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2013-01-25 Assessing the Sustainability of Tsunami-Impacted Communities of Thailand’s Andaman Coast: An Institutional Ethnography
Williams, Aaron
Williams, A. (2013). Assessing the Sustainability of Tsunami-Impacted Communities of Thailand’s Andaman Coast: An Institutional Ethnography (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/25023 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/511 doctoral thesis
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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Assessing the Sustainability of Tsunami-Impacted Communities of Thailand’s
Andaman Coast: An Institutional Ethnography
by
Aaron James Williams
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INTERDISCIPLINARY GRADUATE PROGRAM
CALGARY, ALBERTA
January, 2013
© Aaron James Williams 2013
Abstract
The 2004 Andaman Sea-Indian Ocean tsunami had a profound and enduring effect on communities, environment, and the overall livelihood of survivors. For impacted regions, the nature of reconstruction and recovery efforts has permanent implications for the long-term sustainability of communities and the livelihood of individuals. This institutional ethnography (IE) study assesses the sustainability of reconstruction aid and recovery in the four tsunami-impacted communities of Ban
Nam Khem, Bangkaya, Thuungwa, and Khao Lak in Phang Nga province of Southern
Thailand.
The purpose of this study is to describe the post-tsunami landscape of recovery within these communities, and to document how survivors have experienced the processes of reconstruction, aid and recovery in their everyday world. Employing IE, the research exposes the broader influence of policies and plans created by institutions and government bodies that dictated the ruling relations of recovery within communities of focus. Analysis of data collected from February 2011 to December 2012 revealed an uneven pattern of aid and recovery not only between villages, but within villages. These patterns are delineated by divergent policies for aid and recovery that set people and communities on different trajectories in the reconstruction and recovery process. This has resulted in varying and uneven outcomes for long-term recovery both between and within communities of study.
The emerging problematic within the study centres on the struggle for valuable land within the region. Furthermore, the emerging issues surrounding land and varying policies and plans for aid and recovery appear to shed light on
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fundamental flaws in reconstruction policies as a top down approach, while revealing the benefits of a grass-roots approach to reconstruction, aid, and recovery cultivated through non-governmental organization support, and enacted by people within the community. The overall outcomes and assessment of sustainable development in the reconstruction and aid recovery are discussed as are recommendations regarding how they can be linked to broader global and domestic forces impacting recovery. It is hoped that this study will not only help the people of the selected communities better understand the policies and processes that dictated the reconstruction and recovery effort in their communities, but also allow for NGOs and levels of government to understand more effective ways to rebuild communities following a disaster.
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Acknowledgements To the citizens of Ban Nam Khem, Bangkaya, Thuungwa, and Khao Lak who shared not only their time, but their experiences living through both the tsunami event, but also the long process of recovery. I would also like to dedicate this work to those who did not survive this horrific event of December 26th 2004. To my interpreter, Poypiti Amatatham, thank you for providing your excellent interview, interpretation, and translation skills. Your organization and professionalism provided me with the required informants, an adherence to a rigid timeline for completion, and efficiencies that were essential to complete this research.
To Dr. Dianne Draper, thank you for your guidance and faith in me throughout the entire process of my program. There were periods that were difficult but you always helped me through these challenges. Thank you as well for your tireless efforts reviewing my work, your advice, and keeping me on track. You have always been a positive influence within my academic career. To Dr. Janet Rankin, thank you for introducing me to the method of Institutional Ethnography. You provided me with a means and guidance to apply IE to this incredibility complex landscape of post-tsunami Thailand. You also helped me at every turn make sense of what could often be viewed as chaos that is a disaster recovery region. Thank you as well for your tireless efforts reviewing my work, your advice, keeping me on track, and helping me see clearly the information I sought out and made sense of.
To Dr. Barb McNicol, thank you for helping me keep me organized and with merging my skill set as a Geographer with IE and other disciplines I have employed within this multidisciplinary study. Thank you as well for all your help and support through this long journey. To Dr. Wil Holden, thank you for your help in gaining an understanding of the relevant theory and processes that have influenced this developing country of Thailand. Thank you as well for all of your time reviewing my work and sharing your knowledge regarding environment, development, and sustainability. To my partner Lauren, thank you for supporting and motivating me throughout my entire program. Thank you as well for putting up with my extensive trips away Thailand to complete this research. Finally, to all of those individuals who have supported me through this process that are not mentioned, I thank you. My thanks will be acknowledged individually.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction to Aid, Reconstruction and Recovery in Tsunami-Impacted
Phang Nga Province ...... 1
1.1 Purpose, Objectives and Motivations of the Research ...... 2
1.1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Research ...... 2
1.1.3 The Importance of the Research ...... 3
1.1.2 Motivation and Focus of the Researcher ...... 9
1.1.4 The Chapters ...... 12
1.2 The 2004 Tsunami Event in Southern Thailand ...... 13
1.3 Ecological and Geomorphic Characteristics of the Study Area ...... 14
Chapter 2: The Evolution of the Tourism Economy and Typologies and in Thailand 22
2.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami ...... 22
2.1.1 Economic Policy and Support of the Mass Tourism Economy ...... 22
2.2 Thailand’s Tourism Typologies and Policies ...... 24
2.2.1 Economic Conditions and the Changing Livelihood of Survivors Following the Tsunami 28
2.3 The Impact of the Global Recession and Political Instability ...... 29
2.4 Neoliberalist Policies in Development and Disaster Recovery Research: a Framework of
Thailand’s Historical Development and Tsunami Recovery Policies ...... 33
2.5 Contemporary Theories on Development Within Lesser Developed Countries: ...... 34
Chapter 3: Historical Development, Hazard and Land Tenure in Thailand and SE Asia
...... 37
3.1 Natural Hazard Impact and Development ...... 37
3.1.1 Sustainability of Development in South East Asia ...... 38
iv
3.1.2 Land Grabbing in Thailand ...... 39
3.1.3 Development Within the Hazard Zone: Described as a Development-Induced Disaster .. 41
3.2 Reconstruction Policies and Initiatives ...... 44
3.2.1 Government and UN Policies and NGO Initiatives ...... 44
3.2.2 Financial and Corporate Initiatives Supporting Reconstruction of the Tourism Industry 47
3.2.3 Sustainable Recovery and Reconstruction - Policy and Reality ...... 48
3.2.4 Opportunity for Some ...... 50
3.2.5 Literature on Reconstruction and Recovery Eight Years Later 2004-2012) ...... 52
3.3 Historical Settlement and Ethnic Groups Within the Area of Study ...... 53
3.3.1 History and Settlement of the Andaman Coast of Southern Thailand ...... 53
3.3.2 The Origins and History of the Moken Sea Gypsies in Southern Thailand ...... 55
Chapter 4: Institutional Ethnography as a Methodology in Assessment of Disaster
Redevelopment ...... 58
4.1 Elucidating an Appropriate Methodology to Assess Post-Tsunami Recovery ...... 59
4.2 Defining Institutional Ethnography ...... 60
4.2.1 Identifying Ruling Relations Through Institutional Ethnography ...... 64
4.3 Why the Method of Institutional Ethnography is Effective in Disaster Research ...... 65
4.4 Approach to the Research and Writing Style ...... 67
4.5 Ethical Considerations ...... 71
4.5.1 Consideration of Post Tramatic Trauma Resulting From Interviews ...... 73
4.5.2 Cross-cultural Considerations within the Study ...... 73
4.5.3 Recruitment of Participants ...... 74
4.5.4 Collection and Storage of Data ...... 75
Chapter 5: Ruling Relations and Social Organization of Land in Ban Nam Khem...... 77
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5.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami in Ban Nam Khem...... 77
5.2 Conditions Immediately Following the Tsunami ...... 79
5.3 Recovery Paths for Reconstruction of Permanent Housing and Infrastructure in Ban Nam
Khem...... 87
5.3.1 Reconstruction Policy and Reconstruction Following the Government Plan...... 88
5.3.2 Common Threads Surrounding the Outcomes of the Development Plan...... 91
5.3.3 Organization of Community Activists Opposed to the Government Plan for
Reconstruction of Housing...... 93
5.4 Assessment of Real and Perceived Hazard in the Reconstruction of Ban Nam Khem...... 97
5.5 Activism Spreading Beyond Ban Nam Khem...... 99
Chapter 6: Ruling relations and Social Organization of Land in the Moken Sea Gypsy
Community of Thuungwa ...... 118
6.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami ...... 118
6.2 Conditions Immediately Following the Tsunami ...... 119
6.3 Reconstruction of Thuungwa Moken Community...... 121
6.4 Ruling relations in Thuungwa Following Reconstruction...... 122
6.5 Issues of Housing in Thuungwa ...... 128
Chapter 7: The Construction and Ruling Relations in Bangkaya Tsunami Community
...... 137
7.1 Positive and Negative Impacts of the Integration of Moken and Thai at Bangkaya ...... 140
7.1.1 Reflection on Past Experiences ...... 144
7.2 Troubling Aspects of Aid and Relocation of Villagers to Bangkaya ...... 147
Chapter 8: Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Khao Lak Town ...... 153
8.1 Re-built Tourism Infrastructure in Khao Lak ...... 159
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8.2 The State of the Natural and Built Environment in Khao Lak Town ...... 161
8.3 Trouble on the Horizon: Recent Economic Developments Impacting Sustainability in Khao
Lak ...... 166
Chapter 9: Discussion/Conclusion ...... 174
9.1 Key Issues of Reconstruction and Recovery in Each Village of Focus ...... 174
9.1.2 Key points of discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Ban Nam Khem ...... 174
9.1.3 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Thuungwa Moken Sea
Gypsy Community ...... 176
9.1.4 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery Bangkaya in Tsunami
Relief Community ...... 178
9.1.5 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Khao Lak ...... 179
9.2 Motivation in Reconstruction and Recovery Leading to Different Outcomes in Ruling
Relations and Recovery Outcomes...... 181
9.2.1. The Ruling Relations Organizing Land Value Have Dictated Recovery Policy ...... 181
9.2.2 Priority of the National Government for the Speed of Recovery ...... 183
9.3 Social Organization of Grass Roots Activities Can Make a Difference ...... 190
9.4 Forces Impeding the Sustainability of Culture, Environment, and Livelihood of Survivors in
Post-Tsunami Thailand...... 193
Chapter 10. Threads Not followed: Future Studies ...... 199
10.1 Safety and Hazard Assessment of the Rebuilt Environment for the Local Population and
Tourists Within the Khao Lak Region ...... 199
10.2 The State of the Natural Environment of the Khao Lak Region 8 Years on...... 205
10.3 The Current and Evolving Relationship Between Local and National Government...... 206
10.4 The Ongoing Land Disputes and Ruling Relations...... 207
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10.5 The Recent Acceleration of Outside Interests in Current Resort Development ...... 207
References ...... 210
Appendices A: Ethics Approval Form ...... 223
Appendices B: Informed Consent Form For Informants ...... 224
Appendices C: Informed Consent Form For Informants (Thai Translation) ...... 227
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List of Tables
Table 1: Primary Informants in the Four Communities of Study…………………………..72
Table 2: Assessment of Sustainable Development in Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in
Tsunami-Impacted Communities of Focus…………………………………………………187
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Table of Figures
Figure 1: Study Area With Tsunami-Impacted Phang Nga Province Thailand ...... 5
Figure 2: Direction of Tsunami Impact on Thailand’s Andaman Coast ...... 16
Figure 3: Sofitel Magic Khao Lak Before and After Tsunami ...... 20
Figure 4: Location of the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Resulting Tsunami ...... 21
Figure 5: Ban Nam Khem 2005 (Google Earth, 2012) ...... 100
Figure 6: Map of Ruling Relations and Aid in Ban Nam Khem...... 107
Figure 7: Map of Ruling Relations in the Moken Village of Thuunwga ...... 136
Figure 8: Map of Ruling Relations of Bangkaya Tsunami Village ...... 152
Figure 9: Map of Ruling Relations Khao Lak Town ...... 158
Figure 10: Unequal Distribution of Resources ...... 192
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List of Plates
Plate 1: Coastal Plain of Study Area From South to North ………………………….…………….17 Plate 2: Four Communities of Focus in This Study……………………………..……………………68
Plate 3: Image of Coastal Plain Taken January 2005……………………………………………….81
Plate 4: Ban Nam Khem Ruins of Houses on Flooded Tin Mining pits………………………..82
Plate 5: Letter from Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn’s Personal Affairs Division……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….108
Plate 6: Letter from Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn…………...…111
Plate 7: Local Government Sign Condemning the Rights of Villagers to Rebuild on Their Land at Ban Sak ……………………………………………………………………………………...……….116
Plate 8: Construction Waste Dumped on Property of Ban Sak Villager ……….………117 . Plate 9: Beachfront of Ban Sak Villager’s Property………………….………………….………117
Plate 10: Housing built in Moken Sea Gypsy Village of Thuungwa……………………….129
Plate 11: Replica of Traditional Moken House, at Thuugwa Moken village……….….. 133
Plate 12: Moken Style House Bangkaya Community.…………………………..………….……139
Plate 13: Thai Style Housing Bangkaya Community…………………………….……….………139
Plate 14 Christian Aid Organizations Presence in Thuungwa……………..….…...……….149
Plate 15: Khao Lak Beach Front………………………………………..…………………….…….……154
Plate 16: Coastal View of Khao Lak …………………………………………………………………….162
Plate 17: Alteration of Stream and Estuary in Khao Lak Town……………….……..………165
Plate 18 – Damaged Retaining Wall South of Khao Lak …………………………………………165
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Plate 19: Building on Sand Spit Not Fully Stabilized Following Tsunami…………...….166
Plate 20: Odorous Stream Running Through Resort Property Khao Lak December
201…………………..…………………………………………………………………………….…………………..168
Plate 21: Abandoned Resort Destroyed by Tsunami, Khao Lak February 2011…..…171 Plate 22: Abandoned Resort in Khao Lak Rebuilt, Opened November 2012………….171 Plate 23: Construction of New Resort in Khao Lak December 2011……………………..172
Plate 24: Newly Placed Memorials in Front of Resort Construction Site December 2011
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….172
Plate 25: Completed Resort November 2012 …………………………………………………….… 173 Plate 26: New 400 Room Resort Owned by Phuket Interests, Opened November 2012
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……. 196
Plate 27: Tsunami Evacuation Map for Ban Na Khem Community…………………..………201
Plate 28: Tsunami Evacuation Sign Indicating Direction and Distance to High
Ground……………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….202
xii 1
Chapter 1: Introduction to Aid, Reconstruction and Recovery in Tsunami-Impacted Phang Nga Province
The 2004 Andaman Sea-Indian Ocean tsunami had a profound and enduring effect on the environment, economy, politics, demographics, and overall livelihood of the people living in these regions. In their initial assessment of selected communities impacted by the tsunami, Rigg, Law, Tan-mullins and Grundy-warr (2005) suggest that how communities recover from a disaster depends on the extent of the damage; the timeline of aid relief; the disaster recovery policies in effect; the effectiveness of institutions providing aid; village cohesiveness; and community access to political, economic, and social resources. For affected people, the restoration of livelihoods is vital to their ability to provide for their families during the rebuilding process. Thus, the nature and effectiveness of rebuilding actions and resulting economic infrastructure is essential to the recovery and reconstruction process (Manuta, Khrutmuang, & Lebel, 2005). In order to understand the nature of reconstruction and recovery in tsunami-impacted regions, such as Phang Nga
Province of Southern Thailand, one must consider the makeup of the local economy and new infrastructure that is emerging, as well as the role of surviving people and communities within the new economic landscape. The evolution of the post-tsunami economy is influenced by factors such as the re-emerging tourism infrastructure; reconstruction policies, or lack thereof; the diversity and vulnerability of the local and regional economy; safety and hazard from future tsunami events; environmental rehabilitation and preservation; and the role in and access of local people to the economy.
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1.1 Purpose, Objectives and Motivations of the Research
1.1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Research
This institutional ethnography (IE) research assesses the initial impact, stages of recovery, policy creation, implementation and impact, and the challenges facing the population of the four tsunami-impacted communities of Ban Nam Khem, Bangkaya,
Thuungwa, and Khao Lak in Phang Nga Province of Southern Thailand (see Figure1). A fifth community, Ban Sak, is considered in conjunction with Ban Nam Khem due to their close proximity. Although each community is in close geographic proximity, all had very different recovery outcomes because of factors such as the nature of aid, infrastructure and housing reconstruction, status within society, and availability of desirable land for development.
The purpose of this research has been to describe the post-tsunami landscape of recovery within these communities, and how survivors have experienced the processes of reconstruction, aid and recovery in their everyday world. The processes of reconstruction aid, and recovery within the region of study have been coordinated and are identified as ruling relations. Ruling relations are defined as a complex field of coordination that impose distinctive trans-local forms of social organization and social relations that are often carried textually (Devault & McCoy, 2006; D. Smith, 2005). Ruling relations within post- tsunami Thailand have been established by policies, laws, initiatives, and plans dictated by institutions such as NGOs, levels of government, national and international companies, as well as individuals and social hierarchies within communities and society that convey both economic and political influence that coordinate recovery processes.
3
Using IE, this research elucidates recovery policies, aid and reconstruction actions
on the ground. Within the conventions of the IE method (expanded on in Chapter four), specific objectives are not outlined prior to the commencement of research. There are, however, overarching questions of inquiry that are sought out within the research, as follows:
1. To understand and describe the ruling relations within communities that have resulted in the emergence of their post-tsunami everyday world;
2. To describe in detail the activities that unfolded and directed reconstruction, aid and recovery mechanisms allocated within each community;
3. To assess safety and hazard following reconstruction of housing and tourism infrastructure, as well as the state of the environment (critical in hazard mitigation and long term safety and well being of survivors in the region); and
4. To assess reconstruction, aid (including financial assistance), and recovery within each community of focus and how their experiences and outcomes of recovery have attributed to their everyday world today and outlook for the future.
1.1.3 The Importance of the Research
Understanding the social organization and dynamics of recovery in Southern
Thailand is relevant to multiple scales or levels of practice in geography and cognate disciplines. At a regional level, the social organization that has emerged following reconstruction and recovery is relevant to understanding whether the emerging economic infrastructure (dominantly tourism-related) is allowing for a equitable, safe, healthy, and prosperous livelihood for the local population. From a policy perspective, it is important to gain insight into impacts of policies, initiatives, and
4
plans, or lack thereof, on the stakeholders involved in reconstruction and recovery in
this disaster and in future events. From a broad perspective, the dynamic of recovery
and the question of sustainable recovery is relevant to developing a broader understanding of disaster recovery within tourism economies, where there is a considerable gap in literature. In this research, I aim to contribute not only to the body of knowledge of disaster recovery, but also to knowledge translation (an understanding of the processes of reconstruction, aid and recovery) for the people within Southern Thailand and for people impacted by future natural disasters.
Regarding the 2004 Asian tsunami, there is considerable literature available on
the mechanisms of the event, the immediate aftermath, policies of aid and recovery,
and the environmental effects. Strategies and policies for redevelopment and
rehabilitation have emerged from the different national levels of government, private
interests, the United Nations (UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and relief
organizations. Initial reports of the results of these initiatives show a disconnected
effort that has primarily benefited only the prominent and powerful stakeholders,
such as local elites and resorts (Haynes & Rice, 2005). The Thai national government
implemented plans to redevelop areas in an organized and sustainable way (National
government plans and definitions are outlined in Chapter three) (Haynes & Rice,
2005). However, early documentation or reconstruction one year after the tsunami
reported that in locations such as Koh Phi Phi Island in Phang Nga Bay, haphazard
illegal redevelopment has taken place due to lack of action and enforcement to
regulate the redevelopment process (Haynes & Rice, 2005).
5
Figure 1: Study Area With Tsunami-Impacted Phang Nga Province Thailand
Study Area Takua Pa BTanak Namua P Kahem MYYAANNMMAARR LAOS Chiang Mai Yangon Vientiane Bangkaya Post-Tsunami Settlement Village ThungwaKapon Mokeng Village THAILAND
KhaoK haLako Lak Bangkok
CAMBODIA
Phnom Phangnga Gulf Penh Ranong of Thailand
Study 0 km 300 Area
Koh T H A I L A N D Yao Noppatharat Noi Beach KRABI
KohYao Yai Phuket Phuket A n d a m a n S e a
Koh Phi Phi Phi Phi Le Koh Lanta Noi
Ban Hua Laem Ban Sanganga-U N Koh Lanta Yai
0 kilometres 20
(Adapted from Rigg et al., 2005)
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Although there are sources of information on tsunami reconstruction as discussed
above, there is a gap in the literature regarding how the policy implementation and
action of stakeholders on the ground has impacted the local population and long term
impacts of reconstruction and recovery.
An understanding of the geography of the region is critical to understanding
the impact of the tsunami in Southern Thailand. The complex coastal morphology of
pocket beaches, headlands and long stretches of coastline exposed to the open ocean
along Southern Thailand’s Andaman coastline resulted in devastation of some areas.
Other locations were sheltered by outlying islands or coastal barriers, such as
headlands, that blocked the wave from direct impact on shore. The uneven impact of
the tsunami has led to a spatial incongruity in recovery and in opportunities for
renewal (Rigg et al., 2005). This uneven distribution of impact and recovery is
important in terms of understanding that there is considerable variation of impact
within one region. The coast of Phang Nga province, (the study area for this research)
experienced a disproportionate death toll and damage due to its flat coastline that
was directly exposed to the open ocean and the tsunami with few or no barriers to the
direct impact of the wave (Siripong, 2006).
An additional factor that arose both in literature and in my research was that
the distribution of ethnicity, religion, and class structure of the population in the impacted regions were all factors in the outcomes for survivors in the reconstruction and recovery process. These distributional dynamics within Thai society are
complex, and need to be understood in order to recognize, record and understand the
patterns, distribution and the remerging power structure of the local tourist economy
7
following reconstruction and recovery. There is significant information available
regarding the hierarchy of society and social organization of power in the regions of
Thailand prior to the tsunami from sources such as ‘Siam Mapped, a history of the
geo-body of a nation’ (Winichakul, 1994). However, there is limited documentation of
how the structure and hierarchies within the society of Southern Thailand have
influenced recovery and redevelopment subsequent to this event. Given that there is a
limited focus on understanding how social dynamics have been impacted, as well as a
tremendous push by local elites and outside interests (outlined in upcoming
chapters) to capitalize on the reconstruction, there is potential for exploitation of the
people of this region in a time of vulnerability and transition.
An additional factor affecting survivors’ recovery and access to aid has been
the ongoing political crisis in Thailand. These political upheavals, particularly the
2006 military coup that overthrew the Thaksin government in power at the time of
the tsunami, resulted in a shift in attention away from long-term recovery in the
tsunami-impacted regions1. This research considers these political upheavals and seeks to understand their impact on reconstruction aid and recovery within the communities of focus.
There is limited qualitative research on the impact and ongoing reconstruction and recovery from the Asian tsunami in Southern Thailand. However, one group of researchers collected invaluable qualitative data on the human impacts immediately
1 The Prime Minister at the time of the tsunami was Thaksin Shinawatra, head of the political Party Thai Rake Thai (TRT). Thaksin, a billionaire businessman controlled a large sector of the telecommunications in Thailand(“Profile: Thaksin Shinawatra,” 2011). Although a wealthy businessman, being from the north of Thailand and through offering concessions and support to the poor, Thaksin has the support of the populous North and Northeast regions of Thailand. 2 Holden and Jacobson (2012), define Intergenerational Equity as: development must not benefit present generations at the expense of future generations.
3 The Mergui Archipelago is a series of 800 islands in the southern most point of Burma, just north of Khao Lak Thailand. The Similan Islands to the south within Thai territory are part of 8
following the event in Phang Nga Province and Koh Phi Phi Island, the regions most
affected by the tsunami in Thailand. In their initial assessment of socio-economic
impacts of the tsunami on Koh Phi Phi Island, Rigg et al. (2005) found that fisher folk
and tourism workers were most vulnerable to the resulting economic hardship. In the
following statement, Rigg et al. (2005) p.377 clearly note the challenges these people
face in adjusting to their new reality:
“It [the Andaman tsunami event] does, in a sense, throw the pieces of the jigsaw
in the air. Some return to the place they originally occupied in the local picture;
others become muddled and disjointed; still more are lost entirely in the
confusion and the destruction. Post-tsunami reconstruction, therefore, does not
mean a reconstruction and therefore a recreation of the pre-tsunami state of
affairs.”
Rigg et al.’s (2005) data, collected in the year following the tsunami, is
invaluable in appreciating the immediate impact of the event because it documented the primary issues that emerged with survivors in the initial recovery period and provide a starting point for researching this complex problem. The long-term human
impacts of the event of which this research is focused, are less obvious, and in many
cases, have become buried by the emerging reality of people’s lives and environment
following reconstruction. My research in these impacted regions confirm my belief
that the survivors experiences and outcomes, both in terms of impact and
reconstruction, has not been considered in planning for reconstruction and recovery.
Further, it is clear that continued lack of focus on the human experience of this, and
9
other, disaster(s) will increase the risk of exploitation of the local people. This
research aims to peel back some of these layers of time and renewal, to gain a true
understanding of how the tsunami event has impacted and continues to affect the
people of the region.
1.1.2 Motivation and Focus of the Researcher
As a citizen of the world and a geographer with an understanding of the region
of impact and the mechanism of the tsunami, I will always remember where I was on
day of the disaster. I was on vacation in Costa Rica on a very similar coast
geologically to that of Southern Thailand, a coastline that has witnessed similar tsunami events in geologic history. My thoughts at the time were of the people I had met in Southern Thailand in 2000 and 2003. I also contemplated the possibility that it could have been me, whether it was because of my location at the time, or if the event had occurred one year earlier on my previous visit to Thailand. Over the years following the Asian tsunami, I made a number of trips to Thailand instructing field studies in geography with each trip drawing me closer to addressing my interest in the survivors’ experiences of rebuilding their lives following this devastating natural event. What I came to understand, through observations and literature, was that the
2004 tsunami event was just the beginning of a long journey of transition and upheaval for impacted regions. It became clear to me that the disaster and its aftermath created conditions of crisis that were complex, far reaching, and needed to be approached and understood from many different and multi-dimensional perspectives.
10
Over a two-year period, from 2005 to 2007, my interests and teaching
experiences shifted from physical to human geography. Through my field experience
teaching the mechanisms of the tsunami, as well as focusing on the overall impacts of
the event, my interests began to focus on the human impacts of the disaster and
ongoing recovery. My knowledge of the physical event and the damage it caused,
combined with my emerging interests in human geography, provided me with an
understanding of the complex and chaotic aftermath of the disaster in Southern
Thailand. Although I was aware of the scope of the issues, I realized that my
perspective and knowledge as a geographer could be combined with other cognate
approaches to gain a broad understanding of the processes and organization that
influenced the recovery process for the local population. I needed to gain knowledge
that would provide me with a way of understanding, recording, and communicating
the experience of survivors of the event and their experience in the aftermath. For
this reason, I chose to broaden my perspectives, by learning about qualitative
approaches to research to convey the human perspective of this disaster.
In the fall semester of 2007, I was given the opportunity to instruct a
sustainable tourism course in geography on a term abroad program in Thailand for
the University of Calgary, Canada. Living in Thailand provided me with greater understanding of the people and cultures that exist in this politically complex, multi- ethnic and culturally diverse country. In Southern Thailand, the draw of tourism in the region is the beautiful karstic pinnacle islands, golden sand beaches and tropical coral reefs. This striking natural environment attracts millions of tourists to the region, creating a massive tourism industry that is the backbone of the economy in
11 many of the impacted regions of Southern Thailand. The local population and economy are not only reliant on the tourism industry as the dominant employer, they are dependent on the unique beauty and geography of the natural environment that is the primary resource of the tourism economy. This unique coastal environment was what previously drew me to the region. However, following the tsunami event, my interest in this region took on an entirely new focus and drive to understand the new dynamics of the region. I used the opportunity of teaching in Thailand to make numerous personal trips to tsunami-impacted regions to develop an understanding of the evolving dynamics of recovery, the stakeholders involved, and to observe the impacted regions. In a subsequent trip to Thailand in 2008, I was able to travel to some of the most severely impacted villages in Phang Nga province that were still devastated from the tsunami. The insight and contacts made in 2007 and 2008 were invaluable to my research in the region.
My preliminary review of the literature led me to the conclusion that the ongoing reconstruction and recovery in tsunami-impacted regions of Thailand represented a permanent redevelopment of economy, environment, social structure, and way of life for the population. Thus, the decisions, policies and implementation, and type of reconstruction, such as the nature of tourism infrastructure, set in place the economy, culture, livelihood, and way of life for the population of impacted regions for years to come. The issues identified through my own observations, supported by similar patterns identified in the literature, lead me to question whether the recovery of the environment and economy will allow for a sustainable future for the impacted population, their culture, and the natural environment on
12
which they are dependent. The research focus that evolved from my experience,
observations, and analysis on the issues is centered on whether tsunami recovery on
the Andaman Coast of Thailand contributed to a sustainable future for the population
impacted by the 2004 Asian tsunami.
1.1.4 The Chapters
Using the tenets of the social organization of knowledge that provide the
philosophical underpinnings of the IE method, Chapters one, two, and three outline what is
known about the reconstruction from multiple sources. This information includes news
sources, research on the impact and recovery from multiple fields of study and
backgrounds, and policies and plans laid out by NGOs, levels of governments and other
institutions following the tsunami. These chapters outline some of the theoretical
constructs that organize what others have researched and know about the history, environment, ethnic diversity, development patterns, economy, and livelihood of people
(all within the theoretical lens that they have provided within their account of the tsunami event, reconstruction and recovery). As an institutional ethnographer, I use the various sources that describe the situation following the tsunami as 'data', critically reading it to determine the various theoretical lens that inform how the post tsunami problems are constructed and how that construction organizes how analytic assertions are made. These chapters provide the reader with a scaffolding through which they, too, may understand how issues are formulated within the current discursive practices of knowledge.
13
In Chapter four, the method of IE is introduced, and I describe how and why the IE
method is useful within the context of disaster recovery analysis. In this chapter I outline
how institutional ethnographers are required to “suspend” theoretical knowing in order to
gain a material understanding of the everyday world of survivors and their experiences
through the disaster impact, aid, reconstruction, and recovery processes they have
experienced. Chapters five through eight are the IE data analysis chapters that provide the
basis for the understanding of the four communities’ experiences of disaster, aid,
reconstruction, and recovery within the study. For the purpose of understanding each
community, significant discussion of findings is also included in the analysis chapter for
each community. Chapter nine is the discussion and conclusion chapter. Finally, Chapter
ten outlines the ‘threads not followed’. This chapter covers many aspects of the data and findings that were either beyond the scope of the research, were slightly off topic, or require further inquiry for future studies.
1.2 The 2004 Tsunami Event in Southern Thailand
On December 26th 2004, a magnitude 9.3 earthquake occurred off the northwest coast of Sumatra (Bagla, Stone, & Kerr, 2005). The earthquake generated a tsunami that traveled across the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea, striking coastlines directly in its path, including the west coast of the Malay Peninsula in Southern
Thailand. The impact on human populations from the disaster was staggering, resulting in an estimated death toll of 240,000 people (Kerr, 2005; Paz, 2005;
Thanawood, Yongchalermai, & Densrisereekul, 2006; Wisner, College, & Walker,
2005). Although the majority of casualties occurred in Indonesia and Sri Lanka,
14
portions of Thailand’s Andaman Coast were also devastated by this tsunami. Phuket,
Phang Nga, Krabi, Ranong, Trang and Satun provinces were most severely affected, with 5395 people killed and 2822 reported missing after the event (Thanawood et al.,
2006). However, these official figures from Thailand do not account for the population of illegal Burmese workers with no official status or official record of living in the country (Thanawood et al., 2006). Subsequent to the disaster, it became evident that many survivors would face long term economic, social, and environmental upheaval, which would permanently impact the surviving populations of affected regions (Manuta et al., 2005; Rigg et al., 2005).
1.3 Ecological and Geomorphic Characteristics of the Study Area
The four communities of study in this research, Ban Nam Khem, Bangkaya,
Thuungwa, and Khao Lak are located along a stretch of roughly 20 kilometres of flat coastal plain directly exposed to the open ocean of the Andaman Sea (see Figures 1, 2, and 3).
Small pocket beaches intersect long stretches of light golden sand coastline. Mangrove forests are present as natural vegetation, however rubber plantations intersected with flooded abandoned tin mine pits comprise the dominant vegetation zones immediately adjacent to the coastline. Small streams flowing into the ocean form estuarine environments periodically along the coast, although these environments have often been dramatically altered by historical activities including the development of plantation, mining or tourism infrastructure. Granitic outcrops periodically form the headlands along pocket beaches, and compose the geological makeup of elevated hills set back from the coastal plain. In Khao Lak, these hills form a large elevated headland that is partially protected as
15
Khao Lak National Park. Travelling north from Khao Lak, the landscape opens up into a
large flat coastal plain with elevated hills set many kilometres back from the coastal
settlements.
Natural vegetation patterns in the study area consist of mangrove forests along the
coast and estuaries, and monsoon tropical rainforest would (if not deforested) compose the
dominant vegetation zones inland. Currently, only a fraction of these natural vegetation
zones are now present in the area. Rainforest and mangrove were removed initially by tin
mining, followed by the planting of rubber tree plantations. Tourism development has also
played a part in the removal of mangrove forests along the coastline (see Figure 3, and
Chapter three section 3.14).
