D ~S ED CONFIDENTIAL
U.S. S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)
WAR HISTORY
7 DECEMBER. 1941 TO 15 AUGUST. 1945
The Chief of Naval Operations directs that this report be shown only to those persons to whom the report would be of value In the performance of their dut111s. Steps shall be taken, accordingly, to Insure that the report wlll be seen by those persons responsible for design, con· struction and repair of naval vussels, as v.cll as for their operation, but by no others.
Preliminary Design Section Bureau of Ships 30 April, 1947 Navy Department
WAR DAMAGE REPORT No. 59
Printed By U. S. Hydroaraphfc Office
DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. EIITERPRISE (CV6)
War History
7 Decemoer 1941 to 15 August 1945
Class...... YORKTOWN (CV5 Class) Length (O.A.) ...... 82'7 Ft. 4 In. Launched ...... •..•. 3 O.:tober 193(:; Length (B. P.) ...... '170 Fl. 0 In. Displacernenl (Standard) 19. 900 tons Beam (Without Blisters) 83 Ft. 1 In. (Before Blist.~r Addition) Beam (With Blisters)... 95 Ft. 4- 1/2 In. References:
General: (a) War Diaries oi ENTERPRISE, complete from April 1942 through September 1915, plus January 1942. Damage of 1 February 1942: (b) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. Hr. to BuShips CV6/S81(50-wy), Serial 027 of 7 February l P42. Damage of 24 August 1942: (c) C.O. ENTERPRISE con.f. llr. to BuShips CVG/Lll- 1(50-wy), Serial 0200 of fl Septemuer 1942. (d) Comdl.Havy Yard, Pearl Harbor, conf. !tr. to BuShir.s C- Lll-1/CV/NYlO, Serial Y-01957 of 25 October 1942. (e) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. !tr. to BuShips CV6/L9- 3(50-Bl), Serial 052 of 16 Mnrch 1943.
Damage oi 2o Damage of 18 and 20 March 1945: (h) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. to BuShips CVti/Lll-1(50- cl), Serial 0200 of 4 April 1945. Damage of 11 April 1945: (1) C.O. ENTERPRISE con!. llr. to Comlnch CV6/ Al6-3(11-Pe), Serial 0208 of 16 April H.145. (j) C.O. ENrERPRISE conf. ltr. lo BuShips CV6/L9- 3('70- Ec), Serial 0258 of 5 May 1945. Damage of 14 May 1945: (k) C.O. ENTERPRISE conf. ltr. lo Cominch CV6/ Al6-3(1 l -Pe), Ser ial 0273 of 22 May 1945. (1) War Damage Report - U.S.S. ENTERPRlSE - Actions of 11 April 1945 and 14 May 1945, prepa r ed by Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, forwarded by ComNavShiµYdPug conf. ltr. to BuSnips CV8/Ll 1(254), Serial 0649 of 1 February 1946. er c \Z. VA -_. .~s t.J.5 10.~ 1 CONFIDENT!.AL CONTENTS SECTION A FOREWORD 1 Photographs Nos. A-1 to A-•1 B EARLY HfSTORY 2 1. Design and Construction 2 2. Peacetime Or (rations 2 3. Start of th• W!ir 3 c BOMB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, 1 FEBRUARY 1942 4 1. !Jarratlve 4 2. Material Damage 4 3. Fire and Firefighting 5 4. Conclusio!'l 5 Photographs Nos. C-1 an D HISTORY, FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND, 2~ FEBRUAAY 1942, TO THE LANDINGS IN THE SOLOMONS, AUGUST 1942 6 1. Strikes Against Wah and Marcus Islands, 24 February and 4 March o 2. Bombing of Tokyo, ~8 Aprll Li 3. The Battle of Midway, 4.-6 June ti 4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7 -9 August 7 E BOW.LB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24. AUGUST 1942 8 1. J.Iarrative 8 ?.. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 9 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Pipinir, Machinery and Electrical 12 4. Flooding and Flocx:l.ing Control Measures 13 5. Fire and Firefighting 14 6. Japanese Bombs 15 7. Conclusion 16 Photographs Nos. E-1 to E-20 Plat~.::> 11 and lll s CONFIDENTIAL lU~ClASSIFIED SECTION F BOMB DAMAGE, BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 26 OCTOBER 1942 l '7 1. Narrative l 'I 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 18 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical 21 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures 22 5. Fire and Firefighting 23 o. Japanese Bombs 24 l. Conclusion 24 Photographs Nos. F - 1 to F-24 Plates IV and V G HISTORY, 30 OCTOBER 1942 to 18 MARCH 1945 26 1. The Batlle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942 26 2. Winter and Spring 1943 25 3. Overhaul, Summer 1943 2'7 4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44 28 5. Spnng Activities, 1944 28 6. Advance to tne Philippines, 1944-45 29 1. Landings on Iwo Jima, F~bruary 1945 31 H BOMB DAMAGE, STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN, 18 and 20 MARCH 1945 33 1. Narrative 33 2. Dud Bomb of 18 March 34 3. Near-Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of 20 March 34 Photographs Nos. H-1 to H-6 Plate VI SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, 11 APRIL 1945 37 1. Narrative 37 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 38 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, 39 Machinery and Electrical 4. Flooding and Flooding -:ontrol Measures 41 5. Fire and Firefighting 41 o. Japanese Planes and Bombs 41 7. ConciUSt ,n 42 Photographs Nos. I-1 to I -10 Plat;.; VII CONFIDENTIAL SECTION DECtASSIFIED J SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945 44 1. Narrative 44 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural 45 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electdcal 46 4. Flooding and Flocxiing Control Measures 49 5. Fire and Firefighting 49 6. Japanese Planes and Bombs 50 7. Conclusion 50 Photographs Nos. J-1 to J-18 Plate VU K EXIT ENTERPRISE 52 1. Repairs 52 2. The "Magic Carpet" 52 3. A National Memorial 52 L SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 53 1. Summary 53 2. Conclusion 55 LASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECTION A FOREWORD 2 \ \ I, B O MB DAMAGE, MARSHALL ISLANDS, I FEBRUARY 1942 2 BOMB DAMAGE , BATT L E OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGU9T 1942 3.BOMB DAMAGE, BATT L E Of SANTA CRUZ,26 OCTOBER 1942 4 BOMB DAMAGE,STRIKES AGAINST SOUTHERN JAPAN, I S AND 20MARCH 1945 5.SUICI DE PLANE CRASHES, OKINAWA, II APR IL 1945 6 SUICIDE PLANE CRASH, KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1945 A-1. The war history of ENTERPRISE is unique in length of active service, in extent of destruction orought to lhe enemy and in number of instances of c.lamage survived. Therefore, this war damage r epor t has been written with brief summaries of operational history and detailed tlis cussions of each instance of damage to cover the whole war experience of the ship. A-2. EN:ERPRISE served with the Fleet throughout the war, steaming more than 2'/5,000 miles and accumulating 18 out of a possible 22 combat stars for- carriers in lhe Pacific area. She missed only the Batlle of the Coral Sea and thr ee operations in the Southwest Pacific: Eastern New Guinea, Bismarck Archipelago and Treasury- Bougainville Island. A-3. Her planes, the " big guns" of a carrier, a r e c redited with sinking or an assist in the sinking of 71 enemy ships and with damaging 192 enemy ships. The sinklngs and assists include three lar ge carrier s and a heavy cruiser of the Japanese Fleet in lhe Battle of Midway and a battleship, large cruH;er and four carriers in t!'le Battle for Leyte Gulf. A-4. During the per iod of lhe war she was damaged by the enemy on six separate occasions by 13 hits or near-misses from oombs or suicide planes. ln addition, she was damaged by a fire caused by the detonation of a " friendly" 5-inch anti-aircraft shell. In a~l cases but one, her excellent damage control organization prevented serious consequences and enabled ENTERPRISE to continue in action. Damage to her flight deck which resulted from the suicide plane cr ash of 14 May 1945 so impaired her oper ating efflclency that she was forced to retire the following day. •solid line indicates hits Dashed lines indicate near-misses t"Friendly" shell hits -1- COi·7FIDEi'ITIA L .. PhJlw A- 1: ENTERt'RISE stortly after her commissi:m ing 12 r~:ay 1833. ·~ Ps.ot 1 A - '~: Sll';'ERf.-ft!Si'.. frum L!l~ f).)rt quart~r, sh)rtly Pn.)tJ A-~i: Pi.d'.le!" t&J:ing )lf ir.lm E.HTE.RPRI!:.'E. bra ..;tr:IY.t:: in tr.• WestPr Pacific. - --_--... PhoL'J A-4: ~l!TER.tJRISE a.::; sf.e '.lppear.ed durinl! the ~:att•~r part :>f th..- 1!a.I' a.ft~!· .1,•r 1~143 Jvcrll':.l.UL CONFIDENTIAL SECTION B EARLY HIST0RY 1. Design and Construction Bl-1. At Uie close of World War I lhe potentialities of Naval air-power were recognized and in order to initiate development of a sound doctrine the collier JUPITER was converted into the experimental aircraft carrier LANGLEY (CVl). She was followed in 1927 by LEXINGTON (CV2) and SARATOGA (CV3), which were converted from battle-cruisers as a result of lht:- Wasnington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament. Bl-2. Through the years 1922 to 1929 preliminary design studies of 10,000, 13,800, 17.230 and 23,000 ton standard displacement aircraft carriers were made in order to determ!m, t.ne best way to utilize the 69,000 tons of carriers allowed under the Washington Treaty. Problems of suitable speed, armor, armament, torpedo protection, disposilion of flue gases, arrangement of flight decks, elevators and hangars, location of bridge. criteria of stabllity, etc. were studied by the Bureau of Construc tion and Repair and discussed wlth the General Board, other Bureaus of the navy Department and operating personnel. The studies finally crystal lized into plans for RANGER (CV4), lhe first U.S. aircraft carrier to be designed as such irom its inception. RANGER was ordered 1 November 1930 and commissioned 4 June 1934. Bl-3. With a valuable background of design lessons derived in the evelopmenl of RANGER and a much greater knowh..-'Cige of carrier operations gained from experience with LANGLEY, LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, preliminary design work on ENTERPRISE was started in 1931. Displacement was increased from 14,500 to 19,900 tons standard and speed irom 29.5 to 32.5 knots. Many significant changes were made in the arrangements so that ENTERPRISE and her sistership, YORKTOWN {CV5), embodied many advances in carrier developmenl. Construction of NTERPRISE was ordered 3 August 1933 and her keel ~as laid 16 July 1934 at Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company. She was launched 3 October 1936 and commissioned 12 May 1938. 2. Peacetime Operations B2-1. After a shakedown cruise lo Brazil and winter maneuvers with e Fleet in the Caribbean early in 1939, ENTERPRISE was ordered to the Pacific h1 April 1939. With lhe proclamation of a state of limited national emergency in September 1939, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor where she trained for war operations as a part of the Hawaiian Fleet Detachment and shuttled planes and squadrons among the Pacific island bases. n 28 November 1941 she departed Pearl Harbor for Wake Island with twelve Marine Corps fighter planes to be delivered to lhe newly completed irfield there. -2- CONFIDENTIAL 3. Slarl of the War B3-l. ENTERPRISE was scheduled lo return to Pearl Harbor on ti December, but fortunately was delayed a day by heavy weather. Some of her planes flew to Pearl Harbor during the Japanese raid on '7 December and the remainder were launched in an unsuccessful attempt to locate the enemy carriers after word of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been received by radio. During the early weeks of the war she patrolled to the west of the Hawaiian Islands and acted as escort for transports reinforcing Samoa. Later in January she sailed north lo participate in the first offensive U.S. carrier action of lhe war--lhe strike agai.nst the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on 1 February. There, ENTERPRISE with one task group oi cruisers and destroyers and YORKTOWN with another participated in a joint air and sea bombardment. B3 -2. Planes from ENTERPRISE bombed and strafed shore installa tions on Moloelap, Wotje and Kwajalein in the Marshalls, and bombed and torpedoed several enemy ships including one cruiser and two submarines. The raid set back Japanese plans for strengthening bases in the West Central Pacific, and provided the first good news after lhe disaster at Pearl Harbor. The opposite result might have occurred ii ENTERPRISE had not successfully evaded lwo determined bombing allacks from Japanese land-based planes, receiving only minor damage from a near-miss. CONFIDENTIAL SEC':'ION C BOMB DAMAGE MARSflALL ISLANDS, 1FEBRUARY1942* \ I ~--~~\~~~~~~~ -~--~~~____ !.,_ ~a-'---·------{- I NEAR-MISS 62 5 KG BOMB, FRAME 130 PORT 1. Narrative C 1-1. About 1340 on 1 February 194.2 while operating in the north:- Pastern Marshalls, ENTERPRISE was approached on the starboard bow by five Japanese twin-engin·ed land planes flying at 10,000 feet. While in a shallow power dive to about 3,500 ieet, each plane released three bombs. ENTERPRISE was maneuver ing at high speed and all bombs fell beyond the ship, the nearest about 50 feet off the port quarter at frame 130. The bombs were estimated by the ship to be general purpose with instantaneous fuzes, weighing between 100 and 200 pounds and were probably the 63 Kg Type 99 r o. 6 Ordinary type (U.S.Navy Bomb Disposal School designation 63 Kg SAP). This bomb corresponds in stze and charge weight approximately with the U.S. 100-pound GP type, but has somewhat superior penetrating ability.•• Splashes were 100 to 125 feet high. Slight shock was felt throughout the ship, similar to that caused by firing the ship's guns. Fragments struck the port quarter. Cl -2. One plane returned,apparently to strafe the ship. Its right winv; scraped lhe flight deck between frames 74 and 65, knocking off the ships port side light and cutting off the tail of a scout bomber on deck. It plunged over the port side at frame 62 and carried away the forward stay of the antenna outrigger. Cl-3. A second attack began at 1600, when two Japanese twin-engined planes each dropped two bombs off the starboard bow. The nearest was 150 yards away and the splashes appeared to r ise higher than those of the first bombs. Although several fragments wer e found on the forecastle, no damage was incurred. 2. Material Damage C2-l. Fragments from the first attack opened four 1/2-inch holes i.n the 1/4.-inch medium steel plating of the port hangar bulkhead between frames 130 and 133 and six holes in the hangar roller curtain (Plate I). There were numer ous dents in the 5/8-inch STS shell plating below the main deck and fragments pierced and dented the splinter mats, gallery walkwayJ. ladders and gallery deck in way of 'the . 50 cal. machine gun at frame 1J4.. • BuShips War Damage Report No. 5 ** Handbook of Japanese Explosive Ordnance, OPNAV 30- 3M, 15 August 1945 -4- CONFIDENTlAL L;2-2. The externally-fitted 2 lo 2-1/2-inch gasoline line was pierced by fragments in nine places between frames 119 and 135. A gasoline fire resulted. C2-3. The M-1, M,2 and M-6 coils of the externally-filled degaussing cable at frame 126, i.he hangar sprinkler electrical control box in the port pocket at irame 133 and fifteen minor electrical cables were pierced or severed by fragments or destroyed in lhe gasoline fire. 3. Fire and Firefighting C3-1. Gasoline from i.he pierced gasoline line caught fire either from hot fragments or electrical short circuits and the fire spread over the port gallery walkway and the boat pocket between frames 130 and 144. The flames consumed canvas covers, splinter mats, airplane fueling hose, rubber deck matting, life jackets and paint on the deck and bulkheads (Photos C-1 and C-2). C3-2. Although the fire seemed very threatening, it was soon extinguished wli.h chemical foam from pressure-operated foam generators (phomene accumulators). 4. Conclusion C4-l. By quick and effective use of the available firefighting apparatus, ENTERPRISE repair parties successfully passed their first real test. C4-2. The penetration of splinter mats by fragments substantiatt:d the prior decision to discontinue their use because of their limited valuP against even low velocity fragments. C4-3. Although a gasoline fire developed as a result of penetration of the exposed portion of i.he gasoline piping by fragments, no change ln its location was seriously considered. It would be impracticable to glve adequate protection to this main and a fire on the gallery walkway is obviously preferable to one in the hangar. C4-4. Allhough internal fitting of degaussing cables had become standard practice, ENTERPRISE could not be so filled until her extensive 1 ri43 overhaul. -5- CONFIDENTIAL f'h.JL.> C-_: Fir• •11rr... ig"" ~n .oO cµ··· ma!..!hine gw1 ~allery, p;rt .Jilt:. 1:J1r~ur tat:~r. :'.'r.:im 1i.:; ..ut frarn~ 144 l.;oking f .>!' "a.ru. Phot:> C-2: Cnarrc:a paint on ouiY.. nead, port gun gal1ery. ArcnwaJ· anj laci tr:..r arr: bet N~en fram12s HO and 141. ?romeoe a(.; ·umUJ ltOr at xtrt:n. _ !eit. COl':FlDENTlAL SECTION D HISTORY FIRST STRIKE AGAINST WAKE ISLAND, 24 FEBRUARY 1942 TO THE LANDINGS IN THE SOLOMONS, AUGUST 1942 1. Strikes Against Wake and Marcus Islands, 24 February and 4 March D 1-1. After the success of lhe raid on the Marshalls, other strikes were plan."led. While one task force assembled around LEXINGTON ma.de a diversionary attack on Rabaul, ENTERPRISE accompanied another force against the newly established enemy garrison on Wake Island. Extensive damage to shore installations was inflicted by a combined air-sea bombardment. Dl-2. A brief surprise attack wa~ next made on Marcus Island. Planes bombed shore installations before dawn and then returned to ENTERPRISE which was already proceeding toward Pearl Harbor. Dl-3. During March, alterations, including removal of ten boats and most of the .50 cal. machine guns and the installation oi thirty 20mm gtlllS and additional radar units, were accomplished by Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. 2. Bombing of Tokyo, 18 April D2-l. On 8 April, ENTERPRISE and her escort departed Pearl Harbor lo rendezvous with HORNET (CV8) which had sailed from San Francisco with 16 Army B-25's spotted on her flight deck, destined for a bombing raid on Tokyo. ENTERPRISE provided search and combat air patrol for the attack on the Japanese capital. Although the force encountered heavy gales and was discovered some 800 miles off the coast of Japan, the bombers got away and were successful in carrying out their mission. The ships returned to Pearl Harbor on 25 April. 3. The Batlle of Midway, 4-6 Jwie D3-l. ENTERPRISE next headed south to assist LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN in their efforts to slow the advance of the Japanese, but arrived too late to take part in the auack on the Japanese force at Tulagi, 4 May, and the air battles (Battle of the Coral Sea), 7 and 8 May, in which LEXINGTON* was sunk and YORKTOWN .. was damaged. She returned to Pearl Haroor just in time lo depart again to repel the expected Japanese landings on Midway. 03-2. The Battle of Midway was a turning point in the Pacific War, for from this time the balance of power in the Pacific shifted steadily to the United States side. Three large forces of Japanese ships, • BuShips War Damage Report No. 16 .. BuShips War Damage Report No. 23 -6- CONFIDENTIAL including many transports and cargo vessels, supported by seven carriers, eleven battleships, about fourteen cruisers and many des troyers were severely mauled and driven ofi by U.S. air groups from two task groups buill aroWld ENTERPRISE, HORNET and YORKTOWN and by land-based bombers. The Japanese WPr~ completely surprised. Four carriers and one heavy cruiser were sunk and one heavy cruiser, tWQ destroy.ers and one transport were damaged. On 4 June dive bombers from ENTERPRISE and HORNET severely damaged the four carriers which later sank, and sank the heavy cruiser on 6 June. One of the damaged carriers was torpedoed by a submarine and sank, one sank as the result of a delayed fuel tank explosion and the olher two were scuttled by lheir crews on 5 JWle. ENTERPRISE was not damaged, but YORKTOWN* and HAMMANN (DD4.12) were lost. 4. Landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, 7-9 August D4-1. Following Midway, ENTERPRISE had a short availability at Pearl Harbor, during which lhe forward auxiliary elevator, lhe two cata pults on lhe main deck and lhe remaining . 