Student Research Briefing Series

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ~ TUFTS UNIVERSITY

STUDENT RESEARCH BRIEFING SERIES

VOL IV ISSUE II SPRING 2015

Measuring Immigrant Integration in the European Union

Sarah Lawton

The Student Research Briefing Series is designed to publish a broad range TABLE OF CONTENTS of topics in American Politics, Comparative Politics, Political Theory and Philosophy, and International Relations. The briefings are intended to en- INTRODUCTION 1 hance student appreciation of student research completed in the Department of Political Science. In addition, the publication hopes to serve as outreach to interested undergraduates and prospective students considering a major LITERATURE REVIEW 4 in Political Science. This publication is student produced and the research was conducted during Sarah’s undergraduate studies. Read “Measuring Im- migrant Integration in the European Union.” METHODOLOGY 29

In 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that multiculturalism QUANTITATIVE 45 had “utterly failed,” a statement, which was quickly echoed by French Pres- ANALYSIS ident Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron. This belief that multiculturalism had created divided populations across European had also been debated fiercely in the academic literature on immigration QUALITATIVE 111 ANALYSIS and immigrant integration since the turn of the century. Yet this is not the only debate about integration taking place in the literature. Many scholars debate whether European integration processes due to supranational norms CONCLUSION 122 and institutions, such as the EU. Yet, these qualitative debates about integration policy appear to be taking place in a vacuum. In the academic literature, there is little discussion of ways to measure the efficacy integration policies in a quantitative fashion. Amongst EU policy-makers, this idea has BIBLIOGRAPHY 125 been on the table for almost fifteen with only a few reports to show for it. Thus, Lawton’s research seeks to add to the body of research on European immigrant integration, by examining what makes an integration policy moreor less effective. To do this, she has examined the issue from both angles: quantitative and qualitative. On the quantitative side, she created a

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The Department of Political Science, Tufts University, Packard Hall, Medford, MA 02155, USA Phone: 617-627-3465; Fax: 617-627-3660; Website: http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/default.htm DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ~ TUFTS UNIVERSITY

STUDENT RESEARCH BRIEFING SERIES

MEASURING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION SARAH LAWTON

Continued from Page 1 scale to measure integration policies of 25 EU countries against each other, using EU definitions of integration and Eurostat, Eurobarometer, OECD, and MIPEX data. Furthermore, she seeks to examine immigration integration in greater depth by examining three different cases, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. Thus, by examining it from multiple angles, she aims to better understand this important issue. About the author Sarah Lawton (A’15) majored in International Relations and German Studies. Her interest in Europe began in high school in AP European History. This continued through her senior year, where in her Global Studies seminar she read A Murder in Amsterdam by Ian Buruma. This sparked a particular interest in the political landscape of Europe and right wing parties in particular. While studying abroad for a year in Tübingen, Germany, this evolved into more of an interest in immigrants and ethnic minorities in the continent. This interest provided the foundation for her thesis. Sarah will be spending the next two years in Frankfurt as a teaching assistant at a bilingual private school and hopes to attend graduate school for international relations shortly thereafter.

The Department of Political Science, Tufts University, Packard Hall, Medford, MA 02155, USA Phone: 617-627-3465; Fax: 617-627-3660; Website: http://ase.tufts.edu/polsci/default.htm

Measuring Immigrant Integration in the European Union

Sarah Lawton Senior Honors Thesis Department of International Relations Advisor: David Art

Tufts University 2015 i

Abstract

In 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed that multiculturalism had “utterly failed,” a statement, which was quickly echoed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron. This belief that multiculturalism had created divided populations across European had also been debated fiercely in the academic literature on immigration and immigrant integration since the turn of the century. Yet this is not the only debate about integration taking place in the literature. Many scholars debate whether European integration processes due to supranational norms and institutions, such as the EU. Yet, these qualitative debates about integration policy appear to be taking place in a vacuum. In the academic literature, there is little discussion of ways to measure the efficacy integration policies in a quantitative fashion. Amongst EU policy-makers, this idea has been on the table for almost fifteen with only a few reports to show for it. Thus, my research seeks to add to the body of research on European immigrant integration, by examining what makes an integration policy more or less effective. To do this, I have examined the issue from both angles: quantitative and qualitative. On the quantitative side, I created a scale to measure integration policies of 25 EU countries against each other, using EU definitions of integration and Eurostat, Eurobarometer, OECD, and MIPEX data. Furthermore, I seek to examine immigration integration in greater depth by examining three different cases, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. Thus, by examining it from multiple angles, I aim to better understand this important issue.

Table of Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………….i Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………...……..ii Chapter I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1 II. Literature Review……………………………………………………….………...….. 4 III. Methodology………………………………………………………………………....29 IV. Quantitative Analysis………………………………………………………………...45 V. Case Study: Austria………………………………………………………………...... 60 VI. Case Study Germany…………………………………………………………………79 VII. Case Study Netherlands……………………………………………………………...95 VIII. Qualitative Analysis………………………………………………………………...111 IX. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….122 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………125 Appendix I……………………………………………………………………………………...135 Appendix II……………………………………………………………………………………..137 Appendix III…………………………………………………………………………………….157

Chapter I: Introduction

While European immigration is an age-old occurrence that has shaped the course of history, immigrants and their integration into European society is a far more recent phenomenon.

Beginning in the 1980s, some European countries realized the increasingly strong presence of immigrants, and debates began about what to do with this consistently disadvantaged portion of society. Across the continent this created a series of different responses to the problem, the predominant one during the 1980s and 90s being multiculturalism. After the turn of the century, politicians and academics began to challenge the predominance of multiculturalism. Countries implemented stricter immigration and integration requirements including mandatory languages courses and cuts to government assistance.

However, while some integration policies became stricter, other countries began to take encouraging steps in integration as well. Countries that had previously lacked any sort of an integration policy, such as Germany and Austria, created integration policies and acknowledged their status as an immigration country. Yet this did not mean the end of the debate about immigrant integration.

Today, the immigration and the concept of cultural diversity is a widely disputed topic throughout Europe. With the increasing popularity of radical right parties, positive views of immigration appear to be on the decline. In the 2012 European Social Survey, almost 50% of respondents said that they would allow few to no immigrants of ethnic minorities. Similarly, almost 35% of respondents on the same survey thought that immigrants negatively impacted the livability of their countries. 1 However, amidst the debate about immigration, many have forgotten about the policies that actually affect the immigrant communities in these countries.

1 ESS Round 6: European Social Survey Round 6 Data (Norwegian Social Sciences Data Service, 2012).

For many the discussion of immigrant integration policies seems strange, since “the treatment and accommodation of minorities and strangers is seen to be something that liberal democracy of all systems of political organization, does best; it is indeed widely assumed to be a defining trait of democracy.”2 Yet, countries throughout the European continent have tried different ways to accommodate these immigrants with varying degrees of success. Some scholars and policymakers have claimed that these failures stem from the failure of multiculturalism as an integration strategy. Others have gone so far as to blame Islam for the difficulties in integration.

Despite the intense debate, very few people are talking about integration in quantitative terms.

While there are some indexes comparing integration policies (most notably the Migrant

Integration Policy Index), integration outcomes are not as well observed. Outside of a few initial studies commissioned by the European Union, almost no scholars compare statistical data across

European countries in order to determine which countries have the best integration outcomes.

Thus, this thesis seeks to answer the question: what makes integration policies more or less effective. To do this, I cover both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of this issue.

First, I have created a series of indicators to try and best measure integration across twenty-five of the twenty-eight countries in the European Union (excluding Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia).

These indicators come from five dimensions: socioeconomic, education, social inclusion/culture, political, and attitudes of recipient countries to create one measure of overall integration for each country. These scores were then tested against popular hypotheses. Second, in order to explore the more qualitative side of this issue, I have chosen three case studies from the results of the quantitative measures: Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. Through these case studies, we

2 Adrian Favell, “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe: A Review and Critique,” in Citizenship Today : Global Perspectives and Practices, by Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff and Doug Klusmeyer (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 354.

3 examine the immigration histories and policies in far more depth and thus can also further explore the hypotheses examined in the quantitative analysis.

The results from this analysis make it abundantly clear that the discussion on immigrant integration is not nearly complex enough. Instead of one issue disproportionately impacting integration (as is suggested by the amount of one-issue literature), there are many components that are correlated with higher levels of integration. Perhaps the most important component, however, is a country’s willingness to acknowledge the need for integration policies. While this assertion may seem highly intuitive, most of the countries across Western Europe denied the presence of immigrants within their country throughout most of the twentieth century. Thus, it is the countries that accepted this fact earlier and embraced the government’s important role in integrating these immigrants that have better integration outcomes across the board.

Chapter II: Literature Review Introduction The literature on immigration and integration is extensive. Not only are there disputes about definitions of such basic terms as “immigrant” and “integration,” but also much academic debate about the way that integration works, the efficacy of multicultural integration approaches, and whether or not European integration policies are converging. In addition to these discussions in academia, on a policy level, European Union-commissioned researchers are also trying to find the best indicators to determine the success of integration and what factors best determine integration outcomes.

Some Definitions Creating definitions for the many aspects of integration policy throughout Europe is no simple task, for the simple reason that definitions across the EU vary greatly. Despite EU-wide integration norms and guidelines, the development and implementation of integration policy is largely left up to the member states.3 Thus it is important to note that the definitions of these terms can vary from country to country.

Immigrant Even something as basic as who is considered an immigrant varies between states.

Throughout Europe, most integration programs are directed at a category of immigrants legally referred to as ‘third-country nationals,’ meaning people that have immigrated into a EU Member

State from a non-EU country. However, while this 'third-country national’ terminology holds throughout every country in the EU, the definition of who is an immigrant does not always match. In many cases, an immigrant is simply a person who has come to live permanently in a foreign country, but in other cases, countries’ official terminology does not match this. A good

3 Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” in Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities towards Immigrants (Migration Policy Institute, 2005), 3.

5 example of this type to inconsistency is Germany. Official German statistics are kept not just on immigrants, but also on anyone ‘with a migration background.’ This could include those that immigrated into Germany or anyone who has at least one parent who immigrated into Germany.4

Integration and Integration Policy Integration has been defined in many ways. Sociologists view the topic in terms of a

‘whole.’ For example, Harmut Esser, a professor at the University of Mannheim, states,

“Integration, in general, came be understood as the cohesion of parts in a ‘systematic’ whole, regardless of what this cohesion is rooted in. The parts must be inseparable, or as one might say, an integral part of the whole.”5,6 He continues by noting that the “integration of a system is defined by the existence of a distinct relationship of reciprocal dependence between the whole and the demarcation of the respective environment, through its interdependence.”7,8

However, Adrian Favell, a professor of sociology at Sciences Po in Paris, asks us to break the assumptions inherent in statements such as Esser’s or put as a question, “who or what is integrating with whom or what?”9 Furthermore, he notes that the concept of integration assumes a few more points, stating:

To talk of integration is to envisage a policy that is distinct from immigration policy border control, rights of entry and abode, etc. per se. It accepts some idea of permanent settlement, and is dealing with, and trying to distinguish, a later stage in a coherent societal process: the consequences of immigration. It is also a term which partly builds its success on swallowing up other similar, but more precise, partial or politically unfashionable terms for the same kind of process: terms such as assimilation, absorption,

4 Yann Algan et al., eds., Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, Studies of Policy Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 74. 5 Hartmut Esser, Integration und ethnische Schichtung, Working Paper (Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2001), 40, http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-40.pdf. 6 Translated from the original German, “Unter Integration wird – ganz allgemein – der Zusammenhalt von Teilen in einem ‘systemischen’ Ganzen verstanden, gleichgültig zunächst worauf dieser Zusammenhalt beruht. Die Teile müssen ein nicht wegzudenkender, ein, wie man auch sagen könnte, „integraler“ Bestandteil des Ganzen sein.” 7 Esser, Integration und ethnische Schichtung, 40. 8 Translated from the original German, „Die Integration eines Systems ist somit über die Existenz von bestimmten Relationen der wechselseitigen Abhängigkeit zwischen den Einheiten und der Abgrenzung zur jeweiligen Umwelt definiert, durch ihre Interdependenz.“ 9 Favell, “Integration Policy and Integration Research in Europe,” 350.

acculturation, accommodation, incorporation, inclusion, participation, cohesion, enfranchisement, toleration, etc.10

While these types of discussions certainly make us reconsider the interworkings of integration, they have yet to settle on an agreed-upon working definition of integration.

Thus, we must turn to more quantitative sources. While these sources do contain some of the inherent assumptions mentioned by Favell, they are effective in creating a usable definition of integration. For example, in doing a large cross-country evaluation, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research defined immigrant integration simply as “the degree to which migrants participate in their ‘new’ country.”11 However, definitions of this term given in quantitative studies can also become more complicated. Entzinger and Biezeveld note that depending upon the perspective, integration can mean different things. They claim that “from a macro perspective integration refers to a characteristic of a social system, e.g. a society,” meaning a measurement of how closely distinct parts of the society relate to each other, perhaps best articulated in the term ‘social cohesion.’12 Yet there is also a more micro-level description in defining integration as the extent to which an individual or group has integrated into a society. This can occur either with incidental variables, such as the frequency and intensity of contacts throughout the society or with self-identification. 13 Thus, with the wealth of definitions and debate over those definitions, for the purpose of this paper, I shall use the macro-level term put forth in Entzinger and Biezeveld, describing the level of societal cohesion. From this definition of integration, a definition for integration policy quickly follows. Focused largely on the structural aspects of

10 Ibid, 350. 11 Rob Bijl and Arjen Verweij, eds., Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries, SCP Publication (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2012), 11. 12 Entzinger and Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” 6. 13 Ibid., 6.

7 integration, Entzinger and Biezeveld view integration policy as the “ways of promoting immigrant participation in the major institutional arrangements of a society.”14

Academic Theories of Integration Throughout social science, theories of how immigrant integration works and thereby how a country should structure its integration policy abound. Similarly, the thinking on this topic has evolved over the decades, frequently depending upon the political climate. In this way, academics and policymakers alike have fluctuated between assimilationism, multiculturalism, structuralism, and segmented assimilationism to explain the process of integration. While many have debated between these policies, there is a final one that gets little attention in the integration literature, but nevertheless has clear relevance to the topic.

Assimilation Long the philosophy behind immigrant integration in most Western countries, “it was believed that eventually all immigrants would assimilate to their new environment.” 15

Assimilation was first defined during the large waves of industrial-era immigration in the late nineteenth century and works off of three core features. The first is the assumption that given the same socioeconomic opportunities, any immigrants, regardless of ethnicity, will come to share a common culture with the natives of the host country. Secondly, this adoption of the host country culture requires the gradual disappearance of an immigrant’s native culture, and finally once this process begins, it is irreversibly and inevitably progresses toward full assimilation.16

In practice, nations that implemented this policy forced immigrants to desert their native cultures in order to be accepted into their new society. Although historically, this approach was most prominently used throughout the United States to handle the waves of immigration prior to

14 Ibid., 9. 15 Ibid., 7. 16 Algan et al., eds., Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, 4.

8 the 1970s, there are historic examples from Europe as well. A particularly poignant example is the policies forcing “ethnically despised Polish labor migrants in the German Ruhr Valley…to trade in their language and ‘Germanize’ their names as the price for their acceptance.”17

However, ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ have no longer become synonymous. Many have noted “in recent decades, assimilation has come to be viewed by social scientists as a worn- out theory, which imposes ethnocentric and patronizing demands on minority peoples struggling to retain their cultural and ethnic integrity.”18 For this reason, assimilationist integration policies, as they were practiced during the twentieth century, are seen largely as a thing of the past.

Multiculturalism During the 1970s, the assimilationist rhetoric that had once dominated the field of integration began to evolve into a multicultural dialogue. In its inception, multiculturalism served as a counter point to assimilation, rejecting its imposition of a dominant culture and the oversimplification of the integration process. The early proponents of this theory argued that immigrants were active agents in shaping their own identities.19 But perhaps the most important cornerstone of this theory is its demand that “all groups should be recognized.”20

Since the 1970s, multiculturalism has gained significant momentum and become far more sophisticated in terms of its demands and definition. In defining modern multiculturalism, authors have been careful to distinguish between multiculturalism as a condition of society and multiculturalism as a philosophy of integration. Joppke and Lukes note, “as its name indicates, multiculturalism refers to cultures in the plural, not culture in the singular.”21 In this way,

17 Christian Joppke and Ewa T. Morawska, eds., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 4. 18 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” International Migration Review 31, no. 4 (December 1, 1997): 827. 19 Algan et al., Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, 5. 20 Nathan Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997), 14. 21 Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes, eds., Multicultural Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.

9 multiculturalism can simply be the presence of more than one culture in a society, augmented by an increase in immigration. It is from the blurring of this distinction that creates confusion and incorrect definitions. Proponent, Will Kymlicka notes that to some, “multiculturalism takes these familiar cultural markers of ethnic groups–clothing, cuisine, music–and treats them as authentic cultural practices to be preserved by their members, and safely consumed as cultural spectacles by others. So they are taught in multicultural school curricula, performed in multicultural festivals, displayed in multicultural media and museums, and so on.”22

Multiculturalism as an integration policy takes a step further and asks the government to both recognize this societal situation and provide protections for minority cultures. As Will

Kymlicka notes, “the state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.”23 In addition, recently “minorities and majorities [have] clash[ed] over increasingly clash over…issues [such as] language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization policy.”24 In order to ensure equality amongst cultures, minority rights are sometimes necessary. These minority rights come in three types: self-government rights, polyethnic rights, and special representation rights. The first type, self-government, refers to possible demands for some type of political autonomy or jurisdiction, “to ensure the full and free development of their cultures and the best interests of their people.”25 On the other hand, polyethnic rights refer to the rights conferred upon minority ethnic and religious groups in order to allow them to express their own cultural identity without hampering their success in the political and economic institutions of the

22 Will Kymlicka, “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?: New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies,” in The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies, and Practices, ed. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (New York: Routledge, 2010), 33. 23 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 108. 24 Ibid., 1. 25 Ibid, 27.

10 dominant cultural society. This would include laws that exempt Muslim schoolgirls from co-ed swim classes in physical education or Jewish and Muslim exemptions from animal slaughtering laws. Finally, special representation rights are used to address issues of underrepresentation of minority groups in political bodies, which could arise from political parties becoming more inclusive by reducing barriers that inhibit minority groups from participating or to adopt proportional representation policies.26

Multiculturalists also recognize that there must be limits to these minority rights. Many scholars have strongly emphasized that while minority rights should exist in order to protect minority cultures and allow them to thrive, minority rights should not allow one group to dominate or another or allow a minority group to oppress its members.

Structuralism While assimilationist and multicultural theories on integration focus on the agency of immigrants, the structuralist theory puts more emphasis on the socio-economic opportunities available to the immigrants in their host country. This theory argues that if immigrants have unequal access to housing or jobs, their ability to integrate socially is greatly hindered.27 As

Portes and Borocz note, it is “the combination of different class origins and contexts of reception gives rise to a plurality of settlement patterns” and integration outcomes.28

In order to explain integration, Portes and Borocz elaborate on three different types of

‘contexts of reception.’ The first type of reception is an overwhelmingly negative one. The government takes a very adverse and restrictive stance towards immigration and tries to suppress the influx altogether. Furthermore, “immigrants are negatively typified by employers, either as

26 Ibid, 30-32. 27 Algan et al., Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, 6. 28 Alejandro Portes and Jozsef Borocz, “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation,” International Migration Review 23, no. 3 (1989), 621.

11 unsuitable labor or as suitable only for menial jobs, a condition compounded by generalized prejudice among the native population.” 29 They argue that immigrants in these societal conditions are less likely to succeed than immigrants in either a neutral or favorable society. In neutral societies, the government neither encourages nor discourages immigration and no strong stereotypes about immigrants exist within the society. Finally, in societies that are favorable towards immigration, the government not only permits immigration but bolsters it through legal and material assistance, and society gives these immigrants a favorable reception.30

Also a factor in integration is the social class of the immigrants. Portes and Borocz split immigrants into a dichotomy: manual laborers vs. professionals. In hostile countries, it is difficult for both of these types of immigrants to integrate. In addition to employer reluctance to hire foreigners, professional workers are likely to face difficulties in acquiring the necessary licenses and revalidating titles. On the other hand, in a neutral country, professionals are much more likely to be culturally integrated into society, as they can enter directly into their field, while the manual laborers are more likely to experience setbacks. In favorable societies, however, both types of immigrants are likely to succeed due to the legal and material benefits provided by the government.31 Thus, Portes and Borocz seek to show one important, yet overlooked fact: structure matters.

Segmented Assimilationism While all of the aforementioned theories advocate for only the success or failure of integration amongst the first generation, segmented assimilation notes a different nature amongst second-generation immigrants. Developed by Portes and Zhou, this theory asserts that there could be three potential paths for the second generation: upward mobility, downward mobility,

29 Ibid, 618. 30 Ibid, 619. 31 Ibid, 621-622.

12 or lagged assimilation. In the first path, the children of immigrants are integrated culturally and economically into their host societies, which create opportunities and ultimately prosperity for them. In the second path, a lack of economic opportunity creates and compounds a lack of cultural integration, which yields assimilation into the underclass. Finally, the third path is a combination of the first two. In this path, despite economic opportunities, the immigrants lag behind in assimilation or deliberately preserve their cultural identity.32

The reason for these varied types of assimilation lies in a variety of factors. Portes and

Zhou cite the context an immigrant finds upon arrival as a key point in this discussion. The political relations between the “sending and receiving countries,” the state of the economy, and the size and organization of preexisting ethnic communities play a role in the integration of the first and second generation.33 Sometimes these social contexts create vulnerabilities, which provides a direct pipeline towards downward mobility. The differences for immigrants that live in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods are stark. In these neighborhoods, youth are exposed to “the adversarial subculture developed by the marginalized native youths to cope with their own situation…can effectively block parental plans for intergenerational mobility” for their children. 34 Living in these neighborhoods can also disadvantage the second generation economically, since the economy has developed a new bottlenecked access to jobs that require advanced training. This can place stress on immigrant parents to amass sufficient resources in order to allow their children to pass through that bottleneck.

32 Algan et al., Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, 6. 33 Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530, no. 1 (November 1, 1993): 83. 34 Ibid, 83.

Historical Institutionalism Finally, there is one final popular theory in the political science field that could explain integration. Historical institutionalism is not topic that gets much play in the integration literature, particularly not as a theory that could explain integration outcomes. However, the theory has definite applicability. As the name suggests, historical institutionalism highlights the importance of institutions on outcomes, which are marked by inequalities and differ across countries.35 More specifically, they argue “institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes.”36 This theory could provide serious relevance within the integration field. Particularly in Europe, where integration institutions grew asymmetrically throughout the continent, historical institutionalism could be used to examine the vastly different integration outcomes that have arisen between EU countries.

Attempts to Quantify Integration On the other side, government bodies, think tanks, NGOs, and scholars have been working together to try to quantify immigrant integration and its outcomes. Most prominently for

Europe, this has come from mostly EU-commissioned research using Eurostat data and statistics to help create their measures.

European Ministerial Conferences on Integration and the Zaragoza Declaration Prior to 2010, the EU had held three Ministerial Conferences on Integration: first in

Groningen in 2004, Potsdam in 2007, and Vichy in 2008. These conferences facilitated debates about integration in the EU, commissioned research, and also put forth the idea of benchmarking.

Han Entzinger and Renske Biezeveld wrote one of the first of these reports for the EU

Commission. In it, they put forth the idea of benchmarking and sought to “explore some aspects

35 Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44, no. 5 (December 1996), 937. 36 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 9.

14 of the concept of integration and to assess how these aspects can be measured in a way that enables comparisons between Member States, groups of immigrants, and also over time.”37 In their view, integration can be split into four major categories: socioeconomic, cultural, legal and political, and attitude of recipient countries, each with their own indicators. However, while they do try to give suggestions for creating integration benchmarks, they have also noted that that is not a simply task and involves many hurtles, which have been examined below.

Thus by 2010, the idea of measuring integration was not a new topic. In April 2010, the fourth European Ministerial Conference on Integration was held in Zaragoza, Spain. This conference resulted in the creation of the Zaragoza Declaration, a sixteen-page document outlining the roadmap of furthering progress in immigrant integration and also ways of benchmarking integration successes, in order to “further develop the core idea of integration as a driver for development and social cohesion.”38 In the pursuit of benchmarking integration, the report has outlined four main policy areas to focus on: employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship. Within those policy areas, they identified important indicators for measuring integration. Some of those indicators, such as employment or at-risk of poverty rate, have extensive, uniform data kept by Eurostat, but other indicators, such as languages skills or experiences of discrimination have less data.39 Thus, the Zaragoza Declaration provided a kick- start for the EU to start benchmarking and quantifying their integration processes.

Responses to the Zaragoza Declaration Following the Zaragoza Declaration, the EU-Commissioned several studies. The first of these was a pilot study done by Eurostat in 2011, collecting 2009 data for the Eurostat indicators.

Two years later, the European Commission put out a report with help from the Migration Policy

37 Entzinger and Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” 5. 38 Council of the European Union, Zaragoza Declaration (Brussels, May 4, 2010), 10. 39 Ibid.,15-16.

Group and ESN, a communications agency based in Belgium. This report built upon the findings of the initial pilot study and also added further suggestions for indicators, which went beyond the recommendations of the Zaragoza Declaration.

In addition to adding indicators to those proposed in Zaragoza, this report provides a summary of the current research on the characteristics that are most instrumental in determining integration outcomes. These characteristics can be grouped into two categories: immigrant and host country. The first four of these eight statements refer to characteristics of the immigrants, namely time of residency, gender, socioeconomic background, and origin country.40 These four characteristics ‘matter’ when considering the likelihood that an immigrant will integrate successfully. Using the statistical data, Huddleston and his colleagues have determined that immigrants who have lived in the country longer, who are men, wealthier, and from EU or highly developed countries are far more likely to find success in there new country. The second category of characteristics that impact immigrant integration can be considered ‘country characteristics,’ namely ‘quality,’ discrimination, context, and policy. This report notes that countries that can provide higher quality jobs and housing, less discrimination, more mobile societal structure, and open immigration policies are more likely to have better integrated immigrants. 41 While these initial EU-commissioned report are an important first step at quantifying and bettering immigrant integration throughout the continent, neither of these reports showed any progress at developing any sort of coherent strategy for cross-country analysis or the creation of an index.