The complex coastal morphology of Thailand’s Andaman coastline resulted in uneven impacts from the tsunami (Siripong, 2006). For example, pocket beaches (i.e., bays surrounded by cliffs) directly in the path of the tsunami sustained the heaviest damage due to the amplification of wave height caused by the channelling and piling up of the waves along the headwalls of adjacent cliff walls surrounding the beaches (Siripong, 2006). In comparison, other regions along the coastline that were sheltered from direct impact of the tsunami or from wave refraction sustained minor damage (Siripong, 2006).
16
Figure 2: Direction of Tsunami Impact on Thailand’s Andaman Coast
Takua Pa MYYAANNMMAARR LAOS Chiang Mai Yangon Vientiane
Kapong THAILAND
Khao Lak Bangkok Phang Nga Province CAMBODIA Phnom Phangnga Gulf Penh Ranong of Thailand
Study 0 km 300 Area
Koh T H A I L A N D Yao Noppatharat Noi Beach KRABI
KohYao Direction of Impact Yai Phuket Phuket A n d a m a n S e a
Koh Phi Phi Phi Phi Le Koh Lanta Noi
Ban Hua Laem Ban Sananga-U N Koh Lanta Yai
0 kilometres 20
(Adapted From Rigg et al., 2005)
17
Plate 1: Coastal Plain of Study Area From South to North
(“Google Earth,” 2012)
As discussed earlier, the uneven physical impact of the tsunami in Southern
Thailand was due to the geographical variation in coastal morphology. This resulted in varying impacts from the tsunami, and as a result incongruity in recovery within impacted regions (Rigg et al., 2005). For example, in economic infrastructure recovery, the Phuket region south of Phang Nga Province had many geographic advantages over surrounding regions in terms of redevelopment of the tourism industry and local economy. Although many of Phuket’s beaches were hit by the tsunami, elevated areas were not impacted directly, leaving valuable infrastructure intact (Siripong, 2006). Conversely, in the low lying, directly exposed province of Phang Nga province, most tourism infrastructure was
18
demolished completely, thereby impacting both the physical environment and the tourism-
dependent economy more substantially. In fact, Phang Nga province sustained the heaviest
overall impact and loss of life due to its long flat coastline exposed to the open ocean (see
Plate 1) (Siripong, 2006).
In assessing damage caused by the tsunami throughout the region, areas that were
directly impacted but with intact natural coastal mangrove forests received far less impact
and loss from the event than those that were altered or deforested (Keys, Masterman-
Smith, & Cottle, 2006). Historically, the mangrove forests have been destroyed primarily
due to forest concessions such as tin mining (United Nations, 2005). These activities not
only removed mangroves and interior forests, but also polluted much of the fresh water
sources in the area (United Nations, 2005). Following the decline of tin mining forest
concessions (state land granted to companies for development and resource extraction)
were granted and converted to commercial prawn farming operations, an equally
destructive industry to both mangroves and coral reef ecosystems (United Nations, 2005).
Further, policies encouraging tourism development established a mass tourism infrastructure, a process that was already well underway prior to the 2004 tsunami with the development of large resort complexes displacing protective beach dune environments and mangrove estuaries (Garcia et al., 2006; Mingsarn et al., 2001). The demand for prime beachfront property escalated immediately following the tsunami, leading to “land grabbing” and confrontation between coastal villages and land barons. It has been suggested that the severity of environmental damage and elevated death toll from the 2004
Andaman tsunami can be attributed to the clearing of protective mangrove for industries
19 such as prawn farming, palm and rubber plantations and twenty years of extensive, excessive development of hotels, resorts, restaurants, and shops along long narrow strips of beachfront that exposed the coast to more severe damage (Garcia et al., 2006; Kerr,
2005; Manuta et al., 2005; Paz, 2005; Thanawood et al., 2006; Wisner et al., 2005). From my own observations, it is evident that the impacts of the tsunami in Phang Nga province were amplified by man-made disturbances, as described above. The Sofitel Magic Khao Lak resort (see figure 3), opened just before the 2004 tsunami. Built directly on the open ocean within an old rubber tree plantation, the resort had no natural barriers present to the tsunami. It is estimated that as many as 500 people died at this resort.
It is also important to consider that the 2004 event may not be an isolated incident.
Geologists analyzing the Sunda fault responsible for the Sumatra earthquake and resulting
Indian Ocean-Andaman Sea tsunami suggest that this fault, although previously dormant, has now become active and could pose a risk of failure again in the near future (Bagla et al.,
2005). Thus, it is essential for the safety and livelihood of the population and tourists alike, that redevelopment occur outside of tsunami hazard zones. As recently as April 11, 2012, a major earthquake registering magnitude 8.6 occurred in close proximity to the December
26th 2004 Sumatra earthquake and subsequent tsunami. While this event failed to generate a tsunami (see Figure 4), the earthquake did generate a tsunami warning on shore in
Southern Thailand. Evaluation of the evacuation and subsequent fear and further anxiety of residents in the region in response to the tsunami warning awaits analytical contribution in future research. The next chapter discusses the evolution of tourism typologies and economy on Thailand.
20
Figure 3: Sofitel Magic Khao Lak Before and After Tsunami
Sofitel Magic, built within a rubber tree plantation. Satellite photo before the tsunami. Rounded ponds seen in the images are flooded tin mining pits, another disturbance of the natural coastal morphology and vegetation.
Sofitel Magic, after the tsunami.
(“Sofitel Magic Khao Lak,” 2012 ) Images used with permission of Ikonos Satellite Image © Centre for Remote Imaging, Sensing and Processing, National University of Singapore (2004)
21
Figure 4: Location of the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Resulting Tsunami AREA
TSUNAMI
F TSUNAMI
THQUAKE ANDAMAN TED EA R ON STUD Y A TED TR A AC T 1 2012 1 DIRECTION O IM P GENER A M 9.0 DECEMBER 26 2004 SUM A INDIAN OCEAN APRI L M 8.6 TSUNAMI GENER NO
(“Google Earth,” 2012)
22
Chapter 2: The Evolution of the Tourism Economy and Typologies and in Thailand
2.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami
2.1.1 Economic Policy and Support of the Mass Tourism Economy
Preceding the tsunami, competition for Thailand’s limited economic resources was intensified because infrastructure improvement in tourist destinations and expansion of tourist facilities diverted funds away from other sectors of the economy (Kaosa-ard et al.,
2001). Prior to the tsunami, literature on the development of mass tourism in the coastal regions of Thailand identified such development as being at the expense of the environment and local populations, both of which are primary attractions for tourists to
Thailand (Kaosa-ard et al., 2001). The Thai national government implemented policies that encouraged investment in infrastructure focused on mass tourism development in order to attract and support foreign investment (i.e., multinational tourism corporations), which was often at the expense of the local economy and the environment (Mingsarn et al., 2001).
The diversion of funds towards corporate mass tourism imposed an inherent cost for other segments of society that did not directly benefit from tourism industry expansion, such as agricultural and the fishing industries (Mingsarn et al., 2001). Thus, the low income and resulting poor standard of living in farming communities of the interior of Thailand and in coastal fishing communities had driven many people to seek a new livelihood in the tourist industry of the coastal regions of the country (Wisner et al., 2005). This phenomenon, known as a push factor in Geography as well as tourism studies, is defined as an event or circumstance that “pushes” a population out of an area (Fellmann, Getis, & Getis, 2005).
23
For example, a region with poor agricultural yields, coupled with low standards of living,
(e.g., the central and northern parts of Thailand) can drive people to seek sources of
livelihood in more prosperous parts of the economy (i.e., tourism) (Fellmann et al., 2005).
These push factors, driving people away from poor regions of Thailand and into regions of
expanding tourism development, increased the population in coastal regions (i.e., the
tsunami hazard zone) (Wisner et al., 2005). Through my interviews and travels in the
region, I noted that many people are not originally from the region. Either their parents or
they have migrated to the region because of either tourism or resource based employment.
Further, the development of mass tourism infrastructure in the coastal regions of Phuket
and Phang Nga, altered natural coastal ecosystems, destroyed natural barriers to hazard,
and degraded the aesthetic beauty of the natural landscape. The environmental impacts of
mass tourism and in Southern Thailand are discussed extensively in chapter three.
Another factor that amplified the negative economic impact of the tsunami was the population’s reliance on tourism as the primary source of income. Because tourism dominated the economy, the population was extremely vulnerable to any disruption in tourism, as well as damage to infrastructure. The tsunami caused both (Wisner et al.,
2005). Further, in Phang Nga province, previous environmental degradation related to mass tourism infrastructure and development had devastating consequences that directly impacted the outcome of the event, as well as future possibilities for long-term sustainability and recovery in the aftermath of the tsunami (see Chapter three).
24
2.2 Thailand’s Tourism Typologies and Policies
Within developing countries, mass tourism has often been the dominant tourism
paradigm supported by corporate interests, local elites, and the state (Bookman, 2006). A
mass tourism destination can be identified as a region that is developed and promoted to
attract travel of a large volume of people to the region or destination (Holden, 2000). The
development of mass tourism often does not take into account resource use, environmental
degradation, or cultural and economic impacts on the destination (Holden, 2000). In
Thailand, the state has supported mass tourism as means of developing peripheral regions
of the country, and of generating economic growth, thereby encouraging large volumes of
foreign tourists and foreign exchange (Mingsarn et al., 2001). Since the 1970s the Royal
Thai government has focused their limited economic resources on infrastructure
improvement in tourist destinations, expansion of tourist facilities, and mass tourism
marketing campaigns such as “Visit Thailand Year,” “Amazing Thailand,” and “Unseen in
Thailand” (Leepreecha, 2005; Mingsarn et al., 2001). Government promotion of mass
tourism, such as the “Amazing Thailand,” campaign of the 1990s, highlighted Thailand’s
diversity of culture, exoticism, and unspoiled environments. However, in reality, such
promotion of mass tourism has catalyzed the destruction of the traditional life of ethnic
minority communities and their natural environment via exploitation and exposure to
outside cultures and economies.
Despite the negative impacts of state-sponsored mass tourism on ethnic
communities and environment, there have been regional attempts to promote sustainable
tourism. For example, in Northern Thailand, a collaborative effort between tourism operators and ethnic hill tribe communities has developed community-based tourism
25 operations that provide a balance between cultural preservation and income, which is not funnelled away to outside interests. Community-based ecotourism is defined as “a form of ecotourism where the local community has substantial control over, and involvement in, its development and management, and a major proportion of the benefits remain within the community” (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005; World Wildlife Fund, 2001). In the Andaman region of Southern Thailand, there are also examples (one pre-tsunami, one post tsunami) of initiatives and companies that are working to promote sustainable community-based tourism.
Historically, hill tribe tourism has been developed in communities primarily by lowland Thais (i.e., the ethnic majority from central Thailand) bringing tourists into hill tribe communities primarily to promote the cultural exoticism of communities, while retaining all profits and control over the experience (Richards, 2009). This has often lead to hill tribe communities becoming exposed to the tourism economy and thus switching from a subsistence livelihood to one dependent on a marginal income from tourist visits
(Leepreecha, 2005). Social problems within the community soon follow, particularly in communities that cater to drug tourism in the form of opium smoking or heroin use
(Leepreecha, 2005). Community-based hill tribe tourism arose from the failures and exploitation that evolved from these common exploitive circumstances. The relatively new phenomenon of eco-tourism has provided a framework, market, and awareness for a more sustainable and ethical hill tribe experience in Thailand (Richards, 2009). As a result, some hill tribe communities have developed a framework of operations that allow for the community itself to retain income; to distribute financial benefits from tourism equitably; to maintain their cultural identity and values; to maintain their immediate natural
26
environment; and to provide a sustainable livelihood for the local people (Leepreecha,
2005). Although not all components of an ideal community-based tourism model have been
realized in these communities, it is a positive step in sustaining and preserving the culture
of these hill tribe communities (Leepreecha, 2005).
On the Andaman Coast of Southern Thailand, the region of focus in this research,
similar community-based models have been applied to tourism with varying degrees of
success. A good example of an attempt to create a community-based tourism model is the
Phuket based kayaking tour company, Sea Canoe (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005). Over the last
twenty years, Phuket has emerged as a prominent international mass tourism destination,
largely developed and funded by international tourism companies and supported by the
Thai government (Mingsarn, et al., 2001). Over the period of mass tourism expansion, the
natural areas such as Ao Phang Nga National Marine Park in the Phuket region, have become degraded because of large volumes of tourist operators visiting the ecologically sensitive coastal marine environment on a regular basis (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005).
Another negative impact of mass tourism in Phuket has been the displacement of the local Sea Gypsy (Moken fisher folk, see chapter 4), and the Muslim Malay fisher folk population by increasing such development along the coast, and by increasing segregation of this ethnic minority by the dominant ethnic Thai population (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005).
The community-based model developed by Sea Canoe sought to provide employment for dominantly Muslim Malay fisher folk within Phuket by providing ecological friendly Kayak tours through Ao Phangnga National Marine Park. Research conducted by
Kontogeorgopoulos, (2005) found that the model was successful at first. It provided employment for this Muslim Malay minority group, creating an ecologically friendly
27
alternative to other operations. It also raised awareness of the ecological damage sustained
in the park (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005). However, although a community model was
successful in many ways, it had some unforeseen outcomes. The success of the Sea Canoe
spawned numerous copycat companies that were not necessarily ecologically friendly
(Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005). This phenomenon actually increased the number of visitors to
the park, thus increasing environmental degradation (Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005). Also,
favouring the Muslim Malay community in employment opportunities cultivated tensions
between the local Thai population and Sea Canoe, resulting in incidents of violence
(Kontogeorgopoulos, 2005).
It should be noted that the method of data collection conducted by
Kontogeorgopoulos, (2005) primarily focused on interviewing Sea Canoe founders and the
Muslim Malay employed by the company. Kontogeorgopoulos did not seek out alternative
views and understandings of other stakeholders and ethnic communities within Phuket.
This would be important to understand a different perspective on the evolution of
ecotourism within the region, as well as to understand the perspective of the dominant
Thai ethnic group within this emerging industry.
Despite these moderate successes of community-based tourism in Phuket,
Kontogeorgopoulos (2005), points out the paradox that community-based tourism in this
region must rely on mass tourism to bring tourists to the region as customers. It is also
important to note that Kontogeorgopoulos’ (2005) study is based on data collected prior to
the December 2004 tsunami, which directly impacted this region. Although this event
would have caused considerable upheaval for Sea Canoe and the Muslim Malay ethnic group employees, I have personally witnessed the resilience of this company and Muslim
28
Malay employees following the tsunami. These examples of community-based ecotourism models are important concepts that are attempting to be modeled upon in the redevelopment of the tourism industry and employment for ethnic minorities in post- tsunami Southern Thailand.
2.2.1 Economic Conditions and the Changing Livelihood of Survivors Following the
Tsunami
Within Phang Nga province many coastal fishing villages were destroyed in the tsunami, along with the economic infrastructure such as boats and port facilities (Manuta et al., 2005). Fishing communities were particularly hard hit, with minimal support from aid agencies or the government to rebuild the shattered coastline, harbours and boats that once supported the industry (Manuta et al., 2005). Following the tsunami, the dominant emerging industry within Phang Nga has been tourism, in particular mass tourism development (Williams, 2010). In order to offer a means of recovery and a way to gain entry into the evolving and emerging post-tsunami economy, a community-based tourism model was proposed as an alternative livelihood for former fishing communities of Ban
Nam Khem, and Moo Bahn Koh Muk, both of which were devastated by the tsunami
(Tsunami Aid Watch, 2006). The model calls for the construction of an Eco-Charter Yacht for the community to ensure employment of the population from the two communities
(Tsunami Aid Watch, 2006). Community members would be trained in the aspects of eco- tourism and awareness, as well as hospitality and tourism, and would staff the charter boat.
Capital costs and management of bookings would be managed through money and donations raised by the Heinich Boll Foundation, an NGO operating in Southern Thailand
29
supporting tsunami recovery (Tsunami Aid Watch, 2006). In personal communication with
the staff of the Heinich Boll Foundation in November 2007, I was informed that the project
was well underway with the boat and bookings arranged for 2008. Community based
models such the one described above were discussed in literature as way to achieve a
sustainable redevelopment of the tourism industry and economy in Southern Thailand. To
date, little information is available regarding the success of this community-based tourism
initiative, and I found no evidence of this company operating in Ban Nam Khem during the
duration of this study. It is possible that the global economic financial crisis beginning in
2008, has stalled or cancelled initiatives such as the community based charter boat
operation. Following the tsunami, reconstruction and recovery of all aspects of the tourism
industry have changed the dynamics of the tourism industry as a whole within the region
(Manuta et al., 2005). The observations and data collected within the region of study suggest that despite efforts in the development of sustainable community-based tourism in post-tsunami redevelopment, the overwhelming majority of tourism redevelopment has followed the mass tourism model.
2.3 The Impact of the Global Recession and Political Instability
Although tourism arrivals recovered to pre-tsunami levels by 2006 (“Tourism
Authority of Thailand: Tourism Statistics, 2010,” 2010), as discussed previously, the internal political turmoil starting in 2006, as well as the global economic financial crisis beginning in 2008 may have been confounding factors impacting the tsunami recovery process. The more recent pull-out of major hotel chains and the financial ruin of small
tourism operators, suggest that initial successes in the recovery of the Thai tourism
30
industry may have been thwarted by political turmoil and the downturn of tourism
resulting from the global recession. A 2009 article focusing on Phang Nga province
reported that dozens of small hotels and resorts have been put up for sale in the province
following the global economic downturn (Szep, 2009). In my own research observations in
Phang Nga province, I have not seen direct evidence of the economic downturn causing a sell off of small tourism operations. These economic troubles may be difficult to pinpoint because the sale of properties in Thailand is not always posted, and takeover of properties by larger operations is common. Examples of such takeovers are addressed in the Khao
Lak analysis chapter. Further, in interviews with a resort owner in Khao Lak, she
mentioned that those resort operators who were not able to pay down debt borrowed at
low interest from the government, to rebuild prior to interest rates rising, are facing
financial hardship. This could be extrapolated to suggest that the substantial debt incurred
in tsunami reconstruction combined with slow economic recovery and the confounding
global recession is crippling and potentially eliminating small-scale tourist operators in
Phang Nga.
While small-scale tourism has struggled since the tsunami, larger mass tourism
operators have used the opportunity of the tsunami to expand into the region. Between the
years of 2005 and 2009, a number of large, five-star hotels and residential projects were
being built or in the planning stage in Phuket, Phang Nga and Krabi provinces (The Nation,
2007). For example, the luxury hotel chain Hyatt Inc. had plans to move into the region and
to build two luxury hotels in Phuket (Barnett, 2009). However, due to the economic
downturn and the Thai political instability of the last three years, Hyatt Inc. and the
developing owners have shelved plans for a Park Hyatt, and stopped construction in July
31
2009 on the nearly completed Hyatt Regency in Phuket (Barnett, 2009). These trends in
mass tourism in response to the global recession within Thailand have revealed that a
reliance on large mass tourism operators can be potentially devastating to local labour
markets as large companies such as Accor and Hyatt Inc. have the ability to absorb losses,
shut down operations, lay off workers and even halt development, without a large impact
on their overall global profitability or image. This research reveals how favourable
government loans and support from varying levels of government has favoured the
redevelopment of mass tourism over more sustainable tourism operations. Further, this
research highlights the importance of “land value” in the recovery process, and how it has
inhibited reconstruction of communities and small-scale tourism within desirable areas,
favouring mass-tourism in these locations. Mass tourism domination in the reconstruction
of tourism industry is leading to an increasing lack of diversity within the economy, making
the local population even more dependent on mass tourism for their livelihood than prior
to the tsunami event. Furthermore, the recent decline of tourism resulting from the global
recession, combined with the mounting debt incurred for small-scale tourist operations, is
potentially eliminating the smaller scale resort and tourism sector within the region (Szep,
2009). With fewer options for self-employment and reductions in smaller, locally-owned
tourist businesses, local populations may become completely reliant on outside forces, such
as the volatile global tourist industry to determine their livelihood and quality of life. Such
reliance on the re-emerging tourist economy as dominantly mass-tourism has left the local
population increasingly vulnerable to outside domestic and global mass tourism interests that will affect future livelihoods.
32
Evidence highlighted in my research supports the conclusion that reconstruction and
recovery within the region of focus has failed to meet criteria for what other scholars researching in this field would characterize as "sustainable development". Those researchers use a number of measures including a theorized concept of environmental, cultural, and economic aspects of long-term recovery. My research approach directs me to shy away from these sorts of conceptual definitions in order to describe in rich, thick, ethnographic detail what the concept of "sustainability" as a theoretical construct covers over the practices of people, what actually is occurring regarding reconstruction aid and recovery and what that means for their long-term outcomes of recovery.
Although scholars have identified many dimensions and approaches to the concept of sustainability, sustainable development is broadly defined in literature as a process that involves acting on the concepts of sustainability that consider the actions of what people do within their environment (Hodge, 1997). Furthermore sustainable development has been defined as development that has taken place to meet the needs of the present circumstances, without compromising the ability for future generations to meet their own needs (Hodge, 1997; Robinson, Francis, & Legge, 1990; World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).2 More recently, these early broad definitions have been critiqued
as being limited to only one component of sustainable development, identified as
“intergenerational equity”. (George, 1999; Holden & Jacobson, 2012; Martin, 2003). Holden
and Jacobson (2012) argue that intergenerational equity does not consider how the
benefits of development are distributed within the present generation. Thus a second
2 Holden and Jacobson (2012), define Intergenerational Equity as: development must not benefit present generations at the expense of future generations.
33
component identified as the intragenerational equity of sustainable development assesses
how widely distributed the benefits of development are within the current generation has
been considered (George, 1999; Holden & Jacobson, 2012; Holden, 2009; Martin, 2003).
These two factors are defined as the “twin pillars” of sustainable development.(George,
1999; Holden & Jacobson, 2012; Holden, 2009; Martin, 2003).
The literature on pre and post-tsunami development suggests that Southern
Thailand has failed to achieve sustainable development. As outlined in Chapter one, my research seeks to understand the relationships and stakeholders within the redeveloped tourist industry and the role of local population within the emerging mass tourism economy. As Rigg et al., (2005) describes the initial recovery period as the lives of the tsunami victims being thrown in the air like “pieces of the jigsaw”, one could suggest that
eight years on, many of these pieces of the puzzle have not come down to form a coherent
picture of future livelihood and sustainability for the local population and tourist economy
(p. 377).
2.4 Neoliberalist Policies in Development and Disaster Recovery Research: a
Framework of Thailand’s Historical Development and Tsunami Recovery Policies
Developing countries face significant social, economic, and political challenges
throughout the development process. Within developing countries, neoliberal ideology,
policies and practices have been recognized by many scholars as contributing to the
marginalization of the poor and vulnerable (Farmer, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Hewison, 2005;
Holden & Jacobson, 2007; Keys et al., 2006; Ofreneo, 2008; Schipper & Pelling, 2006).
Neoliberalism is defined as an economic ideology that emphasises and supports free
34 market deregulation, decentralization, privatization, a reduced role of the state, and individual economic independence as being of vital significance to general prosperity
(Hewison, 2005; Smith, 2005). Over the last 25 years, the spread of neoliberal economic policies and market mechanisms have had a profoundly negative impact on the economies and populations of the developing world. Neoliberal policies develop to support unobstructed and unregulated free market mechanisms that, in turn, are the result of the agreements with developed countries (Keys et al., 2006). These policies are forced on developing nations as conditions of their participation in global markets, conditions for financial aid and support, as well as the desire for direct foreign investment that often only benefit elites that profit from such policies and investment (Keys et al., 2006). Within developing countries, neoliberal policies have resulted in the exploitation, degradation or destruction of the environment, the displacement of populations, the elimination of sustainable livelihoods, increased economic and political marginalization, and increased vulnerability of the poor (Farmer, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Holden & Jacobson, 2007).
2.5 Contemporary Theories on Development Within Lesser Developed Countries:
In his medical and anthropological work in Haiti, Farmer (2004) describes how the colonial economic structures created a permanent economic, political, and social system that continued to have influence long after Haiti’s independence from France. Colonialism was replaced by an emerging global market economy dominated by elites and foreign corporations that maintained the system of controlling the means of production, ownership of land, and degrading the environment (Farmer, 2004). These processes and impacts have become known as structural violence (Farmer, 2004). In the post-colonial period of today,
35
Farmer (2004) argues that structural violence continues in Haiti through the replacement
of colonial exploitation with exploitive neoliberal economic policies that have similar
impacts on the poor. These current and past economic policies are responsible for Haiti’s
status as the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. In a sad twist of fate, the impact
of the January 2010 Haiti earthquake illustrated the outcome of development-induced
vulnerability to a disaster of this magnitude.
Aligned with theory of structural violence, the concept of development aggression
emanated from Liberation Theologian opposition to neoliberal economic policies (Farmer,
2004; Holden & Jacobson, 2007). The development of liberation theology can be traced
back to colonial times where clergy in countries in Latin America, and in other developing
nations, criticised the oppression of the poor by the ruling colonial powers (Nadeau, 2002).
However, it was not until the 1960’s that liberation theology was adopted as a direct
opponent to neo-colonialism, and later neoliberal economic policies, that oppressed the
poor (Holden et al., 2007). The central premise of liberation theology is the idea that the
poor were to be considered before all other social classes in society, which was proposed by clergy in developing nations who saw the Catholic Church as the church of the poor
(Holden et al., 2007). On the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, progressive members of the Church were opposed to the top down policies of neoliberal development in the
1990’s (i.e., primarily mining), which they saw as economically, environmentally, and socially unsustainable for the poor majority of the population (Holden et al., 2007). Such neoliberal economic policies in the Philippines were described as development aggression by progressive members of the Church. Holden et al. (2007) employs Nadeau’s definition of development aggression as “the process of displacing people from their land and homes to
36
make way for development schemes that are being imposed from above without consent or
public debate” (p. 192). Another theoretical term of relevance that provides insight into how people were impacted by development and economic policy is termed "accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003). Using this theoretical construct Harvey's ideas are somewhat more congruent with the materialism of IE insofar that they provide a glimpse of people and their practices that details how market forces remove the poor from their land.
Harvey (2003) details how market forces, in developing countries, have allowed for predatory accumulation of property, profit, and capital by exploiting and dispossessing people from their land. This concept along with structural violence and development aggression will be contrasted to findings in this study in the discussion and analysis chapter nine of this research.
Within an institutional ethnography (IE) study, the terms of “structural violence” and “development aggression” are not informing my work in the field because both these terms impart a conceptual understanding that is incongruent with the empirical/materialist goals of IE. Furthermore, at the end of my study I will not work to re- import these terms in order to theorize my findings. Rather, I point to how these ideas are part of the social organization that coordinate what happens on the ground. However, the standpoint of the poor in this research, the nature of historical development in the region of study, and policies and plans of post-tsunami reconstruction aid and recovery revealed in the outcomes of this study contribute a unique view into what other scholars theorize.
The historical development, environmental management, and resulting impact on hazard vulnerability are addressed in the following section.
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Chapter 3: Historical Development, Hazard and Land Tenure in Thailand and SE Asia
3.1 Natural Hazard Impact and Development
The vulnerability of the global population to natural hazards has increased as result of poverty, the growing global population, armed conflict, uneven development, and the impacts of climate change (Schipper & Pelling, 2006). Although natural hazards strike in many forms globally, the vulnerability to natural hazards has been concentrated in the developing world (Schipper & Pelling, 2006). From 1992 to 2007, the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies reported that there have been
594,899 fatalities resulting from natural hazard events in LDC’s, compared to only 27,464 in More Developed Countries (MDCs) (O’Brien, O’Keefe, Rose, & Wisner, 2006). The increased vulnerability of people in the developing world to natural hazards can be attributed to social, environmental, political, and economic factors that are outside the control of the population. Broad and Cavanagh (1993) state that development in developing countries can often have negative economic and environmental outcomes for the poor, since issues in the developing world are often related to “a development model that is rooted in inequities and fosters greater inequities” (p.138). Moreover, Holden et al.
(2007) suggest inequity within a society manifests in the relative access to resources and the nature of the economy. Further, Holden et al. (2007) state that is the poor within a society are not able to independently access resources such as agricultural land, fishing locations, and even the tourism economy, they will be driven to seek employment as wage labourers, leading to dependence on local elites and multi-national corporations that control these resources. Economic conditions such as these often increase a population’s
38
vulnerability and exposure to hazards by concentrating populations in environmentally
vulnerable areas, such as coastal environments or contaminated locations. As discussed in
Chapter one, it is documented that Thailand has experienced similar environmental and
economic conditions that has led to an increase in human migration to coastal areas, and
escalating degradation of coastal environments from industries such as mining, tourism,
forestry, agriculture and prawn farming. These factors, along with the increase in severe
weather and storm frequency as well as the multiple impacts of climate change on coastal
environments, make the outlook for hazard mitigation bleak.
3.1.1 Sustainability of Development in South East Asia
Structural violence and development aggression describe processes that have long been exerted on populations of Southeast Asia. For over one hundred years, the environment of the Andaman Coast of Thailand was exploited through open pit tin mining and rubber plantations, and charcoal production (Barbier, 2008; Ruohomaki, 1999). These
industries were highly destructive to mangrove forests, coral reefs, fresh water supplies,
and beach dune environments, all of which protect the coastal ecosystems and human
population from the impacts of natural hazards such as tsunamis and typhoons (Garcia et
al., 2006). From 1975-1990, it was reported that Thailand’s natural mangrove forests were
reduced by 42.3 percent (3127 in 1975 to 1,905.59 hectares 1990)(Garcia et al., 2006). In the last thirty years, the colonial industries like tin mining and rubber plantations have been in decline (Barbier, 2008) and emerging neoliberal policies have subsequently encouraged the development of mass tourism and prawn farming in the region (Barbier,
2008; United Nations, 2005) These “new” practices contributed to further degradation of
39
the environment of the poor people living in these areas. They could not support
themselves with a local economy and became more dependent on the interests of
multinational tourism companies and Thai elites (Manuta et al., 2005). As well, in the last
25 years, it has been documented that local elites and foreign interests have used
development policies to expropriate land from coastal villages (United Nations (UN),
2005). These conditions created a situation where, at the time of the 2004 tsunami,
natural defences to the wave impact (such as mangroves, coral reefs, beach dunes and
berms) were severely degraded, there was an increase in population (including tourists)
within the hazard zone, and the population was largely dependent on employment,
structure, and infrastructure of these industries. The following sections will discuss how pre and post-tsunami economic policies have left the population Andaman Coast of
Thailand marginalized, vulnerable and dependent on outside economic forces, thus creating a development-induced disaster during and following the 2004 tsunami.
3.1.2 Land Grabbing in Thailand
Although much of the coastal land of Thailand’s Andaman Coast is technically state owned land, villages have existed on the coast for hundreds of years. Depending on status with the government, historical presence in that location, and ethnicity of the population, some have the land title where others do not (United Nations, 2005). Under national law, squatters are eligible to apply for legal title for land after 10 years of continuous occupancy however in reality, few actually obtain legal title and continue to live and build on public land (United Nations, 2005). Using the framework of economic development and growth supported by the national government, speculators exploit these situations by bribing
40
government officials to backdate land sales (United Nations, 2005). In such cases, land
speculators can then claim that villagers have encroached on their land even though their
villages were there long before such titles were issued (United Nations, 2005). In some instances, it has been documented that politicians and businessmen have colluded to evict fishing villagers off lucrative coastal land in anticipation of a tourism rebound (Charoienpo,
2005; Manuta et al., 2005; United Nations, 2005). These actions of displacing communities from their land are inline with processes defined as development aggression (Holden, et al.,
(2007). This displacement and eviction of people from their land has been identified as one of the principal factors hindering tsunami recovery in tsunami-impacted regions of
Thailand. The United Nations resident coordinator in August 2008 stated that: “land title disputes were slowing recovery in Phang Nga and other provinces and that there were reports of intimidation” (UN, 2005).
The village of Ban Nam Khem, in Phang Nga province provides examples of processes inline with theories of structural violence and development aggression that have been imposed for decades on residents. These processes were intensified following the 2004 tsunami. Ban Nam Khem is a seaside settlement composed of ex- workers (and their descendants) that were drawn to the coastal region from all parts of Thailand to work in the local tin mine (United Nations, 2005). When tin mining in the region declined forty years ago, they established their own community along the coast (United Nations, 2005).
With the direct exposure of open coastline, combined by decades of mangrove, coral reef, and beach dune and berm destruction from tin mining, the village was one of the most vulnerable and subsequently most impacted by the tsunami disaster, losing 2500 people, which was approximately half of their residents (Szep, 2009; United Nations, 2006).
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Immediately following the tsunami, developers hired armed men to prevent villagers from
returning to their land or to collect the bodies of their family members (Charoienpo, 2005;
United Nations, 2005). The developer had plans to develop the village land into a golf course and a luxury hotel (United Nations, 2005). My own visit to Ban Nam Khem in 2008, and local news reports indicated that the developer had not been successful in evicting residents and developing the golf coarse (S Montlake, 2005). Nonetheless, this example
demonstrates that the plight of the residents of Ban Nam Khem both prior to, and following
the tsunami is parallel to the concept of structural violence in that they were living and
working within an environment that had been degraded by destructive land use policies
and made highly vulnerable to hazard such as the 2004 tsunami. Further, the population
was dependent on primary resource industries, and later on tourism, of which they had
minimal benefit or say in the operations or decision processes, and often proceeded against
the best interests of local residents.
