FREE THE MOST DANGEROUS MOMENT OF THE WAR: JAPANS ATTACK ON THE , 1942 PDF

John Clancy | 208 pages | 19 Nov 2015 | Casemate Books | 9781612003344 | English | Havertown, (article) | World War II | Khan Academy

Navy battle fleet seemingly destroyed—the geopolitical scene could hardly have looked darker for the newly forged Anglo-American alliance. The Japanese war machine had run up the most stupendous, and swift, totality of conquests in the history of war. Two of the most powerful ships in the Royal Navy, the Repulse and the Prince of Waleshad been sunk off the coast of Malaya in a matter of minutes. The whole Indian Ocean as far west as Ceylon looked painfully vulnerable, with the Japanese roaming its waters and sinking British ships, including the Hermesat will. Even distant was at risk. Having lost strongholds like Wake Island, and with Midway threatened, America had painfully few assets available to strike back at Imperial Japan. Indeed, it was rapidly becoming clear that the true queens of the chess game at sea were the newfangled aircraft carriers: A single one could sink a line of or win a sea battle without firing its guns. And after Pearl, while Japan had six carriers, the United States had only two to cover the entire Pacific. As I turned over and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked. Still, there was a blessing hidden in the Pearl raid. At a time when no more than half the nation supported intervention against Hitler, the treacherous nature of the attack persuaded Americans to wage war with relentless ferocity, self-sacrifice, and a dedication that might well have been absent had the country slid into war reluctantly or half-heartedly, as Britain and France had in Admiral Ernest J. King, who had just been appointed commander in chief of the U. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who would have to provide the few ships he had available as chief of the hard-pressed Pacific Fleet, was rather more cautious. How could they bomb the islands of Japan The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean the aircraft 1942 had? The nearest land base was the tiny atoll of Midway, the farthest west of the Hawaiian group, perched 1, miles from Oahu but still 2, miles away from Tokyo—out of range of any bomber. The only alternative was a carrier-based attack, but the short-range, single-engine bombers then aboard the two U. Pacific carriers had far shorter range and carried very little bomb-weight some miles and 1, pounds compared to a land-based The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean 2, miles and 2, pounds. They would have to launch within miles of the target. That was unacceptably risky; Nimitz could not afford to lose a single carrier. So, what to do? To test the idea, various planes tried taking off a runway in Norfolk, Virginia, painted with the dimensions of a carrier deck. It was determined that the North American BB Mitchell medium bomber was the most suitable plane for the mission. Though never flown in combat, the B, with a 2,pound bomb load, had a range of 2, nautical miles at miles an hour. It had a green 1942, many no more than 18 years old. Some had never seen the ocean until they boarded the carrier. From the moment it departed, every move of the Hornet was cloaked in the most rigid secrecy. Even its captain, Marc A. In January, the chief of the U. Doolittle, to take over preparations for the Tokyo operation, now labeled Special Aviation Project 1. Forty-five years old and standing only 5-foot-4, Jimmy Doolittle was no ordinary staff officer. Though too young for active service in World War I, Doolittle was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for making the first cross-country flight, incrossing America The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean 21 hours, 19 minutes. He went on to break almost every air-speed mark worth having, including a world record of miles an hour in A daredevil, Doolittle delighted in 1942 pranks as flying under low bridges. Once, on the eve of a demonstration flight in Chile, he broke both ankles in a fall after trying to do a handstand on a balcony while drunk. The next day, he insisted on flying, his feet in casts and strapped to the pedals. Though retired when World War II came along, Doolittle rejoined the army as an instructor with the rank of major. He seemed a good choice for what was now required. They all came from the 17th Bombardment Group, which had the most experience flying the Bs. Any man can drop out and nothing will ever be said about it. This entire mission must be kept top secret. There followed a month of intensive, hush-hush training at Eglin. Under the supervision of Lieutenant Henry Miller, detached from the naval flight school at nearby Pensacola, the army crews had to master the art of taking off in the heavily laden B in as little as feet. Counter to all their previous training, the volunteers had to learn to rev their engines to peak power before releasing the brakes, then still take off at what was virtually stalling speed. Two planes crashed and were scratched from the mission. The story of the run-up to the raid, and the training, is well told in the movie Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo. Doolittle, as portrayed by a grim-jawed Spencer Tracy, comes across as more dour and humorless than he probably was. It remains one of the most outstanding films to come out of wartime Hollywood. While training continued, the Bs underwent radical modifications. Weight was