40 Thomas Huddleston, Jan Niesson, and Jasper Dag Tjaden, Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration (Brussels: European Commission, May 8, 2013), 5. 41 Ibid., 5.

The Migrant Integration Policy Index Thus far, while most of the discussions on immigrant integration have largely revolved around qualitative academic studies or EU commissioned reports, which have provided some important data, there has been an attempt to combine all of this into a coherent index: the

Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Put together by the Migration Policy Group and

Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, this index uses “148 policy indicators…that have been designed to benchmark current laws and against the highest standards through consultations with top scholars and institutions using and conducting comparative research in their area of expertise.”42 These indicators are wide-ranging and specific, from examining the presence of support for technical training to the scoring the openness of laws that govern family reunion.

From these indicators and their scores, the researchers at MIPEX have put together an index of the migration policies for 27 countries as of 2010. However, while the MIPEX is extensive and an impeccable resource for studying integration policies across Europe, it has a limited utility in measuring integration outcomes.

Problems with Quantifying Immigrant Integration Part of the reason for this paucity of literature, particularly in the academic field is due to the fact that there are many problems associated with quantifying and measuring immigrant integration. While there are many nuanced problems in the process, the three biggest problems of trying to measure integration on a European-level include: definition questions, ambiguous indicators, and different policies.

The first of these problems comes from the different definitions across member states.

When trying to calculate the number of migrants in a country, the common international practice is to take the number of foreign citizens within the country as the number of migrants. However,

42 “Research Toolkit,” Migrant Integration Policy Index, n.d., http://www.mipex.eu/research.

17 this practice can lead to some incorrect inclusions into the overall migrant number. The number of foreign citizens includes anyone who has membership of a different country, and while this number certainly includes migrants, it also encompasses many people who are not migrants. This number could also, for example, include children with foreign parents, who themselves have no history of immigration. On the other side of this issue, this also excludes those people who have immigrated into the country but have naturalized. This core question of who is immigrant creates a large problem when comparing integration policies across Europe, since these questions create discrepancies across countries between who integration policies target. In addition to discrepancies within immigrant definitions, many indicators that have been employed to measure integration across the EU do not have a consistent meaning across the continent. For example, measures such as delinquency or quality of housing vary across Europe. Thus this complicates

(but does not inhibit) the ability to draw an accurate comparison from country-to-country.43

Furthermore, problems with indicators do not merely include consistency across countries. Indicators that are employed to measure integration can be either ambiguous or difficult to acquire. Despite Eurostat and its extensive data, statistics broken down by nationality or citizenship are not as common. Furthermore, those statistics that are immigrant-oriented and appear clear-cut are not always so. As Entzinger and Biezeveld note, this is particularly the case with indicators such as educational attainment and concentration of immigrants in schools.

Generally, the assumption is that the higher concentration of immigrants in a school, the lower the educational attainment level.44 However, this is not always the case, and thus the meanings and connotations of indicators must be fleshed out.

43 Entzinger and Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” 38-39. 44 Ibid., 41.

Finally, the last main difficulty of measuring integration is simply the difference in integration policies across the continent. EU countries have faced varied immigration scenarios, and thus ‘old’ immigration countries tend to have very different policy approaches than those countries that only recently started experiencing large-scale immigration. For example, many newer immigration countries tend to focus on the legal accommodation of immigrants and think that the social and economic aspects will follow, whereas older countries by contrast tend to put less emphasis overall on legal integrating immigrants. Thus, measuring integration when the objectives are so different makes the entire endeavor more complicated.45

Debate: The Multicultural Wars However, quantitative attempts to quantify integration are not the only discussions about integration throughout the EU. In the academic and policymaking realms, debates rage, perhaps the most prominent is the debate over the efficacy of multicultural integration policies.

In 2010, it was proclaimed that multiculturalism had “utterly failed” as a European integration policy.46 Beginning in October and continuing through the new year, Chancellor

Merkel, Prime Minister Cameron, and President Sarkozy took turns condemning multiculturalism. Cameron claimed that multiculturalism “had failed to promote a sense of common identity centered on the values of human rights, democracy, social integration, and equality before the law.”47 However, these policymakers were not the first to question or criticize the multicultural integration policies that had characterized many Western European integration

45 Ibid., 42-43. 46 Matthew Weaver, “Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has ‘Utterly Failed,’” The Guardian, October 17, 2010, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism- failed. 47 John F. Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain,” The New York Times, February 5, 2011, sec. World / Europe, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/europe/06britain.html.

19 policies. Indeed, there had been “multiculturalism wars” going on for almost two decades.48

Some scholars during the 1980s and 1990s “enticed by the discovery of ‘globalization’” viewed

“contemporary immigration as obliterating and undermining some traditional principles of nation states.”49 Due to this increased immigration and consequent undermining of the traditional nation-state, scholars pointed to this period as one of “unprecedented efflorescence of differentialist discourse – and differentialist integration policies – in all Western countries of immigration.”50 That is to say, these two decades were dominated by a multiculturalist discourse of embracing the differences that immigrants brought to their new homelands. For this reason in

1999, Kymlicka proclaimed, “the multiculturalists have won the day” by reshaping the dialogue about integration policy. 51 During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the academic discourse about multiculturalism began to shift. Many liberal political theorists were quick to counter these claims by questioning the basic principles and assumptions that multiculturalism posits. The belief that multiculturalism was the driving philosophy behind Western immigrant integration policies was disappearing. These are the so-called multiculturalism wars.

The Multicultural Backlash Beginning in the early 2000s, fewer and fewer academics were willing to claim that multiculturalism was the predominant philosophy in European immigrant integration policy and questioned whether it had any place in integration policy at all. Indeed, the popular trend in the political science literature was to attack the core principles of multiculturalism and announce its decline. According to these critics, multiculturalism is in direct conflict with the liberal

48 Will Kymlicka, “Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars,” in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 112. 49 Christian Joppke and Ewa T. Morawska, eds., Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, Migration, Minorities, and Citizenship (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1. 50 Rogers Brubaker, “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (January 1, 2001): 532. 51 Kymlicka, “Comments on Shachar and Spinner-Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars,” in Multicultural Questions, 113.

20 democratic state. While the proponents of multiculturalism have a small number of spokespeople, their opponents have far greater numbers. Many have been eager to herald in the

“Return of Assimilation.”52 But before examining real-world integration policy trends, they first attack multiculturalism’s basic principles. The foremost assertion of these liberal critics is simply that multiculturalism is frequently incompatible with liberal societies. Or even more drastically, that it “has most appeared as a polemical attack on key tenets of liberal societies and states– universalism, nationhood and citizenship, and individual rights.”53 Christian Joppke poses a very simple rhetorical question which summarizes a large point in the liberal critique on multiculturalism: “why…should the description of a multicultural or –ethnic reality result in the prescription that the state has to duplicate or even further this reality in its laws or policies?”54

Brian Barry takes this question even further. In his 2001 book, Culture and Equality, Barry argues that group rights, which multiculturalism proposes, are entirely unnecessary. He states,

“usually…the case for the law is strong enough to rule out exemptions, or the case that can be made for exemptions is strong enough to suggest that there should be no law anyway.”55 In addition to these group rights laws being unnecessary, the entire premise of group rights laws in and of itself is flawed. Joppke asserts that it is impossible to recognize every culture as equal.56

In fact, these laws might not just be impossible or unnecessary, but perhaps dangerous, as Barry warns of the dangers of the “politicization of (cultural) group identities.”57

However, to the opponents of multiculturalism, its practical retreat exists far beyond the realm of public discourse. Joppke breaks the claims for this retreat into three categories: “(1) the

52 Brubaker, “The Return of Assimilation?”, 533. 53 Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes, eds., Multicultural Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1. 54 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” The British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (June 1, 2004), 239. 55 Barry, Culture and Equality, 39. 56 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 242. 57 Barry, Culture and Equality, 5.

21 lack of public support for official multiculturalism policies (a cause largely outside the liberal spectrum), (2) these policies’ inherent shortcomings and failures, especially with respect to the socio-economic marginalization and self-segregation of migrants and their children, and (3) a new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters.”58

This lack of public support for multicultural policies can best be examined in increased support for populist right-wing parties throughout Europe. Beginning in the late 1990s and early

2000s, right-wing parties in Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Italy made huge electoral gains. These parties preached an anti-globalization message, a movement that many associated with “multiculturalism and overly liberal integration policies.”59 In particular, Joppke points to the rise of the prominent right-wing critic Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands as a “liberal distemper” with multiculturalism, which “asked for civic adjustments on the part of immigrants” to adopt more Western ideals, such as equality of women and gays in society.60 However, while some authors assert the theory of a widespread public opinion backlash, others admit that there is a lack of evidence for this argument. Joppke himself notes that the “impact [of public opinion] should not be exaggerated.”61 Some even go further and note that “one should not conflate the appear, ferocity, and ubiquity of backlash discourse in newspapers, by politicians, and on talk shows with actual changes of opinion among the general public.”62

In addition to the questionable nature of these laws, some argue that the implementation of multicultural laws may, in fact, hurt immigrants. In nations with multicultural policies, such as the Netherlands, these authors are quick to note that, “unemployment, poverty, school drop-out,

58 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State.” 244. 59 Andrej Zaslove, “Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti- Globalization Movement,” Comparative European Politics 6, no. 2 (2008): 169–89. 60 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 249. 61 Ibid, 249. 62 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, eds., The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 15.

22 and criminality are concentrated among the ethnic minorities.”63 Similarly, Ruud Koopmans asserts that in the context of the welfare state, “multiculturalism may not be beneficial for immigrants at all, because it may lead to dependence on welfare-state arrangements and thereby to social and economic marginalization.”64 In addition to these concerns, Joppke asserts two specific points about the causes for failures in these policies. The first he argues is that with the growing influx of immigrants from all over the world, multiculturalism could not “maintain a policy that was based on singling out a limited number of clearly demarcated ‘ethnic minorities’ for special treatment.”65 In addition, Joppke argues that in providing this special treatment, namely allowing immigrants their own parallel institutions, the state has “fuelled their

[immigrants’] segregation and separation from mainstream society.”66 Entzinger notes that this is particularly true in the Dutch case, stating that “an ‘ethnic underclass’ is developing that consists of people who do not feel attached to Dutch culture and society and who are unwilling and unable to integrate.”67 Therefore, this approach of creating separate institutions has been a huge hindrance to the ultimate goal of integration.

Thus in response to the growing negative public opinion and failure of these policies, these authors assert that in the past few years that has been a growing “new assertiveness of the liberal state in imposing the liberal minimum on its dissenters.”68 Since these multicultural integration policies have allowed parallel institutions for immigrants, the consequence has not only been separation of immigrants, but also “segregated communities behaving in ways that run

63 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State.”, 243. 64 Ruud Koopmans, “Trade-Offs between Equality and Difference: Immigrant Integration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State in Cross-National Perspective,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36, no. 1 (October 20, 2009): 1–26. 65 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State,” 247-248. 66 Ibid., 248. 67 Han Entzinger, “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of the Netherlands,” in Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, ed. Christian Joppke and Ewa T. Morawska (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003),78. 68 Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State.”, 244.

23 counter to our values.”69 These authors and policymakers tend to claim that homophobic, misogynistic, and anti-western norms are allowed to grow in these communities. In response, many formerly multicultural countries have begun to implement civic integration courses. In

Britain for example, these measures have been specifically instituted to create “a more visible support for anti-discrimination measures, support for women’s rights, a universal acceptance of the English language (seen as particularly important in some areas) and respect for both religious differences and secular views.”70 Thus, with this mandatory civic integration, these authors have argued that multiculturalism’s day has officially come and gone.

Persistent Multiculturalism However, some still have argued that multiculturalism has neither failed nor is it in decline. Vertovec and Wessendorf argue that multiculturalism is still alive and well, just simply under another name: diversity policy. “Rather than treating members of ethnic minorities as ever- representative of bounded collectives,” these policies allow institutions to “recognize cultural difference as individual trait” and that this idea has guided the creation of ‘diversity management’ policies throughout corporations, industrial workplaces, and the government.71

This trend has been seen throughout Western Europe from a ‘diversity unit’ in the Belgian government to the creation of a German Diversity Charter signed by over 500 German companies, such as Daimler and Deutsche Bank.72 Thus Vertovec and Wessendorf ultimately argue that this so-called retreat of multiculturalism is little more than a “crisis of perception.”73

69 John F. Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain,” The New York Times, February 5, 2011, sec. World / Europe, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/europe/06britain.html. 70 Ted Cantle, The Cantle Report: Community Cohesion (Institute of Community Cohestion, January 2001), 19. 71 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, eds., The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 18. 72 Ibid, 20. 73 Ibid, 21.

The strongest and arguably the biggest proponent of multiculturalism, Kymlicka, argues for multiculturalism as a part of liberal integration policy. He asserts that instead the demands for group rights amongst ethnic minorities are completely compatible with liberal democratic systems, and these demands have simply been misunderstood. His argument flows from the assumption that everyone has a right to his or her own culture, something he claims that most liberals would agree with.74 However, many liberals claim that the group rights that many ethnic minorities demands are fully protected under the rights of common citizenship and that state protection of minority cultures is thus completely unnecessary. However, Kymlicka argues that because the state inherently provides an advantage to the dominant culture, in order to ensure equality amongst cultures, minority rights are sometimes necessary.

Furthermore, he claims that the current so-called ‘retreat’ of multiculturalism throughout

European integration policies is a delusion, namely because the same scholars that propagate its retreat also view civic integration policies as directly in conflict with multiculturalism. In a later article co-written by Keith Banting, Kymlicka asserts that instead of these civic integration policies replacing multicultural ones, “in many countries, civic integration programs are being layered over multicultural initiatives introduced in earlier decades, [are] producing what can be thought of as a multicultural version of civic integration.” 75 Thus “the retreat from multiculturalism in Europe is more complete on the level of discourse than policy.”76

74 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 86. 75 Keith G. Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Is There Really a Backlash against Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index,” RECERCAT (Dipòsit de La Recerca de Catalunya), September 2012, 7. 76 Ibid, 6.

Citizenship In the early 1990s, Rogers Brubaker claimed, “in the socioeconomic perspective that prevails in this literature, citizenship is of minor importance.”77 However, since that comment, the debate about citizenship and nationhood has remerged in the foreground of European political debates, due to the large increase in immigration and cultural diversity that began in the

1970s. Much of the research on Western European immigrant integration focuses specifically on the citizenship regimes throughout the continent. In many ways, this focus on citizenship makes sense, as it can be a useful and multifaceted indicator. As the various reports commissioned by the European Union have noted, “citizenship is a societal outcome indicator, a policy indicator, and a measure of openness of receiving societies, all at the same time.”78

One particular metric that many scholars use to determine the liberalness of a citizenship regime is whether it provides citizenship jus soli or jus sanguinis. Jus soli regimes provide citizenship to anyone born in the country. On the other hand, jus sanguinis, as the name suggests, gives citizenship to those who have parents who are citizens, that is to say that citizenship is passed down through blood.

However, while citizenship regimes can provide a useful perspective in examining the integration process, it is far from a catch-all indicator of the success or failure of integration.

Despite his focus on citizenship, Brubaker is quick to point out that “full citizenship adds complete protection against expulsion and complete access to public service employment but its marginal contribution to life chances is seldom decisive.”79 A liberal regime such as the one that exists in Britain does not provide immunity from the creation of an underprivileged ethnocultural

77 William Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” International Sociology 5, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 379–407, doi:10.1177/026858090005004003. 384. 78 Thomas Huddleston, Jan Niesson, and Jasper Dag Tjaden, Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration (Brussels: European Commission, May 8, 2013), 6. 79 William Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” International Sociology 5, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 385.

26 minority, nor does a more restrictive system like the one that exists in Germany prohibit success for those with a migration background.

Debate: National Models vs. Convergence The debate about issues such as multiculturalism and citizenship inherently also create another debate. This debate is more than just how specific countries incorporate its immigrant population, but instead it looks at policies across Europe at a macro-level, debating whether or not immigration and integration policies across Europe are remaining as separate nation-level model or whether they are converging in a similar direction.

National Models When considering immigration and integration regimes across Europe, some academics argue that it is national models that reign supreme and that any type of convergence, post- national or otherwise, holds no ability to influence policymaking. The most prominent scholar to articulate this idea is Rogers Brubaker. In his paper, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-

State in France and Germany,” Brubaker examines the differing citizenship and immigration policies of Germany and France and the national traditions that he argues caused them. Looking at the growth of France and Germany as nation states, Brubaker claims that “what exists are particular nation-states, formed under particular historical circumstances, bearing even today the stamp of these historical origins, and, in consequence, to accept immigrants as citizens.”80 Thus, due to their different histories and national traditions, Brubaker argues that the immigration policies of Germany and France are and shall remain separate.

Brubaker is not the only one to hold this conviction, albeit most scholars claim different reasons for its absence. Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel have quantitatively examined the subject, comparing immigrant rights across 10 European countries from 1980 to 2008. In

80 Ibid., 385.

27 examining varied types of immigrants rights (from political rights to antidiscrimination measures to requirements for foreign spouses to immigrate), they have observed that not only is policy convergence not taking place, but also that there are no grounds for Brubakers’ theory.81

Convergence Much of the debate about multicultural integration policy is based off of the assumption of national models. That is to say that each European country has its own specific philosophies about integration. However, lately, the validity of that assumption and theories like Brubaker’s have come into question. These authors who support convergence theory assert that, “the notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did.”82 Instead, the core argument amongst proponents of cross-national convergence is that immigration and integration will progress

“towards a greater inclusiveness because of the shared diffusion of supranational norms and shared principles.”83 However, this is not to say that states are no longer important in the making of integration policy. Saskia Sassen clarifies, “while the state continues to play the most important role in immigration policy-making and implementation, it has been transformed by the growth of a global economic system and other transnational processes…[and thus] it is no longer sufficient to simply assert the sovereign role of the state in immigration policy design and implementation.”84 This greater inclusiveness has manifested itself particularly with immigrant citizenship rights. For immigrants, convergence theorists argue there has been a distinct

81 Ruud Koopmans, Ines Michalowski, and Stine Waibel, “Citizenship Rights for Immigrants: National Political Processes and Cross-National Convergence in Western Europe, 1980–2008,” American Journal of Sociology 117, no. 4 (January 1, 2012): 1202–45. 82 Christian Joppke, “Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe,” West European Politics 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2007), 2. 83 Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel, “Citizenship Rights for Immigrants,” 1203. 84 Saskia Sassen, “The de Facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy,” in Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States, ed. Christian Joppke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 49.

28 movement away from cultural assimilation. In addition, they argue that countries have liberalized their integration regimes due to normative commitments to supranational entities like the EU.

Conclusion The importance of immigrant integration research is fairly obvious. As the EU has noted,

“immigrants are a critical target group for the EU’s overall strategy on social inclusion and fighting poverty.”85 Thus, it is surprising that the idea of trying to quantify integration is so new in the research. Thus far, most of the research about integration policies gives sweeping generalizations about trends within these policies with limited use of quantitative data. They simply ask whether or not these policies are multicultural or assimilationist or whether policies across Western Europe are converging or remaining as national models. Other authors focus on very specific parts of immigrant integration, in particular the citizenship regimes throughout

Western Europe. The rest of the qualitative literature tends to focus on a specific country, as opposed to an inter-country approach. The attempts to quantitatively measure this policy have been limited at best. The MIPEX has created an extensive policy index and on the EU-level, there has been some work to try to create a system to measure the success of member states’ integration policies. However, the work on this subject is rather limited and has not made any further progress than some initial reports. Thus, my thesis seeks to add a further stepping stone in measuring European immigrant integration. By combining both policies and outcome indicators, it will provide a more balanced measure of the liberalness, but also the effectiveness of these policies and offer a next step in creating an index not only of integration policies, but also outcomes.

85 Huddleston, Niesson, and Dag Tjaden, Using EU Indicators, 27.

Chapter III: Methodology Background and Guiding Questions As discussed in the previous chapter, there are two types of literature in the integration field: the more dominant qualitative studies or the small and relatively new quantitative literature. However, at their core, each of these analyses seeks to answer basic questions, such as, what is integration or what is an indicator that one is integrated into society? These questions grow into more complex ones like do colonial countries integrate better than non-colonial ones or whether it is better to enforce a language proficiency requirement in order to immigrate? In order to best pursue these types of questions, I have chosen a two-prong style of analysis in order to best understand both sides of integration. The first is a quantitative measure of integration throughout 25 of the 28 European Union countries, while the second takes three of those countries for a more in-depth case study.

Operationalizing and Measuring Integration As noted in the literature review, the idea of quantifying integration is not a new one.

Although immigration has been key European issue since the 1990s, it wasn’t until the early

2000s that the EU sought a way to quantify integration across the continent. The creation of

“common indicators would make it possible for policy makers at both a European and national level, to draw comparisons between the ways in which the various member countries are handling issues related to migrant integration…[and] could lead to an identification of relevant trends, developments and ‘best practices.’”86 Approaches such as Entzinger and Biezeveld’s or the one proposed in the Zaragoza Declaration or further EU-commissioned reports, suggest dividing integration into multiple sub-categories. Thus, I have done the same, creating five types of indicators: socioeconomic, education, social inclusion/cultural, political, and attitudes of

86 Entzinger and Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” 4.

30 recipient host countries. From 25 of the 28 EU countries (excluding Bulgaria, Romania, and

Croatia), the data for these indicators is taken from 2009 and largely from Eurostat or

Eurobarometer, with some exceptions. Each of these indicators was then given a total of twenty points, to create a scale of one hundred with higher scores indicating a higher level of integration. For more specifics as to the exact scoring of the data see Appendix I.

Socioeconomic Indicators Within the EU Common Basic Principles of Integration, its states, “employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.”87

Logically following, this indicator tries captures the employment and overall economic status of third country nationals relative to either the native-born population, EU immigrants, or both

(dependent upon the data available).

Unsurprisingly, the first indicator is the unemployment rate. Measured as a percentage of the overall population and taken from Eurostat and OECD data, this indicator compares the third country national rate of unemployment to total rate of unemployment within a country. In order to have an indicator that examines integration within both countrywide and intra-country contexts, unemployment has an averaged rating based upon the gap between the total and third- country national unemployment rates and the third country national unemployment rate itself.

Then both the gap and the actual rate were given a score of one to four based upon their ranges.

These scores were then averaged together to get an overall score for this indicator.

The second indicator examines the gender gap in unemployment rates. The Zaragoza

Declaration puts particular emphasis on this indicator when considering integration. The

87 Commission of the European Communities, A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, September 1, 2005, http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0389:FIN:EN:PDF.

Zaragoza Declaration noted, “Various studies show that the employment rate is low for migrant women especially during the first three years in the host country. For this reason, there is a strong need to monitor the gap as well as to provide early assistance to migrants, women in particular.”88 This measurement examines the gender gap between third country national men and women and aims as addressing a similar yet nuanced issue within integration. Derived based upon the range of the gap, this indicator was given a score between one and four. However, in order to take into account the level of unemployment itself, this indicator was also given a multiplier of 0.75 if either the male or female level of unemployment exceeded 10%.89

On the other side, two more indicators measure the employment rate. In a similar fashion to the unemployment rate, the employment rate is measured both by the rate itself and the gap and then given an averaged score. Based upon the ranges, the gap and the rate are given a score of one to four and then averaged together. The gender employment rate also functions similar to the gender unemployment rate, by simply examining the gap between third country national male and females. Also similar to the gender gap unemployment rate, this indicator also has a multiplier of 0.75, but this time it applies if either the male or female rate is below 55%.90

Finally, the last socioeconomic indicator is median net income, which seeks to demonstrate standards of living. Similar to unemployment and employment, median net income is divided into a gap measure and a rate measure and averaged. This allows for an averaged score that reflects the inequality (or lack thereof) within a country, but also reveals standard of living differences across European countries. Based upon these ranges, these scores are given a score between one and four and then averaged.

88 Council of the European Union, Zaragoza Declaration, 5. 89 10% is higher than the OECD’s average non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) for the Eurozone area in 2009 (8.8%), and higher than the average 2009 NAIRU for 21 EU countries (8.15%). 90 55% is 20% below the EU 2020 employment goal of 75% and also well below Eurostat’s overall average for the EU-27 in 2009 (69%), the male average (75.8%) and the female average (62.3%).

Education Indicators While the Zaragoza Declaration examines economic and educational integration together, my analysis examines education as its own category. The Zaragoza Declaration describes education as an “undoubtedly essential element of the EU’s fight against social exclusion and discrimination,” and it is due to this characterization that education deserves its own series of indicators.91 These indicators combine both outcomes and policies in order to examine both sides of the educational spectrum, but also in part due to lack of data.

The first of these indicators is share of early leavers from education. As Eurostat’s pilot study of integration indicators notes, “Young people with a migrant background are generally at greater risk of exiting the education and training system without having obtained an upper secondary qualification.”92 For this reason, share of early leavers from education has been consistently listed as an indicator throughout quantitative studies of integration from the

Zaragoza Declaration to later studies commissioned by the EU. Similar to the employment and unemployment rates, this score is given based upon an average between the gap between the total and third country national number and the third country national number itself and given a score from one to five.

A second indicator uses Eurostat data to examine the share of the population with what is considered to be the ‘highest educational attainment’ or a tertiary degree. Contrary to the share of early leavers, in many places, immigrants–particularly third country nationals–are under- represented amongst the population with a tertiary degree. Thus, this indicator examines the level

91 Council of the European Union, Zaragoza Declaration, 6. 92 Eurostat 2011, 156.

33 of educational attainment amongst third country nationals instead of just foreign born. The range of this data has been taken and divided into quintiles, scoring between one and five.93

The third indicator seeks to measure immigrants’ access to education. Using 2010

MIPEX scores, I created an average score from four of their indicators: support and access to compulsory age education, support and access to secondary education, access to vocational training, and access to participate in higher education. On the MIPEX data, each of these indicators was given a score of 0, 50, or 100 with 0 indicating the most restrictive systems and

100 the most open. To correspond with my scoring system, a 0 was given a 1, a 50 a 3, and a 100 a 5. These scores were then averaged to create the final score for the indicator.

The final indicator also comes from the MIPEX. This indicator I call ‘supporting measures.’ It creates an average between two indicators: if support exists to aid immigrants in the educating their children and if measures exist to promote social integration through education.

Just as with the last indicator, the MIPEX scores are a 0, a 50, or a 100, which correspond with 1,

3, and 5 respectively. These scores are then averaged to create the final score for the indicator.

