clearly a sign of promotion of authoritarianism. The forces. Obviously, motives were mixed, passiveness on the part of those not likelihood of repeating the Weimar and it was possible that answers might answering. Those who did give an Republic scenario appeared almost be biased because the interviewees give answer said they reckoned with an nonexistent. The dangers of reasons only with hindsight. However, improvement in their living conditions authoritarianism originating from the keeping this in mind, it is nonetheless or financial situation, but only one military seemed to be small, though revealing that personal gain dominated mentioned ‘self-fulfillment’. Among some interviewees may have hidden the decision to become a professional the post-military occupations found, a more explicit authoritarian views. They soldier. Only 4 of the interviewees variety of jobs were mentioned: most were not, however, comparable to the claimed patriotic reasons like ‘defense of frequently administrative or managerial threats against weak democracies that the fatherland’, while almost half cited jobs, work for security services or as a had emanated from an enfeebled or ‘high reputation’, ‘stability of payment’ trainer or teacher in areas related to marginalized military in Weimar or ‘the living conditions’ as being former military skills, for example Germany (1920s), that had arisen in decisive. Roughly one-quarter of those emergency relief. Those who had Latin American countries (mostly interviewed (12) mentioned a family worked as propagandists or economists during the 1960s and 1970s) or which tradition of joining the armed forces. in the military or who had not acquired might have been expected from a 4 held that “military romanticism” was any additional qualifications, either military which plays a decisive role in one of the reasons but very few during or after service, clearly fared deciding domestic conflicts. additionally mentioned military worse on the job market than others. Authoritarian attitudes were not spread discipline as a motivation. It was equally among the counties covered: notable that expectations associated Among the skills acquired during service pre-democratic or authoritarian patterns with the military as a profession or time which proved useful for civilian were the most prevalent in Ukraine and institution outweighed idealistic life, skills in engineering, technical the least discernable in Latvia. reasons. 15 out of 43 were explicitly subjects, leadership and planning were Furthermore, there did not seem to be a disappointed with their experiences in cited most along with discipline, danger of praetorianism by officers the military compared to their original thoroughness and a sense of facing demobilization due to the shaky expectations. responsibility. Compared to the corporate identity and inefficiency of the advantages of these transferable skills military itself. The average duration of military service and habits, very few thought that of those officers who experienced coming from a military background was Identity patterns frustration was 16.7 years. There were disadvantageous. Several mentioned among former some younger officers among the ‘honesty’ or the fact they had ‘too much disappointed, but those with 15 years respect for the law’ as being Ukrainian officers of service or more clearly dominated the disadvantageous in civilian life. Very few group of the frustrated. Most of these discerned within themselves an ‘inability Of the 43 former officers interviewed in disappointed individuals had to make decisions on their own’ or Ukraine, 4 were younger than 30, 14 mentioned ‘high reputation’ or ‘service ‘difficulties in choosing an activity between 30 and 40, 14 between 40 and for the fatherland’ as the main reason without assistance’. 50, and 11 older than 50 years of age. In for originally choosing a military career. terms of rank, 3 were warrant officers, Some added that their disappointment It is striking that, in their self- 11 lieutenant-colonels, 7 colonels, 7 occurred only after the dissolution of assessment, the overwhelming majority majors, 10 captains, 4 senior lieutenants the Soviet Union. Slightly less than half thought that they had acquired and finally one was a female soldier with (20) nevertheless maintained that their advantages and transferable skills during the rank of ‘servicewoman’. In terms of original expectations had been met by service time. Despite this, one-third (14) the duration of military service, 9 had of the interviewees were unemployed, served up to 10 years, 5 up to 15 years, 8 with this unemployment spread quite

B·I·C·C 11 brief 26

evenly across ranks. Unemployment Taking all these facets together one can at the present time’, only 9 answered appeared to affect all ranks and profes- conclude that the ‘corporate identity’ of ‘yes’ and the rest were undecided. It sional backgrounds, not only warrant former officers is weak. seems, therefore, that the military as an officers without any particular dual-use institution to identify with has clearly qualification. On the basis of our Asked what problems proved most lost its attraction for the overwhelming limited sample, the only factor pressing after dismissal, the interviewees majority of the former officers. significantly correlating positively with gave various answers. ‘Lack of Moreover, as far as the interviewees were unemployment was the duration of accommodation’, ‘financial problems’, concerned, the almost unanimous military service: the longer a person ‘looking for a job’, ‘lack of money to feeling was that the military had lost its stayed in the military, the greater the start one’s own business’, ‘lack of former reputation and influence in likelihood of post-military knowledge of legal and economic politics and society. unemployment. matters’, and ‘loss of friends and colleagues’ were the problems most We inquired finally about the general Among other things, we were interested often mentioned. Almost all outlook adopted by former officers. in establishing to what extent the interviewees claimed that ‘the Slightly less than half (18) maintained decision to leave the armed forces had government’ should have assisted them their living standards had dropped since been influenced by discussions with more. Asked what concrete kind of demobilization, whereas somewhat colleagues in the military or whether it support they had applied for, one-third more than one-quarter (12) thought had been taken individually. Only one- explicitly stated that they had not that their situation had explicitly third (14 out of 43) answered positively, approached any agency at all. Slightly less improved. The rest were undecided. saying their decision had resulted from than one-third had encountered Slightly less than half of the collective discussions. If this result ‘indifference’ and ‘empty promises’ interviewees thought that the impact of reflects the larger picture, then officers whereas those who received assistance system change had been negative. But, who left the Ukrainian armed forces did mentioned ‘provision of a job’, asked about their expectations (‘five so in isolation: of those who left ‘retraining’, and ‘help with years from now’), 26 hoped for or voluntarily, only a few claim to have accommodation’. Asked about the expected improvement, 7 were explicitly discussed their decision with their assistance they would like to have pessimistic and the rest found it difficult colleagues—possibly because of the received in the transitional period, only 3 to assess the prospects. unfavorable climate in the armed forces out of 43 gave an answer at all. They for deliberation and discussion. Slightly referred to ‘mental rehabilitation’— Was the military seen as a savior or as an less than one-third of the interviewees whatever that may mean, ‘solving institution better suited to govern the (13) were members of an officer accommodation problems’ and ‘more country? Only 5 out of 43 explicitly association—mostly associations for information’. The inability to verbalize would have preferred an autocratic leader those with housing problems—while expectations in the face of a generally instead of a democratic one, though only 3 reported tangible advantages high degree of disappointment is another 5 qualified their general support from this membership. evident—it mirrors a passive, pro- of a democratic leader by noting that paternalistic attitude. The problem ‘elements of autocratic style’ or a ‘tough’ Officer organizations evidently played singled out by almost all interviewees politician would be needed. Although no significant role in focusing the was ‘lack of money’. Half of the three-quarters may be counted as being interests of laid-off officers. Possible interviewees did not acquire any generally supportive of democracy, reasons for the lack of collective action additional qualification at all after among the former officers there was a may lie in extremely poor resources, the dismissal. Those who did underwent rampant disappointment with the diversity of post-military career goals, management, administrative, foreign political system in Ukraine—corruption, and passivity among the officers. Asked language, computer, or handicraft lawlessness, chaos, absence of control how they solved these problems, very training. and of responsible government, few could answer at all; those that did disorder, demagogy, and populism were mentioned retraining, hard work and Does leaving the armed forces lead to a the features most often mentioned. help from friends. A significant finding retrospective reassessment of the One additionally criticized that ‘freedom was the lack of problem-solving abilities military as an institution? of speech’ allowed a negative image of on the part of individual officers, not to Approximately one-quarter (11) the country to be created. However the mention the lack of collective capacities. regretted leaving the armed forces, more highly critical image of the present than half did not regret their choice system in Ukraine was not tantamount while the rest were indifferent or to a negative image of the West— undecided. Asked whether they would criticism of the transition results was recommend that their sons embark on a military career, 19 answered ‘no’, 10 ‘not

12 B·I·C·C identity patterns

not identical to criticism of the West in gave a variety of reasons for originally significantly increased by voluntary general. We took the image of NATO having joined the armed forces. Among discharge alone—dual-use qualifications as an indicator of the general imagery of those who were able to identify specific were evidently also a key factor. Similar the West—31 had a positive image of reasons at all, 10 claimed romantic or to the findings in Ukraine, former NATO, 7 negative, and the rest were emotional reasons, 8 mentioned the ‘polit-officers’ usually fared worst on the indifferent. social prestige or high levels of job market. payment, 4 mentioned personal reasons Certain conclusions about the exit from such as ‘self-development’, and only 3 Among skills acquired in the armed military roles can be drawn from the mentioned ‘patriotic reasons’. More forces which proved advantageous for Ukrainian interviews. The most than half of the interviewees (23) were civil life, a variety were cited—self- pressing reintegration problem for laid- satisfied with their experience in the discipline and persistence, human off officers in Ukraine was to find military. In retrospect, their expectations resource management, punctuality, a housing outside military garrisons. In appeared to coincide with their actual sense of duty, leadership skills, Ukraine, officers were not sufficiently experiences and they had left the armed proficiency and additional training such prepared for a post-military career forces with a certain sense of fulfillment. as degrees in economics, engineering, during their service time while the Only 4 out of 34 were explicitly foreign languages, legal knowledge and length of the military service evidently disappointed while the rest were computer skills. Few mentioned skills had a negative impact on reintegration undecided or gave no answer at all (7). that proved disadvantageous such as the prospects. Furthermore, there was a The group of those who were ability to handle weapons or those discernable mismatch between how disappointed or who refrained from resulting from the different way of life most of the former officers assessed giving a positive answer was dominated in the military. Generally speaking, a their acquired skills and the demand for by officers who had been dismissed— sense of undue disadvantage on the qualifications on the job market. their negative assessment of the service labor market was not observed. 14 out Regardless of the concrete requirements time was obviously related to the fact of 34 reported having had discussions of the Ukrainian labor market, officers that they had not left the forces with colleagues before leaving the armed to be laid-off need to be empowered in voluntarily. In terms of formal forces, but only 3 thought that these such a way that they are capable of qualifications, almost half of the cohort deliberations with colleagues had had an finding a job. The overwhelming had acquired dual-use skills such as impact on their decision or on the way impression of the officers is negligence degrees as engineers, in economics, or they adjusted to post-military life. Once on the part of the governmental technical capabilities. After dismissal again, the absence of a process of agencies. This is all the more striking from the armed forces, most had been collective discussion and deliberation is because the interviews were conducted unemployed for a certain period of time surprising. Asked what kind of by a counterpart from the National which had lasted from a few months to problems they faced after leaving the Coordination Center for the Social up to two years. armed forces, only 12 out of 34 Adaptation of Former Military mentioned any at all and these 12 were Servicemen in Ukraine, the agency tasked The reasons for leaving the armed forces evenly spread among those who had by the Cabinet of Ministers with were equally divided between voluntary chosen to leave and those who had been reintegration policy. discharge or early retirement (15) on the dismissed. The difficulties reported one hand and dismissal (15) on the were: ‘hypocrisy’, ‘lack of accountability’, Identity patterns other, while 4 had left for reasons of ‘intolerance of different worldviews’, among former Polish health. If we take ‘voluntary discharge’ ‘lack of acknowledgement’, ‘lack of as an indicator of an active pursuit of a English language skills’, ‘lack of a officers post-military career, are there any civilian profession’, ‘the bad image of biographical patterns discernable which former soldiers’, and ‘lack of assistance The group of 34 former Polish officers are conducive to such behavior? In in finding a job’. Similar to the findings interviewed consisted of 14 lieutenant- terms of age, voluntary discharge was in Ukraine, we could—with few colonels, 5 colonels, 5 majors, 4 navy quite evenly spread over the whole exceptions—discern no strategies to captains, 3 lieutenants, 2 squad leaders, cohort. A positive correlation, though overcome the reported difficulties. and 1 contract soldier. The average only a weak one, is discernable with Nobody, for example, mentioned service time of the interviewees was regard to rank—the higher the rank, the further training or requalification as a 25.6 years, with 3 having served 12–16 more likely voluntary discharge was. job-search strategy. years and only 1 having served 3 years. Though our sample was too small to In other words, most of the give a representative survey, the prospect As for expectations that the government interviewees had served 20 years or of post-military employment was not might assist them with reintegration, more. Their average age was 46.2 years, only 10 out of 34 expressed any hope at with no one older than 55 years and the all. When they did, it was directed youngest 29 years of age. Similar to the towards the military, the center for picture in Ukraine, the Polish officers

B·I·C·C 13 brief 26

conversion at the Ministry of Defense whether a decline in the status of the making’. Disappointment with the and, in one single case, ‘local military translated into shifts in attitude concrete experience of Polish post- administration’. Such expectations were in favor of authoritarian or nationalist socialist governments is widespread mostly related to education or training ideologies. However no such shifts were among former officers. in the armed forces, financial support or indicated by the interviews. In Poland, assistance from the local government in even less servicemen than in Ukraine In respect to Poland’s cooperation with looking for a job. If we take these seemed to be members of an officer NATO—at the time of questioning answers as being representative, not all association: only one of those Poland had already been a member for laid-off officers needed assistance but interviewed reported membership, two years—most interviewees had those who did articulate such needs though most said they kept in contact noticed and were pleased about the overwhelmingly pinpointed better with former colleagues on an individual improvement in defense training and education in the armed basis. administration, standards, military forces as being what was required. technology and order as well as the Generally the impression of how Compared to former living standards in increase in regional stability. Yet, caution governmental agencies reacted to those the military, only 5 maintained that their and skepticism were voiced as well. The who were seeking help was positive situation had worsened, 8 reported expectation that NATO would actually which is very different to the negligence improvement, whereas most were either defend Poland was wrong, one reported in the case of Ukraine. 9 out of undecided or thought their living interviewee said. Another even 34 former officers acquired additional standard had basically remained the expressed the hope that Poland would qualifications after having left the same. If this reflects reality, then only a not repeat the fate of the year 1939 service, including English language minor segment of the group chosen in (Hitler-Stalin Pact). While, as a NATO courses, studies in economics, and the overall assessment was dissatisfied. member, Poland would again become training for private security services. Asked whether five years from now an dependent, NATO membership in improvement or deterioration was to be itself would prove very expensive. It All in all, having left the armed forces, expected, only 6 reckoned with a was additionally suggested that Poland ex-soldiers did not appear to have a deterioration, compared to 14 expecting should not accept everything NATO did negative perception of the military. an improvement; the rest were without criticism. Regardless of these Asked whether they ever regretted undecided. Among the positive reservations, 23 out of 34 expressed a having left the armed forces, 16 (out of experiences of system change, positive attitude towards NATO, only 1 34) answered ‘no’, 4 answered ‘yes’, democracy, freedom of speech and the an explicitly negative view, and 10 could while the rest were undecided or did not free market were mentioned most often, think at the same time of both positive answer at all. Asked whether they would whereas negative experiences were and negative aspects of cooperation encourage male relatives to embark on a associated with ‘hopelessness’, with NATO or were simply undecided. military career, 13 answered ‘yes’, 17 ‘no’ ‘corruption’ ‘too many political parties’, and the rest remained undecided or ‘slow privatization’, ‘loss of services Identity patterns declared they would not influence any and pensions’, ‘lack of stability’, among former decision. However affinity to the ‘criminality’, and ‘loss of discipline and military as an institution has clearly morale’. Given the mix of answers it is Hungarian officers weakened. With few exceptions, former impossible to say whether positive or officers felt that the prestige and negative images prevail. When asked The 29 Hungarian interviewees had an influence of the armed forces had more specifically whether an average age of 41.3 years, with none diminished during transition. authoritarian leader, for example a younger than 30 and only 1 older than Questioned whether their political general, would be better suited to solve 52 (namely 57); in other words, 28 of worldviews or party preferences had the country’s problems, 6 out of 34 the former officers interviewed were changed during transition, only 2 explicitly supported such a solution, likely to embark on a post-military answered in the affirmative: both compared to 19 who openly rejected career. On average, the officers had been reported that they now tended to lean such authoritarianism; 9 remained in service for 16.5 years. Almost all had towards the socialist party (PZPR); 6 undecided. If one takes the silent cohort attended the military academy. Among took a decidedly apolitical stance and the into account—those who are obviously the original motives for joining the rest stressed that their world view had unsure in the question of democracy armed forces, half of the group cited not changed. It was not that we were versus authoritarianism—the result can expected benefits such as further interested in the kind of worldviews hardly be interpreted as overwhelming education and stable living conditions. prevalent among former officers as such; support for democracy. Asked what they One-third mentioned romantic reasons we were merely interested in learning disliked most about democracy, the ex- such as ‘a wish to fly’ or ‘love of servicemen most often cited the following: ‘anarchy’, ‘nepotism of the parties’, ‘arbitrariness’, ‘stupidity of the government’, ‘lack of professionalism’, ‘bureaucracy’, and ‘slow decision-