50 cal. machine guns were removed. A 1.1-inch anti-aircraft mount was added at the extreme bow on the forecastle deck and forward fire control radar installed. D4-2. ENTERPRISE departed 15 July for Tongatabu, the staging area for the landing in the Solomons. To covn lhe amphibious force and fire support groups of t.he first U.S. offensive lhrusl, three task groups were formed around SARATOOA, WASP (CV7) and ENTERPRISE. Dunng the successful landings of 7 August on Tulagi and Guadalcanal, planes from the carriers provided air reconnaisance and tactical bomb ing. They were unable to participate, however, in the surprise night engagement of 8-9 August fought off Savo Island during which three U.S. cruisers were lost. • BuShlps War Damage Report No. 25 -7- CONFIDENTIAL SECTION E BOMB DAMAGE BATTLE OF THE EASTERN SOLOMONS, 24 AUGUST 1942 I 250 KG. BOMB HIT, FRAME 174 3 250KG BOMB HIT, FRAME 127 2 250 KG . BOMB HIT, FRAME 179 4 NEAR·MISS 250KG. BOMB,FRAME l 93 PORT 1. Narrative El-1. Durtng the two weeks following the landings in the lower Solomons, the three carrin task groups operated to the southeast of Guadalcanal. On 23 August, WASP's task group was detached, leaving SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE in the area. The following day air contact was made with a large Japanese force of combatant ships. Planes from our carriers attacked this force at the same lime our carriers were being attacked by Japanese planes. A Japanese carrier, a destr oyer and a transport were sunk; go enemy planes were destroyed; a small carrier and a light cruiser were damaged. The Japanese rel!..red wilhoul a surface engage ment being joined. ENTERPRISE was the only U.S. vessel damaged. El-2. About 1112 on 24 August, ENTERPRISE underwent a heavy five-minute attack from more than 30 Japanese dive-bomber s during which she received three direct bomb hits and four near-misses. The first bomb struck about two minutes after the start of the attack piercing No.3 elevator at the flight deck and detonating 42 ieet below, between the second and third decks, close to the starboard side. It caused extensive, though not serious structural damage, mi.nor flooding, disablement of No.3 ele- vator and s~veral stubborn fires. Hali a minute later a second bomb struck the flight deck at frame 1'79, close to the starboard edge of the same elevator, detonating 8 feet below. The flight deck was deflected upward and a severe fire broke out as 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. pro- pellant powder were ignited. A third oomb, dropped a minute later, detonated on impact with the flight deck near the after starboard corner of No. 2 elevator, pulling the elevator out of commission and starting a small fire. Al 1 71 '7 a bomb detonated in the water about 12 feel off the port quarter, causing general flexural vibration of the ship and.permanent deformation of the hull and several decks, including the flight deck. Three other near-misses, which caused minor fragment damage, occurred during the attack. El-3. Despite the damage. ENTERPRISE commenced landing planes within an hour after the engagement. The following day, however, she proceeded to Pearl Harbor for repairs, escorted by PORTLAND (CA33) and four destroyers. - 8- CONFIDENTIAL 2. Damage and Damage Control Med.Sures - Structural E2-l. The first bomb, released from a 65° or 70° dive at an altitude of about 1500 feet, penetrated the forward starboard corner of No. 3 elevator at frame 174, 22 feet to starboard of the centerline. Leaving only a small hole, it continued down Lhrough the starboard bulkhead of the elevator well, Lhe inboard forward corner of Lhe GROUP lll gun gallery, Lhe hatchway on the flat below, the hangar deck at frame 172 and the second deck in D-203-1 LM to its point of detonation between thP ~econd and third decks in D-303-lL at frame 1'71, 12 feet from Lhe starboard side. Total Lhlckness of steel plating penetrated was 2 inches including 1/4 inch of STS and distance from point of impact to point of detonation was 42 feet (Photos E-1, E-2 e.nd E-3). E2- 2. The bomb detonated high order. Its blast tore large holes in the second and third decks, a 12-foot by 4-foot hole in the fourth deck, and a 6-foot by 2-!oot hole through the side plating (Photos E -4, E - 5 and E-6). The second dP.ck was bulged up 4 lo 12 inches over it.:; entire width between frames l5 7 and 173 and Lhe third deck was dished d ·wn more or less irregularly over the same area (Photos E-8 and E-9). The main deck was bulged up symmetrically between frames 157 and 1'73 between Lhe port and starboard boat pockets to a maximum height of 10 inches at frame 165. Stanchions between the main and second, and second and third decks were torn loose at their base but remained attached to the overhead (Photo E-9). The fourth deck was dished down in D-419-3A from the starboard shell to the inboard bulkhead. Transverse bulkheads 15 7 and 173 were only slightly distorted, except above the third deck immediately adjacent to the detonation where bulkhead l 73 was badly distorted and torn. The starboard bulkhead around hydraulic oil tank and elevator machinery trunk, D-523- T, was severely deflected and holed above the third deck (Photo E-7) and deflected between the third and fourlh decks. Watertight doors 2- 173-1, 3-157-1, 3-173-1 and 3-186-2 were blown open and wrecked. N€'arly all bunks and lockers in D- 203-lLM, D- 303-lL and D-305-L were demolished. The crew's washroom, D- 203- 2L, the car penter shop and the brig were wrecked. Numerous longitudinal~. frames and vertical stiffeners were severed, cracked or buckled. E2-3. Fragment damage was extensive. Stiffeners, cables, ducts and piping under the main deck above Lhe explosion were riddled, though only a few fragments per forated the deck itself (Photos E-4 and E-5). The second d\.!Ck was peppered with holes and the third and iourth decks were also penetrated. A few fragmr·nts pierced the shell plating in D-305-L, D-303-lL, D-419-3A and D-521-A (Photo E-6). Other frag ments passed through bulkhead 15 7 above the Lhird deck, through bulkhead 165 into D-417-A, and. through the starboard bulkhead of D-523- E. The maximum distance traveled by a fragment was 56 feel after which il pierced the 3/8-inch medium steel plate of bulkhead 157 above the third dec1c The maximum i.hickness of plating penetrated was the 5/8-inch m~ium steel shell plating below Lhe fourth deck, al a distance of 16 feet. E2-4. The second bomb, released al about the same height and angle as the first, pierced the flight deck at frame l 79 about 11 !eet from the starboard edge of that deck and close to the starboard edge of No. 3 elevator. Il traveled about 8 feet and detonated high order about 3 feet - - 9- - CONFIDENTIAL_ above lhe deck of Lne GROUP Ill gun galler y, shghlly for ward and outooar d of the point of impact (Photos E-11, E-12 and E - 13). E2-5. The blast tore a 12-fool by 6-foot hole in the adjacent starboard bulkhead of No. 3 elevator trunk and another ' about 18 feet by 8 feet in Lhe gallery deck (Photos E-15 and E-16). I nstruments on 5-inch guns Nos. 5 and 7 were wrecked and the guns r endered unsafe ior use. The ammu nilion hoist for No. 7 gun was torn loose and pushed inboard and the scuttle completely destroyed. The hoist for No. 5 gun was damaged and disabled. The splinter shield between the guns was Lorn loose al the bottom and bent aft (Photo E-14) and the sponson shield for No. 5 gun was blowu out. The ready service powder locker for gun No. 5 was demolished and blown in t)Oard and approximately 40 rounds of f>-inch propellant po:.vdPr were destroyed by burning. Although the r eady service locker for Uo 1 gun also was distorted, the powder in it did not ignite. Hatch and scuttle 02-174-1 were blown m and wrecked and the upper half of door 1-1'/4- l was blown of! an E2-6. Fr agment attack was less severe lha::i from lhe first hit. Fragments traveled downward through the deck of the gun gallery, the platform deck in the ready airplane issue room D - 103- A, the main deck in D-103-A and upward through lhe flight deck. The splinter shields anu guns Nos. 5 and 7 were peppered with small fragments and other frag rnents perforated the st'1rooard bulkhead of No. 3 elevator trunk and the starooard bulkhead of D-102, E. The maximum distance tr aveled by a fragment was about 50 feet after which it penetr ated l/4- inch medium steel plate. The maximum thickness of plating pier ced was that of the 3/4- inch STS main deck at a distance of about 19 feet. E2-7. The third bomb, released from a 60° dive at an altitude of about 1500 feet, struck the flight deck at frame 127, 28 feet to starboard of the centerline. close to I.be starboard after corner of No. 2 elevator and detonated instantly (Photo E-18). Por tions of lhe nose continued down through hatch cover 2-1H1 and trunk C- 408-lA as far as the iourth deck. E2-8. A hole approximately 10 feet in diameter was blown in the flight deck by the detonation (:Photos E-17 and E - 18) Blast knocked a high pressure torpedo charging ilask from its br acket on the hangar deck bulkhead, but did not damage it. The yielding element of No. 9 arresting gear was blown overboard. £2-9. Fragments cul or damaged the purchase cable sheave bracket, purchase cable, yielding element contr ol cable and barr ier cross-deck cable of No. 9 arresting gear and the purchase cables of Nos. 7 and 8 arresling gears. Fragments also pierced hatch cover 03 - 107, elements of No. 2 crane, U1e overhead of C-0211-A. the flight and hangar decks and one continued through the second deck. Although the bomb detonated almost against 3/4-inch STS plating protecting U1e ready torpedo and warhead stowage, no fragments penetrated. Yet the 3/4-inch STS after bulkhead of C- 0301 - M was pierced at a distance of ti8 feet. The maximwn distance traveled by a fragment was 113 feet after which it pierced 1/8-inch medium sleel plating. - 10- CONFIDENTIAL · E2-10. While the ship was heeled to starboard in a left turn, a bomb detonated abreast frame 193 about 12 feet from the ship's port side. lt had been released on the starboard quarter at a low angle of dive, about 50°, and at an altitude of about 1000 feet. The detonation caused general flexural vibration oi the ship of low frequency but of relativdy high amplitude. The Commanding Officer estimated that the slt::rn was llited oodily 2 or 3 feel. E2-11. 'fhe column of water thrown up by the detonation deformed the flight deck upward about 8 inches between frames HJ4-l/2 and 198 for l l feet inboard of the port waterway (Photo E-20). Four of the fi!gh~ deck longitudinals were bent and two broken, planking in Lhe area was split and shredded and a oO-man life raft secured at lhe gallery level on the port side was completely demolished. The force of the detonation dished in the hull between frames 188 and 196 from the first platform to the main deck (Photo E-19). The hangar deck was bulged upward slightly over a radius of 5 fer:>l al frame 192 port, the second deck was buckled upward about 2 inches between frames 192 and 193-1/2 for about 3 feel inboard )i the shell, third deck plating was wrinkled throughout the after CPO washrovm and fourth deck plating was wrinkled 10 feet inboard of lhe shell. Bulkheads 190-1/2 and 192 were wrinkled 5 feet inboard. Below the fourth deck, in the void spaces, floors w~re buckled from the stern to as far forward as frame 188 and frames 189 through 195 were variously bent or broken. E2-12. Two other confirmed near-miss bombs which detonated abreast frames /0 and 100 on the port side caused minor fragment damage on the pQrt side between frames /8 and 93. E2-13. The structural damage caused by the hits and near-misses did not seriously reduce the streng'.h oi the ship girder, but impeded operations. The large hole in the flight deck resulting from the detona tion of the third bomb was rapidly covered with two 6-foot by 9-foot, 3/8-inch plates which were secured to the wood deck around the hole by 60 penny nails, previously cut short to a length of 2-1/2 inches. Nail holes had previously been drilled in the plate edges at 6-inch intervals. An identical plate was used to cover lhe hole in No. 3 elevator. Pieces of 1/8-inch plate 2'1 inches by 12 inches or 18 Inches square were secured in a similar manner over small fragnient holes. These repairs were evidemly effective, ior, within an hour, plane.3 were landlng on the t.ieck. E2-14. Wooden shores were fitted to support the main and second decks In way of ruptured stanchions, but vibrations at high speeds loosened the shores, so the stanchions were partially re-established by welding pai.ches over the holes torn in the deck and four short lengths of 3-inch by 3-inch by 3/8-inch angle to each stanchion and to the patched deck (Photo E-9). ::>eek longitudinals broken at their con nections lo deck beams were temporarily strengthened by welding short sections of 2-1/2-inch by 2-1/2-inch angle to the beam, the longitudinal and the overhead. Where the deck had been pulled away arowid sounding tubes, split cotlars were filled and welded to the deck and pipe. -11- - CONFIDENTIAL 3. Damage and Damage Contr ol Measures - Piping, Machiner y and Eleclrlcal t was E3-l. The principal machiner y damage caused by the fir st hi dlsablemenl of machinery of No. 3 elevator which put the elevator out of commission. Bolh lhe low and lhe high pressure accumulator tanks were forced away from the starboard bulkhead rn D-023-E, the oil storage lank was crushed and the bottom blown -.>ut, and mot:>rs were submerged in oil and sail water . Thts was a serious casualty, its repair beyond the capacity of lhe ship's fo rce. However, since the el"vator was al the flight deck level, night operations were able to continue. E3-2. Ammw1it1on hoist motor No. 8 in D-203-lLM was knocked from ils mourning and hoists tn D- 203-lL and D-303-lLM were bent and inoperable. Ventilation blowers 2-158-1, 2- 158- 2, 2- 1'70, 2-116-1 and 4-1 73-4 were wrecked and ventilallvn ducts in the damaged spaces was rendered useless. The aftermost riser of the firemain al frame 1 73 ruptured in several places, but with the firemain split into iour sections, each with lts own pump, this casualty was easily isolated. The starboard riser for the hangar deck water curtain in bay No. 4, frame 1 73, was the ruptured eight feel above the main deck and damage control mains in damaged compartments were rup.tured or carried away. Numerous lighting cables wete cul in the damaged zpaces. E3-3. 'l'he second bomb completed the disablement of No. 3 elevator. the elevator Fragmants goug1 d 'L·1d burred tne main plungers. destroyed platform lock. Cd.rri1>d away all electrical laads and extensively damaged thu t11ght d ·k safety rail and its starboard control shaft. £3-4. AH power wiring, firt: control wiring, LC. wirmg and lighting and in GROUP III gtin gallery were completely destroyed. The motor solenoid for controlling closure of the vent cover on the steering engine nom exhaust duct were dem)lished. Machiner y in the aviation sheet ruetal shop was damaged. E3-f> An hour and a half after the second bomb hit and as a secondary re:mlt Ll ereof, the casualty occurred which. from an operational stand was p int, was the most serious of the whole engagement. ENTERPRISE retiring south frorn the battle with the rest of the task force at 24 knots iur cliouu.g again almost normally ar.d landing aircraft when, suddenly, the> rudder wem hard left, thPn hard rtght and finally stopped at 20° right. Watsr anti foamile used to fight the fire caused oy the second frDm the oomb had co1lech.:d 1r1 the exhaust vent trw1k leading directly tw...> steering motor caJirtgs in steering motor anti control room (D-524-E) level 01 the to the gw1 gallery. This trunk, holed by the first bomb at the ex gun gallery, had been closed 0!1 immediately at its lower ~nd and the haust fan secured when smoke and water passed dowu the duct. Supply olower 4-173-4 had been disabled by the first hit, cuaing off the supply of air lo the space;;; so, conditions became almost wibear&.ble and foe persounel. When tne ventilation system was reopened, water foau1itr-> pouroo from the exhaust duct, flooded the starboard steering motor and its control panel and slopped the motor. Exhausted oy heat -12- CONFIDENTIAL and smoke, personnel on watch could not shift to lht: wid E3-6. The third bomu C1isaoled No. 2 elevalor leaving only No. 1 elevator aole lo handle aircraft. The platform lock control shaft, including the bevel gears. was carried away for auout lf> feet along the starboard after side of the transverse hatch g.rder, the flight deck safely rail and tw6 stanchions were oadly damaged, hydraultc and air lmes to the main elevator platform lock power unil were ruptured or crushed, and elevator control caoles ano electrical leads to tne after safety rail control motor were carried away. Both ele"'.aLOr plungers were scored and burred by iragmenls, the largest score being 1-1/2 inches long by 3/32 inches deep in the forward plunger. 'I'he adj~cent torpedo elevator was also rendered inoperable. Repair of this damage was beyo!'ld the capacity of the ship's for<.;e. E3-7. The near-miss on the porl quarter caused consid~rable leakage through the stern luoe glands of Nos. 2 ana 3 shaits. Two blades of No. 2 propeller and all three blade~; of No. 3 propeller had edges curled aft by the delonation. Degaussing cable "Q" and "M" coils, fitted externally on the sheer straKe, were lorn loose fr.1m their sup p:>rls for a length of 30 feet on the port quarter, out were not broken. E3-8. Fragments from the other near-misses pWlctured the "M" and "F" degaussing coils in numerous places in way of frame 80 port and starboard, pierced sections of the gasoline line at hangar and flight deck levels between frames 80 and lOo port, and carried away the aux iliary radio antenna on the port side at frame 80. 4. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures E4-1. The shell was opened in way of the waterline oy ~he d.etonalion and fragments from the first bomb hit. As a result, D-f>21-A was completely flooded and D-419- 3A partially flooded. A small hole in the forward bulkhead of D-419-3A permitted D-41'7-A to flood lo a di:pth of about one foot on the starboard side. The addi"tion of this water caused a list of approximately 3° to starboard. Trim aft was increased by 11 inches. The increase of mean draft was negligible. Drafts: Forward Afl Before damage: 24 feet 0 inches 27 feet 8 inches After damage: 23 feet 'l inches 28 feet 2 inches These drafts do not quite check with lhe ship's estimate of 245 tons of flooding ·nater, but may have been incorrectly read. - 13- - CUNPIDENTlAL E4-2. Mea.mres were taken immediately to remove lhe h t by pumping out r1pproximalely 10,000 gallons (38 Lon ... ) of sea water from each of the following staruoard tanks: B-15-F1 B-21-F and B-27-F; aud flooding the following port tanks "Nlth 10,000 gallons each: B-16-V. B-22-V ru1d B-28-V. Spaces aljacPnt D-52i-3A were founo to be ligut so Lhe outboard bulkheads of D-~20-A and IJ-523- E were shored. Floodiug through the holes in D-521-A and D-419-A was stoppeo by construcung a cofferdam betwi>en fram s 169 and 173, from the third dee;}: down to the shell. The coff rdam was constructed oi 2-inch by 6-lnch plarll':tng set vert"cally into sl ls formed bet·Neen 3-incu by 6-lnch tJy 18-foot planks laid on tne third ano fourth decKs (Plate 111). Wire me!::'h was laid over the .1.arge hole and mattresses, ulankets ar.d pillows were packed down oetween the shell and lhe cofferdam, which was th8n wedged outboard, forcing lhe packing materials light against the hull (Photo E-t>}. Flooding through a smaller hole, about 12 inches oy 18 inches. just uelow the large hole, was stoppea with an 18-inch wooden plug cut to shape. Smaller wooden plugs were forced into U1e little fragment holes. Altnough a speed of 25 knots and many course changes made construcuon very diiiicult, tne cofferJarn was compbted in dghteen hour.:;. Air-driven sub:mersiole pumps were used for initial pumping oown of the flooded compar~mems and electric submer.;ible pumps were add·~ later. It took iive pumps about six hours to dewater U1e two spac;es oecause debris c::>r.tinually dogged the stratntirs. After the compartmen~s were pumped down, only one suomersible pump ruri!ltng ten nun:.1.tes an hour was required to take car of the seepage through the c;oiferdam into D- 521-A. 5. Fire and Firefighting E5-1. The first bomb started a smoldering fire in pr:iteclive cloth- ing and gas masks rn GROUP III 5-inch gun gallery as it passed through. This fire was absorbed in ~he gener al conflagration on the gallery deck which result~ from the second hil. E5-2. Detonation and ir.igments from the first bomb started a serious Class A fire in oeduing and personal effects in living com partments D- 203-lLM, D-303-lL and D-305- L. Dense smoke com plet• ly filled U1ese compartments. Ther e was little paint on bulkheaas and overheads to support lhe conflagration. E5-3. Dense smoke, wreckage and damage to the firemain hindered firefighting personnel. The ventllation supply sy.3tem was started in the w1damaged area forward on the second and third decks, portable ventilation sets were set up and doors and hatches were opened to lhc hangar oeck in an effort to clear the smoke and give access to the firt>fighters. Gas masks were found to give r elief from the smoke for short periods. At :ft rsl, firemain valves 5- lti0-5 and 5- 125-3 were closed t.J segregatl) the aamagea section, but when the damage was found to be in the ris"'r aft of frame 100, valve 5-125-3 was opened. Before the damaged main was segregated, water pouring from the r is •r helped to extinguish the hottest fire in D-303-lL near th-.. point of detonation. Dam age control valve /-12\J was closed to prevent flooding irom broken damage control mains and risers, but was reopened and valve 6- 143-5 closed when dam ige was found to oe confined to lhe starboard side. The fire was urvught under control in an hour. - 14- CONFIDENT LAL Efi-4. Detonation of the second bomb in lhe gun gallery caused the immediate ignition of about 40 rounds of 5-inch 38 cal. ready service powder. Heavy weather and protective clothing, gas masks, rubber matting on lhe deck and painl on lhe guns conlrlbuled additional combustible material. Slnce all personnel in lhe gun gallery were killed, lhe fire was fought by repair parties from the flight deck (Photo E-11). Water, foam and co2 were used to bring this fire under control in about 40 minutes. As soon as condilions permilled, all remaining powder and projectiles from the gallery were jettisoned. The Hre spread from lhe blasted gun gallery to airplane accessories, flight clvlhing, rubber lungs, etc. in airplane issue room D-103-A immediately below. This fire smoldered and broke out periodically for eight hours. ln D-103-E minor fires occurred and were quickly extinguished among rubber hose, bedding, el ec lrl c cables, in lhe paint on the overhead and in some small pieces of wood ln lhe port forward corner of the elevator pit. E5-5. A small fire, which was extinguished by water and C02, was igmled in the port after corner of C-0211-A by fragments from the third bomb detonation. 6. Japanese Bombs £6-1. The Commanding Officer estimated the hits to be from bombs as follows: Weight Impact in Diam- to Delo- Fragments --Pounds eter Kind nation Detonation Recovered Smoke 1st Hit 1000 12 In. AP 42 Ft. High Order 1 In. Yellowish 2nd Hit 500 12 In. GP 8 Ft. High Order 1 In. Not Noxious 3rJllit 500 ? ? 0 Low Order 10 In. White Nose Near-Miss on Port Quar- ter 500-1000 ? ? ? High Order None None E6-2. The holes left by the first bomb as it passed through the ele vator and main deck indicate that the diameter was approximately 12 inches (Photos E-1 and E-2). Therefore, this bomb was probably a 250 Kg Type 99, No. 25 Ordinary bomb (U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School designation 250 Kg SAP) which corresponds approximately in size and charge ·.veight with the U.S. 500-pound GP bomb. The extent oi tlarr.age was consistent wilh the amount of explosive carried in a 250 Kg i.Jomb ana fragmentation was exceptionally g')od. E6-3. From the small amow1l of evidence available, it is estimated that the second hit and the severe near-miss under the port quarter were also 250 Kg Ordinary bombs. The second bomb detonated in an unconfined space·which would account for lhe lesser damage as compared with that of thP first bomb. -15- CON FID EN1'IAL Eo-4. The comparatively light damage and the recovery of large fragments, some 10 inches in diameter, and segments of the nose of the third bomb indicate that it detonated low order. ll, too, was prooably a 250 Kg Ordinary bomb. 'T. Conclusion E7 -1. The campaign to scrape all paint from bulkheads, overheads and decks inside the ship, which was almost completed in the section affected by the first hit, reduced the extent of lhe fires. Dispersal of repair party personnel and equipment and tletailing special fireiighters to to operal•3 co2 systems in paint, alcohol and pyrotechnic lockers led prompt action in combatting fires and repairing damage. The skill shown by personnel of ENTERPRISE in coping with serious damage and controlling fires and flooding alLests to lhe serious attention given to careful preparation of equipment, to study of war damage to LEXINGTON• and Y 0RKTOWN** and the r ecommendations of the special Damage Con trol Biard of Inspection made in December 1941 and to regular damage con~rol drills. * BuShips War Damage Report No. lo .+ BuShips War Damage Report No. 23 -lo- CONFIDEi,TTIAL Fl.'.Jt) E-1: First h.t. f:Dmb t!ntry h.ile c:.t f:)l'.V rihoto E-2: First nil. Path .v PhOt) E-Z: Fir$t hit. LJ)t\!lf aft and up•.vard f1"Jrt. c mpa1·tm·ml D- 203-lLJ-.: Lhr i.... gh 1 Jml f.Ja.-;::;al!, ltOlP ln !11~if! ;:h r;k tJ 0 )lY1D pa..:;sar,: 0 hol Ul t: ulr:t.-:.id l 73 L.t:.tW•:::"' .. thG r.;nin and gall»r:1 dt:cr:~. , I ( ; • < • .,.. ' ' '\ Photo E-4: F~rst hit. Boml.l h:>le in .Jecon.d dl:ck, e;:nn p~rvn"'n: D- 2'"J3 - 1LM. Nr..-te fn1.g.m~m h0les. C ONFID ENTlAL Ph0to E-5: First hit. Compartment D-419-A, starboarJ ail r ·urn...!r looking Jutooard. Note oomb h.Jle in third aeck a.nd sh.:>ring and mattresses us:;d to sup lea.k ln shell just beleiw the fourth ueck. Photo E -6: First hil. Hole lllown in shell just bebw fouru1 decK showi.!:g wire mesh a:10 mattr _sses usP.Ci lo stop rapid influx of water. C0NFDE1ITLA L .1:-'hol' r- : F.r-l 1,it . .;,,1•Ja.rtr-1P.!.· !:-31,,:3-,_L ln1du1:r ait :tu,v.1w ;3Lart.nar1 ou ..KLntd jf N ).~-! • l \.. •t r r.un i:-- r ~m ,!J-fr.:J-I 11 >t..• J .r. u f Jrt. t11.n1 iJ ct. 01.lhtJU '.I \1m 1.:. l .;.->c Jnd tt:ck at.·n··l -4 . .1: h.)t() E-b: .First hit. C ... rr.partn1~1.t !J-30:3-1.:... l.> >t:ing for ~·ard 5fi.J'l!.:tg dt...ih·cti ~n oi u •. r.1 ctecr;:. CONFIDEN'I'IAL P11 )to E-:J: First hil. View of port aiter c0rner Jf D-303- lL. il.'.>le oulg~ in overhead anci t ... mporary angles welde PMlo E-10: Fil·st hit. View forward acrDss No. 3 elevator pit showing bulge in main deck. CONFIDENTIAL Photo E-11: Second hn. Flghling fire in the Group Ill gWl gallery. I Photo E-12: Second hit. Group lII gun gallery showing oulge in :flight rl.ecr: above gWls caused by bomb explosion aad amrnw1ition olttst. Photo E-13: S"'-c:mc. hit. Emranc!:: hole in fli;;::-ht dPck maJe by bomo. Photo E- 14: Second hil. Damage lo STS shield between Nos. 5 and 7 guns. CJNF!liEt!TIAL Ph 't.> E-15: ..>econd hit. View of fl-inch ur.Jup 11! gun gaLery lookine; for .vard sho·;.•ing damagt in gallery decK and inboard oul.khead by explo.3ior. Jf bomo and burning of b- inch reauy-servlce ammunition. Ph::>to E- 10: Second hit. Looking outboard from No. 3 elevator t r unk through hole blown in mooar d bulkhead of Group III gun gallery by explosion oi bornb and bur mng oi 5-inch r ~ady - service ammun1tion. CONFIDENTIAL Photo E-17: Tnird hit. View of flight deck s:1owing bomb hole near after starooard cornei: oi No. 2 elevaLOr. Photo E-18: Third hit. Close-up of bomb hole in flight deck. CONFIDENTIAL Phot::i E-19: Near-miss. View of CJlUiter sh0·.ving near rni:-is damagf'. IJote near rupture of snell in way ::if third deck and degaussing caole clips sheared ~Mm snell. Photo E-20: Near-miss. Damage to extr eme after por t corner of flight deck caused oy water column frum the near-miss. CONFIDENTIAL SECTION F BOMB DAMAGE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ, 2o OCTOBER 1942 \ 3 \ 1 I 250 KG BOMB HIT, FRAME 4 3 NEAR - MISS 250KG BOMB , FRAME 129 12 STIO 1 2 2 5 O K G B O M 8 H I T , F R A M E 4 4 12 E4 A NR • M I SS B2 5 0 K G 0 M 8 , F R A M E 3 0 S T B 0 . l. Narrative After leaving the Solomons on 25 August, ENTERPRISE pro :eded via Tongatabu to Pearl Harbor, docking immediately upon her ~·rival on 10 Seplember. Shl was undocked three days later and J!pairs were completed by 7 Octooer. Besides baltle damage repairs, ~>me outstandlng ShipAlts including installation of twelve additional JJmm guns, replacement of four 1.1-inch mow1ts with four 40mm quad uple mounts and installation of a search radar were accomplished. Jl - 2. I:>amage to SARATOGA on 31 August and loss of WASP on f1 September, both from submarinE: tor pedoes, had reduced the number carriers available in the South Pacific to one- -HORNET (CVS). l:ter hastily repleni~hing her st:>res and training a new flight group, lNTERPRlSE departed Pearl Haroor for the South Pacific with her •;cort plus the new battleship SOUTH DAKOTA on 16 October. On : October she joined HORNET's task force northwest of the New ¥brides Islands. U-3. In the meantime, despite the victory of the Battle of Cape :;perance on the night of 11-12 October, the support for U.S. lr-:iops 1 Guadalcanal was not proceeding well. The Japanese w+=>re preparing large-scale land and sea offensive to drive the Americans out of the lomons with a force whlch included four carr iers, four ballleships, me c ruisers and a large number of smaller ships. The US. task free ready to repel them was barely half as large, with only two r rlers, one batlleshlp, six cruisers and fourteen destroyers. Air reconnaissance made initial contact with elements of the panese force about noon, 25 October. The Battle of Santa Cruz took )ace tht! following day without contact being made al any time between 1r face ships of the opposing forces. During the cour se of the battle, anes from the Japanese carriers made al least eight separ ate attacks l lhe U.S. ships, damaging both carriers, the battleship, one light ·uiser and lwo destr.:iyers, at a cost of about 100 planes. HORNET 1d PORTER (DD356) were so extensively daUlaged that they were >andoned and sunk by our own force. ENTERPRISE was damaged 1 two uomb hits and two near- misses. Three waves of aircraft om HORNE'r and ENTERPRISE SUCCt-!eded in damaging twu of the panese carriers, a heavy crui:;er and two destroyers, with lhe loss - - 17- C 1.)NFID ENTIA L of /'1 planes, 20 of lhem in combat. Although lhe cost.y Baltle of Santa Cruz appeared of dubious value to our cause, aircraft losses and damage inflicted on the enemy'~ carriers prevented him from providing effeclive air cover in the decisive Battle of Guadalcanal, 11-15 Novemoer 1942. Fl-5. Between 1115 and 1120 on 26 Oct~ber. ENTERPRISE ·nas attacked by 24 dive bombers which succeeded in making two direct hits and two damaging near-misses. The first bourn slruck the fltght deck at frame 4, port sld-=, passed down and out through the ship's side and detonated tn the air ofi thP port bow. ll produced hF>avy fragment damage and started two small fires. The se(;ond bomb struck at frame 44-1/2 on the por~ side of the flight deck and broke up below, part detonating on the hangar deck and part on U.e third deck in the forward repair party station. It caused blast damago in second and third deck living spaces, disablement of the forward elevator and two smal1 fires. A near-miss bomb detonated aoout 8 feel below the waterline, 10 feel from the starboard side at frame 12!1-l/2, deflecting the shell plating below the armor, flooding three fuel tanks and causing shock damage lo No. 2 H.P. turbine casing. Twenty minutes later, 25 torpedo bombers were driven off. At 1221, some 20 dive bombers attacked scoring a second near-miss with a bomb which detonated approximately 11 feet below the waterline and 8 feel outooard of the starboard shell opposite frame 30-1/2. The shell plating was dis torted, several tanks were floodeu and the pump and motor for No. 1 elevator were disabled by shock. At 1232, a fourlh group of 15 dive bombers was repulsed without damage to ENTERPRISE. Fl-o. Despite the crippling damage to No. 1 elevator, ENTERPRISE continut..-' 2. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Structural F2-L The first oorub, released by a dive bomber at an angle of 45° and a height of about 1500 feet, pierced the flight deck at frame 4, 9 iect to porl oi the centerline (Photo F-1), passed through the trans verse bent at frame 3, tumbl..:Ki down through the forecastle deck just inboard of the port bitts about 2 feet forward of the forward perpendicu lar (Photo F-2) and exited 2 feet farther forward through the port shell above the main deck, tearing two of the externally-filled degaussing c·1bles (PholO F-3 ). F2-2. This bomb detonated high order about 20 feet below the forecastle deck, close to the port bow. Blast effect on U1e ship was negligible, but the fragment attack was heavy. About 160 fragment holes were made, varying in diameter from 1/4 inch to 12 inches, the majority oeing small. Fragments periorated the ship's side in A-1-W, A-101-A and A-201-A, some continuing out through the star board side (Photo F-4). Other fragments traveled upward through the port edge of the forecastle deck, the splinter shield of the 1.1-inch director anrl the flight deck. The maximum distance traveled by a -18- - CONFIDENTIAL fragment was about 50 feet after which it pierced Lhe 1/4-inch flight deck 1 plating; the maximum thickness of plating penetrated was the 3/4-inch medium steel stem plate in way of the second deck at a distance of 10 feet. F2-3. The second bomb, released from approximately 1500 feet in a 45° div~. pierced the flight deck at frame 44-1/2, 6 feet to port of the centerline, leaving a 14-incb diameter hole, struck the lower flange of the transverse bent at frame 43 and broke in two (Photo F-5). The conical tail section sheared away from the cylindrical body and hit the hangar deck 3 feet lo starboard of the centerline at frame 39, tearing a 14-inch by 16-inch bole, and detonated (Photo F-6). The nose and body section pierced the hangar deck on the centerline at frame 40-1/2, making a hole about 14 inches by 37-1/2 inches and passed through batch 2-39 in A-208-lL (Photo F-7) down to hatch 3- 39 at the Repair II Station in compartment A-306-L where it detonated (Photo F-8). F2-4. The detonation of the main portion of the bomb caused exten- sive blast damage on the third deck in A-306-L, A-307-lL, A-307-2L and A-308-lLM (Photo F-9) and on lhe second deck in A-208-lL, A-208-2M, A-208-3M and A-208-7L. Above the third deck,bulkhead 38 was deflected forward and bulkhead 43 aft. Watertight doors 3-43-2 and 3-54-2, open during the attack, were damaged and watertight door 3-43-1, which was closed, was blown off and wrecked. The third deck in A-306-L was wrinkled. The second deck was deflected upward unevenly a distance of 2 to 5 inches above A-306-L and A- 307-lL, pulling up stanchions and tearing boles in the third deck. Bulkhead 38 above the second deck was distorted and both doors in it were wrecked. The hangar deck was deflected upward symmetrically between frames 37 and 54 to a maximum of 14 inches at frame 42 on the centerline (Photo F-10) except in way of the lop of gasoline trunk A-513-T where it remained undeformed. Trunk A- 513-T was not damaged. Hatch 3- 39 to magazine trunk A-409-T was demolished and watertight hatch 3-42 was distorted. The staterooms and Repair II locker in A-306-L were demolished. Officers' washroom A-307-2L and all staterooms in A-307-lL were wrecked. Blast effect in A-308-lLM was confined to the port side, partially wrecking the warrant officers' messroom and slightly damaging the staterooms. Blast damage on the second deck between frames 38 and 54 may have resulted from bolh detonallons. All staterooms in A-208- lL and baths A-208-4L and A-208-f>L were demolished. The lightly constructed bulkheads of ammunition handling rooms A-208-2M and A-208-3M and their d ..>0rs 2-41-3 and 2-41-2 were demolished. Officers' washroom A-208-7L was parlially wrecked. On the main deck, lhe sllding door to the bomb ele vator at frame 7~ was blown off and hatch 1-39 was wrecked. F2-5. Fragments traveled downward from the point of detonaUon of the nose and oody of the bomb through the deck of A-306-L and hatch 3-39. Hatch 4-39 was pierced at the edge by a fragment, destroying the watertight integrity. Fragments flew sideward in all directions, but none penetrated upward through the second deck. Fragments from the tail section penetrated downward through the second deck, sideward through the starboard bulkhead of No. 1 elevator trunk slightly gouging and burring the elevator plungers, and through doors 1-39-1 and 2. Other fragments traveled upward and through the flight deck and No. l ele vator. The greatest thickness pierced by fragments from the main porUon of the bomb wa::t 1/" -inch STS, 9 feet distant. Fragments from the tail passed through 1/4-inch medium steel plate at a distance of 40 feet. -19- CO.'.'IFIDENTlAL F2-6. The first damaging near-miss occurred when a bomb detonated about 8 feet below the waterline, 10 !eet outboard of the starboard snell opposite frame 12g-l/2. SJ:.:ir.k to the ship was moderate and a general flexural vibration of low ir~quency occurred oi an amplitude estimated by lhe Commanding Offlcer a.; 1-1/2 feet. F2-7. The shell was opened by rivet iailure along the seam between "G" and "H" st rakes between frames 124 and 129 and also at the upper seam of "H" strake between frames 131 and 134 (Photo F - 11). Tanks D-3-F, D-13-F and C-35-F were opened to lhe sea. Plating was do::flected inward generally over an area aoout 48 feet oy 17 feet between frames 123 and 135, from the upper edge o! lhe armor oelt at the fourlh deck almost to the r1ilge keel. Maximum deformalio:i was about 18 inches al lhe lower edge of "H" strake. Evidently the lap seam between "G" and "H" strakes pro vided local discontinuity of stru<;Lure. as the plating was bent very sharply lnwarJ Just above the seam (Photo F - 11 ). All structural members behind the deflected plating were buckled between frames 124 and 135 (Photos F-12 and F-15). The armor was sprung in a maximum of 10 inches and helo by the l>ent plating behind. No. 2 torpedo bulkhead immediately iuboard and the iourU1 deck were not damaged. Bulkhead 123 was not distorted, l>ut bulkhead 130 was badly buckled {Photos F-13 and F - 14) and torn at the face plate oi the longitudinal stringer behind the lower edge of lhe armor belt. Bulkhead 134 also was slightly buckled bul not torn (Photo F-lti). There was no penetration of structure by fragments. F2~. During the third attack of the day, ENTERPRISE was heeled to port in a hard right turn when lhe second damaging near-miss, a oomo released from a Japanes0 plane ma 45° dive. glanced oi! the s:arooard side al the waterline, frame 30. It delonated about 1 / ieet below tae waterliue and 8 feet outboard of the starboard snell opposite frame 30-1/ 2. Shock was moderate. causing a general flexural vibration of low frequency with an eslimated amplitude of one foot. F2-9. The shell plating was deflected inward over a rougnly ellipitcal area about 48 feel tly 25 feet, between frames 23 and 35, from tr1e first platform level to the keel. The maximum indentation was about 2-~/2 feet, at frame 30-1/2, above and oelow the lower l')ugilud\r,al belnnd "F'' strake (Photos F-1 7 ana F -18). Four small cracks (c1rcled in Photo F-18} were torn m the snt"l1 by the buckling oi frames and longitudinals which pulled a.vay from the plating. 