3.1.3 Development Within the Hazard Zone: Described as a Development-Induced Disaster
Within Phang Nga Province, the region most heavily impacted by the tsunami,
evidence of development-induced disaster and the amplification of the impact of the
tsunami from man-made disturbance is clear. As discussed in Chapter one, a geological
survey conducted in the region immediately following the tsunami reported that wave
heights in the Nam Knem Plain (i.e., Phang Nga Province) ranged from 5-11 meters, with
only undisturbed beach dunes, berms, and tin mining mounds acting as barriers to the
wave impact (Umitsu, Tanavud, & Patanakanog, 2007). In areas of abandoned open pit
42
mines, water from the backwash of the tsunami wave pooled and filled the mine pit; in one
case, 90 people were drowned by the force of water filling the pit (Giri, Zhu Tieszen, Singh,
Gillette & Kelmelis, 2008). In other regions, where natural barriers such as beach berms,
dunes, coral reefs, and mangrove forests were present, tsunami wave height and extent
inland was far less pronounced (Garcia et al., 2006; Giri et al., 2008; Thanawood et al.,
2006). These examples of the impacts of destruction of natural barriers to natural hazards
are indicative of not only a legacy of environmental degradation and development
aggression, but they also are indicators of a development-induced disaster and a probability of increased vulnerability to future disasters.
The concepts of development aggression and development-induced disasters may also be linked to future possibilities of disaster and marginalization of people. For example, assessing the damage from a sudden inundation of ocean water from a tsunami is a reminder that a rise in sea level of 1.5-5 meters that could result from the melting of the
Greenland ice sheet, (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007) and would submerge the coastal plains of Phang Nga Province. The impact of climate change and associated sea level rise on coastal environments and populations in tropical and sub- tropical regions will not only include the direct impacts of loss of land to submergence, it will also involve an increase in the frequency of hazards, with diminishing defences against these hazards. Global economic development policies often exacerbate the likelihood that development aggression in the coastal areas of developing countries will lead to development induced disasters with the increasingly frequent environmental impacts of climate change. For example, mangroves, mainly found in estuaries, will likely not survive
an increase in salinity from the flooding of salt water (Perez et al., 1999). Further, the
43
increase in carbon dioxide concentrations and resulting acidification of seawater, combined with a rapid decrease in visible light available from the increased depth of coral reefs would decimate coral reef ecosystems globally (IPCC, 2007). Confounding the impact of climate change on coral reefs is the rise in sea temperatures. On one of my trips to the region, I took a snorkelling trip out to the Similan Islands of the coast of the study area. This marine park is listed by National Geographic as one of the top ten diving and snorkelling sites in the world. Despite the amazing diversity of species I witnessed on this trip, a significant amount of coral was dead due to a spike in ocean temperatures. Inquiring about this further, I was told by the staff of the company that an abnormally warm current above
32 degrees Celsius (above the temperature for coral to survive) went through the region in
2010.
In addition to the destruction of natural barriers to natural hazards and sea level rise, an increased frequency of storms would submerge and/or disturb numerous contaminated coastal regions, such as Thailand. These forecasts suggest that although recurrence of a natural disaster, such as the 2004 tsunami, must be considered within reconstruction and recovery of the region, the cumulative impacts of climate change within coastal regions of Thailand must also be accounted for regarding long-term sustainability of this region. When considering that the 2007 IPCC report suggests that climate change is primarily induced by man made emissions of green house gasses, (much of which is emitted by the unfettered unregulated industrial development encouraged by practices associated with neoliberal governance), then at a macro scale, as some theorists assert, climate change can be seen as a form of structural violence imposed on the developing world (Tester, 2007).
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In tandem with the potential rise in sea level and destruction of natural barriers to hazards, from 1996 to 2006, weather-related natural disasters have been responsible for
90 percent of the natural disasters, for 60 percent of the related deaths, and for 98 percent of disaster affected populations, most of which are in areas of developing countries
(Helmer et al., 2006; IFRC, 2005). This would suggest that although other natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanism contribute to vulnerability of the global populations, the increase in severe weather related to climate change may be the single greatest threat to global populations, particular in coastal regions.
3.2 Reconstruction Policies and Initiatives
3.2.1 Government and UN Policies and NGO Initiatives
Within the literature and documents on tsunami reconstruction and aid, references to policies, plans and initiatives are often used interchangeably to describe tsunami recovery efforts. Although in other contexts these three terms have different meanings within the literature, there is a disconnect between these processes (i.e. policies and plans and initiatives), e.g, where policy directed by government and business interests, such as the “Phuket Action Plan” (discussed below), is inappropriately labeled as a plan. As a result, I could find now discernable difference in how these terms were used and how they were taken up within the tsunami recovery process. As a result I use these terms interchangeably throughout the research.
As discussed in Chapter one, although the government developed policies for effective redevelopment that appeared to be fair and rational, actual redevelopment
45 occurred in a haphazard and illegal manner. Some authors assert that this was due to lack of supervision and planning enforcement (Rice & Haynes, 2005). For example, the national government policy for redevelopment on Patong Beach in Phuket (immediately south of
Phang Nga province) directed the construction a safe and modern beachfront that would minimize the hazard from a future tsunami event (Rice & Haynes, 2005). However, it has been reported that disagreement with local stakeholders and inaction on the part of the government resulted in the hotels present prior to the tsunami being rebuilt within the hazard zone (Rice & Haynes, 2005). In my personal observations in Phang Nga province from 2006 to 2012, similar patterns have occurred in reconstruction, but unlike Phuket, tourists have not returned in large numbers to support small-scale reconstruction that includes small tourist businesses, restaurants, and hotels.
After the tsunami, in 2005, the United Nations World Tourism Organization
(UNWTO) developed the Phuket Action Plan (Haynes & Rice, 2005; UNWTO, 2005). The
Phuket Action Plan is part of a larger UNWTO plan for recovery of the tourism industry in regions impacted by the 2004 Andaman Indian Ocean tsunami. The primary goal of the
Phuket Action Plan was to restore tourist confidence in the area (Manuta et al., 2005). The
Phuket Action Plan, listed as follows, was to be implemented in four stages (Manuta et al.,
2005; UNWTO, 2005):
1) To assist our key tourist destinations (Patong, Kamala, Khao Lak beaches
in Phang Nga province, and Phi Phi Island);
2) To renew infrastructure;
3) To develop and implement a marketing campaign to restore the tourism
industry;
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4) To provide tourist incentives.
As well, portions of the Phuket Action Plan focus on the environmental rehabilitation of regions with high biodiversity in Thailand impacted by the tsunami (Rice
& Haynes, 2005). An update of policy within the Phuket Action Plan (UNWTO, 2007) focuses on development of sustainable tourism in Phang Nga province, as well as numerous ecological rehabilitation initiatives in national parks, and bio-diverse areas impacted by the
Tsunami (UNWTO, 2007). Critics of the Phuket Action Plan claim that although this plan is positive on paper, there has been little consultation with, or from, local and national governments to follow the plan’s protocols (Rice & Haynes, 2005). In addition, a considerable gap in the literature exists regarding the implementation and outcomes of the
Phuket Action Plan in Phang Nga Province or other regions of focus because the UNWTO has yet to publish a follow-up of the plan’s activities and achieved objectives.
In addition to problems with implementation of policies and aid in reconstruction and recovery, in September 2006 a military coup occurred that replaced the elected government in Thailand with a military regime. Currently, there is a lack of information on the successive government’s implementation of the original policies and aid packages laid out by the Thaksin government or the successive government’s own policies of aid and recovery. Further unrest has occurred in Thailand since a democracy was restored to
Thailand in 2008 and it is likely that political turmoil and the multiple changeover of regimes in Thailand has shifted attention away from reconstruction and recovery efforts.
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3.2.2 Financial and Corporate Initiatives Supporting Reconstruction of the Tourism Industry
The role of corporate and financial interests in implementing policies relating to reconstruction and rehabilitation is also crucial in understanding the mechanisms of aid and recovery following the tsunami. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)(representing the corporate and financial sector) released ‘The Subregional Development Plan for Tsunami-
Affected Andaman Region’ in January 2007 (ADB, 2007) This lengthy report was put together by a consortium of consultants and financed by the Asian Tsunami Fund and summarizes strategies and policies not only for the redevelopment of tourism, but for sustainable expansion into regions not yet developed. The report’s primary findings promote sustainable development while discussing numerous paradoxical tourism expansion initiatives that may be in conflict with the theorized view of sustainability (ADB,
2007). The report identifies an apparent gap in the ability for small-scale tourism to recover as compared with larger hotels because larger operations were insured whereas smaller scale tourism operations were not (ADB, 2007). It is important to note however that the track record of ADB is focused on economic growth that in practice would generally support larger operations as part of an overall growth model (Ofreneo, 2008).
Eight years following the tsunami, there is evidence to support the ADB 2007 findings regarding the economic difficulties for small tourism businesses in the post-tsunami economy. The United Nations (UN) reported that financial institutions approved USD 85 million in loans to revive smaller hotel businesses, however, access to loans was reportedly uneven (UNDP, 2006). Further, many of smaller hotels were not able to cope with losses, unlike the larger resort chains (“United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia,”
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2008). Although many policies were put forward regarding sustainable reconstruction and
recovery, limited evidence exists to suggest that recovery and reconstruction of
infrastructure has followed such policies and initiatives. Evidence from this study
highlights the uneven distribution between rich and poor of aid, financial support, and infrastructure reconstruction provided within the study region. The following section
discusses the impacts of policy implementation, or lack thereof, the focus of reconstruction,
as well as the confounding impact of the recent global recession on the tourism economy of
Southern Thailand.
3.2.3 Sustainable Recovery and Reconstruction - Policy and Reality
Following the tsunami, Rigg et al. (2005) claim the determining factor for
sustainable economic reconstruction and recovery is whether redevelopment is inclusive
of all surviving sectors of the population, regardless of social status. Although this seems a
simple premise, this study highlights the difficulty in achieving such equity due to existing
ruling relations within society that were imported within the, as well as the nature of aid, recovery policy and practice that took place in the region. Prior to the tsunami, ruling relations in the region were deeply divided between ethnic, socioeconomic, and social status within the dominant Thai society. These ruling relations were not removed from the landscape, however tsunami reconstruction, aid and recovery left all sectors of society within the region destitute immediately following the tsunami. As a result, the tsunami event provided a potential opportunity for a change to existing ruling relations within the region with a more equitable distribution aid and access for all sectors of society to the remerging economy. Decisions taken regarding redevelopment of infrastructure define
49 permanent features of the environment and the economy, and determined whether the population will obtain everyday stability in terms of food, shelter, health, education and so forth moving forward following reconstruction and recovery. Pais and Elliot (2008) stated that disasters do not result only from natural occurrences, but also from the combination of these forces with social systems that render some populations more vulnerable than others. Within Phang Nga province, reconstruction and recovery largely followed this premise of disaster recovery laid out by Pais and Elliot (2008). Poor individuals and communities, as a whole, often lack the voice and influence required to negotiate a fair deal from tourism development (Richards, 2009). While the tsunami’s impact was indiscriminate regarding class and status, reconstruction has discriminated by wealth, cast, influence and ethnicity, and the most vulnerable people prior to the tsunami remain the most vulnerable (Rigg et al., 2008; Winser & Walker, 2005). This study provides many examples of the above-mentioned scenario, where the poor are marginalized and the elite are favoured through the reconstruction and recovery process. Although no conclusive studies have been completed comparing pre/post-vulnerability following the Andaman tsunami, this study seeks to understand whether those vulnerable prior to the tsunami face even further economic marginalization in the evolving reality of post-tsunami Thailand.
Within this research, there is one glaring exception to this uneven outcome that has risen to the forefront of this research. Grass roots organizations can empower the vulnerable and marginalized to fight the forces of oppression and exploitation within disaster recovery, which is a phenomenon is addressed in the analysis chapter for Ban Nam Khem.
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3.2.4 Opportunity for Some
The tsunami event in Southern Thailand resulted in death, displacement and
devastation for some, while for others it opened up windows of opportunity. Immediately
following the tsunami, individuals and companies used the disaster as an opportunity to
appropriate valuable coastline property in tsunami-impacted regions (Charoienpo, 2005;
Manuta et al., 2005; S Montlake, 2005). Within Phang Nga province, the tsunami created
potential opportunity for local elites to seize land from individuals and villages that were
devastated. Prior to the tsunami, land titles were issued to individuals and corporations by the government of the time to develop vast areas of valuable coastal land and in forest reserves (Charoennpo, 2005). These land titles, known as Nor Sor 3 Kor property titles, granted legal ownership to outside individuals and companies of land occupied for
centuries by coastal communities (Charoennpo, 2005). A well-documented example of
land appropriation by such means was the Village of Ban Nam Khem in Phang Nga
province. Residents of the coastal community were forced to immediately move to high
ground during and following the event. Using this opportunity, land speculators erected
fences and hired men to not only prevent residents from returning to their property, but
from finding the bodies of family and friends who perished during the event (Montlake,
2005). Currently, it is not clear how many such land grab attempts have succeeded in
pushing villagers off their land. However, three years following the tsunami, it was
reported that more than 35,000 households in 30 coastal villages were still facing eviction
by developers planning to build resorts and hotels (“Land Grabbers Rewarded as Property
Values Jump:,” 2007; Manuta et al., 2005). Court documents obtained for this research
suggest that many of these claims have been settled through compromises between the
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private sector interests and displaced villages. However, this study highlights one example of a community still fighting for the right to return to their land.
There are many examples within the literature of natural disasters being used as a mechanism or excuse to dispossess land from and marginalize the poor. Manatu, et al.,
(2005) state that the recovery efforts in Thailand have used the tsunami crisis to re- allocate access of pristine coastal areas for development. In a study of hurricane recovery trends in the United States in the 1990s, Pais and James (2008) found that the most vulnerable members of society affected by a hurricane were poor minorities, renters and itinerant workers because they had the least resources for recovery. Pais et al., (2008) also asserted that people with established social networks have greater access to aid, capital, and political support that allow them not only to recover, but to flourish following a disaster. Another pattern identified by (Pais et al., 2008) was that elites (wealthy and politically connected people) who occupy hurricane-devastated coastal regions not only recover fully from the event, they use financial capital gained through insurance and social capital developed through elite networks to expand affluent areas. This process further pressures the poor and minority populations by essentially driving them from the region through increased rents, an overall higher cost of living, and lack of affordable housing reconstructed in these impacted regions (Pais et al., 2008). Evidence of land-grabs in Phang
Nga province following the 2004 tsunami suggest that similar processes are occurring in the tsunami reconstruction process in Thailand (Charoienpo, 2005; Manuta et al., 2005; S
Montlake, 2005).
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3.2.5 Literature on Reconstruction and Recovery Eight Years Later 2004-2012)
For Thailand, there is a paucity of information and literature regarding
implemented policies, the ongoing reconstruction, aid and recovery following the tsunami.
This may suggest that combined factors such as political upheaval, apparent rapid recovery
in important tourist destinations, including Phuket, and a gradual shift of attention away
from the disaster has resulted in a lack of focus and study of the long term implications
reconstruction and recovery. For example, an article on the tsunami, described the fishing
village of Ban Nam Khem five years later as “a shell of its former self” (Katyal, 2009). Ban
Nam Khem, (located in Phang Nga province) was devastated by the tsunami, losing over
half of it’s population of 5,000 people (p. 1). Despite the enormous outpouring of aid, implementation of action plans, and sustainability policies, there is evidence that villages
such as Ban Nam Khem have undergone a largely uneven recovery based on diverging
paths of reconstruction and aid distribution (see Chapter six).
Despite international efforts promoting policies for sustainable redevelopment in
Phang Nga, evidence on the ground suggests that the conditions contributing to vulnerability of this population prior to the tsunami, such as lack of diversification within the economy, have continued in post-tsunami reconstruction. In fact, Manuta et al., (2005) suggest that Thailand’s post-tsunami reconstruction has been focused solely on tourism development rather than the livelihood of the poor. Furthermore, land appropriation for mass tourism developments in Phang Nga, has led to pressure to evict residents of coastal villages, legal battles, and violence. (Kaosa-ard et al., 2001; Manuta et al., 2005). Such development demand has resulted in a spike in land prices that has further limited opportunities for redevelopment of small-scale tourism and direct local participation in the
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tourist economy (Manuta et al., 2005). Small, family-run tourism based operations often
did not have adequate insurance to pay for the reconstruction of their businesses (Winser
& Walker, 2005; Jonathan et al., 2005). Those local operators who managed to rebuild often
had to borrow heavily, leaving them vulnerable to the relative recovery and prosperity of
the tourism industry in the region (“Land Grabbers Rewarded.,” 2007). These patterns of recovery immediately following the tsunami have had important implications for the current and future economic conditions within Phang Nga.
3.3 Historical Settlement and Ethnic Groups Within the Area of Study
3.3.1 History and Settlement of the Andaman Coast of Southern Thailand
The Malay Peninsula and the region of Phang Nga province has a long history of
settlement of various ethnic groups. Chinese records indicate that there were many small
settlements along the Southern Thai coast by the third century C.E, (O’Connor, 1975;
Ruohomaki, 1999). River entrances along the Andaman coast were of strategic importance
for those wanting to trade inland and traverse the peninsula including Takupa (the district
capital of the study area, 5 km north of Ban Nam Khem) (Ruohomaki, 1999). By the 16th,
the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, (one of three Kingdoms of central region that would
amalgamate to become Siam (Thailand)) would eventually gain permanent control over the
region (Ruohomaki, 1999; Winichakul, 1994). The exploitation of natural resources in the
region began on the Island of Phuket, just south of Phang Nga province. Small-scale tin
mining had been practiced by ethnic Chinese inhabitants for many centuries up to 1623
C.E. (Ruohomaki, 1999). This mining and other resource based economic activities drew
54 the attention of the Siamese court (Gerini, 1905; Ruohomaki, 1999). In 1623, Siam issued
Article 37 decreeing that the production of tin along with plantations of agilla wood and sapanwood would be Royal Monopolies in Takupa and Phuket (Gerini, 1905; Ruohomaki,
1999). This was the beginning of large-scale mining and plantation monocultures that deforested and degraded much of the coastal regions of what is today Phang Nga and
Phuket provinces.
The history of resource extraction also sheds light the ethnic diversity of the region as result of international interests and the need for manual labour. In 1905, the population of Phuket was estimated to be 178,599, with 101,288 being Siamese, 32,408, Chinese, and
34,903 of Malay origin (Carrington, 1906; Ruohomaki, 1999). The population of Moken peoples is also mentioned, however no population figures are mentioned for this time
(Carrington, 1906; Ruohomaki, 1999). This large historical presence of a number of ethnic groups would suggest that the local ethnic, genetic, and cultural diversity Southern
Thailand’s Andaman coast population is substantial. Despite this diversity, with the wave of Thai migration following, combined with the government’s nation-state policies, the culture of the region today is dominantly Thai.
By the 1880s tin mining began to decline in the region (Gerini, 1905; Ruohomaki,
1999). Following tin mining, rubber tree plantation development began to be a dominant industry along the Phang Nga coast (covered in Chapter two) that brought further migration of peoples from the central regions of Thailand. The next wave of migration to the region was initiated by the mass tourism developments of the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s, which spurred a large wave of migration of Thai peoples from the central and northern regions of Thailand to Phuket and later Phang Nga province. The waves of migration from
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all over Thailand, combined with the ethnic diversity of the region is taken up again in
Chapter nine.
3.3.2 The Origins and History of the Moken Sea Gypsies in Southern Thailand
The migration of the Thai peoples to Southern Thailand and the study area is covered extensively in chapters three and six. Another ethnic group figuring prominently within this study is the Moken peoples. One of the many ethnic minorities in of Thailand, the Moken, also referred to as Sea Gypsies or Chao Lay (sea people) were severely impacted by the 2004 tsunami within the region (Arunotai, 2006). For several centuries the
Moken have led a nomadic maritime existence migrating seasonally along the coasts of the
Malaya Peninsula in the areas of Southern Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia (Arunotai, 2006;
Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005; White, 1922). Much of what is known about the early history of the Moken was documented by the German Anthropologist Hugo Adolf Bernatzik, in his work with the Moken in the 1930’s and 40’s. Bernatzik was in contact with the Moken before the region of Southern Thailand was developed for tourism that resulted in the exposure of the Moken to outsiders and foreigners. As a result, his work provides considerable insight into their traditional way of life, oral history, cultural influences over time, and connections to the sea and environment. The origin of the term Moken is an amalgamation of two words, “Mo” meaning “strake” (a continuous line of wood planking from stern to bow of a boat) and “oken” mean “salt water” (Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005;
Lindberg, 2010). Considerable effort was made by early researchers to understand the meaning of the amalgamation of these two words. Leopold Ainsworth (1930) finally determined the word to mean “immersed in the sea” due to the nature of the center piece
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of Moken boats oken being submerged in the ocean Mo (Ainsworth, 1930; Bernatzik &
Ivanoff, 2005).
The traditional life of the Moken was to live at sea in boats flotillas of ten to thirty
boats called a “Kabang” (Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005). In the monsoon season, the Moken
would settle in protected bays building huts out of bamboos and leaves (Bernatzik &
Ivanoff, 2005). During the dry season (November to April) when the sea is calm, Kabangs
would travel within the islands of the Mergui Archipelago in the Andaman Sea fishing and
other livelihood pursuits (Arunotai, 2006) 3 Arunotai (2006) puts the population of Moken
in Burma at 2000, and the population in Thailand at 800. It is important to note that she
does not include the community the Moken community at Thuugwa or other Moken in the
Khao Lak region of Thailand in these figures. The Moken peoples in my study area that I
was able to interview, no longer live the traditional lifestyle of the Moken at sea. At some
point they switched from a nomadic existence, to a largely sedentary existence on land. In
my study area it is not clear how long ago this change occurred, however a seventy-year-
old women in Thuungwa Moken community (one of my four communities of focus) informed me she had lived there all her life. Thus the timeline for at least semi-permanent
status of the community at Thuungwa was likely prior to seventy years ago. An interesting
note regarding the populations of Moken within the Khao Lak region is that they are not
mentioned in a paper by Arunotai (2006), which documents the traditional knowledge of
the Moken. This may have been an oversight, however, it may be that the Moken living a sedentary lifestyles today are not considered true Moken by those Moken still living
3 The Mergui Archipelago is a series of 800 islands in the southern most point of Burma, just north of Khao Lak Thailand. The Similan Islands to the south within Thai territory are part of the same geologic formations that make up the Mergui Archipelago. Both the Similan Islands and the Mergui Archipelago still contain nomadic populations of Moken peoples.
57 traditional lifestyles or by Arunotai, the Thai author of the said study.
In Thai society, as with many other ethnic groups, the Moken are viewed as impoverished, uneducated people leading a subsistence-based and primitive lifestyle that is backward and in need of development (Arunotai, 2006). Alternatively through centuries of contact with Thai, Burmese and Malaya raiders and slave traders, Bernatzik (1930) notes that the Moken mistrust outsiders, going so far as to change their names when in contact with them. Bernatzik also notes that in order to avoid confrontation with outsiders, the Moken always agreed with them, regardless of whether or not it was favourable outcome for the Moken. Ivanoff, in his 2005 account of Bernatzik’s work in the 1930’s describes how Bertatzik exploited this trait amongst the Moken to extract favours and to get what he needed in his research. These views and perceptions of one another (i.e., Thai,
Westerner, and Moken) have important implications for the Moken in the nature of reconstruction, aid and recovery provided by outsiders (i.e., Thai government and Western aid providers)(see Chapter five).
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Chapter 4: Institutional Ethnography as a Methodology in Assessment of Disaster Redevelopment
Inquiry into the impact and recovery process within tsunami-impacted communities requires a methodology that produces multifaceted understanding of the event’s impact on the economy, culture, environment, politics, demographics, and overall livelihood of the people living in these regions. While it is to be expected that a disaster of this magnitude would put the future lives of survivors into disarray, there are certain aspects of aid distribution and reconstruction in Thailand that contribute to unevenness in recovery efforts and outcomes. The unevenness of the recovery efforts can be attributed to a number of complex conditions many of which have not been fully understood or documented. The post-tsunami landscape extends beyond the physical landscape to include the cultural, economic, environmental and political practices of survivors’ daily lives. The complexities of these activities and the mechanisms of the recovery process provide a rich ground for analysis in order to determine how they arise as the social landscape in which people work. The long- term human impacts of the event are not immediately obvious and, in many cases, have become buried by a sense of the taken-for-granted that is the reality of people’s lives. To understand how the disaster and the ensuing relief efforts are being played out in the lives of the local people in Thailand, a method that can begin to describe, track and map the ongoing recovery work of local people and the ongoing tsunami relief work being carried on in the municipal, national and international levels is required. The methodology of institutional ethnography (IE) provided a way to focus not only on the villagers’ reality, including their recovery efforts following the
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tsunami, but also on the complex organization of power, politics, economy, aid, social
structure, and religious affiliation, that together contribute to the emerging post-
tsunami society.
4.1 Elucidating an Appropriate Methodology to Assess Post-Tsunami Recovery
IE is well suited to research on tsunami reconstruction and recovery because of its
practical approach to understanding problems and their causes in a real world setting. IE
is a pragmatic methodology that seeks to understand how experiences of participants are
organized. In this study it was used to map the forces, policies, and ruling relations that determine and/or influence the overall fate of impacted communities (Campbell & Gregor,
2005).
There is considerable literature on the initial stages of recovery following the 2004 tsunami, including the natural mechanisms of the event, the immediate aftermath, policies of aid and recovery, and the environmental impacts of the tsunami. Strategies and policies for redevelopment and rehabilitation can be traced to different levels of government, private interests, the UN, NGOs and various relief organizations. Initial reports on the results of these rehabilitation and redevelopment initiatives show a disjointed effort, which has ultimately benefited only prominent and powerful stakeholders such as local elites and resorts (Haynes & Rice, 2005). Although policies and plans from various levels of government, the UN, aid agencies, and financial institutions, have been implemented to direct reconstruction and recovery processes, little is known about the impact of these policies and plans on the ground.
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Currently, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding how the policy and plan implementation actions of stakeholders have impacted the local population and ongoing reconstruction and recovery. Institutional ethnography, as a methodology, is well suited to fill this gap with its focus on scrutinizing texts (in the form of policies, plans and initiatives), in order to understand how such institutional mechanisms dictate the emerging social structure, organization and ruling relations of recovering regions.
Specifically, institutional ethnography provides the process by which such institutional mechanisms have impacted real people and communities, such as those in Thailand. While others have written about disaster polices and plans for recovery theoretically, this research focuses on how people activate and produce the material conditions of their lives.
4.2 Defining Institutional Ethnography
Dorothy Smith (1987) pioneered the methodology of institutional ethnography borrowing from philosophical underpinnings derived from Marx’s materialist views of
“Ideology” and his insights into understanding social organization. Smith (1987), adopts
Marx and Engels’s definition of “Ideology” from the treatise, “German Ideology”, understanding that ideology is the ideas, images and social apparatus by which the ruling class dominate the means of production and, ultimately, control over society. Further,
Smith (1987) views the concept of “ideology” as outlined by Marx and Engels not as a neutral theoretical ideas of culture, but rather as ideas and images that are acted on by people that are part of an apparatus by which the ruling class maintains control over society (p. 54). It is here where Smith relies on the materiality of Marx’s method. The social domination by “ideology” is understood by Smith (1987) as action by people in the form of
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ruling relations which govern social organization within institutions and society as whole.
To understand these power relationships, Smith (2005) explains “the aim of the sociology
we call “institutional ethnography” is to re-organize the social relations of knowledge of the
social so that people can take that knowledge up as an extension of our ordinary
knowledge of the local actualities of our lives” (p.29). The origins of institutional ethnography also has roots in second wave feminism wherein Smith’s (1987) experiences
as mother and scholar drew her attention to how society is organized by gendered
processes that “perform a routine, generalized, and effective repression” (p. 26) of the
knowledge practices that arise in “the endless detailing of particulars” (p. 6) that
characterize the domestic sphere. IE has subsequently grown from being “a sociology for
women” to a “sociology for people” where the ruptures between the ordinary knowledge of
what is going on in people’s everyday lives bumps into the authorized, theorized, objective
and abstracted knowledge that dominates ruling practices. The focus of IE on ruling
practices within peoples everyday lives is invaluable to understanding the processes and
impacts of coordinated aid reconstruction and recovery because of the focus on how people
live, their livelihood, housing, the equity of distribution of resources (aid) and their
environment. All of these factors within peoples everyday lives are encompassed within
theorized concepts of sustainability, however IE captures these factors as real world,
material examples.
IE seeks to describe, investigate and understand social linkages within the
environment of everyday life, organization, trans-local processes, administration, and
governance (Devault & McCoy, 2006; Smith, 2005). These linkages result in a complex field
of coordination and control that are defined as “ruling relations” (Devault & McCoy, 2006).
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Ruling relations are commonly activated in textual form (policies, laws, plans, initiatives),
that coordinate how power is retained and held (Smith, 2005; DeVault & McCoy, 2004).
In the context of Southern Thailand, ruling relations are activated within rigidly defined,
ethnic, religious, and political lines (Winichakul, 1994). Authority within Thai society has
been conceptualized to be held largely by the lowland Buddhist Thais as the dominant
group, followed by other groups of ethnic and religious affiliation categorized in a
hierarchal structure in order of rights and power within society (Winichakul, 1994). This
hierarchy is extremely complex and includes practices of racism, citizenship, and national
policies that promote a nation state, in a country that is multi-ethnic.
IE begins with the identification of a problematic. The problematic(s) may become
evident in the intersections between fundamentally different kinds of knowledge practices;
dissimilar ways of understanding something going on in the world. Problematics are
junctures where the researcher can describe people situated “on one side of a line of fault
separating them from the objective bureaucratic domain of a politico-administrative
regime” (Smith, 1995) where the researcher discovers the ‘ruptures’ in ideological
accounts. These may be occasions when the language use contradicts how “people know a
situation to be otherwise on the basis of their everyday experiences” (p. 20).4 The concept of a problematic is used to direct attention to a series of questions that may or may not have been posed regarding understanding the actualities of peoples experiences and actions within the everyday world (Smith, 1987). As Smith (1987) discusses, organization of the everyday world is not transparent, nor obvious, and the actions and experiences of
4 IE’s focus peoples every experiences provides concrete, detailed and descriptive examples of issues impacting people. These material examples are more relevant than theorized concepts such “sustainable development” that can lose sight of daily experiences and the capacity to show "how it works" in specific real world settings.
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people and how they are coordinated are not always clear. Forming a problematic of
inquiry in institutional ethnography requires the researcher to learn about the topic from
those who live and know it (Campbell & Gregor, 2005). The definition of the problematic
assists the researcher in knowing how he/she will take up the inquiry from a standpoint
within the everyday world (Campbell & Gregor, 2005). This requires the researcher to take
the standpoint of people who are experiencing the problematic of focus (Smith, 1987).
Approaching a problematic from a standpoint of actual people allows the researcher to
understand the subject in a real world setting, rather than starting in the abstract world of
theory (Smith, 1987).
Although knowledge of the everyday world of the subject is valuable in itself, it is only the starting position in gaining additional knowledge and mapping the forces or ruling relations that direct, influence, and control the experiences and actions of the people whose
standpoint is being investigated. A standpoint within IE research refers the position of the
“knower” within a community, environment, institution, or location of whom you are
investigating (D. Smith, 2005). Within this IE study the primary informants are villagers
who survived the 2004 tsunami and have gone through the process of recovery within the
impacted region of study. The information or clues that are gained from the expert
knowledge of the subject are used to direct inquiry towards identifying external influences,
activities, practices or forces, that organize and mediate the actions, or livelihood of people
occupying the standpoint being studied.
One of the goals of IE is to support change and social action. Research that utilizes
IE methodology is framed from the perspective of “those who need to know” (Campbell &
Gregor, 2005). IE seeks to provide analysis that will support people to understand the
64 processes ruling relations so that they can enact change on the ground in the real world that they are living. A primary objective of IE is to provide those who need to know with an understanding of the processes, forces, and interactions that influence and control their everyday experiences. In a complex situation such as the 2004 tsunami, it is hoped that knowledge generated by an inquiry focused on the impact of the tsunami will be useful to
NGOs and aid organizations as well to those people marginalized in the recovery process.
4.2.1 Identifying Ruling Relations Through Institutional Ethnography
Institutional ethnography involves a process of mapping ruling relations within institutions or communities. As discussed in Chapter one, ruling relations are defined as complex field of coordination and control within a society that are often carried textually
(Devault & McCoy, 2006). Institutional ethnographers produce maps that illuminate how things are organized often in ways that serve the interests of privileged groups. It is hoped that mapping ruling relations in impacted Thai communities will reveal the structure, function, and nature of actual practices that coordinate recovery, the emerging human and physical landscape, and the new reality for impacted regions. Further, mapping the ruling relations within the region provides a window of understanding as to how local activities are organized and whose interests dominate. As well, the mapping process elucidate how ethnic groups experience variable benefit from the external sources of income from multinational corporations and the overall tourism economy.