Social Inclusion/Cultural Indicators However, integration goes beyond access to education and entrance into the labor market.

In addition to these areas, the EU has placed a large emphasis on ensuring that immigrants integrate into society as whole.94 Thus social inclusion has been given its own category with four indicators. The first of which measures the at-risk of poverty rate. Unsurprisingly, foreign-born immigrants are far more likely to be in poverty.95 This indicator seeks to capture both the discrepancy between native-born and third country nationals within a country and between

93 This scoring also takes into account that the EU-wide goal for the tertiary education amongst 30 to 34 year-olds for EU 2020 is roughly 33% 94 Council of the European Union, Zaragoza Declaration, 14. 95 Thomas Huddleston, Jan Niesson, and Jasper Dag Tjaden, Using EU Indicators of Immigrant Integration (Brussels: European Commission, May 8, 2013), 17.

34 countries. Thus, the at-risk of poverty rate indicator is an average of both the gap between native- born and third country nationals and the overall rate. The ranges of these were measured, divided into quintiles and then given a score from one to five.

In addition to the at-risk of poverty rate, there is also a score for children at-risk of poverty rate. This second indicator seeks to expand on the first. A report commissioned by the

EU in 2013 notes, “the foreign-born are more likely to be at risk of poverty compared to the native born when they have children.”96 Thus, this indicator will provide a familial dimension to the first. Similar to the first, this indicator measures both the rate and the gap and then takes an average of the two scores, which are on a scale of one to five based upon their ranges.

The third indicator seeks to measure the rate of overcrowding in third country national communities. This indicator is important for the social inclusion on immigrants across the EU since “nearly 1 in 4 people in deprived or overcrowded housing in OECD countries live in an immigrant household.”97 For this indicator, I use Eurostat data to measure the difference between overcrowding for EU immigrants and for third country nationals (due to a lack of data on the total percentage of overcrowding in a country), and similar to the first two social inclusion indicators, this one measures both the gap and the rate. The ranges of each of these are measured and then given a score from one to five, which is then averaged to create the final score.

The last indicator measures the ratio of property to non-property owners between the overall population and third country nationals. Property ownership has been used to indicate both immigrants’ long-term settlement in their host country and the presence or absence of discrimination in the rental market.98 As with the first three indicators, this is measured as both a

96 Ibid., 17. 97 Ibid., 28. 98 Ibid., 28.

35 rate and a gap, which is then given a score of one to five based upon their ranges divided into quintiles. These scores are then averaged to create the final score for the indicator.

Political Indicators Besides access to the labor market, perhaps many of the biggest problems, which arise with immigration, involve the legal and political dimensions. Whether or not to grant immigrants citizenship or the right to vote are hotly debated topics across Europe, and thus they are given their own indicator. However, unlike the previous indicators, which largely came from immigrant outcomes, this indicator largely measures legal policies. This is due largely to a lack of information on the legal outcomes of immigrants, such as the percentage of immigrants that vote or the participation of immigrants in civil organizations.

The first of these indicators is an estimated naturalization rate. This indicator seeks to address “both of the willingness of the host countries to grant rights, and of the migrants to make use of these rights.”99 However, one thing to consider with this particular indicator is that a low naturalization rate could be low for more than one reason. Many when looking at naturalization rate assume that a lower rate means that the host country has restrictive policies, which limit immigrants from obtaining nationality. This is not always the case. If a country requires the renunciation of one’s original citizenship, this could provide an additional explanation to low naturalization rates.100 For the purposes of my benchmarking system, I have created a proxy number using the statistics on citizenship acquisition and divided it by the number of foreign citizens within a country, since EU countries do not put out statistics on naturalization rate. This thereby creates a metric that is comparable across countries. From these numbers, the ranges were then divided into quintiles and given a score from one to four.

99 Entzinger and Biezeveld, “Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration,” 12. 100 Alice Ludvig, “Why Should Austria Be Different from Germany? The Two Recent Nationality Reforms in Contrast,” German Politics 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2004), 511.

The second indicator looks at citizenship laws, which were rated by the 2010 version of

MIPEX. This indicator measures two of the MIPEX indicators: the loss of foreign citizenship upon naturalization and whether dual nationality is allowed for second or third generation immigrants. As with previous MIPEX numbers, these are given a score of 0, 50, or 100, with 0 indicating the most restrictive policies, namely a total loss of foreign citizenship upon naturalization and no dual citizenship allowed for the second or third generation immigrants.

These were then given a score of 1, 2.5, or 4, corresponding with the 0, 50, or 100, and then averaged to create the final score for the indicator.

The third indicator examines local voting rights for immigrants. In some EU countries, there are previsions for local voting rights for immigrants with varying requirements to attain these rights. Countries that gave no previsions for local voting rights were given a score of 1.

The rest of the scores depended upon the requirements. The most restrictive kind of requirement is reciprocity, that is two countries must have an agreement to let immigrants from each others countries vote. In many places where this exists, such as Spain and the Czech Republic, only one or sometimes no agreements exist, and thus, it is almost as if there are no local voting rights.

This type of restriction is thereby given a 1.5. Another type of restriction is long-term residence, which can sometimes take upon to ten or more years to receive. Thus, this restriction is given a

2. Then there are duration requirements. Many EU countries allow immigrants to vote if they have lived in the country for a certain amount of time. The duration varies between 3 to 5 years, and thus the scoring for this increases with decreasing duration. Five years is given a 2.5, four years is given a 3, and three years is given a 3.5. Finally, the least restrictive type of voting requirements is a simple registration, which is given a score of 4.

Our fourth indicator examines jus soli laws. By many metrics, such as those of MIPEX, jus soli is considered to be the most inclusive form of citizenship granting. This indicator uses

CITLAW data examining jus soli laws for the second and third generation, and then averages the two scores. In many places, there are no provisions for jus soli for the second or the third generations. ‘No provisions’ in either category is thereby scored as a one. Many countries require that those of the second or third generation live in the country for more than ten years before granting jus soli citizenship. This provision is scored with a 2. Other countries require residence for six to ten years or declared permanent residence, which is scored as a 3. A fourth type of provision is registration or declaration, which is scored at a 3.5. Finally, the last type of jus soli restrictions is an entire lack of one, labeled as ‘unrestricted,’ which is scored as a 4. The scores for second and third generations are averaged together to create a final score for the indicator.

My final indicator comes from the 2010 MIPEX data and measures political liberties allowed to immigrants. While a citizen of each of these EU countries is guaranteed the right to association or membership in a political party, this is not necessarily the case with immigrants.

This indicator measures these two political liberties and also the right to create media, to create an averaged political liberties score. As with previous MIPEX scores, these are measured on a scale of 0, 50, or 100, with 0 being the most restrictive. These scores are correspondingly given scores of 1, 2.5, and 4 respectively and then averaged to create the final score.

Attitudes of Recipient Host Countries The core mantra of EU immigrant integration is that “Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States.”101 In this two way process, it is not only important that immigrants are granted residency or find a place in

101 Commission of the European Communities, A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, 5.

38 the labor force, but also that they feel welcomed and accepted by their host society. This category of indicators seeks to quantify that. Many have suggested using this category to measure discrimination within a country. However, for our purposes, this will measure public opinion and government action, due to an overwhelming lack of data on discrimination through

Europe.

The first three indicators come from Eurobarometer public opinion surveys. The first asks the question of whether one would support the highest elected official of his/her country if they were from an ethnic minority. The percentages measured showed the number that said that they would accept someone from an ethnic minority being the highest elected official in their country.

Thus, for this indicator, a higher the percentage yielded a higher the score. The range was then divided into quintiles and given a score from one to five.

The second indicator examines the number of people that agreed with the statement immigrants increase unemployment, which is a common complaint that many levy against immigrants and also serves as basis for many peoples’ anti-immigration stances. Thus, for this indicator a lower percentage of people yielded a higher score, and as with the previous indicator, the range was divided into quintiles and given a score from one to five.

The final Eurobarometer indicator examines whether respondents agreed that immigrants enriched the cultural life of their home country, wherein a higher percentage yielded a higher score, and in keeping with the previous two indicators, the ranges were divided into quintiles and given a score from one to five.

The last indicator for this category comes from the 2010 MIPEX and examines the presence and strength of an equality agency in a country, which measures the government’s willingness and ability to address discrimination in their country. This indicator measures these

39 agencies on five different metrics: their presence (with a mandate to combat discrimination), their power to assist victims, whether they have “quasi-judicial” powers, whether they can instigate proceedings, and whether they have legal standing to engage in proceedings. As with previous MIPEX scores, these scores rank at 0, 50, or 100, which correspond with 1, 3, or 5 respectively. These scores are then averaged to create the final score.

TABLE 3.1 Summary of Indicators Social Attitudes of Recipient Socio-Economic Education Political Inclusion/Cultural Countries Share of Early Estimated Unemployment At-Risk of Poverty Support for Highest Elected Leavers from Naturalization Rate Rate Official of Ethnic Minority Education Rate Gender Share of Population Children at-risk of Citizenship Immigrants Increase Unemployment with Tertiary Poverty Rate Laws Unemployment (Agree) Rate Education Local Voting Immigrants Enrich Cultural Employment Rate Access to Education Overcrowding Laws Life (Agree) Ratio of Property Gender Supporting Owners to Non- Jus Soli Laws Specialized Equality Agency Employment Rate Measures Property Owners Median Net Political Income Liberties Data Challenges At the start of data collection, I had not chosen all of the indicators that are in my final analysis. There are many indicators that are suggested by scholars, for which European-wide or sometimes even country-level data simply doesn’t exist. For example, the Zaragoza Declaration suggests many indicators that would be helpful in determining the integration of third country nationals, such as language skills and experiences of discrimination.102 However, these types of statistics simply do not yet exist throughout the European Union. In addition, various statistics for some countries, particularly for third country nationals within those countries, also don’t exist. For this reason, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia have been excluded from the analysis.

102 Council of the European Union, Zaragoza Declaration, 17.

Quantitative Analysis Hypotheses In order to best understand the causes of these integration scores, we will test the results against a series of hypotheses. The data for these variables can be found in Appendix III.

The first hypothesis comes from the ongoing debate within immigration literature, described in-depth in the literature review. Here we will test statistically whether countries that have a multicultural approach integrate their immigrants better than those that do not.

Hypothesis 1: Countries that embrace a multicultural approach to immigration and integration will have a lower integration score than those that take a more stringent approach.

The data for this variable was gathered from the Multiculturalism Policy Index created by

Banting and Kymlicka. This index measures the multicultural policies of Western Europe and assigns each country a score and a categorization of ‘strong,’ ‘modest,’ or ‘weak.’ Kymlicka and

Banting arrive at this score through indicators, which they claim “are consistent with the most common usages of the term in both public as well as scholarly debate, and provide a useful basis for investigating the competing claims about the social effects of MCPs, and about their evolution over time.”103 These indicators include affirmative action, dual citizenship, bilingual education, school curriculum, and funding for ethnic groups. Furthermore, since this index only provides scores for Western Europe, Eastern Europe’s scores were estimated using relevant data from the MIPEX, the scores for which can be found in Appendix III. However, this definition of multicultural policies in endogenous with our political integration score, and thus testing this particular variable was done with modified dependent variables. Finally, those considered to have ‘strong’ multicultural policies were given a 3, ‘modest’ a 2, and ‘weak’ a 1.

103 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, “Definitions and Data,” Multicultural Policies in Contemporary Democracies, n.d., http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/about/definitionsdata.html.

However, the immigration discourse in Europe does not only revolve around multiculturalism. Recently, there has been a strong resurgence of radical, anti-immigration right- wing parties in many European countries. This next hypothesis seeks to test whether these parties have any affect on the integration of the immigrants within the country.

Hypothesis 2: Countries with a strong radical right-wing party will have a lower integration score than those without one.

This hypothesis was measured as a binary: either a country had a strong radical right-wing party or it did not. Parties were considered strong if they had won at least one seat in the national parliament for more than one national election, and the party had to be in the national parliament in 2009. Furthermore, this variable was coded by giving countries without a strong right-wing party a 1 and those without a 0.

The next two hypotheses address the religious and origin country make-up of immigrants within the country. There has been much concern in public discourse about the integration of immigrants, but particularly of non-white Muslim immigrants from places like Northern Africa or the Middle East. Thus, these next two hypotheses seek to determine if a larger number of

Muslims within a country or a larger number of non-Western third country nationals has an impact on a country’s integration score.

Hypothesis 3: Countries with a higher proportion of non-EU immigrants will have a lower integration score. Hypothesis 4: Countries with a higher proportion of Muslims will have a lower integration score than those without.

Another two hypotheses seek to look at the history of a country. Rogers Brubaker argued that a country’s history is the determining factor in how the country behaves today. This hypothesis seeks to examine the relationship between countries with colonial backgrounds and integration. To be considered colonial, the country must have had a colony outside of Europe.

Thus, this measure excludes Sweden and Denmark, countries that technically had colonies

(Norway and Iceland). However, this measure namely seeks to examine if an earlier history of immigration through colonial immigration and earlier dealings with people of different ethnic backgrounds has an affect on today’s integration scores.

The second examines the more recent history of a country by examining the affects of geography on integration. This seeks to examine namely if Western countries, categorized as non-Communist countries during the Cold War, have higher integration scores than Eastern states. This hypothesis stems from a series of literature on democratic transition. Some scholars have argued that the Soviet-style of Communism had more lasting effects on countries, leaving them with “a flattened landscape,” which has created a stunted civil society and political atmosphere.104 Both of these variables will be measured as a binary with Western or colonial countries given a 1 and Eastern or non-colonial countries given a 0.

Hypothesis 5: Countries with a colonial history will have a higher integration score than those without. Hypothesis 6: Western European countries will have a higher integration score than their Eastern European neighbors.

The seventh hypothesis seeks to further expand upon this idea of the impacts of civil society upon immigrants and their integration. This hypothesis tests a slightly more nuanced measure for civil society and government, the Economist’s 2010 Democracy Index, and tests it against the integration score. On the Economist’s index, countries are given a score from 0 to 10

(with ten being the most democratic) and are scored along five different guidelines: electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. These scores will be kept as they are for the purpose of analysis.

104 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 247 (footnote 11).

Hypothesis 7: Countries that score higher on the Economists Democracy Index will have a higher integration score.

The eighth hypothesis seeks to examine the correlation between wealth and integration by examining the relationship between GDP per capita and integration score.

Hypothesis 8: Countries with a higher level of GDP per capita will have a higher integration score.

The final hypothesis deals with pre-established policies. I will be testing whether countries with more established integration policies do better than those who have created their policies more recently. To do this, I shall examine the effects of of the presence of integration policies prior to 1990 and 2000.

Hypothesis 9: Countries with longer-running integration policies will do better than those that have created a policy more recently.

In order to be considered as a country with an integration policy, the country must simply have some sort of integration policy written into the country’s set of laws. The policy does not have to have been considered a success, nor does that particular integration policy still have to be enforced. Thus, similar to right-wing parties, this variable was measured as a binary, with a 1 for those with integration policies either prior to 1990 or 2000 and a 0 for those without.

Comparative Case Study Analysis To better understand the specific countries examined within the quantitative analysis, I have also chosen three cases to study in further depth: the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria. I do this to go beyond statistical analysis and to better understand the historical development and motivations behind immigration and integration policies in each of these countries and their outcomes. In addition, from these case studies, I seek to determine if there is qualitative evidence in addition to the quantitative evidence for the eight hypotheses listed above.

The identification of these three cases arose from their scores on the integration scale.

Netherlands represents the high end of the scale, while Germany and Austria the medium and low respectively. These cases each have key similarities that make their vastly different outcomes particularly interesting. To start, all three are Western European countries in the

European Union. Two of the countries, Germany and the Netherlands, have been in the EU and its earlier predecessors since their beginnings in the 1950s. Furthermore, all three countries have relatively similar immigrant make-ups with many immigrants coming from Turkey.105 Many of these Turkish immigrants came during guest worker programs in the 1960s. Yet despite the start of mass immigration in the 1960s, each country was hesitant to declare themselves an

‘immigration country,’ albeit some held out longer than others. The similarities between

Germany and Austria continue further as each country shares a Nazi legacy and have similarly strict conceptions of jus sanguinis citizenship.106 Thus these three countries are appropriate cases for a ‘most similar systems’-style analysis.

In these case studies, I examine a few different aspects in the evolution of each country’s immigration and integration policy. First, I summarize the history of each country in terms of immigration flows, immigrant-related legislation, and other relevant political developments.

Second, I observe the major immigrant populations within each country. This includes both minor statistical data and each group’s position in society. Finally, I detail the recent developments in immigration issues. This section focuses in particular on controversies and discrimination, as well as legislation developments within the past five years. From all of this information, I craft a qualitative analysis examining potential reasons for the very different outcomes of these three countries.

105 The Netherlands, however, has a few other significant immigrant groups, such as Indonesians and Surinamese due to colonial immigration. 106 Ludvig, “Why Should Austria Be Different from Germany?,” 505-506.

Chapter IV: Data and Quantitative Analysis

Data and Rankings As elaborated upon in Chapter III and Appendix I, I collected and scored the data, which can be found in Appendix II. The resulting scores are presented in Table 5.1 for each of the categories and the total score. Each of these scores has also been denoted as high, medium, or low, which was calculated based upon the range and denoted by green, orange, and red respectively.107

On this table, there are some very clear overarching trends. First countries that score well overall tend to score high or at least medium in each of the categories, while those on the lower end of the spectrum do fairly poorly across almost all indicators. The prime example of this is the

Netherlands, which scored the highest overall and scored high in each of the categories. On the other hand, Greece, the lowest scoring country, scored poorly on 3 out of 5 categories and medium on the two others. Second, the most drastic variation that occurs happens within the middle bracket. These countries, such as Finland and Belgium, have strong scores in some indicators but do very poorly in others. Thus, with the addition of more indicators, we might see some up-and-down movement between countries, but the most changes would likely come within countries that are currently in the middle of the pack. Third, there is the ranking of the

Eastern European countries. While none of these countries are considered to be high scoring, a majority of them score in the upper-medium range and two (Slovenia and the Czech Republic) scoring low. While this will be discussed statistically later, this preliminary observation provides an interesting contradiction to the pervasive assumption of Western European superiority.

107 These ranges were scored as follows: Integration Score Socioeconomic Education Cultural Political Attitudes High 68.67≤x 14

TABLE 4.1 Integration Scores By Category Integration Score Socioeconomic Education Cultural Political Attitudes Country Score Score Score Score Score Score Austria 51.3 12.75 8.3 9.5 8.75 12.0 Belgium 59.85 8.00 14.3 9.5 15.25 12.8 Cyprus 55.65 12.75 12.5 13.5 9.5 7.4 Czech Republic 54.75 16.50 9.7 11.0 7.75 9.8 Denmark 74.15 16.00 16.3 12.0 12.25 17.6 Estonia 63.25 15.25 13.9 14.0 7.5 12.6 Finland 64.7 11.50 13.7 11.0 12.5 16.0 France 58.5 9.50 10.1 9.0 13.5 16.4 Germany 59.8 10.50 12.5 14.5 10.5 11.8 Greece 48.15 12.50 7.4 7.5 13.75 7.0 Hungary 63.5 14.50 11 14.5 10.5 13.0 Ireland 72.1 12.50 13.2 16.5 15.25 14.6 Italy 52 11.50 8.6 10.5 10 11.4 Latvia 60.95 14.50 9.8 16.0 7.25 13.4 Lithuania 60.85 15.75 11.4 14.0 7.5 12.2 Luxembourg 63.7 9.50 14.5 11.5 13 15.2 Malta 58.25 13.75 6.7 19.0 12 6.8 Netherlands 78.65 14.50 14.7 16.0 15.25 18.2 Poland 66.95 11.50 13.4 17.0 10.25 14.8 Portugal 74.55 14.25 12.6 14.5 19 14.2 Slovakia 65.3 16.00 11.5 16.5 8.5 12.8 Slovenia 56.55 16.00 9.1 9.5 9.75 12.2 Spain 55.65 12.50 8.9 10.5 10.75 13.0 Sweden 73.6 11.50 16.9 10.5 15.5 19.2 United Kingdom 75.5 15.00 15.4 13.5 18 13.6

Statistical Analysis

Multivariate Regressions The first series of multiple regressions measured all of the hypotheses (with the exception of multiculturalism) against both the overall score and the category scores.108 Most of the variables in each of the categories give us the expected sign. However, there are exemptions in this regard, most notably GDP per capita and Western country. Both GDP per capita and

108 The multiculturalism score was left out of this multivariate regression due to endogeneity with the political score, and thus was ran with all the variables against modified dependent variables.

Western country are mostly negative across the board, with the exception of GDP per capita in the education and attitudes scores and Western in the political score.

TABLE 4.2 Regressions on Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Integration Socioeconomic Education Cultural Political Attitudes Score Score Score Score Score Score 9.20** 0.07 3.08*** 3.13* 2.93** -0.00 Right Wing Parties (3.45) (1.14) (0.79) (1.56) (1.24) (1.28) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 0.00 GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -10.25 7.16 15.42* -12.22 -20.37 -0.24 Muslim Population (34.83) (11.51) (7.95) (15.76) (12.51) (12.92) -23.78* -0.56 -6.47** -14.59*** -3.49 1.32 Non-EU Immigrants (10.68) (3.53) (2.44) (4.83) (3.84) (3.96) -6.78 -3.39* -3.50** -0.94 5.13** -4.06* Western Country (5.45) (1.80) (1.24) (2.47) (1.96) (2.02) 4.28 0.27 1.08 1.14 0.51 1.28 Colonial Country (3.94) (1.30) (0.90) (1.78) (1.41) (1.46) Integration Policy 6.66** -0.58 3.09*** 0.66 1.42 2.07* Prior to 2000 (3.12) (1.03) (0.71) (1.41) (1.12) (1.16) Integration Policy 9.49* 0.24 2.75** 1.32 3.58** 1.60 Prior to 1990 (4.49) (1.48) (1.03) (2.03) (1.61) (1.67) Economist Democracy 6.00 2.32* 1.95** 0.46 -0.88 2.16 Score (3.58) (1.18) (0.82) (1.62) (1.29) (1.33) Constant 24.27 -0.66 -3.04 19.43 14.65 -6.10 R-Squared 0.46 0.25 0.76 0.16 0.56 0.49 F 3.25 1.90 9.30 1.49 4.42 3.60 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Across the integration score, right-wing parties, non-EU immigrants, and early integration policies (both prior to 1990 and 2000) all prove to be significant and in addition, explain a relatively high level of variation.

On the other hand, none of the independent variables prove to be significant on the socioeconomic score. In fact, the most likely determinant, GDP per capita, is neither significant nor in the expected direction. Those who have a higher GDP per capita have slightly lower scores than those without. In addition, these nine variables only explain 25% of all variation, lower than other indicators. Thereby implying that many of the popular hypotheses may be

48 irrelevant when examining socioeconomic integration outcomes. Unlike the socioeconomic score, the education scores have far higher degree of significance with right-wing parties, non-

EU immigrants, and early integration policies. This could perhaps be due to the fact that the education score consists of half policy-based indicators as opposed to outcomes. Furthermore, this implies that more established policies have made significant headway in areas of education.

These variables also have a lower degree of explaining power against the cultural score. Within the cultural score, lack of right wing parties, smaller percentages of non-EU immigrants, and

GDP per capita outweigh the other variables in determining the cultural score. Paradoxically, however, the coefficient for GDP per capita is slightly negative. Almost entirely policy-based, the political score is also pretty thoroughly explained by these indicators. The absence of right- wing parties, western countries, and integration policies prior to 1990 are significant to the second highest degree. Furthermore, each variable is in its expected direction with the exception of GDP per capita. For the attitudes of host countries category, only GDP per capita is significant with the coefficient in the hypothesized direction. Yet, despite only one significant variable, these eight indicators account for almost half the variation in the attitudes data. This would lend credence to the frequently observed phenomenon that in more difficult economic times xenophobia increases.

Multiculturalism Regressions Table 4.3 presents further multivariate regressions, this time including multiculturalism and using modified dependent variables. The dependent variables now exclude the political score as the Multiculturalism Index used for the independent variable uses some of the same indicators. Upon first observation, the most noteworthy observation from these regressions is the negative sign on the multiculturalism coefficients, indicating that multicultural policies actually have a negative effect on integration and potentially giving evidence to multicultural critics like

Christian Joppke. Furthermore, the addition of multiculturalism allows us to explain more variation within the socioeconomic and cultural scores than the regressions shown in Table 4.2.

TABLE 4.3 Regressions on Modified Scores and Hypothesized Determinants with Multiculturalism Integration Without Socioeconomic Education Cultural Attitudes Political Score Score Score Score Score -1.48* -0.53* -0.04 -0.68 -0.23 Multicultural Policies (0.74) (0.29) (0.22) (0.40) (0.36) 9.89*** 1.36 3.17*** 4.80** 0.56 Right Wing Parties (3.28) (1.28) (0.98) (1.77) (1.57) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6.33 5.80 15.32* -13.97 -0.83 Muslim Population (27.58) (10.73) (8.24) (14.89) (13.21) -18.68** 0.02 -6.43** -13.84*** 1.57 Non-EU Immigrants (8.47) (3.30) (2.53) (4.57) (4.06) -12.34** -3.55* -3.52** -1.14 -4.13* Western Country (4.31) (1.68) (1.29) (2.33) (2.06) 4.08 0.38 1.09 1.28 1.33 Colonial Country (3.11) (1.21) (0.93) (1.68) (1.49) Integration Policy 5.91** -0.34 3.10*** 0.97 2.17* Prior to 2000 (2.49) (0.97) (0.74) (1.34) (1.19) Integration Policy 7.96** 0.97 2.80** 2.26 1.92 Prior to 1990 (3.69) (1.44) (1.10) (1.99) (1.77) Economist Democracy 6.62** 2.22* 1.94** 0.34 2.12 Score (2.83) (1.10) (0.85) (1.53) (1.36) Constant 10.43 -0.38 -3.02 19.80 -5.97 R-Squared 0.52 0.35 0.74 0.25 0.47 F 3.57 2.31 7.83 1.80 3.15 N 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

However, the addition of multiculturalism has not changed the significance drastically with the exception of the modified integration variable, which now is more highly correlated with right-wing parties, western countries, non-EU immigrants, early integration policies, and the democracy score. The multicultural variable is statistically significant for the modified integration and socioeconomic scores, but even then it is at the least demanding degree.