0:1e crack occurred at the juncture of bulklwad 2~1 ana waterlighl longitudinal 2-1/2, openinr; up adjoining c mparlruents, A-G-W, A-7-V, A-11-V and A-901-V. The largest crack was tJ inches by 1 inch at the juncture of tanks A-901-V and A-l>V. All frames, floors and bulkheads in way oi deflected plating were bent or buckled (Photos F-19 and F-23) and frames 30, 31 and 34 were oroken. The 4-inch ST.3 bulkheau at frame 3f> held rigid aud no distortion occurred ait of it. BulkhPad 29 was carried away above long!tutlinal .-1/2 mtert;ounectlng tanks A-7-V and A-11-V and a weld cracked below 10ngiluninal 2-1/2 inter.:onnecting tanks A-6-W a~d A-901-W. Bulkhrad 2o b&tween A-o-W and A-fJ- W was buckied and forced away from the shell, making a 3-inch by 1/32-incl: opening. Bulkhead 18 was bulged forwarj openin~ two small leaks near lht' keel between A-3-A am1 A-•1-W. Inner oottom plating, extending to the fourth deck was bulgea inboard in spaces A-9-E ana A-6-W from frame 34 lo bulkhead 2o (Photo F - 24) with ii maxi mum deflection of l 5 inches at a pJint just below .1ongitudinal 2-l/2 at frame 31. -20- CONFIDENTIAL F2-10. The weakened structure showed signs of panting with the shtp underway; so temporary shoring was installed in A-fi05-A to strengthen the fir~t platform over A-9-E and A-6-W and the inboard bulkheads oI A-/-V and A-11-V. There was no penetration of structure by fragments. F2-11. Several other bombs detonated close enough lo the ship ~o throw geysers of water Oii the side. The only damage noted, however, was a pattern of small fragment holes in the hangar curtain at frame 102 on the port side, probably resulting irom a near-miss oif frame 95. 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical F3-1. The "M" amd "F" liJops of the degaussing cables externally fitted on the porl bow were cut by the first hit as it passed out through the shell and by fragments. About 20 lightmg cables located on the iorecastle forward of frame 9 were also cut by fragments. No. 2 radio direction finder loop on the port catwalk fon1ard was knocked ovPr the side and the receiver and power pack were wrenched loose from the bulkhead of i.he uirection finder room. F3-2. As a result of the second hit, firemain risers were carried away at frame 40, port and starboard, in A-208-lL and on the port side in A-306-L. The maln had been segregated at frame 111 port and star board prior lo the action, creating 4 separate sections. Ventilation blower 2-43 was damaged, its control panel destroyed and motor shait bent and all ventilation ducts in the olasted areas were demolished. F:-3-3. There were about 30 gouges und burrs on lhe main elevator plungers, the largest being about 1 mch long, 1/2 inch wide and 1/16 inch deep in the starboard plunger. The starboard pitch and roll guide and gear rack were also slightly gouged. F3-4. Remote control and telephone caoles for GROUP I 5-inch ballery, all power, lightlng, iire control and I.C. cables in A- 208-lL and A-306- L and many cables ln A- 307-lL and 308-L were cut. Con trollers for two sprinkling valves were damaged, several power panels destroyed and two ammunition hoist motors were torn loose from their foundations In A-208- lL. The flooding and sprinkling remote control station l.n A-306-L and auxiliary Batlle Dressing Station ll were destroyed. Vacuum tubes were shattered and leads broken by shock in all trans milters in Radio U (A-0201-C). F3-5. The most serious damage from the shock of the first near-miss bomb detonation was a crac~ which occurred ln i.he after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turoine. The pedestal was cast iron and formed an integral part of the aiter lower section of the turbine casing. The crack extended fore and afl on the inboard side, just abov~ the fillet to the lower ilange of the pedestal. F3-6. The cracked pedestal was repaired temporarily by securing an angle suppor~, built up of a 1-inch plat~ vertical leg, 1-1/4-inch plale -21- CONFIDENTLAL horiz,:mtal leg and 1-1/ 4-rnch plate gussets to the ioJt and vertic~: weub of the pedeslal wnich were ground to make a neat fit. The horizontal l r oi lhe angle support was secured by e;dra long 09lls pal"o;,ing through the foot of the pedestal, and the vertical leg of U1e angle was secured to the webb of thi: pedestal by eight body-bound bolls and one cap screw. F3-7. ln additi )11 to the crackiaa pedestal and also as a result of to shock of the first near-miss, the forward and after gyros spilled a small quantity of mercury. lhe ioremasl was rotated in its socket throwing lhe SG radar wave gULde out of alignment, the YE homing antenna drive shaft was disableu, an overboard flushing line was cracked at frame 130 in C-409~ L and fourteen fuel oil tank level gauges were broken. F3-8. Shock of lhe second uear-miss threw No. l elevator pump and molor off their fotmdation in A-9-E and bent the drive shaft. This, togeUter with damage from lhe second hit, effectively disabled the elevator. In addili:m, some lengths of high pressure hydraulic piping were distorted and ruptured. the secondary drain pump in A-9-E was lhrown off its foundation and brok"'n and overb0ard piping 4.. Flooding and Flooding Control Measures F4-l. Peak lank A-1-W was flooded by seas coming in through frag- ment holes from lhe first bomb hit in way of and above ll'!e waterhne. No att.e.mpl was made to cunlrol this flooding until ENTERPRISE returned to port. The tank was then pumped out with submersible pumps and the holes were patched. F4-2. Flooding alter the second hit came from the broken iiremains i.n A-208-lL and A-306-L. Firemain valves 5-56-2 and 5-5'7-5 were dosed to stop flooding from ruptured risers al frame 40 after it was found tbat remote controls for root valves ln Lhe risers were inoperable and the valves were inaccessible because of 6 feet oi flood water in A-406-A. A-410-A and A-412-A were flooded to a depth of two feet fr·om A-307-lL through .hoies in the lhird deck opened by the pulling up :)f stanchions. A small amount of waler ran down venlilation duct outlets, located just above the second deck, into magazines A-509-M, A-510-M, A-514-M, A-520-M, A-521-M, A-524-M, A-601-M, A-602-M. A-704-M and A-705-M. Some water also leaked lhrough lhe fragm~nt hole in hatch 4-39 into magazine trunk A- 508- T. F4-3. The four rows '.:>f wing tanks in way of lhe first near- miss were generally empty exCPpt for tanks in lhe second row between torpedo bulkheads 2 and 3, which were about three-quarters full of fuel oil. Three outboard lanks, C-35-F, D-3-F, and D-13-F, were holed by the detonati.)n and flooded lo the waterline. C-35-F and D-3-F flooded immediately. D-13-F flooded more slowly, at about 3000 gallons per hvur, and was controlled. with pumps. A list of 2-1/2° lo starboard resulted from the flooding. -22- CONFIDENTIAL F4-4. Tank relief valves in compartments C-409-L and D-401-L above the flooded tanks were gagged to prevenl progressive flooding. The list was removed by partially counterflooding six diagonally opposite fon1ard tanks, A-48-F. A-54-F, B-14-F, B-10-F, B-22-F and B-28-F. Although no explanation was given for not completely flooding two or three of U1ese tanks, il is possible they were already partially full. F4-5. Compartment A-'7-V flooded completely and compartments A-11-V and A-901-V flooded to a depth oi 19 feet in about 1-1/2 hour.> through small cracks in the hull opened by the second near-miss. A-9-E flooded to the fourth deck through ruptured drainage piping and through the overflow piµes from fresh water tanks, A-4-W, A-5-W and A-6-W. Very slow flooding occurred in these U1ree tanks through cracked plating and bulkheads. A-3-A also flood.ea to a depth of almost six ieet. F4-6. The slow flooding resulting from the second near-miss could not be controlled by the ship's pumps because the drainage pump in A-9-E was disabled and subsequently submerged and severed power leads ln the vicinity of frame 3!'>, cut by the second bomb hit, prevented the 1,;.se of electric submersib!e pumps until casualty power leads could be rigged. F4-7. Draits resulting from the flooding and counterflooding were approximately 30 feet forward and 29 feel aft. Drafts prior to the action were approxim:cilely 26 feel iorward and 28 feel aft. 5. Fire and Firefighting F5-1. Heat generated as the first bomb pier.;ed the flight deck set fire lo plaaking in way of lhe hole. A plane parked nearby caught fire and leaked gasoline which burned on the deck. Passage of the bomb also set fire to some rags, ounting and small cordage in A-101-A. The burning plane was pushed over the bow and lhe small nres quickly extinguished. F5-2. Several fires resulted from the twofold d~tonation of the second bomb. Three planes triced up in the overhead and one plane on the hangar deck near frame 40 were ignited by hot fragments or ilash from the deto nation oi the tail section. These fires were quickly extinguished by the sprinkling system which was turned on immediately in the forward end of the hangar. Fires in bedding. office files. etc. in A-105-L, started by hot fragments, also were extinguished without difficulty. F'B-3. A small fire started in protec;.tve clothing and personal efiects in A-306-L from detonation of the main portion of the second bomb. This iire was extinguished by water from th•: ruptured firern:ciin riser at frame 40 on the port side of the compartment. The only serious fire, a co:nbination electrical and Class A fir~·. o)<.:,.;urred In A-208- L. Dense smoke filled lhe compartmeot and hampered firefighters, but was partially cleared oy turning on the supply ventilation in A-309-LM and A-3~0-11 M. The iire was brought wider control within an hour by water and C02. - -23- - CONFIDENTlAL 6. Japanese Bombs Fo-1. Recognizable fragments of the second bomb were recovered, including several pieces of lhe tail !uze, small pieces of lhe nose .fuze, pieces of lhe nose, body and conical tail and one tail strut. With these, the t>ornb was identified as a 250 Kg No.25 "Land" bomb which cor responds approximately will. tm U.S. 500-pound GP type. The conical tail section was secured by a row of screws to a collar, which in turn was riveted lo the cylindrical body. This weak connection, later corrected by U1e Japanese, probably caused the rupture of lhe bomb. The tail cone, containing about 011e quarter of the explosive, fell to the hangar deck and detonated, set off by the tail fuze as described in paragraph F2-3. From the large size of the fragments, the fact that unburned powder still clung lo these fragments and the extent of damage, it ls estimatect that the tail portion detonated 1-ow order. ll is believed that lh.e main portion also detonated low order. F6-2. Although no conclusive evidence exists for identifying the other three bombs, it is believed that they were of the same type and size. The first oornb detonated high order, judging by the excellence of the fragment attack, which was, however, of a different character than lhal of he first bomb hit on 24 August. The size of the holes left in the ship's structure by the passage of the bomb inc.llcates a diameter of about 14 inches. The two near-miss bombs which struck close to the starboard side also evl denlly detonated high order. As experience has often indicated, the water prevente:.1 underwater fragment anack. The shock of the detonation was in ooth cases sufficient, however, to open up the shell by structural .failures. 7. Conclusion F7-l. Again, as during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the excellent damage control organization oi ENTERPRISE prevented fires from getting out oi hand and enabled lhe ship to continue in the battle as an almost normal fighting w1it. Measures taken to train the crew and to strip the ship of all inflammable material had been conlinued at an accelerated pace. Linoleum and paint were being removed, wooden articles, overstuffed furniture and transoms had been put ashore. office files, libraries and publications had oeen reduced to a minimum, and a policy of keeping only one week's supply of inflammable materials stowed above the waterline had been established. F7-2. As in the action of t.M August. flooding of watertight compart- mt.:nts through pi plug, ventilation ducts, etc., occurred. Firefighting water fow1d its way down ventilation ducts into some :>f · h magazines, and elevator pump room A-9-E flooded partly throuvh relief valves in overflow pipes froin the three fresh water tanks forward. In way of the near-miss afl, however. tank relief valves were ace· . ·siLle and were gagged by the ship's force i.o prevent progressive flooding in spaces above those opened to direct floodiug. F7-3. Flooding resulting from lhe two near-misses probably could have oeen avJidt:d had the outboard spaces been full oi water instead of empty. -24- CONFIDENTIAL The crack sustained by the after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turbi11e ca.sing from the shock of the first near-miss again emonstrated the poor shock resisting qualilies of cast iron. During e ship's atJailaoillty in the summer oi 1~43, thls pedestal casting was eplaced with one made of ca:::t steel. It was decided, however, not lo replace e undamaged cast iron pedestals oi the other turbines. IL is, therefore, f particular mterest to note Lhat the casualty occurred again on 11 April 945 on No. 3 H.P. turbine as a re<:>ult of an underwater detonation. -25- co:;FIDEN flAL Ph >D F-1: Fir st h"t. V~ 0 w >: b:mrn entry h.>le tll flight d ck. PhotJ F-2: First hit. Bomb passage h.>le in p~ r t side oi i:>recastle deer:. CO.ffl;)EI!TlAL r'hoto F-3: F!.rst h.t. Bomo exit h.>l in way of d gaussing caoles and fragmei t nol~ on port bow. Photo F -4: First ht. Fragm nt hl.)!e.- :m (:. rt o.>w. Fragment exit noks circled 1u starooarj O'J'.V CONFIDENTIAL Photo F-5: Secor.d h~t. Vie·.v fror;i hangar dt:t:k ,·hoJ1ir.g bomo ··ntry hJle in flight deck and f'.>int ;.>f unpact :>r. transver~·e bent at frame 4.3. Phot0 F-6: SecDr.J nit. Hangar decK at nai.c;i, ~ - 3G, 101..1k:ng ait. 1'.iair, ~:>rt1on of oomb pa.;sed tnr::mgh d.,ck aft 0i hatch on centuli.ne. Tall portio11 slruck and d~tonated on starroard side of l.atch. CONFIDENTIAL Ph )l, F- I: fe..:vnd hiL Hal.en :C. - 3g Jn seconci deck look:ng forward. M'lin iJ.Jrt!.-r.. 0f t.iomb passoo thrJug.t halch to A-3)o-L. Fn1.i:;mem hJles are frDm d~tor.ation ')f tail j.....)l'ti0r. at mai.r. aeck above. Ph~U F - ~: ::'l;;!c..>nJ hiL. Third :ieck r.ear pvint of dl"tonaLhn oi mair. portion of bOmb h A- 306-L. -.::oNFlDEIJTIAL Photo F-.J: Second hit. Blast eiiect in A-306-L, starooard sid0 lJoking aft. Stanchion in center is at frame 50. Pnot F-10: Sccona hit. B.i..u>t eifect m A-2v8-L. showing liiting of main deck and teanng of bulkhead 42. COiffIDENTIAL Photu F - 11: Fir.'>L near- miss. Star board side frames :23- 13f1 in ·J/ay of dl?:Lonalion. Note wooden plugs driven int:> rivel holes by divers. Photo F - 12: Fir st near- miss. Looking aft and outboar d to frame 12 / and sh0 ll ,n tam: C-35- F. .Note sharp bends in shell al seam bdwe<"n G and H str akes. C0N1"IDE,ITlJl.L Photo .F - 13: Pir.::;t r.e'lr- rn1. s. LooKinf aft to ou.lr.J1ead . frame .. 30 .n tan~ C -3o- F . Note j1;>er-. wrinkles rn hulk hea::i platin-r. 7 Photo r - !4: Fir .:;t near- miss. Looking forwar j and .Jutboard in tank !:> - 3- F sh::>wu.g uistorted stiifener s or1 bulr:ht.ad 130. CONFIDElJTIAL Photo F- 15: First near- miss. Tank D -3-F I.Joking aft and up to armor deck. Ph .. Photo F - 17: Sec ..md near- m.ss. VLw of damage to snell frames 23-3f starooard. Photo F-18: Second nP.a r-miss. View Ji dam nge to sheil >11llh small cracks in pnting cirdeo. ) ) ) • ) ) Ph'JtO .F - 1~: Si:.:(;Ond n~ar - rmss . Tank A - 5- W looking forwar d anu oi..tti.:>::n·i.l to shell and swash bulkhead 24 . Photo F - 20: Secona :v"ar- miss. Tank A - 6-W looking dovm and aft Jr. forJJa r d side of bulkhead 2::!. CON.F'IDENTIAL Photo F - 21: Second near- '11iss. Tank A - 11-V looking fon1ard and ao·.vn to swas!". oulkheatl 32. Photo F - :-'2: S ... cond near-miss. Tank A - 11 -V looking down and !Jrward between frames 33 and 34 . Note oreak in fram0 34. CONFIDENTIAL Pf'iolo F-23: Second near- miss. Looking down into tank A-7-V. Photo F-24: Se.::ond near-miss. Deflected inner bottom pla:..ing in A-9- E, looking forward on starboard side. CONFIDENTIAL SECTION G HlSTORY 30 OCT0BE;R 1942 TO 18 MARCH 1945 l. The Batlle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 1942 Gl-1. Jn Noumea, shipfit~ers and machinists from VESTAL (AR4), a construction bat;.allon and the ship's for.:;e worked continuously to repair damage incurred lu the Battle of Santa Cruz. Work was not completed on 11 November, however, when ENTERPRISE was ordered to proceed to Guru.lalcanal. Gl-2. The japanese had assembled a large force with which Lo make a last supreme eifort to drive the U.S. forces frDm Guadalcanal. It was essential to reinforce our troops and destroy the Japanese force. ENTERPRISE's planes, operating from Henderson Field, gave air sup port to U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal and made strikes against the ~a.panes•" Fleet in the battle which culminated in the defeat of a superior Japanese force by two U.S. battleships and escorting destroyers in the night surface engagement of 14-15 November, and lhe full retreat of the remnants of the Japanese Fleet on 15 November. G t-3. Unremitting repair work on ENTERPRISE succeeded in ready ing lhe fon1ard Pleva.tor for testing at lhe height of the battle. However, because of the possibility lhat it might not come up again after being lowered, the tests were postponed and ENTERPRISE completed her part in the engagement wilh only twJ elevators operating. After her return to Noum•"a on 16 Nov·3mber, work was continued, although no effort was ma.tie to repair the damage caused by the two near -misses received on 26 October beyond restoriug watertight imegrity and stiffening weakened frames for JJard as extended drydocking would have been required. Canvas partitions sufficed 'to replace demolished joiner bulkheads in the officers' country forward until permanent repairs could be made the follo·Ning summer. 2. Winter and Spring 1943 G2-l. From December 1042 until May 1943, ENTERPRISE operated out of Espiritu Santo spending a relatively quiet lime in port with occasional sorttes for patrol, submarine hunting or train ng duties. The only action occurred at the end of January when her planes pro vided air cover for CHICAGO which had been damaged by Japanese bombers and torpedo planes in the evening of 29 January. Unfortu nately, a f,m::e of 11 or 12 Japanese torpedo planes, intercepted in a projected attack on ENTERPRISE, succeeded in hitting CHICAGO with four ad'lltiona1 torpedoE:s which sank her. The enemy planes were all shot down subsequently by AA fire and fighter planes.• • BuSMps War Damage Report No. 37 -26- CONFIDENTlAL G~-~. ENTERPRISE sailed for Pearl Harbor on 1 May where she was drydocked from 18 to 29 May for Lh r .... pair of the underwater damage suffered in the Battle of Sama Cruz. .Jn '>7 May, Admir al Nlm:;.z pre sented the av:ard of the Pr13sidential u~1t Ctl 3. Overhaul, Summer 1943 G3-l. After leaving drydock on 29 May, ENTERPRISE remainea m Pearl Harb:>r ourln& June and parl l Jul.y. A few alterations, including fitting of identlf1cat1on radar, removal of patnl and inflammable st res tv fum"'-tlght compartme:-its below the waterhne iuted with mechanlca. v •ntllation and C02 fire extinguishing sy.