14 B·I·C·C identity patterns

weaponry’ and 3 referred to the during the 1990s: idealistic or intrinsic difficulties, most prominent among influence of their families, but nobody attachments to the military proved no them financial problems, lack of mentioned patriotic or political reasons. compensation for concrete individual professional skills, lack of knowledge of disadvantages. foreign languages, general difficulties in Compared to the Ukrainian or Polish adapting to civilian life, lack of work cases, only 2 were unemployed at the Among the so-called transferable experience, prejudices towards soldiers, a time of being interviewed, although qualifications, the former officers lack of personal networks. Some vividly another 6 had been unemployed from a mentioned ‘team-leadership’ and articulated psychological hardships— few to 12 months. It thus transpires ‘planning skills’, ‘knowledge of human nervousness, decreased self-esteem and that the social urgency of reintegration nature’, ‘analytical skills’, ‘technical skills’, a sense of hopelessness but only one was far less obvious in Hungary than in ‘organizational skills’, ‘accuracy’, expressed ‘lack of support’ as a Ukraine or Poland. Three of the ‘reliability’, ‘punctuality’, ‘consistency’, problem. Given the fact that they were interviewees had retired, only ‘self-discipline’, and the acquisition of aware of the difficulties on the civilian occasionally taking up new jobs. Among degrees with a civil application such as job market, it is surprising that only 13 those with a distinct post-military engineering degrees. out of 29 former officers acquired occupation, some patterns were evident: additional professional skills after 8 worked either for the police or the Former Hungarian officers voiced their demobilization—predominantly in security services, 9 worked as managers opinions on the disadvantages of a management, private security services, in retail sales, wholesales or in the military career in a comparatively strong foreign languages, consulting or service sector, 4 were teachers or form. ‘Schematic thinking’, ‘stereotypes marketing. journalists, and 2 had opened up their and prejudices’, ‘having been in the own small businesses (bakery and armed forces at all’, ‘lack of professional When specifically asked about what transport). Our limited sample seemed skills for civil occupations’, ‘starchiness’, assistance they expected, one mentioned to suggest that the absorption capacity ‘lack of connection to civilian life’, ‘the ‘powerful military friends’, while all the of the Hungarian labor market was low reputation of former officers’ and others had either no particular idea higher than in Poland or Ukraine. ‘inadequate personal (social) skills’ were about whom they could rely on or identified as unhelpful. The shared mentioned friends and their family (12 Asked whether their original experience of disadvantages on the civil out of 29). In the Hungarian case it is motivations for joining the armed market was not however identical with worth mentioning that almost no forces were matched by actual experience, regretting having left military service. paternalistic mindsets existed—friends, 12 answered ‘no’, 7 ‘yes’ and 10 thought Only 5 out of 29 actually regretted their family and self-help were seen as the their expectations had at least in part decision to quit. Asked whether they means to overcome the reported been met. While these answers would recommend that their sons or difficulties while the government or the suggested that roughly 41 percent had male relatives should embark on a military itself was rarely expected to been frustrated by their military military career, only 7 give a positive assist. Most simply answered: ‘I did not experiences, the assessment of affinities answer. ask for help’. Those who did receive to the armed forces became even more material benefits upon quitting the critical when we looked at the reasons On being asked whether they had armed forces, mostly reported an offer for leaving the armed forces. 19 had left discussed their decision to quit the to buy their service apartment along voluntarily, 5 had chosen early armed forces with colleagues, 11 with financial compensations. Only one retirement; the rest had left due to answered negatively and 18 positively, of our interviewees was offered a job in health reasons or was simply dismissed. though only 7 of the latter recalled any the regional administration. The reasons for leaving the armed forces positive influence of these deliberations. were often mixed. Some officers left the Compared to the Ukrainian or Polish With the exception of one former armed forces after their units had been interviews, it seems that the Hungarian officer, it was the view of all dissolved and they were offered lower officers were less isolated in their interviewees that the prestige and positions which they were not willing to decision to quit the armed forces. It standing of the army had declined accept. Most were very outspoken about would nonetheless be an exaggeration during transition. Above all the feeling the reasons for quitting—‘lack of to suggest there was a pattern of that the reputation of the army within perspective’, ‘lack of money’, ‘perma- organized decision-making. 6 out of 29 society had decreased was strongly nent reorganization’ and ‘lack of interviewees declared that they had voiced, together with the opinion that stability’ were frequently mentioned; experienced no problems in adjusting to the army no longer played an important one added his ‘inability to fulfill orders civilian life. 23 reported a variety of role in the support of politicians. One of stupid people’. If one compares interviewee expressed the hope that the reasons to quit with those for original status of the army would increase with enrollment, it becomes clear that those NATO membership. Asked whether entering the forces for reasons of self- interest gradually lost their illusions

B·I·C·C 15 brief 26

their political worldviews or party EU, provide more stability for the that a significant number of those who preferences had changed during region, allow for the modernization of had joined the National Guard transition, 14 answered ‘no change’, 6 the army, and guarantee security. Not a (Zemessardze) or the regular armed forces said they were apolitical; 4 indicated a single interviewee was openly critical of in 1991/92 left the Latvian armed forces change (2 in a more liberal direction, 1 to NATO, though 3 expressed voluntarily in 1999/2000. Among those the right) and 1 maintained he had reservations—2 preferred neutrality, who left voluntarily, ‘stagnation’, become more interested in politics in especially under the impression of the ‘intrigues’, ‘lack of promotion’ or general than he had been in the past. Kosovo war, and 1 questioned whether ‘promotion not based on merits and NATO would defend Hungary if the performance’ and ‘low competence’ of Most discharged officers kept in contact latter could not defend itself. military leadership are the reasons with former colleagues, though only 4 reported for disappointment. Further had joined an officers’ association. There Identity patterns reasons for voluntarily discharge is clearly no pattern of collective interest among former included financial problems (including aggregation or representation. In the the need to support a family), health Hungarian case, the motivation for officers in Latvia reasons, reaching the military pension joining might be missing because 18 age and early retirement As for the out of 29 were of the opinion that their The 15 interviews in Latvia were Russian officer who had been life had improved since leaving the conducted with 14 Latvians and 1 discharged, it seemed as if his ethnic armed forces, while only 6 maintained Russian officer who had served in the origin was a disadvantage even after 8 their life had deteriorated and the rest post-independence armed forces of years of service in the Latvian armed were hesitant to give an assessment. Latvia. All interviewees had left the forces. Latvian officers with a lengthy Only 4 expected a worsening of their Latvian armed forces some time after period of service in the Soviet armed situation in the coming five years; all 1997, that is, not as a result of the forces expressed a similar sense of others were optimistic. As for the downsizing or dissolution of Soviet discrimination. overall assessment of system change, troops. The average age of the attitudes were mixed, with those seeing interviewees was 48; half of the group Among the abilities deemed useful in the more positive aspects (17) prevailing consisted of former Soviet officers, the post-military adjustment, organizational over those with predominantly negative other half of officers who had joined skills, leadership, a sense of order, impressions (12). the armed forces or the National Guard punctuality, fast decision-making, of Latvia after independence, namely decisiveness, and—for those in security Lastly, we were interested in the from 1992 onwards. services—the command of weapons democratic or authoritarian mindset of were mentioned. Half of the former officers. Only 2 out of 29 Compared to former Soviet officers, all interviewees declared that they discussed explicitly opted for authoritarianism. those who joined the Latvian armed their decision to leave the armed forces Asked what they disliked most about forces after independence claimed that with colleagues. Whether the decision to democracy, these two individuals ‘patriotism’ was the main reason. Given leave the forces is discussed or not is mentioned ‘corruption’, ‘venality’, ‘lies’, the advanced age of this group, we may indicative of two issues: the degree of ‘the greed of politicians’, safely assume that these allegedly purely individual versus collective decision- ‘permissiveness of authorities’, ‘patriotic’ officers had originally served making and the openness of the climate ‘disinterest in people’, ‘nonsensical talk’, in the Soviet army as well and had in the military for discussion at all. In ‘a culture of shifting blame among simply cut this part out of their the case of Latvia, it seems that the politicians’, and ‘wild capitalism’. Not biographical account. Furthermore, had collective had a comparatively stronger only did the answers reveal the duration of service only consisted effect on decisions—even if most disappointment with the post-socialist of the years after independence, officers maintained that their ultimate decision experience, but in certain cases also an who claimed they had enrolled after was taken alone—and that the inner- underlying misunderstanding of independence could not have reached military climate was more open for democracy. The more or less clear the ranks they gave (colonel, lieutenant- discussions. absence of support for open colonel, captain, and so on). One of the authoritarianism is therefore not first observations thus pertains to the One of the prime difficulties in post- identical with an unwavering pro- split identity of Latvian officers with a military adjustment in Latvia is the democratic stand. record in the Soviet armed forces—on system of military pensions which does the one hand a ‘patriotic’, ‘Latvian’ not allow ex-soldiers to take up a new With respect to NATO membership, identity was stressed in order to distance job if they want to continue receiving the interviewees were overwhelmingly in oneself from the Soviet past, on the their military pension. Hence, as nobody favor (21 out of 29), giving a variety of other hand the Soviet ranking was reasons: it would ease the way into the retained. Though the limited number of the sample group must be borne in mind, it is nevertheless conspicuous

16 B·I·C·C identity patterns

wants to lose his pension, there is no As for their overall assessment of post- incentive to look for a job, even if age military life, the group was split equally and ability make this possible. As in the between those who had experienced a other case studies, a significant portion material improvement, those whose of the former officers who took up jobs living conditions had deteriorated and did so in areas closely related to the those who either thought conditions military—either in private security had stayed the same or merely had companies, as guards or as civilians difficulty in answering. A slight majority working for the Ministry of Defense. It nonetheless thought that the transition is once again noteworthy that only 1 out period had brought positive rather than of 15 acquired any additional negative results. Not a single interviewee qualifications after leaving the military. stated that his worldviews had changed If one compares the case of Latvia with under the impact of transition or Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine, the leaving the armed forces. With the provision of pensions is the only exception of one former officer who measure reintegration policy covers—at maintained that for a short period of least from the perspective of the former time an authoritarian leader could solve officers. Until 2000, there existed neither Latvia’s problems, all other interviewees a system for preparing officers during ruled out a military or authoritarian service time for a post-military career, leader as a solution. Criticism of the nor administrative structures to support post-independence democracy was very the reintegration process. As a matter of similar to that in the other case studies. fact, looking for a job was actually ‘Corruption’, ‘anarchy’, ‘disregard for discouraged once an officer had become ordinary people’, ‘bureaucracy’ and entitled to a pension. Only 2 of the 15 ‘hypocrisy’ were the deficits most often officers interviewed expected to receive mentioned. Asked about their government help after leaving the forces, relationship to NATO, all expressed a while the rest thought of their friends positive attitude with only two and families as their support groups. suggesting that the ‘Partnership for Peace’ would be sufficient instead of full Among the Latvian interviewees we NATO membership. found a high degree of identification with the military as an institution—only 3 dismissed the idea of recommending a military career to their sons or male relatives and all kept in contact, at least at irregular intervals, with former colleagues. Only 2 out of 15 were organized in an officer association (the Union of Latvian Officers or the Association of Reservists). In contrast to this emotional—rather than organizational—affinity with the military, most former officers were critical of the Latvian armed forces, maintaining that the current army did not differ much from the old Soviet prototype and society had a negative attitude towards the armed forces. It was nonetheless mentioned that, in comparison to Soviet times, not only nutrition but also motivation and discipline had improved.

B·I·C·C 17 brief 26

Administrating Demobilization: Experiences in Ukraine, Russia, Poland and Hungary

Ukraine Social Adaptation of Servicemen under Before 2002 it was impossible to the Cabinet of Ministers (NCC) has officially obtain exact figures on fter the dissolution of the Soviet since stated that the overall number of Ukrainian troop strengths which would AUnion in December 1991, Ukraine military servicemen was in reality clarify the de facto strength of personnel inherited one of the largest armies in reduced between 1991 and 1996 by in the various military branches and Europe. In 1991 there were some 410,000, that is, 40,000 less than their ranks as well as those of troops 780,000 soldiers on the territory of originally planned. Between 1997 and under the supervision of ministries Ukraine, plus an estimated number of 1999 the size of the Ukrainian armed other than the Ministry of Defense. 130,000 troops under the Ukrainian forces was cut back even further: 127,000 Budgeted troops often do not coincide Ministry of the Interior, Border Troops, persons were discharged, among them with actual troop strengths. In 2001 a Special Forces, and KGB men (Shikalov, 60,000 military servicemen and 67,000 Ukrainian expert estimated that the 2001). On 24 August 1991— civilian personnel (Shikalov, 2001). This difference between the reported and the immediately after the failed August would imply an overall reduction in the actual troop strengths amounted to putsch in Moscow, but still four 1990s of 470,000 military servicemen 40,000 soldiers, without taking troops months before the dissolution of the (officers, contract soldiers and recruits), under the Ministry of Interior, Border Soviet Union—the Supreme Soviet of civil employees of the Ministry of Troops and Special Forces into account Ukraine took the Soviet troops on its Defense not included. More than 80 (Interview, L. Polyakov, February 2001). territory formally under its own percent of the servicemen laid-off were Requests submitted to the Ukrainian jurisdiction. The post-independence reportedly less than 45 years of age. Ministry of Defense asking for the troops consisted of almost all those respective information were declined on nationalities of which the Soviet Union Unfortunately these figures on troop grounds of “state security”. It is had been comprised. About 12,000 reductions contrast with those provided therefore hard to confirm or qualify such officers or NCOs of non-Ukrainian in the “Law on the Number of Troops figures on the actual dimensions and origin returned to their home republics in Ukraine” (7 December 2000) which nature of downsizing of the Ukrainian in the years 1991–1994, while 33,000 estimated troop strength for the year armed forces. The figures on soldiers came back to Ukraine from 2000 at 400,000, including 310,000 downsizing only match the reported other Soviet successor states (Shikalov, military servicemen (Zakon Ukrainy O troop strength if one assumes that 2001). chislennosti Vooruzhennykh Sil Ukrainy na substantial new recruitment has taken 2000-2005 gody, N 2128-111, 7 December place to fill the gap. Apart from the Ukraine then began the formation of its 2000). As for future downsizing until Soviet legacy of disinformation and the own armed forces, based on ex-Soviet 2015, forecasts foresee a further possibility that the Ministry of Defense units located on its territory. According reduction by 2005 (the end of the first itself does not know actual troop to Ukraine’s military doctrine adopted stage of restructuring) to 295,000 strengths, the purpose of by Parliament on 14 October 1993, the servicemen, plus 80,000 civilian misrepresenting or over-representing armed forces, which had numbered employees. In the second stage, 2006– figures could be to receive more approximately 780,000 in January 1992 2010, the number of military budgetary means or to impress (Shikalov, 2001), were to be reduced by servicemen is expected to decrease to potential adversaries. 450,000 men by the end of 1995. The 275,000, plus 70,000 civil employees, National Coordinating Center for the and in the third stage, 2011–2015, yet another reduction to 240,000 military servicemen, plus 60,000 civil employees is foreseen (Polyakov, 2001).

18 B·I·C·C Ukraine

Figure 2: Ukrainian troops other than regular armed forces, 1998–2000

Source: Polyakov, 2001 a Planned number of personnel according to law b Number of personnel according to the presentation of the Head of General Staff before the Ukrainian Parliament on 22 December 1998 c Approximate estimate of the total number of troops other than regular Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense) ( ) Reported strength of the National Guard before its dissolution

Troop name Category of military personnel 1998 1999 2000

Border Troops Military servicemen (total) 43,500b 42,000 42,000 Of whom draftees 15,000 14,000 14,000 Of whom civil servants n.a. 3,000 3,000

Total n.a. 45,000b 45,000b

Troops of the Ministry Military servicemen (total) 39,700b n.a. n.a. of Internal Affairs Of whom draftees 15,000 15,000 15,000 Of whom civil servants 1,000 1,000 1,000

Total 49,414a 49,414a 49,414a

Civil Defense Troops Military servicemen (total) 9,550a 9,550a 9,550a Of whom draftees 5,500 5,500 5,500 Of whom civil servants 668a 668a 668a

Total 10,218 10,218 10,218

National Guard Military servicemen (total) 25,500b 25,500b Dissolution in (19,000) 2000 Of whom draftees 7,000 7,000 Of whom civil servants 2,000 2,000

Total 128,632c 127,732c 104,632c

In Ukraine, the downsizing of the In Ukraine, discharged professional recently released servicemen has armed forces mainly resulted from the servicemen face four main hurdles in reportedly risen significantly need to reduce the burden inherited adapting to civilian life: (www.irf.lviv.ua/military.html). Social from the Soviet Union and the problems—the main one being the lack intention to restructure the armed Retraining of housing—increase levels of stress forces. As in other Eastern European and uncertainty. The large numbers of countries, the Ukrainian army was a Finding employment discharged servicemen are being released mass army, top-heavy and short on into an environment characterized by contract soldiers as well as non- Social problems high unemployment and economic commissioned officers. If one compares crisis, caused to a major extent by the absolute figures at the beginning of Medical or psychological difficulties. transition to a market economy. In the 1990s with those at the end of the addition, most servicemen have decade, the most significant shortages During the period of transition to families, which adds to the already pertain to the air force or the air defense civilian life, the death rate among overwhelming numbers of people forces. requiring assistance.

B·I·C·C 19 brief 26

Retraining and reintegration motivated by the desire to speed up the financed program came to an end in programs withdrawal of former Soviet troops 1997, the three Interregional Training from East Germany. The program Centers (ITC) came under the The reintegration of military servicemen foresaw the retraining of reservists as jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry in Ukraine has been conducted within well as of their wives and children. It of Education. The courses offered at the framework of four major programs: was financed by the German the ITCs since then are mainly 5-month government and was administered courses with a symbolic fee of 150 The German-financed reintegration financially by the Kreditanstalt für Hryvnas (29 euros) to be paid by the program for officers originally Wiederaufbau (KfW). Between 1993 and former officers. The ITCs do not engage stationed in East Germany 1995, three interregional ‘model’ in job placement, and no records are retraining centers were set up: one in the kept on the success of their students on The EU-TACIS program city of Kiev, one in Krivoy Rog and one the job market. It is nonetheless in Khorol. The program’s partner on assumed that those who passed the NATO’s language training courses. the Ukrainian side was the Ministry of original 10-month courses were usually Education, while the German successful on the job market. The program of the Renaissance consulting company GOPA Foundation, a subsidiary of the Consultants, together with BC Berlin In some subjects, Ukrainian trainers first George Soros’ Open Society Consult and ABU Consult, functioned had to be trained. For instance, German Foundation as the general contractors of the teachers offered trainer courses in market retraining program. The total amount economy for 8 Ukrainian teachers while Additionally, the International offered to CIS countries (Belarus, 28 teachers were sent to Germany for Association for the Rehabilitation of Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine) by the training courses in car servicing, radio, Military Servicemen, based in Israel and German government was approximately TV and PC repair and the management headed by the former Russian citizen, DM 200 million with an Ukrainian share of construction companies or small Evgeniy Shpits, has offered retraining of DM 22.98 million. enterprises. The first training courses in courses in Israel with stipends of US April 1993 concentrated on teaching $600 per month. The association The money provided by the German small business management and the use originally announced its willingness to government was mainly used for the of personal computers. By the end of retrain some 2,500 to 3,000 former acquisition and furbishing of teaching June 1994, altogether 116 former officers but no information could be facilities (c. DM 20 million) as well as the officers or their family members had obtained on how many officers actually setting-up of administrative structures successfully completed professional participated in courses in Israel. for the interregional training centers. courses. The number grew by the fall of Two training centers were particularly 1994 to 350 course participants in Kiev, The administrative setup and the scope built for teaching company 164 in Krivoy Rog, and 65 in Khorol. of the reintegration measures in Ukraine management. Altogether courses were have resulted almost exclusively from available for sixteen different However, due to nontransparent impulses given by foreign aid. The professions. Additionally, ABU Consult accounting procedures, the overall incentive to design and build up offered enterprise managers, those number trained under the German administrative structures for starting up businesses and young program is not known, nor is it firmly reintegration thus came from outside— entrepreneurs training in privatization, established what happened to parts of the offer of money from Western restructuring, business management, the costly office equipment once the countries or organizations. During the planning, controlling, marketing, program came to its conclusion in 1997. 1990s, the fear that laid-off military distribution, accounting, investment, Against the backdrop of the numbers professionals could turn into financing, and the reform of public of dismissed officers, the German mercenaries, threaten the administration. contribution to actual retraining was of democratization process, or cause social more of a symbolic nature, though the unrest reinforced this benevolent Topics for the original 10-month apparent high job-placement rate behavior of Western donors. courses were, for example, ‘The Small bespeaks success. The very creation of Business Specialist’, ‘The Car Mechanic’, ITCs helped to sustain retraining The German-financed ‘The Specialist for the Repair of capacities even after the German project reintegration project Personal Computers’ and ‘The Specialist came to an end. The shortcomings of for the Repair of VCRs and TV Sets’. the German-financed project were a The first program for reintegration in Course participants were delegated by result of the institutional setup: as Ukraine was financed by the German their respective district military governmental bodies, the ITCs were government as a means to facilitate the commander. When the German- exclusively subordinated to the return of soldiers originally stationed in Ukrainian Ministry of Education, the former GDR (German Democratic excluding the Ministry of Defense. By Republic). The German approach was