Furthermore, it has reduced the r-squared values for both the education and attitudes scores.

Finally, most of the signs are in the expected direction (with the exception of Western countries, multicultural policies, and GDP per capita) and in the same direction as in Table 4.2.

Integration Score Models TABLE 4.4 Regressions on Integration Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 7.24* 5.46 5.38 6.14 7.03** Right Wing Parties (3.65) (3.54) (3.59) (3.63) (3.30) 0.00 0.00 GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) -20.44 -37.15 Muslim Population (32.77) (30.93) -10.08 -10.49 -12.37 Non-EU Immigrants (8.25) (8.46) (9.10) Western Country

Colonial Country Integration Policy 10.21*** 9.76*** 6.95** Prior to 2000 (3.10) (3.22) (3.00) Integration Policy 13.10*** 12.11*** 9.21** 7.40* Prior to 1990 (3.72) (4.05) (3.75) (4.05) Economist 2.42 Democracy Score (1.98) Constant 60.24 59.19 61.12 54.20 60.08 32.38 R-Squared 0.30 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.41 F 4.43 3.90 2.94 3.77 3.13 5.16 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 The next table (Table 4.4) examines the integration score, broken down into five different models. Based upon result from the full multivariate regressions, I examined the effects of various independent variables, namely those that proved significant in the earlier multivariate regressions. When examined further, it appears that the effects of non-EU immigrants and right- wing parties on integration may be weaker than indicated in Table 4.2.

However, the most important from these regressions is the significance of the presence of early integration policies. This data suggests that possessing any sort of integration legislation before 1990 or 2000 yields better integration in 2009. While this conclusion may seem obvious, the presence of an early integration policy also suggests other characteristics of the countries that possess them, namely that they are more open to immigrants and in particular, acknowledge that these immigrants intend to remain in the country. In addition, the presence of these early policies reveals an acknowledgment by the government that they are at least partially responsible in aiding in the integration of these immigrants.

Socioeconomic Score Models TABLE 4.5 Regressions on Socioeconomic Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 -0.25 -0.29 -0.24 -0.78 Multicultural Policies (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.61) Right Wing Parties -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -5.17 Muslim Population (8.89) Non-EU Immigrants -2.06* -2.62** -2.86** Western Country (1.17) (1.09) (1.09) -1.31 Colonial Country (0.86) Integration Policy Prior to 2000 Integration Policy 0.15 0.17 Prior to 1990 (1.06) (1.08) Economist 1.95** 2.33** Democracy Score (0.77) (0.82) Constant 15.15 15.14 15.23 15.72 16.08 15.94 1.49 -0.31 R-Squared 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.42 0.44 F 3.98 8.30 2.69 4.66 4.44 4.06 6.88 5.71 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 The socioeconomic models prove to be more decisive than the larger multivariate regression. GDP per capita proves significant across 5 of the 7 models, although the sign is still

52 negative. GDP per capita is not the only variable with an unexpected sign. Both the western and colonial variables are also negative. This would lead one to believe that richer western countries are simply leaving their immigrant populations behind socioeconomically. Yet the addition of the Economist Democracy Index score yields considerably more significance in the socioeconomic score but in the expected direction, thus stating that stronger democracies do better at integrating their immigrant populations socioeconomically. This this leads to a bit of a contradiction. Across the board, Western European countries score better on the democracy index than their Eastern European neighbors, yet Western countries are negatively correlated with a higher socioeconomic score.

Education Score Models Education scores are far better predicted by these hypotheses. In particular a lack of right- wing parties, early integration policies, and fewer non-EU immigrants yield distinctly better education outcomes. In the case of Model 2, these 4 variables account for 70% of all variation in education scores. Furthermore, each of the signs in these models is in the hypothesized direction.

In particular, the presence of an early integration policy appears to have an especially important role in bettering education scores. This suggests that overtime integration policies in countries, which have possessed them for an extended period of time, have evolved to both liberalize education policy and better education outcomes.

TABLE 4.6 Regressions on Education Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 2.24** 3.42*** 2.78** 2.27** 1.76 3.32*** Right Wing Parties (1.00) (0.84) (1.09) (1.01) (1.14) (0.87) GDP per Capita 7.89 Muslim Population (9.18) -6.09** -6.43*** -5.86** -5.36** -5.97*** Non-EU Immigrants (2.39) (1.86) (2.46) (2.55) (2.08) -1.61 Western Country (1.27) Colonial Country Integration Policy 4.13*** 3.04*** 4.30*** 3.04*** Prior to 2000 (0.87) (0.74) (0.90) (0.75) Integration Policy 3.48*** 4.92*** 4.10*** 3.23*** Prior to 1990 (0.91) (1.11) (1.31) (1.04) Economist 1.50* 0.30 Democracy Score (0.85) (0.54) Constant 11.48 10.60 12.09 10.74 -1.50 8.07 R-Squared 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.49 0.38 0.68 F 8.88 14.72 7.92 6.76 4.74 11.42 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 Cultural Score Models The cultural models do not give as satisfactory results. Only accounting for 22% of variation at best, GDP per capita is the only indicator that is significant across all models.

However, sometimes the correlation is slightly positive, other times slightly negative. Non-EU immigrants do also possess significance in 4 of 6 models. Unlike GDP per capita, a higher percentage of non-EU immigrants is correlated with a lower cultural inclusion score. Thus, this finding suggests that countries have a particularly hard time pulling non-EU immigrants out of poverty, and these immigrants are more likely to live in overcrowded conditions. This characterization follows most of the qualitative and anecdotal data on immigrants across the EU,

54 which states that a high percentage of immigrants tend to live in small apartments in majority- immigrant neighbors.

TABLE 4.7 Regressions on Cultural Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 -0.05 -0.05 Multicultural Policies (0.35) (0.36) 0.61 Right Wing Parties (1.24) 0.00* 0.00* -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -13.11 Muslim Population (11.81) -0.73 -0.44 -9.16** -10.59** -8.87** -8.95* Non-EU Immigrants (3.93) (3.82) (4.10) (4.08) (4.19) (4.42) Western Country

Colonial Country Integration Policy Prior to 2000 Integration Policy 0.11 0.12 Prior to 1990 (1.44) (1.47) Economist Democracy Score Constant 9.74 10.06 21.43 22.71 21.33 21.40 R-Squared 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.13 F 1.91 2.83 2.70 3.27 2.71 1.94 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 Political Models Table 4.8 shows the results of regressions run on the political score. In this model, western countries and countries with an integration policy prior to 1990 are significant at the most demanding level and lack of right-wing parties and a smaller Muslim population are also significant. In particular, western countries are significant at the most demanding degree across the board, the only category in which the western country variable is significant. These results

55 could given credence to the popular hypothesis mentioned in the methodology: that the lasting effects of Communism have suppressed civil society. Yet it is also important to note that, by

2009, Freedom House had placed many Eastern European countries on par with their Western

European counterparts. All of the Eastern European countries measured in my index and all of the Western European countries were given a score of 1 (considered “most free”) with the exception of Latvia which is given a 1.5.109 Thus, perhaps the legacy of Communism may not be the only factor to explain this correlation.

TABLE 4.8 Regressions on Political Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 0.51 1.95 2.14* 2.00* 2.13* 2.01 Right Wing Parties (1.18) (1.14) (1.15) (1.09) (1.15) (1.27) GDP per Capita -16.49* -17.48* -20.15 Muslim Population (9.35) (9.88) (11.96) -1.20 -0.05 -0.40 Non-EU Immigrants (3.00) (3.20) (3.23) 4.71*** 3.76*** 3.34*** 4.32*** 4.14*** 3.99** 4.93*** Western Country (1.14) (1.04) (1.12) (1.04) (1.15) (1.40) (1.52) 1.19 Colonial Country (1.15) Integration Policy Prior to 2000 Integration Policy 3.63*** 3.36** 3.57*** 3.69*** 3.76** 2.89** Prior to 1990 (1.26) (1.29) (1.20) (1.27) (1.46) (1.26) Economist -0.27 -0.78 Democracy Score (0.92) (1.02) Constant 8.17 6.92 6.75 6.94 7.66 8.89 14.77 R-Squared 0.39 0.54 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.50 0.50 F 8.74 10.52 8.19 9.46 7.28 5.75 5.89 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

109 Freedom in the World 2009 (Freedom House, 2009), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom- world-2009#.VRN_4DvF-5L.

Attitudes of Host Country Models Finally, the attitudes of host countries regressions are showed in Table 4.9. Across, these models different variables stick out. Most notably, early integration policies are consistently significant across all models. Perhaps the most relevant variable in these models, Muslim population, proves significant in the second model, likely due to Islamophobia in Europe.

Interestingly, the non-EU immigrants variable, examined in model 4, is not significant nor is the sign in the expected direction. The one variable that was significant in the full multivariate regression, GDP per capita, is only significant in four of the seven models. In contrast with the other models, the coefficient for GDP per capita is positive. The cause of this particular finding is uncertain. One hypothesis could be that native residents in wealthier countries are less likely to fear immigrants taking their jobs than those in poorer countries.

TABLE 4.9 Regressions on Attitudes Scores and Hypothesized Determinants Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 0.05 Multicultural Policies (0.32) -0.05 Right Wing Parties (1.21) 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 GDP per Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -22.48** -13.84 -10.96 Muslim Population (10.08) (10.39) (10.95) 3.28 Non-EU Immigrants (3.73) -2.72* Western Country (1.36) Colonial Country Integration Policy 3.00*** 2.90** 3.34*** 2.61** 3.13*** Prior to 2000 (1.03) (1.04) (1.10) (1.10) (0.91) Integration Policy 3.46* 3.55*** 2.02 3.44** Prior to 1990 (1.33) (1.22) (1.35) (1.37) Economist 2.17** Democracy Score (0.96) Constant 10.95 11.28 9.92 7.41 9.64 9.95 10.83 -5.57 R-Squared 0.33 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.53 F 6.86 7.06 7.12 5.47 6.02 7.40 4.38 7.67 N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

What Does Determine the Efficacy of an Integration Policy? A few indicators stick out across multiple categories. GDP per capita influences attitudes and cultural and socioeconomic integration. Yet whether a higher GDP per capita is beneficial is questionable. Similarly, the presence of early integration policies heavily impact attitudes, education and political integration, and the total integration score. Finally, the demographics of immigrants also play a role in almost every category, but very minimally in the overall integration process.

The role that immigrant demographics play has been widely debated across Europe.

Many right-wing parties have exploited xenophobia and Islamophobia to their advantage in order to gain votes. Recently, in a New York Times article responding to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, leader of the French Front National, Marine Le Pen warned that immigration allowed “weapons from the Balkans [to] enter French territory unhindered and hundreds of jihadists [to] move freely around Europe.”110 This type of rhetoric is not limited to France. Right-wing leaders across Europe use immigrants, particularly non-white, Muslim third country nationals, as scapegoats for any number of problems due to their failure to integrate. Geert Wilders, the leader of Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) in the Netherlands, has frequently taken aim at Moroccan immigrants within the country. Wilders has claimed that he wants fewer Moroccan immigrants in the country, “because they are one of the largest immigrant groups here and are overrepresented in our crime and welfare statistics.”111 Yet as the data shows, this immigrant- blaming is largely misplaced. While a higher percentage of non-EU immigrants or a larger

Muslim population do have minor negative effects in some categories, the presence of

110 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: France Was Attacked by Islamic Fundamentalism,” The New York Times, January 18, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic- fundamentalism.html. 111 Geert Wilders, “Talking About ‘the Moroccan Issue’ Is Not a Crime,” Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2014, sec. Opinion, http://www.wsj.com/articles/geert-wilders-talking-about-the-moroccan-issue-is-not-a-crime- 1419195337.

58 integration policies has a far greater impact. Thus blaming immigrants for failed integration is in many ways placing guilt on the wrong group. It is the countries that recognized their role in integration earlier, who have more successful integration. Blaming immigrants takes the onus off of governments to actively take part in the integration process.

Furthermore, the significance of early integration policies also brings up the importance of historical institutionalism within the realm of integration literature. In the current literature, the effects of institutions on integration are woefully understudied, and this significance brings into question why so little energy has been put into examining this phenomenon.

In particular, these results show that these hypotheses explain policy far better than outcomes. As previously mentioned, due to lack of data, the education, political, and attitudes categories include a series of policies measures instead of examining strictly the outcomes. These three categories are also best explained the by stated hypotheses, while the two outcome-based categories, socioeconomic and cultural, have much less statistical significance. This brings into the question the utility of simply measuring policies. To date, the largest immigration-related indexes measure policy alone. The MIPEX, for instance, measures if an integration policy is

‘favorable’ or ‘unfavorable’ to integration. The utility of such indexes is obvious, but without a similar index measuring the actual integration outcomes from these policies, this type of index only tells half of the story. Furthermore this calls into question the impact of policy on actual outcomes. Regressions on the socioeconomic and cultural scores indicated that early integration policies had little impacts and that these outcomes were more influenced by variables like GDP per capita or the Economist Democracy Index score.

Much of the literature would lead you to believe that there is a simple silver bullet that can cure all integration-related ills in a society. Many politicians and scholars have spent vast

59 amounts of time and energy arguing that certain policies, in particular multiculturalism or lack there of, will cure these ills. Joppke argues that multiculturalism is on the decline and “whenever political leaders pronounce multiculturalism dead and wish to move beyond it, central to it is a deep suspicion that the integration of Muslim immigrants and especially of their offspring has failed.”112 Joppke’s characterization is not inaccurate. Many critics have cited the ‘failed’ integration of Europe’s Muslims. In one particularly poignant example, Prime Minister Cameron asserted that British multiculturalism allowed for the growth of isolated communities that serve as bastions for Islamic extremism.113 Proponents of multiculturalism are just as guilty as the opponents. With similar fervor, they claim that multiculturalism will almost single-handedly foster an environment favorable to integration. For example, Kymlicka claims that “group- differentiated rights…can help rectify this disadvantage [of minority groups], by alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority decisions.”114

Yet what is abundantly clear from this data is that no such silver bullet exists. In the case of multiculturalism, it appears to only have minor effects on integration outcomes if any at all.

But an even bigger picture exists. The right-wing parties that strongly influence education scores have little impact on cultural integration. Early integration policies disproportionately affect policy outcomes. The effects of a higher GDP per capita are mixed. Yet the literature focuses on only one aspect of it. It is multiculturalism or Muslim immigrants or right-wing parties that are hindering successful integration. Thus the question must be asked: are we having the right conversation when it comes to integration

112 Joppke, “The Retreat Is Real—but What Is the Alternative?”, 288. 113 Burns, “Cameron Criticizes ‘Multiculturalism’ in Britain.” 114 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 109.

Chapter V: Austria

Austria is a country “dotted with Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Polish names,” a country with a history of immigration.115 Like many Northern European countries, Austria took part in the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program of the 1960s. This brought in many

(theoretically) temporary workers, who stayed and created a large foreign contingent. Similarly

Austria received many refugees from Eastern European countries, throughout the course of the

Cold War, and in the 1990s, a massive influx of Yugoslavian refugees. Clearly, Austria has had a history of immigration, yet has had trouble acknowledging this fact. Despite having many immigrants, only during the past ten years has immigrant integration become a national policymaking priority.116 For this reason, many have criticized Austria for its integration policy or lack thereof, claiming “Austria in this area needs to catch up.”117,118 Although these authors issued this statement in the early 2000s, it is still highly applicable today.

The History of Austrian Immigration and Immigration Policy Immigration Prior to 1945 Prior to becoming a republic in 1918, Austria existed within the Austro-Hungarian

Empire, which stretched across large swathes of territory in Eastern Europe. During the years of the empire, immigration concerns were far different from those of today. Instead of focusing on those coming into the country, “until World War I, the emphasis of control over international

115 Albert Kraler and Michael Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?,” Migrationpolicy.org, March 1, 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/austria-country-immigration. 116 Albert Kraler and David Reichel, “Monitoring Integration in Austria,” in Measuring and Monitoring Immigrant Integration in Europe: Integration Policies and Monitoring Efforts in 17 European Countries, ed. Rob Bijl and Arjen Verweij (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2012), 43. 117 Heinz Fassmann, Irene Stacher, and Elisabeth Strasser, “Einleitung: Zweck des Berichts, zentrale Begriffe und inhaltliche Gliederung,” in Österreichischer Migrations- und integrationsbericht: demographische Entwicklungen, sozioökonomische Strukturen, rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Vienna: Drava, 2003), 9. 118 Translated from the original German. “Dass in Österreich in diesem Bereich Aufholbedarf besteht.”

61 migration was on exit.”119 People were leaving Austria-Hungary en masse, mainly going across the Atlantic to the United States. Most of the immigration coming into what is modern-day

Austria came from other eastern rural parts of the Empire. Yet, migration within the Empire was an uncertain prospect. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a person’s ‘residency right’ was tied to the region in which they were born, and while municipalities had an obligation to care for their poor residents, they “could expel ‘alien residents.’”120 Yet, this did very little to hinder internal migration. By 1900, “60 percent of the Viennese population and a staggering 80 percent of

Prague’s population were thus considered ‘strangers’ [Fremde].”121

Despite massive emigration, Austria-Hungary was still a diverse empire with many different ethnicities and languages. However, instead of allowing this multiethnic empire to remain so, the ruling elite insisted on assimilation for non-German minorities within the empire.

This assimilationist idea of integration, some argue, has affected Austria and its immigration policy even today.122

Much of this changed after the disintegration of the empire, following their loss in World

War I. After 1918, migrants that came from disparate lands in the Empire to reside in Austria were no longer simply ‘strangers.’ They became international immigrants and lost their citizenship. This and later the authoritarian Dollfuss regime fueled yet another wave of emigration to countries overseas.123 Emigration was not the only thing that characterized the interwar period. During the high unemployment of the 1920s, Austria sought to control the influx of foreign workers and created a work permit system through the Laws for the Protection of

119 Rainer Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” in Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, ed. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999), 99. 120 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 121 Ibid. 122 Johan Wets, “The Turkish Community in Austria and Belgium: The Challenge of Integration,” Turkish Studies 7, no. 1 (March 2006), 89. 123 Kraler and Reichel, “Monitoring Integration in Austria,” 43.

Native Workers (Inlanderarbeiterschutzgesetz).124 This wave of migration increased particularly after the Nazi Anschluss. From 1938 to 1941, as many as 128,000 Jews were forced to emigrate, and by 1945, more than 64,000 Austrian Jews were murdered.125 During the war, many left-wing political dissidents abandoned the country for the Soviet Union. In addition to this forced emigration, the Nazis also established a new system of work permits, which required the employer to prove that no domestic labor was available for that specific job.126

Before and during the war, Austria had a very different immigration situation. However, one thing that is abundantly clear during this period is that Austria was far from being an

Einwanderungsland (immigration country), and these many years as an Auswanderungsland

(emigration country) shaped Austrian policy-making for much of the 20th century.

Post-War and The Gastarbeiter System By the end of World War II in Europe, Austria was a hub of about 1.4 million displaced

POWs, foreign workers, war refugees, and ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe. While many were repatriated, about 500,000 of these displaced people permanently settled in Austria.127 This, however, was only the beginning of Austria becoming an immigration country. Austrian employers began to demand a more flexible foreign worker policy during the 1950s, and the

Austrian guest worker system began in the 1960s, a few years later than similar programs in much of Northern Europe. This came in 1961 when Austrian trade unions reluctantly accepted the Raab-Olah Agreement, which created a system of yearly temporary guest worker groups, in exchange for more influence in wage and price control policy-making.128 Yet the agreement was not the only thing influencing this decision. Beginning in the 1960s, the domestic labor supply

124 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 100. 125 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 126 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma.”, 100. 127 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 128 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 100.

63 began to stagnate, and female employment began to decline, in part due to a rising birth rate.129

Soon after agreeing to allow foreign workers into the country, Austria signed a series of recruitment contracts with Southern and Eastern European countries, namely Spain in 1962,

Turkey in 1964, and Yugoslavia in 1965. Since the guest worker program was meant to be temporary, there was little concern as to who was entering Austria. Most of these foreign workers were brought in to work in industrial heavy industry, such as mass production or mining.130 During this time, the Nazi foreign labor policies were still on the books, but for the guest worker program, unless the contingent was exhausted, there was no investigation into whether domestic labor was actually available for these jobs. Thus, the two most important conditions for this guest worker program were “first, that guest workers could only be employed at the same wage and working conditions as Austrian workers and, second, that foreign laborers should generally be rotated after a year and would have to be dismissed before Austrians lost their jobs.”131

However, towards the end of the 1960s, the demand for foreign labor increased starkly, and the guest worker program began to evolve.. Instead of going through the formal process of recruiting immigrants, “employers asked their migrant workers to bring in family members and friends. These new migrants came as tourists.”132 Similarly, since employers were unwilling to train new workers, they simply kept their original migrant workers. These changes, albeit informal, fueled the beginning of family reunification for the families of migrant workers.133

Thus, “within a few years, Austria had gone from almost no immigration over the organized

129 Heinz Fassmann, Rainer Münz, and Wolfgang Seifert, “Was Wurde Aus Den Gastarbeitern? Türken Und (Ex)Jugoslawien in Deutschland Und Österreich,” Demographische Informationen, no. 1997/1990, 59. 130 Ibid., 47. 131 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 100. 132 Ibid., 101. 133 Fassmann, Stacher, and Strasser, “Einleitung: Zweck des Berichts, zentrale Begriffe und inhaltliche Gliederung,” 22.

64 import of foreign workers to virtually uncontrolled chain migration and permanent settlement.”134 While this period was marked by accelerated migration in many European countries, it was particularly stark in Austria. From 1968 to 1973, foreign workers went from making up 2.9 percent of all employment to 8.7 percent (or 67,500 workers to 226,801).135

Yet Austria never developed a legal system to handle this wave of labor migration, since the guest worker system was legally viewed as separate from immigration. Laws regarding the residence and deportation of these foreign workers were never grounded within the legal system.

Instead, “territorial admission and residence followed form admission to employment.”136

Similarly, the Fremdenpolizeigesetz (Law on Policing Aliens), which regulated legal residence and deportation, was written in 1954 and never amended to address the wave of foreign labor immigration.

This system continued in chaos until the 1973 oil price shocks. Due to the global recession, the demand for foreign labor came to a halt and recruitment ended in 1974.137 In

January 1976, the Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz (Aliens Employment Act, AusIBG) was passed, which reasserted the native-born priority in the labor market and succeeded in reducing the number of foreign workers in Austria.138 Under this law, “foreign workers [could] only be employed if the situation and development of the labor market and important public and national economic interests permit.”139

134 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma.”, 101. 135 Gudrun Biffl, Migration and Labour Integration in Austria: SOPEMI Report on Labour Migration Austria 2010‐ 11 (OECD, December 2011), 69. 136 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 102. 137 Fassmann, Stacher, and Strasser, “Einleitung: Zweck des Berichts, zentrale Begriffe und inhaltliche Gliederung,” 23. 138 Ibid., 23. 139 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 102.

Cold War Asylum Immigration Guest worker migration was not the only type of immigration to Austria during the 20th century. While there were many asylum-seekers after the war (namely ethnic Germans from

Eastern Europe), this phenomenon continued long into the Cold War. Despite being originally viewed as a burden, the ethnic German refugees were quickly welcomed as permanent settlers in

Austria (due to their integral place in reconstructing workforce) with the option of gaining

Austrian citizenship in 1954 by a simple declaration.140

The secondary group of refugees was from Eastern and Central Europe. During this time,

“Austria was one of the main receiving and transit countries for refugees fleeing communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe.”141 This, however, proved slightly more difficult than the policies regarding ethnic Germans. After the war, Austria was declared neutral by the occupying

Allied powers, a fact which left it towing an awkward line between the Western powers and the

Soviet Union. In Austria, many of these Eastern European refugees found protection, something that the USSR could not interpret as hostile only because it was written into international law.142

Although it evolved slightly over time, Austrian asylum policy was largely consistent and unrestrictive throughout the Cold War, since “these refugees were…perceived as something like close relatives who deserved to be admitted for reasons of national identity.”143

These refugees came in three major waves. First 180,000 refugees came from Hungary in

1956 after the Hungarian Revolution. The second took place in 1968 after the Prague Spring, wherein about 162,000 Czechoslovakian refuges came into Austria, and finally after the routing of the Solidarity Movement in Poland in 1981 and 1982, about 150,000 Poles sought asylum in

140 Ibid., 106. 141 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 142 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 106. 143 Ibid., 106.

Austria.144 These were not the only Eastern and Central European refugees that came into

Austria. Throughout the course of the Cold War, about two million people were at least temporarily sheltered in Austria. Many of these people simply used Austria as a transit country before leaving for another Western European country, but many stayed, giving Austria a sizeable

Eastern European population.145

The 1980s and a Turning Point in Austrian Immigration Policy While many view 1989 as the turning point for Austrian immigration policy, in many ways, changes began earlier. The first came in 1986, when Jörg Haider became the leader of the

Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). Founded in the 1950s, the

FPÖ was the successor party to the Federation of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen,

VdU), the former Nazi party. However in the 1960s and 1970s, FPÖ leadership sought to liberalize the party and atone for its Nazi past, thereby making it an acceptable coalition partner in the Austrian parliament.146 Prior to the 1980s, the FPÖ had never succeeded in getting more than a small minority of the national vote. Both of these things changed with the rise of Haider.

By capitalizing upon an embarrassing faux pas by the liberal leadership, Haider succeeded in rallying the FPÖ’s right-wing, nationalist base and ousting the leadership. After Haider became leader in 1986, “liberals left the party in droves [and] right-wing extremists and members of the neo-Nazi scene flocked to it.”147 Quickly, the party that had never held more than a very small minority in the Austrian parliament began to win more votes. In the 1986, the FPÖ captured 10% of the vote, nearly double its share from three years prior, and remained in the majority coalition

144 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 145 Ibid. 146 David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 177. 147 Ibid., 182.

67 throughout the 1990s.148 In the immediate aftermath, this had little impact on immigration in

Austria. Prior to 1989, immigration was not even on the policy-making agenda, nor was it considered a top national priority.149 Thus, during the 1980s, the FPÖ did not address issues of immigration in its party platform or rhetoric. It wasn’t until the early 1990s, that the FPÖ became the voice of immigration opponents.

The second development came in 1987 with a ruling on the Fremdenpolizeigesetz.