• tems, and fitting of watertight qu1cr:-acting scuttles rn halches leading to •levator machinery and pump room A-9-E. were accompllsned dur.ng this period. 03- ,_. On l·i July, ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor for Puget ..,ourtd where she was placed in No. 5 g r aving do;:k on 23 July. During the period from 23 July to 26 September blisters wer e fittf>d between frames 36 and 150 to effect improvement in stability necessitatea by the increase in topside weights r~sulting irom wartime alterations. Her original gasoline t:i.ni G3-3. rn addition to the two major s~n.:ctural alleratio1 s mentioned ao.:>ve, comparlmems A-18 and A-25, made availaole by the change in gasoline stowage, were altered to pr ovide additional 40rnm. p:ane arnmwution and ir:cemiiary bomb stowage; gasoline mains were extended aft; a manual1y-coutr.:>l1ed Inert gas system was installeu to replace the and purging of gasolme lin1:::s; and air-driven Cu2 system ior protection defueling pumps were filled at each fueling statior. on the flight aud hangar deck!'" to expedite the ara!mng ~f fuel tanks in returned planes. G3-4. Firefighting facilities were improved by U1P install~tion of manually-contr olled fixed iog nozzle systems in many spaces and steam suuthering lines 111 the machinery spaces and oy r eplacing chemica: foam generator s with new desi~n mechanical foam pr essur e proportioners. Add1t1onal cutout valves were fitted in lh-" damage control and f1rern?.in systems and two 1000 GPM Diesel-driven centriiugal pumps were installed, one in A-~-E and one in D-523- E, and connected to the i!re mains. G3-5. The entir e ventilation system was revisoo to improve water- tight Integr ity and living conditions. The ::;ystem was altered m the steering motor room to prevent a recurrence o:f the casualty of 29 August 1942 and terminals of all natural exhaust ducts .:'.rorn forwad magazines were r aised 5 feet above the second deck. G3 -o. Other alterations included fitting 00-p.:>und STS plati:.g ar:>m.1 trunk D-304 -T between the second and third decks leading to the after -27 - CONFIDENTIAL magazines; installatio:-i of lnterual degaussing cables; addition of several radars; replacement of the two forward flight deck calapults with units of a later design; and an increase of armament by the addition oi 8 - 40mm t.vln mounts and scvera1 20mm guns. All alterations, trials, etc. were complete and El'ITERPRlSE was ready for sea 31 October. 4. Amphibious Operations and Strikes, Winter 1943-44 G4-l. On 1 NovE moer, ENTERPRISE departed Pugel Sound for Pearl Haroor where on ! 1; vt:mber she ~oined the task force which was to support the landings 0r. Tarawa, Makin and Apamama in the Gilbert Islands. On board were newly organized teams of night fighters, "Bat Teams," each consisting of a radar-equipped Avenger torpedo plane and two Hellcat fighters. ENTERPRISE planes struck at Makin during the three-d11y perioa 19-21 lJovemoer and during the nights. of 24, 25 an1l 2o Novemoer ner mght fighters successfully repulsed attacks oy Japar.ese torpedo bombers against the task force. ENTERPRL.SE withdrew on the afternoon oi 28 November, her part in the opGratiou against the three islands complei.ed. On the way back Lo Pearl Harbor she circled north of the Marshalls in order to launch a strike aga!nst shipping and shore installations on Kwajalein. She arrl•1ro in Pea.n Harbor !:i December. G4-2. ENTERPRISE departed Pearl Harbor 16 December to participate In the landings on Kwajaleln in the Marshalls. Operating to the south and west of the islands, she provided planes for the bombarJment of enemy aircraft and grounu installations, ior comoat air patrol. anti-submarine patrol, photographic rs:connaissance and for dlrec;. support of landliig troops. The ~apanese ofiered comparatively little resls;.ance. N.:> special mght fighters were required and the occupation was completed by 4 Fi:bruury. G4-3. On 16 February, p•anes from E;i!TERPRISE partidpated in strikes against shipping and oil storage installations at Truk. Although Lhe rna1or units of the ~apanesc Fleet had already left that hase, six enemy combatant ships and many enemy auxiliaries Nere sunk or damaged. The stri~:es contlnued through the seventeenth. Then the U.S. carrier.:> and their escorts retired rapidly to the northeast, pausing to launca lw.:> striKes agarnst shore installations on }aluit, 20 Feoruary. 5. Sprmg Activities, 1944 G!J-1. On l March, ENTERPRISE headed once more for the South- west Pacific where her pmnes pr.:ivided air support, combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol ior the landings or. Emirau. She then JOined Task Force 58 and participated ln strikes against Peleliu and Koror in the Pa.hu Islands, Yap and Ulithi in the ·.vestern Carolines a:id, as the group retired eastwarJ, against Woleai. G5-2. ENTERPRISE planE>s fle'JJ thE>ir first strikes against air- fields and lnst.allatlon~-· in Hollarnila on 21 AprU in support of amphibious operat\oas in TanahmPrah Bay. She remained in the area -28- CONFlDEI!TIAL until 26 April, when, after a final strike against Wakde Island. she retired to th•.; newly won harbor at Manus to repair a hydraulic leak in lhe ste~ring engine and lo pick up replacemems. G5-3. On 29 and 30 April, six strikes were ilown by ENTERPRISE planes each day against ground insi.allations anu aircraft on Truk. Her ta.SK group then continued eastward to Majuro, where they am.:hored 4 May. G~ -4. After a month of relative inactivity, ENTERPRISE departed MaJuro on 6 June with Task Group 58.3 to support lnnuings on Saipan. Her first fighter s weeps were sent against the Island on 11 June and continued for the next three days. On 15 June the .andi.ngs took place, supported oy carrier planes and oombardment oy suriace ships. While repulsing an air attack, superficial damage to superstructure was sus tau1ed when a 40mm shell from a U.S. vessel struck ENTERPRISE. Go-5. ll was suspected that lhe Japanese Fleet was in the vicinity, and during 17 and 18 June the U.S. ships worked around lo the west of Sair-an, searching for the enemy neet. On 1., June the U.S. task group was attacked by more than 400 Japanese aive bomoer.s a1a toq::.:do planes. U1e majority of them carrier type aircraft. 3 :> ifective ·Neri? the comoat at:r patrol and anti-aircrait defense, ti ~ -h roximately 300 •nemy planE:s were destroyed, ENTERPRISE fliers accounttng i or 19. UnfJrtun ilely search planes cowd not discover the Japanese naval force until th~ afternoon of the twentiern, some 6 /0 miles JJest of Saipan. M deratP. damGl.ge was inflicted on the enemy ana one carrier v:as sunk. The Japanese retired raµidly westwaru so that, although contaci. was main tam~d by search planes through the fo lowing da:,·, the dislunce was too real to munch a strike. ENTERPRISE and the other U.S. vess'3ls then r turned closer LO Saipan from where she launched dally strit:es against Guam between 28 June and ~J • uly. She returned to Eniwetok ~m 9 July and frum Eniwetok proceeded to Pearl Harbor \~here she haa availability at the Navy Yard from 16 July to 3 August. 6. Auvance to lhe Pn11ippmes, 1944-4~ Gtl-1. At the cost oi harJ fightirP and many casualties. Sa pan v.as stablished a.· a base from which lhe strategic bombing of Jap n could :.ar:e place. In addition, 1l afforded protection to U1e northern ilank of th .lne :>f a::ivaace from the Centr.9..1 .1:->acifH.: t the PUHppmes, tJward. wr.kh thP a1!1phibious force.; of the S)uU1.vest .Pacific were also h aaed. A bast:> in the ~.' stern Caro.. ine~ was needed, however, and the Palau Is a11ds Nt>r • chosen. G6-2. To divert attention from the pro1ected landings on f' • 1u i.. tl.e Palau I lands. Tas.:< Group 38.4, wh1 ~h included ENTERPRISE. ma ~e a raid n the Volcan...> ana Bonm Islanas. .Vh1le the other carrier· of the task group struck at Iwo Juna, she l 1uncheJ fighter swt:! p..: again.... t Ch1ch1 Jirna anu provided cornoa~ al r patr ol and photographic r con na1sance. -29- CONFIDENTIAL G6-3. After a orief stop at Sa!pan, ENTERPRISE sent fighter sweeps ano photographic mtss!ons against Yap and Ulilhl on ti, 7 and 8 September, foll:.>wed by strikes against Malakai Harbor In the Palau Islands on 10 and 1 l September. G6-4. 011 15 Sep:.ember, troops land~ on Pelellu with planes from EUTEP.PRISE furnishlng a part of the direct air support. She continued t.> provide air support wuil 18 Sept G6-5. The task gr.oup returned to patrol dutles west of the Pal.aus on 21 September remaimng for tht: next eight days ready Lo intercept any attempt oy the Japanese Fleet t..> repeat the tactics useo. at Sa1pan. G6-6. During the vperations against the Palau Island:>, another task f!'rJup was making the first large raids vn Formosa and the northern Phillppmes. These were designed to divert the Japan8se away fr.)m the amphibious operation and to ·>1hlttle down the enemy's strength in the Philippines. Opp...;sition was so Hght that th~ decision was made lo accele rate the speed of advance oy landing directly in the Philippines. 'lo-/. ENTERPRISE's part preliminary to this landmg was to ... trikt.: noz'Lt. of Lht: Ph1llppin~s as a umt .::>I one of three task groups. On 10 October her p~anes flew against Okinawa Shlma ln th£> RyuJ.:yus. The n~xt day she provided combat air patro. while planes from other carriers attacked northern Luzon. On 12 and 13 O::..>b1 r, str~kes were made against strong Japanese installations on Formosa. un '. 5 October, from a positl.:m t•ast of Luz.>u, ENTERPRISE sent a fighter , trii GG-8. The landings on Leyte took place 20 O:lober, with ENTER!?RISE planes among the air support groups. She left the next day, however, and headed toward Ulithi as the La:::k group had been out since 2t. September and other ships were availaole to cover the operations. But on the tweuly-lhirJ, ir.1.elllgence advised that the Japanese Fleet was at 1ast coming out of hidmg to throw all of its weight against the U.S. foothold in Leyte Gulf and all available American vessels were readied for action. G6-9. The Japanese attack was three-pronged. Gne force came up from the :;outh, through the Sulu Sea toward Surigao Strait, south oi Leyte; a central force passed north oi Palawan into lhe Sibuyan Sea, heading for San aernardino Strait, north of Samar; and a northern force sailed south from japan directly toward Samar aud Leyte. The resulting Batlle :for Leyte Gulf accordingly developed rn three parts, known respectively as the Batlle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar and the Battle off Cape Engano. G6-10. ENTERPRISE planes participated in action against all three of these Japanese Forees. On the morning of 24 October, they damaged two battleships and a cruiser in the Sulu Sea and in the aflernoon they scored torpedo ana oomo hits on a thir d battleship in the Sibuyan Sea. During the night and next day, the Seventn Fleet bore the orunt of the attacks from the Japanese southern and central forces. The southern force was routed 1n the night Banle oI Surigao Strait and the next moru:ng the powerful central force was engaged by a task unll of CVE's. Durmg -30- .;0NFllJ£:.N rlAL t..1 t. m, ErITl!.RPRlSE had steamed north w1U1 the ThlrJ Fleet to r.gag th · Japar u n rtr.ern fore off Cape Engano. Five strikes u1uncr.l:d t y F.N. ERP.H.iSE on 2f> 0.;tober as~isted in sin.king four J1:1pan ~ c rricr ni damaging battleships and other Wlils. G6-1 l. Tl .led ENTERPRISE's part in the !argesl i-laval engage- rr. nt f th war. F r the remainuer of lhe month, she remained on 1 atrol ~ast Ji Samar and Leyte, providing ~0mt..al air patrol, survivor s arcli""S and . arch-altad: groups. On 3 V:.:t ber, a strong enemy ·ur attack d v ioped which included suicin • ..... e crashes on FRANKLIN* CV13) and BELLEAU NOOD (CVL24). On° ZEKE, although on fire from r p~ateu hits. dlveu on ENTERPRISE from the starooard bear!l, crossed the att ·r !11ghl deck, no.rrowly missed parkP.d planes am! fell into the sea on UL p >rl qu&rtt--r. The nP.xt day the task group departed for Uiilhl. Go-1 . ENTERPH.ISE spent only thrl"e day~ at Ulithi, leaving on 5 Novem- bt.r with Task Group 38.4. On 11 November, a successful strike was made on a Japanese convoy landing troops in Ormoc Bay on the west side of Leyle nnd on 13-14 November a heavy attack was made against sh\pping in Subic arid Manila Bays. Many ships wer"' SWlk or damaged. Aiter r utme patrols and fueling near Palau, the Lask group returried on £l Novemoer to attack Clarr. Field and Subic Bay. Gti-13. PJter the strike of rn Novemoer, ENTERPRISE retired eastward seuding planes against lhe airfields at Yap before anchoring in Ulilhi on 22 Novemoer. Five days later, she departed for Pearl Harbor arriving 6 06cemoer for two weeks' availaoi!ity at the Navy Yard where new Iour -u ~ade:i prope... ers were fitteu in an effort to reduce vibration during h1gh ~pe .d. turns. The new propellers were successful and on 24 December she ,i parted for the Philippines. Gti- 14. After the successiul landings at Leyte and Mindor0, it was decided t~ land on Luzon and Lingayen Gulf was chosen to achieve ~ urpr1se in th~ rear oi i.he main Japanese forces on the island. In order t0 protect the amphibious opera.lions, a strong force of carriers and other ships operated oetweea Luzon and the mainland of Asia. G6-lb. ENTERPRISE joinerl Task Group 38.5, a night carrier group forming pad of this strategic support force, on 5 }anuary. During the following tw~nly days, her planes performed routine patrols, participated tn strikes against airfields on Luzon, shipping off the coast of Indo-China ar.d installations on U1e coast of China and made sweeps along lhe coasta1 area of the China Sea irom Formosa to Hong Kong. 7. Landings on Iwo Ji111a, February 1945 07-1. in February, ~s a diversion for the planned amphibious opera- tions against Iwo f ma, carriers of lhe Fifth Fleet sailed north from Ulitlti to within 120 miles oi Honshu. While planes from the olher carriers strU<..:k at airilelds, groWld insta1lat1ons and shipping in the Tokyo area, ENTERPRISE provided planes for combat air patrol. * BuShip:; War Damage Rep6rt No. f>li -31- CONFIDENTIAL G7-2. The carriers then retired southward, arriving near Iwo Jima on the evening of the landmgs. lU Feuruary. For almost three weeks thereafter, until 10 March, EHTERPRISE planes had a busy routine of uay and night combat air patrol aud strikes against airfields on Chichi Jima. With the bitter stru5gle for Iwo Jima almost completed, ENTER PRISE returned bo Ulilhi on 12 Mar.::h. -32- co:.~IDEiITIAL PhOlO H-1: :Jud hit. F~rward ele','at::>r shm;:mg polm of tni~ial irnJJ::t..:t. Photo H-2: Dud hiL. Port siGe ')f ;!'land and navigat~ng oridge shnw,ng brac.:Kt:t3 brok<=>n by passa.~e 0f bomb. CONFIDENTIAL Photo H-3: Gud f!lt. Fught d ~ck arr"'"idsnips showing main port Un ~f bomn ar.j ~c::i ttereu lump~ of picric acid. Pn.>to H-4: "Friend1y" sneL mt. Parked plaiw..:· on fire. Uotp us~ oi I '>V! veloc 1Ly f >g applicaDr to i.-ntect r.ian VJith ioam hJse. C ONFID EI':TiA L Photo H-5: "!='rieno:y" shell hit. Vh:w )f 11.~r.~ Jo-> 'KI ~ar h;land aiter fires -::xlinf.U:.;hoo. Ps.~to H-6: "Friendly" :=hh! hit. G1.1tti:>d Wmm rn ..:mnts ilos. f and l. CONFIDENTIAL SECTION H BOMB DAMAGE STRIKES AGAL'JST SOUTHERN JAPAN - 18 AND 20 MARCH 1945 I 250 KG D U D B O MB H I T , FRAME 3 2 3 . 5 I N C H , 3B C A L~ FR I E N OL Y S H ELL", 2 5 1NCH , 38 C AL " FR I ENDLY SHELL " FRAME 3 4 PORT FRAME 60 • 70 STARBOARD 1. Narrative Hl-1. Shortly before operatlons star ted against Okinawa Gunto, the fasl carrier force which had supponed the landings on lwo Jima was sent north to continue strikes against the Japanese home islands. Its mission was to provide a powerful shield between Japan and Okinawa which could preven: large- scale Japanese Fleet action against the U.S. amphibious operations, to bombard and bomb strategic shore installations and to seek out and destroy the remnants of the Japanese Fleet. Hl-2. ENTERPRISE departed Ulithi on 14 March as a unit of a night carrier task group. Her primary mission wa."' to furnish night combat air patrol for the task force which struck alrfields, factories and ships in the Kyushu, Shikoku and southern Honshu area during the three-day period 18-20 March. Hl- 3. On 18 March, the task group operating to the southeast of Kyushu was subjected to sporadic attacks by single Japanese planes. At 0735 a JUDY was sighted on the port bow al a distance of 10,000 yards and an altitude of about 150 feet. Although taken under iire, the plane flew head on toward ENTERPRISE and dropped a 250 Kg bomb which ricocheted off the fo.:ward elevator, struck under the navigating bridge and fell to the deck, a dud. Five more attacks were made on the ship durhlg the oay without causing damage. The following day, ENTERPRISE was spared attack, but FRANKLIN was badly damaged by two bombs and subsequent fires. Hl-4. On 20 March, the ships were subjected to additional sporadic attacks from Japanese planes. At 1613 a JUDY dropped a bomb about 50 feet Lo port of frame 60 and at 1626 another plane dropped a bomb off the starooarci quarter. Ot.her shi.ps in the vicinity had opened fire a:id two 5-lnch 38 cal. prDjectiles detonated over ENTERPRISE, start ing a moderately serious fire on lhe flight deck in way of the island and a small fire in shield ammumtion at No. o, 40mm mount. Al 1652 anot.her Japanese bomb was dropped but missed the port quarter. - 33- CONFIDENTIAL. Hl-5. The task group retired to the southeast on the twentie~h, and on 22 March, ENTERPRISE, in company with other damaged shtps, re turned to Ulithi for repalr. 2. Dud Bomb of 18 March H2-l. On 18 March as described In paragraph Hl-3, a bomb was released almost horizontally from maslhead height, struck the forward elevator at frame 32 about 7 feet to starooard of the centerline, rico cheted aft and struck the island structure just be~vw the port side of the navigaling bridge at frame '12 (Photos B-1 and B-2). It passed through seven brackets supporting the navigating oridge and primary fly control, tumbling as it went, and broke into lwo partd. The small tail cone fell Lo the flight deck, immediately below thP navigating bridge and the main portion came to rest farther aft on the flighL deck without detonating. Some picrlc acid was strewn over severed electric cables under th~ navl.gatini; bridge and ignited by short circuits, causing a small fire. P1cric acid was also scattered over the flight deck from frame 74 to frame 125, out did not ignite (Photo H - 3). The bomb was pushed over board soon after it hit. H2-2. Planking on No. 1 elevator was crushed and broken in way of the in!tia1 impact over an area roughly 10 fef>t by 6 feet, the aluminum deck beneath was ruptured and one longttudinal was sheared at frame 34 so Lhat lhe elevator sagged abouL 12 inches. Electric cable$ running along the port side of the island structure to primary fly control and lo lhe alldade on the port wing of the navigating bridge were severed. H2-3. The small fire under primary fly control was quickly extinguished and temporary repairs were made lo No. 1 elevaLOr within half an hour, permitting it t::> operate. Direction of air activities was shifted to second ary fly control. H2 -4. The bomb was identified as a 250 Kg, streamlined, No. 25, Mod. ? Ordinary bomb. It corresponds approximately with the U.S. 500-pound GP bomb, but has somewhat greater penetrating ability. Altho..igh normally fitted with nose and tail fuzes, it had a plug in its nose fuze seal which partially accounts for its not detonating. The Lail cone was fuzed with a B- 3(a) fuze which fell out on deck without functioning. H2- 5. Throughout the war ENTERPRISE was favored by good fortune which accoums in no small measure for her survival. This was particularly lrue in this case, for had the bomb deLOnated either on impact with the forward elevator or on striking the island, severe damage would have resulted. 