20 B·I·C·C Ukraine

and large, they acted independently of The essential goal of the TACIS project ministries in charge. A certain ‘mania’ each other and without any tangible was to reintegrate discharged officers of for secrecy inherited from Soviet days contribution from the National the Ukrainian armed forces by means of also contributed to delays. It was not Coordinating Center at the Cabinet of forming central and regional centers for until 5 August 1996 that, based on an Ministers in Kiev (NCC) (more below), retraining and job placement. Successful order of the Ukrainian Cabinet of leading to a lack of exchange of job placement was the ultimate aim and Ministers, a National Supervisory Board information, coordination and retraining was intended to contribute to was created to coordinate activities monitoring. this. The TACIS project encompassed related to the reintegration of military five elements: support for the ‘Complex servicemen. The Supervisory Board was The EU TACIS Project Program’; labor market analysis; formed by the heads of departments in upgrading of teachers’ qualifications; several ministries, among them the The German project for reintegration of development of general and specialized Ministries of Defense, of Labor and former Soviet officers originally training programs for officers; and, Social Policy, and of Education. The stationed in East Germany was support for civilian reemployment. Supervisory Board was to provide the followed by the European Union’s Reemployment soon emerged as the National Coordinating Center (NCC, TACIS project (EDUK 9301) which core concern of the project. see more below) with the necessary lasted from 2 March 1995 to 31 information. The Ministry of Labor, for December 1998. It was carried out by Setting the retraining of some 8,000 example, was supposed to provide the GOPA Consultants, the company which military service men as its goal, the NCC with information on regional had won the international tender. The TACIS project offered standardized labor markets and to assist former main long-term expert was Dr Frank courses: a 640-hour course on officers in finding jobs. At the level of Jacobi. Parallel to the EU project, the management; a 200-hour basic course regional governments, additional Ukrainian government developed a on ‘Forming an Enterprise and Manage- Supervisory Boards were formed in ‘Complex Program for the Social ment of Small and Medium-sized order to assist in the implementation of Readaptation and Reemployment of Enterprises (SMEs)’; as well as the governmental ‘Complex Program’, Military Officers Laid Off or Transferred specialized 640-hour courses on mainly in the field of local housing to the Reserve, and their Families’ ‘Management of Public Administra- policy and job placement for former (called hereafter ‘Complex Program’) tion’, ‘Financial Management’, officers. The launch of the ‘Complex which became the basis for ‘Production Management’, ‘Manage- Program’ actually began in May/June implementing the TACIS project. ment of Accounting and Auditing’, 1997. TACIS supported this ‘Complex ‘Personnel Management’, ‘Management Program’ for 46 months through a of SMEs’, ‘Information Management’, It is safe to assume that no project entitled ‘Support to the ‘Banking Management’, ‘Tourism governmental reintegration program Retraining and Reemployment of Ex- Management’, ‘Marketing’, and ‘Food would have taken place in Ukraine if the Military Officers in the Ukraine’. Processing’. Before the retraining could EU program had not been initiated. start, teachers themselves had to be Out of US $13.16 million foreseen for The immediate objectives were trained. In 1997, 250 teachers for the reintegration measures for the period identified as retraining of officers were selected on a 1996–1998, 10.6 million came from the competitive basis; all underwent EU. The Ukrainian share in financing Support in the establishment of preparatory courses in computer literacy, mainly consisted of renting administra- institutional capacities at the national 138 took English lessons, and 60 tive buildings free-of-charge, taking on and regional levels to implement and attended the 1-month ‘General Manage- running costs, providing community monitor the national ‘Complex ment Training’ course in an EU-country. services, taking over personnel on the Program’ governmental pay-roll, and assisting Administrating reintegration: former officers in building up their The establishment of institutional The National Coordinating businesses. capacities for job counseling and Center (NCC) and Regional career advice Centers for Employment Before the TACIS project could commence, it was necessary to create a The provision of different kinds of At the beginning, the Ukrainian counterpart organization in the Ukraine. retraining and requalification government, and in particular the It took 21 months after the official programs for laid-off officers. Ministry of Defense, did not feel a sense launching of the TACIS project for the of urgency. Presented with an offer by Ukrainian government to form a basic the EU, the Ukrainian government working unit—the National seems to have taken its time before Coordinating Center for the Social accepting it. The protracted build-up of Adaptation of Military Servicemen a sustainable structure reflects under the Cabinet of Ministers (NCC), institutional infighting among the

B·I·C·C 21 brief 26

headed by Colonel Aleksander signed and implemented temporary, Box 1: Training and Stepanovich Shikalov. The NCC though renewable, contracts with the job procurement currently has 46 staff members, NCC in Kiev. Apart from assisting in including 19 regional representatives for job placements, one additional task of through the RCEs local coordination. In Kiev, the NCC is the RCEs consisted in elaborating and divided into four departments: Trai- assessing projects for small businesses RCEs provide services in three main ning, Reemployment, Utilization of with the support of the NCC, often areas: retraining, job procurement, and Military Assets, and Housing for based on former military infrastructure promotion of small businesses. The Discharged Officers. In September 2001, or using ex-garrisons. In short, the RCEs regularly function as the liaison reflecting its new role in the conversion RCEs were active in three fields: between those undergoing training and of military bases, the NCC was renamed assistance in job placement for those the subsidiary centers (Regional’nye the ‘National Coordinating Center for who had undergone retraining; Uchebnye Tsentry) which carry out some Adaptation of Servicemen, transferred counseling former officers on professio- of the courses. Each RCE consists of a to Reserve or Retirement, and for the nal retraining; and helping to build-up director, a training manager, a manager Conversion of Military Assets’. new businesses. Altogether some 5,000 for the promotion of SMEs, a manager people found new jobs in small for job placement and, in some cases, a The NCC, though formally a special businesses formed with the help of the manager for distant learning as well. The body of the executive branch, remained RCEs and the NCC. The most RCEs mostly assist in job searches and closely linked to the Ministry of successful small businesses were usually job placement, even if they cannot Defense, though it lacked sound in the field of food processing for the perform the task of an unemployment financial backing from this ministry. local market, such as bakeries or noodle office. Cooperation between the NCC and production. During the first TACIS both the Main Administration of the project (until end of 1998), the results The training courses at the RCEs are Cadres Politics and the Main Admini- of the actual creation of new jobs were divided into short-term courses (1–3 stration for Military Education of the modest: NCC and GOPA Consultants days at US $30), medium-term courses Ministry of Defense is practically reported that 306 jobs had been newly (6 months at US $600) and long-term nonexistent (Narodnaya Armiya, 14 April established. courses (1–2 1/2 years). Most courses 2001, p. 5). Another illustration of the which take place are short- or medium- lack of coordination between the NCC The NCC controls the finances of the term courses. Retraining encompasses and the Ministry of Defense is the RCEs used for retraining and courses in 30 different disciplines, ‘Program for Social and Professional reemployment. The RCEs have to including distance learning for small Adaptation of Laid-off Officers up to account for their work to the NCC and business management, career planning, the year 2004’, signed by the President in the TACIS administration. The regional and business planning. Whereas at the May 2000: the Ministry of Defense did representatives of NCC, who are beginning the courses had concentrated not incorporate the expenses for this responsible for establishing contact with on basic administrative or computer program into its planning for annual regional and local administrations, are skills, over time they have became more budgets, obviously hoping that the often located on the premises of the specialized. NCC would attract finances from RCEs. Their actual function—apart abroad. It would seem that, for the from oversight—nevertheless remains Former officers were able to choose Ministry of Defense, the NCC vague. between training in 32 different represented an ‘agency’ to which it could professions. The average duration of transfer its own responsibilities. With time, most of the RCEs the courses was four months—one Understandably, the NCC then strove channeled their activities in new usually spent on basic market economy for several years to achieve the upgrading directions. As the retraining of former and computer skills and three on the of its status and for more independence officers lost importance, they turned chosen specialization. One task of the from the Ministry of Defense—up to either to the professional training of the RCEs was to assist former officers to the present, however, with no avail. general public, to professional job- acquire basic knowledge and skills for placement activities, or transformed jobs in the newly emerging market Regional Centers for themselves into developers of former economy or to facilitate the build-up of Employment (RCE) military sites. Cooperation among the their own enterprises. In order to individual RCEs is one of the weakest promote the formation of small With TACIS help, 12 regional centers elements in the whole system. Some businesses by former officers— for job placement (Regional’nye Tsentry have signed bilateral agreements among particularly in order to assess the Perepodgotovki i Trudoustroistva—Regional themselves or with state enterprises viability of business plans—the NCC Center for Retraining and Employment) founded by the NCC. In contrast to the signed an agreement with the Ukrainian were created. The RCEs represent the ITCs, which remained state institutions, Foundation for the Promotion of regional agencies responsible for the RCEs are private. Entrepreneurs. In the city of Kharkov, a implementing the TACIS project. They special Social Center for the Promotion

22 B·I·C·C Ukraine

of Private Initiatives was formed Practical work of the NCC policies, mostly with participants from (Khar’kovskii Obshestvennyi Tsentr Eastern Europe and the CIS but also Sodeistvia Chastnym Initsiativam) whose In February 1998, the NCC formed a with representatives from Austria, purpose was to legally advise and ‘Methodological Center’ in Kiev whose Germany, the United Kingdom, and technically support discharged officers in main task became the preparation of Israel. building-up their businesses. materials for a Distance Learning System. Financed through TACIS, the The NCC has furthermore developed a A major part of the work of the NCC Methodological Center helped the housing policy in conjunction with the and the RCEs consisted in regular labor regional centers to acquire and exchange All-Ukrainian Union of Reserve Officers market analysis. By the end of 1998, the teaching experience, mostly by holding and the Union of Homeless Officers RCEs had reportedly assisted in the seminars and creating and distributing (Soyus bezdomnykh ofitserov). The Union career planning of 3,701 laid-off officers handbooks as well as functioning as a of Homeless Officers has a reported while 412 new work places had been consulting organization. Based on the membership of 30,000. On the other created in 103 new small businesses. agreements between the NCC, 12 RCEs hand, however, the second half of the Furthermore, 2,882 individual career and the 3 ITCs, 9,356 people 1990s saw constant reductions in special plans and 773 business plans had been underwent some form of retraining in financing from the national budget for developed. How much of this the years up to 2001. This figure the housing of discharged officers— consulting resulted in actual job probably relates to short-term from 6 million hryvnas in 1996 to 2 placement was not recorded. counseling as well as the retraining of million in 1997. In 1998 and 1999, all family members. budgetary allocations for the Job procurement includes the creation construction of houses for laid-off of new work places, job placement The NCC claims that by 2001 120 officers were cancelled. After public without or after retraining, pre-selection businesses had been set up with its pressure from the homeless officers, the of candidates for enterprises, consulting help, providing new jobs for 4,400 Ukrainian government resumed its on job procurement, and preparation of people, among them 3,321 discharged budgeted support in 2000 by equalizing candidates for job interviews. Constant servicemen. In areas where the the housing entitlement of former labor-market monitoring by the RCEs unemployment figures for former officers to that of other needy groups. and their cooperation with the State officers were high, the NCC established In the years 2000–2001, the NCC Employment Service was supported some state enterprises of its own, reportedly provided former officers with through RCE staff training and altogether eight. It is not possible to some 1,000 apartments, financed by a coaching. Finally, the promotion of assess the effectiveness of these special tax on enterprise profits. Given small businesses encompasses enterprises, though the NCC claims that that reports in 2001 indicated that consulting, equipping with money generated by these state 13,300 former officers did not have telecommunication equipment, enterprises has been used for the proper apartments, it seems that business planning, the build-up of creation of new jobs. drawing the Ukrainian President and networks, accounting services, the parliament’s attention to the urgency of selection of candidates, advertisement With the assistance of TACIS, the NCC the housing situation and a slight and help in registering small businesses. built up eight ‘project groups’ in order improvement in the situation was all to formulate long-term government the NCC had achieved. programs for the reintegration of ex- servicemen. These included, among others, groups on telecommunications, construction work, tourism, agriculture and the conversion of military sites. One of the instruments used to promote job procurement by former officers was job fairs. In December 1998, in the city of Donetsk, a job fair was conducted with 502 representatives from seven garrisons, among them 343 reserve officers. Representatives of 68 enterprises and firms (59 Ukrainian and 9 Western) offered 369 open positions which resulted in 68 job contracts. From 1998 onwards, the NCC additionally organized a series of international conferences on the Crimean Peninsula on demobilization and reintegration

B·I·C·C 23 brief 26

Box 2: The focus extra-budgetary funds as well as Despite this, the Ukrainian government shifts from investment for these military cities, places high hopes on getting the though the NCC itself does not have support of the Economic Department reintegration to site specific expertise in promoting of NATO for site conversion. conversion economic policy on a regional scale. According to plans, the Uzin military airport is to become a pilot project in If the NCC had initially concentrated on The two most ambitious site Ukrainian cooperation with NATO. the reintegration of servicemen into the conversion projects are the Interests differ however: whereas job market, from May 1998 onwards it transformation of the military airport NATO may have an interest in the increasingly became responsible for Uzin (70km south of Kiev) into a cargo future use of the airfield, the primary administrating closed garrison towns airport and the conversion of the concern of the NCC is the fate of the and converting them into training former rocket base in Novye roughly 16,000 people living in the centers, business incubators or techno- Belokorovichi, 200km east of Kiev, into garrison town, among them 2,500 parks. The procedure was as follows: a company for refining oil and gas. At military persons with military pensions The Ministry of Defense usually the time of writing, it was still unclear who are mostly unemployed. informed the NCC about its intention to what extent the NCC would be to close a certain military base. The NCC successful in attracting the vast In April 2001 and April 2002, in order then took the initiative to form a investments required. In the case of to attract additional investments trusteeship-takeover in order to set up Novye Belokorovichi, which was still particularly in garrison towns or at state enterprises on the premises. The inhabited by 2,5000 persons of whom military sites to be converted, the NCC business incubators were supposed to 1,000 were laid-off servicemen, it was conducted conferences on the Crimean help small businesses by providing expected that the necessary impulses for Peninsula, “The Crimean Spring of information technology, consulting domestic and foreign investment in Conversion”. Neither the list of facilities and professional training. In civilian production could be created by participants nor individual reports by some of these garrison towns, the NCC freeing enterprises from import custom participants given to the author after the opened up consulting bureaus duties, from paying value-added-tax on conference indicate that significant (konsul’tatsionnye punkty) where former imported machinery, profit tax and land investment can be expected. officers could participate in distant tax for three years, and by reducing the learning programs (covering some 2,866 regular tax load by 50 percent for the officers or their family members up to following three years. Similar tax breaks the end of 2001). are offered by regional administrations at a number of other military sites as Lack of affordable accommodation was well. the reason many laid-off officers could not move to a civilian city in search of a The authorities assigned a variety of job. As a rule, ex-officers in garrison tasks to the NCC which proved difficult towns only had limited capital with to coordinate in practice: retraining and which to start a business and lacked career-planning belong to a very professional skills. About 500 garrison different area from transforming towns in Ukraine are slated for garrison towns or finding a civilian use conversion in conjunction with the for military infrastructure. Given both restructuring of the Ukrainian armed the type of expertise of its staff and its forces. From 2000 onwards, the NCC structure, it is difficult to imagine that began to take charge of entire military the NCC is the appropriate institution towns such as in Uzin, Belaya Tserkov, to deal with site conversion. There is a Svidnitsa, Alchevsk, Lugansk, L’viv, on distinct difference between creating the Crimean peninsula and in the business plans for self-employed former Zhitomir region. Whenever garrison officers and the development of huge towns were handed over to military areas such as the Uzin airfield or municipalities, they were usually entire garrison-towns. Quite apart from stripped of all their assets by the local the fact that they are isolated from major populace and thus became useless for cities and regional markets, military sites future investment. The NCC is keen to slated for conversion regularly represent preserve such facilities and to attract ecological disasters or require expensive cleaning from explosives before investors would take an interest.