reduced by removing the lower gun turret and replacing the guns in the tail with wooden broomstick dummies. Doolittle declared after the raid that these actually scared off Japanese planes. Because the bombing was to be carried out at only 1, feet, nothing more sophisticated was required. As a security measure, crews would hang on to the empty cans and then chuck them out all at once, so no trail could be traced to the Hornet. Why did the planes need so much 1942 The answer reveals the most dangerous aspect of the mission, and one that would be fatal for some of the raiders. The original plan had the Bs, unable to land on the Hornet after completing their bombing run, overflying Japan to land in Russian Siberia or China. But the nearest friendly airfield was in Vladivostok, Siberia, and the Soviet government—unwilling to get embroiled in war with Japan—refused the raiders permission to land. To reach China, the bombers were going to need every last drop of gas. By the end of training, the bombing force had been whittled down to 15 Bs, each with five crew members. But at the last moment the navy squeezed in one more plane, as a spare. This meant, among other things, that he would have the shortest takeoff run—a bold decision in keeping with his daredevil past. From there the planes were lifted by crane onto the Hornet and lashed down securely in the launch order. The curious were told that the bombers were being shipped to reinforce Hawaii. It was not until the carrier 1942 well clear of the California coast that either its crew or its Army Air Force passengers were informed of their real destination. The secret had been remarkably well kept. With its own fighters stowed below decks, the Hornet was in effect defenseless. Sailing in radio silence, the expedition comprised two carriers, four , eight destroyers, and two fleet oilers. For just over two weeks the sailed west in lonely and silent splendor through the empty seas of the North Pacific. A Japanese picket boat, the ton Nitto Maruspotted the American ships. Astoundingly, the Japanese did not react; perhaps, arrogantly, they could not believe that an American force would dare strike at Japan or that 1942 planes had the range to reach their home. Nevertheless, the mission seemed imperiled. At a. The wind, typical of the vile weather of the North Pacific, was gusting up to 31 miles an hour as the others followed off the pitching deck, one by one, over a wild sea—conditions that would have tested even trained carrier pilots. Byall 16 planes each assigned a number denoting order of takeoff were safely in the air—a testament to the thorough training of the crews and their meticulous maintenance of the engines. There was one casualty, a sailor blown into the propeller of one of the bombers. His arm was badly injured and later had to be amputated. Along the way, crews of Japanese fishing boats waved cheerfully at what they assumed were friendly aircraft. At one point, Doolittle spotted nine Zero fighters high above, in V formations. But the deadly planes flew on, mistaking the Bs for Japanese bombers. Finally, at noon Japanese time, after flying all the way at wave-top level to avoid detection, the Bs reached the coast of Japan. None was shot down; only one, No. Joyce, sustained minor damage from Japanese fighters. Another, No. Holstrom, was forced to jettison its bombs before reaching the target after being set upon by fighters. The raid was all over in a matter of minutes. The damage inflicted on Japan was minimal, as each stripped-down B could carry no more than four pound bombs or clusters of incendiaries. But the 80 American airmen had achieved their mission. Japan had raided the U. The planes flew west toward China. After 13 hours of flight, night was approaching and all were critically low on fuel, even with crews manually topping off the fuel tanks. Having 1942 a record 2, miles in 13 hours in the No. He ordered his crew to bail out, then followed them into the night and the unknown. Miraculously he landed unhurt in a rice paddy recently fertilized with human excrementand the following day managed 1942 find a 1942 military patrol. Had it not been for a god-sent tailwind, few of the planes would have made it to territory not occupied by the Japanese. Not everyone was fortunate. In darkness and blinding rain, Lawson ditched his plane in the sea The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean off the China coast. All but one of the crew were injured. Osprey Publishing - Osprey Publishing

James H. Doolittle during a San 1942 visit. Photo courtesy of the West Texas Collection. Doolittle, was a pivotal moment in World War II, resulting in strategic implications far beyond the modest damage it did to the Japanese homeland, according to Dr. Robert S. Eighty aviators, including 13 from Texas, one of whom was born in nearby Robert Lee, struck a retaliatory blow on a mission that marked the first time a foreign power had successfully attacked the island nation. The raid dramatically re-shaped Japanese strategy, disastrously as it turned out, in the early months of the American conflict in the Pacific. Roosevelt asked his military planners to come up with a way to hit back at Japan, primarily to give the home front something to cheer about. Japan was so far removed from American airfields that U. Doolittle gave them the option to do so. They were extraordinarily courageous, committed The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean their mission and confident in their capabilities. In