3. Near- Misses, "Friendly" Shell Hits and Fire of 20 March H3- 1. On 20 March, as stated in paragraph Hl-4, three bombs det0nated in the water not far from the ship; one about 150 feel to port of frame 60 and two off lhe port and starboard quarters, 50 to 100 feet away. These were visually identified as the 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary type. Shock -34- CONFIDENTIAL cracked 2-inch tubing in U1e relief and replenishing line to the expansion tank of the starboard steering Wlit and a brazed joint between the flange and shell of a 12-inch copper auxiliary exhaust pipe in the after englne room. No other damage was reported. Steering was shifted to the port uml until repairs could oe effected during the night. H3-2. During th bombing attack, a 5-lnch, 38 cal. projectile, fired by another U.S. ship in the task group, detonated over 40mm mounts Nos. 5 and I between frames 60 and '70 on the starboard side of lhe fHght deck. Almost simultaneously a second 5-inch, 38 cal. projectile detonated off the port bow starting a small fire in lhe ammu nition on the shield of 40mm mount No. 6. This fire was quickly extinguished. H3-3. Shell fragments from the first detonation pierced the belly gasoline tanks of two F6F planes spotted ln the vicinity of the hit, igniting gasoline which spread over the flight deck between frames GO and /5. The burning gasoline ignited two additional planes and initiated the explosive burning of 40mm ready-service ammunition stowed on the shields of Nos. 5 and '7 40mm mounts and .50 cal. plane ammunition piled on the ilight deck just fo::-ward of the island. H3-4. Primary fly control,the main communication office, radio cen- tral and CIC were made untenable by heat and smoke and abandoned via descending lines previously attached to the navigating bridge. The navigating bridge, however, remained habitable and the ship's course was altered to take advantage o! the wind to clear smoke and hea:. to port away from the island. H3-5. As a result of the fir~ Nos. 5 and 7 40mm mounts and the Mk.51 director for No. 5 mount were burned out (Photo H-6). Primary fly control was gutted and the port signal bridge facilities were destroyed or put out of commission. Electrical, radio and IC systems in the pilothouse, main communications office and Radio I were burned out or grounded oy water. Flight deck planking was destroyed in the area between frames 55 and '75 on the starboard side; and the expansion joint cover at frame 70, the armored hatch of the forward bomb elevator and lhe palisades al frame 64 were also damaged. H3-G. Although hampered by exploding ammunition, flying fragments and continued dive bombing attacks, repair parties attacked the fire vigorously, cooling and smothering it ·.vith fog and mechanical foam so that after 35 minutes all out a few persistent blazes, apparently burn ing magnesium airplane wheels, were smothered beneath the foam blank~t. Electrical fires in the island structure persisted somewhat longer, out all fires were out 50 minutes after the hit. H3-'I. While the fire raged on the fhghl deck, measures were taken to prevent its effects from spreading to other parts of the ship. Ready servlce ~Omm ammuni~ion In A-0301-M was sprinkled, hose streams were played on lhe overhead of the hangar deck beneath the conflagration and the aiter water curtain of the forward bay was turned on to segregate planes aft. A small fire de\:eloped in the bottom of the forward bomb elevator well, fed oy gasoline which leaked around the damaged elevator -35- CONFIDENTIAL hatch. Although the elevator trunk bulkheads in way of the thi rd deck Wf.:re heated, the fir e burned itself out without causing damage. H3-8. Water tlght integrity ior the most part was good, pr eventing all bul a small quantity of the tons of water poured Jn lhe flight and hangar decks from penetrating the hull belo"» the he:mgar deck. Some gasoline and water leaked down lhe after llomo elevat.::>r without ignit- ing and gasoline and water also backed up into crew's head D- 203- 2L and sick uay bath D- 302- 3L through weather deck and below deck drai.nage which intercormeded at the same valve on the fourth deck. Ther e was no measurable reduction in buoyancy or stabilny. H3-9. Fire- resistant paint and fiber glass insulation on the inside of U1e island plating stood up excellenlly to the intense heat. Alth mgh paint on the inside of dead- lights In some cases ~aroonized and flaked, it did not ignite, th::=reby preventing fire from spreading through the inter ior )f the island. H3 - 10. Burning gasoline and exploding ammunition pr esented the initial ingr edients which in some other cases of carrier damage resulle(l in fatal or near falal conflagrations. The characteristically skillful and vigorous attack made by ENTERPRISE's crew on lhe conflagration, however. confined it to the initial a r ea--witl1 the exception of the smai.l ilre in the forward bomb elevator--so that a minimum amoWlt of damage resulted. -36- CONFIDENTIAL SECTION I SUICIDE PLANE CRASHES OKINAWA, 11APRIL1945 ~ I SUI CI DE P L ANE 8 2 5 0 K G BOMB NEAR M I S S ,FRA ME 136 PO RT 2 SUICIO E PLANE 8 25 0KG 80'<\B N EAR · M SS ,FRAME 3 0 STARBO ARD 1. Nar ralive Il- 1. On 24 March, EN1'ERPRISE anchored in Ulithi where repairs to lhe damage received on 18 and 20 March wer e under taken by the ship's force and persoru1el from JASON. They were not completed in lime ior her to par ticipate in lh-: 1 Apr il landings on Okinawa, but by 1 Apr il she was aole to join Task Group 58.3 operating near Oagari Shima, to lhe east of Oklnawa. Il- 2 After the landings on Okinawa, the Japanese c.:ommnled lheir last air reserves. the Kamikaze corps of suicide pilots, alr eady used with some success at Leyte and Lingayen. Although a ser ious drain on Japanese manpower and airc raft pr oduction, it was the most effective aer ial weapon 10r damaging naval targets developed by the enemy in the war. so the list of sunk and damaged U.S. vessels grew rapialy. 11 -3. A large-scale Kamikaze attack developed against Task Group 58.3 on 11 April nor theast of Okinawa. At 1345 two large groups of Japanese aircraft were noted closing irom the norlh. ENTERPRISE openeu fire on two planes at 1408, shooting one down about 1500 yards ofi the starooard quar ter . While ENTERPRISE was in a port turn, the other olved on lhe port quar ter, str uck and car ried away the spon,mns of 40mm mounts Nos. 8 and 10, and fell into the sea. The engine of ~he plane glanced off the ship's side at the water line, denting and opening the ulister al frame 136. The bomb cai-ried by the plane d~tonaled beneath the ship at approximately fr ame 134 lifting the ship bodi!y and whipping it viol•::!ntly. Eight fuel tanks and two voids were ruptured. r>edestals oI spring bearings for Nos. 3 and 4 shafts, after pt::!destals of Nos. 3 and 4 turbo-generator s, SK radar and the fo r ward master gyr o compass wer e damaged by shock. The damaged genera tors had to be secured, so that split operation 01 the electr ic plant could not be continued. 11 - 4. At 1500 another Japanese plane carrying a bomb, attempted a suicide dive out missed and struck the water 45 to 50 feet off the star board. bow opposite frame 30 ">Jhe r e the bomb delonateo. causing additional shock damage and slight str uctural damage in six tanks and voids. Water spray carried as far aft as the pilothouse and part of the - 3 7- CONFIDENTIAL plane wing was hur led to the fhgllt deck. A fighler . plane on the _s ta rboard catapult was ignited and fi r e spr ead to the deck. Swee s hock failure of lhe fo rwar d Diesel fir e pump hamper ed fir efighti ng, the plane was catapulted into t.he sea. The small fi r e on deck wa. quic:-kly extinguished. U - 5. Dar ing the af ter noon, five mor e enemy planes wer e shot down near ENTERPRISE. After dar k the Japanese dropped fla r es, but no attacks dev;;:loped. A tor pedo plane, r etur ning fr.om a nlght in lrud~ r mission, made a cr ash landing. It destroyed four night fighter air c r aft and startro a fire which was quickly exti!lguished. 2. Damage and Damage Control Measur es - Str ucLural !2- 1. The outboard gun shields and semicir cular platfor ms of 40mm mounts Nos. 8 and 10 wer e shear ed off or bem by impact of the plane and blast from the fi r st near-miss (Photo 1-1). Par ts of the plane r emained in the gun tubs. Distortion of the shield of mount No . 8 blocked the train of the gun until damage contr ol par ties r emoved the obstr uction. The guns and mount were undamaged. 12- 2. The plane's engine str uck the blister at frame 136, tearing a 3-foot by 2-foot hole into D - 54 - F at the waterline {Photo I - 2). No other holes were opened in the welded blister plating, although it was dished in between fram1;:s 134 and 138 by the bomb detonn.l1on. 12- 3. Tanks D - 4- F and :J - 12- F wer e opened to D - t-4 -f F by a il ure of about 100 r ivets along the seam just below lhE a r m:)r, (Photo I- 3), and to :::ach other through a 2-inch crack in a se'1.m A bulkhead 134 which was baaly wrinklea. Swash plates and floor s . frames 132 through 13 7, wer e crumpled, bulkh~ad 138 was slightly buckled and No. 2 tor pedo oulkhead between tank.~ D-4-F and D- 12-F and tank D - 6- F WtlS def!ec:.ed but not opened. The original shell plating at the bottom of D-o-F was dished In ancl a rivett>d sea:n o~ned . Tank~ C - 3~ - V, D - 2- V and D-10- F , between torpeHo bulkhe&ds 1 and 5, were .:> 1,enf'd to the sea through leaky seams m tne shell. Deformation of bulk.heads aud stiffeners occurred as far 111board as the port oulkhead of after gene rator room. :D - 5-E. No panting of da!11aged str ucture developed. 12-4. Violent whipping of the foremast tnuuced by the fl 12- 5. The se<.;011d near-rnisci slightly ouckl~d floors, frames and bulkili:iads iri tanks A-.:lOl -V, A-'7-V, A-11-V, A - 17- V , A - 23- V and A-!5-W. Sligl1L leaks developed through ~he.l seams and rivets into A - &01 -V, A-7-V an'.l A - 1 /-V and through bu!khead 35 between A-15-W and A - 1:-v. -38- CONFIDENTIAL 3. Damage and Damage Control Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical 13-1. Shock and structural deformation between frames 120 and 150 in way of the first near-miss forced foundations of Nos. 3 and 4 main generators, Nos. 3 and 4 main engines and Nos. 3 and 4 shaft spring bearings inward and upward with a maximum perma nent deflection of about one inch. 13-2. Both generators were broken loose from their foundations at the after ends of the turbines. The turbines were thrown upward four to five inches. The supporting pedestals broke away from the cast iron exhaust casings of which they were a part (Photo I-4), leaving the eads of the turbines with no support. ln addition, the governor relay ho~sing of NI). 4 generator broke (Photo I-5), fixed and moving rows of bla.tl:ng were bent at t.he <3dges, and bull gear, pinion and turbine bearings and bull gear and pinion thrust bearings were wiped. Also, the forward bull gear bearing of No. 3 generator was wiped. Further damage was prevented by lifting the ends of the turbines on hydraulic jacks. 13-3. No. 4 generator, which was carrying the load aft under split plant operation, tripped out. An attempt was made to carry th:i load on No. 3 generator in order to maintain split plant operatio:'l, but after two hours running, vibration became excessive and it was secured. The ship was then dependent on Nos. 1 and 2 main gene rators and the emergency Diesel generaLOrs. It should be noted that the after emergency generator started instantly and automatically when No. 4 main generator trip;>ed out. 13-4. No. 4 shaft was slightly bent, the oow in the shaft causing its Nos. 2 a:.J 3 spring oearings to wobble alhwartships about one inch with ea<.:t. r•_·v 'lution. In addition, the horizontal lop plate of the founda tion for Nu. 3 spring bearing was Lorn from lhe vertical plates,one foot supporting the shell of No. 2 spring bearing was broken and No. l spring bearing was moved slightly out of alignment. 13-5. There was no damage to No. 4 main engine, although all three bearings of the H.P. pinion and the center bearing of the L.P. pinion were wiped and burned. The after end of the L.P. pinion was slightly out of alignment bul the bearing was not wiped. This damage apparently did not prevent the reduction gears from functioning normally. 13-6. Although bent less than the outboard shaft, No. 3 shaft suffered more damage to its supports. No. l spring bearing, closest to the detonation, had three shim chocks on lhe outboard side and the foot and one shim chock on the inboard side fractured in compr ession -39- CONFIDENTIAL (Photos 1-6. I-7). No. 2 spring oear!ng was broken in a .,1milar way and in addition had a crack in the bearUJg sni:?li which permitted oil to leak from the sump. Two shim chocks ea.ch wcri;; oroken at Ho. 3 a:.d No. 4 spring bearings. 13- 1. Damage to No. 3 main engine was appreciable, thoug~~ not dis- abling. The bearing pedestal at tile after end of the H.P. turorne was llited 1/16 inch clear of the shim chocks on the uiboard side and the foot of the pede..;ta! was cracked hy thf' compressive load on the outboard side (PhJto I-8). Two chocks were broken under the outboad side of the L. P. turbine. The after bearil1g of the L. P. turbine, the forward and after bearings of tile H.P. tUrblne anu all tilree bearings of t>olh H.P. and L.P. plnio:is were wiped. The reduction gear teeth 'Nere not damaged., but nnsalignrnent in lhe gears caused intense vibration at high speeds anrl durlng turns. 13-8. Noi=;. ~ and 4 sh1p's service AC-DC motor-generator.., were d splaced by U1e shock. Deformation was generally elastic, however, with permanent dislorlion only 111 the foundation bolts whlch nad to be tlghtent>d one half turn. No. 4 motor-g•~nerator was temporarily dis able 13-9. The general flexural vibr4tion splashed some mercury from the bowls of both gyro compasses across electrical connections. The forwan compass wa... disablea out was restorea to service within a few hours. The after gyro compass continued to function. 13-10. Miscellaneous shock damage occurred n..s follows: (i) The after surge tank lea.r (ii) The base of a 14-mch lathe in the general mat:hine shop was broken. (iii) Numerous lherlllometers ar.d gauges in compartments betweer. irames 120 and 150 were broken. (iv) There were several piping failures in sall waler fuel oil and drain lines. • (v) No. 2 36-lnch sear.:hlight was hit by fragments and damaged by shock. Lens and instruments Nere broken. 13-11. The SK radar was inoperable because of the broken supporting struts for the antenna on the foremast. -40- CONFIDE.NTrAL I3-l2. Blast ruptured lhe main drain line of the external gasoline system between frames 141 and 152 beneath Lhe 40mm mounts. The system was secured at a cut-off valve forward of the oreak. I3-13. The most serious machinery damage resulting from the near-miss forward was the disablement of No. 1 Diesel fire pump in A-9-E. Shock opened its piping connections, distorted the foundation and broke the timlng gear housing. Repairs were beyond the capacity of the ship's force. 13-14. A minor leak occurred in the inner wall of the double-walled gasoline system drain Hne in way of the gasoline lrunk as a result of the second near-miss. 4. Floo:iing and Flooding Control Measures 14-1. The three tanks between torpedo bulkheads 4 and 5, D-10- F. D-2-V and C-34-V, which were opened t.:> Lhe sea through weeping seams and rivets, were lhe only damaged tanks empty at U1e lime. They filled slowly and caused a l 0 list to port and an estimated 3- inch increase in !4-2. Fuel tanks, D-4-F. D-6-F, D-12-F and D-54.-F were full so that, although l aks contaminated and largely displaced the fuel, there was little aH reciable effect on list or trim. Flooding from the sea was more rapid tha.n for the inboard tanks, hence only D-t:i-F could be pu.rnped down. A large OLl slick trailed ENTERPRISE for about an hour. 14-3. The drafts before damage were approximately 26 feet 10 inches forward and 28 feet \:J inches aft as read on the internal drait gauges. The draft was increased about 3 inches aft by Lhe flovding from the first near-miss. 5. Fire and Firefighting 15-1. Failure of lhe forward Diesel fire pump in A-9-E hampered efforts to extinguish the olaze on the p.i.ane spotted on the starboard catapult, since segregation of the firemain in battle condition assigned this pump to the forward starboard plugs. While cross-connection valves were being opened and hoses led from tbe other plugs, the ourning plane was catapulted from the ship. The burning tail remained on deck and was rapidly extinguished with water and foam. 6. Japanese Planes and Bombs 16-1. The problem of mounting an effective attack against the growing U.S. Pleet, complicated by the improved interception of our combat air patrols, the accuracy of our sh1p anti-aircraft fire using the proxi.mlly fuze, a lack of thoroughly trained pilots and other -41- CONFIDENTIAL factors was solved In char acteristic Japanese fashior. by organizir.g a corps of suicide pilot~. the Kamikaze, to dive explosive-lad::!n planes directly Into the target ship. A.though this z:nethod was ~ery wa_steful of planes and pilots, 1t was extremely effecuve in inflicllng serious damage Lo our ships. 16- 2. The first appear ance of a deliberate suicide attack by Japanese planes was at the Batt.e for Leyte Gulf. ZEKE- 52's, tile most commonly used at first, 'Ner e supplemented by wany other types later on. A 250 Kg bomb was usually carried. 16 -3. T!le final war damage report from the Commanding Officer of ENTEHPRLSE, which Iorms a part of rderence (1), made no aaempt lo identify the planes used in the :-;uicidc auac~:s other than to call them dive bombers. The a(;tion rf'oort. reference (I), stated the b•Jlief lhat both near-misses were oy JuDY-ll's. However, a photograph in referer.ce (1) show.; a bea::i - on view ~ust before the c rash. which inclicales that the planP whica grazed the port quarter was a ZEKE-52. with a bomb slung under the iu.3elage, the type of plane and bomo po:5illon also used i11 the attack of 14 May. The plane which f ell off lhe sla rt>oard uow was probably a ] UDY-11, j utiging from the act ion r e1 :>rt and from a photogr aph oi lhe piece of the wing recovered on lhe flight deck. 16-4. 1'ner e is no way to determwi; the type of uoni.b carried ln either instance. The damage sustained a~ a result of the detonation wider lht::- port quarter would .;ugge.5t a 2fi0 Kg streamiine<.i Ordinary bomb. This bomo wa..; very commonly used during the latter part of the war and was the typ~ which i,-=.L as a dud on ENTERPR!SE on !8 Mar ch and also the lyr.e carrii>d into lhe stup oy the ::micide plane of 14 May. I. Conclusion I'l-1. Prompt inleJligc·nt action, typical of the history of ENTERPRISE. pr evenlt..> Il-2. Except where torn open by the impact of the plane's engine, Lh" ·.velde 17-~. A~ ln the Batlle of Santa Cruz, cast 1r on failed when ~uojected to snock. In the l_attnr inst -42- CONFIDENTIAL to use grey or white cast iron in machine parts aooard ship. Motor generator parts_. which were made of cast liteel rather than ca:;;l iron, ...;tood up very well. 17 -4. More serious perhai.s lhru1 iaUure of the turbine, generator and bearing part.; made oi cast iron '.'las the misalignment of the two port shafts. Both were oowed, the .:mtboard one consideraoly, as a result of general defo1·mation of tht.: ship's structure in way of the detonation. This could oaly be prev1;;nled by design changes which would be too costly in weight as discusseu i.n the War Damage Report on C.Al:BERRA*. Allh-.)Ugt1 t.he engineering force e: • BuShips War Damage Report 110. 54 -43- COi:FIDENTlAL Pr Jt; I-~: First near-mis~. 4:mm rn.Jur.ts No;.". 8 a. d :u. frclm· lf,u p 1n. s.1owin5 ~ur, ..:f ;r~~n .:;t.ic: ... Js sh('ared off by phm-. Protruding pip~ iin& ;,:; gasoline mair. dralt1. Ph >l.