24 B·I·C·C Ukraine

Outcomes of the first EU The second EU TACIS project It is estimated, for example, that more TACIS project and future directions than 50 percent of former officers ended up in private security firms. Former It is reported that, by December 1998, In July 2000, a second EU project polit-officers were as a rule hard to re- 8,013 people of the so-called ‘target (SCRE1/No. 42) on assisting job employ. With few exceptions, officers group’ had been trained in one way or creation for ex-members of the military who turned to trading or commercial another through the joint TACIS/NCC was launched with a duration of 24 business ran the risk of unemployment, program. If one adds those trained by months and a budget of 2 million mainly due to the shaky nature of the Interregional Training Centers, a euros. The group targeted by this commercial business itself. Moreover, total of 9,356 people (compared to the project was 5,000 discharged military such officers needed a krysha—a ‘roof’ 8,000 planned) reportedly underwent servicemen and the staff of both the or protection from the Mafia. One of some form of retraining. Out of these, NCC and the RCEs. Partners of the the most critical groups was that of laid- 2,866 officers or their family members new EU project were the Ministry of off officers and their families who had participated in distance learning Defense, the Ministry of Labor and continued to live in former garrison courses, mostly officers in garrison Social Policy, the Ministry of Education towns. towns who would not otherwise have and Science, the Ministry of Economics, had the chance to commute to the the Ministry of the Interior, the Security On the basis of the author’s interviews training centers. 61.5 percent of the Service of Ukraine, and the Border with TACIS staff, the NCC and trainers course participants were officers laid-off Guards. at the RCEs, certain qualifications and shortly before retraining, the rest were skills proved advantageous in the reserve officers. A high proportion of One of the goals of the new TACIS attempt to find a new job: discipline, the personnel retrained were family project was the formation of so-called accuracy, persistence, a structured manner members—39.5 percent of the total ‘project groups’ with the aim of creating of decision-making, trustworthiness, amount. The figures on the actual jobs in the area of new technologies, for communication skills, the ability to results of the first TACIS project example IT-technologies, energy-saving delegate tasks and—for those nonetheless vary: according to a report technologies or ecologically-clean subsequently employed in security by the NCC, 6,895 ‘people’ had finished energies. The hope is that profits services—the ability to handle weapons. retraining by 1 December 1998, 1,768 incurred from these technologically Many former officers simply moved were still undergoing training at that advanced endeavors could, at least from the regular armed forces to the time, and 1,043 were planning to do so partially, be used to solve some of the ‘Security Service’ (the successor of the in the future. The accounting for the housing problems experienced by KGB, with approximately 40,000 first EU TACIS program thus seems to former officers. However, in the years members) or the Border Guards be ambiguous. leading up to 2005, it is becoming (approximately 40,000 servicemen); in apparent that retraining is gradually fact, neither agency has reduced its Within the framework of the first losing importance within the overall numbers over the last decade. Traits TACIS program, it is reported that 103 framework of reintegration. This echoes which proved to be a disadvantage for (according to the report from RAG the decline in importance within Ukraine reemployment were: relying on Bildung GmbH: 122) new businesses of demobilization itself, as confirmed entitlements instead of self-reliance, a were set up, resulting in 412 (or 466, by the planned structure of the budget ‘wait-and-see’ approach, an according to the RAG report) new jobs. for reintegration measures. unwillingness to leave the military Career services helped to place 3,701 (or community, and—frequently 4401, according to RAG) of the ‘target Assessment of the ‘Complex mentioned—drinking problems. As the group’ in new jobs (Shikalov, 2001; Program’ and the TACIS entitlements which ex-officers are due Körver-Buschhaus, 2000). Although projects are still above the social average, they are the differences in the reports may in part usually far better off than the other be due to the use of slightly different Over the years, some 12,000 people, unemployed. Seen in a European timeframes, ‘elastic’ accounting criteria both officers and their family members, context, the entitlement of an officer to also played its part. According to the have been retrained by the NCC, of an apartment is quite an unusual figures given by the NCC, 4,400 people whom an estimated 8,000 later found privilege; obviously the Soviet mentality successfully found jobs after retraining, employment. It is impossible to give an is still strong. of whom 3,321 were former military exact figure because not all who undergo servicemen. retraining by the NCC or its The NCC and the RCEs built up a subcontractors report back to the reintegration capacity that was at the organization once they have found same time both regionalized and employment. Reemployment—not just centrally coordinated. The regional retraining—tended to be most successful when skills acquired during the military service could be transferred.

B·I·C·C 25 brief 26

approach by the RCEs proved to be itself, nor did the armed forces investment and the raising of extra- particularly constructive. Nonetheless, development plan guarantee the budgetary funds for new businesses, retraining and job placement was largely requisite financial backing for the social proved difficult. The NCC particularly dependent upon physical access to the and professional reintegration of ex- lacks expertise in assessing the assets of regional centers although officers who officers: there is simply no provision for huge military sites. did not reside in the vicinity of RCEs this in the Ukrainian budget. This could benefit either from more flexible situation is exacerbated by a further Difficulties in implementation of the distant learning courses or from the critical weakness of the reintegration Ukrainian ‘Complex Program’ result offer of training modules on military policy: the lack of an adequate legal basis furthermore from institutional premises before actual discharge. for planning military, and post-military, mismanagement. Continuing delays in Competition among the RCEs during careers. releasing budgeted funds by the the tendering process, the auditing of Ukrainian government inhibited the income and expenses by the NCC and Yet another shortcoming of the NCC’s work during the first TACIS annual reports on outcomes were salient ‘Complex Program’ relates to the project. Having said that, the instruments to maintain a stimulus for exchange of information. Officers are distribution of budgeted means to the good performance. Some of the RCEs rarely informed about their dismissal in NCC was nonetheless far better than on clearly fared better than others in terms due time while regional commanders do average in Ukraine: the NCC received at of employment results or job not usually pay any attention to the least 93 percent of the budgeted means procurement resulting from the creation post-military careers of their in 1997 in contrast to other of new businesses. Leaders were the subordinates. More than 90 percent of governmental agencies which received centers in Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, the officers discharged claimed that no only 63 percent. Kiev and Nikolaev. Their success is only preparation for a civil career had taken partially attributable to more favorable place during their time in service Certain services under the TACIS structural conditions. A better (Narodnaya Armiya, 25 May 1999, program were at times criticized for performance in administration, pp. 4–5). Nor do regional military being just a job procurement measure management, strategy development and commands for the reserve fare better in for Western consultants who would be innovation evidently made a difference. this respect. For the years 1996–1999 it otherwise unemployed. As is often the However not only are all of the RCEs was reported in several cases that case with international aid originally formed still in existence, but, regional military commands were not organizations, the Ukrainian over the last two years, two more RCEs able to provide laid-off officers with counterparts questioned the cost-benefit (in Zaporozhe and Lutsk) have even information on the ITCs or the RCEs, ratio of short-term consultants or of been created. simply because they did not know standardized Western ‘business plans’ anything at all about such retraining which did not take the local market into The main Ukrainian agencies that opportunities. Officers slated for account. received money from foreign donors for discharge were not systematically reintegration viewed each other as informed about their rights and General conclusions competitors in the tight market of opportunities, though the information sponsors. The NCC and the Renais- policy improved slightly with the build- The Ukrainian experiences allow for sance Foundation project (details below) up of a NCC website. some general conclusions. It would be did not exchange information on better if retraining started during a retraining methods, for instance. One of the flaws of the Ukrainian preparatory stage in the military, the Cooperation between the Interregional program consisted in weak linkages earlier the better. Family members, Training Centers, originally equipped between retraining programs and actual especially wives, need to be regularly with money from Germany, and the job placement. While the cooperation included in reintegration measures. Yet NCC remained similarly weak. Despite of the RCEs and the Interregional retraining should not be seen as having the impressive setting up of Training Centers with the Ministry of a value in itself but must be linked to reintegration agencies, their work will Labor left much room for employment. Especially at the not become an integral part of the state improvement, the Ministry of Defense beginning of the Ukrainian program for the development of the merely transferred its own reintegration programs, training was of armed forces until 2005: in short, responsibilities to the NCC. In short, a too general nature and was not restructuring, downsizing and the Ministry of Defense or its sufficiently market-oriented. In order to reintegration have not been integrated substructures did not cooperate link retraining to job placement, into one single effort. Neither did post- constructively with the various different information on the regional labor military career planning become an organizations engaged in the markets has to be regularly updated. On integral part of military career planning reintegration measures. As the capacities of the NCC were not evenly strong in all areas, the management of military assets, especially the attraction of foreign

26 B·I·C·C Ukraine

the other hand, valuable experience has The Renaissance Foundation Ministry of Education. Although been gained through the TACIS/NCC project 48,858 former servicemen are reported project as far as the combination of to have been retrained through this reintegration measures with the In October 1993, the ‘Social Adaptation Renaissance Foundation project, these conversion of military sites is concerned. of Military Servicemen’ (Sotsial’naya numbers seem unrealistic, given the The creation of special agencies to adaptatsiya voennosluzhashikh) program schooling facilities and the finances manage the conversion of military of the Renaissance Foundation was available. assets is preferable to subordination to formally launched in Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense or to a transfer continued until 1998 based on an On 13 December 1998, an International of the assets to municipalities which agreement between the President of Fund for Social Adaptation (IFSA) was usually see military sites only as an Ukraine and George Soros. In reality, the formed on the basis of the earlier additional burden. Finally, it must be Renaissance Foundation project Renaissance Foundation project. The said that in gaining experience with properly began in 1994. The Retraining adjective ‘international’ indicated the reintegration policies in Europe— of the Military program retrained intention to cooperate with NGOs especially in Eastern Europe—the discharged or reserve officers in operating within the Commonwealth Ukrainian NCC has played a leading altogether 50 disciplines, among them of Independent States (CIS), particularly role. Since 1998, for example, the NCC sales management, bookkeeping, Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, as well as has organized a series of conferences economics, PC skills and small business with donor organizations in the West. with the aim of exchanging management. Training centers were Against the framework of the IFSA, 24 information. Nonetheless, even if every located at Kiev, Kharkov, Lugansk, centers for social adaptation, 17 centers effort should be welcomed in itself, the L’viv, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, for the promotion of businesses and extent to which information is actually Odessa and on the Crimean Peninsula. business-incubators, 3 centers for social- transferred is unfortunately still The courses were licensed by the psychological and medical rehabilitation, unsatisfactory. and 3 credit unions have been set up since work began in 1999.

Box 3: Secondary who have left the military. The aim of With the formation of the IFSA, the reintegration this cooperation consists in training personnel covered by reintegration measures between 80 to 130 Ukrainian officers measures expanded. The promotion of annually, mainly in foreign languages, social adaptation was widened to and 130 former marine officers for encompass not only former serviceman, Grassroot activities reemployment on trade ships. but troops of the Border Guard, the Participants have to pass competitive Security Service (former KGB), the Some associations of officers—there are exams before course enrollment. The Ministry of the Interior and the altogether 43 such associations in courses were provided by the British Ministry of Emergency Situations as Ukraine—offered professional training Council (English), the Institut Français well as family members of these troops. courses as well. The Ukrainian (French) and the Goethe Institute The scope of activities run by the IFSA Association of Professional Reserve (German). According to figures given by also expanded. Anyone interested in Officers (Ukrainskaya assotsiatsiya the NCC, the overall costs of these creating his or her own small business uvolennykh v zapas kadrovykh language courses amounted to US could apply to the IFSA for help. This voennosluzhashikh/UAUZV), for $100,000 by the year 2001. From the expansion of services is indicative of a example, organized short-term courses perspective of NATO’s Economic broadening in the understanding of (from two weeks up to five months) in Department, the promotion of these reintegration. Over time, however, it Kiev, but there was no cooperation with language courses represented an turned out that the retraining centers the efforts of the NCC. inexpensive means of polishing up had built up more capacities than could NATO’s image in Ukraine. In 2001, actually be used by former servicemen. NATO language courses in language training financed by NATO Coupled with the fact that the retraining Ukraine reached some 90 students, receiving centers also required alternative sources wide press coverage. As a NATO official of income, the IFSA began to develop Since November 1998 the NCC has admitted in private conversation, their purely business activities of its own— been collaborating with the Economic purpose consisted primarily of PR not only general training seminars but Department of NATO in order to activity for NATO. even marketing their retraining facilitate the reintegration of officers programs in other countries.

B·I·C·C 27 brief 26

Figure 3: Number of ex-servicemen retrained by the Renaissance Foundation, 1992–1998

Source: Information supplied to the author by the International Foundation for Social Adaptation, Kiev, [email protected]

Measures 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total

Re-training 253 2,000 7,258 12,582 10,412 9,836 6,517 48,858

Job placement - 510 2,808 4,784 6,410 6,147 3,158 23,817

Formation of - 72 11 52 152 112 211 610 small businesses by former officers

Though the author could not verify of receiving funds. The weak spots of whether reported figures of retrained the Renaissance Foundation project officers corresponded to actual figures, evidently consisted in the absence of allegations were repeatedly made by adequate monitoring and auditing from persons spoken to in Ukraine that outside and the lack of proper funds belonging to the Renaissance coordination with governmental Foundation were being misused for institutions such as the Ministry of purposes other than those specified Defense, the National Coordinating under the grant. The underlying idea of Center at the Cabinet of Ministers and the Renaissance Foundation project was the regional administrations, including to organize reintegration primarily the labor offices. through non-governmental structures, idealistically assuming that these would be less compromised and corrupt than governmental ones. Former officers usually set up centers in the expectation

Figure 4: Implementation of the Program of the International Fund for Social Adaptation/Retraining of the Military Program (RMP), 31 December 1999

Source: Information supplied to the author by the International Foundation for Social Adaptation, Kiev, [email protected]

1994–1999 Kiev Dnepro- Donetsk Kharkov Luhansk Lviv Odessa Crimea Total Petrovsk

Retrained 27,035 3,307 2,706 3,819 200 4,037 3,933 5,979 51,016

Employed 10,803 2,428 2,327 2,145 58 1,766 2,255 3,599 25,381

Total number 38,185 6,271 4,162 5,835 218 4,896 6,085 6,507 72,159 of persons assisted by the RMP

28 B·I·C·C Russia

Russia top of planned troop strength cuts in by some national off-budget funding, is the army and navy. It is mostly the the main source of funding (BICC, Until the turn of the century, young officers who decide to leave the 2001, p. 75). Out of a total of 3.5 reintegration efforts in Russia were not armed forces, a situation which is mainly billion rubles allocated for military allotted high priority by the Russian attributed to social insecurity and low reform in 2002, 50 million rubles were government. Reintegration policy in salaries. earmarked for the retraining of military Russia had a protracted start, and it is professionals. However it was only in not clear to what extent demobilization During the first decade after the 2001 that the government set aside efforts announced in the 1990s were dissolution of the Soviet Union, the money for retraining military actually implemented (for an early Russian Ministry of Defense did not professionals when it allocated 24 assessment, see OECD, 1993). During create institutional capacities to deal with million rubles for the first time, and it is the 1997/98 demobilization campaign, reintegration. At a meeting of a not yet clear whether the government when the strength of the authorized government committee on social issues will indeed hand out all the money forces was ostensibly reduced from 1.8 affecting servicemen, the chief inspector allocated for retraining (see Mukhin million to 1.2 million, only 120,00 at General Headquarters, Gen. Mikhail 2001, also on the following). people were actually demobilized Moiseyev, released figures showing that, (BICC, 2001, p. 74). As in the case of since 1992, more than 900,000 officers, Nevertheless, at least on paper the Ukraine and Belarus, reintegration warrant officers and midshipmen had government is doing something for the measures initially benefited from the been dismissed. Of this number, only servicemen who have lost their jobs in German contribution to reintegrate 60,000, or 7 percent, had undergone the military. Such servicemen are covered servicemen formerly stationed in East retraining for civilian professions at by a 1998 Federal Employment Program Germany. The German government Defense Ministry training centers for 1998–2001. Another plan, passed by provided money to set up 10 retraining (Mukhin, 2001). Up to 1999, there were decree in 2000, is aimed at compensating centers for servicemen, similar to the only 5 or 6 officers in the whole of dismissed servicemen for the cost of ones in Ukraine. Over time, other Russia providing information on training for a new profession. Western countries invested money as retraining programs while Germany, by Furthermore, a government committee well. However, with the new Putin contrast, had approximately 1,000 such on social issues affecting servicemen is administration, the approach to people. It was not surprising that the in existence, headed by Deputy Prime demobilization and reintegration morale of servicemen to be discharged Minister Valentina Matviyenko. The changed. was low as they knew that the Ministry committee is working on a draft federal of Defense was not taking care for program that aims at facilitating the Reintegration was inhibited by the them. A survey of servicemen showed integration into civilian society of indecisiveness of the Russian that two-thirds were worried at the servicemen to be discharged between government and the alleged shortage of prospect of having to find new work 2002 and 2005. The committee is money. For long, the scope and nature after leaving the military. Many of those drawing up welfare programs for of future downsizing remained affected by the cutbacks will also face servicemen and their families. In early undecided, and even at the time of this problems finding new places for their 2001, former Defense Minister Igor writing, disputes over the future troop wives to live and work. Sergeyev signed a resolution to set up a strength had not yet been resolved. coordinating council on the welfare of Vladimir Potapov, Deputy Secretary of The government program dismissed servicemen and their families, the Security Council, announced in June which should unite the efforts of the 2002 that the numerical strength would The system of retraining was finally various Defense Ministry departments. be brought down from the authorized altered in 2000 by being centralized and Yet, the proliferation of servicemen’s figure of 1,200,000 for the year 2000 to brought under the Ministry of Defense, welfare committees does not in itself between 1,000,000 and 850,000 by 2010. with regional authorities contributing to solve anything. The military sociologist Nonetheless the General Staff cites a job placement for former officers. In Sergei Solovyev estimates that a little less different figure, speaking of an even 2000, the ‘All-Russian Center of Social than half the officers who fall under the 1,000,000, the troop strength initially Adaptation of Military Servicemen’ was cutbacks will end up having to find specified for the armed forces by 2005 established, uniting all retraining centers. work of some kind or another for (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 June 2002). The International assistance, supplemented themselves. “It’s particularly hard for military is particularly concerned about servicemen over 50 living in small the unprecedented high number of towns or in garrisons where there are resignations from the officer corps on

B·I·C·C 29 brief 26

many retired servicemen,” Solovyev said the educational and training Box 4: Cooperation (Mukhin 2001). Generally speaking, job requirements of local business and between Russia and placement depends on the state of the industry. There is, furthermore, an labor market in the regional economy; identified need to strengthen distance NATO training itself is no assurance of finding learning capacities for those who do not a place to apply the learned skills. live in the vicinity of retraining centers. Since 1998 there have been discussions A particular role in reintegration of between the Russian Ministry of Regional efforts servicemen is played by various regional Defense and NATO on possible Associations of Soldiers’ Mothers, reintegration measures (www.nato.int/ Most of the regions (68 out of 89) have though their prime focus is on soldiers docu/pr/1998/p980528e.htm). On 28 set up centers of their own for the social who have participated in the Chechnyan May 1998, the NATO-Russia Perma- adaptation of military servicemen, wars (see International Foundation for nent Joint Council discussed though some of these centers deal Civil Liberties, Kolokol.org, at: www cooperation on the retraining of retired exclusively with the development of 209.235.228.197/english/161.htm). military servicemen at the ministerial self-governing bodies in garrison-towns level in Luxembourg. In December (full list in TACIS 1999, pp. 21–32). The Centers of higher education 2000, NATO defense and foreign center in Kaliningrad, for example, ministers met their Russian supports the establishment of Some regional centers of higher counterparts, Marshal Igor Sergeyev and residential self-governing committees in education have begun to specialize in Minister Igor Ivanov, once more at four formerly closed military towns (see: retraining courses for military ministerial sessions of the Permanent www.civilsoc.org/nisorgs/russwest/ servicemen. But the existing system of Joint Council at NATO headquarters in milgrnt.htm#Social%20Adaptation). The professional retraining programs is order to discuss, among other things, emphasis of the Kaliningrad center often hindered because financial support the retraining of discharged military ([email protected]) is on citizen for travelling to the retraining centers is personnel. involvement in community limited, while the cost of renting development. The Nizhny Novgorod accommodation for the duration of Michel Duray, who was with the Center for the Social Adaptation of courses is high. Furthermore, services Economic Department of NATO until Military Servicemen supports the offered by retraining centers on a 2001, said that retraining programs development of civilian institutions in commercial basis are rarely affordable for funded by NATO for officers leaving three formerly closed military towns laid-off officers. military service were of particular through the establishment of importance. This comment became residential self-governing committees especially valuable once Russia (contact: [email protected]). A further announced that it would make large cuts center exists in Odintsovo, Moscow in armed forces personnel over the oblast, supporting job creation and following few years. Duray called business activity among attention to the fact that even long-term decommissioned military officers enlistment usually meant only 15–20 through specialized training, years in the army, so that it was necessary consultation services, and assistance in to offer retraining in civilian skills when obtaining micro-loans from a local credit a person entered the military and not cooperative serving this target group after they had left. He stressed that (contact: [email protected]). Apart from many servicemen were faced with losing the regional centers, usually linked to the not only their jobs but also their regional government, 34 regional housing, in some cases at only months’ institutions specialized in the retraining notice (Lagunina, 1999). According to a of former officers existed in 2000 (for a joint plan of NATO and the Russian full list, see TACIS 1999, pp. 60–62). Ministry of Defense, training in the use However, not only are these centers of the internet would be provided to usually in need of the appropriate service personnel. In June 2002, NATO equipment for teaching, but teaching and Russia’s Ministry of Defense set up itself ought to be more closely linked to a center, which, among other things, provides stipends for officers to learn how to use the internet.