Despite vast changes in the political and immigration landscape since the laws inception in 1954, the Fremdenpolizeigesetz remained on the books until a challenge brought before the

Constitutional Supreme Court. First in 1985, the Supreme Court annulled the provisions of the law that made foreign residents liable both to deportation and prohibition of reentry for a potentially indefinite period of time, claiming that these provisions violated provisions set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights.150 In the following years, the government attempted to re-write the law without changing its substance, but “a 1987 amendment finally required that public interests in a residence prohibition had to outweigh private interests of the foreigner (not to be separated from his or her family for example.)”151 Beyond implementing necessary changes, this ruling also showed the efficacy of challenging Austrian immigration policy in higher courts, making judicial review a significant part of immigration policy.152

This ruling had further impacts across the Austrian government. Prior to 1987, immigration policy was divided across three different ministries. The ruling on the

Fremdenpolizeigesetz caused many to call for reforms for the entire immigration process.

Despite floundering at first, these eventually paved the way for true change in this area. In

148 Ibid., 185-187. 149 Kraler and Reichel, “Monitoring Integration in Austria,” 43. 150 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 111. 151 Ibid., 111. 152 Ibid., 111.

68 addition, in the late 1980s, the Austrian government began to grow concerned about population development, due to declining fertility rates and an ageing population. The Austrian government felt that it could combat this problem through the immigration of young and economically active people. Thus, “all this led quite naturally to the proposal of introducing relatively stable immigration targets by setting yearly contingents for gross immigration.”153

This caused a series of cautiously liberalizing reforms to the AusIBG throughout the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Under these reforms, the employment years requirement in order to obtain a permit was reduced. Immigrants, particularly foreign youth that grew up in

Austria, were given easier access to ‘exemption permits.’ Finally, these reforms created a third type of work permit between an employment permit and an ‘exempt permit,’ wherein after a year of continuous employment, immigrants could change jobs within their province.154 Some of the changes, however, were not so liberal. Changes in 1990 created both federal and province workforce quotas for immigrants.

The 1990s and the “Immigration Crisis” While the Austrian system saw minor changes in the 1980s, serious changes occurred in the 1990s. Prior to 1989, immigration policies oriented themselves solely towards the guest worker policy of the 1960s, and Austria lacked any semblance of an integration policy.155

However, an asylum crisis in the early 1990’s provided a stark wake-up call for Austrian policy makers.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War swiftly kick-started asylum migration from East and Central Europe. At first, these refugees, mainly from Czechoslovakia,

153 Ibid., 112. 154 Ibid., 113. 155 Rainer Münz, Peter Zuser, and Josef Kytir, “Grenzüberschreitende Wanderungen Und Ausländische Wohnbevölkerung: Struktur Und Entwicklung,” in Österreichischer Migrations- Und Integrationsbericht: Demographische Entwicklungen, Sozioökonomische Strukturen, Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Irene Stacher (Vienna: Drava, 2003), 27.

Hungary, and the GDR were greeted with open arms, as “these people symbolized a new era when communist regimes would no longer be willing or able to impede their citizens’ free movement…[and because] they were the last group refugees or emigrants who…contributed perfectly to the role that Austria had assumed during the Cold War.”156 This enthusiasm changed, after the Romanian uprising and Romanians seeking asylum in Austria. Instead of being welcomed as refugees from a brutal regime, Romanians were quickly “stigmatized collectively as the prototypical example of bogus asylum seekers,” who sought to exploit the asylum process in order to gain economic advantages.157 Due to their increasing numbers and negative feelings towards the new refugees, their presence was far more publicized, which led to an ‘asylum crisis.’ This crisis manifested itself in a newsworthy fashion, such as when the Austrian government tried to place 800 male Romanian asylum-seekers in old army barracks in the 260- person Burgenland town of Kaisersteinbruch. After protests from the residents and other outside supporters, the government reversed its decision.158 But it was these such incidents that fostered the belief that Austria was being overrun by asylum-seekers and caused the government to institute restrictive reforms.

In 1991, a year after the ‘asylum crisis,’ the Austrian government instituted two new laws regarding asylum seekers: the Bundesbetreuungsgesetz (Federal Assistance Law) and the

Asylgesetz (Asylum Law). The first of these laws aimed to cut the benefits ensured to individual asylum seekers and ensured that benefits would come in the form of goods and services, lessening the economic incentives of coming to Austria. Secondly, the asylum law imposed harsh penalties on companies caught transporting illegal immigrants and introduced new visa

156 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 117. 157 Ibid., 118. 158 Ibid., 119.

70 requirements for asylum seekers from certain countries.159 This started first in 1989, when

Austria introduced visa requirements for Bulgarians and continued with new visa requirements for Turks and Romanians in 1990.160 In addition, this law established the principle of ‘safe third countries’ or ‘safe origin countries,’ which allowed for Austrian authorities to deny asylum to anyone who came from a country considered ‘safe,’ even if it was only in transit. Also this asylum law only granted temporary residence to those whose asylum status had been finalized.

Therefore, anyone who was denied asylum status was simultaneously deported, requiring them to appeal the decision abroad.161 This new asylum policy was heavily criticized but also proved to be inefficient. After enacting this law, complaints questioning the legality of this immigration policy flooded the Administrative Supreme Court, and deporting rejected asylum seekers proved to be costly and complicated.162

Most asylum-seekers during the 1990s came from war zones in Bosnia and Croatia, and during the first part of the conflict, until November 1992, Austria continued to operate based upon its 1965‘Austrian-Yugoslav on Visa Policies in Regards to Bosnian Citizens,’ simply granting Bosnians admission for six months.163 However, just as with the Romanian refugees,

“Austrian officials worried that the country would soon be swamped by Bosnian refugees.”164

For a variety of reasons, the Austrian government sought to create a system to accommodate these asylum seekers outside of the newly constructed asylum system. It was hesitant to allow these refugees asylum status, since that would give them both unlimited residence and access to

159 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 160 Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, “Austria: A Country of Immigration and Emigration,” in European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994), 165. 161 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 120. 162 Ibid., 121. 163 Barbara Franz, “Bosnian Refugees and Socio-Economic Realities: Changes in Refugee and Settlement Policies in Austria and the United States,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 8. 164 Ibid., 7.

71 the labor market. 165 Thus, throughout the course of the war, the Austrian government implemented more restrictive requirements. The government operated under the 1965 agreement until 1993, when the Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residency Law) was enacted. This law stated that the

Austrian government could grant Bosnian refugees temporary residence as long as necessary, but imposed subsequent restrictions, such as Bosnians needing travel documents or sufficient finances. In April of 1995, a further restriction required Bosnians to have a visa to enter

Austria.166 Despite these restrictions, from 1992-1995, about 95,000 refugees from the Bosnian

War were harbored in Austria, and by 1999 about 70,000 Bosnian refugees were given residency permits.167 While this may seem like a high number, more than two-thirds of Bosnian asylum applications were rejected, “on the grounds that applicants did not arrive directly from the country of persecution, could not demonstrate their fear of individual persecution, or, if the applicants could prove persecution, that their persecutors were private groups rather than state- related institutions.”168

It was not only government officials in favor of restricting the inflow of asylum-seekers and immigrants. In Austria during this time, “public opinion still favor[ed] border controls, and the term ‘immigration’ [had] a negative connotation for many people.”169 The FPÖ capitalized upon this fact. After immigration came to the forefront of public concern, “the FPÖ made halting immigration a centerpiece of its political program.”170 The party argued throughout the 1990s that immigration increased crime in Austria and took jobs from native Austrians. Haider made such claims as “between 1989 and 1992 some 10,400 new jobs were created. All of them were

165 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 122. 166 Franz, “Bosnian Refugees and Socio-Economic Realities,” 8. 167 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 168 Franz, “Bosnian Refugees and Socio-Economic Realities,” 9. 169 Fassmann and Münz, “Austria: A Country of Immigration and Emigration,” 149. 170 Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, 183.

72 taken by cheap immigrant labor.”171 This type of rhetoric proved very effective. Throughout the

1990s, the share of FPÖ votes rose steadily, culminating in 1999, when the FPÖ won 26.9% percent of the total vote and 47% of the working class vote.172

But perhaps what was most clear about Austrian immigration policy in the 1990s was the lack of any sort of coherence. Between the differing asylum policy and growing restrictions, it was clear that Austria sought during the 1990s was unsure of what to do with the new post-Cold

War immigrants. The most important part of this incoherence, however, was the “yawning gap between Austria’s self-image and its demographic reality.”173 Despite a significant portion of its population being born outside the country, during the 1990s, Austria still did not see itself as a immigration country, nor did it have any form of an integration policy to accommodate the immigrants within the country.

2000’s Policy It wasn’t until the 2000’s that immigrant integration became a part of the national policy- making agenda. Most of Austrian immigration policy up until this point still treated immigrants as temporary visitors rather than long-term or permanent residence, and therefore, there was seemingly no point in creating an integration policy. But the turn of the century saw progress in a few key areas.

The first important development of the 2000’s was political. In February 2000, the ÖVP-

FPÖ coalition government came into power, after an election where the FPÖ won 42% of the vote.174 Amidst immense criticism and sanctions from other European countries, the FPÖ-ÖVP government sought to amend immigration legislation, and in July of 2002, the Austrian

171 Andrej Zaslove, “Closing the Door? The Ideology and Impact of Radical Right Populism on Immigration Policy in Austria and Italy,” Journal of Political Ideologies 9, no. 1 (February 1, 2004), 107. 172 Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, 184. 173 Fassmann and Münz, “Austria: A Country of Immigration and Emigration,” 149. 174 Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria, 188.

Parliament adopted changes to the Fremdengesetz and the Aufenthaltsgesetz, which yielded three main changes. The first limited labor immigration only to key personnel. The second allowed seasonal workers to work outside the traditional industries of agriculture and tourism, a move that critics argued could effectively start a new guest worker regime, and finally all non-EU immigrants would be required to attend ‘integration courses.’ Not complying with this integration course mandate could potentially lead to penalties and ultimately deportation.175

It was only three years after these revisions that the ÖVP- FPÖ government decided to revamp immigrant legislation again. In 2005, the government began drafting the

Fremdenrechtspaket (Aliens Rights Package), which sought to change residence requirements, asylum, and enforcement measures and was necessary largely in order to comply with new EU regulations on the free movement of peoples and family reunion. However, this legislation proved to be even more restrictive than the earlier law. It further reduced the number of acceptable grounds for long-term residency and increased the number of language course hours required of immigrants from 100 to 300. Furthermore, it changed the application process for residence permits, requiring potential immigrants to apply from abroad and enforcing a minimum disposable income level required to be eligible for family reunion.176

The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government ended in 2007, when the Sozialdemokratische

Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria, SPÖ) made an electoral comeback.

While the FPÖ was left in the opposition, the laws that it helped craft were largely unchanged.

175 Kraler and Jandl, “Austria: A Country of Immigration?” 176 Albert Kraler, “The Case of Austria,” in Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present, ed. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Penninx, and Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 46.

The policy agenda put forth by the SPÖ differed little from the laws at the time, and thus immigration reform was largely ignored.177

The Current Austrian Immigration and Integration Policies and Problems Recent Policy Developments Over the past five years, Austria has experienced a series of reforms in many facets of their immigration and integration policy. The first began in 2009 with a string of reforms, including changes to the Asylgesetz, Fremdenpolizeigesetz, Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz (StbG,

Citizenship Law) and Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz (NAG, Settlement and Residence

Law). These reforms had a series of consequences, and mostly they served to make immigration and naturalization more difficult. First, reforms to the NAG raised the already high bar to qualify residence. It now required that those who wished to qualify for residence have regular and sufficient income. This caused the bar for nationality to be raised higher as well. The StbG required that the applicant not have received welfare at least three years before applying for citizenship.178 Further amendments to the StbG included a provision for an age assessment or

DNA if the applicant is underage or their kinship is in question. However, these new amendments also provided another exemption for the citizenship test. While the citizenship test, originally enacted in 2006, provided exemptions for the sick, elderly, and minors, the amendment added an exemption for foreign nationals who have attended Austrian schools. A final amendment to the StbG reflected the legal recognition of same-sex couples and allowed them equal footing with heterosexual couples in terms of naturalization.179

One of the largest developments came in 2010. That year the ÖIF announced the creation of the Nationaler Aktionsplan für Integration (NAPI, National Action Plan for Integration).

177 Ibid., 47. 178 Dilek Çenar, Country Report: Austria (EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010), 11-12. 179 Joachim Stern and Gerd Valchars, Country Report: Austria (EUDO Citizenship Observatory, September 2013), 17.

Officially, this plan sought to “pursue the goal of optimizing, bundling, and systematically further developing the successful integration of the federation, states, cities, communities, social partnerships, and civil organizations.”180,181 It targets both those born abroad and those with a

‘migration background’ and aims to alleviate the problems within these communities. The NAPI advocates for better German language courses and educational opportunities, particularly for children and adolescents. It also seeks to provide better job training and employment opportunities, particularly advocating for more foreign nationals and those with a ‘migrant background’ in the public sector. Furthermore, the plan calls for more protections for victims of discrimination or violence.182

In 2013, Austria made a few minor changes to their StbG in order to comply with recent judgments made by the European Court of Human Rights. The first of these changes allowed children born out of wedlock to an Austrian father and a foreign national mother to gain Austrian citizenship. Furthermore, those with disabilities are exempt from the income requirements.

Finally, foreign nationals who have been living in the country for 6 years are allowed to naturalize if they have a B2 (upper-immediate) level of German or have volunteered at an

“association that contributes to the common good.”183

Most recently, Austria has been making waves in the news after an updated Islamgesetz

(Law on Islam) came before the parliament. The law was first introduced in 1912 under Franz

Josef. It made Islam an official religion of Austria and guaranteed Muslims a wide-ranging series of rights including religious education in state-funded schools, a very progressive law for its

180 Nationaler Aktionsplan Für Integration: Bericht (Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, 2010), 3. 181 Translation my own: “Der Nationale Aktionsplan für Integration verfolgt das Ziel, die Maßnahmen für erfolgreiche Integration von Bund, Ländern, Städten, Gemeinden, Sozialpartnern und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen zu optimieren, zu bündeln, und systematisch weiterzuentwickeln. 182 Nationaler Aktionsplan Für Integration: Bericht, 11-27. 183 Rainer Bauböck, “Austrian Parliament Adopts Citizenship Law Reform,” EUDO Citizenship Observatory, July 6, 2013, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/922-austrian-parliament-adopts-citizenship-law-reform.

76 time.184 When a new draft of the law first came to parliament in November 2014, there was a large controversy in Austria. The new law requires the use of a standard German translation of the Quran and bans foreign funding for Islamic organizations. The Austrian government has argued that this new law strengthens the status of Muslims by guaranteeing religious care in hospitals and ensuring Muslims rights to produce prepared by Halal guidelines.185 The largest

Islamic organization in Austria, IGGiO, has accepted the provisions of the new law, but many in the Islamic community feel that it violates the idea of equality that was enshrined in the original law. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration, Sebastian Kurz, maintains that the foreign- funding ban is necessary, since with Islam “we have to fear influences from abroad and therefore have to be stricter with financing.”186 The law came into effect at the end of February after passing through parliament.

Discrimination, Xenophobia, and the Pegida Movement With the popularity of the FPÖ and poll after poll results, it appears that racism and discrimination is a problematic phenomenon in Austria. In 2012, the special Eurobarometer report on discrimination showed that 23% of respondents in Austria had personally felt harassed or discriminated against, which tied for the highest percentage along with Italy, Slovakia, and

Hungary.187 However, only 48% of Austrians believe that discrimination is a problem, 8 points lower than the European average.188 Yet, it is precisely this disbelief that fuels the problem. As

184 Bethany Bell, “Row over Austria’s Islam Law,” BBC News, November 3, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29814688. 185 Shadia Nasralla, “Austria Passes ‘Law on Islam’ Banning Foreign Money for Muslim Groups,” Reuters, February 25, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/25/us-austria-muslims-idUSKBN0LT28420150225. 186 Bell, “Row over Austria’s Islam Law.” 187 European Commission, Discrimination in the EU in 2012, Special Eurobarometer (Brussels: European Commission, November 2012), 64. 188 Ibid., 29.

77 previously stated, Turks in Austria are a particular target for discrimination with 55% reporting that they feel discriminated against always or much of the time.189

This problem of discrimination and xenophobia has come to a head most recently this year with the start of the Pegida movement. Beginning in Dresden in October 2014, Pegida

(standing for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes or in English

Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) quickly spread to Austria. While the

Austrian movement does not have any official organization ties with the German Pegida, its message is largely the same: no more immigrants and no more Islam.190 Similarly, Austrian

Pegida does not have formal ties with the FPÖ, nor does it want to. Speaker for the movement

Georg Immanuel Nagel explained in an interview that the idea is to create pressure on the political system from outside and that “if we became a political party, then we would inevitably become a part of the political system.”191,192 In early February of this year, only a couple hundred people took part in Pegida’s first Austrian march in Vienna. They were severely outnumbered by the roughly 5,000 who showed up for a counter-protest.193 Similarly, a second demonstration in Linz only attracted about 100 Pegida supporters, outnumbered again by 1,800 counter protesters, and racked up a €200,000 bill for the 700 police officers sent there to monitor the protest.194 However, despite small numbers, Pegida Austria is still planning on staging further protests and appears to slowly be gaining steam.

189 Potkanski, Türkische Migrant/-Innen in Österreich: Zahlen. Fakten. Einstellungen, 25. 190 Martin Fritzl, “Wer Ist Pegida Österreich?,” Die Presse, January 30, 2015, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/4651678/Wer-ist-Pegida-Osterreich. 191 Ibid. 192 Translation my own. “Wenn wir zur Partei werden, dann werden wir notwendigerweise auch Teil des politischen Systems.” 193 “Anti-Islamist Pegida Group Holds First March in Austria,” BBC, February 2, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31103221. 194 “Pegida Linz: Polizeieinsatz Kostete 200.000 Euro,” DiePresse.com, February 23, 2015, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/4669934/Pegida-Linz_Polizeieinsatz-kostete-200000-Euro.

Conclusion Since before the twentieth century, Austria has considered itself an emigration country, and it is only recently that mindset has begun to change. Decades of asylum seeker and guest worker immigration have turned Austria into a multiethnic country with a diverse population.

Yet, the clearest part of the Austrian case remains its stubborn refusal to acknowledge itself as an immigration country and adopt a coherent integration policy, augmented by the strength of the

FPÖ. Similarly, immigrants and those with a ‘migration background’ also report high levels of discrimination and are far more likely to be unemployed or under educated. Thus, Austria’s integration policy and outcomes lag behind the rest of the continent.

Chapter VI: Germany

Similar to Austria, Germany is a country with names of all different nationalities and has had a long history of immigration. From guest workers to asylum seekers, people from many different countries have come to call Germany their home. Yet, also like Austria, for most of history, Germany refused to acknowledge its status as an Einwanderungsland. The German government mistakenly thought the workers brought in under the Gastarbeiter program were temporary and didn’t develop any sort of coherent immigration or asylum policy until much later than many other Western European countries. It wasn’t until 2005 that Germany “developed integration policies as well as a welcoming culture for immigrants and fostered diversity systematically.”195 While Germany has made strides in integrating its foreign population in a short amount of time, there is still much progress to be made.

The History of German Immigration and Immigration Policy Immigration Prior to 1945 Throughout the nineteenth century, Germany was an emigration country. Although

German citizens had long been leaving the German states for far away lands, emigration during this time was particularly stark. After the failed revolutions of 1848 and throughout the 1850s, numerous Germans emigrated, many coming to America. Throughout the 1850s, nearly one million Germans came to the United States.196

However, during this century, there was some immigration to Germany. While the more famous guest worker system began in the late 1950s, Germany had been employing foreign labor long before that. Soon after unification in 1871, the first foreign workers came to Germany. At this point, they were Polish agricultural laborers working in East Prussia. However, it wasn’t

195 Petra Bendel, Coordinating Immigrant Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming at the Federal and Local Levels (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, August 2014), 1. 196 “The Germans in America,” Library of Congress, April 23, 2014, http://www.loc.gov/rr/european/imde/germchro.html.

80 long before newly united Germany began importing Polish laborers to work in the Ruhr Valley to work as miners.197 Both of these groups were treated as second-class citizens, as the system was “purposefully designed to facilitate the exploitation of foreign workers while guarding against their social incorporation.” 198 These foreign laborers were still the subjects of conservative ire. Slogans such as ‘Germany for the Germans’ arose in response to the so-called

‘Polonisierung’ (Polonization) and Überfremdung (being overrun by foreigners) that these workers symbolized, also embodying the age-old German dilemma of “the desires for cheap foreign labor as well as an ethnically pure culture.”199

This effort to ensure that Germany was kept for Germans manifested itself symbolically with the 1913 Reichs- und Staatsgehörigkeitsgesetz (Reich and State Citizenship Law). This law had two main provisions. The first allowed Germans living abroad to retain their German citizenship, and the second definitively rejected the basic premise of jus soli.200 In addition to ensuring that Poles or Eastern European Jews could not claim German citizenship, this law enshrined jus sanguinis into the German national identity.201 This established itself in an

“ethnocultural understanding of nationhood,” which considered only those with German parents to be German and still in some ways remains in German national identity today.202

This demand for foreign labor intensified during the First World War, as Germany recruited forced labor from Eastern Europe to stabilize its war economy. However, with the hyperinflation and economic crises of the 1920s, many of these laborers were sent back to their

197 Brett Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 35. 198 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos and Karen Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System,” German Politics & Society 24, no. 3 (80) (October 1, 2006), 4. 199 Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship., 35. 200 Ibid., 43. 201 Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country,” 5. 202 William Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A Comparative Historical Analysis,” International Sociology 5, no. 4 (December 1, 1990), 380.

81 home countries, but this changed after the Nazis came to power. The Nazi rearmament created many jobs and eventually a labor shortage, requiring a new influx of Poles and other

Europeans.203 After the war began, the Nazi conscribed labor from occupied territories and POW camps in order to keep their economy running. By the end of the war, the Allies liberated these forced laborers, thereby marking the close of an era of German immigration history.

Post-War: die Aussiedler und die Gastarbeitersystem By 1945 Germany was chaotic with millions of transient people fleeing to or from the country. Many of the refugees fleeing to Germany were ethnic Germans who were driven out of

Eastern Europe, known as the Aussiedler. After the war, nearly 12 million Aussiedler from

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia fled to Allied-occupied Germany.204 As a policy, these Aussiedler automatically acquired citizenship simply by immigrating to Germany (a practice that continued until the 1990s).205 In addition to automatic citizenship, the Aussiedler were also given special support in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD, Federal Republic of

Germany) such as priority for housing, training programs, and language courses.206

While the immediate post-war era was dominated by the immigration of the Aussiedler, the 1950s saw the rise of the guest worker program. After the founding of the BRD in May of

1949, Germany’s economic rebuilding began. The so-called Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) took place in the 1950s, a decade wherein unemployment dropped from 9% to 1% and industrial productivity tripled. 207 With the growing demand for labor and agitation from

203 Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship., 36. 204 Veysel Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition,” Migration Policy Institute, July 1, 2004, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-immigration-transition. 205 Rainer Münz and Ralf Ulrich, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany,” German Politics & Society 17, no. 4 (53) (December 1, 1999), 6. 206 Hedwig Rudolph, “Dynamics of Immigration in a Nonimmigrant Country: Germany,” in European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994), 115. 207 Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country,” 6.

82 employers, the government turned to recruiting foreign workers, in order to continue this rapid economic expansion. Thus the government began taking an active roll in recruiting foreign labor.

In 1955, the BRD signed its first foreign labor treaty with Italy and then in the next thirteen years with seven more countries: Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal

(1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968).208

During the course of the 1950s, about 167,000 guest workers came to Germany, but it wasn’t until the 1960s that demand for foreign labor truly picked up. With the building of the

Berlin Wall in 1961, the BRD lost a valuable source of Übersiedler (East Germans fleeing to the

West) labor. Additional concerns about a declining working-age population, a shorter workweek, mandatory military service, and low female workforce participation rates added to the demand for foreign labor.209 Thus in 1961 alone, around 259,000 guest workers came to Germany, and while it was thought that this migration would simply be temporary, this was not the case. This was particularly evident in the foreign labor agreement with Turkey. When the government tried to enforce the two-year maximum stay provision, employers intervened to prevent it, finding

Turkish workers particularly productive and not wanting to re-train workers every two years. The

German government was willing to compromise in the agreement by abolishing the maximum stay provision but limiting family reunification, but the Turkish government rejected the proposal. The final agreement lacked both maximum stay clause and any limitations on family reunification.210 Thus, while this program was meant to be temporary, it proved to be the gateway for large-scale long-term immigration.

This was not the West German government’s only attempt to try and get the immigration situation under control. In 1965, the government passed the Fremdengesetz (Foreigners Law) as

208 Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship, 38. 209 Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country,” 7. 210 Ibid., 8.

83 an update from the Nazi-revised Weimar Ausländerpolizeiverordnung (Foreigner Policing

Regulation). Due to the unsavory history of the former law, the German government purportedly tried to make this law a liberal example of the progress that the BRD government had made in overcoming its Nazi past. However, this law did very little in the way of bettering life for immigrants. This law ensured that residency could only be extended if it did not “injure the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.”211 Similarly, the interior ministries were trying to simultaneously create the Grundsätze der Ausländerpolitik (Basic Principles of Foreigners

Policy), which sought to reinstate the rotation provision back into the guest worker program and hinder family reunification. Due to intense criticism of this program, the interior ministries were forced to back down from many provisions, most importantly rotation.212

Germany continued the active recruiting of foreign labor until the 1970’s. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent recession caused a labor market crisis in Germany, causing the government to protect domestic jobs. However, there were concerns about the guest worker system before the oil embargo began. The German government tripled the employers fees required to hire guest workers, but after the embargo began halted the program entirely.213 The end of the guest worker program did not produce the expected exodus of guest workers. Instead, the foreign population continued to grow, due to family reunification policies and high birthrates among foreign families.214 By the late 1980s, there were nearly 4.5 million foreigners living in

Germany, 7.3% of the total population.215 In addition, the labor market was highly segmented

211 Ibid., 9. 212 Ibid., 9-10. 213 Münz and Ulrich, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany,” 18. 214 Klopp, German Multiculturalism: Immigrant Integration and the Transformation of Citizenship, 39. 215 Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition.”