> I-2: First near-miss. Hole eu• i:-. bl.:ter, frame HiG, at waterline. tan.re D-54- F, by plar:e. CONFIDENTIAL Phot:J I-3: First near-miss. Riveted seam beiow armor c.:ilt 1t~slde tJLster lank D- 54 - F, ruptured as a result <>i bomu detonation. Photo [-4: First near-miss. Vit w of break in foot, tur bine end of No. 3 generator. CONFIDENTlA L Photo 1-5: First near-miss. Break in gov.:.rnor-relay housing. No. 4 generator. Photo 1-o: Ftrst near-miss. Showing compression failures ir. chocks, port side No. l steady bearing, No. 3 shaft. COi!FIDENTIAL PhJtJ I-1: Fi1·st near-m •. ·s. C)mpressUn fa1lur-'s in f.)ot of L~aring h')using. starooard ~ide No. 1 steady nearing, No. 3 shaft. Photo I-8: First near-m1ss: Cn1ck in No. 3 eugine H.P. turbine pedestal. CONFIDENT!AL Photo 1- 11 : Firs;, near- mis::. View A ..;barred con t r 0ller p~inPl , l"!o. 4 motor-gt::ner·alJr. _ hJto I-1 : 3ecJn.:i near-miss. J e·.~· 1f f!ight di:>cJ.: fJr ward aiter ourning fig:::er plan~ catapllitej ;ii. CONFIDENTIAL SECTION J SUICIDE PLA.ll'E CRASH KYUSHU, 14 MAY 1J45 """'-----~----'+ I SU ICI DE PLANE 8 2~0KG BO MB H I T , F R AM E 4 2 1. narrative Jl-1. ENTERPRLSE remained in the viciuity of Okinawa pr0viding 11Igtt com oat air patrol:. anli-S1lbmarine patr ols, etc., until H April wh~n sht:: oncE" aga!n depar~ed for Uli:..hi fo r r epair s. A patch was we.tied ovpr the hole at frame 130, .;pring i.Jearings were- realigned, and cracked cast iron fe=-t::t .:m turbines and spriug bearings wer;;; rt!pa1rco with mi:>tal-lJCi< or brazing. A 4-inch riser to thf:l iiremaia was connecltld from Ollf.... of tl1e two stearr. centr ifugal pumps whtd had b<•t::n installed but not connect"'d in thP summer 'Jf 19·13. By 3 :..1ay tcmp.>rary repairs were comple:': Jl - 2. Thtl next si>: day... were spent uortheasl ol Okinawa pro- viding niRht and Lwilighl combat air patr ols, target eombat air p1.trols ar.d night he\:klcr flights ovPr lhe nor thern Ryukyus and the airfields of south~·rn Kyushu. Il-3. On tl1e night of 13-~4 May, U1e tank gr oup was southuar;t of Kyushu. launching strikes against Japanese airfields. At 0357, ENTERPRI$E wt:?nt to Gr->nera1 0u~rte r s upon receipt of the rt>porl that Japanes,., plan~s were m thi:- vkin\ty. It was not until 064~' however, that the cornb~t a! r patrol ::-t1ot l.i;>wn thrc>e p.an -..... Al 0 'fi3, the guns of ENTERPRISE open"'d fire on a plan<> to marooar i ar.d thl! shtp s .vung harj 1f'it ir. an emerger.c:1 turn. but to no avaU. Tt1e 9nemy plan'3 mar.£;UVt'r d 111 the c.o.il.; and 1ropr P.d from an altltud£> of appr.n:1mat' ly 1500 :':ePt in a 30° divt>. Som"' 200 yards from th..: ship the pilot flip:->ed I.he plane O':er in a left-har.d snap roll t o steepen the dive an:l struck th~ flight deck ~usl abaft tne forward elevato :::;lig11tly to port oi the c·.=nterli.ne (Photo J- 1). Jl- 4. The planr.>, engine and bomb c.;ra::-hP.d througr. the .:kck and lhr:? en~in .. and plecr·s of th"' plan~ came to r l~.;t 1n tile forward. elevator p!t. The b.:unb penetrate<.: the elPvator pH Into EtOrL'r on1 A-300-A bel')W, .vhere It aet:>natt:d h1gt1 Jruer t'lusing c>Y.l~nsivc> structwra; damage an:i igmt!r.g a ser:ous fire. Th0 forw:lrd elevator was completely demo!L... I. ·~ 'lnd the flight dPck .vas r ndr>red -44- CONFIDEN~tAL inoperative aft to frame 70. F•rAS were extiuguishea by 0/30, bm abom 2100 t':>ll.;:, of firefigliliJJg watf: r •.::i.J iJoode<.i spaces be~ween framf.s 26 and 38 up to th•- nangar d·~k. ~l-5. During U1e attack, EHTERPRISE maintained ht3r station In the l'Jrurn.uon an?. from O?C18 to 0817 was aclivi.!ly engaged i.n repelling 1nter milti=>nt attacKS by Japaue~e planes, "Jf which her gwmers shot ci:iwn four. Tnc rernalnder oi :.he day ·1.'a..:, relatively quiet. 2. Drunage anJ Damage Control Measures - Structural J2-l. The plane st.rucr: the GighL deck al an angle of about 45°, just abaft the 1:.irward e11~valor al frame 4°2, ::lightly to piirt of the centerllue. A hol~ roughly 12 foet long oy 20 feet witie was punched through lhe illgnt dc'Ck (1 noto J-3,. After nicking th•~ lower flange of the transverse !lent at frami.; 4G, plane and bomb separat•"d. The bomb pi~rced tht'! tilPVator ti•l \dccor.:i d0ck) at about frame 3!1 just to starooad oi the centerline an.ti det..mated hlgn orJer oelow, in A-30t1-A on top of stowed rags (.Photo J-4 ). Tho englm~ and piece.:; of th<:: plane landed in Lhe forward ·tarboard corner ".>i the elevator pit. J2-2. A hole roughly ~2 r~et square was bbwn through Uie second dPck nnd a slightly 'malJn one through the thir'.i deck. The forward elcvatar was ht1rh.-d tn~o tile ail·, the de-eking pulling away from the m'lin :>upponir.g frarnt•wJrk. AboUL three-quarters of the decking wad r•rds<=>d imact -:>n a plume of sm.:>ke about 400 feet above the ship ~-:.na ft.!ll into the :;;~a (Pholo J-2). Tne elevalor framew.:lrk was turned over al>out a transv'-'r..,e axis falling upside down illlo Lite elevator µh (Ptioto }-b). Otl18r parU; Ji Lhe elevatn. lh•3 remai.nder of the {ll-'Cking, the pE::ripherr.1.l g;irder and bracketc for lhP. steadying rails it tl 011 vuriou.3 parts of the flight deck forward and aft uf lhe "'levutor t1ut1,;h. une pi!.':!ce s:.ruck the; navigating bridge splim.:::r shield at frama 70. J2-3. The fourth ueck an A-40:J-A was deflected downward oy the blrist and adjrLcent .;lructure was damfu.g(;d sufficiently to render ineffoclual ll1e waterlight integrity o( tht:' foJlowing compartml?nl~: A - ~ - E , A-11-V. A-ti04-A, A-bOf"l-A, A -404-A through A-408-A, A-:~Of>-A. A-201-L, A-~0() - A, .A-20'7-AT and A-208-IL. The forwar.'..1 bulk.head of the f:~;..•1tttor trm1k al fra:ne 2•i was deflec~ed forward betwl"en the rr~in and flight ded:~ (I-111 Jto J-1.:i). Quick-acting watertight door 1- 2G-1 was 1 tnv·Nn forward (PI! >t..l J-7). ThreE: officerd heads forwar.:1 ~f the ..,lt..vawr and the uffic1;:rd1 living quarters surrounding the elevator were \iPmOlished. J:::l-4. De...;pittw' the large "venting area'' provld~ by lhe elevator :>pening :n th8 flight cteek, the eff~ct of the blast in the hangar space wad gr~at. 1 he ilight ued: bu~!$'cJ upward acro:;s the whole wiuth ::>f the ::>hip bet;.veen frames 40 and o~ ,Ph.:ito ]-8) with a maximum d<>flecli\>11 ?f at;::mt :3 i ,~t o iucht>s at frame 46 centerline. Light, built-up, trans '."::r.sP gider~· deflectt>c! m.:>re tr.an heavier plate bents (Photo]-.)). ln auihion, the po.rt er1d connecti1Jn of the inlerrnediate LransverJ"? ilight d .1.:r. gi.i·uer nl framt ·10 parted .::m1pit;:lPly and the iligm -45- C ,)NFID E.:l 1'1' lAL d~cr: belw•-r-:H fr0tm··~ 43 and W toru away 'tlong the inb')ard bulk.head uf th. g-a:lery (I..1hotr1 J-1.,,J. Tht> blast wave continued aft ?lowing out u1· tlarnu.gu.g hangar dF>ck ct.rt.a.n;...; uack to franH~ 14U. Ev.1.uen<.:: was not~d , f rci..~ct1 u vf the bla::;l ·11av<> duwnwar:i from the: f.1ghl uecl<': to lhe 1Jang&r uect al frame f.:i 7 and upwarJ L.J tnP gallery dec;k at fr~me 80 n•: mvre s~vere ctL.. t ,rtior. of ...;truct11re at tht:sr:i pomts. Bucklmg CJf tt;t! 1.e>avy certterilne slanclLiou ht:low U1i:> maln deck at frame 67 lllu.,,trat~s t~id rE:L<>ctt )IJ (1A«,to J-11). Ra·no 111 i:in the gal.ery dec.:k, frames Gti to 1i!1, was severely darnng"'.!d by buc1ding of the deck. Stime stru1.:~ur:tl 1.lei0rmatbr1 wa;;:; alo.o f JUrd m tne .,;P.contl deck between frames 20 and 10. j2-5. The bomb d8t::>nation W"l.8 about 10 feet aft and 4 feet below a .;ectio11a1 shel rack in the elt:~.·alor pit Oll ·.vhicl1 was stowed a quantity of oar sto..;K. Althour•h lhe rack was dt>struyed, none of lhe stock dislodged waf' as a "mi.~sih.: ha?srd.'' Th~ bars, ~lill t1Pd together by light wire, ft:!ll l J?,-6. Delvna:.ion vn... · jut:t abuv~ a pile of ra~.J. clowed 4 U 6 feet 'lt;...ef. irt A-30fi-A, whlch was dfei.:L~Vt:: in lin11ti.ng fragment penetration btHuw tLe tnird d·~ek. Fravlllent per1etr !2-1. Twt:.>nty ht lium anJ <:>iXl"'er. uxygPn .;ylind·}r..; jf U1e s!1atlerproo.f, 201) c:uoic i·?~t capa1.·H:i type sto'.•:ed in Lue ellvator pit, half on each side al)ng the longitu J2-8 AlthJugh .;tructu.ral damage reducr:>d oper_ational effecllveness hy rendering Lhe £light d,._.ck u::;eless betwE::r>r frames 25 and 70, lhe .:>trength of the ship'.; girder was little affected. Tl!e hangar deck was slighlly weaken~ by minor defurmalion and the second and third decks were urn 'Jpen t)elow Uh~ elevator pit, but temporary repairs were not n~quirtid a11d permanent repairs could not oe made with the facilities o:i board. 3. Daniae;11 and Damage Controi Measures - Piping, Machinery and Electrical J3- L The m0st seri.ous piping damage was the rupture in A-305-A .Jf a 6-inch firi::main loor. and a 3-inch damage control main riser. Waler flowing through u.~se breiLkS was one of the principal sources of floodin?-". High and low pr~~sure air lines, fr,-.:>.;h water piping and 'irainage piping abo were ~xtenmvely darnnged in the vicinity of the exr losivn (Photos J-12 and J-13). -4.G- C ONFlD ENTIAL J3-2. 'I'11ree :>f lhe nhip's f:>ur gasoline tanks dcvPloped slow leaks from the .aiot:r:. The port gasoline rna.ir; was crushea and unfit for use or>twe"n iraanes o2 and lOo; the stas\Joaru main was destroyed by fire and fragm~utfl oetween frames 26 and 38 and various ri!';er.;, valves and fueling stations were ctPstroy1::d. The system was P:'>Limated to be only ~O per C"'nl operative. :3-3. ~!entllatiou duct.:; wtr~ carried away in the lnnn('diate vicinity Jf th~ ll"'ton i.ti m ano consinerabk duct work was puncturt=id, dentP.d and c.rusheo tnroughout Lt.e an·a in w!Hcb bla.~t damag•· to bulkhead~ and decir.s Jccurred. 'l'hi0 dt1rna.g'":! wa.; heavi~..>l b~lwF>en frames 20 nml 54. on the sP.cond d£-ck anct frames 18 and U cm tht:: main d1:1ck. Thn most serhms damage to Utt> ventilatior. .~yst~m uccurred when bla~>t jarnmed oper, th~ Cb.sure of tt1e DiP..1t>l fJUrup air supply duct in A-g-r~ perm1liing firP flt;hlir,g waler and wnter from damagt:d mains Lo flood the SJ.-ace. Five men wi r"' ctriV"'r• oul Jf A-,,-E r.md later trapped and oruwnP.d i:1 A-404.-A. J3-4. Fboding Jf No. ~ :>ie;·<>l :fire [>Ump in A - ~t-E wn.; the only important mat:i.inc-r:,· casualty 1•rodw..:ed oy the hit. Pumps were over .oa.i~1 .n order L_, mainllin 100 pounds pr~ssure. N\;J. '1 firt>-and-bilve pump and NJ. 2 Dh'.,i=. firic pump overh1""ated, bul did nJt havP to be si:-cur~d O"'fOre ti ... fir~ was under control. J3-5. Ht::..ivy .an ... k>- fror:1 the fir"" rea1.:hed ]3-1. El(·ctrl ·a.l dnnu1g0 wa.s exLtJr.s!v..... A totc.11 lf 75,0UO fePl Ji pJwtr, lip:lllinP- a.n j3-8. SOll1"' ligllllng wa~ re.nerd t'y portable cabies and • !T!Prgency ' .v l\J KV A singJ.., ph -•17- CONFIDENTlAL ]3 - ~. The waler which entered A-~1 - E through the supply duct flooded the secondary drain pump and both fresh Nater pum~s in the space. Fr=sh waler supply for the ship was regained by utilizing a bol.ler !e(:'(I pump taking suction from a reserve feed water tank and discharg ing to the fre~h ·.vater system through a hose connected between the pump and a shore filling cormet:tion. J3- l 0. No damage was sustained by the gener ating plant. ':J.though water irorn flooded compartmen~s leaked ttlrough damaged canles and dripped onto bus bars l)f the forward distribution switchboard, the cables werts disconn~cted irom the switchboard beiore shorl cir cuits developed. With split plant oper alion, only one forward generator ·.vas running. lls main circuit breaker tripped out, but the contacts, which were lashed closed bf'>c;ause the tlrt.aker was nol shoc.:kpr oof, did not separate anti loss of power was prevented. J3- ~ 1. The relay panel and controller "' for valves S2-39-l and S2-3.3-2 oi Lhe hangar sprinkling syslem were damaged by shock and the cables wt.re ..,evereo by fragments. In addltrnn, the controllers ior hangar curtains Nos. 2 and 4 were gr..iW1ded by salt waler. J3-12. Aler.est complete l•)SS of ventilation occurred iorward of frame 50. Healer and ian panel No. 2 at frame 38 on the second deck was damaged by shock, fragments and sall water. Power panels 3~ and 39S, which supply a number of vent ::;els in lhe forward area, were soaked with saa water and damaged by shock (Photo J-14), and many ventilation unit.:; and control.ers were damaged by fragments, shock, fir~ ur water. Undamagea units wer<.:l reconnected to available 440 volt oul!ets. !3-1 3. Th;: forward elevator main purnp, sump pump, thruster motors, contro!lers, cables and powP.r panel 'Nere submerged in salt ·.vater. Motor s and controgers for flight dPck stanchion.:5 were destroyed by fire ana shock (Photo J-:5) and lhe hangar deck stanchion motor con troller was destroyed by iragments and shock. !3-1'1. Power to the Mk. 14 "'ights of 20!nm batlenes l, 2 and 4 nnd to 5-inc.:h Groups I and II was inkrrupted by lhe dest r uc~1on of a bank of transformers mounteo under the flight deck. directlv in the palh of the bomb and plant:!. 40mm mounts 1 ,2,3,4 and 6 and their MK.3 l dire~lors lost power by the severance of nor mal and alternalive power supply cahles in the ekvator trunk. 5-inch ammunition hoists Nos. 1,2.3 and 4 were disabled when two controllers in µower panel No.41 wc·re ,:larnaged L>y shod: and limit swHche~• in the hoists were grounded by salt water. ]3-15. . Almo.;t all of the radio and electronic appar atus in Radio m. lm.:ated in the gallery between frames ti7 and 69, was destroyed by shock and blast. -48- CONFIDENTIAL 4. Flo :xiuw and Flooding Conlr.:>l Measures J4-1. Nater p.:>urmg from breaks in the fire and damage control mains ana r,.;nrs together wilh ftrefif,hting water rapidly fl..>oded the damaged arPa fr Hn tbP hangar dC'ck to the hold, six levels bel0w, between frames ~t: and :m. spr~ading through fragm~nl holes, oucts and ruptured strul!tur~. rhe rirt!ak:: m Uw mains and risers were not isolated for murt.:! U1an tw )4-2. Drafts l>efore damage of 26 feel o inches forward and 28 feet 2 mches afl increased to about 33 feet forward and 2fi feet afl. The trim had lltt.ie effect on maneuverability. Stability was reduced by the free surface above the second deck, but not critically. There was no list. J4-3. S!.eps were taken to reduce the flooding as soon as firefighting was secured. Electric submersihle pumps were lowever into lhe elevator pit and two P-500 gasoline-driven pumps were put into action. Free surface water rn U1e officers' country on the second deck was eliminated through tleck drains and commode drains in U1e heads. Pumping was severely hampered by the fouling oi the pump strainers by small pieces oi rags and toilet paper. It took 36 hours to removP the 2000 tons of flood water. 5. Fire and Firefighting J5-l. As a night carrier, ENTERPRISE had no planes armed or fueled at lhe lime of the crash and bomb detonation. Plane:;; were parked closely in the forward end of the hangar, however. and four which had just landed were not completely defuele Jo-2. As pieces of the enemy plane and the engine crashed into the elevator pit, flames about ten ieet high ilared up, evidently fr.:>m the plane's gasoline. Fragments and flash from the detonation of the bomb set fire to the engines and tanks of the planes spotted forward or. thP- hangar deck. J5-3. The iorward oay of lhe hangar sprinkling system from the elevator to frame /0 was turned on at once by hangar control but pressure was not immediately avail.aDld on the forward starboard fire plugs. However, ample pressure on the port plugs enabled repair parties to nltack lhe fire promptly. Hose streams were tlirecled from Ute fllghl deck as well as from the hangar (Photo J-16). Within a few minutes. p1·essure was available on the starooard side iorward. Hangar dec.K, plane and elevator pit firas were brought under control in lo minutes and were completely extinguished in 30. No foam was used. 1 Jo-4. Small, stubborn fir~s developed below decks In oii1cers clothing and bedding from fragments and short circuits. Although -49- <.;ONFIDENTlAL rwt b. Lht::mselves dangerous, U1ey generated a great deai of smoke which endani;"e l'ed Lhe ship oy marklr,g her as a cripple and by making fire fighting am.l rescua work difficult. Rescue i.>reathing apparatus and gas mas1rn were used effectively. In :.me compartment, A-208-IL. smoke oecame so thi<.:k that investigation was .mpossible. The fixed fog system ln Lhls compartment was connecLed to the firemain and turned on for five minule3 extinguishing most of the fires in that space and permitti:1g personnel to enter. J5-5. Fragments caused a severe electric and powder fire in Group l 5-mch e-•ms on the starboard side oi the gallery deck flanking the ele vator, and a small fire In Group I1 5-incb gwlS '.)pposite. The fire in the port g roup was quickly extinguished by installed :spritl.klers and hose streams. No armrrnnitlon detonated. Water lv f1ght the starb:)ard fire was ·not available unlil extra hose lines were run from the port side and fr w1 tr.e sLarboard ii.re plug al frame 69. Some 5-inch ready-service powder ourned without injury to personnel. 'T'nis f;re was extinguished at about the sa.rne lime as lhe fire on the hangei.r deck (Photos J- Hi and J-17 ). Gun crews and repair party personnel threw over u.e side ammu nit10n which had been heated. ti. Japanese Planes and Bombs JC'-1. Phutograph J-1 ~-"'rmits accurate identification oi the plane which diwd on ENTERPRISE as a ZEKE-52. The bomb can also be .:>t:en in lh!c" photograph and its rounded shape strongly supports the belic>f that it was a 250 Kg streamlined Ordinary bomb which was in cv111mon use. 'I'lie extent of damage was consistent with this type. Pragment-3 of the bomb were r·~covered, but tht: bomb disposal offic&r was kHled so Lht• fragrnems were nol posilively identified. 7. Conclusion J7-l. ENTERPRISE repair parties performt..-0. excellently and pre- Vf'nlt.:r.1 serious fires from developing into a general conflagration. Everyon~ had been at General Quarters ior three hours before the crasr: frnd was ready for any eventuality. The damage sustained during lhe previous Lwo months, combined with realistic oattle drills which were eonducled regularly even in forward areas, had trained the crew lo a poinl where each man k'1ew exactly what to do. The clue to suc cessful firefighting was found to oe immediate action. j?-2. ENTERPRISE was a night carrier and as such all her planes wore normally secured in the daytime and the ship was then in the besl material conditi0n for receiving damage. Gasoline lines were drained and the bomb magazines securely closed. The aircraft which had been out at - 50- CONFIDENTIAL J7-3. Rescue breathing apparatus, Lype A-1, proved of great vaJur:: rn fir'.lfighllng and rescue work and ga~ masks were sallsfaclory against smo.Ke for .:;horl periods wher<=> lhe oxygen supply was suiiicient. The ship reported that sealed oeam lignts and battle lanterns ·.ver~ inval uable for penetr;i.liug smoke-filled compartments . ._ Fiash-proof c1othing p:-oviued excellent and complete protection frorn severe flash. Rigid stretchers were iotu1d to be impractical for transporting wow1dea through tortuous passages. J7-4. Scme of the flooding and probably the drowning of 5 men might have been prevented had the ventilation duct closure in A-0-E wilh:itood the blast of lhe detonation. Flooding from brJken fire and damag~ control mains coul:.1 have been reduced if knowledge of the breaks had been ascer tained. sooner. J7 - 5. Thirty- six hours were required to pump out waler which was pumped aboara in one- half hour. Strainers of porlable electric submersi ble pumps were constanUy clogged by debris. scuppers through wh.ch the water should have drained off lhe third deck became oL>cked in Lhe same way and the secondary drainage pump in A - 9- E could not be used. J7-6. The experience of ENTERPRISE u1 this case illustrates the ineffectiveness of " veming" the aeL:maLi0n of a medium Jr large bomb. The forward elevator was blown clear oi the ship, opening an area of about 2000 square feet; the large volume of the hangar space was avail able and the two hangar curtains just abaft lhe elevator hatch provided 1200 squ::..re feet more of opening. Yet, a large section of the flight deck was forced upward and rendered useless. J7 - '7. Al the lime of Lhis hit, ENTERPR1SE was Vice Arlmiral Milscher'.c; flagship. His comment was: " Th"" performance of duly of the officers and men on the ElITER PRISE unaer fire and lhe1r effective damage control measures were outstanding, of the highest order and lhe most effective that I have seen during one year's servicP in (Task Force 58). I was ~.articularlj nnpressed wit..1 the attiLude of tne st ip's company in combatting fire when under fire; your ship is indicative of the high order of efficiency that is rapidly winning lhe war." " BUSh1ps War Damage Reporl No. 56- -FRANKLIN - 51- C ONFIDENTlAL - Photo J- 1: ~apane.'