addition to distance, the plan faced a severe technical problem as no medium- or long-range bomber had ever taken off from an aircraft carrier. Even if such a plane could go airborne from a carrier deck, landing was out of the question. In other words, the raid would be a one-way trip for the American fliers. The B medium bomber was selected for the mission, and Doolittle, a pilot with a national reputation and one of the best aeronautical engineers in the country, was chosen to lead the operation. Ehlers said Doolittle was the first pilot to successfully fly entirely on instruments, his cockpit being blacked out so that he could see nothing but his instrument panel from takeoff through landing. As a member of the board of Shell Oil Co. Doolittle solicited volunteers for the dangerous but otherwise unspecified Special Aviation Project No. Under normal flying circumstances, a fully-loaded B required a thousand or more feet of runway to take off. For Special Aviation Project No. Hornetwhich by then was one of only 1942 surviving U. To reduce weight, the first things to go from the bombers were armaments and ammunition. The The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean guns were replaced with broomsticks painted black to give the appearance—but not the punch—of actual guns. By reducing all nonessentials, the planes could maximize the bomb and fuel loads for the one-way mission. The plan was for the carrier to launch them within range of China so the planes could attack their targets then land in China at prearranged airfields with homing devices. Unfortunately, the details for the landings were never finalized with or implemented by the Chinese military, which had its hands full fighting Japanese invaders. In the end, the Doolittle Raiders would be on their own after bombing the home island. It would be the last time the carrier would ever see the continental United States, fated to sink that October in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. Doolittle left frontleader of the attacking force, and Captain Marc A. The two carriers retraced some of the same North Pacific waters that Japanese carriers had traversed to attack Pearl Harbor. This northern route was less active militarily and provided the best course for secrecy. The goal was to get within miles of Japan and launch planes at dusk on April 19 so they would attack Tokyo at night, limiting their vulnerability to Japanese fighters and giving the Army air crews daylight to make their landings by the time they made it to China. The farther from Japanese shores they launched the Bs, the longer the odds. At miles they had little margin for error. Any launch beyond miles meant they would likely never reach China and the possibility of safety. The machine guns were replaced with broomsticks painted black to give the appearance of actual guns. The plan worked until the task force ran into Japanese trawlers, which had orders to relay all intelligence to the Home Islands. At about a. The American fleet was miles from Japan and well within range of land-based bombers. After sinking the trawler, the fleet commander faced a difficult decision to either launch the planes and escape or to move in closer and risk the carriers. Doolittle was for fulfilling his mission. He gave his men one last chance to back out. When none did, Doolittle and the other 79 airmen ran to their planes and prepared for takeoff. Thirteen Texans flew with Doolittle, more than twice as many as the five from both Massachusetts and Oregon, the second most represented states. Plane two carried Texans from Temple and Mineola. Planes three, four and five carried Lone Star residents from Killeen, Pampa and Taylor, respectively. The ill-fated plane six was piloted by Dean Edward Hallmark, who had been born in Robert Lee and spent time as a kid in Bronte where his grandparents lived. Prior tohe moved to Greenville, where he played high school football. As soon as the 16th and final plane was launched, the American task force with the irreplaceable carries turned from Japan and high-tailed it back to Pearl Harbor, leaving the airborne Army pilots to their own devices. Ten of the planes bombed Tokyo, two each attacked Yokohama and Nagoya and one each hit Nagoya and Kobe. The 16 aircraft and 80 crewmen caused negligible material damage to their targets, but spawned a tremendous impact on the psyche of two nations. The Japanese who witnessed the event had a negative response, but the really decisive thing—and this is why the raid had such a huge grand strategic impact—was the effect it had on the Japanese leadership. Ehlers explained that the Japanese Army and Navy high commands had different strategies for defeating the Allies. The army was heavily engaged in China, had advanced to the borders of , and wanted the navy to support an Indian Ocean strategy that would allow the Japanese to capture Ceylon now Sri Lankaan island with major British naval and air bases at the time. Using Ceylon as a base for attacks on merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean, the The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean hoped to defeat the British force in India, then ultimately link up with the German Army and defeat the Allies with a unified force. By contrast, the Japanese Navy wanted to maintain the integrity of the defensive barrier it had created in the Pacific and to take New Guinea and at least parts of Australia, along with all the islands in that region, to keep the Americans from