30 B·I·C·C Russia

External support The UK Ministry of Defense program officers to service Japanese cars and is the most prominent retraining other products. “The rate of In 1994, a EU TACIS officers retraining program in Russia. From 1996 employment among its graduates is very program was launched, the initial phase onwards, the United Kingdom has high, given the local demand and of which totaled Ecu 24 million. It been spending over US $2 million prestige that it has developed. Many involved the establishment of retraining annually in the support of 6 retraining graduates are employed in Russo- centers and the retraining of 17,000 centers for retiring officers in the Japanese joint ventures and assist officers, some 60 percent of whom have Moscow region, St. Petersburg, Japanese investors to develop local already found permanent jobs. In Kronstadt, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov- infrastructure for distributing and addition, the EU has provided teaching on-Don and Vladivostok. During that servicing their goods” (Antonenko equipment and computers to build a time, more then 10,000 officers and 2000, see also on the following). network linking the retraining centers. their dependents have passed through This network covers 10 retraining the program and over 70 percent of In 1999, the Norwegian government centers of the Russian Ministry of them found employment upon started a program for naval officers in Defense. graduation. “The secret of the British Murmansk with support from the success is its commitment to retaining commander of the Northern Fleet. It is At the end of 1998, a project worth Ecu full financial and operational control conducted in cooperation with a 4 million in support of officer retraining over the program with a full-time Norwegian university. was approved. Under this, demobilized British officer running the program on Russian officers were to receive help to the ground in Russia. All funding has Until recently the US government has find work either in military industries been delivered directly to retraining not participated in reintegration which were being converted to civilian centers, thereby minimizing programs in Russia due to production or in small and medium- opportunities for corruption. Another congressional limitations that were sized enterprises. Training in job important feature of the UK program is imposed on providing assistance for skills—including management, banking, its flexibility, which includes constantly military retraining and housing, ecology, insurance, investment, logistics reshaping their training curriculum in following corruption allegations about and production—would be provided by accordance with local employment German government assistance. a total of 600 teachers throughout a market research. Finally, the UK However, the British assistance has network of 23 retraining centers run in program has managed to establish demonstrated that corruption can be conjunction with the Russian Ministry constructive relations with the effectively minimized. The PONARS of Education and the Ministry of commanders of the North Caucasus study concluded in 2000 that “there is Defense. The EU project was to pay Military District and the Pacific Fleet, no reason why such programs and special attention to both the municipal who then issued orders authorizing experience cannot be extended to social development of former military towns officers to attend the UK courses before adaptation and small business and the reintegration of military people retirement, thus assuring their smooth development among ex-military into these local economies. The shift in transition to civilian life” (Antonenko personnel” (Antonenko, 2000). focus, from mere retraining to 2000). About 14,000 Russian reintegration, is a reflection of the servicemen have received civilian training Along with these, other programs current needs in Russia (see TACIS through funds assigned by the British supported by foreign countries and Annual Report 1998 at: Ministry of Defense. The British international organizations also exist www.europa.eu.int/comm/ coordinator, Jack Hemsley, noted (on the following see Hemsley, 2001). external_relations/nis/tar98/russia.htm). however that, under an agreement Two German NGOs are active in the Thus the EU TACIS project particularly between the United Kingdom and resettlement field although the numbers targeted servicemen in remote military Russia, the program “would not last being retrained are small. The UK’s towns and tried to help them both with forever” and may in fact cease to exist Know How Fund ran a “Training the professional retraining, development of very soon. Trainers” program to establish local self-government and with business retraining facilities on a number of development. The British experience was subsequently Strategic Rocket Force bases but there is used by the Japanese government in no recent information on whether this developing their own reintegration project has continued under Russian program for the Russian Far East. The Japanese program, running in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Sakhalin and other regions, offers retraining for

B·I·C·C 31 brief 26

guidance. Sweden initiated a small Lessons learned military towns. A final remark on the program in Northwest Russia, Norway, frequently mentioned shortage of as mentioned above, has a program in Because the Russian reintegration efforts funding—funding from the business Murmansk, which started in 2000. 109 are still ongoing, the following remarks world would enable the retraining officers of the Northern Fleet have been must be seen as preliminary. In the project to proceed more rapidly. retrained so far, 81 of whom started in Russian case, the most critical Instruction should be adapted to reflect March 2001 and the annual target is 160. shortcoming pertains to indecisiveness the needs of businesses in which The reported success rate of those over the future strength of the armed officers will be working. moving on to employment is 60 forces along with salaries, pensions and percent. The program is very similar to the benefit package for officers—all of the British program. As also mentioned which affect the subsequent size, and above, Japan has run several 2-week consequences of, downsizing. Work is seminars in Vladivostok and still needed to clarify the roles, Khabarovsk and may expand to responsibilities and resources at federal, Sakhalin. Denmark recently expressed an regional and local levels of government. interest in joining the UK program in St External support can help to formulate Petersburg. legislation on pensions, housing and retraining and to support the build-up One of the programs specifically of related capacities, but a definite targeting small business development financial and administrative among ex-servicemen is being commitment by the Russian undertaken by the Russian ‘Partner’ government is a prerequisite for Foundation, which in turn receives implementation. The experience of the financial support from the Soros UK project is particularly worth taking Foundation. By February 1999 this into account: it was regionalized, thus program had reportedly retrained 5,700 circumventing bureaucratic stalemate in servicemen and employed around 4,000. the central government; it established In 2000, Antonenko reported on the clear cost-benefit ratios and paid due achievements of this project: “Two attention to accounting, thus reducing “business incubators” have been set up the potential for corruption and misuse and 9 more regions have offered to of funds. create them. Fourteen credit unions among ex-servicemen have been As in the case of Ukraine, it became established to help fund business start- evident that retraining programs alone ups. The program has also helped to are no longer sufficient. Reintegration create 23 small enterprises. The program must become part of a comprehensive connected 28 resettlement centers to the program targeting economically Internet and set up 15 libraries in deprived areas and creating military towns and garrisons, as well as employment. Programs supported preparing 36 resettlement specialists for from abroad should also assist local other regions”. Part of the success of governments in acquiring professional the projects rests in the close employees and should help integrate ex- cooperation of the Foundation with servicemen into civil society by regional governors, who provide space supporting non-governmental in closed military towns free-of-charge associations to set up local social for setting up the business incubators. adaptation programs. They should particularly help to develop self- governing structures in converted

32 B·I·C·C Poland

Poland figures include reductions in the actual approximately 31,500 commissioned total of compulsory-service recruits by officers (c. 67 percent of the 1990 Since 1989 the Polish armed forces have 56.2 percent (from 279,110 to 122,260) figure), some 18,100 warrant officers experienced numerous plans for and of professional servicemen by 30.5 (c. 70 percent), and some 12,750 NCOs reorganization, changes of doctrines percent (from 112,656 to 80,634). The (c. 62 percent) (Dragsdahl, 1999; and alteration in the relevant legislation. given numbers refer to official figures, Giermakowsi and Keson, 2002). The The general intention was to replace the but do not necessarily reflect actual deterioration of living conditions in the former offensive and support functions holdings: official figures differed in the armed forces—even poverty, bad of the Warsaw Pact; to ensure 1990s from source to source and actual housing and expected gains on the integration into and interoperability holdings were often below the numbers civilian market led the younger, more with NATO by mirroring its structure, reported . ambitious and better qualified training and equipment; to cut back air professionals to leave the armed forces and air defense forces; and to redeploy Reductions in the 1990s voluntarily whereas older colonels, of Polish forces from the Western to the whom there were too many, remained Eastern border (the following section The years 1996–1999 saw a sharp (“A Servicemen’s Poverty”, FBIS Daily draws largely on Dragsdahl, 1999; increase in the number of contract- Report, FBIS-EEU-97-023, 20 January Giermakowski and Keson, 2002). soldiers. A total of 8,181 professional 1997). Apart from individual soldiers were conscripted at the time, preferences, the number of persons Between 1 January 1989 and 1 Novem- including 320 commissioned officers, leaving voluntarily depended on the ber 1998 altogether 71,296 individuals 699 warrant officers, and 7,162 non- regional unemployment rate and the left the professional military staff. Of commissioned officers. The number of cost of renting flats. In larger towns in this total number, 35,611 had already professionals leaving the armed forces particular, officers frequently took up left during the period 1989–1991. From during the entire period is nonetheless second jobs in order to increase their 1989 to 1999, the overall number of higher than the number of positions income while formally retaining their posts was reduced from 398,660 to cut. Between 1990 and 1999, more than status in the armed forces. As a result of 226,460, namely by 43 percent. The 62,500 professional servicemen retired restructuring and voluntary exit the number of posts for commissioned from the army—approximately 67 armed forces actually lacked qualified officers was reduced by 27.3 percent, percent of the manpower in service at personnel. Many positions were held by warrant officers posts by 9.8 percent and the end of 1990. This includes captains and lieutenants whereas NATO NCO posts by 36.4 percent. These countries would have filled them with NCOs.

Figure 5: Changes in proportions between professional servicemen ranks, 1990–1999

Source: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 14

B·I·C·C 33 brief 26

Figure 6: Changes in proportions between ranks in the Polish armed forces, 1990–1999

Sources: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 13

34 B·I·C·C Poland

Figure 7: Total number of dismissals from professional military service, 1990–1999

Source: Giermakowski and Keson, 2002, p. 15

Reason for dismissal 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Incapable of professional 2,362 1,840 723 499 541 685 786 712 596 320 military service according to Military Medical Commission (WKL)

Legal retirement age 1,115 285 277 162 155 194 270 151 104 101 reached

Term as professional 5,122 4,199 759 1,044 2,637 3,347 4,823 5,174 7,036 1,632 soldier expired

Term of military - - 58 269 179 208 406 205 140 174 body expired

Age limit for rank 3,095 1,671 334 111 86 145 88 25 18 18 reached

Full pension - - - 10339232- - - entitlement acquired

Court ruling 23 50 46 42 35 44 21 45 33 37 (imprisonment)

On request of soldier 1,063 537 365 38 46 20 35 24 35 2

Death 226 151 140 125 111 142 102 113 86 74

Other 1,007 908 1,058 216 100 98 64 51 115 78

Total 14,013 9,641 3,760 2,516 3,923 4,975 6,627 6,500 8,163 2,436

Benefits on discharge of outlays for weapons procurement, amount of his new salary having an command systems, communication impact on the level of pension received. Contradictory opinions are held in systems and interoperability with However, when a soldier has acquired Poland on the potential savings gained NATO. partial pension rights, regulations are from downsizing personnel: the benefit such that taking up a new job does not package given to military professionals is According to Polish regulations, necessarily mean an increase in income. generous when compared to average professional soldiers have a right to Especially among NCOs, warrant pensions. This is admittedly a reason impressive pension benefits—40 officers, and junior officers with short why reductions have not been more percent of their basic salary after 15 years seniority, the economic situation of the drastic: the costs associated with of service (see Giermakowski and soldier’s family may deteriorate upon his retirement are too high (Jane’s Defence Keson, 2002 on the following). For each release from duty. For former Weekly, 17 April 1996). Nonetheless, in additional year, a rate of 2.6 percent servicemen, taking on an additional job future, maintenance of manpower will applies, up to a maximum level of 75 is therefore practically unavoidable. occupy a decreasing share of military percent of the basic salary. When Career officers with seniority shorter expenditures in comparison to the share discharged, a soldier who has acquired than 15 years are in the worst situation, full pension rights amounting to 75 percent of his basic salary can then take up new employment without the

B·I·C·C 35 brief 26

as they do not have any pension rights Reintegration support of Defense. The army itself does not at all. During the restructuring process, offer any particular retraining for officers the attempt is made to protect such Reintegration measures began in 1993 as slated for discharge. In the years 1998– people from redundancy, even if this a reaction to the first wave of 2000, 2,768 former officers were cannot be guaranteed in every case. dismissals, but it was not until 1996 retrained, mostly with a view to working that these were given a legal framework later in security services (60 percent); 10 To facilitate their integration into the through their inclusion in the law on percent acquired computer skills, 7 civilian community, the following the military service of professional percent driving licenses, 5 percent benefits are available to discharged soldiers. Sociological studies undertaken foreign languages skills and 4 percent military personnel: by the Ministry of Defense in 1997 knowledge of accounting. show that 68.8 percent of the soldiers The amount of remuneration of the released during the years 1993–1996 As of September 1997, a special decree last position is paid out every month took up paid work, 5.7 percent were in has been in force specifying which posts for a period of one year after the process of finalizing formalities in central and local administrations discharge. A discharged soldier may related to employment, 18.7 percent did dealing with national defense are to be take up an additional job within this not currently work but intended to do staffed by former professional time and still receive remuneration so, and that only 6.4 percent of those servicemen. An agreement aimed at from the military. As this additional interviewed had no intention of easing the adverse effects of income from the military does not looking for work after discharge. 5.1 unemployment was signed by the count for tax purposes, tax benefits percent had taken up work straight after Ministry of National Defense and the are incurred for one year. leaving the forces, 51.2 percent in the 6 National Office of Labor in March 1999. months following discharge and a In practice, however, these provisions A monetary equivalent will be paid further 20 percent took up work are ineffective, as the said positions are for holidays which are outstanding, between 6 and 12 months after already occupied by civilian personnel: to including the holiday not taken in discharge. employ former soldiers would the year of discharge. necessitate dismissing the current staff. Various agencies in charge of human A one-off severance payment, resources have been active in assisting The following example may serve to equivalent to three months’ salary of laid-off officers to prepare for civilian illustrate this practice: The officer in the last position held, is provided. employment. This help has included so- charge of reintegrating personnel in the The level of this severance pay rises called ‘conversion seminars’, professio- Krakow region identified 627 open by 20 percent of the monthly salary nal advice, professional training, positions in 526 agencies subordinated for every full year of seniority above support in finding employment, to the regional administration 10 years of continual military service, housing assistance, financing of (Vojevodstvo, Krakow). Though up to the amount of 6 monthly individual qualification efforts and former servicemen were eligible to salaries. organized group retraining. Though preferential job placement, only 30 understaffed, there is a special percent of these positions were filled Additionally, until 31 December department at the Polish Ministry of with discharged officers. The office in 2003, the period of notice for Defense that deals with the ‘conversion’ charge gave the following reasons: termination of military employment of personnel. This department of the former administrations lacked may—even on request of the Ministry of Defense cooperates with the knowledge of mandated tasks; capacities soldier—be reduced from 9 to 1 Ministry of Social Affairs and the which would allow the implementation month. Soldiers discharged from regional labor exchanges (Interview, M. of legislation were very limited; agencies military service are entitled to receive Fedasz, 21 July 2000). Laid-off officers were unwilling to hire former officers; a one-off payment equal to their were entitled to a one-off amount of there was a widespread perception that accumulated monthly salary for the financial support for retraining by the officers with military pensions did not reduced period of notice. Thus the Ministry of Defense, ranging from need jobs; and—on the part of the reduced period of notice is treated as 1,750 to 2,500 Polish zlotys (430–612 former officers themselves—many being equivalent to military service euros). Formally, the Social Department officers were unwilling to take up jobs and is recorded as a period of active has the right to place retired officers in in case this might have a negative effect military duty. state enterprises and civil on their military pensions (Koscielecki, administrations. Until 1998, retraining 2001). Costs for moving the soldier and his was organized by the Ministry of family to a civilian place of residence Defense but since then some 180 of their choice will be reimbursed. institutes of higher education have begun to offer retraining courses on a regional basis. Finances for retraining are provided upon request of the Ministry