Theoretically, the pre-tsunami social apparatus has been detailed in literature. This provides the discursive backdrop upon which I build an empirical understanding about how these relationships influence recovery. The tsunami event and the scale of impact,
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devastation and reconstruction brought in many new stakeholders that have influenced,
benefited, or upset the established relations of impacted regions. These include extra-
governmental organizations such as the UN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), NGOs, financial organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank, aid agencies, religious groups, and most importantly (for the focus of this analysis),
the multi-national interests of mass tourism that dominate the economy (and that may
have benefited most from the upheaval of the 2004 Asian tsunami). The arrival of these
complex organizational trends on the tsunami wake have infused structured recovery
based on policies, and IE can show how this works. The mapping of social organization
within post-tsunami Southern Thai communities through the associated methods of
institutional ethnography reveals the new structure of ruling relations and analyzes how these new structures result in an effective and healthy recovery for the local population of impacted regions.
4.3 Why the Method of Institutional Ethnography is Effective in Disaster Research
Institutional ethnography has provided critical information on the assessment of long term recovery of the specific Thai region of focus following the disaster. It has allowed for an investigation of the actual everyday world of people impacted providing a rich, thick description of the issues, problems, conflicts and disjunctures that have characterized post tsunami events. Knowledge gained from tracing what happened at the local, trans-local
(with gestures towards the trans-national levels), produces a useful view into understanding the overall mechanisms and realities of reconstruction and recovery. This IE is different from other applications of IE in a number of ways. Like other IE studies, this
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research relies on the understanding of the actions and lived experiences of those who
know the outcomes in the real world. However, unlike other applications of IE, the chaotic
nature of a disaster, as well as Thai government policy to allow uncoordinated access for
aid and recovery, there is no clear link to texts in the form of policies and plans that have
clearly defined enacted outcomes for reconstruction, aid and recovery. This does not mean that the processes of aid and recovery were not coordinated by texts, rather that the actual
texts may be buried behind layers of various people’s activities (the military, the NGOs,
local governments and the villagers). The activation of texts that established the ruling
relations in these post-tsunami villages took many forms. These were mediated by the
ruling relations at play prior to the tsunami, the interaction between levels of government,
interactions and relationships between business interests and government (practices that
could be conceptualized as the corrupt activities of people working in their own interests).
They included erected signs, and actions that gesture to a confusion of policies and plans
that I have not been able to empirically link and track among the textual data I was able to
collect. These texts such as the building plans, and texts that have been established through
actions of aid and recovery were impossible to retrieve during the time limited field
excursions. Further, as discussed in chapter three, texts of policies and plans that I
unearthed appear to have little to no activation on the ground in the recovery process.
Another difference between this study and a conventional IE is the difficulty in
establishing the historical processes of reconstruction, aid and recovery through a
framework of IE after the fact. Other than policy documents, almost all literature on the
initial stages of reconstruction, aid, and recovery has been framed within a theoretical lens.
This is also true of the general literature on disaster and environmental impact research.
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As a result, while I approach the literature as data, to determine the ideological/conceptual
practices it generated, I also mined it for any traces of a descriptive record of the things
that happened. I have had to rely on this information, what others claim to know about the
tsunami event and the recovery process early on. Further, within the discussion of the
findings of my IE research, I do contrast conceptual and contemporary frameworks that I
discovered in the literature, in order to show how other people’s theories are, in actuality
an abstraction of the practices of people, variously located, who put the post-tsunami world together as it happened. My return to theory in the discussion section of my dissertation may be seen as incompatible with research in IE however it provides a terrain through which I can successfully disseminate my detailed discoveries, so that other scholars may also learn about what the “sustainability” discourse consistently covers over. I utilize this discourse selectively in order to establish a common ground upon which those of who are interested in the lives of local people can begin to share knowledge.
4.4 Approach to the Research and Writing Style
This research was conducted from September 2007 to December 2012. Interviews were conducted in four tsunami-impacted communities from February 2011 to November
2012, in the region of Khao Lak, in Southern Thailand’s Phang Nga province (see Plate 2).
The majority of interviews were conducted from February 2011 to December 2011.
Analysis was largely completed throughout the summer of 2012. I had the opportunity to
conduct several brief follow-up interviews in November 2012 which provided the
opportunity to empirically develop aspects of the analysis where my data was a bit thin.
This is entirely congruent with the iterative nature of IE research.
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The interviews were conducted in a way to produce a rich and thick ethnographic description about what has happened since the tsunami. The informants were asked to recall as accurately as possible the unfolding of the events both in the immediate chaos of the disaster and throughout the ensuing years
Plate 2: Four Communities of Focus in This Study
(Google Earth, 2012)
My translator is a prominent Thai reporter for a major international news provider.
In her primary job as a reporter she is constantly interpreting the Thai language into
English. In this work she is careful to understand the real meaning and interpretation of language from Thai to English. As a result, at times the transcript appears to convey broken
English. It has been written in this manor in order not to lose the authenticity of the
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subjects’ statements. In places, sentence structure has been corrected, however important
care has been taken at every step from interviews to transcribing to writing not to
misinterpret the true meaning of the subjects statements. Following each interview my
interpreter and I would go over the transcript to make sure the interviews were an
accurate translation. Further, if aspects of customs or language were not understood by me, my interpreter would fill me in on any analytically useful details that I needed to
understand more clearly.
Using IE, my approach to writing is to chronicle the actions and experiences of my
subjects by relying on their knowledge of events, interactions with outside forces, and the
everyday experiences following the tsunami. In describing informants’ lived experiences I
pay attention to the clues in their stories to identify the forces that were implicated in the
aid and recovery processes and that have established the emerged ruling relations within
the community, economy, government and institutions. Numerous interviews and follow-
up interviews (roughly 30 interviews in total) were conducted in each community of study.
Interviewees included villagers of various ethnicities, gender, age, and status within
society. Officials were interviewed at multiple levels of local government such as village
Head Men (mayors), the sub-district (county) mayor, and the former governor of Takupa
district. All of these officials were either present or in charge of their respective
government positions during the time of the tsunami and the reconstruction aid and
recovery process. Despite interviewing these officials, only a few were able to provide
information that supported me to understand the processes of reconstruction aid and
recovery. What was revealing about those officials that did not provide insight was their
rigid adherence to a somewhat scripted response that indicated that reconstruction aid and
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recovery occurred very quickly and efficiently over a one-year period. This appears to be
the standard government position that was communicated to outsiders regarding recovery
following the tsunami and is relevant to the discussion developed in Chapter nine. Despite
some of the interview challenges I faced, the interview process in each community led me
to principal “knowers” in the field that provided critical information to peal back the layers
of interactions and social relations that expose the ruling relations of the post-tsunami
landscape. As a result, although numerous interviews were conducted in each community
as well as with levels of government and stakeholders, only a eleven key informants were
primarily utilized and referred to as sources of information in the research. These
informants names occur frequently throughout the IE analysis therefore their backgrounds
and relevance to the study are summarized in Table 1. Care has been taken not to reveal the names of local individuals. Government official’s names are revealed due to their public nature and position within society. The following table summarizes their names or designations within the research.
One of the primary methods in IE is to produce schematic diagrams that represent the links between people's activities as they are coordinated across time and geography. In
IE this is referred to as mapping. This mapping process aims to enlarge the scope of visible social relations through inquiry and to map the relations that connect one site to others
(Smith, 2005 p. 29). Like a spatial mapping exercise, IE’s purpose is to describe graphically how people’s experiences locally are impacted by the by the extended social relations of ruling and economy and to locate the intersections of people’s work inside complex systems of ruling (Smith, 2005). Within this research IE maps serve two purposes: 1) to conduct data analysis and to make sense of the ruling relations within communities, the
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reconstruction and recovery processes; the organizations involved; and levels of
government. These processes are graphically represented to reveal connections and
extensions of the data that may not be revealed through other methods of analysis; and 2)
to formally display the overall ruling relations, processes of recovery, and stakeholders
involved within each community and the impacted region as a whole. In each community
an IE map has been created, each of these contributes to developing the ‘overall ruling
relations map’ that is referred to within the discussion chapter (Chapter nine).
4.5 Ethical Considerations
The Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board at the University of Calgary approved this study (See Appendices A). The following section addresses the ethical concerns and considerations surrounding this research.
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Table 1: Primary Informants in the Four Communities of Study Ban Nam Khem Village Information and Relevance of Informant Local-Villager-Turned-Activist This individual lives in Ban Nam Khem and was one of the leaders responsible for banding together survivors to fight for the rights for housing and pool aid resources coming in from government NGOs and other sources. Community Activist Leader This individual is the leader of the citizens group of survivors that organized themselves to fight for the rights for housing and pool aid resources coming in from government NGOs and other sources. He is still running his community bank and NGO organization that continues to support the survivors in Ban Nam Khem and other tsunami-impacted regions. Village Head Man-Ban Nam Khem This individual is a fisher and Head Man of Ban Nam Khem currently and at the time of the tsunami. Villager, Ban Nam Khem She is a survivor of the tsunami event in Ban Nam Khem who received the government aid for reconstruction of housing in Ban Nam Khem. Governor Pipop Nukwan Former Governor of Takupa district (the district where the 4 communities of focus are located) at the time of the tsunami Ban Sak Villager This individual lived in the nearby village of Ban Sak. She is included in the analysis of Ban Nam Khem because of she close proximity to Ban Nam Kham. She is also receiving support from “The Community Activist Leader” in the fight to rebuild on her land. Bangkaya Tsunami Community Fisher and Head Man of the Moken People in This individual moved from a coastal Bangkaya community community to Bangkaya, a community built on crown land donated by the King for victems choosing to move from the coast. Village Woman from Bangkaya This individual lost her home in Khao Lak and was forced to move to Bangkaya following the tsunami. She is Thai, but an outsider originally from Chiang Mai, in Northern Thailand. Thuungwa Moken Community Head Man of Thuungwa He is the Head Man of the Moken community seeking to remain on their land. Village woman at Thuungwa She is a resident of Thuungwa and survivor of the tsunami. She is also a fisher. Khao Lak Resort Owner She owns a resort on the beach in Khao Lak. and is a prominent business woman in the community
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4.5.1 Consideration of Post Tramatic Trauma Resulting From Interviews
Due to the traumatic nature of the tsunami event, there was a possibility that
discussing the events and resulting circumstances would bring some distress to individual
participants. Interview questions were focused only on participant’s lives before the
tsunami and their current situation, not the tsunami event. With the focus of questions on
participants’ current situation, risk of distress was minimal. However, if participants were
to become distressed, they would have been encouraged to contact local assistance.
Counselling services are limited in Phang Nga province in Thailand, however local support
such as religious leaders (monks, ministers, village elders) do provide community and
emotional support. No distressful incidents occurred in the interview process for the
participants within this study.
4.5.2 Cross-cultural Considerations within the Study
There are many cross-cultural differences that may arise between the researcher
and participants. I have spent a considerable amount of time in Thailand and the region of
study prior to the commencement of this research, and understand a multitude of
differences between Thai and Moken cultures and the western culture where I come from.
That being said, considerable consultation was conducted between my Thai interpreter and
myself to avoid offence, being respectful and understanding surrounding my questions, and
most importantly not compromise the safety and livelihood of informants through their
participation in the study. This was done both through the wording and conveyance of the informed consent form (see Appendices B) as well as by asking informants directly if any of
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the information that they revealed through their interviews may be harmful to their safety,
job, family members or standing in the community.
4.5.3 Recruitment of Participants
Potential participants were identified by the researcher and interpreter through
convenience sampling and snow-ball sampling techniques. Key stakeholders in the local
community, such as village leaders, as well as external stakeholders such as NGOs and
resort managers were approached. Discussion with first level informants (those who were
introduced to me first and/or interviewed first in the communities) influenced who was interviewed at each subsequent level. At each level of recruitment of participants, appropriate care was taken to minimize possible negative outcomes resulting from participation in this study. No minors participated in the study. Verbal communication was addressed in ethical consideration for participating in the study, along with a translated version in Thai language. The interpreter/transcriber was fluent in English and Thai and understood differences in interpreting the meaning of English words to Thai as well as cultural differences or misunderstandings that may have occurred between the researcher and participants. No remuneration was provided for participation.
Each participant was asked to sign a consent form to ensure that he or she was fully informed of their role in the research as a participant, as well as how the information they provide will be used in the research context, and to ensure that they know that they may remove themselves from the study at ay time. Participants were told that their identity will be protected in any research reports. However, if a participant chose to remove themselves from the study, the data collected from them prior to that point remains as part of the research data. Participants were informed that the transcripts will be translated by a hired
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translator/transcriptionist. Consent included their permission to share their data with the
researcher, interpreter, transcriptionist and supervisors. The consent form was provided in
English and Thai to ensure full comprehension and proper informed consent (see
Appendices B and C). The translator/transcriptionist was aware of these ethical considerations and did not share the data outside of the study. Important attention was paid to the translation to help ensure the understanding of potential participants prior to their participation in this study. Every effort was made to remove identifying information from these quotes, and informants will be referred to by an identified name defined by the researcher (see Table 2). However, it is still possible that insiders within the community or within organizations and government may be able to identify individual informants from their quoted comments. The risk of identifying people interviewed was communicated to potential informants in the consent form prior to the interview.
4.5.4 Collection and Storage of Data
In Thailand, as well as in Canada, raw data resulting from interviews, journals, and observational notes are securely stored on password protected equipment and recording devices that were erased imediately following data upload into password protected equipment. Upon returning to Canada, all data was transferred and converted to electronic
format and securely stored in a locked cabinet at the reseachers residence. Data will be
kept for 30 years for comparative purposes and for future research. Informed consent
includes the length of which the researcher will keep the data for research purposes. Field
notes were placed in a hotel safe while the researcher was in the field. Only the researcher, interpretor/transcriber, and the supervisors have access to the raw data that includes
76 recorded interviews, field notes, transcribed interviews, pictures, and typed notes on computers.
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Chapter 5: Ruling Relations and Social Organization of Land in Ban Nam Khem.
5.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami in Ban Nam Khem.
Wisner (2005) describes the impact of the 2004 tsunami as “largely a development induced disaster”, and the fishing village of Ban Nam Khem in Phang Nga province fits this definition. Within the tsunami-impacted area of Southern Thailand, Ban Nam Khem was arguably the most devastated by the event. Ban Nam Khem’s geographical location along the low lying coastal plain of Phang Nga, combined with its past environmental disturbance as a tin mine location, left the village population completely exposed to the wave. As discussed in Chapter one, tin mining in the area was extremely destructive to the natural coastal ecosystem of mangroves, coral reefs, and stability of beach environments. In the case of Ban Nam Khem, the destructive legacy of tin mining left the community vulnerable to the tsunami because of the destruction of the natural mangrove defences and open mining pits. The effects of such mining destruction were indicated by a teenage boy in my first visit to the village who described how many of the villagers were sucked down into the deep pits of the former tin mine by the back swash of the tsunami waves, drowning many of the villagers. The combined impacts of the direct exposure to the open ocean, severe degradation of natural barriers, the hazards of open mine pits, and the low lying topography made Ban Nam Khem the most severely affected village on the Andaman coast.
This example of degraded environmental conditions is just one of many environmental hazards resulting from prior development and degradation of the landscape. In one villager’s account of the tsunami, a villager was in a truck with his mother and father, and a load of Burmese workers in the back. He and his family were able to get on a roof of a
78 building and survived, however, all of the workers in the back of their truck drowned.
These were circumstances discussed in my interviews, that allowed me to see that my cohort of informants were either able to stand on something higher than the wave or were able to get to higher ground.
Social and economic factors in Ban Nam Khem prior to the tsunami further added to the vulnerability of survivors following the tsunami. As the former Governor of Takuapa district Governor Pipop Nukwan (where the four communities within this study are located), at the time of the Tsunami describes:
“You may think that why Khao Lak and Ban Nam Khem is so different. Ban Nam Khem is
the community where many people from 76 provinces of Thailand live.” Mr. Pipop
Nukwan, 24 Feb. 2011.
He is referring to the fact that many of the people living in Ban Nam Khem migrated to the village within the last 30 to 40 years. In interviews with the Head Man of Ban Nam Khem, he described the community as being composed of two waves of people. First, the people came to Ban Nam Khem to mine tin. Second, following the end of tin mining, the people turned to fishing for their livelihood. As a result, many of the people were relatively new to the region and thus, prior to the tsunami there were unclear land tenure arrangements within the community (discussed in Chapter three). Many of the residents did not own their property prior to the tsunami event, thus leaving them with little compensation or aid following the tsunami. The implications of these existing social, economic and political factors will be discussed in the following sections documenting aid and reconstruction in
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the village. It is important to point out, here, that the land tenure system in Khao Lak was
different than Ban Nam Khem, where many of the villagers did own the land. This will be
addressed in the chapter on Khao Lak.
5.2 Conditions Immediately Following the Tsunami
In this section, this research examines an incredibly chaotic period following the tsunami of approximately 18 months, where the village begins the reconstruction and recovery process. There are numerous opinions, interpretations, and documentations of this period, all with different points of view, focus, and pieces of information. This research pulls together an understanding of the processes, policy, aid and ruling relations that dictated, transformed and rebuilt the community into its current form. Through interviews with villagers, the government officials, and community activists, the research reveals two dominant and competing paths in the reconstruction process in this village. Noteworthy, is that there were myriad outcomes for people in this transitional recovery period that the
scope and scale of this research cannot examine. One dominant path to recovery was
enacted by the national government in coordination with the local government and the
National Army through the national government plan for tsunami recovery. A second path
emerged from the grass-roots empowerment of community members aided by select NGOs
who fought for their rights in the decision-making processes in order to achieve
sustainable housing, land ownership, and livelihood. My interviews within the community
of Ban Nam Khem led me to two individuals involved in activism for the rights of tsunami
victims. These men are key informants who supported me to identify the multiple paths to
recovery in the community. The first individual I refer to as “Villager-Turned-Activist” due
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to his transformation from tsunami victim to activist within Ban Nam Khem. The second
individual, to whom I refer later, I have named “Community Activist Leader” as he was the
leader of the activists who successfully lobbied for villagers rights in Ban Nam Khem and
surrounding impacted regions.
Conditions after the tsunami were chaotic and horrific circumstances. Ban Nam
Khem lost close to half of its Thai citizen population (approximately 4000), and an
unknown number of migrant and illegal workers from Burma who could not be accounted
for through census data (Aldis, Tima, Sawanpanyalert, & Bhatiasevi, 2005).5 All
infrastructure including housing, roads, power, water, sewage was completely destroyed
(see Figure 5). In my interviews with the Villager-Turned-Activist, he describes his situation following the tsunami as follows:
“After tsunami, we thought that we could not stay at Ban Nam Khem anymore since
everything was washed out and all destroyed. And we also didn’t have the title deed
for the land because we rented the house. Everyday was a struggle to live. We did not
have many restrooms in the village. Further, I did not know anyone in the village so it
was quite difficult for me to find ways to live there. The municipality governor and the
leader of the village said that we couldn’t live in the Ban Nam Khem anymore and we
have to move.” Villager-Turned-Activist, 23 Feb. 2011.
5 There is no accurate way of assessing the number of Burmese migrant workers in the region due to the itinerant nature of there passing through the border that extends for hundreds of kilometers to the north of the region. Some workers are there legally, however many others are illegal workers that are often deported regularly only to make there way back to the region in the following days.
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Plate 3: Image of Coastal Plain Taken January 2005
(“Google Earth,” 2012)
In the aftermath of the tsunami, government compensation and eligibility for housing was based on ownership of land. Many people living within the village having not
lived in Ban Nam Khem for a long period of time, and had been renting their housing. Most
were left with no material assets or compensation following the tsunami. The plight of so
many in the community who were destitute as a result of the tsunami brought the attention
of media, and eventually the presence of NGOs and aid agencies to Ban Nam Khem.
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Plate 4: Ban Nam Khem Ruins of Houses on Flooded Tin Mining Pits
Being the hardest hit community in the region, Ban Nam Khem became the center of numerous tsunami aid and reconstruction initiatives following the tsunami. In the first months of the aftermath, the Bang Muang temporary housing camp was set up near Ban
Nam Khem, where over 60 Thai and international organizations offered various forms of aid within the camp (Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid, 2005). Initially the temporary camp was set up for 400 households, however at the height of the camps occupation, 850 families (i.e. 3500 people) were said to have occupied the camp (UNDP,
2006). Interviews with villagers and external verification (UNDP, 2005), revealed that immediately following the tsunami a network of villagers and external NGOs were involved in unique and textually coordinated recovery efforts. These relief efforts were organized
83 through the establishment of a framework of initiatives that were acted out through the coordination of villagers and organizations such as the Community Organizations
Development Institute (CODI) and the Chumchon Thai foundation (CTF). (CODI) defines their aid and recovery initiatives in a text titled “Support for Rehabilitation of Traditional
Communities and Municipalities in Tsunami-affected Areas in Thailand”. This text outlined a number of goals, initiatives and expected outcomes from the implementation of the organization’s aid program that ran from April to December 2005. These goals were listed as follows: 1) the promotion of people’s participation in the development process and decision-making at the local level; and 3) to support and promote decentralization and strengthen local governance. Goal 2 was not mentioned, and there was no corresponding explanation of the omission. The following is a list of expected outcomes of the implementation of the program (Support for Rehabilitation of Traditional Communities and Municipalities in Tsunami-affected Areas in Thailand., 2005):
1) Traditional Communities including Sea Gypsies empowered to plan and
implement the rehabilitation and recovery needs of their respective areas;
2) Existing support networks strengthened to provide sustainable livelihood
options and mechanisms for these communities to participate in the development of
conservation regulations in partnership with provincial and local authorities;
3) The capacity of provincial and local authorities increased in participatory
rehabilitation planning; and
4) Documentation of lessons learned.
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The target beneficiaries of this program were the Bang Muang Relief Center (located
in Ban Nam Khem), and the Tung Wa Sea Gypsy community, two of the four communities of
focus within my research. This makes CODI a key player in the study of aid in recovery in
the research study area.
My initial interviews with the Villager-turned-activist involved in establishing and
running the network within the Bang Muang camp described his knowledge of the actual
organization of aid and relief in the initial stages of recovery. He describes how he and
other individuals in the community took charge of relief materials through establishing a
common coffee area where villagers could meet every morning to organize the community
and distribute aid:
“…..So that’s why we set up the community bank to collect the money by ourselves. I
was the one who proposed the idea. We had a meeting every morning to settle all the
problems. We thought that if we do not do anything, we would start fighting for sure.
We decided we should have our own organization. We started with the coffee area first
because the south people like to have coffee in the morning and talk. At least, it would
help us relax.” Villager Turned Activist, 25 Feb, 2011.
The Villager-Turned-Activist refers to the CODI as the organization responsible for the
setting up of the temporary camp and housing.
Q : How long did it take to build the temporary houses?
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A : “Around 1 month. We found out later that we got the budget to do everything from
the Community Organization Development Institute (Pubic Organization) (CODI). We
had 800 temporary houses in Ban Nam Khem.” Villager Turned Activist, 25 Feb, 2011.
This description is well aligned with Community Organizations Development Institute
initiative for tsunami reconstruction and aid and recovery document, as well as the
aforementioned goals and outcome objectives for initial tsunami recovery. Outlined in
their aid and recovery policy document CODI’s mandate was to: “Promote people’s
participation in the development process and decision-making at the local level.” Strategies
to accomplish this were directed toward:
A) To create a public space in target communities for the exchange, sharing and
learning of cultural-related issues;
B) To establish community networking events; and
C) To set up community forums for exchange of experiences on various
rehabilitation and recovery initiatives.
Many of these goals and initiatives, as laid out by this policy, appear to have been realized and activated as described by the account from the Villager-Turned-Activist in his account of the organization of the temporary camp and the distribution of aid were organized:
“We started talking and asked for volunteers to manage the provided aid. We
categorized it. We had meetings everyday. We planned the day in the morning and had
a debriefed meeting in the evening. NGOs told us to do like that. We also had the radio
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in the camp to notify the victims. There were around 1,500 tents in the camp. We also
had electricity in the camp too. There were so many organizations that came down
here.” Villager Turned Activist, 25 Feb, 2011
Through the accounts of other villagers and through analysis of the policy document from the CODI, it appears that the policies laid out in the short term went a long way towards empowering local people to work together in the distribution of aid, social initiatives, and the initial temporary reconstruction process. My interviews with villagers all led to one individual who appears to have been responsible for organizing and empowering a large number of villagers to fight for their rights to land, decision making processes involving the reconstruction process, and the organization of aid from NGOs and government following the tsunami. In my visit to Ban Nam Khem in December 2011, I was able to interview this individual I refer to as Community Activist Leader (introduced previously in this chapter).
The information collected from this interview connected many pieces of the puzzle explaining the recovery process in Ban Nam Khem. Further, this interview exposed different paths to recovery that were taken by villagers. His account reflects how the chaotic aid and reconstruction initiatives following in the event played out across the region. He describes these inequities as follows:
“At that time, there was many Thai and foreign organizations that had nothing to do
with the government, came down to Ban Nam Khem to give relief. Receiving aid from
these organizations depended on whether you ran into them. That was the reason why
we had to gather as a group and set up a center for Tsunami-affected people by our
own. Community Activist Leader, 15 Dec. 2011
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The Community Activist Leader goes on to explain, in more detail than others interviewed, how his group began organizing the camp, aid, and financial support from NGOs:
”People at the time scattered everywhere. So we gathered in the temporary camp. We
used tents. We started to make people to be more disciplined, assigning one leader in
every 10 families. All the tents were distributed in rows, organizing zones in the camp.
The community ran this. The government didn’t get involved with this. Chumchon Thai
foundation helped us organized things. They gave us advice about managing. They
said we needed to arrange tents in rows and organize donation and relief supplies.
After that, we started to think about the security in the temporary camp as well as
kitchen center and health care system like toilets and trash. We all initiated that on
our own. We set up a center and we had meetings everyday.” Community Activist
Leader, 15 Dec. 2011
The Community Activist Leader describes the initial stages of organization of his group and the NGO that helped cultivate this operational structure within the camp. This was the seed for a structure that would continue to grow in organization, empowerment and self- reliance, as discussed in the following sections relating to long-term recovery.
5.3 Recovery Paths for Reconstruction of Permanent Housing and Infrastructure in
Ban Nam Khem.
Although the short-term recovery policies by the CODI and other organizations appear to have made significant advances to the initial recovery process, many of these
88 policies and projects were only enacted and funded for a short period of time. With the commencement of permanent reconstruction of housing and infrastructure in Ban Nam
Khem and other villages, an entirely different set of policies and regulations were enacted through a government plan for reconstruction in the region. These government policies and regulations differed from opposing plans laid out by community members who were fighting for land and sustainable reconstruction of their housing.
5.3.1 Reconstruction Policy and Reconstruction Following the Government Plan.
The UNDP document titled “Tsunami Recovery: One Year Later (2005), discusses some of the Royal Thai government’s recovery plan in Phang Nga province. Further information on the government plan for reconstruction was obtained through my interviews with local government officials and community members. The following information is a summary of the government plan, as I have come to understand it through both the UNDP document and my interviews with government officials.
1. The Army and Navy would be responsible for the coordination and labour for
reconstruction of permanent homes (UNDP, 2006);
2. 30,000 Thai Baht (1000 USD) would be allocated per household for reconstruction
(from interview of Mr. Pipop Nukwan, the former bailiff (governor) of Takuapa
district); and
3. Only those who owned the land prior to the tsunami could have government
assistance and rebuild on the land, which would require proof of previous
ownership.
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The initial government plan for reconstruction of housing in Ban Nam Khem
(described above as point three) was criticized by community members and NGOs as having many flaws. Many of the villagers did not own their land, or could not prove that they owned it, thus they did qualify for lump-sum financial aid or the military reconstruction of their homes. In my interview with Ban Nam Khem’s Head Man (Mayor), he stated that he and his staff drew the map that should have determined who owned each plot of land, which was devised from a previous map of the town. However, the landscape following the tsunami was completely altered, which made it difficult to determine where the property lines were. Further, whole families perished in the tsunami leaving some plots abandoned, and therefore open for the taking. The organization of people-achieved allocations of newly surveyed property is discussed by the Head Man:
“Most of the villagers here have the title deeds of their lands. We had the civil servant
from the Land Department come here to survey and measure the area of each piece of
land according to the existing evidence before reconstructing the house for the victims.
Moreover, for those who were suffering, as they didn’t have title deeds resulting that
they had no houses to stay. They would have to go staying at Pootiew, the temporary
housing area. We informed all the people who were affected by Tsunami to show
intentions to the land department staff and asked for measuring the land for
rebuilding the houses. The engineer battalion army would be notified by the land
department staff to rebuild the houses according to the evidences given by the
villagers.” Village Head Man, Ban Nam Khem, 21 Feb 2011.
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In further discussion with the Head Man of Ban Nam Khem, I determined that the
“existing evidence” from prior to the tsunami of which he refers to, was the map he and his staff drew after the tsunami. This map was then used to survey the town by the army surveyors in charge of the eventual reconstruction of housing under the government plan.
In the Head Man’s account, villagers who did not own land were excluded from the government plan and had to go live elsewhere.
Point two of the government plan, money allocated for the reconstruction, was also inadequate for most people. The initial Thai government offering of 30,000 Thai Baht
(approximately 1000 in USD) fell short of being able to rebuild even a basic house.
Through subsequent interviews with community members I confirmed that money from private donations, NGOs and foreign governments, were used to augment the above- mentioned Thai government funds allocated for rebuilding. The average house under the government plan was said to cost around 140,000 Thai Baht (4600 USD), with construction completed within one year of the tsunami event. In my interviews, it is not clear whether full payment for the housing built by the army was covered using the pooling of aid funds.
However, what is elucidated through my interviews and observations, is that in some cases
NGOs covered shortfalls, and in other instances people received low interest loans from
Thai Banks backed by the government. From interviews with other villagers, it is clear that some affected people only received the basic government funding, resulting in housing constructed using the bare minimum of materials, leaving many of the structures without bathrooms and other basic features.
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Addressing point one within the government plan; although it was an effective use of resources to have the Army help in tsunami aid and relief, in my interviews villagers point to the fact that soldiers are not trained in construction or building techniques. This may have lead to the construction inadequacies discussed in both my interviews and the literature on tsunami reconstruction (Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid, 2005).
5.3.2 Common Threads Surrounding the Outcomes of the Development Plan.
Points made in interviews with villagers who followed the government plan had a common thread. People were largely in the dark about what organizations were available to provide aid, what options they had for reconstruction of housing, and where they were able to rebuild. One villager described how the aid was haphazardly distributed. The aid organizations were unable to contact people who had been forced out of the village:
“I think the assistance at the time came too fast. Everyone came down here to help, help
and help. Some of the villagers here had to move out, as we didn’t have any place to live.
Many left to stay in other places after the Tsunami. That’s why they’ve got little aid. But
the organizations should have offered aid after the houses had been rebuilt and
everyone was able to come back home. They could offer aid directly to the victims at
their home. That would have been a fair distribution. Some groups of people came here
with the truck to help people, some didn’t. For those who didn’t have the truck, they
couldn’t reach the place where victims Tsunami lived.” Villager, Ban Nam Khem, Feb.
2011.
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This villager describes how she did not know about what options were available to her
family for reconstruction.
“We didn’t ask for the new house in time. We missed it. We found out later about the
new provided houses. We didn’t know this information before. Only some groups of
people were told about this option to move.” Villager, Ban Nam Khem, 24 Feb. 2011.
This interview, in particular, highlights the theme throughout many of the villagers’
experiences that information regarding options for aid and recovery was not fairly
allocated throughout the community. This resulted in uneven distribution of resources to
people in the community. She describes how she missed the opportunity to move to the
new communities for tsunami victims, and that given the opportunity and knowledge about
the options she may have moved away to the new communities such as Bangkaya Tsunami
Relief Community (discussed in Chapter seven).
Another problem with the government plan was the quality of the houses constructed by the Army. Villagers who occupy these houses complained of deficiencies in quality and design, and inequities in infrastructure between their houses. Compounding this issue is evidence which suggests that some villagers had aid from organizations and private interests that improved the quality of their houses, as compared to the basic models provided by the government plan. One villager describes the problem with the housing as follows:
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“...They operated too fast. We’ve got smaller houses. Some houses don’t have the
kitchen areas or even toilets. They gave us only 4x9 square meters houses. We had no
choices. We have to renovate our house by our own money so right now we have the
same-size-house back. These houses were rebuilt by the military.” Villager, Ban Nam
Khem, Feb. 2011.
The UNDP report “Tsunami One Year Later” (2005) also discusses this problem with
reconstruction by the Army: “These houses are being built according to standardized and
conventional house designs, which in several instances have not been found suitable by the
beneficiaries” (p. 40). Further, the report states that CODI worked with local government,
NGOs and international organizations to rebuild housing with professional architects and
planners to construct more sustainable and suitable housing. This information is a clue to
the social organization of the second major path that coordinated reconstruction; the
activities instituted by community activists in consultation and support from NGOs, such as
CODI and the Chumchon Thai Foundation. The following section addresses the role of
NGOs in initiating and facilitating grass-roots organization of aid, reconstruction and recovery in Ban Nam Khem.
5.3.3 Organization of Community Activists Opposed to the Government Plan for
Reconstruction of Housing.
Many villagers who had favourable outcomes in reconstruction of housing had the benefit of resources and knowledge from NGOs who supported their rights for sustainable housing and equitable aid. This resulted in long term support for rebuilding their lives and
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communities. One of the most notable features of my interviews is how some villagers
were able to rise up against government policy, organize aid, and rebuild their lives under
their own terms. In Ban Nam Khem some NGOs sought to support the reconstruction of
communities through translation of knowledge to victims that would support villagers to
become actively involved in cooperation and strengthening of community networks, and
the ability to organize their own aid distribution, reconstruction and recovery. These NGO
practices characterized by the organizations as “translation of knowledge” arguably
redefined the ruling relations of tsunami recovery, and eventually within the ongoing
construction of the community itself. Redefining the ruling relations of recovery was
accomplished through reversing aid and recovery policy from the top down approach of
the government plan, to harness a grass-roots, bottom up plan for reconstruction of
housing and livelihood in Ban Nam Khem.