sending reinforcements there, Ehlers said. 1942 the navy would go after the remaining American carriers to ensure Japanese naval mastery and freedom of action in the Pacific. So, the raid set Japanese strategy in such a way that Midway became the decisive meeting point, and the Indian Ocean strategy went out the window. Official U. Navy Photograph, National Archives collection. Not quite two months later, the between June 4—7,would mark the turning point in the war. Though the U. Yorktownthe Japanese lost four large fleet carriers, all of which had been involved in the surprise . American forces sustained slightly more than killed while the Japanese toll was more than 3, including the pilots to some carrier- based aircraft and more than 40 percent of their trained aircraft mechanics and technicians. Today, the Battle of Midway is considered the turning point in the Pacific conflict. Without the , Midway would likely never have occurred and the course of the war would have been changed. Most of the raiders overcame the slim odds their commander Doolittle had given them. All but 11 of the 80 survived the mission, though 12 of their planes crashed in China, three ditched in the China Sea and one landed in Russian-held Siberia. Of 1942 16 crews, 13 survived intact and a fourth lost only one man. The three surviving officers were captured by the Japanese. Hallmark was one of three raiders executed by Japanese firing squads. The one Green Hornet survivor willed himself to live and one day testify against the Japanese tormentors of the Doolittle captives. Doolittle himself survived a crash landing and evaded capture by the Japanese to return to the United States and play an even bigger role in the war effort. Ehlers said Doolittle went on to earn three-star general rank, commanding strategic bomber forces in the North African and Italian campaigns, and then taking over command of 8th Air Force and leading that huge unit in its bombing of Germany. He, like his fellow raiders, was highly 1942 for his bravery. He was, like the best men of any generation, dedicated to doing what was right, and what had to be done. In the collection at the U. Inside the case are 80 silver goblets, each inscribed with the name of a Doolittle Raider. As each member of the Doolittle Raid dies, The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean goblet is inverted. As of the beginning of the 70th anniversary year of the raid, five of those goblets remained upright. Social Media Directory. The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean State University. Doolittle Raid Remembered for Impact April 05, Seventy years ago this month, 16 B Mitchell bombers dropped bombs on the Japanese homeland, just days after the disastrous attack on Pearl Harbor, boosting U. Twitter Facebook Email Copy Link. Angelo State University W. - Wikipedia

Strategic Bombing Survey. While the original purpose of the interrogations was to gain evidence for an assessment of the role of airpower in the war with JAPAN, in the absence of any other body concerned with the conduct of this naval war, this purpose was broadened to include as wide a survey of wartime events as time and other restrictions would permit. The specific purpose of individual interrogations varied between that of obtaining comment and opinion from those very senior officers who were in a position to view the war as a whole, the discussion of specific operations and engagements with responsible commanders or other eyewitnesses and the elaboration and clarification of documentary material. In addition to being interrogated on their particular specialties and experiences, these officers performed research at the direction of the Naval Analysis Division and, together with the Japanese Naval Liaison Office, gave useful assistance in identifying and procuring other officers for interrogation. Despite the cooperation of the Japanese, a number of unavoidable difficulties hindered the investigation. All work was conducted by a small staff under pressure of time, without an adequate library, and in the face of an almost complete lack of original Japanese documents which had been either burned in air raids, or destroyed or hidden on surrender. Towards the end of the stay in JAPAN a quantity of hidden records were discovered; these have been returned to the United States and are now in process of translation, a work which will require a period of years to complete. In many instances, therefore, questions had to be explored entirely by interrogation with only partial or inaccurate war-time information as the starting point, with resultant delay and repetition. So far as the question of veracity is concerned, it should 1942 stated that almost without exception the Japanese naval officers interrogated were cooperative to the highest degree, and that no important attempt consciously to mislead the interrogator was ever noted. Accuracy on fine points was inevitably affected by the language problem which necessitated in most cases translation of both question and answer, by the specialized nature of the naval vocabulary which in some instances troubled the interpreters, and by the somewhat imprecise nature of the Japanese language itself. Allowance must also be made for the normal fallibility of human memory and in particular the memory of events months or years in the past which were witnessed under the intense strain of combat. Despite all these considerations it is felt that the interrogations provide an accurate picture of the war