36 B·I·C·C Poland

In total, 25,762 professional servicemen 2000, there were only four persons governmental authority be appointed to left the armed forces in the period 1996– dealing with reintegration at the corps deal with matters relating to the 2000, 13,642 of whom came under the and military district command employment of former officers in the Personnel Conversion Program. Of headquarters. In fact, throughout the defense industry and the public sector. these 13,642, 3,491 soldiers were entire armed forces, only 33 people deal A suggestion has been made that career retrained, 7,925 were given job full-time with the reintegration of officers might be offered shares in the counseling and 5,620 were assisted in personnel—23 civil servants and 10 property of garrisons to be disbanded looking for a job, while jobs were found from the military. Members of the and bases to be closed as well as in their for 2,077 others. Even though the Provincial Military Staffs and of the infrastructure and land. Discharged number of soldiers who actually found Military Reserve Commands are soldiers could participate actively in the new positions may seem low, one expected to support the program process of creating jobs and conditions should bear in mind that this only although not officially involved in it. conducive to business. The real estate includes those soldiers who found Of these 33 people, 8 are in charge of and assets of former military property, employment opportunities through the reintegration work at the Social Depart- transferred by the Ministry of Defense direct involvement of the conversion ment of the Ministry of Defense, 16 to the Agency for Military Assets with authorities. The above figure is in fact provide information on the job market the express purpose of finding an quite promising, as it does not include at the Provincial Military Staffs or the economic use for them, might provide former soldiers who established their Military Reserve Commands, and the premises and infrastructure. own businesses or found jobs either on remaining 9 are spread between several their own or through other Military Centers for Professional There are two additional non- employment services. Activities. governmental associations dealing with reintegration. The first is the The financial benefits available to ex- The existing structures are not able to Foundation for Professional Activation soldiers in addition to pensions effectively provide all assistance (FAR), founded in 1994, which aims to (remuneration for one extra year, measures foreseen for military staff stimulate the economic activity of severance pay, compensation for a under the law. Along with extremely former servicemen and to support the shortened period of notice) and limited capacities at headquarters and an Ministry of Defense in retraining. FAR support in finding jobs (seminars, almost complete absence of organizes training courses and collective and individual career advice, representation in the field, there is a establishes contacts with job providers. recruitment assistance, collective permanent lack of funding. It has Another grassroot association is Mars & retraining, and so on) are far from being therefore been recommended that the Mercury Europe, founded in 1996, sufficient. The ‘conversion seminars’ means for reintegration be distributed offering courses in marketing and offered to groups of 40–50 persons not simply to the command posts of microeconomics as well as languages for usually last for only three days and the military districts but also to military former officer. Mars & Mercury, financed provide little more than basic career administration authorities at a lower by a small French grant, covered only a planning advice. The names of laid-off level and to garrisons slated for minor group of totaling 40 servicemen. servicemen are entered into a databank downsizing. Unless administrative Compared to Ukraine, it appears that of persons looking for jobs, but apart resources are increased, reintegration the collective self-help of former from identifying preferences, little efforts—organized for the most part servicemen is even less significant in assistance is offered. centrally—will not be able to provide Poland. the necessary measures foreseen by law. Shortage of funding A notable new direction has been the Grassroot initiatives and establishment of a system to help Efforts to reintegrate personnel into business start-ups soldiers start up businesses using some civilian life are constrained by a shortage of the assets currently at the disposal of of funding. In 2000, the Ministry of Even though there are no formal the Agency for Military Assets. Defense planned to earmark 1.6 million structures supporting reintegration According to Article 9.1 of the law of PLN (392,000 euros) for demobilization within the associations of former June 2001 on the restructuring of the and reintegration measures up to 2005. officers, many ideas are born at their armed forces, “the Minister of Defense Yet, only 1.14 million PLN (279,00 meetings. For example, the Dean may, until 31 December 2006, transfer a euros)—one-third less—were de facto set Convention (which consists of subordinated or supervised unit to the aside for the 5-year restructuring representatives of various different Agency for Military Assets for a limited program and the ensuing downsizing ranks such as NCOs, warrant officers or unlimited period to secure the which commenced in 2001. and officers) proposed that a special continuation of its business activity”. Reintegration measures are further Moreover, Article 10 stipulates that inhibited by the limited number of property from disbanded military administrative staff. Until February organizations subordinated to, or

B·I·C·C 37 brief 26

supervised by, the Minister of Defense Box 5: New In collaboration with the local may be made available until 31 directions government, the Ministry has prepared a December 2006 under the terms of a program to test new solutions and limited tender for enterprises whose instruments for regional growth. The sole proprietors are discharged career In view of the substantial reductions program will be financed through planned for overstaffed garrisons and officers. This solution may prove governmental resources (in 2001, 8.5 military districts between 2001 and 2003, effective for whole groups of discharged million PLN = 2,081,000 euros will be soldiers. Another useful decision would special authorities responsible for allocated from the general budget conversion issues will be nominated. be one enabling the Agency for Military reserve). The Department of Social Affairs Assets to take over individual facilities at garrisons slated for closure while they within the Ministry of Defense has also What are the lessons of the CITE-Nysa proposed some further-reaching were still operational (such as pilot project? First, governmental solutions. Four career support centers workshops, fuel depots, canteens, assistance is required, particularly a laundries, nurseries, warehouses, or could be established in Bydgoszcz, legislative foundation for the local and Wroclaw, Kraków, and Olsztyn to hotels) and transfer them to new central administrations. Second, expand the structure of the entire companies established by ex-military launching the project at an early stage in personnel whom it employs, pending reintegration apparatus to 105 persons the downsizing of the garrison paves (currently 33). The employment of tender. The businesses set up by such the way for counteracting discharged soldiers calls for inter- ex-military staff could offer perimeter unemployment in the town and in the guard duty along with additional ministerial dialogue and cooperation region alike. Third, the reintegration of among the communities. services such as construction, geodesic personnel cannot be left in the hands of or military catering services; they could the military alone. Collaborative efforts run recreational and sports facilities, or Based on recent experience, it seems no by local government and the Ministries longer advisable to switch to a career in clear the military complexes of explo- of Regional Development and of management and marketing as the sives. A next step would be the legislati- Defense are crucial. ve backing to establish appropriate boom in such positions is receding. With this market segment saturated, procedures and a preferential system Fully aware of the deficient state of technical specialists—especially in the within the agency (payment deferrals, reintegration measures, the Social preference prices and tenancy fees) in area of information technology—seem Department of the Ministry of Defense to be the ones most sought after. support of the legal handover of suggests the following: the transfer of According to the Ministry of Justice, it property to former military personnel. career planning and advisory services to would be possible to employ discharged the provincial military commands; soldiers either in prison management or special programs for abandoned as probation officers. This idea coincides garrisons; the facilitation of acquisition with another project of the Ministry of of military assets by former officers; the Justice focusing on the transformation attraction of non-budgetary funds; of former garrisons into penitentiary regular sociological studies on officers’ facilities. Action taken by the Ministry of needs; and, finally, preferential job Regional Development and procurement within the civil Construction is even more promising in administration of national defense for that it has designed a “Pilot Project of ex-officers (Koscielecki, 2001). Re-conversion of the Nysa Garrison into the Center of Innovation, Technology and Education (CITE)”.

38 B·I·C·C Hungary

Hungary of socialism. Until the late 1990s, Transfer to civilian life and a new adjustments had concentrated primarily profession is often abrupt and happens The legacy of the Warsaw Pact affected on the downsizing of personnel (on without appropriate warning. It has the post-socialist armed forces of the following see Urbani, 1998a; Urbani proved quite difficult for former officers Hungary in many ways: the command 1998b; Urbani, 1999; Urbani, 2002; to find new jobs that correspond to system was oversized; the army was Molnar and Keresztes, 2000; Interview their level of qualifications. Given that overstaffed; the number of officers and Szabo, 2001). Only with the war in the overwhelming majority of military warrant officers was out of proportion Kosovo and Hungary’s joining of professionals with 25 or more years of to the number of recruits and contract NATO did military reform begin to service tend to leave the armed forces soldiers; troops were primarily located in follow a conscious design (Interview, voluntarily and that younger officers and the western side of the country; there Szabo, 4 December 2000). NCOs often switch to the private sector were a great number of support and immediately after having received a service bases; military technology was of The downsizing of the Hungarian college diploma, the pool of military an offensive rather than a defensive armed forces has caused considerable personnel is being depleted. A nature; and, finally, massive emphasis social tension. Complaints from the sociological study conducted in 1993 was laid on land forces instead of air Association of Hungarian Servicemen, revealed that the prime motives for defense. The overall goal of post- HOSZ, maintain that officers who have leaving the armed forces in the early socialist restructuring consisted in the been laid off did not receive any material 1990s were: misconduct of leading creation of a small, but modern, army. assistance apart from the money paid as commanders; insecurity about future an indemnity, and that even such career; the bad atmosphere; exaggerated Although the restructuring of compensations were at times only bureaucracy; the hope of a higher Hungary’s armed forces has been transferred after court rulings. In income; more freedom. Over time, the underway for more than 15 years, a Hungary, the most crucial problem expectation of higher income became planned effort has only become impeding military reform has been a the most dominant factor (Molnar, apparent since the year 2000. In public, deficiency in financial allocations. During 2000). the military burden was largely perceived the period 1989–2000, the share of as the main obstacle for economic military expenditures in GDP (gross reform and as one of the last bastions domestic product) decreased substantially—from roughly 2.71 percent in 1989 to 1.51 percent in 2000.

Figure 8: Changes in the distribution of military ranks

Source: Figures provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, November 2000

Rank Nominal positions Actual positions December 2001 Planned by available occupied the end of 2003

Generals 85 62 45 45

Officers 11,100 9,500 8,555 8,000

NCOs 11,000 10,000 10,320 11,000

Contract 5,300 3,700 6,700 7,200 soldiers

Recruits 21,000 19,000 12,160 13,000

Civilian 11,600 10,500 4,010 5,800 employees

Total 60,085 52,762 42,900 45,045

B·I·C·C 39 brief 26

Reductions, 2000–2003 Box 6: Changes in the pool of future contract soldiers and personnel structure NCOs, it admits that mainly the poor, According to the parliamentary decisions or persons otherwise disadvantaged on of June 2000, the future peacetime the labor market, are likely to embark on strength of the armed forces under the Plans for changes in the personnel a military career (Interview, Angyal, 1 structure of the armed forces predict an command of the Ministry of Defense is December 2000). overall reduction of 29 percent in the to be limited to 45,000 persons with a concentration on contract soldiers and number of planned posts: the number It has been estimated by the Ministry of of officers is to drop by 32 percent, NCOs and with a reduced number of Defense that the number of military NCOs by 6 percent, recruits by 40 recruits. The major bulk of troop personnel to be laid-off before 2003 reductions was to be accomplished by percent and civilian employees by 56 who do not have any social securities is percent. As a consequence, the overall the end of 2001. Restructuring between 2,700—mostly civilian employees. Some proportion of officers will be reduced 2000 and 2003 will involve a nominal 1,000 career officers will be relocated reduction of approximately 15,000 from 16 to 15 percent, of recruits from from closed garrisons to other units and 39 to 33 percent and of civilian persons, but this does not mean that all some 700 are to be employed by other employees from 17 to 11 percent; the these people will enter the civilian job armed organizations such as perimeter market. In 2000, fewer positions were proportion of NCOs on the other hand guards. Nonetheless, altogether some should increase from 18 to 24 percent actually occupied than were available on 4,000–6,000 persons, civilians and and contract soldiers from 10 to 17 paper: 23 fewer generals, 1,600 fewer military alike, will face problems on the officers, 2,000 fewer recruits and 1,100 percent. The division of labor between job market, even if they receive some officers and NCOs will be largely fewer civilian employees. Based on the form of indemnification. The most determined by NATO requirements. real amounts of military personnel in problematic cases are people with highly 2000 and the planned strength for 2003, While officers will be mainly responsible specialized military skills—pilots, for strategic tasks, NCOs will deal with there was an excess of 12,217 people to artillery officers or gunners—and those training and everyday command duties; be dismissed and a deficit of 4,500 whose civilian qualifications are already persons to be hired. All in all, many peacekeeping and crisis prevention over-represented on the labor market or duties will be performed by contract more contract soldiers, officers of lower who reside in areas with high soldiers. rank and corps officers left the armed unemployment. Of those dismissed forces than had been planned by the persons likely to face reintegration Ministry of Defense which was mainly difficulties on the labor market The restructuring implies a due to low salaries. On the other hand, approximately 2,700 are civilian pressure from the military to increase transformation of certain services run employees, 1,000 officers laid-off before by the military—for example cultural, salaries was regularly met with criticism their planned retirement and an social and sanitary services—into public from civilians in the government. estimated 1,000–2,000 warrant officers companies which will continue to who voluntarily left the armed forces employ the same personnel. Of their due to the new pension regulations. 4,700 employees, between 2,000 and 2,500, officers, NCOs and civilian Reintegration programs employees alike, will be transferred to these so-called ‘carved-out’ service According to the Hungarian Ministry of companies. As the majority of officers Defense, data on the absorption capacity discharged have a service time of at least of the labor market for former officers 25 years and are thus entitled to military and NCOs is not reliable, however the pensions, they will not necessarily overall impression is that discharged appear on the labor market as potential officers manage to reintegrate job seekers. themselves fairly quickly. As in other Eastern European countries, many Paradoxically, the Ministry of Defense is discharged officers end up as guards in not only burdening the labor market by security services or public service dismissing officers and warrant officers, companies held by the Ministry of but is also a major job provider in Defense or in other governmental certain regions (especially in Tata, Gyor, agencies. Before 2000, the Ministry of Hódmezovásárhely, Debrecen). Though the Ministry of Defense aims at an improvement in the qualifications of

40 B·I·C·C Hungary

Defense had only established a modest offer career advice, retraining and job of 7.7 million forint (31,482,1 euros). reintegration program. In 1995, an office procurement services (Interview, Angyal, By the end of 2001, 516 former for the coordination of reintegration 1 December 2000). The overall sum servicemen found employment with the measures was formed under the General allocated to this project, planned for the help the MEBs. Staff with just five employees. The task period until the end of November of this unit was to find alternative jobs 2002, is 440 million Hungarian forint The ‘tool kit’ for reintegration of the for discharged officers and to establish (roughly 1,798,975 euros), to be MEBs includes: information on the contacts with other state agencies, redirected from budgets of all the labor market and on employment mainly the police and the border guards, ministries involved. possibilities; advice on jobs and carrier or state enterprises that might become opportunities; rehabilitation programs future employers. Altogether the PPR assistance affected for the handicapped; subsidies for some 3,500 former servicemen, 2,180 of unemployed persons; the teaching of In October 2000, an additional inter- whom turned to the labor offices of the job-search techniques; psychological ministerial committee was established, regions (Comitats) for assistance and counseling; financial subsidies for including representatives of the 1,320 of whom approached the 12 employers (support of training, salaries Ministries of Defense, Labor, Social existing Committees for the Promotion or the creation of new workplaces; tax Affairs, Education and Agriculture. Its of Job Seekers (MEB) which are benefits) and support in becoming an task was to coordinate the use of funds affiliated with major garrisons and entrepreneur. for the Program for Promotion of supported by the county labor offices. Reemployment (PPR). The main goal Each MEB consists of representatives of this interministerial committee was from the labor office, the regional to assist closed garrison-towns in site military command, trade unions, local conversion, the promotion of small administrations and the chamber of and medium-sized enterprises and to commerce. From 2001 to 2002, the MEBs were financially supported by the labor offices of the Comitats to the sum

Figure 9: Number of servicemen affected by downsizing and reintegration measures resulting from the Strategic Examination between 1 January and 30 September 2001

Source: Keresztes, 2001

Rank Servicemen laid-off Recipients of Support through Newly employed Participants of due to the PPR assistance the MEB after MEB retraining courses ‘Strategic Program Support Examination’

Officers 1,709 866 660 218 217

Warrant 1,898 917 373 95 107 officers

Contract 749 536 153 64 109 soldiers

Civilian 2,122 1,181 465 139 105 employees

Total 6,478 3,500 1,498 516 538

B·I·C·C 41 brief 26

Figure 10: Forms of assistance under the Hungarian PPR Program (until the end of 2001)

Source: Keresztes, 2001

Note: Double entries of forms of assistance possible

Employment Officers Warrant Contract Civilian Total assistance officers soldiers employees

Professional 212 127 154 459 952 advice

Career advice 314 343 278 485 1,420

Support in 458 401 306 549 1,714 job search

Advice for 1 11 11 121 144 local employment

Job procurement 396 249 169 294 1,108

Other forms 86 74 31 58 249 of advice

Social remedies mobility of officers and warrant officers be opened at many garrisons. It is has diminished critically. In contrast to planned that joint commissions Officers with at least 25 years of service, Ukraine or Poland, there is no special comprising representatives of these usually between 42 and 45 years old, housing policy for discharged bureaus and regional commanders be receive a modest pension which is in servicemen in Hungary. Only those set up and that regular contact with local most cases not sufficient to support a willing to move to another garrison are labor exchanges, major enterprises, local family (maximum: 68,000 forint per entitled to accommodation support, administrations and education facilities month, or approximately 278 euros). either in the form of rent payment or take place. Those with less than 25 years of service beneficial credits for the purchase of an receive the equivalent of a one to eight apartment (up to 4 million forint or Fixing criteria for salaries, the 10-year months’ salary as a one-off roughly 16,354 euros). Plan stresses the interdependence of compensation, depending on age, rank, position in the military hierarchy service time and rank. Almost all The long-term plan for military and duration of service on the one members of this group are thus forced restructuring (2000–2010) attempts to hand, and the assessment of individual to seek post-military employment. address some of the social problems performance and qualification Retraining courses which are the most stemming from past military reform. development on the other. Service popular are those for computer Officers to be discharged are now to careers should follow the principle programmers, security guards, receive compensation, pensions and ‘upwards or outwards’ in the sense that accountants and security managers. other forms of material assistance. those who do not move up on the Innovation Bureaus for Employment carrier ladder should exit the military. At the beginning of the 1990s, the in the Honved Army are to be allotted The reform should meet a variety of Ministry of Defense sold off the more personnel, while sub-offices are to requirements: the specific need for more majority of apartments previously officers in the lower ranks; the allotted to officers. Since then the overcoming of congestion in upward

42 B·I·C·C Hungary

mobility; provision of transparent and involved in the setting-up and However, despite their tangible impact, predictable career models; operation of regional Committees for the representatives of HOSZ complain implementation of competitive the Promotion of Job Seekers (MEB). that their criticism and proposals are not principles for promotion and The personnel department of the taken into consideration seriously by the reimbursement; and, lastly, the need to Ministry of Defense also contacts the Ministry of Defense and regional bring the composition of ranks closer officer associations on a regular basis. military commanders. to the envisaged ‘optimal model’.