As discussed in the description of aid and recovery following the tsunami, NGO
groups such as the CODI and the Chumchon Thai Foundation provided pragmatic advice
and strategies to help people in the camp organize aid and recovery, The organizational
structure within the camp that formed in the early months following the tsunami grew into
a cohesive, highly organized group of survivors who, when faced with challenge of long-
term recovery, were able to coordinate and rally institutions, NGOs, and foreign
governments to help them control their long-term destiny.
After surviving the initial months within the camp, many families faced a bleak
future with nowhere to go and little-to-no resources or livelihood. Those who did not own their land, or could not prove they owned the land, were initially told by the government that they could not return to Ban Nam Khem. Many of these individuals were located in
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temporary housing in Bang Muang camp (on the outskirts of Ban Nam Khem). Some of
these people did not return to Ban Nam Khem, choosing to live in housing provided by the
government in villages such as Bangkaya Post-Tsunami Settlement (Bangkaya will be
discussed in Chapter seven). However others were more persistent in their efforts to
return home.
The Community Activist Leader describes their fight for land and to remain in Ban
Nam Khem as follows:
“After that, we decided to go back to our home. The government declared the land hit
by the Tsunami - as the risky area. So the government announced to the local people
not to go back to the area. But we insisted that we were going to live in our own
places. We drafted our town plan and proposed that to the government through the
media. Through public pressure, the government agreed on our plan and offered to
rebuild the houses in the same villages. So there was division in the community where
some people agreed to move in the same place while the others did not. The majority
agreed to move in the same place and would want the government to rebuild the new
houses for them. I and my friends, around 150 families, insisted that we wanted to
rebuild our houses by ourselves. We thought that we should build a house according to
the preference of the owner. We assembled as a group and wrote a proposal for
requesting fund in many organization including foreign organizations. And we also set
up the community bank in the villages. We’ve received funding from EU and Denmark.
And we got the fund from Thai government 140,000 Baht per house as well.
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Our houses are better than the houses that built by the government. They were happy
at first because they’ve got the houses before us. The military quickly built those houses
for them. Their houses took one year to finish while we took 1 year and a half. We built
our houses on our own. It took more than one year because we had to seek funds from
foreign organizations and we also built the house on our own. You have to know that
we wouldn’t seek only from EU but also many different places. We’ve received 40
million baht from the EU and 13 million from Denmark.” Community Activist Leader,
15 Dec. 2011
Further, the Community Activist Leader describes how his group was able to fight for land for those who did not have the deed to their property.
“There were 150 houses to be built, as well more than 100 families did not have the
land rights so we also allocated the budget to buy the land too.” Community Activist
Leader, 15 Dec. 2011
From the Community Activist Leader’s account it is clear that through organization, aided by NGO policy, he and his group were able to break the top-down approach of ruling relations as dictated by the government in reconstruction and recovery. They were able establish their own ruling relations within the community that opposed the external top- down plan from the government, and empowered themselves to take control and coordinate aid reconstruction and recovery for their group of survivors. He describes how the housing his group built is better than those built by the government, a sentiment in-line
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with the villagers who described their Army-built housing as being sub-standard.
Moreover, the pooling of resources of aid money was achieved by establishing a community
bank. Funds from the bank were used to equitably distribute funds to construct village
participants desired housing, provide food, clothing and funds to support reconstruction of
livelihood, and to save funds for future events and disasters. The community bank
continues to operate for both deposits and withdrawals and is located within the offices of
the Community Activist Leader in Ban Nam Khem. By banding together, pooling resources,
and through gaining the knowledge and connections to successfully advocate for their
rights to have a say in the processes of reconstruction and recovery, their community group was able to achieve a more sustainable outcome for housing and reconstruction of livelihood.
5.4 Assessment of Real and Perceived Hazard in the Reconstruction of Ban Nam
Khem.
Despite some clear lessons that can be learned from the Ban Nam Khem reconstruction project a potentially fatal flaw in rebuilding the village is that it was largely
reconstructed in the same urban style of convoluted roads and houses that existed prior to
the tsunami. Although an evacuation plan and early warning system is now in place, it is
questionable whether it would be possible for residents to actually make it to the highest
point in the village, the public school. Furthermore, flooded tin mining pits that intensified
the impact and death toll of the tsunami are still present within the community. The Village
Head Man of Ban Nam Khem, as well as the Villager-Turned-Activist suggested that it
would have been better if a new city plan with well-developed transportation routes had
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been developed to improve both the city plan and safety in the case of another tsunami
event.
There is also an abiding fear and perception of hazard that is an ongoing experience
for those survivors who moved back to the original village. The Villager-Turned-Activist stated that prior to the tsunami his daughter loved the ocean, choosing to swim daily. Since the tsunami, she has been afraid of the sea. This sentiment resonated in interviews throughout the Ban Kaya community, where villagers chose to move to the newly built community on crown land that is on elevated land away from the sea. There is a sense that victims of the tsunami are still constantly on edge and afraid of a future event due to the traumatic experiences and loss they experienced on December 26th 2004.
The coastline of Ban Nam Khem has been permanently altered from the tsunami,
which resulted in the loss of a considerable amount of beachfront in the community
(Segschneider, Chaikeo, & Maeroh, 2008). Prior to the tsunami, there was a beach bar (i.e.
sandbar) present offshore from Ban Nam Khem that prevented large waves from pounding
the coast and allowed for the build-up of beautiful sand beaches along the waterfront of
Ban Nam Khem (Segschneider et al., 2008). This sandbar not only provided for a beautiful
beach that could be utilized for tourism, it also provided for a natural harbour for local
fishers to secure their boats and offload their catch (Segschneider et al., 2008).
Segschneider et al. (2008) indicate that the beach bar has failed to return following the tsunami due to a large seawall extending outward in to the ocean that was part of the reconstruction of a resort on the Koh Khor Khao Island immediately offshore from Ban
Nam Khem. This newly built wall has prevented sand from drifting off the island to form the beach bar that previously existed offshore (Segschneider et al., 2008). Although the
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beach bar did not prevent the destruction of Ban Nam Khem in the tsunami event, the
removal of this barrier to wave action makes Ban Nam Khem even moremore vulnerable to
future tsunami events than if the beach bar had not been impeded by development.
Additionally, mangroves that were present in the northern section of the town acted
as buffers to the tsunami. Several houses located behind the mangroves were left standing
following the tsunami (Segschneider et al., 2008). However, these forests were destroyed
in the tsunami event, leaving all the coast of Ban Nam Khem completely exposed to wave
action (Segschneider et al., 2008) Three years after the tsunami, it was reported that the
mangrove forests had still not returned (Segschneider et al., 2008). In my own research
observations of the area more recently however, it appears that some of the mangroves appear to be regenerating either through natural processes or planting (see Figure 5).
5.5 Activism Spreading Beyond Ban Nam Khem.
The organization network established by the Community Activist Leader and
supporting NGOs is not confined to the village of Ban Nam Khem. His network of activism
and organization has spanned outward to surrounding communities and even to disaster
recovery abroad. In further discussion with the Community Activist Leader, he describes
how their organization was able to link up and help other communities within Thailand
facing similar problems following the tsunami.
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Figure 5: Ban Nam Khem 2005 (Google Earth, 2012)
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When asked about the inequity of land rights and issues of “land grabbing” following the tsunami, the Community Activist Leader responded with a detailed account if the issues of land-rights in the region. His response connected his group to activism he has been involved with outside Ban Nam Khem:
“ Villagers were not allowed to go back to their villages like some fishing villages.
Therefore, we connected each village as network to empower the sense of community
to bargain power with the authority. It’s called “Network of Tsunami-affected
People”. Community Activist Leader, 15 Dec. 2011
The work in which the Community Activist Leader is involved that links to many other communities expands his organization’s involvement to the entire area of Southern
Thailand impacted by the tsunami. This grassroots of activist expansion beyond Ban Nam
Khem is fascinating and invites further investigation and is discussed in Chapter ten,
“threads not followed”.
My interview with the Community Activist Leader provided evidence of yet another outcome for tsunami victims in a nearby community Ban Sak (a coastal community approximately 2 kilometers to the south of Ban Nam Khem), those who were not allowed to return to their land. The Community Activist Leader describes their situation as follows:
“As for the land issue, we still have those problems. There are 80 communities with
land problems. Seventy-nine communities went back to their places but without
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license. They are still seeking ways to get the land back and own it legally. There is
only 1 community still cannot go back to their land. I would say this community
obeyed to the authority in the first place that’s why they still don’t have their place
back until now. The government always said ‘we will take care of it’ and ‘no worries’
but still – they never get the land back. The other communities didn’t trust the
authority so they seized the land back first and figure it out later.”
“Only Bang Sak village still cannot get back to their community. The villagers had
stayed there for long time ago. They don’t know that they live in the state land. They’ve
live there for like 30-40 years. As I can remember, the officials came to the village and
declared the area as the state land in 1991 but the villagers were told to live there
with no worries, as the government will not take the land back anyway. I would say the
villagers at that time were too obedient. They trusted the authority. But once the
Tsunami hit the coast, they were discharged right away. They were not allowed to live
there anymore.” Community Activist Leader, 15 Dec. 2011
The Community Activist Leader described the tenuousness of land ownership, state land and tenancy prior to the disaster. He speculated that trust in the government, contributed to the displacement of the people living in Ban Sak. They have not been allowed back to rebuild. For other survivors, physical occupation of the land following the tsunami (despite the immediate hardships encountered) resulted in favourable long-term outcomes for the survivors. The Community Activist Leader connected me with a woman in the village of Ban Sak fighting for the right to rebuild on her land, who I interviewed. My
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interview with the woman from Ban Sak, (identified as Ban Sak Villager) provided more
details into the ongoing conflict that is currently playing out between the national, regional
and local levels of government and the villagers surrounding the land rights of villagers in
Ban Sak. The history surrounding the Ban Sak Villager’s family settling in the region is
typical of how the entire region has been settled over time, both pre and post the tsunami.
The settlement happens with uncertain land tenure arrangements. What the Ban Sak
Villager’s data reveals is the ongoing state of flux within which local people live in this region. It also highlights that contested land rights have centred on land that is considered commercially valuable for mass tourism. Ban Sak Villager described the history of her village and the origins of the land conflict which I have summarized below as follows.
In 1971 her father settled in Ban Sak Village. Later, in 1975-1976, tin mining operations began in Baan Nam Khem and Ban Sak. Many people from other provinces moved there such as people from Ayutthaya (Central region) or Bangkok. Many upholders (Capitalists) came to the villages to invest in tin mining. With the expanding population from tin mining, her father opened a restaurant selling Thai food along the coastal road within the village of
Ban Sak. There were no paved roads or services when the restaurant was built, however in
1984, the Regional government authority built the road in Ban Sak and provided services such electricity. From this point, villagers started to register their address at the government office. The community kept expanding.
She continued to describe that in 1981 the villagers learned that even though their land was owned by the state, the villagers were allowed to stay on the land. As stated above this was followed by the addition of a road and services to the community in 1984. In 1999, the authority (here, I assume it was the regional government authority acting
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understanding direction of the National Government) surveyed and posted (i.e., erected
signs) in the village and surrounding area, identifying it as state land. She described how
officials told her that they surveyed and posted the land as state land because they only
wanted to know the boundary lines, and, once again, the villagers were given reassurance
that could stay on the land. From that point up until the tsunami in late 2004, the Ban Sak
villagers had no conflict relating to land rights with the government, people lived and thrived in these small settlements. However, the tsunami, and the subsequent official government plan for tsunami reconstruction, disrupted the historical land arrangement between the government and villagers at Ban Sak. In Ban Sak, those conflicts are ongoing.
In Ban Nam Khem, despite that the historical land tenure arrangements were similar
to those discussed by the Ban Sak Villager, different processes were followed post the
tsunami, and the long-term advantages to the local residents are apparent. Contrasting
these events may have lessons for disaster relief efforts elsewhere. As in Ban Nam Khem,
the villagers of Ban Sak were told initially that they could not return to their land. In Ban
Nam Khem the Villagers fought this ruling, returned to the land, and were eventually
allowed to stay. On the other hand, in Ban Sak, villagers did not return to their land right
away. The Ban Sak Villager describes this decision and the consequences as follows:
“The authority (Government) threatened the villagers that if went back to our land
and built rebuilt our houses without permission, the government will not restore
electricity and water supply. The villagers here at that time were convinced that they
needed to wait for the authority to rebuild infrastructure and sort out the issue of land
ownership. We were afraid that if we didn’t listen to the authority, there would
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consequences later. We were afraid of not having electricity and water supply stalled
in the village. Even though there were foundations (NGOs) willing to help us rebuild,
they would only stay with us 1-2 years and then they would leave. Our rationale was
that the authority is the one that we have to deal with forever. So we trusted them the
authority, and ever since we have been fighting to return to our land.” Ban Sak
Villager, December, 2011.
My interview with the Ban Sak Villager represents the ongoing dynamics of the
social and ruling relations that are creating contradictions and tensions for survivors. The
Ban Sak Villager had appealed to the national government to support her in her conflict
with the regional authorities. In April 2011, the National Government and the Royal
Princess ruled in the Ban Sak villager’s favour; a decision was made to return a portion of
the land back to the villagers. The Villager from Ban Sak shared two documents; one from
the National government from April 2011, and another from the Royal Princess’s office
directing the regional government to grant a portion of the land back to the villagers. Due to issues of anonymity and confidentiality I have removed names and identifiers in the document (see plates 5 and 6). My analysis of the texts indicate directives that expose yet another conflict surrounding land use in Ban Sak. The regional government under the
Head Man had conspired to create a public park where the former village was located. The recent ruling from the National government infringed on the regional government’s plans to build the public park. As of yet (November 2012) they have yet to carry out the National
Governments order to return the land to the villagers.
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The Villager from Ban Sak suggested that there was considerable money to be made both in the construction of the park and in private businesses that were planned within the park. Further, she suggested that the local Head Man had a considerable amount to gain from the construction of the public park. This conflict is extremely complex. It may involve corruption in government at a local level. The actual activities being coordinated inside this conflict are sensitive and beyond the scope of this work. Nonetheless, it is my impression that this situation is representative of the competing interests being played out in post- tsunami Thailand and are worthy of further investigation. Investigations of this sort are highly complex and fraught with challenges. The recent change of National Government suggests a social organization that involves complex relations between regional and national political affiliations, which require sophisticated insider knowledge of the “expert informants” who are living it, in order to fully understand the nuances and complexities of relations between national and regional governments, as well as between local communities and said governments.
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Figure 6: Map of Ruling Relations and Aid in Ban Nam Khem.
TEXT POLICY POLICY STATEMENTS STATEMENTS OF NGOS AND NGOS OF INSTITUTIONS INCREASING POWER AND INFLUENCE ON RECONSTRUCTION AND ECONOMY HAM KHEM AND SUSTAINABLE AND SUSTAINABLE RECONSTRUCTION AND SELF SUFFICENCY AND SELF NGOS AND INSTITUTIONS NGOS FOR RIGHT TO REBUILD TO FOR RIGHT ORGANIZING COMMUNITY ORGANIZING COMMUNITY VILLAGERS WHO FOUGHT WHO FOUGHT VILLAGERS COORDINATING RECOVERY RECOVERY COORDINATING LOCAL COMMUNITY ACTIVIST ACTIVIST COMMUNITY LOCAL MEMBERS, DISTRIBUTION OF AID, MEMBERS, DISTRIBUTION OF QUALITY HOUSING WITHIN BAN HOUSING QUALITY AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT EMPOWERMENT AND COMMUNITY POLOCY FOCUSING ON INVIDIDUAL FOCUSING ON INVIDIDUAL POLOCY TEXT CASES, COURT DOCUMENTS CASES, COURT ACTIVE LAND DISPUTES COURT ACTIVE LAND DISPUTES COURT VILLAGERS WITHOUT TITLE TO TO TITLE WITHOUT VILLAGERS LAND LIVING IN BAN NAM KHEM LAND LIVING IN BAN NAM KHEM = LACK OF DIRECT CONTROL OF POLICIES AND RECOURSES POLICIES OF CONTROL DIRECT = LACK OF = CONTROL OF INFORMATION AND RESOURCES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY AND RESOURCES FOR RECONSTRUCTION INFORMATION OF = CONTROL ROYAL THAI NATIONAL THAI NATIONAL ROYAL GOVERNMENT PLAN FOR GOVERNMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION NGO AND POST TSUNAMI AID TSUNAMI AND POST NGO KHEM UNDER THE KHEM UNDER GOVERNMENT PLAN GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT LAND GOVERNMENT LAND REBUILDING ON VILLAGERS WITH TITLE TO TO TITLE WITH VILLAGERS TO TITLE WITH VILLAGERS LAND REBUILDING IN BAN NAM LOCAL GOVERNMENT: GOVERNMENT: LOCAL REGIONAL ARMY ON ON THE ON ARMY REGIONAL GROUND LACK OF TITLE LACK OF VILLAGERS FORCED TO MOVE TO VILLAGERS FORCED TO GOVERNMENT LAND DO TO TO LAND DO GOVERNMENT TO TEXT VILLAGE HEAD MAN AID AND AID ARROW LEGEND ARROW LEGISLATED LEGISLATED GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT RECONSTRUCTION PLAN FOR TSUNAMI TSUNAMI PLAN FOR MAP OF RULING RELATIONS AND AID IN BAN NAM KHEM AND RULING RELATIONS OF MAP BURMESE FISHING AND BURMESE FISHING CONSTRUCTION LABOURERS BURMESE APPOINT HEAD MAN APPOINT BURMESE ACTIVISTS VILLAGERS RULING TEXTS RULING NGOS AND COMMUNITY AND COMMUNITY NGOS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LEVELS OF BOX LEGEND INCREASING VULNERABILITY FOLLOWING TSUNAMI
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Plate 5: Letter from Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn’s Personal Affairs Division
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Translation of the above document:
Department of Lands of Phangnga, Takua Pa district
Petchakasem road, Phangnga province 82110
29 September 2011
Subject : Request for the land rights.
To : The representative in Bang Sak community
Reference : The letter from Bang Sak community
Attachment : One copy of related document
According to the letter referred to the representative of Bang Sak community saying the result of the meeting of the coordinating committees for providing the community deed as well as the letter from Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn’s Personal
Affairs Division to yield 10 rias of the land for 18 families in Bang Sak community. The representative of the community acknowledged the officials of department of lands in
Phangnga, Takua Pa district and the officials will operate on procedure accordingly.
The department of lands in Phanggna, Takua Pa hereby informs the residents that as
Phanggna provincial office have issue the letter that the result of the coordinating committees for providing the community deed on 25 April 2011 approved to authorized
“Bang Sak community” to use the lands which is overseen by Ministry of Interior in
Thambon Bang Muang. The Ministry of Interior ordered the department of lands to take responsible for the issue of procedure of operating the use of the state land. In order to be
110 granted the community deed in the lands belonged to the ministry of interior, the community is required as a position of juristic person and operate the request of the state land auction according to article 12 of the land code which the criteria and procedure are stated in ministerial regulation issue 12 (1957). The department of lands has clarified the procedure as attachment.
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Plate 6: Letter from Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn.
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Translation of the above document (Plate 6) (Thai documented blacked out for Confidentiality): Letter to Ban Sak Villager:
According to the letter to Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn
asking for assistance on land to make a living;
The division has asked for cooperation from Phangnga provincial office to look into
the fact and considerations to give assistance to the residents. The division is reported that
the land - where Ms. Ban Sal Villager had ran a shop – is located in Bang Sak community,
village 7 and 8, Thambon Bang Muang, Amphone Takua Pa, Phanggna province. This land is
registered as forbidden area in 1931. Later on in 1971, Ms. Ban Sak Villager and residents
moved in and made a living since then. In 1999, the department of lands under ministry of
interior declared this land as public benefit land for common use of people and is issued
the document as state title deed. After that, the village was devastated by tsunami, the
authority surveyed according to the evidences, which later found out that the land, in fact,
forbid the people to move in. In 2007, there was a meeting held by the villagers in village 7
and 8, which the result from the meeting agreed to build the King's Glorification Public
Park. The project covers the state land. However, Phanggna Provincial office has provided
10 rais of land to 18 households for Ms. Ban Sal Villager and residents in order to make a
living as before.
Her Royal Highness Princess Maja Chakri Sirindhorn’s Personal Affairs Division
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Although it is not possible to obtain direct evidence of tension between levels of
government due to the scope and position of the researcher (not to mention personal
safety), these documents are evidence of significant conflict between and within these
levels of government. In her letter to the local government, Her Royal Highness Princess
Maja Chakri Sirindhorn’s Personal Affairs Division clearly states that the land should be
returned to the villagers in the following language:
“The department of lands in Phanggna, Takua Pa hereby informs the residents that as
Phanggna provincial office have issue the letter that the result of the coordinating
committees for providing the community deed on 25 April 2011 approved to
authorized “Bang Sak community” to use the lands which is overseen by Ministry of
Interior in Thambon Bang Muang.”
This is a directive from a royal branch of the national government to return the land to the
Villagers. However, this has not been the case. As of November 2012 the land has not been
given back to the Villagers. The answer to this might be in both the language and
bureaucracy involved in dealing with land titles and local government. The following wording in letter one may be the issue:
“The Ministry of Interior ordered the department of lands to take responsible for the
issue of procedure of operating the use of the state land. In order to be granted the
community deed in the lands belonged to the ministry of interior, the community is
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required as a position of juristic person and operate the request of the state land
auction according to article 12 of the land code which the criteria and procedure are
stated in ministerial regulation issue 12 (1957).”
The legal terms juristic person, state land auction according to article 12 of the land code, and ministerial regulation issue 12 (1957) imply that there are legal precedents that are used to justify the return of the land. They may also be legal precedents that could be argued, or at least used to stall the process. In my own research with dealing with the same department of lands office in Takupa, I can see where the problem lies. I was trying to access the deeds to coastal lands in Khao Lak that were supposed to be public record. My interpreter was able to contact the official in charge of the Department of Lands. On the phone he was receptive for us to come to Takupa to view the title deeds. However, when I got to the office it was apparent that they either could not provide me with the deed documents or were not willing to do so. The title deeds were in massive paper stacks in a clerks office. There was no computer filing system or computer documentation. I was told that if I could find the latitude and longitude coordinates of the land and deed I would like to view they would send a request to Bangkok to have the deed faxed to me. It was very clear from the look on the officials face and the confusion of my interpreter that I was not going to get what I wanted. The process of visiting the department of lands office was a waste of time for my original purpose of obtaining land title information. However the visit exposed the bureaucracy and stonewalling that can be imposed by this institution. It is possible that the same processes that the Villagers from Ban Sak are facing.
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While observing the former town-site in Ban Sak, it was clear that the land issue was
a major source of conflict and uncertainty within the community. The Village Head Man
had erected signs stating that villagers should not be allowed to invade public land (see
Plate 7). Moreover, the contested site of my informant’s land, (Villager from Ban Sak), has
been recently used as site to dump massive amounts of concrete construction waste (Plate
8), which is an example of the pure physicality of how contested land is being used and
occupied. One further critical observation surrounding the Ban Sak town-site is that the
town includes a beautiful undeveloped golden sand beach that stretches many kilometers
(Plate 9). This beach land is extremely valuable, particularly from a tourism industry perspective, and is a underlying factor as to why the regional government is strongly opposing the return of the villagers of Ban Sak to their land on the coast. This issue of land use, property rights and the value of the land will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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Plate 7: Local Government Sign Condemning the Rights of Villagers to Rebuild on their Land at Ban Sak
Translation of above sign
We against having the community deed in this public- benefit land
People of Bang Sak community in village 7 and 8 and people in Thambon Bang Muang are against everyone, every group, civil servants, politicians and everyone from every party who want to turn this 64 rais of land to be community deed for particular person.
***Please stop what you are doing immediately****
We want the King's Glorification Public Park
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Plate 8: Construction Waste Dumped on Property of Ban Sak Villager
Plate 9: Beachfront of Ban Sak Villager’s property
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Chapter 6: Ruling relations and Social Organization of Land in the Moken Sea Gypsy Community of Thuungwa
6.1 Conditions Prior to the Tsunami
The Moken (Sea Gypsy) community of Thuungwa was another village in Phang Nga completely devastated by the tsunami. As discussed earlier, the Moken are a semi-nomadic fisher-folk people who traditionally migrated along the Malaya peninsula. Because land ownership in much of Thailand is often not clearly defined, communities and especially minorities such as the Moken, do not own the deed to the land. In addition, under the more recent paradigm of neoliberal policy of land management by successive Thai National and regional governments in the last 20 years, such minority groups are considered to have been squatting on government or private land. However, there is evidence to suggest that these minority groups are less itinerant in recent times; for example, one villager of approximately 70 years of age told me she has lived in the village all of her life. Interviews with Moken villagers suggest that their life prior to the tsunami was one of isolation from outsiders; living primarily a subsistence lifestyle that included surviving on fish and other local resources. Dwellings consisted of stilt housing built from wood harvested from the local forests and coastlines. The village head Man showed me a replica of a rebuilt dwelling as an example of the Moken’s traditional housing. Interviews also revealed that prior to the tsunami most of the villagers were fisher-folk. The language spoken in the community prior to the tsunami was primarily the local Moken dialect, and children primarily learned to speak this dialect rather than Thai. The housing, linguistic and subsistence characteristics of the Moken village indicate a relative isolation of the Moken at Thuungwa prior to the tsunami, which is relevant to the overall outcome of the recovery process of the village.
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6.2 Conditions Immediately Following the Tsunami
Like Ban Nam Khem, the Thuungwa Moken community received considerable publicity in the Thai press regarding the plight of tsunami victims in the region. The events that transpired immediately following the tsunami at Thunngwa drew attention to land- grabbing issues in Phanga Nga province, and more specifically in the Thunngwa community. Following the tsunami, the Head Man of Thuungwa described how the villagers were told by authorities to leave their land and to go live in a temporary village erected for tsunami victims. A couple of weeks later, the Village Head Man describes how they were informed by local government authorities that they could not return to the land because it was to be the site of a new hospital donated by Germany. The Tsunami News
Letter, published by “Housing by People in Asia”,“ Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,”(August 2005) describes a similar account regarding the proposed construction of the
Hospital on the Thuungwa village site. The newsletter describes that following communication by Thai press with the German embassy, the hospital plan was exposed as hoax. This hoax was an attempt by local authorities and business interests to seize the valuable land for tourism development (“Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,”
2005). Following this land-grab event, with instruction from NGOs, the Moken returned to their land without permission, roping off the land and setting up camp on the site in attempt to prevent development. As with Ban Nam Khem, the Moken Village Head Man describes how the publicity and injustice of land grabbing and attempted eviction at
Thuungwa captured the attention of numerous NGOs and the Deputy Prime Minister, Gen
Chavalit Yongjaiyuth, in-charge of tsunami recovery efforts in Thailand. In my interview with the Head Man of Thunngwa, he brought out a book with a picture of the former
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Deputy Prime Minster; pointing to him, stating “he was the one who let us stay”. This was
the first indication by the Moken Village Head Man of the unresolved issues surrounding
the land at Thuungwa. He describes the visit of the Deputy Prime Minster as follows:
“He said to his crew that ‘Don’t evict the Moken out of the area. They have the right to
live here. They cannot live in the mountain because their main career is fishing so
that they are supposed to live next to the ocean. Don’t let anyone drive the Moken out.
We should let them stay here.” Head Man, Thuungwa Mokan community, February
2011.
The newsletter article, “Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,” (2005)
describes the victory of the Moken people at Thuungwa as a success story and a model for
Andaman Fishing Villages fighting for land rights. Although, in August 2005, the success
story of the Moken people at Thuungwa may have appeared to be true, events, political
circumstances, and the account of the Moken living within the reconstructed village in the
years following cast doubt over this apparently just outcome. 6 These outcomes of reconstruction aid and recovery will be expanded on in the following section.
6 Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR) was formed in 1987 from an amalgamation of activists and community organizations. It’s goals were to address the challenge of forced evictions in Asian cities. ACHR serves as a network translating knowledge for community, financial organizations, and linkages with city governments and institutions and NGOs (“International Networks: Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR),” 2012).
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6.3 Reconstruction of Thuungwa Moken Community.
Following the initial support for the Moken to remain at Thuungwa, the Head Man described how many different organizations came to help the community; as with Ban Nam
Khem, the Thai National Army were the first on the ground to clear the area of debris. The
Head Man described the time of aid and reconstruction as a chaotic period:
“Many organizations came to help Moken with the issue such as Gen Chavalit under
Thaksin’s administration. Many agencies come to help us. Most of the people come to
help the Moken sometime they want to exploit on us. Some of them really want to help
us.“ Head Man., Thuungwa Mokan community, February 2011.
Housing by People in Asia, “Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,” (2005) provides further insight into the organization and planning of the reconstruction of
Thunngwa. The newsletter outlines how a deal was made to secure the land by dividing the 4.16 hectares of the original village, giving 2.56 hectares to the Moken, and 1.6 hectares to the province of Phang Nga (“Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,” 2005). This was described as win-win scenario by the authors of the newsletter, given that it appeared that the province could receive the desired land for development (in whatever form that may be), and the Moken could rebuild their village at the same location (“Managing the
‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,” 2005). The Newsletter also describes how “The Community
Planning Network” organized a few architects to rebuild the village. My research observations of the reconstructed housing at Thuungwa reveal that they are wood stilt housing similar to traditional teak houses of central and Northern Thailand. In emphasizing the success of this redevelopment project, the Newsletter notes that the
122 contracted architects won “the most popular Andaman house award” for the best designed tsunami reconstruction dwellings. Relying on this information in the Housing by People in
Asia, “Managing the ‘second tsunami’ of relief aid,” (2005) the UNDP report Tsunami, One
Year on, published July 4th (2006), states that the reconstruction of the Thuungwa Moken community provides a model for effective tsunami reconstruction and recovery. My interviews with people in the community six years later provide a very different perspective of the reconstruction, aid efforts, NGOs involved, and the social, cultural and economic impact on the community.
6.4 Ruling relations in Thuungwa Following Reconstruction.
Although the reconstruction of Thuungwa was publically characterized as a success story, my interviews with villagers in 2011 describe many social, cultural and political problems that have resulted from the reconstruction process. The most pressing issue for the community is the continuing threat of being evicted from their village by the local government. Although the national government in 2005, under Thaksin, supported the
Moken’s right to rebuild at Thuungwa, successive governments have not succeeded in providing the Moken with the official deed for the land. As a result, the regional and provincial governments have continued to put pressure on the Moken to leave the land and move to Tsunami resettlement villages. When asked about the current status of the land tenure of Thuungwa the Village Head Man responded:
“The National government continues to say they don’t want to drive us off our land.
The lower level government agency want to evict us. I have been waiting seven years
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for the community deed that was promised.” Village Head Man Thuungwa Moken
Community, February 2011.
From the reconstruction of the village up until 2011, it appears that the Moken community has been living in period of flux, not knowing whether they would be allowed to stay at Thuungwa. In early 2011 there was an indication that the National Government would provide the dead to the land, allowing the Moken to stay. At the time of our interview, the Village Head Man had just returned from Bangkok where he submitted a petition to the Prime Minister at the time, Abhisit Vejjajiva. The Head Man was hopeful that the national government would finally present a community deed for the Village of
Thuungwa. Further, the Head Man stated that the recently appointed local governor supported the Moken in their right to stay at Thuungwa, a position not shared by previous local government. In December 2011, I checked back with the Moken community, and it appears they have won the right to stay at Thuungwa, expecting the deed shortly.
Although there were many organizations that came to help the Moken at Thuungwa, the Head Man at Thuungwa describes how there were very few that stayed over the long- term to promote sustainable recovery in the community. One of the key issues identified in my interviews with villagers is the Moken community’s exposure to outsiders such as the
NGO workers, that is a result of the reconstruction and recovery process. Prior to the tsunami, the Head Man at Thuungwa stated that the village had very little contact with outsiders. Most people spoke only their traditional language. Furthermore, the livelihood had been primarily subsistence fishing, a lifestyle that had been the same for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. The dwellings, and infrastructure of wood housing did not have
124 services, sanitation or electricity. Adding these services to the reconstructed village requires the village to have money to pay for these services. Therefore, modernization of the community through the reconstruction of infrastructure has changed the community from a largely subsistence livelihood prior to the tsunami, to a dependence on a livelihood that requires money and more financial involvement outside the community following reconstruction. The Village Head Man describes these said effects of modernization on the culture of the village:
“Things have changed a lot since civilization has reached the village. Moken’s were
independent. Moken could live by themselves. Moken’s could live without water supply
or electricity. They used nature to live their lives. But right now they have to work
harder to find more money to pay for the monthly bill of water supply, electricity,
mobile phone and satellite using. He said originally the Moken liked freedom. They
hated disturbance. They lived very down to earth; for example when the food fell down
on the ground, they picked up the food, washed it, and then ate it. But now they say the
food is dirty so it shouldn’t be eaten.” Village Head Man, Thuungwa Moken
Community, February, 2011.