84 with foreigners making up a much higher portion of unskilled and semiskilled workers than native Germans. This segmentation persisted throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s.216

Cold War Asylum-Seekers Guest workers were not the only ones immigrating to the BRD during the course of the

Cold War. During this time, West Germany also housed refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, most notably the Übersiedler fleeing the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German

Democratic Republic). Since the creation of the BRD and DDR in 1949, many East Germans sought refuge in the West through the then porous border. However, it quickly became apparent that the DDR government was threatened by the existence of West Germany, and thus in 1961, the East German government began building the Berlin Wall, after nearly 3.5 million citizens had left for the West.217 Despite the Wall, immigration to the BRD still existed. From 1961 to

1989, more than 600,000 East Germans came to live in the West.218 Like the Aussiedler, the

Übersiedler were guaranteed West German citizenship and money upon arrival.

The 1990s and Asylum Seekers Other than the Übersiedler, the question of asylum seekers did not come to the fore until the late 1980’s when the number of asylum seekers overtook labor migration and family reunification. During this time, the number of asylum seekers increased from 57,400 in 1987 to

438,000 by 1992.219 At the time, the West German constitution had very liberal asylum provisions, written as a symbolic break from the Nazi regime. In addition, Germany had one of the strongest economies in Europe, and after the guest worker program, the only way to gain access to the labor market was through asylum.220 These immigrants came largely from the

216 Rudolph, “Dynamics of Immigration in a Nonimmigrant Country: Germany,” 122. 217 Ibid., 115. 218 Ibid., 115. 219 Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition.” 220 Rudolph, “Dynamics of Immigration in a Nonimmigrant Country: Germany,” 123.

Central and Eastern Europe, in particular East Germans leaving after the fall of the Wall,

Aussiedler, and Yugoslavs fleeing the war.

Due to the high volume of refugees, the German government was quick to create revisions to their incredibly liberal asylum policy. Even during the liberal asylum years, the process only yielded a 10% success rate, as the administrative process proved to be highly restrictive, but after 1993, this percentage grew even smaller. 221 That year, the German government passed the Asylkompromiss 1993 (Asylum Compromise of 1993), which added additional barriers to gaining political asylum in Germany. The first established the concept of

“safe third states,” wherein if an asylum seeker passed through an EU country or other state deemed ‘safe’ on his/her way to Germany, then that person could be sent back to that country without a trial. The second provision tried to simplify the asylum process by creating a list of countries considered to be ‘free of persecution.’ Applicants from these countries were almost always rejected outright.222 These new provisions drastically decreased the number of accepted asylum seekers by late 1993. However, Germany was far from having a coherent asylum policy.

Instead, Germany created policies for asylum seekers based upon their country of origin.

Another large change to immigration policy was to the Aussiedler policy. After the fall of the Wall, most of the Aussiedler who came to Germany were from Eastern Europe and the former USSR. While they enjoyed more privileges than other immigrants, the Aussiedler still experienced difficulty integrating due to their poor knowledge of German.223 Their difficulty integrating, as well as West German concerns about restructuring the East German economy, caused the German government to rethink their Aussiedler policies. In the mid-1990s, the government began putting more emphasis on bettering the lives for Aussiedler in their home

221 Ibid., 123. 222 Münz and Ulrich, “Immigration and Citizenship in Germany,” 19. 223 Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition.”

86 countries in order to make immigration less attractive. 224 In addition, it became more complicated to be admitted into Germany. In February 1996, the government cut the length of language courses, precluded Aussiedler from unemployment benefits, and cut other welfare programs, forcing local and state governments to cover the costs of these Aussiedler, thereby spoiling the once welcoming attitudes of localities. These measures were also successful in drastically reducing the number of Aussiedler that immigrated to Germany.225

Other immigrants and asylum seekers were handled differently. Amidst all of the conflicts in Eastern Europe, Germany created a special policy for Jews coming from the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They were labeled as ‘contingent refugees’ and were given large amounts of public assistance by Jewish welfare programs. Much like the

Aussiedler, this included language and employment programs. Unlike the Aussiedler, their immigration was not limited by the government, but instead by the definition of being a ‘Jew.’226

While Bosnian refugees technically had the same legal status as CIS Jews, they were treated very differently. During the first years of the conflict, Germany had been very restrictive in their asylum policy towards the Bosnians, requiring them to have a hard-to-obtain visa. After strong international criticism, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced in the summer of 1992, that

Germany would ease restrictions on Bosnians refugees.227 This was not the only way in which

Bosnians were treated differently. After granting them asylum during the Bosnian War, the

German government in 1996 began repatriating these refugees. In a conference of Federal and

State Ministers of the Interior, it was declared, as of July 1st, the repatriation of Bosnians would

224 Rudolph, “Dynamics of Immigration in a Nonimmigrant Country: Germany,” 177. 225 Dietrich Thränhardt, “Germany’s Immigration Policies and Politics,” in Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, ed. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999), 38-39. 226 Ibid., 40-41. 227 Stephen Kinzer, “Germany to Ease Curbs on Bosnians,” New York Times, July 21, 1992.

87 begin, starting with single people and childless couples returning first.228 This proved incredibly difficult due to the destruction of Bosnia and the continued ethnic cleansing. For this reason, in

1997, Germany stopped sending Croats and Muslims home to areas controlled by Serbs but still continued to send other Bosnians back to the country.229 This policy drew much international criticism. However, before the turn of the century, a majority of Bosnian refugees in Germany had returned to Bosnia either through voluntary repatriation or forced deportation.

The 2000s: A Turning Point in German Immigration Policy Prior to 2000 Germany had served as the new home for many immigrants, guest workers and asylum seekers. Yet the key characteristic of German immigration policy up until this time was its total and complete incoherence. Similarly, in the 2000s, foreigners made up almost nine percent of the total German population.230 Yet the German government still maintained that it was not an Einwanderungsland, was particularly restrictive in its concept of national identity, and made little effort to integrate its immigrants.

Beginning in 2000, this concept began to change. That year, a new citizenship law came into effect. Under this law, children born to immigrant parents were automatically granted

German citizenship, provided that one parent had legal residency for at least eight years. These children could also hold the nationality of their parents, only having to make a decision of which to keep before they turned 23. In addition, those living in legally Germany for eight years could be naturalized, as opposed to the earlier requirement of fifteen years. Finally, this law also

228 Thränhardt, “Germany’s Immigration Policies and Politics,” 41. 229 Mary Williams Walsh, “Germany Relents on Bosnia Deportations,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1997. 230 Amelie Constant, Olga Nottmeyer, and Klaus Zimmermann, “Cultural Integration in Germany,” in Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe, ed. Yann Algan et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 71.

88 introduced the concept of language requirements for naturalization.231 Then in August of 2001,

Germany instituted a green card, which guaranteed five years residency.232

The next year, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder introduced the Zuwanderungsgesetz

(Immigration Act). In addition to providing Germany with its first coherent immigration policy, it was supposed to “mark a turning point in Germany’s attitudes towards immigration…[and] symbolize the beginning of a new era, in which Germany acquired a new identity as an immigration country.”233 Prior to the law’s introduction, the Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, appointed Rita Süssmuth, CDU politician and former President of the Bundestag under Helmut

Kohl, to lead a commission to exploring to guiding principles for a future immigration law. In its final report, the Süssmuth Commission recommended a Canadian-style point system to attract highly skilled immigrants, comprehensive measure to integrate the immigrants presently living in

Germany, and a humanitarian-driven immigration policy.234 The bill was first introduced by the

SPD-Green coalition in November 2001. It had provisions to particularly encourage immigration for those looking to establish businesses, but limit the number of temporary workers.235 Despite criticism, this bill passed and was supposed to take effect in January 2003. However, a Federal

Court ruling blocked it from coming into law. This led to a new round of extensive, grueling negotiations between the German political parties. An agreement was only reached after the core of the law, the Canadian-style point system, was removed by CDU demand.236 Afterwards, the law passed and was put into effect on January 1st, 2005. The law that passed enacted widespread changes. It consolidated the types of visas into two categories: temporary and permanent. In

231 Rita Süssmuth, The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany (Washington, D.C: Migration Policy Institute, 2009), 2. 232 Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition.” 233 Harald Bauder, “Media Discourse and the New German Immigration Law,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34, no. 1 (November 21, 2007), 96. 234 Ibid., 99. 235 Oezcan, “Germany: Immigration in Transition.” 236 Ibid.

89 addition, it granted visas to any immigrant that either invested €1,000,000 into the country or created ten or more jobs and those with an income above €86,400. It also mandated language courses for immigrants with poor German language skills. Finally, it recognized persecution by non-state actors or for gender-related reasons as grounds for asylum.237 However, “the law that took effect in 2005 did not open the country’s border to immigration of any significant magnitude, nor did it become the desired symbol of Germany’s departure from the self-image of a non-immigration country.”238

Since then this slow yet steady liberalization of German immigration has continued. The opening of the German labor market to Eastern Europeans was a start. Formerly viewed as third country nationals, citizens from countries that joined the EU in 2004 were by and large allowed to begin working in Germany by 2007, when many of the restrictions barring them from the workforce were lifted. However, despite these liberalizing reforms, there are still problems facing Germany and its immigration policy today.

The Current German Immigration Policies and Problems Recent Policy Developments After the overhaul of immigration policy in 2005, 2007 saw a series of reforms to comply with EU directives. This first reformed immigration law. Many of the reforms included more restrictions, such as cracking down on forced marriages by mandating that a spouse must be 18 to enter the country or requiring basic German language skills. The law also introduced obligatory integration courses. In addition to requiring these courses, the reforms decreased the amount of federal subsidies for them and imposed fines upon those who do not enroll.239

However, in some ways, the restrictions were lessened, such including a grandfather clause for

237 Süssmuth, The Future of Migration and Integration Policy in Germany, 2-3. 238 Bauder, “Media Discourse and the New German Immigration Law,” 95. 239 Eric Leise, “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies,” Migration Policy Institute, July 9, 2007, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germany-strives-integrate-immigrants-new-policies.

90 the right of residence, awarding it to anyone who had been in the country for at least 8 years for individuals and 6 years for families.240 Due to the changes in immigration law, this also included

24 amendments to the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG, Nationality Law). With these changes, those who had been “treated by the German authorities for 12 years as a German national” could be granted German nationality “regardless of permanent domicile in Germany.”241 However, the biggest change to the StAG was that it required those wishing to naturalize to take a vow to accept the basic rule of law and democratic principles of German society.242 These changes provoked a controversy within Germany with critics claiming that the reforms went far beyond what was mandated by the EU and that it made the lives of immigrants more difficult.243

A few weeks after the implementation of these immigration reforms, Chancellor Merkel announced the introduction of the Nationaler Integrationsplan (National Integration Plan) at that year’s Integration Summit. On that day, the 12th of July 2007, Merkel’s government approved

€750 million worth of funding for integration. The first steps of this policy advocated for opening up a dialogue on integration, strengthening migrant organizations, and better education and job opportunities for immigrants and those with a migrant background.244 Yet despite this unveiling of a national integration plan and the increased funding, this summit was criticized by those in the media. Der Spiegel claimed that it was “overshadowed by ultimatums and boycotts” referring to the summit boycott by Turkish groups.245

240 “German Parliament Passes Immigration Reform,” Deutsche Welle, June 14, 2007, http://www.dw.de/german- parliament-passes-immigration-reform/a-2609349-1. 241 Kay Hailbronner and Anuscheh Farahat, Country Report on Citizenship Law: Germany (EUDO Citizenship Observatory, January 2015), 10. 242 Leise, “Germany Strives to Integrate Immigrants with New Policies.” 243 “German Parliament Passes Immigration Reform.” 244 Nationaler Integrationsplan: Erster Fortschrittsbericht (Deutsche Bundesregierung, October 2008), 9-13. 245 Anna Reimann, “A Contentious Summit: Merkel’s 400 Integration Promises,” Der Spiegel, July 13, 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-contentious-summit-merkel-s-400-integration-promises-a- 494215.html.

Furthermore in 2014, the German parliament amended asylum rules in the face of an influx of refugees from the Balkans. Namely Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina became classified as ‘safe countries of origin,’ thereby disqualifying everyone who came from those countries for asylum status. This reform was criticized as a move that would prove particularly detrimental for the Roma looking to escape persecution in those countries.246

Finally, recently there have been discussions within the German parliament about the need for immigration reform. Proponents of reform, namely SPD politicians, argue that the rise of right-wing populist movements in Germany, like the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD,

Alternative for Germany) party and the German Pegida movement, reveals the need for change.

Specifically, these politicians want to articulate immigration as something that brings in skilled workers and a solution to Germany’s aging population.247

Discrimination, Xenophobia, and the Pegida Movement In 2010, German Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin published a book titled

Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany is Doing Away with Itself). In it, Sarrazin warned that immigrants would soon outnumber native Germans and that they were dumbing down the gene pool. Instead of receiving widespread criticism, 62% of Germans believed that Sarrazin’s comments were justified, and his book has become a bestseller. 248 Thus claims of no discrimination in Germany are a bit disingenuous. A 2011 study done by the Institute for

Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at the University of Bielefeld found that

246 Harriet Torry, “Germany Approves Tighter Asylum Rules for Immigrants From Balkan States,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-approves-tighter-asylum-rules-for-immigrants- from-balkan-states-1411128028. 247 Sabine Kinkartz, “German Parties Consider Immigration Law Reforms,” Deutsche Welle, January 10, 2015, http://www.dw.de/german-parties-consider-immigration-law-reforms/a-18183796. 248 Gary Younge, “Germans Still Struggling to Resolve Issues of Race,” The Guardian, March 15, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/15/germans-struggling-resolve-issues-race.

47.1% of Germans believe that there are too many foreigners in the country.249 Anecdotally, there is ample evidence from across the country and across different immigrant groups. Asian immigrants report job call-back rates much lower than native Germans. Afro-Germans repeatedly hear the n-word in schools.250 Those with a ‘migration background’ experience the

“your German is pretty good” statements, regardless of whether or not they have lived in

Germany for their entire lives.251

These widespread feelings of discrimination have only worsened with the rise of the

Pegida movement. In October 2014, the first faction of the Pegida movement sprung up in

Dresden. Likes it counterparts across Europe, the Pegida movement “claims it is trying to defend

Germany from ‘Islamization’ at the hands of Muslim immigrants.”252 The first march in late

October attracted only 350 people, but by the end of December, the Pegida rallies in Dresden had attracted up to 22,000 supporters.253 In addition, the movement had spread to Leipzig, Cologne, and Berlin, and by January to Stuttgart, Hamburg, and Munich.254 However, in that same month, there were some issues with leadership resignation wherein the found Lutz Bachmann quit due to controversy over a photo of him posted online dressed up as Adolf Hitler and then subsequently

5 of its tops leaders quit.255 Yet, since then the movement has only continued to gain steam,

249 Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey, “Twenty Years after Rostock: Racism and Xenophobia Still Prevalent in Germany,” Der Spiegel, August 24, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/xenophobia-still-prevalent- in-germany-20-years-after-neo-nazi-attacks-a-851972.html. 250 “Multicultural Germany: How We Experience Racism,” Der Spiegel, September 19, 2013, sec. International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/15-people-with-foreign-roots-discuss-experiences-of-racism-in- germany-a-922529-6.html. 251 Heiner Kiesel, “Day-to-Day Business of Racial Discrimination in Germany,” Deutsche Welle, December 29, 2011, http://www.dw.de/day-to-day-business-of-racial-discrimination-in-germany/a-15629838. 252 Justin Huggler, “Germany’s Pegida Anti-Islam Movement Unravelling,” Telegraph, January 28, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11375165/Germanys-Pegida-anti-Islam-movement- unravelling.html. 253 Rick Noack, “Anti-Islam Protesters March in Dresden, Germany,” CNN, accessed March 22, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/12/europe/germany-anti-islam-marches/index.html. 254 “Pegida: Migrationsrat Hält Pegida Für Spätfolge Früherer CDU-Politik,” Die Zeit, January 5, 2015, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-01/pegida-demonstration-migrationsrat-berlin-koeln. 255 Huggler, “Germany’s Pegida Anti-Islam Movement Unravelling.”

93 holding protests across Germany and its sentiments enjoying support from about one third of the population.256 However, although Pegida does appear to enjoy widespread support, the rest of the

German population is not neutral towards their views. Counter-protests have drawn up to

100,000 protestors, four times that of the largest Pegida protests.257

Controversies Throughout the recent years, there have been a series of immigration-related debates on the national political stage in Germany. One of the longest running is the German debate about headscarves. Although Germany does not have any French-style bans on headscarves, there has been a debate over whether teachers in public schools should be allowed to wear headscarves.

Until recently, teachers wearing headscarves in schools has been banned on the grounds that wearing a headscarf “violated the duty of civil servants to appear ‘neutral’ in the workplace.”258

(Christian symbols were exempt from this ban.) However, a string of courtroom decisions in the early 2000s began to challenge that law. In these cases, teachers, who had been fired for wearing headscarves, appealed these decisions in German courts, and the teachers won. However, the courts also “explicitly declared that individual states are free to ban or approve the wearing of headscarves or other such religious symbols in the school system.”259 Furthermore, the courts stated, “it is the legislators, not the courts of unelected public authorities, should decide on the headscarf issue.”260 Despite this call for legislator action, a year later, the courts ruled that the ban violated religious freedom, but it wasn’t until recently that the ban was overturned. In March

256 “Fast jeder Dritte hat Verständnis für Pegida,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 1, 2015, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/umfrage-zu-anti-islam-bewegung-fast-jeder-dritte-hat-verstaendnis-fuer-pegida- 1.2287619. 257 Huggler, “Germany’s Pegida Anti-Islam Movement Unravelling.” 258 Veysel Oezcan, “Gender, Religion, and Secularism Meet in Germany’s Headscarf Battle,” Migration Policy Institute, March 1, 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/gender-religion-and-secularism-meet-germanys- headscarf-battle. 259 Veysel Oezcan, “Germany’s High Court Allows Teacher to Wear Muslim Headscarf,” Migration Policy Institute, November 1, 2003, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/germanys-high-court-allows-teacher-wear-muslim- headscarf. 260 Ibid.

94 of this year, the German courts ruled that schools must show “‘not only an abstract but sufficiently specific risk’ to justify the ban” on the grounds to displaying bias. Furthermore, the court ruled that exempting Christian and Western symbols was discriminatory.261

Conclusion Similar to Austria, Germany came late into the ‘Einwanderungsland’ game. Despite having the largest Turkish minority in Europe, Germany adamantly maintained throughout the

20th century that it was not an immigration country. It wasn’t until 2001 with Chancellor

Schröder’s announcement of the Zuwanderungsgesetz that Germany accepted its status as an immigration country. This immigration reform did not pass quickly or as intended, and despite its symbolism, it did not bring about much of the proposed change. Since then, Germany has been working to reform its immigration and integration policies with mixed policies, some more restrictive and others more open. These policies seek to address real problems within immigrant, second, and third generation communities, who experience disproportionate levels of unemployment and representation in the under-educated classes. Thus, while Germany has sought to better these outcomes, there is still much more left to do.

261 “German Court Ends Ban on Islamic Headscarves for Teachers,” BBC, March 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31867732.

Chapter VII: The Netherlands

Like Austria and Germany, the Netherlands is a country with a long history of immigration but was an unenthusiastic immigration country. In addition to a similar guest worker program as the ones in Austria and Germany, the Netherlands also dealt with large amounts of colonial migration throughout the twentieth century. However, the Netherlands embraced its status as an immigration country and a series of coherent multicultural immigration and integration policies in the 1980s. These multicultural policies have not lasted to the present. In

2004, the Netherlands renounced its multicultural policies in favor of more restrictive integration policies and a different definition of what it means to be Dutch, namely “adhering to a certain set of cultural and social norms and practices.”262 Yet despite this turn to more restriction, the

Netherlands has continued to be an integration powerhouse in Europe.

The History of Dutch Immigration and Immigration Policy Immigration Prior to 1945 The Netherlands has had a long history of immigration due to a complex series of factors, namely its geographic location, maritime economy, colonialism, and open borders. These features drew a diverse array of people, such Europeans escaping religious persecution, but also caused many to emigrate, leaving for one of the Dutch colonies.263 However, it has been noted by scholars that, during this time, the Dutch were far more likely to leave the country than welcome immigrants into it.264

262 Monique Kremer, The Netherlands: From National Identity to Plural Identifications (Migration Policy Institute, March 2013), 1. 263 Han Entzinger, “Shifting Paradigms: An Appraisal of Immigration in the Netherlands,” in European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century: Historical Patterns, Actual Trends, and Social Implications, ed. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1994), 93. 264 Patrick Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 117.

While there was movement of people into and out of the Netherlands before, it seems that immigration after 1945 is far more important. However a key part of Dutch immigration policy and national identity is rooted prior to 1945 with the creation of Dutch jus soli citizenship laws.

The first citizenship laws mixed the two concepts of descent and residency but are viewed as

“extreme examples of the jus soli notion.”265 These early laws set up the Netherlands to have a very different definition of what it means to be Dutch than strict jus sanguinis countries, like

Germany or Austria, and thereby have bearings on Dutch immigration policy even today.

Major Immigration Flows after 1945: Colonial Immigration and Gastarbeider System Despite extensive immigration after the war, in 1945, the Netherlands considered itself to be an emigration country. Just as before, the Dutch continued to leave for other countries, including the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.266 Throughout the 1950s, about 400,000 left the Netherlands for abroad, giving the country an immigration deficit. This negative immigration balance lasted until 1961, when the Netherlands for the first time and continuously after that had more people coming to the country than leaving it.267 However, the past emphasis on many Dutch citizens emigrating abroad overshadowed an increasingly important trend: immigration into the Netherlands.

In some ways, the Dutch story of post-war immigration is different than that of Austria or

Germany. Post-war, two major groups immigrated to the Netherlands, the first being immigrants from former colonies. Unlike Austria or Germany, who never had colonies or lost their colonies after World War I, the Netherlands witnessed large-scale colonial immigration after the gradual fall of the empire throughout the 1950s. Despite attempts to reestablish Dutch rule after World

265 Hans van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands,” in Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of European Regulation Policies, ed. Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar (Oxford ; New York: Berg Publishers, 1999), 138. 266 Hans Vermeulen and Rinus Penninx, “Introduction,” in Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case, ed. Hans Vermeulen and Rinus Penninx (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 2000), 5. 267 Entzinger, “Shifting Paradigms: An Appraisal of Immigration in the Netherlands,” 94.

War II, Indonesia, the most important of the Dutch colonies, gained its independence in 1949, which lead to the influx of an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 colonizers (known by the Malay word totoks) and mix race Dutch citizens (known to the Dutch as Indische Nederlander) to immigrate to the Netherlands, virtually the entire Dutch population on the archipelago.268 Since these immigrants were also Dutch citizens, this has created different terminology when discussing immigrants in the Netherlands. The Netherlands rarely called its immigrants

‘foreigners’ or ‘foreign citizens,’ something that has held over today.269 However, this mindset that these repatriated immigrants were citizens proved to be harmful. The Dutch government went to great lengths to encourage the Indische Nederlander to remain in Indonesia, encouraging them “to become ‘fully Indonesian.’”270 It was only after the Dutch government realized there was no other solution did repatriation begin. During the beginning years of immigration, the

Netherlands never developed a coherent policy regarding these immigrants. Many had never even visited the Netherlands before and despite legal equality, quickly descended into the lower ranks of society. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Netherlands was in the midst of rebuilding after World War II and the consequent housing shortage.271

The Dutch government, for its part, was quick to realize the need for a policy regarding these immigrants. Together with social organization, the government created an integration policy for these immigrants focusing on citizenship and the rights it conferred, namely social care. To address the housing shortage, the government enacted measures to provide temporary shelter to those coming back from Indonesia and enacted the 5% Rule, which required communities to reserve 5% of any new housing for those coming back from Indonesia. The

268 Ibid., 93. 269 Ibid., 97. 270 Hans van Amersfoort and Mies van Niekerk, “Immigration as a Colonial Inheritance: Post-Colonial Immigrants in the Netherlands, 1945–2002,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32, no. 3 (April 1, 2006), 326. 271 Ibid., 325-326.

Dutch government also went to great lengths to integrate these immigrants into the labor market, which included education initiatives and adding counselors to the Employment Office specifically for repatriated immigrants from Indonesia.272 These new measures had their intended effect, and the Netherlands was able to absorb these immigrants with an astounding speed.

The totoks and Indische Nederlander were not the only ones coming from Indonesia in the 1940s and 50s.. After the Dutch gave up sovereignty over Indonesia, the matter of what to do with the mostly local colonial army, the Royal Dutch Indian Army (KNIL), came to the fore.

When the Republic of Indonesia was first declared, the situation was highly volatile, and in 1951, an independent Republic of South Moluccans was declared with the support of many ex-KNIL men. After the Indonesian armed forces crushed this separatist republic, the Netherlands didn’t know what to do with these former KNIL men, who were still under their jurisdiction. Thus seeing little other option and with protests from these men, the Moluccans and their families were brought to the Netherlands. The Netherlands made the mistake of assuming that it could send them back once the Moluccan Republic was reestablished. They were housed in camps and barracks and lacked access to the labor market. It took until 1957 for the government to start a commission and another two years for that commission to come back with suggestions, which mainly involved moving the Moluccans out of the camps and into newly constructed neighborhoods.273

For their part, the Moluccans were resentful of both the commission trying to help them and the Dutch government, feeling betrayed since “they had always been loyal to the Dutch crown and…[now] their services were no longer rewarded.”274 While the younger generation progressed and became somewhat more integrated with Dutch society, there were many who

272 Ibid., 326-327. 273 Ibid., 329-331. 274 Ibid., 331.

99 were not content. This resentment led to terrorist attacks throughout the 1970s, first on the residence of an Indonesian ambassador in 1975 and second on a train and a village school in

1977. This violence quickly lost support amongst the Moluccan community and served as impetus to start fresh. In 1976, the IWM (Inspraakorgaan Welzjin Molukkers) was founded, wherein the government could discuss policies with Moluccan representatives. Two years later, the government sent a bill to parliament, which presented measures to better integrate the

Moluccans into Dutch society, which drastically improved the situation for the Moluccans.275

After the Moluccans came a third round of immigrants, beginning in the 1960s. Like other Western European countries, the Netherlands had a guest worker program, but it came into the guest worker game later than most countries, due to limited heavy industry.276 Prior to the signing of official labor agreements, many industries, such as shipbuilding and textiles, were having trouble finding workers. This attracted workers from all throughout the Mediterranean,

Turkey, and guest workers from Germany, who found work in the Netherlands but at a substandard wage and lived in poor housing conditions.277 Thus in order to get a better grip on this labor migration, the Dutch government began signing labor agreements with these countries.