>e suicide plane (ZEKE-52) just oefore st r ~king deck. - , :~1 • ..1tJ >2: .t-'l..:turt:! taken irom BATJ..AlT (CVL29) sh.:iwing argt. ~ ~t..)r, i;;f 01 vat.:ir platf.>rm at ~or.- )i explos!;,n p_urr,e. CONFIDENT LAL Phot".> J- 3: Hole in i!ight deck al frame 42, made by crashing suicide plane. Photo J-4.: View of de truction in A - 305-A where bomb carried by suicide plane detonated. CONFIDENTIAL Ph..>U 2-5: Vi<~w l..iuLng JOHn a:1d aft imo .No. 1 ,...le•.r:;.;.u1· t1·w.k fr::n-a Lrwar:.i ·dge )f L.1gr.t a1=ck 1evel. i\'Jlt "''~:va t >1' beam:; 1.1p icte .:I.nm tu u?tl'.>m ... ; l- it; nv!•..; ol Jv:n m 3d<:.Ond ar.d thi!'d ju:!k::; oy Jetor>.at..:>r. Df L..Jmti. r>hOLO J-o: Vi~w 1o krng to port and f,Jrward in No. 1 Ed~V~HH lruni{ aiter uebris clearer.1 up. l•!ote dishing af oulkh~ :...us a;1d iragment ho!F"::s. CONFID ENTL<\L Photo J- 7: Frame of quick-acting, :.vatertLght door l-2t:-l oetwe~nA-10'1-lLand N.J. l dt:vatur trunk. Door Na.s blown oul Jf frc.trne. I' Pi: o~o T- .,_ V1!"w of flight deck looking f:>rward fr~rn frame 75 sh J~ling de:formati )n of deck. CONFIDEil'flAL Photo J-9: 0vi=rnead of llangar deck looking forward and to port showing bulg0 u1 flight deck framt.'s 58 to 2ti. Note buck.ling of gir li»r struts ln benls at frames 4ti and 50. Pholo J- 10: Flight deck damage looking to starboard at frame 46. Nolt:! large deflection upward .>f i"ctr. tu - larb:>ard of inboard port bulkhead of galle:ry ca.used by complete failur e of end connections of light gird 0 r at frame 46. c~x-JF~ENTlAL Ph.>to J-1:: St~nchion in wardroom mess, frame 61, buckled by reflection )f 01a;l wave do .vnward Jn hangar deck at frame 67. Photo J-12: DamagPd .tlrt:main riser cut-out al main deck, frame 3 /, looking inboard and aft in compartment A-~ Oti-L. .,: 0Nr L::'.l F.l !Tl.AL Pinto .-1 : -,ri~·w f darn-:..~~ fir"'mair. risPr, : 0 ~:md 1 "K, fram€ 24, ~t.irb') rl iu•. Photo J-H: Look.ng to starb.)ar 1 tu...k- h1->ad 3b, ~ 1:. ·or:d Jt ;k. !" :He dam;;i.ged .1t1- i.itiun p w&r par. £!::;. CONFIDENTIAL Photo : - 15: Loo!dng ait arn.l l J sta.rDoard. r )rt E- inct. f.1L1 platform ~ 1 lvwing dam::i.gec1 Light d.::.ck ~1t:>vat::ir tru11k .;tanchion mot Jr. Pnoto J- lti: General vie >1 '>f fir.,.fighting ai;:tlvilies on flip:ht deck. COlJFIDENTLt\L Phr,tr_, J-1 {: Vi""W )' r·•ady l >Wdt·r lol..!k"'r >n ir,b >u.rd bu1kheaa uf }r'l..ip I !'-ir. ·h ~ur. gallt-!ty, fram.-. 3(', gall:- r!J 0"-'1..!k, Jlart Jard; SCC:!l'll:: ')f powder a'1d elPCtrlC fin... I.>hoto J-18: View of fire damage on Group I fi-is.ch gun gallery looking wrward and to p0rt al fram·· 25. CONFlDENTlAL SECTION K EXIT ENTERPRISE L Repairs Kl -1. On 15 May, lhe night carrier task group off Okinawa. somewhat battered by the Japanese air attacks of the day before, retired lo the south to iuel. In view of the serious reducllon in her operating efficiency, ENTERPRISE was sent to Puget Sound. via Ulithi and Pearl Haroor, ior repairs. She arrived in Bremerton for a two months' overhaul on 7 June. Kl-2. Despite furious attacks oy fanatical suicide pilots which sank or rendered inoperative many ships, including ENTERPRISE. the Japa nese high command failed to prevent the defeat of the lmpedal Forces. Surrender of the enemy occurred on 15 August 19.;5 while ENrERPRISE was still under repair in Pugel Sound. She was,U1erefore, denied the pleasure of entering Tokyo Bay and witnessing the signing of the final surrender document::;. 2. 'flie "Magic Carpet" K2- l. Repairs and alterations, including removal of sponsons Lo permit passage through the Panama Canal, were completed on 12 Septemoer. ENTERPRISE then proceeded south to Alameda. Cali fornia, where she picked up 878 enlisted men and officers for trans port to Pearl Harbor. She arrived at Pearl Harbor on 23 September. K2-2. In order to assist the speedy return of our citizen army to civilian liie, the Navy madt! ava.1abl ~ a numbe;r of its combatant ships, with their superior speeds, as a "magic carpel" between to.:> advanced bases and home. On ENTERPRISE's first trii; as a part of tne carpet, sne carried 1141 officers nnd men from Pearl Haroor to New York via the Panama Canal. K2-3. After a refit at Boston to provide additional berthing space, she made two magic carpet trips to Southampton, as1d Lhen one last trip to tne Azores lo pick up passengers rescued fNm the ATHOS II and the HOOD. In January 1946, she tied up at Bay ..mne, New Jersey, awaiting decision as to her permenent berth. 3. A National Memorial K3-1. As a tribute lo ner llllsurpassed war record, ENTE.RPRISE was cnosen for retention as a National Memorial in tne company of such ships as CONSTELLATION a11d CONSTITUTION. On 1 November 184b, the President of the Umted States approved the recommendation made oy tile Secretary of the Navy that " - - -ENTERPRISE should be retained permanently al some proper place a::; a visible symbol of American valor and tenacity :m war and of our will to fight all enE>mies who assail us---" -52- CONFIDENTIAL SECTION L SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 1. ~ummary Ll-1. ENTERPRISE was damaged in six different engagements by a total of si.x bomb hits, six damaging near-misses, one dud bomb hit and two "friendly" shell hits. Her exper ience is tndica- uve of the impor i.aucc of the bomb as a weapon against aircrafl carr iers and is confir med by the r ecord of U.S. carriers damaged or sunk in World War 11. Out oi a total of sixty-seven cases of carrier damage or loss, fifty-two were caused by bombs or Kamikaze suicide planes. The balance of the damage or loss was caused hy sub mar ine and air c r aft Lorpe Ll- 2. Although extensive structural damage was incurred on 24 August l~H2. 26 October 1942 anu 14 May 1945, t.he !'>lrenglh of the ship girder was never seriously affected. Nos. 2 and 3 elevators wer e rendered in.>perative by bomb ciamage on 24 August and 26 Octo ber 1!142, but '»ere locked in the up position at the time damage was incurred. This permitted contmuation of flight operations with only slightly reduced eificiency after completion of temporar y r epairs to the Hight df,Ck. The bomu explosion of 14 May. however, demolished No. 1 elevator and damaged the flight deck fo rward so extenslvely that ENTERPRISE could not continue flight operations. ·Ll -3 As previously noted, Lhe only carriers to be attacked by shell fire during the war were unarmor ed CVE's. The side belt armor of ENTERPRISE was not attacked at any time. Ll-4. Engineering casualties wer e numer ous, but fortunate!y of a rt}lalively mlnor nature. Shock damage from near-misses on 26 Ocl\>b •r 1942 and 11 April 1945 resulted In the most serious derangements incurred by the mach:nery. Cast iron parts of No. 2 main i:>ngine were fractured on 26 O:tober and cast iron parts of steady bearings ior Nos. 3 and 4 propd.Ler shafts. parts of No. 3 maln ~nglne and Nos. ~ and 4 ma1n generators were fractured .)n 11 April. E.L1minat1on vi cast iron from machine parts aboar.:i ship Nill preclude i..he recurrence of similar casualties. Nos. 3 and ·~ propell1::r shafts were bowed by shock derangement of supporting structure on 11 April. Similar cases are fully .:liscussert in wai damage reports 'ln C.Ai!BERRA (CA70)• and HOUSTON (CL81)u . ,. BuShips 'Har Damage Report No. 54 • • BuShips War Damage Report No. 53 - 53 - CONFIDENTIAL Nurnijrous instances of shock damage to electr ic switchboar ds, motor controller panels and electr onic equipment il.u-trated the need for continued effor ts to impr ove the ability of equiµrnenl to withstand shock. Ll-5. The desir ability of segr egating duplicate systems was demon- strat~d by the loss of steer ing conlr ol after fir efighting water stopped the starboard steer ing motor on 24 August 1942. Personnel on watch wer e overcome by heal exhaustion befor e U1eJ could star t the por t steer ing motor which was localed in the saine cowpar tmenl and steering contr ol was lost for 38 mh1ules. Similar ly, all potable water pumping capacity was lost when d uplicate fresh wat er pumps, both located in elevator machinery and pump r oom A- D- E , wer e stopped by Hooding of the pump r oom on 26 October HJ12 and '\gain on 14 May H.J45. Ll-G. Piping, ventilation and electr ical systems wer e ruptur ed or destr oyed in many places rn way of bomb detonations. P r ompt s~g r e g::i.tion of fir emains, however, maintained fir efighting efficiency; em'-'lrgency ventilation equipment r ~sto r ed essential ventilation; and casualty power lines supplied vital power r equirements. Ll - 7. Plooding ior the most pan was confined to tanks and non essential compar tments and control of f.ooding was pr ompt so that res~ r ve buoyancy and stabilily wer e never ser iously reduc;ed. The cofferdam oullt in storer ooms D - 521 - A and D- 4i9- 3A on ?4 August 194£! was a major W1dertaking anu proved ver y effective. On Ll-8. Although fires resulted from bomb detonations ln each of the six actions, the ship's preparedness and the pr ompt and intelllgenl attacks made upon the conO.agr1tions prevt>nled any from getting out of co11trol. The vigorous progr am of scr aping paint from all inter ior surfaces and substituting one thin coal of fire r etardant paint, the removal of overstuffed furnitur e and non-essential paper s , files. etc. and the stowage oi all but a week's supply of inilammable stor es in compartments bPlow the walerline, together with Lhe fact that µiaaes for thi=> most par t were u1;1gassed and mW1ilions wer e ~aowed in the magazines at the time of the attacks, reduced exposed comoustible material to a rnmimum, thus greatly limiting the severity of con ilae;rali"Jns. The hangar sprinklme; system was very effective in limiting the spread of the fires of 20 March and 14 May 19·15 and rnechanical foam rapidly extinguished the gasoline fi r es of 20 Ma r ~h and 11 Ap r il 1945. -54 - CONFIDENTIAL 2. Conclusion L2-1. ENTERPRISE was fortunate in thal no oombs p ... r etraled to her magazines, gasoline tanks, main machinery ')r 0ther vital spaces. Her pianes were secured and deiueled, with bombs, torpedoes and plane ammunition stowed in magazines al the time bomb hits were scored. A policy of keeping personnel at General Quarlers when lhere was danger of enemy attack was maintained so that they wer"' not caught Wlprepared. As many fire hazards as possible w12re "'liminated and Material Condition ABLE was maintained when in dangt'rous areas. assuring that lhe ship would be i.;1 Lhe best possible condition lo resist damage. Finally, conslam damage control drill and study of lessons learned by other ships so developed the crew's skill that each ma1. knew his dulies and carried Uiem oul wiU1out hesitation, thus pruc.iucing the immediate action which is the fundamental clue to succe;,siul .fire fighting. L2-2. Failure of cast iron machinery parts when subjected to shock clearly illustrates the grave potential danger 0f substituting cast iron for cast steel .)r steel weldments in machinery components. Deviations from machinery specifications whicb require casl steel or steel wel:i menls for machinery components therefore should be undertaken only in lhe event of severe procurement difficulties. L~-3. Flooding oi lhe duplicate steering motors and duplicate fresh water pumps indlcat~s the undesir ability of 10caling duplicate units in lhe same compartment. Although such an arrangement provides adequate protecti.:>n against the failure of one unit during peacetime operations, war lnilicted casualties will g1::nerally aifect bolh uni ts unless lhey are separated al least by a watertight bulkhead. - 55- PLATE I BOMB DAMAGE ll...tl , PLATE I CONFIDENTIAL rfl I 1 c ----- _.J...... L ~1- .... f ".& "' .... --~-- l[~"l f a.Tt •• -. .. "-- ••- Cl!OlHH, 1.tlrit ' - -~---, _:r-6-i---'--- ._,u_J GALLERY DECK SECTION AT FRAME 146 SECTION AT FRAME 134 LOO•l KC ro••••H> LOOa Jlta f OJf •flt: ~- ... __ J -' c_ ;, •1. ...,.,,- ;r, , oh ,;. iT ... •• .-...... ----,,...---.,,...... ) l ~-cv-s uMARSHALL.s s EN TE RIP SR~K~DS FES. 1942 MAIN DECK BOMB DAMAGE BUREAU OF SH I PS NAVY DEPT. 1'> • PLATE .II BOMB DAMAGE PLATE JI CONFIDENTIAL HIT NO 2 -r_ _ ----- ~ • LI 0. 1'J \.. • D ,__. - , _____,____ u· ----- h ~--. 1 r ----~-- r-~-....--~-,.,.--.----;1,,..-----.,,n--- ' -: ~-.•. IT .....----,...... - HIT N0.3 r 1h ol i .r, ,,...... "' l... (I. - HD\.r .,,,.,.o.. •Otu.t1•0ta.11111ur:w TOJUI II 'LI.Mt CIC• •r "'' N'O J FLIGHT DECK r•H•CNT& '''"''"TC•CD 1Kt rLll"l OIC\. f'Ll!Ul•e &"0 f'UtlUatlO •1Wlt• f'\.ATl•I PLATFORM DECK &90\'( MIA l lll >fC· l ./ _/~c ~ __,,,.....- ---=~~---_,-_....- -=-~ ------·- ,_,...... ~-- L_ -- ' ' j l- ___> ------~ ---· . --- -_.J.... -- ~ ...... ···~[4,~;;·~~!S~~~~~~ ------•-•LL t--- - t T --- i ~~~~~: ... ~ LEGEND !'-. J: .• , t"" ~ ...... ,, ,j; ,, ,,·, -t ,,, 10 ,,. I .. .1. h I• ~rtl " .... D I I T ._ Dl'P'l oot 1aau1 e::i / t•¥ cV-6 I USS ENT-ER PR I SE EASTERN SOLOMONS 24 AUG 1942 H··· I I ------~I . ~_..._-_..._ ...... I -_r~ •U•lOOUl t•Ultl•TO PftOMMITOD> BOMB DAMAGE > ~l MAIN DECK .. lf•ATlD f"( N1U•dAlt HC:• GALLERY DECK H .T•tl• rtt.t.V(f tl7 ut JD NAVY DEPT BUREAU or SHIPS ------..J..::------<=-=:....:....-=t"" l"~- PLATE ill BOMB DAMAGE PLATE 1II CONFIDENTI AL C ~ •"'t "- Tl~ J"OP &htl CRC-Yrl • C JO .. [. (UiDI OLWOL lt'J(O *"O 11 -, ore: .. Ah D fk[LL c T ..• frtD., lilt-. LID •Y J· t l} ,,, - ;. -ir-_J D ~ ..... s_ --.:. ~ -1 1 I L• .....1. SECOND DECK FO URTH DECK oooro•s or1 o· >ot·tt·L Sftl LL &ND ,L'()O r ... I • CJr LD . , .. , ...... 111 4 J ~ 1. -~.--- -.•• ,.,., --=----__, ••• .. O• J OI .. llW •I Otlf U 1.. OH o·>o• ·•• L ------ - ITA .. eittO.. s lll•C[lr~ SlCOlfD tNO n o •o or.e•• TOlllllll LOOS( Ar fttC: 1tt llAtC IUT N(tU.1•tO AiTTAtrttO 10 T"C. OYfR"[AD THIRD DECK LOCAt l O~O, D(lO'U Tl (I~ F I RST PLATFORM NA1-. Ol CtC OC:O K SlCONO DC CI 0 ;~:t:::,~~ . ..~~~·,to't .. ro '"0M HIT ,_0 I LEGE ND 0 "';: 1: .:t:.,,;.~i,:~~~~1~,t;:t:, THI RD OtCt< \.tQHT aHOI DllTftOYtO l'U\.&. flOODl 'fl VA IN OCCI. V AI N 0 ( CI ~ !':. ~~tt~:~ :'~T"sT~: r:-:i":~OTN I O Ull T H DI C K llGOfll D 0~_, .. t\lOlll. 0£h.[':T(D OOws.w•!leD .. L A 0 I • lf ..OVf unt ' .!777':-t.:::-".".'::::::"'.7'.~"it~~~~O::,~ _ WL .& :0 h •I.'" JO trU I t."i:ti=~~>;;::=:L..._~:5!~· ;•o~-~ n.oooto htROu ~ '""r' o" " U S S ENTERPR I SE CV-6 , fl' AQltlfil ftOL I L '"' L a IHlD 1v ftf 1t1t· 111111 EAST°ERN SOLOMONS 24 AUGUST 1942 SECTION AT FRAME 190 COFFERDAM T CONTROL L.OOK NG ArT FLOODING FROM HIT NO. I SECTION AT FRAME 172 F RAME 172 BOMB DAMAGE ~OO~ I HG A rT NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SH I PS ~ PLATEN BOMB DAMAGE PLATE JS[ CONFIDENTIAL NEAR MISS BOMB NO I BOMB H [~ _!' Ml l>l S DOl/.8 tlO 2 ~ ____._[Jl],____ ' ,... ,.... A I • .._ .. • 101 Tl !Jalt I •LLT r-oc1101. 1 ..u1 ~ .. ,,, .. , [ .... ~ i •nu• ••DL• ______,,, ;; - ...... -- ...... + •O•t ••Or flG-\ t .,,,f'IDJI 14 I• OHi •l Tflll tli •LtC"t Ot • A j 01 IL.'t •OMl•Hf"O SECOND DECK ••• L______-1---- ;.. ~L :-;,;,,:. ~,t.11oo•u ,.. to• h... \ .•t;l cJ0:•1.",~~1~0"• .•,."f'ttJ':{,,~·,• •"' 'j.. ~1.~,•:o• t CO•.,lnu.• OO•l)L , .. lo- •l•I OU•Ol.•lttt~ FLI GHT DECK CDlllC&l ·un "ICH0-.111 '"' &illfD •••• now CtLUt !Ut&l 100\1 Of IOWI •llG• T J.'11 M&lil&Jt O!h 1hllttl PUT TO UID • "fQ.00" 1 ti • 0PCt1&f11111 OrA1Ut• er Htl ll.. .U •ftAlltl ,. •MtllE Ot1'04U.Tl llJ •OO•• Uro tu•"'• ,.•au· .. ou 1•1111 He.• •O'll ••O eon •r.a·uo-. o'•O•u .. ,. f CUCI 1111.1'1.D ,., Dt eoaw 11110 0' . ... . •T OOClll! ... ' . .. , Of'l• •r' ., ...... ~~:~,·: "io•,r•l&l• 11 Sh. Ot &tt•Ck AtiO • ll O•W.l4lP ~t • • I ~ LEGEND !_f'St1• Ml1 ~I ...... ---.-.- ---.. j • I Ot 'LM ...... t.a•1;:S CO"U "'"' LiOUIQ trra•u O• ••Ol .tOttflV t!lllATt 0 01111 O'l" YO f ..I THIRD DECK ••• vn• O••••t •tD AlltC .t• IMO# mg tOUO Ot ,. •• _J-1--~1-~--- ____.MAIN-- OECK u.s.s ENTERPRISE cv- e SANTA CRUZ 26 OCTOBER 1942 BOMB DAMAGE NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OFSHIPS PLATE JI. BOMB DAMAGE PLATE Y CONFIDENTIAL .,,, .. 'OC.ILC DCC III. Ot """""TO• "0C'W •oo• 0 S I '"''' Jlij( ! ··t •1, ... 111 ••• c f •I UTllll 01511111tlrJHC •00" 0 SOI ' • AT FRAME 30 PLATFORM LOOI\ t HG If' T ... 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""LllklS A'iO n.1 C.OtfTftOl..,M&JOlt P01HIOlrfl1tU 't'D$[0, IOWll " CAUSED t.XPL0$1\1£. eunr.i•N. 0, •Ou v ,,..0 'OCll llllCID1 ~(flV1C( UU•U .. flOk OAVt TO .,..'11 ,AflT;t[tll' ... • OM TtU' t" LIOttT C!.~K Gt()~( 0 ON THt IP'.l..I H ""Ul S~ltl 08 0' Tt-4.[ 110111 W lfOUH TS A ND .! T THE'. fOR WA A 0 t NO Al Fft 116 .".. or .. ,., PILOT~ J!Jt P" trUt.t1 ft.Y CONTROL loND PQRT' 8A&Ct\t1 9\JPPQ"T, nu..c;..•ri.l "ONl•OL. SlGNAL "PO~ .. WINO !OltOI! GIJfftO &T H .. awr.-t or """v 4.llfffO lfttCt! RUf'tOllUO ,, ,.~s•o£ 0, 10... , D,. ~O Ml\1-C~I -\ S"A•l ft~' rr11 DY p CtUt ~(; 0 s~•IH"£D Olf 'HOE UD ~ £l.tCTR C.l.Ci10=.lt 11.UA•C.tt • I U.£C.llHCAL AlrfD l.C SV-'-1l¥S IUR"CO OUT OR G~DUNDto 8Y w.tTt::• A"JfU:JvL.T 0' r '"or :owa~c" COMMUNICATION PLATFORM NAVIGATING BR I DGE SPACCS r1t•. LEO ilfjTtt fl •.. Ot<£ 4-.0 MAD[ Ul'fT t •t~IU: flY Mt'•T -!Ot.ii\fft:tt ... ' "v•ou. '''l!t OUl ·~·C. e ---'---'=--': INFORMATION PLATFORM LEGEND t S Y O)(l rlLLfD IPAOES U.S.S. ENTERPRISE CV·6 SOUTHERN JAPAN 18-20 MAR. 1945 DUD BOMB 81 FRIENDLY SHELL HITS NAVY DEPT. BUREAU OF SHIPS PLATE 3ZII BOMB AND SUICIDE PLANE DAMAGE ------PLATE 3ZIT. ...,,. oir ••ATf Pal,. or,.. •• ., IUl(; I DC ,LA.It( CONF I DENT I AL AMO Jill A• • 11 1•t Of It Al"IUL ._0 I fL.1 VA•Qf1 OUIOLtl"tD .,. • t...iol'f', .t L.lllfU. S I CfrO• • i.C •• • OO • ICt !'l r,.l A1I . •r•A1 .. DrM 't'l,HU CD g,c• AIOUT .t.'T.IU ,.tVt•:.r .&,;. t A" l\Df ...,.SIUO UP~IDt..DO tt ,. .. CLl'i 4 TD ~ flfl _ .1_ _l I I ·' I --..--- J Ut l ~ ll • C. •• , .... ',. ~ ,. ., t " " l • •• D OIC~ ... r _- &O. 4 lilU %-'-- .,.. It ... -r. , ~....;.~-,,~~~~-....,..,.....--:,,.---;...... -., ;:-:~"""~"""~,___._. ., . u .a• • IC-fl•• t•• .. .. .,...... , ..., .. SIC-0 111 0 ,I.. ar rQllflf ,______1 ~-6.... l ______" .r, .. 'I •• .. . .• .. L- r~ooo r'tl •110• •J1 t •• 11 ... u • 1: .a.tt oou u.ca: CO " TttCL •t19't ... a.,,,., .... ,.o. , •r ft GH lt ~I ••? I• ' ""ouc" r•uowr•t MOLC1. MAIN DECK OtlC. T'I •- tt •U,,IURl Q' SlRUC. ru11r PU• " •G:> fllf & I · t f LOODl D IP'! • OUl"t t••Ulll G OL..OIU•l or Al li'" '""" " DIJCT --- ..._ __ --;-- - 1 ___ ) t o\f ttll (if.NLftU O" 1 ( ¥ 11i4"01tA ·o-. , .. 1t00tit I 1 T llllU Hl Jll DO W 0 " 0 4 • ( t&. '5 t ,,, ,·,----Vt ,_ _ l ._.. . .- .. 0 't I - r .,Tl:. ~=:,: · ~,l~J~ ...... --,r-_ _..r _1__ ..__ -1 .---- L r Fl RST PLATFORM S'400ti UfD Hfl!!.ICTUIUL OtfOIOtAt IOI\ :ltl" ..ltl,,_. f 'It U O ft !iO Ofl - Aft,.fl!OKI M&tt 1..0C&TIQN HOt OA- WA!lil OlliU•tD1't, '""Ot fOHAl' .-1a11 IOtt· ___v t'tl IOAll___ _ llW W.U Of ""'I' "[Al\ liflft.' 0411f40t0 ~ HOt )I ...... "' ~tlOl,.(I. , ... , ,.,0 u -,.,,!J'f$fi ,Q,. .. oaa-4 !HOT\- I LEGEND a ''' ---nv J. J.: ?-- us s ENTERPRISE CV•6 OKINAWA 8 l 0 I DECLASSIFIED een devised to give increased protection a.gainst underwater attack, spells, bombs, splinter::., de. (A discussion of this type of tank is included in BuShips War .:..>arrage Report No. 39 " W.f\SP").