Another key issue since the reconstruction of the village that has had both a positive and negative effect is the 7 years of education of Moken children since the tsunami. The
Head Man discusses these issues:
“The real Moken in the past didn’t go to school. We did not know how to read and
write. However, we need education to help us sometimes such as to be able to read the
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name and how to take medicine. Before that, we couldn’t read and write, we
sometimes had 2-3 pills at a time despite the doctor telling us to take only 1 pill. The
outsiders suggested the young people to go to school. This is a good thing but the
problem is when a Moken speaks the Moken language in school, most of the students
laugh at them. They felt embarrassed to speak that so they stop speaking it. It’s like
only 2 Moken out of 500 students. When they come home, they don’t speak Moken.
Apart from that, the young Moken know too much, the fathers and mothers couldn’t
follow them. They think that they know the world more than the parents…….. The
Moken language is about to die since only the old people still speak it. The new
generation feel that the Moken language is not important to them but actually they
should keep it because it is their own culture...... I think Thai government should
put the Moken language into the textbook for the school where there are Moken
people.” Village Head Man, Thunngwa Moken community, February 2011”
As discussed in Chapter two Winichakul, (1994) outlines the Thai government policy on education and minority groups in his book “Siam Mapped: A history of the geo- body of a nation.” The policy requiring ethnic minorities to go to Thai government schools is common throughout the country. Although this policy has increased literacy and education within minority communities, the standardization of curriculum which discourages speaking minority languages, and the policy of supporting the dominant central Thai culture, has led to the erosion of ethnic minority identity, culture, and language throughout the country. Winichaku (1994) coins this policy as “Thaiafication” and provides examples throughout the minority villages across Thailand. NGOs and the Village
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Head Man have made considerable efforts to reverse cultural erosion and to preserve
culture within the Thuungwa Moken community and particularly with children. The Head
Man discusses these efforts as follows:
“NGOs came to help us but I would say they help us for just a short-period of time.
We’ve never gotten full supports from them. They asked us what do you want? So that
I replied them that we need the cultural center to assemble all of our history in,
however, they said it uses a lot of budget. They just came to offer the stuff and then
they were gone……..One professor came to the village and asked us what kind of
assistance the Moken wanted? We replied that we need to preserve our language
because it’s going to die. They offer us budgets to build the Moken School and I was
hired as a Moken language teacher to teach the Moken students. However, it failed
later because we did not have the budget anymore since they stopped allotting money
to us and the project fell through.” Village Head Man, Thuungwa Moken
Community, February 2011
During my research in Thuungwa, I was able to tour the cultural center that had been built with the support of various NGOs immediately following the tsunami. The community center is a museum documenting Moken culture and history in text and art.
There are pictures displayed of the construction of the centre, along with pictures of the
Head Man (much younger looking). The pictures appeared to convey a sense of accomplishment and pride in constructing the center. Currently the center is open to tourists. However, when a visitor wants to visit the centre, they usually have to find
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someone in the community to open the center because it is not staffed full time. There is a
donation box at the front for visitors but no entrance fee. It is not clear to me whether the
village is continuing to receive ongoing funding, however from the evidence from
observations in 2011, it would appears that it is no longer funded.
The Head Man expressed a great deal of concern for the sustainability of the
historical cultural resilience that had survived through many generations. He described
how his community is abandoning traditional values, language, livelihood and culture as
result of contact with outsiders in the reconstruction and recovery of the village.
“There was many organizations came to help us and it was in the same time when the
villagers met the people outside the community. Some of the villagers later married to
Thais, Farangs (foreigners, usually white people) or Burmese………… I think Moken will
not be the real Moken anymore. I’ve tried to do everything to save our culture.
However, everything has been developed very fast. Moken sometime married to
westerners and Bangkokians (Central Thais). Sometime I met them and I approach
them by speaking Moken, they just turned their faces away and said, “Do we know each
other?” So I think what happened to us? I saw some Moken people in Bangkok. They
have cars and big houses. I said hello to them but they pretended that they don’t know
me despite that we were born in the same village and we are like brothers and sisters
while we were young.” Village Head Man, Thuungwa Moken Community, February
2011.
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The Head Man of Thuungwa articulated how contact with outsiders, and even marriage between outsiders and Moken, has separated many Moken from their traditional cultural identity and community, which he further expressed, has been a concern. He also blamed these changes on education, however it is likely many of the influences resulting from outside contact have coalesced to contribute to dissolving traditional Moken culture and society. As described by the Head Man, NGO workers were present within the community for some time during the reconstruction of the community. This contact led to relationships with Moken, as well as their subsequent departure from the community with said individual aid workers. Further, as discussed in the earlier examples of education and the changes in livelihood, young people now leave the village to go to school and/or earn income, which has led many of the villagers to adopt the cultural traits, attitudes of the central Thais. Exposure to the dominant Thai culture led the Moken to increasingly question whether their own culture is backwards, and to experience feelings of embarrassment. As described by Winichaku (1994), these attitudes are often learned and reinforced by the national education system and the National Government which supports ideas of one ethnic nation as a “Nation State of Thailand”.
6.5 Issues of Housing in Thuungwa
The traditional houses of the Moken at Thuungwa could not be rebuilt due the lack of availability of trees that were the traditional construction material. The amount of wood required to rebuild the village all at once would have completely deforested the surrounding area. As a result the, design of the houses is completely different than the traditional structures had been. Although the housing at Thuungwa won an award for its
129 efficiency and quality, the new design has fundamentally changed the way the Moken live.
The Moken now require services (electricity, water, garbage collection), which have forced the community to move toward a more capitalist economy and away from a subsistence- based way of living because they require money to pay for these new services. To illustrate the significance of the changes, the Head Man at Thuungwa showed me a reconstruction of a traditional Moken house built near the cultural center. It was considerably smaller, but he said he preferred the traditional house because the wind and air could blow through, working to cool the inside. He also stated that the new houses, although bigger, were much hotter requiring fans and electricity to cool (see plate 10).
Plate 10: Housing built in Moken Sea Gypsy Village of Thuungwa
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Changes in the style of housing, the infrastructure and the addition of services in the reconstruction of Thuungwa village had unforeseen impacts on the cultural, social, and economic make up of Thuungwa. Ruling relations prior to the tsunami appear to have been primarily directed by internal hierarchies within the community, where the Village Head
Man held the most influence on everyday life within the village (see figure 7). Following the tsunami, social relations changed to be directly organized and influenced by outside forces. Immediately following the tsunami, village life was organized by the Army and both regional and national levels of government. To make matters more complex, two levels of government had opposing policies for the fate of the Moken at Thuungwa. The
National Government supported the villagers to stay and rebuild, whereas the provincial government ordered them to leave. These tensions have had profound impacts on the mental health of villagers. At the time of this research the opposing policies of ruling the
Moken had yet to be completely resolved. The village has been in a state of flux for seven years as a result. The Head Man described this state of flux, the uncertain future and the impacts on him and the community:
“I am very confused about what we will do. The District Administration Organization
told us that we can live here but some said we couldn’t live here………They said they
don’t want to drive us out. But for the lower level government agency want to evict us.
…….Some of Central Thais told us that the Moken shouldn’t live here and that the
Moken might be evicted soon. They say that the Moken would be happier living outside
this village. Central Thais suggested we buy the new houses. The sense of Moken
community has been destroyed by Central Thais. We seem to turn our faces away from
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each other. We rarely talk.” Village Head Man, Thuungwa Moken community,
February 2011.
Another force of change within the Thuungwa community following the tsunami
was the impact on the villagers’ livelihood. The Head Man at Thuungwa describes
transition from subsistence living to the adoption of modern living and use of money as
follows:
“Before the tsunami, we used nature to live their lives……..The Moken villagers later
become resort employees, some are chefs. Many of them go to study in Bangkok. They
changed a lot. They are more Thainess. It looks like the new generation wants more
materialism. They like to be rich.” Village Head Man, Thuungwa Moken community,
February 2011.
In my visits to Thuungwa, the Head Man showed me a traditional Moken house built
as a display for their community center museum (see Plate 11). It would have been difficult
to attach services such running water and electricity to their former dwellings due to the
flimsy construction from local small trees. Historically, the Moken were nomadic and their
traditional housing was designed to be practical and temporary due to the fact that they
may not occupy the same house for long periods (Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005). However, it is likely that in Thuungwa that these traditional houses were used as permanent dwellings, which would have needed constant upkeep and maintenance. As discussed earlier, one of the reasons they did not rebuild traditional houses was that there was no longer an
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abundant source in the area of the trees used to build their traditional housing. This factor,
along with government and NGO support of a more modern dwellings to be constructed, forever altered what was left of the Moken’s nomadic heritage. With the building of permanent housing following the tsunami, the Moken at Thuungwa are now in a sense fixed to the land along with the trappings of modern living that requires capital. Evidence of this transition is everywhere in the community, from satellite dishes, to garbage bins, and even the Head Man’s cell phone. His phone was the way we were able to contact him for the interviews we conducted. The transition to modern living and capitalism was, in many ways forced upon the community in the way the community was reconstructed and integrated into the surrounding economy dominated by the Thai majority. The integration of the Moken into the dominant Thai society not only includes the infrastructure that requires capital, but the need to acquire sufficient capital to pay for increasing exposure to market forces. This has resulted in a change of livelihood from traditional fishing to employment in the tourism industry and other service based employment.
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Plate 11: Replica of Traditional Moken House, at Thuugwa Moken Village.
Talking with villagers about how things have changed since the tsunami revealed recurring themes regarding impact on the community and traditional way of life that mediate many contradictions for the villagers. The construction and nature of the housing reconstruction and the economic driver of the tourism industry have significantly changed the livelihood and traditions in the community. One woman in Thuungwa described the conflict between resort development on the coast following the tsunami, and the fishers of the village. My translator transcribed this interview like this:
“The area to go fishing is less than before since there are more resorts and hotels after
the tsunami. Most of them don’t allow the Moken to go fishing in their area. Before the
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tsunami she could go anywhere in the sea to look for fish and shells but right there are
more restriction from the hotels. It was like she invaded to their area and she is wrong.
She said sometime the hotel worker let the dogs out to drive her out from the area.”
Moken Village Woman, Thuungwa, February, 2011.
This village informant implies that the reconstructed and new hotels built following the tsunami are controlling not only the beach area, but the waters offshore of their property locations. While I was not able to validate the extent of land and sea control by the tourism industry following the tsunami, this statement suggests that access to the sea for fisher folk such as the Moken is being restricted by new tourism development.
Although the reconstruction of Thuungwa was initially hailed as a success story in reconstruction, aid and recovery, the cumulative impacts of the exposure to the outside world; the changes to educational infrastructure; different requirements for money and economy; changes to the traditional fishing livelihood; the uncertainty of land tenure; the expansion of the tourism surrounding the village, and subsequent reduced access to ocean resources have had profound effects on the long-term sustainability of the Moken at
Thuungwa. Although there were considerable acts of kindness and good intensions surrounding the reconstruction of the village, the ruling relations established in the community and with outsiders and government in post tsunami development have led to the erosion of traditional Moken culture and way of life at Thuungwa. In assessing the overall impact of reconstruction and recovery at Thuungwa the tsunami not only brought a wave of physical and environmental destruction to the community, but a second
135 destructive wave of outside social and cultural influences and change that will forever alter the way of life for the Moken at Thuungwa.
Although the Moken at Thuungwa chose to rebuild on their traditional village land, not all tsunami victims choose to rebuild within their community. The following chapter focuses on the tsunami village of Bangkaya, a kilometer to the North of Thuungwa. This village had profoundly different outcomes surrounding recovery that serve as stark contrast to outcomes at Thunngwa.
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Figure 7: Map of Ruling Relations in the Moken Village of Thuunwga
MAP OF RULING RELATIONS MOKEN VILLAGE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ROYAL THAI NATIONAL REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT
BOX LEGEND
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT NGOS WHO CONTINUE TO NGOS WHO ASSISTED IN SUPPORT THE RIGHTS OF THE NGOS AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION OF VILLAGE MOKEN TO LIVE IN THIS ACTIVISTS LOCATION
VILLAGERS
VILLAGE HEAD MAN
VILLAGERS WHO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO STAY IN THEIR LOCATION
VILLAGERS WHO ARE AT ODDS WITH HEAD MAN AND DECISION TO STAY
YOUNG PEOPLE LOSING THEIR CULTURAL IDENTITY THROUGH CONTACT WITH OUTSIDERS POST-TSUNAMI
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Chapter 7: The Construction and Ruling Relations in Bangkaya Tsunami Community
As with the villages of Ban Nam Khem and Thuungwa, in Bangkaya, the Thai national government offered the option for tsunami victims in this coastal community to move to
‘safer’ inland communities reconstructed on crown land. In the case of Bangkaya, the victims did in fact relocate. Interviews with community members at Bangkaya describe that post-tsunami community as a village that was constructed on crown land donated by the King of Thailand to tsunami victims as an alternative to rebuilding within the coastal zone. Bangkaya is situated about two kilometres inland from the coast, on elevated land relatively safe from future tsunami events. From observation and interviews with villagers, the community is divided roughly 50/50 between ethnic Thai and Moken people. Villagers chose to relocate to Bangkaya for a multitude of reasons, however a common theme throughout interviews within this community was that villagers considered the location much safer than the coast. For example, one of the villagers describes his decision as follows:
“We found it more convenient to work in the old community as it’s closer to the sea.
However, if you stay here without the vehicle, you will find it difficult to go to work as
it’s far from the sea. However, it’s safer here. If the warning system rings, we can
evacuate faster from here. Furthermore, this place is 10 metres high from the sea
level.” Moken Fisher and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami Community,
February 2011
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Other reasons for relocating the community were financial. For example, one Moken
villager in the community describes his situation following the tsunami as follows:
“We used to have the houses there (near the coast). We had 5 rows houses. Let say
worth around Baht 1 million. The government offered us only 30,000 baht so I think it
was not enough to build the houses with that little budget. We have 1rai of land there.
We were told to choose the options that do you want to move into the new houses or
get the money. Thus we moved here because it’s safer” Moken Fisher and Head Man of
Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011
His decision, although financial, still implied that safety was a primary consideration for moving from the coast. Fear of the sea was a common expression in many of the interviews throughout the region. Such a fear of the ocean and another tsunami resonates through all
the interviews I conducted in Bangkaya.
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Plate 12: Moken Style House Bangkaya Community.
Plate 13: Thai Style Housing Bangkaya Community
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7.1 Positive and Negative Impacts of the Integration of Moken and Thai at Bangkaya
What is most unique about Bangkaya is that, although villagers are from a variety of
different villages and ethnic backgrounds, the individuals all appear to get along with one
another and seem content with the outcome of reconstruction and recovery for themselves
and their families. These accounts from villagers at Bangkaya are in stark contrast to the
accounts of villagers in Ban Nam Khem and Thuungwa where villagers have described
levels of animosity relating to the fairness of aid, recovery and reconstruction and land
rights within their community. When initially visiting the Bangkaya community, I was
expecting to find animosity between the Moken and Thai people in the community that
would be similar to what I had witnessed at Thuungwa between the Moken and outside
Thai influences. Instead, what I found was evidence of considerable cooperation and
communication between members of the two cultural groups, who participated in monthly
community meetings and had developed a hierarchical structure within the community
that allowed for communication between all groups. As a result, the people of Bangkaya
appear to have a strong sense of community and respect for one another. When
interviewing a Moken villager, I asked him how he got along with the central Thais within
the village; he replied:
“Before that we had the problem that the central Thais turned on the radio so quite
loud in the night-time while we, Moken, go to bed. However, that problem has been
fixed since I talk to the head of the village and he coordinate with that villager and
asked them to be quiet at night.” Moken Fisher and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya
Tsunami Community, February 2011.
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I asked a similar question to a Thai Woman living in the village regarding the Moken within
the community. She said that they all got along within the community.
“The villagers have a meeting every 5th of the month and we all attend the meeting. We
always have the activities.” Thai Woman, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February
2011.
These statements indicate the shared governance within the community which I learned divided power between the actual Head Man of the village who is Thai, and a Moken Head
Man within the village. Both cultures are fully represented. The two Head Men meet regularly to ensure that issues are resolved easily and that there are no problems between the two groups. It appears that this distribution of governance between the two groups, combined with ongoing consistent efforts towards communication, has provided for a strong sense of community in Bangkaya. A Thai villager describes this as follows:
“I sense the feeling of the community here. When I was in Khao Lak, everyone just don’t
care for each other. They lived individually, including me. But as we have the meeting
every 5th, we meet each other more often and become friends very fast.” Thai Woman,
Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011.
One interesting outcome of the construction and relocation of tsunami victims to the
Bangkaya community is the diversity of people within the community. Ethnic Thai
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villagers relocated into the village are originally from regions from all over Thailand. Such
diversity is partially related to changes in the landscape following the tsunami and
tsunami-recovery efforts, as well as to the employment in primary resource industries and tourism development that existed in the region prior to the tsunami (as discussed in
Chapter three). Further, there does not appear to be major conflict between ethnic groups; particularly between the Moken and Central Thais were there has been community integration and intermarriage. A Moken fisher, also the Head Man of the Moken community, describes how integration within the community has affected his family:
“My daughter married with Central Thai from Kalasin province. The fourth son
married to the wife from Chiang Rai province. Moken or Central Thai are Thais. We
have the same King. Our Moken tribe still believes in the superstition.” Moken Fisher
and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011.
He goes on to discuss how most Moken sons and daughters have married Thais, however he emphasizes that the Moken are Thais under the same King. This implies that he supports the National Governments policy that Thailand is a nation state, and that all minorities are Thai people. As discussed previously, the “Nation State of Thailand” is ideologically supported by the state, however, in many cases, minorities do not have the same rights as central Thais.
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Although intermarriage and livelihoods are closely entwined in Bangkaya, as with the Thuungwa community, there are concerns about the Moken language being impacted and potentially lost within post-tsunami society. When asked about the preservation of his livelihood as a fisher, the Moken Fisher and Head Man replied:
“It depends on the career of the head of the family. If the head of the family works as
fishermen, the children tend to follow that. However, the young Moken right now
doesn’t speak Moken since they go to Thai school. And when they are back from school,
we go fishing. So we don’t have time to teach them Moken language.” Moken Fisher
and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011.
The statement that “…they do not have time to teach the Moken language” implies that there is an attempt to maintain livelihood as fisher folk, however there is no time to teach the young people the Moken Language. Despite the similarity of this situation to the erosion of Moken culture and language described in Thuungwa, there is a striking difference between these two informants. The Moken Fisher and Head Man at Bangkaya appears to accept intermarriage between his daughter and a Central Thai, as well as the his children going to a Thai school and thereby not learning their traditional Moken Language, whereas the Head Man at Thuungwa saw the intermarriage between his people and outsiders of a community, as well the lack of Moken language proficiency for young people in his community as a tragedy.
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7.1.1 Reflection on Past Experiences
A number of years ago, I participated in a kayak trip in Phang Nga Bay run by a
Moken village. The Moken guide took us to a burial sight within a karst cave where there
were bones of his ancestors, he described the nature of the burial and the religious
practices of his people. Following the viewing and his description of the burial and
customs of his people, he stated, “…now we are all Thai people as the government tells us”.
At the time I found this statement very interesting as I had just finished reading “Siam
Mapped” by Winichakul, 1994. In his book Winichakul argues that Thai government polices
support the concept that Thailand as a “Nation State” that is enforced through a
standardized education system that not only instructs solely in the Thai language, but
supports the concept of all people in Thailand identify themselves as ‘Thai’ rather than an
identity that is tied to a minority group such as the Moken. However, despite this
educational strategy, those groups who are not historically ‘Thai’ do not have the same
rights of citizenship, government services or free movement throughout the country. In
my academic work at the time, I was instructing students from the University of Calgary
Canada in a course that focused on ethnic minority Hill Tribes in Northern Thailand where
we learned about the national policies. From my recent research interviews with the Head
Man at Thuungwa and the Head Man and Fisher at Bangkaya and other Moken within these villages, there is evidence that the same policies of Thaiafication are occurring in Southern
Thailand and that the tsunami has accelerated the homogenization of the diverse cultures of Thailand. 7
7 “Thaiafication” is a term defined by Winichakul, (1994) to describe the Thai Government’s efforts to assimilate all ethnic groups into the dominant central Thai language and culture. This is accomplished through policies of standardizing the school systems to only teach central Thai language and culture and to
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My research reveals that the tsunami aid and recovery processes have contributed to this
form of colonization of the minority peoples of Thailand. For the Moken this has involved
the exposure to outsiders in the aid reconstruction and recovery, the adoption of the
capitalist market system, and an education system that only supports the dominant Thai
culture and language.
During my ethnographic engagement with the Bankaya villagers, I developed an understanding that the people were satisfied with the housing provided by the government. There were two options in style of housing built by the army. One was a two- story house with the main living area elevated from the ground on the second floor (plate
12). This design provided an easy way to expand the square footage by finishing the ground floor at a later date if needed. This was the house that the Moken villagers preferred as it was a similar style to their traditional houses (plate 13). The second style of
house was a single story house with more square footage, which was a style of housing that
the Thai villagers tended to chose. One advantage that the villagers at Bangkaya had over
other villages, is that by choosing to move to Bangkaya, a relatively high standard of
housing was completely provided for by the government and aid organizations. This is in
contrast to the situation I encountered in Ban Nam Khem, where villagers reported that
they had to provide supplementary funds beyond those provided by the government to
complete their houses. These differing experiences suggest that between villages there
were contradictory government incentives for reconstruction as outlined in Chapter six. As
a result, there was more of a sense of equality in the distribution of aid and the style of
housing constructed in Bangkaya.
convey the myth that the geographical boundaries of Thailand have always been controlled by the central Thai people.
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Furthermore, when asked about the quality and style of housing in the community,
Bangkaya villagers are generally happy with the housing built for them within the community. Both Moken and Thai people in the community were able to choose their traditional style of housing respectively, which aided in both the satisfaction and utility of their housing needs. Each family received similar size and quality of housing provided by the government and aid organizations. As a result there were no striking differences between from house to another as witnessed in Ban Nam Khem. There was some animosity conveyed by some villagers regarding uneven aid distributed after construction to provide interior finishing and amenities in housing, however these sources of funding appear to come from aid organizations based on religious affiliations or missionary work and not from the government. Further, the housing was completed in only 3 months, allowing the villagers to move on in the recovery processes much faster than those at Ban Nam Khem, where even the villagers who followed the government plan were homeless for one year.
The head start in the recovery process and equality in the reconstruction of housing in the recovery process went a long way in providing a more sustainable and harmonious outcome at Bangkaya than communities in the region.
One can only speculate as to why the outcomes for government reconstruction at
Bangkaya were considerably better than Ban Nam Khem and Thuungwa. Notably, compliance in moving away from their former land to this location, citizens of Bangkaya experienced far less uncertainty and friction from the local and national government as compared to Ban Nam Khem and Thuungwa. It is not clear why the housing at Bangkaya built by the Army was superior to that built by the Army and the government at Ban Nam
Khem. One possibility is that the construction of the Bangkaya community was a priority as
147 an incentive from the government for people to move away from their coastal land. As a result, housing quality and standards at Bangkaya may have been emphasized and prioritized as means to convince more people to move to this more marginal and less valuable land inland away from the more valuable coastal locations.
7.2 Troubling Aspects of Aid and Relocation of Villagers to Bangkaya
Despite the overall positive outcome at Bangkaya, there is still lingering resentment about aid distribution and activities of aid organizations operating in the region following the tsunami. When asked about the equality of the distribution of aid and housing, the
Moken fisher and Head Man at Bangkaya responded:
“I don’t know because I worried about myself. I have no time to go peeking some other
houses and think who got more or less than us. But if you asked about the distribution
from all organizations grant to the villagers, I would say it is unfair at all. If one talks
smoothly, they will get more.” Moken Fisher and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya
Tsunami Community, February 2011.
The practices of aid organizations also introduced contradictions in inequalities, as one
Thai Woman in Bangkaya explained:
“This community is the first place that had been rebuilt. But you see, we got the empty
houses; the other places got the furniture, bed, and kitchen. We had none. We had to do
the new tile-floor by ourselves and also paint the new color in the wall. There was also
the Christian group came to the village and offered a lot of things but we have to
change the religious. So I said I am Buddhist, I cannot do that. So I got nothing from
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the foundation. I said to them I cannot go to church. That’s why I still have the house
like this.” Thai Woman, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011.
The aid and upgrades to victims housing specifically negotiated with Christian
organizations was accomplished in exchange for conversion to Christianity. 8 I have
witnessed similar instances of these arrangements with missionaries operating in Northern
Thailand with the Hill Tribe minorities. In these instances these religious conversions in
exchange for aid created similar resentment and anger within the communities. It is not
clear which Christian aid organizations were active in Bangkaya however there is a Baptist
Church in close proximity to the village and the Baptist missionaries had been active in
other communities such as Thuungwa (see Plate 14).
8 Interviews with members of Christian and other faith based aid organizations are beyond the scope of this project. However, this is a subject I would like devote future research attention to including how do these organizations enter the country, how do they operate within a Buddhist dominated society, and how they distributed money and aid.
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Plate 14: Christian Aid Organizations Presence in Thuungwa
It is not entirely clear is what happened to the original land along the coast the
Moken community at Bangkaya moved from, which is another troubling tension that my research did not fully investigate. When asked about his land in his former community, the
Moken Fisher and Head Man responded as follows:
“We have 1 rai of land there. We were told to choose the options that do you want to
move into the new houses or get the money. Thus we moved here because it’s safer….
It’s still my land. I still own the title deed. There’s no one there. There are the hotels
next to my village.” Moken Fisher and Head Man of Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami
Community, February 2011.
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While this informant stated that the land was still his, when I asked if other land in his village had been sold to hotel developers following the tsunami he replied:
“Yes. Around 2-3 families sell their land to hotel developers.” Moken Fisher and Head Man of
Moken, Bangkaya Tsunami Community, February 2011.
This statement implies that despite the fact his village was relocated with the understanding that it was rebuilt within safe location, the ‘unsafe’ land has been redeveloped commercially. It is notable that the community was convinced to relocate away from the coast due to safety concerns, yet tourism development continued on their former land following the tsunami. Land conflict relating to commercial value is present in all three communities. The more valuable the land within a community (particularly along the coast), the more influence and pressure was exerted from government and developers for residents in those areas to relocate. For example, in both Ban Sak and Thuungwa, there have been considerable efforts from government and developers to evict villagers from the land. In Ban Nam Khem, villagers had to fight for their rights to rebuild by occupying the land. This has embroiled them in processes that take considerable time and resources. On the other hand, the community that, at this juncture in the reconstruction appear to have had the fastest and most favourable outcomes surrounding community harmony and satisfaction was Bangkaya, which occupies the least commercially valuable land of the four communities within this study. Further, many of the villagers (particularly of Moken
151 peoples) were convinced to leave their land to move to the less valuable locations inland.
This decision is embedded in complex relations related to land ownership, business development, and government strategies for economic growth. More IE research into these complexities of ruling relations is necessary to completely understand the dynamic forces at play.
The “Moken Head Man and Fisher” also commented that the land inland was safer than his previous land near the coast. This was emphasized both by the victims traumatized by the tsunami event at Bangkaya but also by the government convincing them to move away from the coast. Despite this perception of living in a safer location inland, many of the villagers are still fishers, or work at resorts along the coast within the hazard zone. In actuality, villagers at Bangkaya still spend a considerable amount of the day within the tsunami hazard zone.
This project has generated compelling evidence to support the assertion that the value of the land is implicated in the ruling interests of the post-tsunami recovery and outcomes for people. The following chapter on the town of Khao Lak (i.e., the primary location of economic development in the region), highlights the key social relations organized by the land value. It expands understanding about the priority of reconstruction efforts and organizations, allocation of aid, and the rights of victims following the tsunami.
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Figure 8: Map of Ruling Relations of Bangkaya Tsunami Village
GOVERNMENT ROYAL THAI NATIONAL THAI NATIONAL ROYAL MOKEN VILLAGE LEADER MOKEN TO VILLAGE FROM OTHER TO LOCATIONS POST -TSUNAMI POST LOCATIONS MOKEN VILLAGERS MOVED MOKEN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: GOVERNMENT: LOCAL REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL REGIONAL TSUNAMI LOCATIONS POST - POST LOCATIONS THAI VILLAGE LEADER THAI THAI VILLAGERS MOVED VILLAGERS MOVED THAI TO VILLAGE FROM OTHER VILLAGE FROM OTHER TO MAP OF RULING RELATIONS OF BANGKAYA TSUNAMI VILLAGE TSUNAMI BANGKAYA OF RULING RELATIONS OF MAP DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES AND SUPPORT RESOURCES DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL NATIONAL VILLAGERS THAI VILLAGERS MOKEN = = = = LEGEND
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Chapter 8: Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Khao Lak Town
From an economic and social perspective, Khao Lak Town is the regional hub of
Takupa district of Phang Nga Province. It is a major tourism destination due to its picturesque beaches and National Park forests. The majority of resort and other tourism- based employees live in outlying villages from Khao Lak such as Ban Nam Khem, Bangkaya and Tuungwa, as well as many other villages skirting the national highway in close proximity to Khao Lak, thus Khao Lak is more of a commercial rather than a residential center. Prior to the tsunami, Khao Lak was experiencing a boom in tourism visitation and an associated growth of infrastructure and tourism economy. Unlike other villages in the region, most of the local villagers who are the descendants of the original settlers of Khao
Lak own land within the town and adjacent to the beach. This land is primarily utilized for commercial use for resorts, hotels, shops and other tourism-based businesses. In my interview with the former governor of the district at the time of the tsunami, Mr. Pipop
Nukwan, he described the differences between Ban Nam Khem and Khao Lak in terms of residents as follows:
“You may think that why Khao Lak and Ban Nam Khem is so different. Ban Nam Khem
is the community where many people from 76 provinces of Thailand live. The Khao Lak
area is the tourism area so that why it recovered very fast.”Mr. Pipop Nukwan, the
former Bailiff (Governor) of Takuapa district. February 23rd 2011.
As discussed in Chapter five, Ban Nam Khem was primarily residential. However, the former Governor is also addressing the differences between the two towns by stating that
Khao Lak is the commercial tourist area and center for the economy in the region. He is
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describes how the tourism area became a government priority in terms of economic
recovery and redevelopment. This emphasis on tourism in Khao Lak was in contrast to
other locations such as Ban Nam Khem, where roads infrastructure and housing
reconstruction took approximately one year to complete. In numerous interview sources,
it is emphasized that the first priority for government aid in the region as a whole, was to
rebuild the roads to and within, Khao Lak, even though it was not a residential area with
homes and families. Within days following the tsunami, construction began on rebuilding
the road from the highway through town to the beach resort area, which allowed for quick
access to remove debris and to begin the reconstruction process as quickly as possible,
particularly in the areas frequented by tourists.
Plate 15: Khao Lak Beach Front
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Pre and post tsunami human-land relationships were an important coordinator of the reconstruction efforts. The legitimated historical relationships to the land have been a matter of importance in redevelopment. The interview with a resort owner, referred to as
“Khao Lak Local Resort Owner” emphasized that local villagers from Khao Lak own the land when she states:
“One other thing is we are the owner of this piece of land. It’s family heritage. We are
the local people in Khao Lak.” Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, February 2011.
This statement implies that villagers with local heritage have legitimacy of claim and actual legal deed to the land in this prime resort region. From the accounts of the Khao Lak Local
Resort Owner it appears that both local and national government supported the legitimacy of land ownership and that these titled land arrangements were key features in how the redevelopment proceeded. The government actively supported the land owning “Villagers in Khao Lak”, through the reconstruction process. Unlike residential areas such as Ban Nam
Khem, Ban Sak, and Thuungwa, local and national government interests in the reconstruction process for commercial tourism land and infrastructure in Khao Lak appear to be coordinated. All government actors seem to have been in agreement and there was minimal evidence of land conflict.. In my interview with the Khao Lak Local Resort Owner she describes the reconstruction process of her resort:
“As the tsunami happened in December and our resort was destroyed 100%, we
started rebuilt our resort in the beginning of March 2005. And then our 1st phase, 30
rooms were finished around November 2005 and we opened our resort right away.”
Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, February 2011.
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The Khao Lak Local Resort Owner described how this rapid rebuilding was possible, in part, within government prioritized reconstruction efforts that provided resort owners with low interest loans with flexible payment options. Building permits were also rushed.
She describes such “rushed” government support as follows:
“The government offered two percent interest rate for us for three years. As I can
remember, it seems that we didn’t have to pay the principle of a loan back. It’s like we
took around 50 million Baht with a two percent interest rate for 3 years. The period of
the loan scheme started counting the period from 2005 so the faster we rebuild the
resort, the more benefit from the loan scheme we would get….Apart from the offered
funds, we would have to ask for the construction permit from the government sector.
The government showed full support to that by pushing the government sector, which
is in charge of doing this, worked faster and cut some slow steps in coordinating with
the civil servants. The staff from the department of public works and town, country
planning came down to measure and survey the land for us. In fact, it would take time
for years to ask them to come here since there’re so many steps in the process.
Fortunately, the government pressed them to work faster. That’s good for the resort
owner like us. It took only two weeks to get things done.” Khao Lak Local Resort
Owner, February 2011.
Although support from the government favoured the elites of the region such as the Khao
Lak Local Resort Owner, the support, at least in this case, allowed for a swift recovery of the
157 economy and local infrastructure. When she describes the speed of the rebuild from March
2005 to November 2005, thirty rooms opened in less than a year after the disaster.
“We opened our resort right away. I would say that after the tsunami, we rarely took a
loan. We used our own funds.” Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, February 2011.