By 1964, the Netherlands had signed four different labor agreements with Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, and in 1969 signed another agreement with Morocco. These agreements created a series of regulations on guest workers and employers, such as requiring foreign workers to acquire work permits in their home country. Like the rest of Western Europe, the Netherlands continued the active recruitment of foreign workers until the oil embargo of 1973, when the

275 Ibid., 331-333. 276 Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State, 117. 277 van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands,” 146-147.

100 entire program came to a halt.278 However, during the time of active recruitment and after, many employers and recruits did not follow the laws laid out by the Dutch government and in some cases, these laws proved to be ambiguous and confusing. This illegal immigration led to two important policy developments. The first came in 1975, when the Dutch government instated a regularization measure for illegal immigrants residing and working for the long-term. A second law, enacted in 1979, stopped the issue of new work permits and levied weak sanctions against employers that used illegal immigrants, which had little effect.279 The end of active recruitment did not decrease the number of immigrants in the Netherlands. Just like in Germany and Austria, the number increased due to family reunification, even despite added regulations.280

Later, in the 1970s, the Netherlands dealt with immigration from a different part of the world, this time their colonies in the Caribbean. In 1954, it was proclaimed that the colonies of

Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles would gain autonomy and together with the Netherlands would form the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In addition, this also conferred citizenship upon all residents in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Despite a steady flow of immigrants, up until the 1970s, immigration was not viewed as a problem. Immigrants were predominantly of the elite classes or skilled workers and Creole.281 This changed drastically in the 1970s, as more and more Surinamese left for the Netherlands and a drastically larger portion of them were from the lower classes and from different ethnic groups. The flow of immigrants increased even further after Surinamese independence in 1975. These immigrants opted for the certainty of the

Netherlands over the uncertain new Surinam.282 From 1974-1975, more than 50,000 people left

278 Anita Böcker, “Paving the Way to a Better Future: Turks in the Netherlands,” in Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case, ed. Hans Vermeulen and Rinus Penninx (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 2000), 155. 279 van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands” 147-148. 280 Ibid., 148-149. 281 Mies van Niekerk, “Paradoxes in Paradise. Integration and Social Mobility of the Surnamese,” in Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 2000), 66. 282 Ibid., 66.

101

Surinam, roughly 13% of the country’s population.283 The Dutch government tried in vain to stem the tide of this immigration. In 1975, the Dutch and new Surinamese governments agreed to a five-year agreement to regulate immigration. Under this agreement, the Surinamese that came to the Netherlands could opt for Dutch citizenship, and after 1980, visas were required for those who wanted to immigrate to the Netherlands. This agreement only served to increase the number of Surinamese immigrating to the Netherlands.284

Like the Moluccans, the Dutch government neglected to acknowledge the long-term nature of this migration, maintaining “the idea that Surinamese migration was a historical mistake and that the Surinamese were soon to return to their newly independent country.”285 In addition, the Surinamese came into the country during the oil crisis and subsequent economic recession, further hampering their integration. However, many of these immigrants were very well integrated culturally and linguistically, due to their education in a Dutch-style system. Thus, having knowledge of both the culture and the language, the largest question of Surinamese integration was into the labor market, which steadily improved throughout the 1980s and 90s.286

The final group of colonial immigrants to reach the Netherlands was from the

Netherlands Antilles. Like the Surinamese, there had been people from the Netherlands Antilles immigrating to the Netherlands, but it wasn’t until later that this was considered a problem.

Before the 1980s, the Antilleans who immigrated were usually from the highest classes of society and well educated, but mass immigration from the Antilles began in 1985. Many of these newer Antillean immigrants were from the lower classes and unprepared for life in the

283 van Amersfoort and van Niekerk, “Immigration as a Colonial Inheritance,” 335. 284 Ibid., 335. 285 Ibid., 336. 286 Ibid., 336-337.

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Netherlands, turning to crime and the drug trade.287 Similar to the policy towards Surinam, the

Netherlands tried to discourage migration from the Antilles and developed little in the way of policy. In fact, “for the Netherlands, the policy was to be successful if the migration to the

Netherlands declined.”288 However, unlike the Surinamese, the Antilleans have had much greater problems integrating into Dutch society.289

The 1980s: The Starting Point of Dutch Integration Policy Despite this massive immigration influx, the Netherlands never considered itself to be an immigration country. Instead the government “considered the Netherlands to be ‘overpopulated’ and actively promoted emigration.”290 In fact, the Dutch government denied that there were even immigrants in the country.291 However, this mindset very quickly shifted at the beginning of the

1980s. This change came with a report from the Scientific Council for Government Policy

(WRR). Issued in 1979, this report acknowledged that much of the Dutch policy prior to the

1980s had “to a great extent been based on the concept of temporary residence in the country” but then condemned this belief as a detrimental fantasy.292 It claimed “much of the inequality in practice may be traced to the fiction of temporary residence (i.e. the possibility of expulsion), which is enshrined in the aliens legislation.”293

This report spurred what some scholars refer to as the first frame of Dutch immigrant integration policy.294 This frame came about in 1980 and was characterized by the presence of a

Minorities Policy. As the Council report suggested, the Dutch government “formally admitted

287 Ibid., 339-340. 288 Hans van Hulst, “A Continuing Construction of Crisis. Antilleans in the Netherlands.,” in Immigrant Integration: The Dutch Case, ed. Hans Vermeulen and Rinus Penninx (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers, 2000), 118. 289 Ibid., 118-119. 290 van Amersfoort and van Niekerk, “Immigration as a Colonial Inheritance,” 324. 291 Ibid., 324. 292 Scientific Council for Government Policy, Ethnic Minorities (The Hague, 1979), 4. 293 Ibid., 157. (Emphasis in original text.) 294 Peter Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 69.

103 that the idea that most immigrants would never return should be abandoned.”295 After ending the fiction of temporary residence, the Netherlands announced its first integration policy in 1983, referred to as the Minorities Policy. Instead of pursuing all immigrants, this policy was developed for a certain groups who “were considered to be in danger of becoming minorities.”296

These groups were namely the Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, foreign workers, Roma, and refugees. The aims of this policy were three-fold. The first and a key part was the so-called

“social-cultural emancipation of minority groups,” which the Dutch government believed would serve as a catalyst for better socio-economic integration.297 To help further enhance socioeconomic integration, the Minorities Policy had measures to combat discrimination and increase accessibility of institutions. In addition to these two objectives, the Minorities Policy encouraged multiculturalism. In practice, this was done through the promotion of immigrant language and culture classes. All of these measures were done with the ultimate goal of increasing the participation of immigrant groups in society.298

This was the clear starting point in the Dutch multicultural integration policies that have been the subject of much debate. The model was “based on the belief that the cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into Dutch society.”299 These immigrants were not asked to make many drastic changes in terms of giving up their cultural identity. The Dutch government would only require the giving up of culture “when values and norms of minorities from their original culture clash with those of the established norms of our pluriform society and when these are considered fundamental for Dutch society.”300

295 Entzinger, “Shifting Paradigms: An Appraisal of Immigration in the Netherlands,” 101. 296 Vermeulen and Penninx, “Introduction,” 20. 297 Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, 73. 298 van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands,” 155. 299 Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, 68. 300 Minorities Memorandum, Parliamentary Document, TK 1982-1983, 16102, nr 21, 108.

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The 1990s: A Change in the Discussion The Minorities Policy remained relatively stable throughout the course of the 1980s. An economic recession and high unemployment caused minor changes in the policy to try and further increase socio-economic integration. However, unemployment rates soared, and many immigrants did not speak Dutch.301 Thus the Minorities Policy had many critics. In the fall of

1991, the debate about immigration and integration came to the fore. The parliamentary leader of the Dutch House of Representatives and party leader for the conservative-liberal party the

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy)

Frits Bolkestein kick-started this debate by making a series of comments about minorities and immigration. Bolkestein voiced his concerns about the potential for “clashing values” between the native Dutch and immigrants, a statement that was highly taboo within the multicultural

Dutch system. 302 In turn, these comments create a public debate, in which the depth of xenophobia in the Netherlands became apparent.303 This helped to begin a reevaluation of the

Minorities Policy. This was further catalyzed by economic woes that required a cutting back of the welfare state. In 1993, after a series of parliamentary debates, the Dutch Parliament adopted a motion to formally recalibrate the government’s integration policies.

This led to a new integration policy (not Minorities Policy) with an entirely different emphasis. Instead of focusing on immigrant groups, the new integration policies focused on individuals ‘integration’ as opposed to ‘emancipation.’ Similarly, the emphasis turned towards active citizenship, persistently referring to immigrants as ‘citizens,’ as authorities feared a

301 Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State, 123. 302 Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 53. 303 Entzinger, “Shifting Paradigms: An Appraisal of Immigration in the Netherlands,” 108-109.

105 potential ethnic divide between native Dutch and immigrants.304 In addition, the focus became upon socio-economic integration, believing that it would lead to cultural integration (as opposed to the other way around that the Minorities Policy proposed). Finally, a distinct change came in the way of Dutch multiculturalism. While “the government still recognized the de facto multicultural status of Dutch society, it no longer considered the active promotion of such a society a facet of government policy.”305 Thus, it legitimized immigrant language education by the theory that learning one’s native language will help them better learn a second one (as opposed to the earlier emphasis on promoting different cultures). Despite its emphasis on the socio-economic side of integration, this policy saw far more progress in terms of political and cultural integration, and the “‘ethnicization’ of social disadvantage” continued.306 Yet despite this overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the underprivileged parts of society, during the course of the 1990s, there was progress made at closing this gap.

The 2000’s: A Turn towards Assimilationism and the Murder of Theo Van Gogh A combination of domestic issues and September 11th led to the rise of more immigration critics in the Netherlands, very notably Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn’s beliefs “could be summed up in negatives; he was against bureaucracy, leftist regenten, and immigration, especially Muslim immigration.”307 He argued that the beliefs of Islam were contrary to the cultural norms of the

Netherlands. Yet he did not advocate for the repatriation of immigrants already in the

Netherlands or for social welfare discrimination.308

It wasn’t until the early 2000’s that Fortuyn began his fast ascension towards Dutch political stardom. He was elected the party leader of the newly formed Livable Netherlands

304 Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, 74- 75. 305 Ibid., 76. 306 Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State, 130. 307 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 39. 308 Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State, 133.

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(Leefbaar Nederlands) movement, a populist party that advocated for restricted immigration.

However, after his now infamous comments in a 2002 interview with the newspaper de

Volkskrant, wherein he called Islam “a backward culture,” he was promptly dismissed from his position within Livable Netherlands.309 Afterwards, he quickly founded Livable Rotterdam in his hometown, which won 36% of the vote in the March election, particularly shocking given that

Rotterdam had been under Labor Party control since the end of the war.310 Then for the national election in May of 2002, he formed the party List Pim Fortuyn. Amongst a wide variety of social issues, this new party demanded “a ‘zero Muslim immigration’ policy, cuts in the overall number of new immigrants allowed into the Netherlands, and more successful integration of the resident immigrant population.”311 With this anti-immigrant platform, the List Pim Fortuyn won 26 seats in the lower house of the Dutch parliament. However, Fortuyn did not witness his party’s success. Just days before the election, Fortuyn was murdered on the streets of Hilversum by an animal rights advocate named Volkert van der Graaf.312 While the List Pim Fortuyn collapsed a few months after the election, the lasting impact of Pim Fortuyn was substantial. By discussing issues that were considered to be taboo in the multicultural Netherlands, he resonated with the public. This forced mainstream political parties to finally take up these topics. In short, Fortuyn

“made the issues of Islam and migration a normal part of political discourse.”313

The debate further intensified two years later. On November 2, 2004, Theo van Gogh was murdered in broad daylight on the streets of Amsterdam by a second generation Dutch-Moroccan man named Mohammed Bouyeri. Theo van Gogh was firm director and author, who was “known

309 Frank Poorthuis and Hans Wansink, “De islam is een achterlijke cultuur,” de Volkskrant, February 9, 2002, http://www.volkskrant.nl/den_haag/article153195.ece/De_islam_is_een_achterlijke_cultuur. 310 Ireland, Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State, 131. 311 Ibid., 131-132. 312 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 40. 313 Kremer, The Netherlands: From National Identity to Plural Identifications, 8.

107 less for his films than for his provocative statements on radio and television.”314 Unlike Fortuyn,

Theo van Gogh was murdered by an Islamic extremist, and although van Gogh did not have the same political impact, his murder rocked the Netherlands. It reinforced the idea that Fortuyn had brought to the fore: “that tolerance and multiculturalism Netherlands-style had proven largely unsuccessful.”315

This idea was not just embraced by the Dutch public, but also the government. In 2004, the Dutch government rejected multiculturalism as a guiding principle for immigrant integration, asserting that it failed to address the issues facing immigrants. Multiculturalism was thus abandoned in favor of a focus on ‘common citizenship.’ This approach indicated a slightly more assimilationist turn and defined ‘being Dutch’ by the adherence to certain social and cultural practices.316 Furthermore, now the Dutch government sought to eliminate the social-cultural differences, that they now believed inhibited socioeconomic participation.317 This put further requirements on immigrants in order to be considered integrated citizens. By 2007, the Dutch government had put civic integration tests about Dutch society and language in place for non-

Western third country nationals entering the country. Those that fail this test are denied admission into the Netherlands. Furthermore, there are restrictions for those immigrants already living in the Netherlands. For example, lack of sufficient Dutch language skills can be grounds to reduce social welfare assistance.318

Furthermore, there are other right-wing anti-immigrant parties that have followed the failed List Pim Fortuyn. Founded in 2006, the most successful PVV is led by Geert Wilders and

314 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 2. 315 Joanne van Selm, “The Netherlands: Death of a Filmmaker Shakes a Nation,” Migration Policy Institute, October 1, 2005, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/netherlands-death-filmmaker-shakes-nation. 316 Kremer, The Netherlands: From National Identity to Plural Identifications, 1. 317 Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, 78. 318 Kremer, The Netherlands: From National Identity to Plural Identifications., 9.

108 largely seeks to build off of what Pim Fortuyn began. Like the List Pim Fortuyn, the PVV is nationalist, anti-establishment, and above all highly skeptical of immigration and Islam. With this platform, the PVV won 15.5% of the vote for the Dutch parliament in 2010 and made it the third largest party in the Netherlands.319 Thus, the Netherlands has seen a rightward turn.

The Current Dutch Immigration Policy Recent Policy Developments Since the introduction of civic integration courses in 2007, Dutch immigration and integration policy has become more restrictive. As of 2010, family members of asylum seekers were no longer guaranteed asylum status.320 Two years later, the Dutch government limited family unification to married couples or those with registered partnerships.321

However, more extensive changes came in 2013. After a series of pilot projects, the

Netherlands adopted two new immigration laws, the Modern Migration Policy Act (MMPA) and the National Visa Act in 2013. The two new laws marked a series of changes, but perhaps the most important change came in the form of sponsorship. The MMPA enhanced the role of business of citizen sponsors in the admission process. Under this new law, sponsors and immigrants are mandated to keep and provide the government with accurate, up-to-date information and allows sponsors to submit a residence permit application for an immigrant.322

The IND maintains that the MMPA accelerates the admission process by consolidating the processes of applying for provisional and long-term residency permits.323

319 Ibid., 3-4. 320 European Commission, Developments in Dutch Migration and Asylum Policy (European Migration Network, May 2011). 321 European Commission, Country Fact Sheet: Netherlands 2012 (European Migration Network, 2013). 322 Wendy Zeldin, The Netherlands: Immigration (Law Library of Congress, April 2013), 2. 323 Ibid., 4.

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Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Controversies Yet while there haven’t been monumental changes in immigration policy since the official introduction of civic integration in 2007, xenophobia has been on the rise. For nearly a decade, Geert Wilders has been the leader of the PVV, denouncing not just radical jihad but all of Islam. Similarly, the PVV seeks to severely restrict immigration, particularly from places like

Morocco. Even before the rise of Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders, there has been a strand of xenophobia woven throughout Dutch society. In an interview with author Ian Buruma, conservative politician Frits Bolkestein stated, “One must never underestimate the degree of hatred that Dutch people feel for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. My political success is based on the fact that I was prepared to listen to such people.”324 Wilders has similarly capitalized on this xenophobia. Wilders does not just advocate for restricted immigration. He has compared the Qur’an to Mein Kampf and “said that immigrant Muslims should be deported if they break the law, or engage in behavior he has described as ‘problematic’ or they are ‘lazy.’”325

Yet despite these comments, Wilders has received support from a sizable portion of the Dutch population by feeding off of Dutch fears of Islam. While Wilders’ PVV has been able to maintain popularity, the Pegida movement has not yet spread fully to the Netherlands. As of now, there have been no Pegida rallies and the Dutch movement remains small.

Political vitriol from Wilders and other PVV politicians is the not the only form of xenophobia in the Netherlands. As of 2014, a quarter of the Dutch population has claimed to experience some form of racism or xenophobia in the past twelve months.326 Reports from the

Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP, Social and Cultural Planning Office) indicate severe job

324 Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, 64. 325 Steven Erlanger, “Amid Rise of Multiculturalism, Dutch Confront Their Questions of Identity,” The New York Times, August 14, 2011. 326 “Older Job Hunters Say They Face Age Discrimination, Race Also an Issue,” DutchNews.nl, January 24, 2014, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/01/older_job_hunters_say_they_fac/.

110 discrimination for both youths and adults. According to a 2012 report, after being interviewed, native Dutch candidates are offered the job 44% of the time, as compared with 23% for those with an ethnic minority background.327 This is not limited to ethnic minority youths. 20% to 40% of older adults claim that they have faced job discrimination, due upon their background.328

Internationally, Dutch xenophobia has not gone unnoticed. In a 2013 interview with the newspaper Trouw, the Romanian labor minister claimed there is “almost no country in Europe as xenophobic as the Netherlands.”329 A year later, the Turkish Foreign Ministry chastised the

Netherlands, claiming that Turkish immigrants were being discriminated against.330

Conclusion The Netherlands accepted its immigration country status relatively early and created its first integration policy in the 1980s. Since then, the country has changed integration philosophies drastically, going from a very multicultural approach to rejected multiculturalism outright in

2004. After that, civic integration and the creation of a Dutch identity, which revolved around adherence to societal and cultural norms, became the basis for immigrant integration. Also during this period, the rise of Geert Wilders’ PVV party revealed a deep-rooted discontent about

Dutch immigration policy and Muslim immigrants in particular. Moroccan immigrants, who are largely considered the least integrated of all Dutch immigrant groups, experiencing higher levels of unemployment, have been the target of this right-wing ire. Thus while the Netherlands scored the highest on the integration index, there are still deep-rooted issues, controversies, and unequal outcomes within the country.

327 “Ethnic Minority Youngsters Do Face Jobs Discrimination: New Report,” DutchNews.nl, December 17, 2012, http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2012/12/ethnic_minority_youngsters_do/. 328 “Older Job Hunters Say They Face Age Discrimination, Race Also an Issue.” 329 Niels Mark and Laura van Baars, “‘Bijna Geen Land in Europa Zo Xenofoob Als Nederland,’” Trouw, October 9, 2013, http://s.trouw.nl/3506683. 330 Thomas Escritt, “Dutch Lawmakers Demand Explanation from Turkey over Race Spat,” Reuters, November 28, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/28/us-netherlands-turkey-idUSKCN0JC1Q820141128.

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Chapter VIII: Qualitative Analysis

The Netherlands, Germany, and Austria face similar problems when it comes to integrating immigrants. For decades, each country has had a starkly segmented workforce with immigrants overrepresented in unskilled jobs and in the unemployment numbers. This has only recently begun to improve, but there is still a strong divide, even for second and third generation immigrants in some cases. Similar disparities exist amongst education outcomes for immigrants and the second and third generations. In many cases, immigrants lack political power, and in a majority of cases, they also face discrimination in a variety of arenas from the classroom to job interviews to the street. Yet while each of these countries and the immigrants within them has similar problems (and much work to do), each of them occupies a very different position within the index. The reason for this stems from the quantitative hypotheses tested earlier. In particular, the Netherlands dominance across the integration index originates from its early acceptance of its status as an immigration country and its government’s active role in creating integration policy.

Comparing Immigration Histories These three case studies all began as self-described ‘non-immigration countries.’ Each had had such a strong history of emigration prior to World War II that the mindset continued after the war, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. The first evidence was the guest worker policy. Germany’s guest worker policy began the earliest. It’s first labor treaty was signed with

Italy in 1955 and throughout the course of the 1960s signed seven more treaties with Spain,

Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia. Austria and the Netherlands came to the game quite a bit later, beginning to sign labor treaties in the early and mid-1960s.

However, the countries with whom they signed these treaties were similar, the most important being Turkey. In each of these countries, vast numbers of guest workers streamed in, and in order to try and stem the tide, each of the countries tried to implement a rotation mandate.

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However, in each of these countries, the legislation either did not pass or was ineffective. In

Austria, despite laws mandating a limit on the maximum stay, employers did not wish to retrain employees and thus guest workers remained in the country much longer than originally intended.331 In both the Netherlands and Germany, maximum stay clauses were never enacted, and thus attempts to limit the number of guest workers in this fashion were ineffective.332 In the

Netherlands, other provisions were enacted (such as requiring prospective foreign workers to acquire work permits in their home countries), but they proved to be not easily enforceable.333

Even after these programs ended their active recruitment in 1973, the numbers of immigrants streaming into the country continued to rise due to family reunification, contrary to the expectation of the Dutch, German, and Austrian governments.334

Guest workers were not the only immigrants coming into these countries during the course of the Cold War. In Austria, due to its geographic position in Europe, Cold War refugees flooded into the country. At first these refugees were welcomed, as they symbolically proved the dominance of the Western system. However, over the course of the 1990s, Austria tried to restrict the number of people applying for asylum, especially Romanians and Bosnians.335 In

Germany, there were fewer post-war and Cold War refugees. In the immediate years after World

War II, a series of ethnic Germans, known as the Aussiedler, were driven out of parts of Eastern

Europe and were granted automatic citizenship and other perks, such as housing priority and government-funded language courses.336 After the division of Germany, refugees from East

331 Fassmann, Stacher, and Strasser, “Einleitung: Zweck des Berichts, zentrale Begriffe und inhaltliche Gliederung," 22. 332 Triadafilopoulos and Schönwälder, “How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms," 8. 333 van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy," 141-142. 334 Fassmann, Stacher, and Strasser, “Einleitung: Zweck des Berichts, zentrale Begriffe und inhaltliche Gliederung,” 22; Klopp, German Multiculturalism, 39; van Amersfoort, “Migration Control and Minority Policy: The Case of the Netherlands,” 148. 335 Bauböck, “Immigration Control without Integration Policy: An Austrian Dilemma,” 105-107, 119-124. 336 Rudolph, “Dynamics of Immigration in a Nonimmigrant Country: Germany,” 115.

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Germany, the Übersiedler, were also granted automatic West German citizenship and money upon arrival. The Netherlands lacked this type of massive Cold War asylum-seeker immigration.

Instead, a large number of immigrants to the Netherlands came from newly independent Dutch colonies. This first began with the independence of Indonesia in 1949, wherein many mix race

Dutch citizens (Indische Nederlander), colonizers (known by the Malay word totoks), and

Moluccans came back to the country. In the case of the Indische Nederlander and the totoks, since they already had Dutch citizenship, the Dutch government did not make any attempts at creating an integration policy. Moluccans were treated differently. From the beginning it was assumed that they would return to Indonesia when an independent Moluccan Republic was created, an event that never occurred. Thus, there was also no integration policy for the

Moluccans either.337 Additional immigrants came to the Netherlands from Suriname, which gained independence in 1975. Surinamese immigration post-independence largely came from the lower classes and varied ethnic groups. Like the Indonesians, due to their possession of Dutch citizenship and the Dutch government’s assumption that they would return to their home country, the Dutch government did not develop an integration policy right away.338

Testing Hypotheses Using the information from these case studies, I shall test how they hold up against the quantitative hypotheses. Within the multivariate regressions, nine of the ten hypotheses proved significant across one of the scores, and thus we shall examine these three case studies first through this lens. However, some of the hypotheses can be thrown out. First, the Western country hypothesis is not a relevant explanation for these case studies as all three are Western countries. Similarly, the Economist Democracy Index score is likely insignificant, as all three

337 van Amersfoort and van Niekerk, “Immigration as a Colonial Inheritance: Post-Colonial Immigrants in the Netherlands, 1945–2002,” 325-331. 338 Ibid, 333-337.

114 countries have similar scores and are considered ‘full democracies.’339,340 In addition, the GDP per capita in each of these countries is relatively high with Germany at €27,900, Austria at

€30,800, and the Netherlands at €32,700. Finally, the differences in multicultural policies are similarly negligible. Despite its history of multicultural policies, the Netherlands rejection of them in 2004 and subsequent role back has been quite extensive. Thus, the difference between

Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands in multicultural policies as of 2009 is small, with Austria scoring a 1.5, the Netherlands a 2, and Germany a 2.5 and placing them all in the ‘weak multicultural policies’ category.

Hypothesis: Countries with a higher proportion of non-EU immigrants will have a lower integration score. First, we shall examine the effects of the presence of non-EU immigrants within each of these countries. As previously noted, the presence of Turkish immigrants in each of these countries (and Moroccans in the Netherlands) has proven to be very controversial with right- wing parties, such as the PVV or the FPÖ, or protests groups like Pegida blaming them for higher crime rates and using them to stir fears of fundamentalist Islam. In addition, these groups have also been blamed for their failure to integrate.

Yet, what Figure 8.1 shows is that the presence of non-EU immigrants does not necessarily correlate with lower integration scores. In 2009, the Netherlands did have a much smaller percentage of non-EU immigrants relative to the overall immigrant population, but the

German and Austrian numbers do not match with the hypothesis. As of 2009, Germany had a significantly higher percentage of non-EU immigrants relative to the overall immigrant population, and yet did distinctly better than Austria in the integration index. Furthermore, the

339 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat (The Economist, 2010), 3. 340 According to the Democracy Index, the Netherlands ranks 10th with 8.99. Austria is 13th with 8.49, and Germany is 14th with 8.38.

115 percentage of non-EU immigrants to the total population in each of these countries is comparably small varying between 0.17% and 0.33%.