At the end of 2000 the Hungarian parliament approved a program for the Box 7: Goals of achieve healthier proportions between fundamental improvement of soldiers’ future restructuring the various command structures and living conditions. Accordingly, soldiers subordinate ranks, and to reduce will be allowed to choose between personnel in the support services. Thus The 10-year plan aims at a concentration private and service accommodation, the future structure of the armed forces preferential credits for building or of forces to compensate for reductions will affect the composition and size of in personnel; the outsourcing of buying houses will be provided, extra the various branches, the actual meeting functions carried out by superfluous or allowances for accommodation will be of planned troop strengths, the increased, and special payments will be uneconomic institutions; a reduction of structure of command and troop personnel in the support services and offered for moving from one military locations, and the proportions allotted within command structures; a change in location to another. It remains to be to certain ranks. seen to what extent these the type of training given to officers and non-commissioned officers; and an announcements are actually The transformation of the Hungarian improvement in working and living implemented. army from one with compulsory Magyar Honved conditions ( , “Reform military service to a voluntary or 2000–2010,” No. 49, 8 December 2000, In Hungary there are four associations professional army is still under dispute. p. 5; Magyar Honved, No. 49, 8 December of soldiers that aggregate and represent Through its new policy, the government the interests of (former) servicemen: the 2000). hopes to create the factual preconditions Association of Hungarian Servicemen for a professional army over the planned The first stage of the 10-year Plan (HOSZ), the Trade Union for Civilian 10-year period. The reduction of the Employees (HODOSZ), the Union of (2000–2003) concentrates on changes in service time for recruits from 9 to 6 the location of troops, as well as in the Troop Soldiers (CSESZ) and the months is in line with this. The decision way troops are composed, and an National Association of Comrade to join NATO clearly reversed the Soldiers (BEOSZ). As an association improvement in service conditions. decade-long decline in military With an end to the radical downsizing with the rights of a trade union, HOSZ expenditures, and further increases are of the previous period, it is hoped that represents the most important of these envisaged. According to the 10-year associations. While regional insecurity of status will be reduced and Plan, financial means will be extended that military service will become more commanders were almost exclusively by increasing the military budget and by attractive for the young. occupied with the effects of downsizing saving money through troop in the early 1990s, the soldiers reductions, the concentration of The aim of the second stage (2004– associations pressed for financial infrastructure and personnel, 2006) is to increase the combat capacities compensation, retraining and job outsourcing of non-military tasks, and procurement (Urbani, 1998a; Urbani, of the armed forces along with their the privatization of real estate and ability to operate in conjunction with 1998b). In order to alleviate the effects services. While there is general support NATO. of downsizing, these associations took for the military reform plan among the part in regular meetings at a forum parties in parliament, against the The main goal of the third stage (2007– attended by the military command of backdrop of increasing poverty in the 2010) consists in the technological the central and regional levels. populace and the substantial costs of Furthermore, the HOSZ is regularly modernization of the armed forces, preparing for EU membership, critics are hand-in-hand with further nonetheless beginning to voice concerns improvements in the qualification of over the extent of military expenditures personnel. compared to the means set aside for other pressing transition tasks. The general aim of the 10-year Plan is to actually fill the positions planned, to

B·I·C·C 43 brief 26

Conclusions

When compared to the other countries covered in this report, it becomes apparent the Hungarian labor market is in a position to absorb a high share of laid-off officers. The number of soldiers voluntarily leaving the forces is correspondingly high. Moreover, comparing the numbers of dismissed officers or NCOs in Hungary with those in Russia, Ukraine or Poland, the need for reintegration measures appears less pressing. Furthermore, a cultural factor may have shaped the Hungarian low-key approach—among the countries under study here, the importance of the military for the collective national identity of Hungary seems to be insignificant. Given the low ranking of demobilization on the transition agenda, interministerial cooperation was not launched till the fall of 2000, though the main responsibility rested with the regional Committees for the Promotion of Job Seekers. Their services concentrated on career advice, but did not include a package of vocational retraining courses specified to the needs of laid-off officers and regional or local business. The Hungarian government evidently never applied for foreign funding; neither did it attract business funding for retraining.

44 B·I·C·C summary

Summary and Recommendations

1. The future structure and tasks of 3. It is important to establish from a balance of assets and needs, the armed forces must be coordinating bodies. rather than being decided from the explicitly defined. Support for Central agencies at the ministerial top down. reintegration and clear decisions level are necessary for project on the part of civilian authorities initiation, coordination, the 5. Retraining is best organized and are necessary. exchange of information and conducted at the regional and As long as the future tasks and monitoring. To facilitate adjustment, local levels. structure of the armed forces remain special interministerial coordinating As a rule, flexible and decentralized blurred, manpower is usually bodies for reintegration should pool approaches which not only respond retained in the military without experiences gathered at regional and promptly to changes in regional actually having a clear function. Due local levels, together with expertise market requirements but are to the minor relevance of military in the assessment of qualifications, combined with regional structural politics for party competition and vocational training, and job-market policies are preferable to control by electoral campaigns, awareness of requirements. It should be their task central agencies which do not have reintegration issues remains the not merely to establish information regional implementation capacities. domain of the military networks and to encourage a Retraining is best conducted at a establishment which commonly constant flow of information, but regional and local level where the lacks proper guidance from the also to prevent hierarchies in the specific characteristics of the civilian sections of the government, access to information from downsizing pattern, the local job including parliament. One of the developing. These coordinating market, and the opportunities for key problems in demobilization and bodies would be responsible for job creation can be taken into reintegration is the postponement guaranteeing regular evaluation of account. Close cooperation with of hard decisions, causing a lasting program implementation and the regional employment offices, job sense of unpredictability as well as generalization of insights into placement agencies and vocational psychological and moral hazards for successes and failures. A combined training centers is therefore key. officers subject to demobilization. military-civilian authority is a Regional coordinating units that prerequisite. It is not advisable to bring together regional military 2. The Ministries of Defense must leave reintegration measures to commanders, regional play a critical role. military institutions alone—neither administrations and the agencies In institutional terms it is obvious to the Ministry of Defense nor to involved in retraining or job that the Ministries of Defense must regional commands. Such military creation—including small business play a key role in preparing, institutions usually lack proper incubators—should be set up. implementing and adjusting information on labor market Regional administrations can reintegration measures. Special requirements, instruments of encourage job creation by providing administrative units with economic promotion and retraining assistance in the establishment of appropriate funding for the skills. small and medium-sized duration of the reintegration enterprises, for example through program together with qualified 4. Reintegration programs must be encouraging the setting up of manpower must be set up to regularly evaluated by indepen- business parks or by providing tax implement reintegration policies, dent institutes. benefits, public services or premises particularly the retraining of, and job Independent institutes must at reduced prices. Job placement creation for, redundant officers. It is regularly evaluate the viability of necessitates close links with potential imperative that the Ministries of reintegration programs, weighing employers. Job fairs, vocational Defense cooperate closely with other them up against their aspirations training on-the-job, and support in ministries involved in the and objectives. Furthermore, the establishment of small and reintegration measures (Finance, constant and independent medium-sized enterprises are Labor, Social Affairs, Education) evaluation is required in order to instruments that should already be and with regional and local labor prevent misuse of funds. The way taken into consideration at the offices. reintegration authorities are planning stage. organized should be derived from their tasks and objectives as well as

B·I·C·C 45 brief 26

6. Individual responsibility is officers, might have. Part of the discourages post-military job essential. toolkit facilitating the reintegration searches, either because job Ex-servicemen should be process should be a systematic and acquisition is ‘punished’ by total encouraged to take on responsibility regular assessment of the loss of pension entitlements or for themselves. They cannot be marketable personal strengths and because pensions are too high. exempted from the market qualifications of the target group as Instead, the military pension system pressures faced by other social well as a sober look at weaknesses should begin to reward post- groups. Generally speaking it seems (for example, low problem-solving military job acquisition and must be necessary to change both the image capacities or hierarchical thinking) flexibly adjusted, taking age and of, and approach to, military service: coupled with possible strategies to working ability into account. At no longer can it be treated as a overcome these. It is striking that, in times, pension entitlements could lifetime profession and officers or their self-assessment, the be substituted by financial support NCOs should be made aware of overwhelming majority of laid-off for retraining, job searches and this fact from the outset. It is officers think that they acquired relocation during the critical interim advisable that serviceman are advantageous or transferable skills period. prepared as early as possible for the during their service time. It would eventuality of a post-military career. therefore seem advisable to assess 10. Solid financing is a prerequisite. transferable skills more As most reintegration measures 7. Soldiers should be prepared for systematically during the last stage have suffered from insufficient or the eventuality of a post-military of military service, not least in order discontined finances, it must now career and given appropriate to give officers a stronger sense of be recognized that reintegration training while in the military. control over their own lives and to support necessitates financial One of the findings of this study overcome tendencies towards backing for the complete planned highlights the key importance of passivity. Post-military job duration of the downsizing effort. proper information on, and the procurement should make Non-governmental funding mostly timing of, retraining measures. It conscious use of transferable and came from foreign actors, with few would be best if preparation for marketable secondary skills such as attempts made to systematically post-military professional life began self-discipline and persistence, skills involve potential national employers during military service, commencing in human resource management, or to attract private financing of as early as possible and concentrating punctuality, a sense of duty, reintegration measures. on transferable and marketable leadership skills, proficiency and qualifications. The Czech Republic additional degrees, for example in 11. Financial means should go seems to be the only Eastern foreign languages, technical skills, directly to beneficiaries. European country where retraining legal knowledge and computer skills. Financial means should be geared at is undertaken before actual discharge direct beneficiaries to prevent NGOs from the armed forces. Servicemen 9. Reintegration needs a strong or other agencies from consuming who have been prepared for legal base. most of the money allocated to reintegration psychologically and Successful reintegration requires reintegration. Retraining agencies vocationally as early as possible fare predictability of military career paths should be chosen on a competitive better on the job market while a and of the post-military benefit basis, evaluated regularly, and protracted break with the military package. A professional career in the rewarded for job-placement inhibits later reintegration. In certain military ought to be perceived, successes and for their flexibility in cases, reintegration must be organized and legally guaranteed as a meeting real needs. A fixed, transpa- accompanied by special psychological temporary occupation presupposing rent, and accountable ratio between assistance, supportive measures for later civilian employment. management costs and the cost of families and, very often, a specific Parliaments are called upon to retraining beneficiaries is a housing policy. provide legislative security for and prerequisite. control of the implementation of 8. Servicemen must be legal acts. Mechanisms such as 12. The importance of an systematically trained in skills limiting service age and financial orchestrated job-creation effort. which are in demand on the incentives can be but two of many Demobilization itself, along with market. components essential to the the accompanying training seminars, Not all discharged officers need reintegration process. In certain cases provides no real assistance to assistance but, for those who do, the pension system actually discharged personnel unless backed help should be customized, that is, up by an orchestrated job-creation it must be made to fit the particular effort. The scope of the conversion requirements an officer, or group of

46 B·I·C·C summary

measures adopted should stem a sign of collective passivity. The personnel is linked to the fate of from local needs and opportunities, price for the absence of closed garrison-towns. Reintegration from the situation on the labor praetorianism, authoritarianism or policies should thus be organized in market, and from its capability to marked nationalism is nonetheless such a way that they incorporate absorb the qualified workforce. paternalism and isolation of the efforts to convert military bases, for Coaching into a new career should individual. In order to overcome instance, by using infrastructures for take into consideration the existing such paternalistic patterns and the job creation programs, including the niches in the labor market and be in lack of individual problem-solving promotion of small and medium- line with medium- and long-term abilities caused by a long service sized enterprises. regional development strategies. time, reintegration policies should Not only should newcomers to the empower officer associations to play labor market be recognized as an active role in all facets of qualified former soldiers, but their reintegration, not least in order to employers should also assess the create a feedback mechanism for the value of their qualifications before government. they are discharged from service. 15. External assistance is of crucial 13. Democratic education should be importance. a facet of military service and of External assistance has been of reintegration programs. crucial importance. Quite often Among former officers, there has reintegration was only initiated after been a widespread sense of financial contributions were made frustration over post-socialist available from abroad. The democratic experiences, along with European Union’s TACIS program, the strong feeling that their NATO, individual NATO countries governments were indifferent to and NGOs such as the Soros these problems. Even if criticism of Foundation have been active in democracy reveals only latent anti- supporting reintegration in one democratic leanings, its very form or another. However, up to existence nevertheless highlights the the present time, the exchange of necessity of enhancing efforts to information and coordination improve democratic education between the various programs has during military service. There is a been limited. In order to make valid reason for this: officers who national and international programs grew up under socialism and served more available to the public, the for decades in the armed forces lack suggestion has been made to build the democratic experience of civilian up a special website and an electronic life. It would therefore be advisable newsletter encouraging the exchange to include political reeducation of of information. officers in the so-called ‘retraining kit’ in order to help discharged 16. Reintegration must be linked to servicemen differentiate between local needs and the promotion of unconsolidated democracies and regional economies, in particular democracy per se. after the closure of military bases. 14. Officer associations should be Very often, closing down military encouraged to play an active role bases and dismissing military in all aspects of reintegration. personnel affect not only individual The absence of a corporate identity people but entire towns and and of organized protest among regions. It is therefore vital that former officers may be seen as projects are designed to take account favorable as long as it prevents of local needs and to help establish undue military intervention into an infrastructure which will support politics; on the other hand, it is also the economic existence of the region once the military facilities have closed. Very often reintegration of

B·I·C·C 47 brief 26

List of Interview Partners and Persons who provided Information for Preparing this Report

damsons, Janis, Member of Fedasz, Mariam, Ministry of Defense, Keresztes, Lajos, Dr, Eötvös Loránd AParliament (Saeima), Commission Department of Social Affairs, Warsaw, University in Budapest, Hungary. of National Security, Latvia. Poland. Keruss, Janis, Ph.D. candidate, Aksionov, Gennadiy, Colonel, Garrido, Francisko, Dr, Director of the University of Riga, Department of Executive Head of the Ukrainian Vinnitski Technopark, Vinnica, Ukraine. History, Latvia. retraining program for ex-officers (“Renaissance Foundation”), financed Giermakowski, Lech, Professor Dr, Keson, Tadeusz, Dr, Government by the Open Society Foundation. Wyzsa Szkola Spoleczno-Ekonomiczna, Center for Strategic Studies, Department Warsaw. for Defense Affairs in Warsaw. Angyal, Istvan, Ministry of Defense, Head of the Department on Human Grytsenko, Anatoliy, Dr, Director of Kirch, Aksel, Dr, Director of the Resources, Budapest, Hungary. the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Institute for European Studies, Political Studies, Kiev. Estonian Academy of Sciences, Tallinn, Babos, Tibor, Dr, Ministry of Defense, Estonia. NATO Department, Budapest, Heidenhain, Stephan, First Secretary of Hungary. the OSCE Mission, Tallinn, Estonia. Korsun, Oleksandr M., Head of the Regional Center for Employment in Brugetajs, Janis, University of Riga, Hemsley, Jack, Russian Resettlement Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine. Department of History, Latvia. Project, Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe, Ministry of Defence, Korynski, Piotr, Open Society Institute, Bystrytsky, Yevhen, International London. New York, Director of Economic and Renaissance Foundation, Kiev bureau, Business Development Program. Ukraine. Hobster, R., EU TACIS Program Officer, Brussels, Belgium. Koscielecki, Lech, Colonel, Dr, Czylyk, Julian, First Secretary, OSCE Ministry of Defense, Head of the Mission in Riga, Latvia. Ivanov, Viktor, Department Head at the Department of Social Affairs, Warsaw, National Coordinating Center for the Poland. Damiani, Enzo, TACIS long-term Social Adaptation of Military expert in Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine. Servicemen, Cabinet of Ministers, Kiev, Kovtun, Sergeiy, Retired Colonel, Ukraine. Director of Ukrtourservice, Kiev, Degeratu, Constantin, General, former Ukraine. Minister of Defense, Bucharest, Jacobi, Frank, Dr, EU TACIS long- Romania. term expert in Kiev, Ukraine. Krivenko, Aleksander, Retired Colonel, former member of the General Staff, Dimitrov, Dimitar, Professor Dr, Jundzis, Talavs, Dr habil, former member of the Mezhdunarodnyi Tsentr University of National and World Minister of Defense, Latvia, currently Ofitserov v Zapase, Kiev, Ukraine. Economy, Department of National and Director of the Baltic Center for Strategic Regional Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria. Studies, Latvian Academy of Sciences. Kurek, Jan, Major, Ministry of Defense, Department of Transatlantic Relations, Dragsdahl, Jorgen, freelance journalist, Kaminski, Anton, Professor Dr, Polish Warsaw, Poland. Copenhagen, Denmark. Chapter of Transparency International, Warsaw, Poland. Lejins, Atis, Head of Latvian Institute Duray, Michel, Dr, NATO Economic of International Affairs, Riga, Latvia. Department (Brussels), currently NATO representative for Ukraine, Kiev.

48 B·I·C·C intervierw partners

Lukk, Toomas, Head of Department, Poti, Laszlo, Dr, Miklos Zrinyi National Voicehovics, Stanislavs, Lt. Colonel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, Defence University, Budapest, Hungary. Chief of Military Personnel Division, Estonia. Ministry of Defense, Riga, Latvia. Rudolph, Wolfgang, Professor Dr, Milder, Kirk, Dr, Head of the Office of GOPA Consultants, Bad Homburg, Wellmann, Arend, Dr, Berliner Informati- the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Kiev, Germany. onszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit, Ukraine. Berlin, Germany. Schibria, Olga, Local Expert Mirchev, Angel, Professor Dr, CMP Employment, EU TACIS program, Yasniuk, Tatiana, National Consulting, Varna, Bulgaria. Kiev, Ukraine. Coordinating Center (NCC) at the Cabinet of Ministers, Kiev, Ukraine. Molnar, Ferenc, Dr, Miklos Zrinyi Schröder, Hans-Henning, Professor National Defense University, Budapest, Dr, Bremen University, Forschungsstelle Zalkalns, Gundars, Colonel, former Hungary. Osteuropa, Germany. Executive Head of the National Security Council, Riga, Latvia. Myrttinen, Henri, Project management, Shikalov, Aleksander, Colonel, military site conversion, Bonn Interna- Chairman of the National Coordinating Zukrowska, Katarzyna, Professor Dr, tional Center for Conversion, Germany. Center at the Cabinet of Ministers in Warsaw School of Economics, Poland. Ukraine. Nassauer, Otfried, Director of the Berliner Informationszentrum für Transat- Slobodyanyuk, Sergeiy Mikhailovich, lantische Sicherheit, Berlin (BITS), Vice Director of the Khmelnitskii Germany. Regional Center of Employment, Ukraine. Noorkoiv, Tiit, Ministry of Defence, Director of the Department of Defence, Smolanski, Oles, Dr, Professor of Policy and Planning, Tallinn, Estonia. Political Science, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, United States. Orzali, Achille, EU TACIS Officer, Brussels, Belgium. Sourkov, Aleksander, Retired Colonel, Manager of the Uzin Airfield, Ukraine. Pocheptsov, Georgiy, Professor Dr, Institute for International Relations, Stanczyk, Jerzy, Dr, Instytut Studiow University of Kiev, Ukraine. Politicznych, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. Podnebesny, Jurii Vladimirovich, Social Services for Military Pensioners at the Szabo, Janos, Dr, former Vice-minister Russian Embassy in Latvia of Defense, Budapest, Hungary.