Opening thirty rooms to tourists when other communities were still in temporary housing is an indicator of pre-existing differences in the socio-economic resources that were amplified during the reconstruction. By opening so quickly she was able to rebound financially, thereby no longer requiring financial aid. Her resort was one of the first to reopen, which resulted in her business receiving some of the first tourists back to the region. She was also able to provide accommodation to aid workers, journalists, and researchers who continued to work in the region through the initial tsunami recovery process. Another feature of the recovery and the social organization of land in Khao Lak is that local villager elites not only own the prime beachfront property in Khao Lak, they own much of the land leading from the beach to the main road in town. As a result they are the landlords of much of property available for tourism businesses, restaurants and other tourism industries within the town.
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Figure 9: Map of Ruling Relations Khao Lak Town
GOVERNMENT ROYAL THAI NATIONAL THAI NATIONAL ROYAL AND ECONOMY RECONSTRUCTION AND INFLUENCE ON INCREASING POWER INVESTORS INVESTORS INVESTORS FOREIGN AND NATIONAL AND NATIONAL FOREIGN OUTSIDE LAND OWNERS AND OUTSIDE LAND OWNERS INDUSTRY LOCAL LAND OWNERS LOCAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT: GOVERNMENT: LOCAL SMALL TOURISM BASED TOURISM SMALL TOURISM BASED BUSINESS TOURISM REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL REGIONAL RENTING OUT OR RUNNING RENTING OUT MIGRANT WORKERS FROM MIGRANT OR COUNTRIES WORKING IN OR COUNTRIES RESORTS OR CONSTRUCTION RESORTS OWNERS RENTING FROM KHAO OTHER DISTRICTS PROVINCES LAK LAND OWNERS AS WELL AS WELL AS LAK LAND OWNERS VILLAGERS WORKING TOURISM TOURISM WORKING VILLAGERS KHAO LAK TOWN AND TOWN KHAO LAK RESORT OWNERS (THE RESORT ORIGINAL LAND OWNERS OF LAND OWNERS OF ORIGINAL LOCAL ELITE LAND OWNERS/ LOCAL MAP OF RULING RELATIONS KHAO LAK TOWN KHAO LAK RULING RELATIONS OF MAP TSUNAMI ECONOMY ECONOMY FOLLOWING INCREASING TO TOURISM VULNERABILITY TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE MIGRANT WORKERS MIGRANT VILLAGERS WHO OWN VILLAGERS OWNERS OF LAND AND LAND OWNERS OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY TOURISM THE BUSINESSES OR WORK IN BUSINESSES OR LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LEVELS OF BOX LEGEND
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8.1 Re-built Tourism Infrastructure in Khao Lak
The roads and infrastructure in Khao Lak were also rebuilt relatively quickly following the tsunami. In spite of the reconstruction speed, from my observations the engineering and construction of these buildings were in many cases very good (with the noted exception of the lack of adequate service and sanitation infrastructure, and environmental protection). In fact, in some cases the resort buildings improved compared to previous infrastructure. In the case of the Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, she described how prior to the tsunami, her hotel had been built haphazardly over 30 years. Changes were being made all the way up to the tsunami event:
“In fact, I didn’t start the business. This resort was built in my father generation. We
had only 10 rooms at the past time. They were the kinds of bamboo bungalows. As I
can remember, we started from 9 rooms and then expand our business. However, the
problem was we did build our resort in the way we want the resort to be. We didn’t call
the engineer or any architect to help us plan the construction at all. The structure of
the hotel is not that good. Before the tsunami, we planned to renovate the resort as our
hotel is next to the beach and we suppose to charge the guest more. However, we know
that our rooms are not good enough to charge. However, we didn’t know what to do.
So after tsunami, we hired the architects to plan and design the construction.” Khao
Lak Local Resort Owner, February 2011.
Although the tsunami was a horrific and tragic event, for some survivors, it provided an opportunity for renewal of infrastructure and opportunities for expansion for those in the position to take advantage of the situation. In the case of the surviving village elite in Khao
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Lak, they were able to rebuild their livelihood and businesses quickly. They received a
different level of government support, financially and logistically. In large regard this
differential support happened through the recognition of the legitimacy of the ownership of the land. In the case of the Khao Lak Local Resort Owner she was not only able to rebuild
following the tsunami, the quality of her resort and the room capacity increased
significantly. The Khao Lak Local Resort Owner also described situations where villagers
were not so fortunate. Other circumstances such as the loss of significant family members
responsible for ownership and running the business led to the sale of resorts or land to
outside business interests.
When asked how the tourism economy has been following the tsunami the Khao Lak
Local Resort Owner responded:
“I think it’s better. The tourist can pay more. In the past, we could charge the tourist
around 1000 baht per person but right now we can charge them around 2000 baht per
person per day. However, the tourists came here more, too. Before that we had only
bungalows, we didn’t have the 3-storey building, so we decided to build the 3-storey
building to support the numbers of guests and to serve those who don’t want to sleep
next to the beach because they still concern about the tsunami. Thais people will come
in around low season.” Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, February 2011.
Her comments suggest that the improved building infrastructure has allowed her to
increase revenue from her property. Further, the ideal site and situation of her property on
161 the beachfront of Khao Lak, as well as the relatively small scale of her resort, allows her business to stay at a relatively high capacity throughout the year.
Although the structural improvements increased capacity has benefited resort owners, not all people within the community benefit from the expansion of tourism. The volatility of the global economy since 2008, and the recent economic issues in Europe have led to a downturn in tourism in the region and a narrowing of high season to only a few months. In December 2011, tourism visitor numbers were notably down from the same period in 2010. In corresponding interviews with local restaurant owners and taxi drivers there was a common theme that tourism, particularly those tourists arriving from Europe, were notably lower than in previous years. For those who rent or lease their income property or vehicle from other people, this decrease in tourist numbers has led to considerable economic hardship. One local taxi driver described how he rented his car from a local operator and had to pay the lease regardless of the amount of business he was able to do. Restaurant owners face similar issues in paying rent during the lean times of the off-season, and economic hardship that has been exacerbated by the decline of tourist arrivals due to global recession.
8.2 The State of the Natural and Built Environment in Khao Lak Town
As discussed in Chapter Two, the natural environment of the Khao Lak region had already been damaged by almost of century of destructive resource based economic activities such as tin mining and rubber plantations, which cleared and altered the coastal environment through the removal of mangroves, the destruction of beach berms, and the digging of deep mining pits (Siripong, 2006). However, within Khao Lak town itself, a large
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portion the town was largely saved from resource extraction and plantations due to the
town’s proximity to the National Park located on a large headline that encompasses the
southern extent of the town (map).
Plate 16: Coastal View of Khao Lak
(“Google Earth,” 2012)
Although portions of the town were not saved from rubber plantation, elevated portions of the town remained protected by a natural forest canopy. A possible explanation for the remaining intact forest is the unclear boundaries of the National Park,
which has resorts developed very close to its border. A local man, Villager-Turned-Activist,
interviewed in Ban Nam Khem (quoted earlier), claims that the park was at one time much
larger and that many of these resorts were built illegally within the town/park region. My
attempts to verify this claim were unsuccessful as I was unable to obtain the land
documents from the “Takupa District Land Title office” the district of which Khao Lak town
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is a part of. The Northern extent of the town extends out onto a coastal plain, a geographic
feature that continues north. It is these coastal features that makes Khao Lak Town
desirable as a prime tourist destination with a series of pocket beaches that line the beach
front. These pocket beaches through coastal wave action have collected some of the
regions most beautiful golden sand. The combination of old growth rain forest, elevated
and flat coastal regions, and the golden sand pocket beaches were the catalyst for tourism
expansion in the region.
Prior to the tsunami, tourism resort expansion was primarily responsible for disturbing or destroying some the town’s natural defence features such as mangroves berms and dunes. In the redevelopment of resorts along the coast in Khao Lak, following the tsunami, there were many man-made attempts to retain and protect sand and beachfront during the construction of new resorts. A confounding factor for these efforts
was that the beach and sand itself was in a considerable state of flux following the tsunami
due to the enormous movement of sand and the destruction of coastal vegetation and reefs
that were a consequence of the tsunami. Because of the rapid reconstruction immediately
following the tsunami, it is likely that the sand and coastal morphology had not fully
returned to a state of stability in the year following the tsunami.
Many factors, such as the movement of sand back to shore after being sucked out to
sea during the tsunami, the reshaping and repositioning of estuaries and streams from the
event, the damage to coral reefs offshore, and regrowth of coastal vegetation would
prevent coastal stability during these early months. For this reason, the re-developers built
retaining walls, reshaped stream locations, and drained estuaries during resort
reconstruction. Following the tsunami there is evidence that coastal alteration from
164 development and the ongoing natural evolution of the coastline, resort location and construction are at odds with the evolving action of coastal processes in the region.
Extending up the from Khao Lak there are numerous concrete retaining walls that are collapsing from the shifting sand that undermines the walls and the winter storm damage that removes large portions of sand and pounds these man made features. Plate 17, 18, and
19 illustrate prime examples of this development and the subsequent configurations and contours that are contributing to rapid coastal changes.
Coastal morphology is impacted by the alteration of streams and estuaries which flow into the ocean on Khao Lak’s coast. In the initial development of the town, many of these streams have been redirected. In 2011, the town of Khao Lak built a holding pond which retains the runoff of one of a stream that used flow directly in to the ocean. It is not clear the direct intention of this works project as I was not able to get a clear answer regarding its function however its impacts are noticeable on the beachfront (plate 17). The stream provided a considerable amount of sediment to the beach. Since the stream was reengineered, a noticeable amount of sand has disappeared from the beachfront in this location. At the very least, this is a troubling indicator of how great an impact the alteration of coastal estuaries and streams is on beach morphology. The worst case scenario may be the rapid erosion of this section of beach, and prime section of Khao Lak’s beachfront.
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Plate 17: Alteration of Stream and Estuary in Khao Lak Town
Plate 18: Damaged Retaining Wall South of Khao Lak
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Plate 19: Building on Sand Spit Not Fully Stabilized Following Tsunami
8.3 Trouble on the Horizon: Recent Economic Developments Impacting Sustainability in Khao Lak
With the steady reconstruction of resorts within the Khao Lak region, tourism has been increasing since 2005. Even though the recent global economic downturn has impacted the local tourist economy significantly, it has not stopped the construction or reconstruction of resorts in Khao Lak. With the increased tourism capacity particularly in high season, there has been an increase in small-scale tourist businesses such as restaurants, bars, laundry and other tourism related businesses. This increase in facilities, combined with an increase in tourist arrivals, has strained the local environmental capacity for water catchments as well as the capacity of the ocean to manage the discharge of waste.
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The advantages accrued to the Khao Lak Resort Owner when government pressed for
speed in surveying and permit application have been offset by the lack of planning and
public infrastructure needed to facilitate large resort developments and more tourists.
Even though the government sped up bureaucratic processes for the private sector, Khao
Lak does not have the needed public works infrastructure such a municipal sewage
treatment facility, and it appears that there are no current efforts being made to make such
needed improvements to the infrastructure. In the high season when tourism capacity is at
its peak, these deficiencies are manifested by the smell of raw sewage from both the
streams and the ocean where they discharge (plate 20). At the time of my initial interview
with the Khao Lak Local Resort Owner, there was a strong sewage smell emanating from the otherwise beautiful stream that ran through her property. Without asking her direct questions surrounding the state of water quality in the ocean and local water catchment she had this to say about the environmental problem facing the town:
“We have the problem already about the environment. I think because we have so
many people here and we don’t have the system for cleaning. The municipality should
take it seriously. We have a lot of wastes. Right now the sea smells not so good and
very difficult to stay along the beach. But the low season is okay. We will have
monsoon in the low season. The monsoon works so that it cleans automatically. The
small restaurants release the waste down to the sea. I think we should take it seriously.
I think someday it’s going to be a polluted environment if we don’t have the waste
management system. Most of us want to do the business by ignoring about the
environment matter. We don’t think ahead in the future so that’s why we don’t have
the prevention for that. Furthermore, the trees have been cut a lot lately. The buildings
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were built and blocked the water flow that cause flood. At the moment, the problem is
not that much. But in the future, maybe it maybe greater.” Khao Lak Local Resort
Owner, February 2011.
Plate 20: Odorous stream running through resort property Khao Lak December 2011
The issue of sewage treatment and water quality appears to ebb and flow with the
monsoon and high season tourist period. In a subsequent interview with the Khao Lak
Resort Owner during low season, she downplayed the problem of water pollution, stating
that was not really a concern. I am not clear whether this change in perspective was due to
the general attitude of wanting to “ignore the problem” as described above, or whether she
felt that she said too much to me in our previous interview, thereby exposing information
that may hurt her business, or that of Khao Lak as a whole.
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An important aspect of life in Khao Lak both pre- and post-tsunami is the
organization of local land ownership and control. Unlike the more established and larger
tourism destination of Phuket to the south, Khao Lak land ownership immediately
following the tsunami remained largely in the hands of elite villagers from Khao Lak.9 My initial interview with the Khao Lak Local Resort Owner inquiring about ownership of land in Khao Lak, revealed the following information surrounding land ownership:
“Most of them are [owned by villagers from Khao Lak]. In the first 2-3 years after
tsunami, all the hotels, which had been rebuilt, were the hotels of the local people. Not
new comers. Just a few hotels sold their business. If some important people of the hotel
died from tsunami, that hotel seems to close their business because there’s no one to
operate the business further. The hotel next door bought the business. We just have the
new comers to do the business last year.” February 2011.
Her statement suggests that in the period following the tsunami, local interests primarily controlled the tourism infrastructure and development. Although these differences in land ownership and control suggests significant inequality within the community and the region as whole, an argument could be made that local land ownership kept revenues mostly within the community, and encouraged the scale of development to be relatively small. However, the dominant local ownership of land in Khao Lak is changing; for example, a troubling development in 2011 and 2012 is the construction of two new
9 Phuket is one of Thailand’s oldest and most established tourist destinations. Although there is significant domestic ownership of land resorts, there are many multi-national tourism operators in the region such as the Accor chain of hotel brands as well organized crime.
170 large scale resorts in Khao Lak Town. One resort property purchased by a business interest from Phuket is a reconstruction of a resort property abandoned following the tsunami (See plates 21 and 22). The second resort being constructed is a completely new development on the land abandoned following the tsunami. Purchased by outside interests from Phuket, this prime beachfront land for resort was actually bought from the family of the Khao Lak Resort Owner (See plate 23, 24 and 25). According to the Khao Lak Resort
Owner, the new resort will have as many as 400 rooms, thus adding to the tourism capacity
Khao Lak. Further, the Khao Lak Resort Owner revealed that the new owners are offering above-market sums of money to local land owners to purchase more land surrounding their property in order to expand further, which could contribute to imbalance in the local economy.
Many points of concern relating to the overall sustainability of Khao Lak arise from the recent development of these large resorts. First, Khao Lak is already experiencing notable negative environmental impact from sewage discharge from the existing tourism, even prior to the new resort development. Second, with the volatility of the tourism economy, particularly an economy that is highly dependent on European tourist arrivals (a region in economic turmoil in 2011-2012), the increase in capacity has the potential to negatively impact smaller resort operations owned by local people who may not have the resources to either ride out an economic down turn, or compete with larger scale resorts.
Finally, the increase in outside interests may inhibit the ability of local resort owners and tour operators to continue a sustainable livelihood.
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Plate 21: Abandoned Resort Destroyed by Tsunami, Khao Lak February 2011
Plate 22: Abandoned Resort in Khao Lak Rebuilt, Opened November 2012
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Plate 23: Construction of New Resort in Khao Lak December 2011
Plate 24: Newly Placed Memorials in front of resort construction site December 2011
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Plate 25: Completed Resort November 2012
Given that this resort expansion is recent, it is unclear what the long term implications of these developments. However, important lessons and parallels could be learned from the expansion of Phuket, the much larger and mature tourism destination to the south.
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Chapter 9: Discussion/Conclusion
9.1 Key Issues of Reconstruction and Recovery in Each Village of Focus
As is congruent with the iterative nature of IE, analysis of text and other data sources is a continuous and cyclical process which I have captured within the available data that I relied upon in each chapter of analysis. I organized the analysis around occurrences in each of the four communities. In this chapter I highlight the key points and work to expand the links between the social and ruling relations that were played out in each community. My goal is to highlight the overarching ruling relations activated within the region as whole.
9.1.2 Key points of discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Ban Nam
Khem
It is important to emphasize Wisner’s et al, (2005) characterization of the 2004 tsunami as “largely a development induced disaster”. Ban Nam Khem is a notable example of this description and outcome. Ban Nam Khem was arguably the most devastated by the tsunami. Ban Nam Khem’s geographical location along the low lying coastal plain of Phang
Nga, combined with its past environmental disturbance as a tin mine location, left the village population completely exposed to the wave. Many of the residents of Ban Nam
Khem at the time of the event did not have long standing roots within the region and many lacked the deed to their land. The survivors in Ban Nam Khem were particularly vulnerable and powerless in dealing with local and national governments one on one. The National government plan allowed for aid organizations to flow into the region in a completely
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uncoordinated and unregulated manner, distributing aid randomly throughout the
community. The random and haphazard organization of relief efforts led to extremely
uneven distribution of aid and reconstruction within the community of Ban Nam Khem, and
the region as whole. The rationale behind this loose policy directed toward relief organizations seems to be rooted in the deregulation of money and aid intended to speed up the recovery process of aid and recovery. This corresponded with the rapid reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads and services that lead the national government to declare the reconstruction process over (completed) within one year’s time.
In Ban Nam Khem, there were two dominant paths that emerged in the reconstruction process. One path was villagers following the national government plan for reconstruction, which resulted in highly uneven distribution of aid money from donors and
NGOs and the national government as well as in many cases of sub-standard quality of housing. The second path was one where a grass-roots community organization aided by the advice and assistance from NGOs was able to organize in the following ways:
1. Through the policy and support of the NGOs of the Community Organizations
Development Institute (CODI) and the Chumchon Thai foundation (CTF), the community group was successful in following grass-roots organization strategies and empowerment;
2. Organize and distribute aid within their community group by centralizing financial resources in a community bank;
3. Lobby for the land rights and deeds for those without land in the community;
4. Plan and build high quality housing that fit the needs of the villagers;
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5. To provide ongoing organization to support for survivors through a the community
bank, and continued social assistance; and
6. To expand outward to help other communities and to assist individuals as they fight for
their rights in the reconstruction and recovery process.
9.1.3 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Thuungwa
Moken Sea Gypsy Community
The story of reconstruction of Thuungwa was initially declared a success story by
the national government, NGOs, and the media one year after the tsunami event. As time
went on, however, many points of tension and concern emerged regarding the status of the
deeds to their land, the impact on their traditional way of life, and their overall outlook for
the future.
Contact with outsiders such as expatriate NGO workers, local Thais, and the
transition to modern living drastically changed the way of life for the Moken people in the
village. Within less than one generation children no longer speak or learn the traditional
language and culture of the Moken people. This is primarily due to the national policy requiring ethnic children in Thailand to attend to Thai national schools that instruct and
accept only the dominant Thai language and culture. The national government aggressively
held the Moken to this policy during the post-tsunami reconstruction processes. This has led to the rapid assimilation of the Moken youth in to the dominant Thai culture. Moreover, many of the youth have chosen to move away to larger cities by seeking employment or through marriage to outsiders. The livelihood of people within the village has changed from
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being dominantly fishing oriented, to many people working within the tourism industry
and other commercial industries that depart from their fisher folk heritage. The nature of
reconstruction of housing and infrastructure at Thuungwa immediately exposed the Moken
to the dominant capitalist economy by connecting this community to services such
electricity, sanitation, and communication devices, all requiring financing. Such changes in connection necessitated a shift in livelihood away from largely ‘sustainable’ subsistence living, to employment in the dominant tourism industry in the region.
The Moken in Thuungwa are still in a state of flux relating to their ownership of land due to disagreements between local and national government surrounding the rights for the Moken to stay in their current location. This has lead to anxiety and tension within the community and disunity regarding the future of the village. The uncertain status of
Thuungwa appears to be directly related to the value of the land that they occupy. Located in the proximity of the expansion of commercial tourism-based businesses on the outskirts of Khao Lak, this land is highly valued for the expansion of resort service industries such restaurants and other businesses expanding alongside resort expansion down the coastline.
Although there are promising signs from the national government for the Moken to be allowed to stay at Thuungwa, as yet, the villagers still do not have the permanent deed to the land and the status of the future of their community remains tenuous due to the value of land they occupy.
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9.1.4 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery Bangkaya in
Tsunami Relief Community
A key factor in the relative harmony of Bangkaya community that emerged in my
interviews with villagers is related to the equitable reconstruction of their housing stock.
The villagers were provided with a choice in the style of housing which suited the needs of
the two primary ethnic communities in the village, Moken and Thai. Villagers are generally
happy with their housing and the housing was built relatively quickly following the
tsunami, which allowed the villagers to rebuild their livelihood faster than other
communities such as ban Nam Khem. The fact that all infrastructure was built from scratch
and was relatively equal, combined with the relative high quality construction of housing
and infrastructure is in stark contrast to the disparity, inequality, and poor quality of
government reconstruction in other communities such as Ban Nam Khem. The equality of
housing and equity of resources appears to be a key factor in why villagers in Bangkaya
appear to be much more satisfied with the outcome of reconstruction and recovery in their
new village home.
Another reason the Bangkaya community is relatively harmonious is due to the
open dialogue between the Moken and Thai people in the village through monthly meetings
and a sharing of power relationships.
Housing construction at Bangkaya was superior to construction efforts in Ban Nam
Khem, even though they were commissioned under the same national government plan and in both locations built by the army. In Bangkaya all dwelling were constructed in the same manor with no variation in quality (unlike Ban Na Khem). The housing at Bangkaya was also completed faster than in Ban Nam Khem. This suggests that priority was given to
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reconstruction at Bangkaya due to the motivation of government and business to move
people away from the more valuable coastal land. This darker outcome suggesting
exploitation emerges in some of the interviews. Villagers were encouraged to move away
from the coast to this inland village at higher elevation. This provided villagers who were
traumatised by the tsunami event a sense of safety from the sea. In some cases, however,
these villagers sold their land to businessmen seeking to build resorts. This raises a
question surrounding government and business interests motivated to expropriate more
valuable land through the recovery process in the guise of safety and wellbeing of the
village population, a concern that seems contradictory to the ongoing development of
tourist accommodation in the ‘unsafe’ area.
9.1.5 Key Points of Discussion for Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery in Khao Lak
Recovery policy appears to have favoured the elite within the region, and those
willing to move away from highly desirable and valuable coastal lands. Khao Lak is the
location of many of these wealthy elite whose land value and land distribution continues to
be held by the original villagers of Khao Lak. Although there was tremendous economic
benefit in getting the tourism economy up and running quickly following the tsunami, there
is a striking contrast of priorities and class distinction where the elite (in the case of Khao
Lak and the region as whole) received a far greater share of aid, recovery, money and
assistance than the poor and non-ethnic Thais, such as the Moken, despite the fact that a great deal of the reconstruction resources were international and nongovernmental. It is not clear how the social and ruling relations coordinating international aid worked, but what is apparent is that the wealthy elite had more access to these resources.
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While lacking detailed empirical data (texts and textual processes) that characterize
IE analysis in developed, resource rich countries, there is enough evidence to argue that in
Thailand the speed of reconstruction of tourism infrastructure was emphasized over long- term planning for safety of evacuation routes, water treatment, coastal stability and preservation, and quality of infrastructure. Moreover, there is a sense of complacency regarding the tsunami early warning system and overall personal safety in the event of another tsunami. This complacency seems to be reinforced by a false sense of security surrounding evacuation routes, the amount of time needed to reach high ground, and the overall awareness provided to visitors to the hazard area.
The current state of Khao Lak’s economy is in transition. The community is now vulnerable to economic takeover from outside interests willing to pay top dollar for coastal land for new resort construction. The lack of water treatment is leading the contamination of the water catchment flowing through the town and into the coastal beachfront, which is particularly striking in high season when these streams smell like an open sewer. Local residents employed in the tourism industry are highly vulnerable to the volatility of the tourism industry through the economic downturn. The volatility of tourism, the lack of sewage treatment, and the recent construction of large (mass tourism) resorts by outside interests leads to serious questions regarding the overall carrying capacity for both tourists and tourism workers in Khao Lak and region.
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9.2 Motivation in Reconstruction and Recovery Leading to Different Outcomes in
Ruling Relations and Recovery Outcomes.
In each community of focus, there has been different recovery outcomes based on
the nature of recovery efforts, the ruling relations that re-established within the community, the status of villagers within the community and region, and the value of their land. The following section discusses these divergent outcomes of recovery within the study area.
9.2.1. The Ruling Relations Organizing Land Value Have Dictated Recovery Policy
My research has revealed that despite ideological assertions that recovery efforts were focused on supporting survivors in rebuilding their lives, the economic ruling relations in the region prior to the tsunami have heavily influenced recovery policy, reconstruction and distribution of aid. In particularly, these economic ruling relations coordinated interests that were contradictory to those of many survivors. In the recovery process within the Khao Lak region immediately following the tsunami there is strong evidence that the local and national government gave priority of aid and reconstruction of housing to those who were economically advantaged in the community. Within Ban Nam
Khem, only people with the title deed to property recognized by the Village Head Man were provided with reconstructed housing under the government plan. Although the national government initially supported the Moken Sea Gypsy community at Thuungwa to stay on their land, in the years following the tsunami, it has become clear that successive local governments have not supported the Moken stay, leaving the community in a state of flux.
In Khao Lak where the majority of villagers are the local ruling elite landowners,
182 there was more government (and international) support for fast rebuilding of infrastructure and favorable financial aid. Examination of the social organization that dictated government policy revealed that land value and relationship to the land (historical ownership with established textual bureaucracies) was critical to the coordination of control, development and growth. Such ruling relations that dictated distribution and use of resources were evident in three of the four communities studied. The skewed advantages linked to the ruling relation of the tourist economy were present throughout the recovery process, and continue to dictate the ruling relations within communities and the region as a whole.
The only community where this appears not to be the case is the Bangkaya Village, which was built on crown land that is located far inland from the sea and well up the road from the economic centre of Khao Lak. This land would be deemed of less economic value than the other three communities due to its location inland, and thus away from land of prime economic value for tourism. In Bangkaya Village I witnessed strong national and local government support in the reconstruction process in the form of rapid construction of housing, options for housing design, and support for villagers remaining in their housing indefinitely. Further, many of the villagers who chose to move to this community have moved away from land that was closer to the sea, land more highly valued for the tourism industry. In the cases where villagers moved away from coastal land, there is evidence that such land closer to the sea has been bought up by outside interests for the tourism industry. Thus, in a contradictory twist, the community of villagers who seem most stable have in some cases sold valuable coastal land to commercial interests and are also
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contributing to a pool of cheap labour that the mass tourism profits rely on. Moreover,
despite the villagers relief that they are not living with the omnipresent danger of ocean
proximity, most adult villagers spend the majority of their work-lives in the danger zone.
The two communities that have experienced the greatest political challenges to their
capacity to rebuild on their land and that have received the least amount of government
support are located in areas of high economic and touristic value. The Moken Sea Gypsy
community of Tuungwa is situated close to the national highway in the proximity of
tourism infrastructure growth that is spreading out from Khao Lak. These beautiful
stretches of beach are highly valued for future tourism expansion. Areas close to this
primary real estate (such as Thuungwa) is valued for other tourism enterprises due to the
proximity to the large resorts. Of the communities in recovery, the community
experiencing the most difficulty in rebuilding, with zero reconstruction of homes to date is
the community of Bang Sak. Bang Sak village is located directly on a golden sand beach and
has not been reconstructed in any way because it is currently locked in a land battle that
has pitted the former occupants against the local and national governments and also
against one another.
9.2.2 Priority of the National Government for the Speed of Recovery
Interviews with expert local informants who have been involved in the tsunami
recovery have provided the key data for this research that points to a national government plan (coordinated with local governments) that was directed towards a speedy recovery, as opposed to the effective organization and fair distribution of aid, long-term safety from hazard, and quality of environmental infrastructure and development planning. In my
184 interview with the former Governor of the Khao Lak region at the time of tsunami, he stated that in his opinion, the lack of coordination and control of aid distribution and reconstruction efforts led to extreme inequalities within and between villages in the region.
His assertion is shared by many of the villagers interviewed including the Head Man of Ban
Nam Khem Village.
For the reasons discussed in this document, the reconstruction efforts were extremely uneven, with some residents receiving more than others depending on which organization they received aid from. The uneven nature of recovery and reconstruction has been a common theme throughout my interviews in all communities. Furthermore,
Thai national government policy allowed for full and immediate access to tsunami victims and communities with largely unregulated access of aid and relief organizations. The intent behind providing unregulated access of victims to aid and relief efforts was to allow for an immediate access to aid and for the reconstruction process to begin very quickly.
The outcomes of policies and texts dictating the national government’s recovery plan have largely shaped the structure, infrastructure and, indirectly the livelihood of communities all within a very rapid reconstruction period of approximately 18 months.
Furthermore, the individual or institutional decisions by people in-charge of the recovery efforts have impacted the social organization of communities for a number of reasons, listed as follows:
1. Some people within the affected community received more resources than others,
such as two homes, one of which they could rent out or sell;
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2. Some within the region have had their source of income return quickly through aid
and assistance such as favourable loans to reconstruct businesses or reconstruction
of fishing boats;
3. Some people have received permanent ownership of their land or community where
others still live in limbo with no clear decision made about their status, such as the
Moken village at Thuungwa and Villagers at Ban Sak;
4. Some individuals have benefited in the long term from the tsunami through access
to cheap capital to rebuild their businesses with upgraded infrastructure and
increased capacity (land and resort owners of Khao Lak); and
5. Through lack of construction of environmental infrastructure such as sewage
treatment or a long-term development plan limiting environmental impacts of
development, natural resource of this beautiful coastal environment is currently
threatened by ongoing development and environmental degradation.
As a human geographer it is important to disseminate my findings to my geography colleagues to communicate the important contribution of IE. In the following table (Table
2), I contrast how the theoretical language of the "twin pillars of sustainability" can be materially described in the actual practices that I discovered being lived out in the villages I studied.
My empirical investigation into how what happened in post-tsunami Thailand has not unearthed evidence about how the Thai national government policy towards tsunami reconstruction, aid and recovery was established. Despite a national policy that appeared to direct an even handed response to all the victims of the tsunami, my informants
186 described how NGOs, aid agencies, and other organizations were given apparent free reign to distribute aid randomly. Further, I am left to speculate some of the analysis to explain what were the conditions under which uneven policies and directives towards housing reconstruction happened. The difficulties in attempting to discover empirical historical data from a period of deep chaos with minimal disaster infrastructure hampers what can be definitively described, however the institutional ethnography reported here points to practices embedded in global economic responses to developing nations that are closely aligned to the interests of a globalized corporate economy that coordinated land development and economic development.
187 of! % Lak % ! .!! on!monetary! ! prime!land!from! Khao ! Lack!of!sanitation! infrastructure!leading! to!degradation!of! environment.! Government!favours! elite!resort!owners!in! distributi Fails!to!achieve! sustainable!! reconstruction,!aid!and! recovery and!logistical!support.!! Mismanagement! water!catchment.! Outside!interests! buying local!elite ! % le!deed.! fishing! ! Young! ! . o!stay!in!there! Thuungwa subsistence! existence people!not!learning! traditional!language! and!culture.!! Uncertainty!of!being! able!t village,!no!tit Nature!of!rebuilt! housing!requires! exposure!to!market! economy.!Livelihood! changed!from! traditional Fails!to!achieve! sustainable!! reconstruction,!aid! ! and!recovery ' ! ! % r!long residents.!! ! meet!the! ! Bangkaya term!sustainability!for! residents Negative!aspect!is! many!residents!sold! more!valuable!coastal! land!to!developers Government!provides! equitable,!quality! housing!to! Community!organized! and!harmonious. Meets!requirements! for!sustainable! development!at!the! surface.!!Villagers! who!are!dispossessed! of!more!valuable!land! fails!to requirement!fo % of! ) ! % Ban%Sak chapter%5 reconstruction,! Ban%Nam%Khem,% overnment!to! (considere d%within% Community!not! rebuilt.!Failure local!government!to! enact!orders!from! the!national! g rebuild!community.!! Future!existence!of! community! ! uncertain Failure!to!achieve! any! ! aid!and!recovery ! % ,!aid! roots! ' roots! ' Ban%Nam%Khem vernment!plan!fail! grass ! o overnment!plan!fails! A community! organization! distributes!aid! equally!and!builds! quality!housing!for! current!and!future! generations.! Reconstruction!for! those!following!a! g to!provide! adequate! housing.!Aid!not! distributed!equally. Grass organization!achieves! sustainable! reconstruction and!recovery.! Survivors.! G to!achieve! sustainable! reconstruction,!aid! ! and!recovery % % % % % ! & quity quity E E Status%for% evelopment Sustainable% Sustainable% D Development Twin%Pillars%of% Intragenerational Intergenerational% Table 2 : Assessment of Sustainable Development in Reconstruction, Aid and Recovery Tsunami Impacted Communities of Focus. ) ! Twin!Pillars!of!Sustainable!Development!(Holden!&!Jacobson!(2012 !
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When I asked local officials about the nature of reconstruction housing and infrastructure, the common response was that reconstruction happened in 2005 and that it is all over now.
There is no more reconstruction, it was finished fast.