from the Japanese viewpoint, subject only to the qualifications that on important or disputed points of documentary confirmation should where possible be obtained. The planned use of this material was, as has been noted above, as evidence for an evaluation of the role of airpower in the . These interrogations, together with other material 1942 by the Naval Analysis Division, form the basis of reports to be submitted to the chairman of the U. In view, however, of the wide range of subject matter covered, the important and in some cases unique qualifications of the Japanese officers interrogated, and the improbability that such an investigation will ever or could ever be repeated, it is believed The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean these interrogations form a body of source material indispensable to any future study of the war with The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean. Allied Officers Present: Captain S. Russel, USN; Lt. Parry, USA; Comdr. Hayward, USN; Comdr. Moorer, USN; Lt. Field, Jr. No attacks were made on the Carrier Force prior to the dive bombing attack the morning of 4 June. The presence of the United States Carrier was not known to this officer. Dive bombing attacks were most feared. The fires as a result of the attack ignited planes and ammunition which resulted in the sinking of the KAGA during the afternoon with the loss ofsaving personnel. No other bomb hits were made on the KAGA. Captain Amagai stated that as a result of the damage to the aircraft carriers with consequent loss of air power, the decision was made to abandon the attempt to seize MIDWAY. Were there any other forces such as Support Force or Occupation Force? Believe there were two other forces for occupation, but am not sure of composition or relative location. In daytime a circular formation was used, but at night a column was formed. We had expected an attack by scouting planes at miles, and by bombing planes at miles and by small planes at miles. No, but it was reported that an American plane was heard over the carrier formation at night, one or two days before the battle. When was the KAGA first hit? It was hit by dive bombers two or three hours after sunrise, 4 June 5 June Tokyo time. How many bombs hit the KAGA? There were four hits on the KAGA. The first bomb hit the forward elevator. The second bomb went through the deck at the starboard side of the after elevator. The third bomb went through the deck on the port side abreast of the island. The fourth bomb hit the port The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean aft. When the bombs hit, big fires started. Unable to see much because of smoke. Did any of the American bombers dive into the deck? No, not on KAGA. Did not hear that any had dived on other carriers. Were any other ships hit by bombs at same time? Was the KAGA attacked by torpedo planes? I saw torpedo planes but do not think KAGA was attacked. No torpedo hits were made. However, while swimming in water several hours after attack saw a torpedo apparently fired from strike side of ship at angle and bounce off. Didn't explode. Torpedo went bad. Were any other ships attacked by horizontal bombers? Did not see any hit. Saw some pattern of bombs fall in water during day. Which type of attack most feared - torpedo plane, dive bomber, or horizontal bomber? Dive bomber, cannot dodge. Were planes on board when ship was hit? Yes, about 30 planes in hangar loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air. 1942 bombs sink the ship? Yes, gasoline and bombs caught fire. 1942 sank itself, Japanese no need The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean with torpedo. Was KAGA strafed by planes? Was done during diving, one or two personnel and 1942 on deck were injured. What kind of planes made the attack - torpedo planes, dive bombers or horizontal bombers? Dive bombers. In what order was attack made? I think first high horizontal bombers, no hits. Then torpedo attack. Was dodged, no hits. Then dive bombers, 4 hits. Then more horizontal bombing about meters away. No hits. Most attack all the same time. It all depends upon Captain The Most Dangerous Moment of the War: Japans Attack on the Indian Ocean ship. No, all planes on board except six fighters overhead. I heard that they landed on other ships. How many protective fighters CAP were over carrier formation? Normally Two carriers supplied eight each, the other two carriers provided six each. This was normal patrol. If attacked, other planes rose to meet opposition. How long did fighters stay in air, and how were planes in air relieved? Two hours. When the waiting planes get in air up high, then the former patrolling plane comes down and lands. When the carrier launched the patrol did it turn into the wind alone, or did all ships turn? All turn in same formation. We use 14 meters wind over deck for landing and launching. If only few planes launched individual carrier turns into wind. If many planes launched or landed entire formation turns. When over miles from target, carriers operate independently. When within miles of target, all ships maneuver together. About how far apart were the ships in the formation? A square formation about meters apart. When need much speed and wind, distance large. When wind and sea strong, the distance diminishes. Were destroyers employed with the carriers when operating the planes? Yes, sometimes, one, sometimes two destroyers would come from outside circular screen. They take station about meters astern.