Pogrebniak, Viktor, Retired Colonel, Tolson, Rebecca, Open Society Institute, Executive Director of the Regional New York, Economic and Business Center for Employment in Kiev, Development Program, United States. Ukraine. Tsilevich, Boriss, Deputy of the Polyakov, Leonid, Dr, Director for Latvian Parliament (Saeima), Human Military Programmes at the Ukrainian Rights and Public Affairs Committee. Center for Economic and Political Studies, Kiev, Ukraine. Vaares, Peter, Professor at European University, Tallinn, Estonia.

Viksne, Ilmars, Head of the Latvian Military Academy, Riga, Latvia.

B·I·C·C 49 brief 26

Appendix: Questionnaire for Interviews with Demobilized Officers

1) Personal background: Age, years 10) Whom did you expect to help 18) How frequently do you still keep in service, rank, qualifications, and assist you in overcoming in contact with former original reason for becoming a reintegration problems? comrades? professional soldier, years after leaving the army, times of 11) What kind of assistance in 19) Did you join any association of unemployment/occupation after reintegration (finding a job, new former officers? If so, what kind leaving the army, current apartment, retraining) did the of benefits does this association occupation. army, the government, the local provide for you? community or regional 2) Was your original expectation for administration provide? 20) If you look back at the time after becoming a professional soldier leaving the army, do you think matched by your actual 12) What were the reactions by those your life improved or worsened? experience in the army? agencies you addressed with Give reasons. your problems? How could they 3) Reasons for leaving the army: have helped you better in 21) If you look forward, five years health reasons, dismissal, early shifting from a military to a civil ahead, do you think you will live retirement, voluntary discharge career (what are you the least better or worse than currently? content with in terms of 4) In the case of voluntary discharge, governmental, military 22) If you had to assess the positive what were the prime motives for assistance)? and negative experiences of the doing so? What were your system change since the early expectations? 13) What additional qualifications 1990s, what prevails (positive, did you acquire after leaving negative)? 5) Which qualifications and skills service? acquired in the military proved 23) Do you think that an army to be useful for civil occupation? 14) Did you ever regret the decision general would fit better for to leave the army? ruling the country and solving 6) Which qualifications and skills its problems than an elected acquired in the military proved 15) Would you recommend that your democratic government? to be disadvantageous for civil son or male relatives embark on occupation? a military career? 24) What do you dislike most about the democratic form of 7) Did you discuss your decision to 16) How do you see the prestige and government in your country? leave the army with your standing of the contemporary comrades? How did discussions army of your country compared 25) Do you think that close influence your decision-making? to the socialist past (ten years cooperation with NATO is a ago)? Do you think its role in good or a bad thing? Give 8) Name at least three major politics and society has reasons. reintegration difficulties after diminished or increased? leaving service. 17) Did your political worldviews 9) How did you overcome these and party preferences change difficulties or do they persist? after leaving service? If so, what were significant changes that come to your mind?

50 B·I·C·C acronyms & abbreviations

List of Selected Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US State Department BEOSZ National Association of Comrade Soldiers (Hungarian Army) CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CITE Pilot Project of Re-conversion of the Nysa Garrison into the Center of Innovation, Technology ad Education (Poland) CSESZ Union of Troop Soldiers (Hungarian Army) CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington) EU European Union FAR Foundation for Professional Activation (Poland) GDP Gross domestic product GDR German Democratic Republic HODOSZ Trade Union for Civilian Employees (Hungarian Army) HOSZ Association of Hungarian Servicemen IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies, London IFSA International Fund for Social Adaptation ITC Interregional Training Center (Ukraine) KGB Former Soviet Secret Service KLA Kosovo Liberation Army MEB Committees for the Promotion of Job Seekers (Hungary) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCC National Coordinating Center for the Social Adaptation of Servicemen under the Cabinet of Ministers (Ukraine) NCO Non-commissioned officer NGO Non-governmental organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PONARS Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (CSIS, United States) PPR Program for Promotion of Reemployment (Hungary) PZPR Polish socialist party RCE Regional Center for Employment (Ukraine) RMP Retraining of the Military program (Renaissance Foundation, Ukraine) SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises TACIS Technical assistance to CIS countries UAUZV Ukrainian Association of Professional Reserve Officers

B·I·C·C 51 brief 26

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Herspring, Dale, 1994, “Revolution in Luttwak, Edward N. 1999. “From Ringe, Jörg. 1998. “Kooperationsmög- Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Vietnam to Desert Fox: Civil-Military lichkeit in der Ostsee mit den Slovak and Hungarian Militaries.” Relations in Modern Democracies.” baltischen Staaten.” Europäische European Security, Vol. 3, No. 4 Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring), pp. Sicherheit. No. 8, pp. 47–50. (Winter), pp. 664–690. 99–112. Sarvas, Steven. 1999. “Professional Hoppe, Hans-Joachim. 1999. “Geheim- Magyar Honved, ed. 1999. National Soldiers and Politics: A Case of dienste und Sicherheitsstrukturen in Defense 1999. Hungarian Ministry of Central and Eastern Europe.” Armed Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn.” Defense, Budapest. Forces and Society. Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall), Osteuropa, No. 9 (September), pp. pp. 99–118. 893–907. Molnar, Ferenc. 2000. “Former Military Professionals in Hungary.” Shikalov. A. S., 2001. Programmy Huntington, Samuel P. “Reforming Unpublished Manuscript. Budapest. podderzhki demobilizovannykh Civil-Military Relations.” In professional’nykh voennosluzhashikh v Diamond and Plattner, eds. Civil- Molnar, Ferenc and Lajos Keresztes. Ukraine. Report by the National Military Relations and Democracy. 2000. “Reintegration into Civilian Coordinating Center (NCC) at the Baltimore and London: Johns Life in Hungary.” Unpublished Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Hopkins University Press. report commissioned by BICC. commissioned by BICC. Kiev, Budapest, December. Ukraine. Keresztes, Lajos. 2001. “Reintegration Measures in Hungary.” Unpublished Mukhin, Vladimir. 2001. “Soldiers Simon, Jeffrey. 1995. “Forging a Chain report commissioned by BICC. Worry About Road to Civilian Life. of Civilian Command for Poland’s Budapest. Pending Reform Means Many Will Military.” Transitions, Vol. 1, No. 23, Soon Have to Look for Work.” The 15 December, pp. 37–40. Knudsen, Olav F. 1998. Cooperative Russia Journal, 11-17 May, 2001. Security in the Baltic Sea Region. ______. 1997. “Central European Chaillot Paper 33. Institute for NATO-Ukrainian Open-ended Working Civil-Military Relations and NATO Security Studies, Western European Group on the Retraining of Retired Expansion.” In Bebler, ed., 1997, pp. Union, November. Military Personnel. 1999. Report of 123f. the Meeting. Kiev, Ukraine, 25/26 Körver-Buschhaus, Harald. 2000. February. Szabo, Janos. 1999. “Report to the TACIS Tender: Further Support to the Government on the Comprehensive Re-employment of Discharged Officers of Nelson, Daniel N. 1998. “Civil Armies, Strategic Review of the National the Armed Forces of Ukraine. RAG Civil Societies, and NATO’s Defence of the Republic of Bildung GmbH, January. Enlargement.” Armed Forces and Hungary.” October. Available at Society. Vol. 25, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 137– www.//193.6.238.52/mod/rev/ Koscielecki, Lech. 2001. 160. report.htm. “Commissioned Report on Personnel Conversion in Poland.” Organisation for Economic Co- ______. 2000. “Hungary’s Decision- Ministry of Defense, Department of operation and Development. 1993. making in Military Affairs.” Social Affairs. Unpublished report Russian Officer Conversion Programme. Unpublished Report by the Vice- commissioned by BICC. Warsaw, OECD/GD (93)9. Paris. Minister of Defense, commissioned Poland. by BICC, Budapest, June. Polyakov, Leonid. 2001. Lagunina, Irina. 1999. Russia: NATO “Commissioned Report on Military Szemerkenyi, Reka. Central European Experts Hope For Resumption of Restructuring in Ukraine.” Report Civil-Military Reforms At Risk: Progress Contact With Russia. Radio Free commissioned by BICC. Ukrainian in Establishing Democratic Controls over Europe/Radio Liberty News Line, 30 Center for Economic and Political the Military Has Not Been Sustained. April. Studies (UCEPS). Adelphi Paper No. 306, pp. 74ff.

Republic of Lithuania. 1997. Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning, 1997. Ministry of National Defense, March.

B·I·C·C 53 brief 26

Selected Publications

TACIS Project 97-0466. 1999. For a complete list of our publications, please refer to Recommendations to Officers Who Are Leaving the Army: Preparation to www.bicc.de/publications/. Civilian Life. Guide prepared by the All briefs and papers can be downloaded from this site. European Commission and the Russian Ministries of Education, Labor and Social Policy and Defense. January (available at: yearbooks No. 3: www.konversia.org/pamiatka.htm) Jürgen Altmann (Hrsg.). 2000. Dual-use in Conversion Survey 1996: der Hochtechnologie: Erfahrungen, Strategien und Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Perspektiven in Telekommunikation und Urbani, Gustav. 1998a. “Personelle Demobilization, Oxford University Press, Luftfahrt, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden- Konversion der Streitkräfte Ungarns UK, 1996 Baden 1990 bis 1998.” Unpublished Manuscript. Berliner Informations- Conversion Survey 1997: No 4: zentrum für Transatlantische Global Disarmament and Disposal of Surplus Hartmut Küchle. 2001. Rüstungsindustrie im Sicherheit. Weapons, Oxford University Press, UK, Umbruch: Strategien deutscher 1997 Unternehmen und Ansätze einer europäischen ______. 1998b. “Streitkräftereform Neuordnung (Arms Industry Restructuring—Ger- Conversion Survey 1998: und neue bürgerliche Regierung in man Companies in a New European Setting), Global Disarmament, Defense Industry Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Ungarn.” DDD-Arbeitspapiere, Vol. Consolidation and Conversion, Oxford 44. Dresden. University Press, UK, 1998 No. 5: Sami Faltas/Joseph Di Chiaro III (eds.). ______. 1999. “Demobilization in Conversion Survey 1999: 2001. Managing the Remnants of War: Microdis- Hungary 1989–99.” Unpublished Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and armament as an Element of Peace-building, No- Manuscript. Berliner Informations- Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, mos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden zentrum für Transatlantische Baden-Baden, 1999 Sicherheit (BITS), Berlin. No. 6: Conversion Survey 2000: Michael Brzoska. 2001. Smart Sanctions: The ______. 2002. “Hungary’s Reform Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Next Steps. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Ba- Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, den-Baden of the Armed Forces.” In Heine- Baden-Baden, 2000 mann-Grüder, 2002, pp. 23–29. briefs Conversion Survey 2001: Vlachova, Marie and Stefan Sarvas. 1997. Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and brief 15: “From the Totalitarian to the Post- Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Herbert Wulf (ed.), Security Sector Reform, Totalitarian Military.” In Bebler, ed., Baden-Baden, 2001 June 2000 1997, p. 94. Conversion Survey 2002: brief 16: Wellmann, Arend. 1999. Global Disarmament, Demilitarization and Herbert Wulf (ed.), Practical Disarmament, “Demobilization of Armed Forces Demobilization. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, August 2000 Baden-Baden, 2002 in Eastern Europe.” Unpublished brief 17: manuscript. Berliner Informations- Ksenia Gonchar, Russia’s Defense Industry at zentrum für Transatlantische BICC disarmament and the Turn of the Century, November 2000 Sicherheit (BITS), Berlin. conversion studies brief 18: Wiatr, Jerzy J. 1997. “Military Politics No. 1: Peter Batchelor, Jacklyn Cook and Penny and Society in Poland during the Jörn Brömmelhörster (ed.). 2000. McKenzie, Conversion in South Africa in the Democratic Transition.” In Anton A. Demystifying the Peace Dividend, Nomos 1990’s: Defense Downsizing and Human Bebler, ed. Civil-Military Relations in Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Development Changes, December 2000 Post-Communist States. Central and No. 2: brief 19: Eastern Europe in Transition. West- Natalie Pauwels (ed.). 2000. War Force to Ksenia Gonchar and Thilo Roettger, port, London: Praeger, pp. 77–85. Work Force: Global Perspectives on Assisting Conversion and Company Restructuring Demobilization and Reintegration, Nomos in Moldova, September 2001 Wierzynski, Jan. 2001. Lt. Colonel, Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Reconversion of Personnel in the Polish brief 20: Armed Forces. Ministry of National Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf- Defence. Social Affairs Department, Christian Paes, Wag the Dog: The Mobilization Warsaw, April. and Demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army, October 2001

54 B·I·C·C publications

brief 21: report 10: Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Frankenstein Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Small States— Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Development (eds.). 1997. Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outco- Big Worries. Choice and Purpose in the Security (R&D) Conversion in Russia, May 1997 mes—Defense Conversion in China, Lynne Ri- Policies of the Baltic States, February 2002 enner, Boulder, CO report 11: brief 22: Keith Cunningham, Base Closure and John Hart and Cynthia D. Miller. 1998. Corinna Hauswedell and Kris Brown, Redevelopment in Central and Eastern Europe, Chemical Weapon Destruction in Russia: Politi- Burying the Hatchet—The Decommissioning of July 1997 cal, Legal and Technical Aspects, Oxford: Ox- Paramilitary Arms in Northern Ireland, ford University Press March 2002 report 12: Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.), Converting Michael Brzoska and Ann Markusen (eds.). brief 23: Defense Resources to Human Development, 2000. Military Industrial Conversion, Special Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and Isabelle Conference Proceedings, October 1998 issue of the International Regional Science Masson (eds.), Small Arms in the Horn of Review (IRSR), vol. 23, no 1, Sage Publica- Africa: Challenges, Issues and Perspectives, report 13: tions April 2002 David DeClerq, Destroying Small Arms and Light Weapons: Survey of Methods and Practical Monterey Institute for International Studies brief 24: Guide, April 1999 (MIIS) and Bonn International Center for Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold and Vanessa A. Conversion (BICC). 2000. Tackling Small Arms Farr (eds.), Gender Perspectives on Small Arms report 14: and Light Weapons: A Practical Guide for Collec- and Light Weapons: Regional and International Herbert Wulf (ed.), Disarmament and Conflict tion and Destruction Concerns, July 2002 Prevention in Development Cooperation, Conference Proceedings, February 2000 Kees Kingma (ed.). 2000. Demobilization in brief 25: Sub-Saharan Africa; the development and security Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (ed.), papers impacts. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press The Military in Transition: Restructuring and Downsizing the Armed Forces of Eastern Europe, paper 20: August 2002 Vanessa Farr, Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuilding Tool, June 2002 brief 26: Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Becoming an paper 21: Ex-military Man: Demobilization and Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska with Kees Reintegration of Military Professionals Kingma and Herbert Wulf, Voice and accoun- in Eastern Europe, October 2002 tability in the security sector, July 2002

paper 22: reports Dimitar Dimitrov, The Restructuring and Conversion of the Bulgarian Defense report 4: Industry during the Transition Period, July 2002 Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer, Restructuring the US Military Bases in Germa- paper 23: ny: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities, June 1995 Amanuel Mehreteab, Veteran combatants do not fade away: a comparative study on two demobiliza- report 5: tion and reintegration exercises in Eritrea, Sep- Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and tember 2002 Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversion for Social Development, July 1995 paper 24: Isabelle Ioannides, The European Rapid report 8: Reaction Force: Implications for democratic Ulrike Lindemann und JØrgen Klußmann, accountability, September 2002 Konversion militärischer Liegenschaften—Eine welt- weite Herausforderung, Konferenzreportage, Ok- books tober 1996 Michael Brzoska und Werner Voss (eds.). 1996. Auswirkungen und Alternativen des Eurofighter 2000, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden

Ulrike Lindemann und Ulrich Schirowski. 1996. Truppenabbau und Konversion in NRW, Handbuch für Kommunen

B·I·C·C 55 The Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the transfer of former military resources and assets to alternative civilian purposes

he transfer of resources from the military learinghouse. In its capacity as an T to the civilian sector represents both a C independent organization, BICC supports social and an economic challenge, as well as and assists international organizations, offering an opportunity for the states government agencies, nongovernmental concerned. The sustained process of organizations, companies and the media, as disarmament during the decade following the well as private individuals. It hereby mediates end of the Cold War has made defense conver- and facilitates the conversion process at all sion an important issue in many countries levels—local, national and global. BICC today. This process has now slowed down collects and disseminates data and information considerably, but the problems faced by those on conversion to practitioners in a wide range affected are far from solved. BICC’s main of fields and institutions. BICC strives to reach objective is to make use of the chances offered researchers and practitioners as well as by disarmament, whilst at the same time parliamentarians, the media, and the general helping to avoid—or lessen—the negative public by means of a variety of tools including effects. its library, its extensive on-line documentation services and its internet service (www.bicc.de). This issue concerns a number of areas: What Furthermore, the Center documents the course can scientists and engineers who were formerly of disarmament and conversion in its annual employed in weapons labs do today? What is conversion surveys and produces a variety of the fate of the roughly eight million employees publications. who lost their jobs in the defense factories? Why are so many defense companies faring The Bonn International Center for Conversion better today than they did ten years ago? Will was established in 1994 with generous support all demobilized soldiers or former combatants from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia find a future in civilian society? What action (NRW). The Center’s Trustees include the two must communities take when suddenly faced German states of North Rhine-Westphalia and with the closure of a huge military base? How Brandenburg as well as the Landesbank Nord- does one solve the problem of the ready rhein-Westfalen and the Landesentwicklungsge- availability of small arms and light weapons? sellschaft NRW (LEG).

It is BICC’s task to tackle these questions, to analyze them on the basis of scientific research, to convey the necessary information, Published by and to give advice to those involved—in short, © BICC, Bonn 2002 Bonn International Center for Conversion to manage disarmament. Director: Peter J. Croll Publishing Management, Layout: Katharina Moraht & Svenja Bends nternational think tank. BICC conducts An der Elisabethkirche 25 I research and makes policy D-53113 Bonn recommendations. In-house and external Germany Phone +49-228-911960 experts contribute comparative analyses and Fax +49-228-241215 background studies. E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.bicc.de roject management and consulting ISSN 0947-7322 services. BICC provides practical P Printed in Germany support to public and private organizations. All rights reserved For instance, BICC staff advise local governments confronted with the difficult task of redeveloping former military installations. BICC also combines development assistance with practical conversion work by helping in the fields of demobilization, reintegration and peace-building.