Data from this study supports a conclusion that ideological practices seeded what happened in the sequence of events following the tsunami. Certainly my interview data supports that it was important for the government to establish the appearance of a speedy recovery. Speedy redevelopment of tourism and rapid efforts to meet the basic housing needs for those people left homeless were government priorities, while public infrastructure, quality housing, and strategies to address landscape hazards were not a priority. Here “recovery” was about economic recovery driven by interests that were significantly different than the economic security and livelihoods of the people living in the villages who were the personal victims of the tsunami. It is my impression that a principal goal and common response to outsiders was that the government handled recovery and reconstruction quickly and efficiently. This messaging about the speed with which the government responded to the disaster and recovery reflects a system of organizational practices designed to project the message that everything is fine and functional, and that
“Thailand is open for business and travel”; it implies there is minimal disruption caused by the tsunami.
Indeed on paper, it seems from the national tourism statistics (chapter two) that this message has been successful. The tourism economy conveys a strong message to the broader global economy and the World Bank (WB), and economic indicators for Thailand
189 continue to improve. The Gross National Income (GNI) for Thailand in 2011 of $4,420 USD edges upward yearly, from $2,340 in 2004 (The World Bank, 2012). GNI per capita adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is also rising from $5,960 USD in 2004 to
$8,390 in 2011 (The World Bank, 2012) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Thailand is also up sharply from 2004’s number from $161,339,790,595 to more than double that in
2011, $345,649,290,737 (The World Bank, 2012). Although this would suggest a steady improvement in quality of life and standard of living, wealth in Thailand is not distributed equally, particularly in a mass-tourism economy. As discussed in Chapter two and three, mass tourism does not benefit the majority of the population in proportion to dollars spent because the majority of revenue is retained by the owners of infrastructure who are usually either the elite, or outsiders who funnel money away from the local people. Such processes, ethnographically described here, are referred to as economic leakage (A. Holden, 2000).
What this analysis offers is a clearer view of what actually happens when people are enticed to move away from, or to sell, their prime tourist locations Since the overwhelming majority of rebuilt tourism infrastructure in the study area follows the mass tourism model, very little money filters down to the local population (Marfurt, 1999; Sinclair, Thea
& Stabler, 1997; Vanhove, 1997). My ethnographic evidence supports this.
The Thai national government under Thaksin was vested in handling the disaster efficiently. Under the global scrutiny of the World Bank “Core Sector Indicators” the Thai economy is held to a “Results Measurement System” that is used to identify and track development. However, my IE research reveals a different understanding of facts related to the "results" of the post-tsunami terrain. The lasting implications for villagers of this speedy unregulated recovery policy has been an uneven, convoluted recovery process that
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has left many victims with a permanent outcome of unsatisfactory housing, as well as
diminished economic livelihood and social well-being now and into the future. My research
describes how the actual processes of recovery benefitted the local ruling elite. While some people organized and actively challenged the systems and directives that coordinated financial aid and the rapidity within which the Thai military were deployed to rebuild, overall, the reconstruction aligns with outside, rather than local interests. The activities of people who managed to organize their own aid and recovery served to avoid some of the impact of this uneven, convoluted, divisive and unsustainable outcome from the aid and recovery process. These organic, grass roots efforts provide important lessons for NGOs involved in disaster response efforts.
9.3 Social Organization of Grass Roots Activities Can Make a Difference
This research has revealed that in the case of Ban Nam Khem, to achieve a favourable outcome for aid, reconstruction and recovery it was essential for NGOs to support the grass-roots organization of victims to enable them to achieve financial agency over aid resources in order to coordinate their desired outcomes of recovery and desired livelihood. This included the pragmatics of daily meetings, agreement among the villagers to pool their money and the establishment of a community bank that was overseen by the
Community Activist Leader. This was accomplished through open discussion, transparency, equality and justice that seemed to thwart others who were driven by self-interest. Those individuals and organizations who followed the grass-roots community organization path to aid, reconstruction, and recovery achieved far superior outcomes than those dependent on the government, Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and
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WB plan. Grass roots organization for successful reconstruction aid and recovery was obtained through a strict adherence to policies established at the local level that were
expressed in texts, as mentioned earlier, that were systematically activated by the villagers
through the recovery process. The implementation was not only successful in achieving
the goal of housing, livelihoods, education, healthcare, and economic stability in recovery, the community organization remains successful at continuing their grassroots organization within Ban Nam Khem as well exporting these ideas elsewhere. This study has revealed what other scholars theorize as "structural violence" that I have shown playing out in the practices of the variously positioned people in the communities of focus. In the case of specific focus of research within a defined disaster region, theories of "structural violence" are not as useful as the description of actual practices that I have displayed here. Well intentioned organizations that, prior to my research relied on theoretical tools (such as structural violence) now have an empirical analysis to support their efforts to work on behalf of victims during times of crisis. Practices of land displacement and rapid corporate development intensified during this post-tsunami period of disaster response. Figure 10 maps out the unequal distribution of resources detailed within my study. The following section discusses this unequal distribution of resources, the conflict valuable of land, and contemporary theories that are inline within my findings the communities of focus.
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Figure 10: Unequal Distribution of Resources
INCREASING OF VALUE LAND AND SUPPORT NGOS PROVIDING AID NGOS PROVIDING
FISHING GOVERNMENT MOKAN SEA GYPSY GYPSY MOKAN SEA OPPOSED BY LOCAL LOCAL OPPOSED BY ORGANIZATION OF AID OF ORGANIZATION RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION PRIMARY EMPLOYMENT PRIMARY GRASS-ROOTS COMMUNITY GRASS-ROOTS COMMUNITY FOR LAND TO BE RETURNED, TO FOR LAND LAND. TOURISM AND FISHING TOURISM LAND. BAN SOK VILLAGER FIGHTING BAN SOK RECOVERY IN BAN NAM KHEM RECOVERY COMMUNITY, NO DEED TO THE TO NO DEED COMMUNITY, LAND HIGH UN-EMPLOYMENT - LAND HIGH UN-EMPLOYMENT THRIVING VILLAGE ON CROWN THRIVING
LAND LAND MANAGEMENT OF MANAGEMENT MANAGEMENT OF MANAGEMENT REGIONAL AND LOCAL AND LOCAL REGIONAL ROYAL THAI NATIONAL THAI NATIONAL ROYAL GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POLICY GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT POLICY AND POLICY GOVERNMENT UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES DISTRIBUTION OF UNEQUAL LACK OF DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES OR SUPPORT OF LAND OWNERSHIP OF RESOURCES OR SUPPORT DISTRIBUTION OF LACK OF LAND OWNERSHIP OF AND SUPPORT RESOURCES DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS INTERESTS SECTOR PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL NATIONAL THE REGION VILLAGERS IN NGOS ======STRUCTURE TREATMENT ) TREATMENT POST TSUNAMI POST ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROVIDED (SEWAGE PROVIDED (SEWAGE KHAO LAK TOWN AND TOWN KHAO LAK RESORT OWNERS (THE RESORT FAVOURABLE PAYMENT PAYMENT FAVOURABLE INFRASTRUCTURE NOT INFRASTRUCTURE NOT LEGEND GOVERNMENT TO REBUILD TO GOVERNMENT TOURISM INFRASTRUCTURE TOURISM ORIGINAL LAND OWNERS OF LAND OWNERS OF ORIGINAL LOCAL ELITE LAND OWNERS/ LOCAL PROPERTY SOLD OR GRANTED SOLD OR GRANTED PROPERTY BEACHFRONT) 2% LOANS FROM TO TOURISM INDUSTRY PRE AND PRE INDUSTRY TOURISM TO
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9.4 Forces Impeding the Sustainability of Culture, Environment, and Livelihood of
Survivors in Post-Tsunami Thailand.
Throughout my literature review for this study, there was a consistent reference to
neoliberal policies entrained within the use of resources, government polices towards
recovery, and the economic policies towards the unfettered expansion of the tourism
economy within the region. My data chronicles how this is made possible during the chaos
of the tsunami. My data points to a finely choreographed set of organized practices that
were carried out inside the chaos of the human tragedy. This "behind the scenes"
organization supported mass tourism development that was carried out in tandem with the
reconstruction of the communities and the distribution of aid. The data provides evidence
about how reconstruction efforts produced what is theorized about in the literature that
conceptualized "neoliberalism" while at the same time obfuscating the actual practices that
accomplish this political agenda. Rather than conceptualizing my findings within terms
such as those coined by Farmer (2003) as “structural violence” I have worked to stay in a
material description of an environment and economy that arise within a complex set of
ruling relations that I have begun to track and to map. The data describes pre-tsunami
development, and post-tsunami reconstruction, aid and recovery that fails to result in the
sorts of communities where people have the opportunity to thrive and live well.
Marx’s critique on capitalism was that its advancement was dependent upon a vast
wealth of capital created at the expense of dispossessing land, property and goods from the
peasant population through fraud, violence and other means (Harvey, 2003). This process of advancing capitalism described as the “primitive accumulation” of capital was
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considered by Marxist scholars to be a process that has run its course through history and
is no longer relevant (Glassman, 2006; Harvey, 2003; W. Holden, Nadeau, & Jacobson,
2011). In his assessment of global economic trends since 1973, Harvey (2003) challenges
the idea that the forces of “primitive accumulation” are no longer relevant today. He
describes how market forces, particularly in the developing world, have allowed for
predatory accumulation of property, profit and capital by exploiting and dispossessing
people. Harvey (2003) defines this process as “Accumulation by Dispossession” through
the use of a number of methods. These methods include, the commodification and
privatization of land and the forceful expropriation of land, the conversion of various forms
of property rights into exclusive property rights, the suppression of the rights of the
commons, the commodification of labour, the suppression of alternative (indigenous)
forms of production, and the colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources) (Harvey, 2003). It is these broad "methods" that I
have shown at work within the practices of villagers, local government officials, national
players and those people working with NGOs.
The critical (theorized) understanding of the global market forces that dominate the
scholarship on disaster recovery and global market forces are empirically described here.
This is a critical contribution. Until we discover how development injustices are
perpetrated at the very local level of displacement, we lack the tools to act on behalf of
victims of disaster. It is in this way that IE is an activist project. In Ban Nam Khem the
people were left vulnerable by the destruction of their natural environment through
resource extraction and environmental degradation. In Ban Sak, the community has had its
land expropriated by the local government primarily due to its value as coastal property.
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This is also the case in Thuungwa Moken community where there is pressure to displace
the community due to the value of their land for commercial tourism. At Thuungwa, the
Mokens’ traditional means of production (fishing) has largely been suppressed due to the
need for electricity, goods, garbage collection that introduced the capitalist market
economy into their everyday life. This can be graphically displayed in Plate 10 which shows
the standardized garbage bins for garbage collection as well as the power lines that run
through the community (all of which are billed to residents). In Bangkaya, villagers were
convinced to leave their coastal land with the promise of safer, high quality dwellings on less valuable land. In Khao Lak, the elite were given preferential assistance from the government to rebuild, favouring the dominant economy of tourism over survivors. More recent developments suggest that even the ruling elites in Khao Lak are vulnerable to larger global market forces, with outsiders increasingly buying valuable coastal land.
Outside interests will have less vested interest in the local people, economy and environment than the local elites and may outcompete local elites through the quality, scale, and volume of their businesses.
Thailand is currently in a state of political flux and power struggle that will determine which forces will control the country in the future, the business elite such as the former Prime Minister Thaksin, or the traditional monarchist elite, who strongly support the King yet also benefit from the reigns of power. This political turmoil has played out a
number of times in the last six years through a coup in 2006, the protests that shut down
the International Airport in 2008, and the Red Shirt protests that crippled the business
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district and resulted in violence in 2010.10 The advancing age of the King are currently contributing to uncertainty as to what will happen with his succession, and who will ultimately control power within the country.
Plate 26: New 400-room Resort Owned by Phuket Interests, Opened November 2012
Much is also at stake when considering Thailand’s economy. Thailand’s economy,
including tourism, is booming with new connections with China and other South East Asian
nations, such as Burma (World Bank, 2012). As Harvey’s (2003) ideas of continuing
10 In 2006 The Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was overthrown by monarchist elements of the military (“Profile: Thailand’s Reds and Yellows,” 2012). The yellow shirts are citizens made up of monarchists, ultra nationalists, and the urban middle class that oppose the election of Thaksin supporters. The red shirts are an amalgamated citizens group of the rural poor, left wing activists, student groups, and most importantly Thaksin supporters(“Profile: Thailand’s Reds and Yellows: Britsh Broadcasting Corperation,” 2012)
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primitive accumulation of capital through the forces of “Accumulation by Dispossession”
resonate on the post-tsunami landscape, this may be just the tip of the iceberg for Thailand.
The King personally owns $ 5 billion US in shares of the “Crown Property Bureau” an asset
management group established by the Thai government that controls much of the crown
lands of the country (Forbes, 2012; Mellor, 2007). Much of the land within the country is currently owned by the King (and Royal family), which means that Royal interests control land use. At present, with his control over vast tracts of property in Thailand, (including prime property and real estate in Central Bangkok), as well as other holdings, the King of
Thailand is considered the most wealthy monarch in the world, worth in excess of 30 billion US dollars (Forbes, 2012). A change in the status of, and ownership of this land with a shift in power, would make available enormous amounts of wealth and capital to be exploited by those who ultimately might win this political power struggle. These lands also include vast stretches of pristine beach properties within the Khao Lak region ideal for tourism development.
As described by Harvey (2003), the ongoing processes of economic power dynamics that flow continuously across space have directly influenced the process of reconstruction aid and recovery in the Khao Lak region. My ethnographic data describe the forces that continue to act on the economy, people and environment and overall sustainability for the region into the future. This research has revealed that effective communication and implementation of policies designed specifically to counteract unchecked and discriminant market forces, such as the grassroots movement of reconstruction, aid, and recovery in Ban
Nam Khem have been successful in stopping and reversing these processes. This is a critical discovery revealed by this research that should be taken up in many other forms of
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disaster and development research. In addition, in addressing the negative aspects of
development, it is my hope that by revealing the actual occurrences and nuances of the post-tsunami recovery, as well as what is currently happening in my study area, that this knowledge can be taken up and used to avoid future exploitation and dispossession in future post disaster settings.
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Chapter 10. Threads Not followed: Future Studies
Throughout this study there were many threads of research relevant to assessing the sustainability of reconstruction aid and recovery that were not followed due to my research focus, size of my study, and resources available to me. In this chapter I address these as “threads not followed” so that myself, or others may take up this research in future studies.
10.1 Safety and Hazard Assessment of the Rebuilt Environment for the Local Population and Tourists Within the Khao Lak Region
Immediately following the 2004 Indian Ocean – Andaman Sea tsunami there was much written about how reconstruction and recovery should focus on building infrastructure and an early warning system that would prevent such a catastrophic loss of life. Wisner et al. (2005) address many of the key variables required to achieve rebuilt environment that is safer and sustainable for the population within the hazard zone. The
“Phuket Action Plan” that was draw up by the World Tourism Organization (WTO) made many recommendations regarding building within the hazard zone as well as identification of safe, effective evacuation routes in the event of another tsunami.
A tsunami evacuation map and signs have been erected and planned for coastal settlements and towns in Southern Thailand that includes the location of safe high ground and the amount of time one would need to make it to this location (see plate 26). There is also an overall map for hazard and evacuation for each community. From interviews in Ban
Nam Khem, villagers are aware of the evacuation routes and muster stations (in this case the local school).
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In other tourism dominated locations such as Khao Lak Town, there is very little public information as to the routes of evacuation and the safe muster locations on high ground, particularly for tourists who may be the highest percentage of population in this location at any given time. However, some accommodation where I have stayed in the region provides information on evacuation procedures and locations of safety. However, provision of such evacuation literature for tourists is rare. Most accommodations do not have any information on evacuation procedures in the event of a tsunami. As described previously, in Khao Lak there is only one primary road accessing the beachfront. This road would be the primary route for evacuation assessable for tourists and traffic and could possibly be bottlenecked with traffic and people from multiple resorts along the coast.
Further, the evacuation distance to high-ground is significant and it would be very difficult accomplish evacuation in enough time, especially given the general lack of knowledge of evacuation routes, congestion and distance. Plate 27, is one of the evacuations signs posted on the front beach road in Kao Lak.
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Plate 27: Tsunami Evacuation Map for Ban Na Khem Community
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Plate 28: Tsunami Evacuation Sign Indicating Direction and Distance to High Ground
There is also considerable misinformation perpetuated by locals regarding the length of time available for evacuation to high ground in the event of a future tsunami. In interviews with villagers throughout the region, the consensus indicated is that they have approximately 20 minutes to get to high ground in the event of a tsunami warning.
However, tsunami research indicates that the time it takes for a tsunami wave to arrive onshore is highly variable and relates to multiple factors (Dudley & Lee, 1998; Easterbrook,
1999). The speed and size of a tsunami is directly related to the depth of the ocean at the
203 epicenter of the earthquake, the amount of water displaced in this location form the event, barriers to impact, and depth of the coastal shelf (if present) in that location (Dudley & Lee,
1998; Easterbrook, 1999). Thus a safe time-frame for evacuation is highly variable for each tsunami event and for each location along the shore. Wave height is also highly variable in each tsunami event, and is also directly related to above mentioned factors of ocean depth, coastal depth, and displacement. It is not clear how the safe height above sea level in Khao
Lak and surrounding areas was determined in each location. However it is important to note that in the recent Honshu tsunami event of 2011 in Japan, safe muster locations were miscalculated in many locations resulting in multiple deaths in these presumed safe muster locations (Matsuo, Fraser, Leonard, & Murakami, 2012). These miscalculations from the
Honshou Japan earthquake and tsunami have been considered part of the failure of the early warning systems and evacuation routes in the Indian Ocean and are in the process of review (Akhyarsi & Akhyarsi, 2012). Processes of hazard assessment and warning system development and protocols for relaying this information the public within hazard zones is a key factor in the assessment of overall sustainability within a hazard region.
The research framework of IE succeeds in so far as it reveals the complexities of recovery, and how global ruling relations play out in many different ways within and between communities. An IE study can shed light on the organization and implementation of land use planning, building codes, environmental management, the implementation and management of the tsunami early warning system early system, and many other policies, regulations, and planning activities that were enacted by various stakeholders within the recovery process. It is clear that many policies identified by government and institutions were not implemented or followed. In every question that follows, an important dimension
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to investigate are the ruling relations and organization involved in these processes that
remain unanswered from the subject matter and outcomes of this study. Questions that
could arise from such a study of such issues would include:
1. How is the overall safety infrastructure and hazard planning that is in place organized?
2. Where did reconstruction, early warning system and evacuation plans deviate from recommended policies and regulations?
3. How does the sense of complacency and miss-information on evacuation routes and time to get to high ground get perpetuated?
4. Why is there not more information for tourists regarding the tsunami early warning and evacuation routes?
5. Actual assessment of time required to get to high ground, the evacuation routes, and the knowledge of locals and tourists regarding procedures and routes within selected hazard zones.
6. There is a need for an assessment of the safety and planning of rebuilt tourism infrastructure in the event of another tsunami in order to consider the safety of the local population and tourists inhabiting the hazard zone.
7. An evaluation of the texts including signage surrounding evacuation and early warning.
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10.2 The State of the Natural Environment of the Khao Lak Region 8 Years on.
Some research has been conducted concerning the state of mangrove forests, coral
reefs, and coastal features in the Khao Lak region following the 2004 tsunami. The recovery
and reconstruction of infrastructure has been an ongoing process, and this research
revealed many recent environmental problems relating to water quality and sanitation
infrastructure. The recent increase in tourism carrying capacity in Khao Lak town and
region begs a more detailed scrutiny. IE research and/or environmental assessments could
be conducted to assess the current and future environmental sustainability of the Khao Lak
region. The following topics could be addressed in future research relating to the natural
environment:
1. An environmental assessment of the streams carrying effluent into to the ocean as well
as the quality of water and impacts on ocean water and offshore coral reef ecosystems.
How will additional tourists and tourism infrastructure impact these environments? What
are the ruling relations organizing these decisions?
2. An evaluation of the alteration of the coastlines, movement of sediment, and contamination of beaches and reefs resulting from poor quality or haphazard resort developments within unstable coastal areas that were still stabilizing following the tsunami. What are the ruling relations organizing this degradation?
3. The ongoing deforestation resulting from the planting of new rubber tree plantation in coastal areas. How will this put the local population at continuing or greater risk in the
event of another tsunami or storm surge? How is this organized and what are the ruling
relations surrounding these processes?
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4. This research has revealed, through interviews with fishers, that that the reefs and fish
stocks have not recovered from the tsunami event. An assessment of the health of coral reefs and the fish stocks available is relevant to the overall livelihood fishers and sustainability of the fishery within the region. How is the authorized knowledge about fishing being developed?
5. Interviews in this research revealed that illegal logging is taking place in the Khao Lak
National Park. An assessment of how and where this is occurring, the impact on the water catchment and biodiversity, as well as lack of enforcement is relevant to the long-term sustainability of the National Park and Khao Lak.
10.3 The Current and Evolving Relationship Between Local and National
Government.
This research has revealed that at various times since the tsunami, local and
national government have been at odds with one another surrounding land disputes, and
the status of minority groups such as the Moken. Since the Thai national government
system has been in turmoil numerous times since the tsunami, with many different and
conflicting governments in power, it is very difficult to track how government policy, both
locally and nationally, has evolved since the tsunami. The research reported here has
focused primarily on how government policy of the Thaksin government in the 18 months
following the tsunami unfolded into the lives of the locals. Since then there have been a
coup overthrowing Thaksin’s government, a military regime, a number of coalitions, a
Nationalist government, and now a government lead by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck
Shinawatra. The current Prime Minister, is seen as a puppet of her older brother Thaksin
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who is the real power behind the current government. A detailed IE analysis into how
these shifting governments and allegiances has impacted the long-term recovery for
victims on the ground would be very revealing. My interviews with local government
officials in this research suggests that this would be a very difficult undertaking given that
many officials will only reveal the ‘government line’ regarding policies and change. This
line of inquiry may be potentially dangerous because many government officials and elites
have a lot to lose if corruption or disobedience is revealed in the research.
10.4 The Ongoing Land Disputes and Ruling Relations.
My interview with a villager from Ban Sak that came late in my study revealed a
current struggle for an entire community to be able to move back to their land. The
research also exposed a conflict between local and national government surrounding the
implementation of national government policy. An IE study surrounding the conflict
between local and national governments, as well as the community’s ongoing fight to
return to their land, would be pertinent, relevant and time sensitive relative to the current
and evolving development in this dispute.
10.5 The Recent Acceleration of Outside Interests in Current Resort
Development
Prior to the tsunami and throughout the recovery process, the majority of resort
ownership in the Khao Lak region has been the local elite of the region, the original
villagers of Khao Lak community. Interviews in this research revealed that two recent
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large scale resort developments are owned by Thai investors from nearby Phuket. These
new developers are not only moving in, but they are willing to pay top dollar for coastal
land for current and future construction in the region. A number of factors could be
considered for inquiry:
1. How will the increase in outside business interests impact the ruling relations within the local business elite and the community as a whole?
2. Are there enough tourist arrivals to support further development in the region?
3. Will this ‘improvement’ require more outsiders to move into the region to fill employee requirements for these new developments?
4. How will this impact the natural environment and sanitation infrastructure of Khao Lak?
5. Will this lead to economic growth, or more vulnerability to a downturn in the tourism economy?
6. Is Khao Lak moving to towards a development model and scale of development similar to Phuket, where the development is much more developed and mature in relation to mass tourism as a destination to the south?
7. Do these new developments consider the hazard potential in their locations given the fact that they were the sites of resorts destroyed in the 2004 tsunami?
All of these threads not followed are issues that are revealed within this study and are pertinent to the overall future sustainability of the region. Although focused on a small geographic region, my research has revealed an array of disjuncture’s and complex social, cultural, and environmental issues that could not fit into one study. A disaster of this magnitude not only has a multitude of variables, stakeholders and subjects to consider, it
209 also has a temporal component. As time goes by following the tsunami event, one can witness the effects of ruling relations imposed on communities in the redevelopment process, and how they continue effect the evolution of the post-landscape. It is my hope that this study has shed considerable light on issues of sustainability in reconstruction, aid and recovery following the tsunami in these four communities. It also is my hope that researchers including me, will be able to take up these (and other) threads not followed in future research.
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References
ADB. (2007). Status Report on the Asian Tsunami Fund (January–June 2007). Asian
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Appendices B: Informed Consent Form For Informants
Name of Researcher, Faculty, Department, Telephone & Email: Aaron James Williams PhD Candidate, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program. Telephone : 403 383 2506 e-mail: [email protected]
Supervisor: Dianne Draper PhD. Professor, Department of Geography Telephone: 403 220 5586 E-mail: [email protected]
Title of Project: Assessing the Sustainability of Tsunami-impacted Communities of Thailand’s Andaman Coast. Sponsor: NA
This consent form, a copy of which has been given to you, is only part of the process of informed consent. If you want more details about something mentioned here, or information not included here, you should feel free to ask. Please take the time to read this carefully and to understand any accompanying information.
The University of Calgary Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics Board has approved this research study.
Purpose of the Study:
The purpose of this study is to assess the cultural, economic and environmental sustainability of the re-emerging/rebuilt tourism economy and infrastructure and for people living within the post- tsunami landscape of Southern Thailand. The primary means of assessing and understanding sustainability for people, communities, economy, and environment is to document the outcomes of policies relating to reconstruction and resulting social organization that have occurred in post- Tsunami Southern Thailand.
What Will I Be Asked To Do?
The study will take place from February 2011 to February 2012. Your participation in this study involves 3 or 4 interviews of approximately 30 minutes each to discuss your daily activities, your
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livelihood, your community, and housing following the 2004 Tsunami. As a participant in the study, you are free to withdraw from participating in the study at anytime. However, any information collected prior to your withdrawal from the study will remain part of the study data. You are also fully able to refuse participation in any or all parts of the study.
What Type of Personal Information Will Be Collected? No personal identifying information will be collected in this study, and all the names of participants shall remain confidential. However, should you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to provide your gender, age, and general location of residence with the Khao Lak region. In spite of the researchers best efforts to maintain confidentiality, it may still be possible that you may be recognized as a participant to those who know you. However, the researcher will at no time inform employee managers, government, or community leaders as to the specific participation, non participation or withdrawal of any individual.
There are several options for you to consider if you decide to take part in this research listed below. You can choose all, some or none of them. Please put a check mark on the corresponding line(s) that grants me your permission to:
I grant permission to be audio taped: Yes: ___ No: ___
Are there Risks or Benefits if I Participate?
Participation in this research may require you to recall events from the Tsunami event that were traumatic. Prior to being interviewed, we will ask you the name and contact information for someone in the community you would wish to talk to if you become distressed (such as, religious leader, village leader or elder, family member, health care provider). We will ensure you will be escourted to the location of that person within the Khao Lak region.
There will be no costs incurred by participants to take part in the research process. The researcher will travel to your location within the Khao Lak region. Participants will not be asked to take on any cost associated with the research process.
What Happens to the Information I Provide?
The primary use of date collected will be to inform a doctoral research project. Participation is completely voluntary and confidential. You are free to discontinue participation at any time during the study. No one except the researcher, his supervisor and the interpreter/transcriber will be allowed to see or hear any of the answers to the audio recording or notes taken during the interview. There are no names or personal identifiers used in data collection. Audio and transcribed interviews and notes are kept in a locked cabinet only accessible by the researcher, and the interpreter/transcriber. The data and transcribed notes will be stored for up to 30 years on a computer disk for comparitive and follow-up purposes, after which they it will be permanently erased. The researcher may be taking pictures of your community. No particular individual will be singled out in a photograph in this research. However, your house, community, or inviduals within a picture taken within the community may be included in published research. Please note that, if intended reporting of photograph includes public display, the researchers will have no control over any future use by others who may copy the images and repost them in different formats or contexts, including online.
Signatures (written consent)
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Your signature on this form indicates that you 1) understand to your satisfaction the information provided to you about your participation in this research project, and 2) agree to participate as a research subject.
In no way does this waive your legal rights nor release the investigators, sponsors, or involved institutions from their legal and professional responsibilities. You are free to withdraw from this research project at any time. You should feel free to ask for clarification or new information throughout your participation.
Participant’s Name: (please print) ______
Participant’s Signature ______Date: ______
Researcher’s Name: (please print) ______
Researcher’s Signature: ______Date: ______
Questions/Concerns
If you have any further questions or want clarification regarding this research and/or your participation, please contact:
Mr. Aaron Williams, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program/Faculty of Graduate Studies + 1 403 383 2506, [email protected] And Dr. Dianne Draper, Department of Geography/Faculty of Arts telephone + 1 403 220 5586, [email protected]
If you have any concerns about the way you’ve been treated as a participant, please contact the Senior Ethics Resource Officer, Research Services Office, University of Calgary at (403) 220- 3782; email [email protected].
A copy of this consent form has been given to you to keep for your records and reference. The investigator has kept a copy of the consent form.
227
Appendices C: Informed Consent Form For Informants (Thai Translation)
ชื่อนักวิจัย!"คณะ!"สาขา!"เบอร์โทรศัพท์ และอีเมลล์
Aaron James Willliams PhD Candidate, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program. Telephone : 403 383 2506 e-mail: [email protected]
ที่ปรึกษา: Dianne Draper PhD. Professor, Department of Geography Telephone: 403 220 5586 E-mail: [email protected]
หัวข้องานวิจัย#"
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วัตถุประสงค์ของการวิจัย:
วัตถุประสงค์ของการวิจัยนี้คือ การประเมินความยั่งยืนในด้านวัฒนธรรม!"เศรษฐกิจและสิ่งแวดล้อมของ คนที่อยู่ในพื้นที่ที่เคยเกิดเหตุการณ์สึนามิทางภาคใต้ของประเทศไทย วิธีหลักในการประเมินและเข้าใจ ความยั่งยืนสําหรับคน!"สังคม!"เศรษฐกิจและสิ่งแวดล้อม คือ การบันทึกผลของนโยบายในการสร้างสิ่ง ก่อสร้างใหม่ และโครงสร้างของสังคมที่เกิดจากเหตุการณ์นี้
ผู้ให้สัมภาษณ์ต้องทําอะไรบ้าง?
การมีส่วนร่วมในงานวิจัยนี้จะมีการสัมภาษณ์โดยใช้เวลาประมาณ 34 นาที นักวิจัยจะสังเกตการณ์บาง ส่วนของกิจวัตรประจําวันของท่านและจะมีการพุดคุยโต้ตอบกับท่านระหว่างการสัมภาษณ์ โดยการวิจัยนี้ จะเริ่มตั้งแต่เดือน ธันวาคม 5663"7"เดือนธันวาคม 5668 โดยจะทําการสัมภาษณ์ประมาณ"398 ครั้ง ในการ เป็นผู้มีส่วนร่วมในงานวิจัย ท่านมีอิสระที่จะถอนตัวได้ตลอดโดยที่ไม่ถูกลงโทษหรือเสียผลประโยชน์แต่ อย่างใด ส่วนข้อมูลที่ได้บันทึกก่อนที่ท่านจะถอนตัวจะยังคงเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของงานวิจัย ท่านสามารถ ปฏิเสธการมีส่วนร่วมในบางส่วนหรือทุกส่วนของงานวิจัยได้
ข้อมูลส่วนตัวที่จะบันทึกมีอะไรบ้าง?
จะไม่มีการบันทึกข้อมูลที่สามารถระบุถึงตัวท่านได้ หากท่านตกลงที่จะเข้าร่วมในการวิจัยนี้ ผู้วิจัยจะขอ ให้ท่าแจ้งเพศ!"อายุ!"การศึกษาและภูมิลําเนาของท่าน
1
ลายเซ็นต์
ลายเซ็นของท่านในฟอร์มนี้แสดงถึง
;: ท่านได้รับข้อมูลที่เพียงพอเกี่ยวกับการมีส่วนร่วมในงานวิจัยนี้
5: ท่านตกลงที่จะเข้าร่วมงานวิจัยนี้
การลงลายมือชื่อในงานวิจัยนี้ จะไม่เป็นการลิดรอนสิทธิทางกฎหมายของท่าน โดยผู้วิจัยและ มหาวิทยาลัยจะไม่ละทิ้งหน้าที่และความรับผิดชอบตามกฎหมาย
ชื่อของผู้เข้าร่วม : (กรุณาจด) ______
ลายเซ็นต์ของผู้เข้าร่วม: ______Date: ______
ชื่อของผู้ทําวิจัย : (กรุณาจด) ______
ลายเซ็นต์ของผู้ทําวิจัย: ______Date: ______
คําถาม<ข้อสงสัย
หากมีคําถามหรือต้องการข้อมูลที่ชัดเจนในการวิจัย"และ<หรือการมีส่วนร่วมของคุณ"โปรดติดต่อมายัง#
Mr. Aaron Willliams, Interdisciplinary Graduate Program/Faculty of Graduate Studies + 1 403 383 2506, [email protected] And (Dr. Dianne Draper, department of Geography/faculty of Arts telephone + 1 403 220 5586, [email protected]
หากมีข้อสงสัยเกี่ยวกับการดูแลท่านในฐานะผู้เข้าร่วมงานวิจัย คุณสามารถจะติดต่อ
The senior Ethics Resource Officer, Research Services Office, University of Calgary at (403) 220-3782 email [email protected]
สําเนาแบบฟอร์มจะอยู่กับท่าน 1 ฉบับและผู้วิจัย 1 ฉบับ