FIGURE 8.1 Percentage of Non-EU Immigrants to Total Immigrant Population, 2009-2012

45%

40%

35% Netherlands Germany 30% Austria

25%

20% 2009 2010 2011 2012

Eurostat

Thus the effects of non-EU immigrants in these three case studies must be brought into question. While the lower percentage of non-EU immigrants could potential make integration easier in the Netherlands, the significantly larger percentage of non-EU immigrants in Germany in 2009 leads one to question its importance.

Hypothesis: Countries with a higher proportion of Muslims will have a lower integration score than those without. Muslims also tend to be grouped in the same category as non-EU immigrants by many radical right-wing parties, and there is some overlap when examining these two groups, as many

Turks (and Moroccans in the case of the Netherlands) are Muslim. In particular, many politicians have argued that Islam is in direct conflict with the fundamental tenets of Western society and

116 thus many Muslims do not wish to integrate into Western society. This claim is only further reinforced by stories of Islamic extremism, such as the murder of Theo van Gogh or the Charlie

Hebdo attacks.

Table 8.2 Muslims Relative to the Total Population, 2009 Muslims Total Population Percentage The Netherlands 353,000 16,485,787 2.14% Germany 4,026,000 82,002,356 4.91% Austria 946,000 8,335,003 11.35% Pew Research and Eurostat

The evidence presented in Table 8.2 would appear to suggest that the percentage of

Muslims does indeed play a role in the level of integration in a country. This result brings up images that politicians frequently mention: the proclivity of Muslims to create separate communities and thus hinder their integration. This issue has been brought up in each of the case studies. Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria are far more likely to live in mainly Turkish neighborhoods and to lack host-country language skills. This leaves them cut off from the rest of society and largely disadvantaged socioeconomically and academically.

Despite these accounts, the validity of this hypothesis must be drawn into question.

Within the multivariate regressions, the Muslim variable was only significant in the education category. In addition, while Austria has a much higher percentage of Muslims, the German

Muslim population is more than four times larger than the Austrian one.

Hypothesis: Countries with a strong radical right-wing party will have a lower integration score than those without one. In two of the cases, radical right-wing parties are an important part of the political landscape. In particular, Austria’s FPÖ has been a strong contender in most elections and a part of the national parliament since the early 1990s. On the other hand, the Dutch right-wing parties have been less consistent. Pim Fortuyn’s party made a relatively strong showing in the election

117 after his assassination but crumbled shortly after. A few parties have tried to follow in its foot steps, and the party that has been the most successful is Geert Wilders’ PVV, which had a strong showing in the 2010 national election but has not been as powerful since. Germany lacks any strong right-wing party similar to either the PVV or FPÖ.

While this pattern certainly doesn’t follow the proposed hypothesis, the effects of the

FPÖ on Austrian policy-making cannot be denied, particularly in relation to Germany. Germany and Austria are very similar in many regards. They have large Turkish populations, share a national language, have a similar jus sanguinis definition of citizenship, and insisted upon their status as ‘not immigration countries’ for similar periods of time. Yet, by 2009, Germany has much better immigration outcomes. At least part of this result can be attributed to the FPÖ success in Austrian politics. In 2000 (roughly the same time Chancellor Schröder proposed the

Zuwanderungsgesetz), the FPÖ won 42% of the vote in a national parliament election and created a coalition government with the ÖVP. During its seven years in the leading coalition, the

FPÖ helped to update a series of immigration laws to make them more restrictive and implemented more stringent integration measures, such as requiring more hours of language courses but cutting funding for them.341 Three years after the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition ended, the

Austrian government announced the NAPI, which expanded the focus of integration beyond language skills.342 Yet despite this liberalizing integration measure, other immigration legislation has proved to be particularly restrictive, likely due to FPÖ pressure. Thus, this continued pressure from the FPÖ has stunted Austria’s legislative ability to integrate its immigrants effectively.

341 Kraler, “The Case of Austria,” 46-47. 342 Ibid., 48.

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Hypothesis: Countries with longer-running integration policies will do better than those that have created a policy more recently. This hypothesis is the only one of the four that holds up against all three of these case studies. Despite similarities in immigration histories and guest worker programs, these countries developed integration policies at vastly different times. Unlike Germany and Austria, the Dutch government accepted far earlier that their immigrants and ethnic minorities were there to stay and decided to implement policies. This allowed the Dutch government to take an active part in immigrant integration and improve outcomes.

The Dutch policy began with a jarring report. In 1979, the Scientific Council for

Government Policy (WRR) issued a report disabusing the Dutch government of their ‘temporary residence’ fantasy and encouraging the development of policy to support the many immigrants within the country. This led to the creation of the first Dutch integration policy known as the

Minorities Policy, which aimed to increase immigrant participation in society. It did this through the “social-cultural emancipation of minority groups,” which included the promotion of immigrant (non-Dutch) language and culture classes and was believed to catalyze socioeconomic integration.343 In the 1990s, the Dutch created a new integration policy to replace the

Minorities Policy. In a reversal of the Minorities Policy, this integration policy switched the focus from socio-cultural emancipation to socioeconomic integration, believing that the latter would lead to the former. Yet the focus during this time was still very much multicultural.344 In

2004, the Dutch government rejected multiculturalism as the driving principle behind immigrant integration and took a more assimilationist turn in terms of integration policy. It defined being

Dutch by the adherence to certain societal and cultural norms, and in 2007, the Dutch

343 Scholten, Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Polucy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective, 73. 344 Ibid., 74-77.

119 government instated a series of mandatory civic integration tests for non-EU and non-Western people looking to immigrate to the Netherlands.345

Germany developed its integration policy much later. Up until the late 1990s, German politicians maintained that Germany was not an immigration country, despite a very large

Turkish minority. In 2001, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder introduced the Zuwanderungsgesetz, which in addition to providing Germany with a coherent immigration policy also marked a turning point by acknowledging Germany’s status as an immigration country.346 However, due to a series of Federal Court ruling blocking its implementation, a less far-reaching version of the law was implemented in 2005.347 Since the laws implementation, Germany has made vast strides in liberalizing its immigration policies, and in 2007, Chancellor Merkel implemented the

Nationaler Integrationsplan, a comprehensive integration plan for immigrants and those with a

‘migration background,’ which aimed to strengthen education and job prospects amongst a series of other aims.348

Austria has not been able to make the same strides. Similar to Germany, Austria maintained throughout the 20th century that it was not an immigration country and tried everything in its power to limit the number of immigrants coming into the country. Unlike

Germany, Austria has yet to have a defining point in which it acknowledges its status as an immigration country. In the early 2000’s, integration finally became a national policy-making priority, but at first, it came mainly as a series of updates to preexisting laws, such as the

Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz or the Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz. Most of these changes

345 Kremer, The Netherlands: From National Identity to Plural Identifications, 1, 9. 346 Bauder, “Media Discourse and the New German Immigration Law,” 96. 347 Ibid., 95. 348 Nationaler Integrationsplan: Erster Fortschrittsbericht.

120 were aimed at restricting immigration or coming into line with EU mandates.349 In 2010, the

Austrian government announced the Nationaler Aktionsplan für Integration. Similar to Germany, this plan targeted both immigrants and those with a ‘migration background’ and problems facing those communities, such as higher unemployment and lower levels of academic achievement.350

The Netherlands has had a series of integration plans, oscillating between strict multiculturalism and civic integration. Yet despite these changing policies, it was their simple creation of integration policies in the first place that allowed the Netherlands to become the relative integration powerhouse of Europe. These integration policies served as an acknowledgement that the government had a role to play in integration and that it was not simply up to the immigrants to integrate into society. By acknowledging the government’s role in integration, it has given it a hand in influencing the outcomes. This is an idea that the EU has only recently sought to adopt, made very clear by the “dynamic, two-way process” language in their Common Agenda for Integration.351 Austria and Germany came very late to this idea.

Through their years of claiming that they were not immigration countries, they implemented policies that made it harder to integrate into the country, such as implementing restrictive residency requirements or making it more difficult to acquire job permits. Thus, when Germany and Austria finally accepted the government’s role in integration, they not only had to create integration policies, but also undo years of policies that were hostile towards integration.

Conclusion Much of the qualitative work around integration in Europe has sought to examine the effects of one phenomenon on either one or a few countries in Europe. This analysis examines

349 Stern and Valchars, Country Report: Austria, 17. 350 Nationaler Aktionsplan Für Integration: Bericht, 19-23. 351 Commission of the European Communities, A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, 5.

121 the effects of a series of different hypotheses and conclusions on the immigration history and outcomes of the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria. Further solidifying the conclusions from the

Chapter 4, this analysis reveals that integration outcomes are determined by a series of factors.

Contrary to much of the literature, it appears that current multicultural policies have little influence on these case studies (although the influence of historical multicultural policies has not been addressed). Similarly, the Western and democracy hypotheses also play little role amongst these three case studies, as they are all western and score similarly on the Economist’s

Democracy Index. Instead, it is the percentage of Muslims, the presence of right-wing parties, and early integration policies that play a role in the outcomes of these case studies. A correlation exists within these three case studies between higher percentages of Muslims and a lower integration score, albeit with questions about the validity of the hypothesis. Furthermore, I argued that the presence of the FPÖ in Austria has stunted its creation of integration-promoting policies. Finally, the early creation of integration policies in the Netherlands helped the government take an active role and better integration outcomes.

122

Chapter IX: Conclusion

The topic of immigration into the European Union has been a hot one with equally loud and influential proponents and critics. The political debates about whether to allow immigration and how much and what to do with the immigrants already within the country have been heated.

Many countries have enacted controversial laws that disproportionately affect immigrant populations, such the recent Law on Islam in Austria. Academic debates are similarly heated with scholars debating the merits of multiculturalism or national models. Outside of initial reports commissioned by the EU, few have sought to identify and empirically test what makes an integration policy more or less effective, and even fewer have sought to compare these hypotheses against qualitative case studies. This has been the goal of this thesis.

After creating a five-category (socioeconomic, education, social inclusion/cultural, political, and attitudes of host countries) definition of integration and identifying indicators within each of these categories, I created an integration index, ranking each country on a scale of

100. I tested these scores against nine hypotheses of which eight where significant, most notably the effect of early integration policies. The results of this analysis brought to attention the need to measure outcomes separately from policy and also the need for more nuanced literature on the subject. Most importantly, however, this analysis showed the importance of early integration policies across the integration score and three of the five categories, thus implying that the government plays a key role in the process of integration.

The three case studies allowed us to further explore these hypotheses. The Netherlands,

Germany, and Austria have a similar history of immigration, as each of them had a guest worker program in the 1960s, which attracted a series of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe,

North Africa, and Turkey. (The Netherlands also had a series of important colonial immigrants

123 during this period.) Yet despite this clear immigration, each of these countries insisted that they were not an immigration country. The Netherlands was the first to drop the myth of temporary residence and implemented its first integration policy in the 1980s. Germany and Austria followed, albeit more than thirty years later. Furthermore, the enduring presence and political power of the right-wing FPÖ in Austria has kept its immigration and integration policy highly restrictive. These factors have all contributed to these highly disparate outcomes. The delayed creation of integration policies in Germany and Austria not only prevented the government from playing a strong role in influencing integration outcomes but also due to the strong denial of their status as immigration countries, brought in a series of restrictive integration-prohibitive policies.

This conclusion appears to doom those that developed integration policies later to inferior integration outcomes. Yet, Germany proves this is not the case. Germany and Austria were largely at the same place in 2000. Neither had a coherent immigration policy and lacked any kind of integration policy. Each had a similar make-up of immigrants, largely from Turkey and

Eastern Europe, and a similarly strict jus sanguinis notion of citizenship. Nevertheless by 2009,

Germany was in a vastly different place than Austria in terms of integration. One could attribute this to the more liberal German reforms as compared to their Austrian neighbors. Thus, while those with early integration policies tend to do better than those without them, this does not condemn those countries with more recent integration policies to lesser integration outcomes.

Further Questions Finally, the question of where do we go. There are many questions involving integration that have yet to be answered and issues that must be addressed. One critical issue is the lack of immigrant-related statistics across all EU countries. This is especially poignant given that many indicators suggested by the Zaragoza Declaration are not kept by Eurostat or lack data for every country in the EU. Additionally, some of the indicators lack data particularly for third country

124 nationals, thus making it even more difficult to quantify the situation of non-EU immigrants.

Better statistics could also pave the way for not just more and better indicators, but also for outcomes indices for specific ethnic minorities across Europe.

The most natural extension of this study would lead to the inclusion of more indicators and creating indices for multiple years. Including more indicators (such as immigrant language acquisition or immigrant voting rates) and better-kept statistics could give us a more complete picture of the integration across the EU. Additionally, creating indices for multiple years could indicate which countries are consistently the strongest integrators and how the rankings have changed along with policy changes. Furthermore, it could indicate the impacts of phenomenon like economic recessions or changes in political parties on integration.

In addition, these results call attention to the importance of institutions in integration.

Both the quantitative and qualitative results suggest that there is a positive connection between institutions and integration. Yet, most of the integration literature neglects to examine this. Thus, further studies could study integration thorough a historic institutionalist lens.

Finally, this study brings into question the relationship between policies and outcomes.

As observed in the quantitative analysis, there is a discrepancy between the variables that influenced the policy-oriented categories (education and political) and the strictly outcome categories (socioeconomic and cultural). Namely, earlier integration policies had a considerable impact on the overall integration scores and the education and political scores, but did not have the same significance on the socioeconomic and cultural scores. These scores were not as well explained by the stated hypotheses and the hypotheses that did have significance were the GDP per capita and democracy scores. This begs a very obvious question: do integration policies actually have significant impacts on integration outcomes?

125

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Appendix I The Scoring System 1 point 2 points 3 points 4 points 5 points Indicators Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Socioeconomic Indicators Unemployment Gap -14.1 -10.35 -10.35 -6.6 -6.6 -2.85 -2.85 0.9 Unemployment Rate 18.3 22 14.5 18.25 10.75 14.5 7 10.75 -11 -8 -8 -5 -5 -2 Gendered Unemployment Gap 8 11 5 8 2 5 -2 2 3 6 Employment Gap -18 -12 -12 -6 -6 -3 -3 3 Employment Rate 50 55.75 55.75 61.5 61.5 67.25 67.25 73 24 36 -18 -12 -12 -6 Gendered Employment Gap 12 24 6 12 -6 6 Median Net Income 4,232 8,519 8,519 12,806 12,806 17,093 17,093 21,380 -3,000 -1,500 Median Net Income Gap -9,000 -6,000 -6,000 -3,000 1,500 3,000 -1,500 1,500 Education Indicators Share of Early Leavers Gap -24.8 -19.46 -19.46 -14.12 -14.12 -8.78 -8.78 -3.44 -3.44 1.9 Share of Early Leavers 41.2 49 33.4 41.2 25.6 33.4 17.8 25.6 10 17.8 Highest Educational Attainment 10 16.6 16.6 23.2 23.2 29.8 29.8 36.4 36.4 43 Education Promotes Social Integration 0 25 50 Support for Migrants 0 50 100 Education Access Score 0 50 100 Cultural/Social Inclusion Indicators -38.79 -30.17 -30.17 -21.55 -21.55 -12.93 -12.93 -4.31 -4.31 4.31 At-Risk of Poverty Gap 4.31 12.93 At-Risk of Poverty Rate 42.2 49.8 34.6 42.2 27 34.6 19.4 27 11.8 19.4 -9.75 -3.25 Children at-risk of Poverty Gap -29.25 -22.75 -22.75 -16.25 -16.25 -9.75 3.25 9.75 -3.25 3.25 Children at-risk of Poverty Rate 36.4 42.6 30.2 36.4 24 30.2 17.8 24 11.6 17.8 Overcrowding Gap -50.3 -39.9 -39.9 -29.5 -29.5 -19.1 -19.1 -8.7 -8.7 1.7 Overcrowding 48 60 36 48 24 36 12 24 0 12 Ratio of Property Owners 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 1 1 1.3 1.3 1.6 Ratio of Property Owners Gap 4.64 5.7 3.58 4.64 2.52 3.58 1.46 2.52 0.4 1.46

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1 point 2 points 3 points 4 points 5 points Indicators Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Political Indicators Estimated Naturalization Rate 0.22 1.51 1.51 2.8 2.8 4.09 4.09 5.38 2.5 points Civil Liberties Score 0 50 100 2.5 points Dual Nationality Laws 0 50 100 None Reciprocity Long-Term Residence 5 years 4 years 3 years Registration Local Voting Laws 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 No provisions More than 10 years residence 6-10 years Registration Unrestricted Jus Soli Laws 1 2 3 3.5 4 Attitudes of Host Recipient Countries Highest Elected Official 3.5 4.4 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.2 6.2 7.1 7.1 8 Specialized Agency Score 0 50 100 Immigrants Enrich Cultural Life 7 21.6 21.6 36.2 36.2 50.8 50.8 65.4 65.4 80 Immigrants and Unemployment 78.2 90 66.4 78.2 54.6 66.4 42.8 54.6 31 42.8

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Appendix II Socioeconomic Data Annual Unemployment Rate (Percent) Country Third Country Overall Total Rate Gap Gap Score Rate Score Nationals Score Austria 4.8 11 -6.2 3 3 3 Belgium 7.9 22 -14.1 1 1 1 Cyprus 5.4 8 -2.6 4 4 4 Czech Republic 6.7 8 -1.3 4 4 4 Denmark 6 10 -4 3 4 3.5 Estonia 13.5 15 -1.5 4 2 3 Finland 8.2 16 -7.8 2 2 2 France 9.1 17 -7.9 2 2 2 Germany 7.8 15 -7.2 2 2 2 Greece 9.6 11 -1.4 4 3 3.5 Hungary 10 9.1a 0.9 4 3 3.5 Ireland 12 14 -2 4 3 3.5 Italy 7.8 11 -3.2 3 3 3 Latvia 17.5 18 -0.5 4 2 3 Lithuania 13.8 14 -0.2 4 3 3.5 Luxembourg 5.1 14 -8.9 2 3 2.5 Malta 6.9 8.4b -1.5 4 4 4 Netherlands 3.7 7 -3.3 3 4 3.5 Poland 8.1 11.6a -3.476 3 3 3 Portugal 10.6 14 -3.4 3 3 3 Slovakia 12.1 13.3a -1.2 4 3 3.5 Slovenia 5.9 8 -2.1 4 4 4 Spain 17.9 28 -10.1 2 1 1.5 Sweden 8.3 18 -9.7 2 2 2 United Kingdom 7.5 10 -2.5 4 4 4 Eurostat Labor Force Survey a. OECD International Migration Outlook 2011 (foreign number, not third country national) b. Foreign-born number, not third country national 138

Gender Gap Unemployment Rate (Percent) Country Third Country Third Country Overall Gap Gap Score Multiplier National Male National Female Score Austria 12 9 3 3 0.75 2.25 Belgium 22 21 -1 4 0.75 3 Cyprus 14 4 -10 1 0.75 0.75 Czech Republic 7 8 1 4 1 4 Denmark 10 9 -1 4 1 4 Estonia 18 13 -5 3 0.75 2.25 Finland 16 17 1 4 0.75 3 France 16 17 1 4 0.75 3 Germany 16 14 -2 4 0.75 3 Greece 10 14 4 3 0.75 2.25 Hungary 8.6a 9.5a 0.9 4 1 4 Ireland 17 11 -6 2 0.75 1.5 Italy 9 13 4 3 0.75 2.25 Latvia 22 15 -7 2 0.75 1.5 Lithuania 16 11.8a -4.2 3 0.75 2.25 Luxembourg 9 20 11 1 0.75 0.75 Malta 9.6b 7.05c -2.55 3 1 3 Netherlands 8 7 -1 4 1 4 Poland 12.2a 10.9a -1.3 4 0.75 3 Portugal 15 12 -3 3 0.75 2.25 Slovakia 12.5a 14.3a 1.8 4 0.75 3 Slovenia 8 7 -1 4 1 4 Spain 31 24 -7 2 0.75 1.5 Sweden 19 18 -1 4 0.75 3 United Kingdom 10 10 0 4 1 4 Eurostat Labor Force Survey a. OECD International Migration Outlook 2011 (foreign number, not third country national) b. Born outside EU-25, not third country national c. Calculated from total and male data and population sizes 139

Employment Rate (Percent) Country Third Country Overall Total Gap Gap Score Rate Score National Score Austria 75 64 -11 2 3 2.5 Belgium 67 50 -17 1 1 1 Cyprus 76 72 -4 3 4 3.5 Czech Republic 71 73 2 4 4 4 Denmark 78 68 -10 2 4 3 Estonia 70 68 -2 4 4 4 Finland 74 62 -12 2 3 2.5 France 70 57 -13 1 2 1.5 Germany 74 61 -13 1 2 1.5 Greece 66 71 5 3 4 3.5 Hungary 61 66 5 3 3 3 Ireland 67 61 -6 3 2 2.5 Italy 62 66 4 3 3 3 Latvia 67 64 -3 4 3 3.5 Lithuania 67 66 -1 4 3 3.5 Luxembourg 70 65 -5 3 3 3 Malta 59 65 6 3 3 3 Netherlands 79 66 -13 1 3 2 Poland 65 53 -12 2 1 1.5 Portugal 71 73 2 4 4 4 Slovakia 66 70 4 3 4 3.5 Slovenia 72 67 -5 3 3 3 Spain 64 61 -3 4 2 3 Sweden 78 60 -18 1 2 1.5 United Kingdom 74 64 -10 2 3 2.5 Eurostat Labor Force Survey

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Gender Employment Rate (Percent) Country Third Country Third Country Gap Gap Score Multiplier Overall Score National Male National Female Austria 72 56 16 2 1 2 Belgium 60 39 21 2 0.75 1.5 Cyprus 64 78 -14 2 1 2 Czech Republic 82 64 18 2 1 2 Denmark 74 62 12 3 1 3 Estonia 69 68 1 4 1 4 Finland 70 54 16 2 0.75 1.5 France 66 49 17 2 0.75 1.5 Germany 71 52 19 2 0.75 1.5 Greece 86 53 33 1 0.75 0.75 Hungary 78 59 19 2 1 2 Ireland 69 53 16 2 0.75 1.5 Italy 82 50 32 1 0.75 0.75 Latvia 65 62 3 4 1 4 Lithuania 67 64 3 4 1 4 Luxembourg 79 51 28 1 0.75 0.75 Malta 82 48 34 1 0.75 0.75 Netherlands 76 57 19 2 1 2 Poland 63 47 16 2 0.75 1.5 Portugal 78 69 9 3 1 3 Slovakia 72.2a 71 1.2 4 1 4 Slovenia 72 61 11 3 1 3 Spain 63 58 5 4 1 4 Sweden 66 55 11 3 1 3 United Kingdom 75 54 21 2 0.75 1.5 Eurostat Labor Force Survey a. OECD International Migration Outlook 2011 (foreign number, not third country national)

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Median Net Income (€) Country EU Citizens (not Third Country Number Overall Gap Gap Score reporting country) National Score Score Austria 16,890 15,075 -1,815 3 3 3 Belgium 18,000 11,659 -6,341 1 2 1.5 Cyprus 14,325 12,765 -1,560 3 2 2.5 Czech Republic 7,798 6,805 -993 4 1 2.5 Denmark 26,292 18,930 -7,362 1 4 2.5 Estonia 7,261 5,242 -2,019 3 1 2 Finland 18,201 14,775 -3,426 2 3 2.5 France 18,952 12,415 -6,537 1 2 1.5 Germany 19,191 13,483 -5,708 2 3 2.5 Greece 9,000 8,400 -600 4 1 2.5 Hungary 4,919 9,413 4,494 2 2 2 Ireland 22,432 19,530 -2,902 3 4 3.5 Italy 13,377 11,700 -1,677 3 2 2.5 Latvia 3,697 4,926 1,229 4 1 2.5 Lithuania 4,168a 4,232 64 4 1 2.5 Luxembourg 28,790 21,380 -7,410 1 4 2.5 Malta 13,056 12,380 -676 4 2 3 Netherlands 19,351 16,922 -2,429 3 3 3 Poland 5,689a 6,872 1,183 4 1 2.5 Portugal 8,678 6,979 -1,699 3 1 2 Slovakia 6,944 4,319a -2,625 3 1 2 Slovenia 10,737 8,381 -2,356 3 1 2 Spain 12,500 10,278 -2,222 3 2 2.5 Sweden 20,178 13,749 -6,429 1 3 2 United Kingdom 16,199 14,216 -1,983 3 3 3 Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions a. 2008 Eurostat data for median net income

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Education Data Share of Early Leavers from Education Country Third Country Overall Total Gap Gap Score Rate Score Nationals Score Austria 8.7 27 -18.3 2 3 2.5 Belgium 11.1 23 -11.9 3 4 3.5 Cyprus 11.7 26 -14.3 2 3 2.5 Czech Republic 5.4 14 -8.6 4 5 4.5 Denmark 11.3 16 -4.7 4 5 4.5 Estonia 13.5 25a -11.5 3 4 3.5 Finland 9.9 22 -12.1 3 4 3.5 France 12.2 23 -10.8 3 4 3.5 Germany 11.1 24 -12.9 3 4 3.5 Greece 14.2 49 -34.8 1 1 1 Hungary 11.2 18b -6.8 4 4 4 Ireland 11.7 13a -1.3 5 5 5 Italy 19.2 44 -24.8 1 1 1 Latvia 14.3 23a -8.7 4 4 4 Lithuania 8.7 11c -2.3 5 5 5 Luxembourg 7.7 12a -4.3 4 5 4.5 Malta 27.1 46c -18.9 2 1 1.5 Netherlands 10.9 15 -4.1 4 5 4.5 Poland 5.3 4c 1.3 5 5 5 Portugal 30.9 29 1.9 5 3 4 Slovakia 4.9 10c -5.1 4 5 4.5 Slovenia 5.3 13 -7.7 4 5 4.5 Spain 30.9 46 -15.1 2 1 1.5 Sweden 7 15 -8 4 5 4.5 United Kingdom 15.7 10 5.7 5 5 5 Eurostat Labor Force Survey a. Foreign number, not third country national b. Foreign-born number c. Calculated by adding the percentage of those with a tertiary or secondary education and subtracting from 100 143

Share of Population with Highest Educational Attainment (Tertiary) Country Third Country Total Score Nationals Austria 18 13 1 Belgium 32 26 3 Cyprus 34 34 4 Czech Republic 15 23 2 Denmark 31 29 3 Estonia 33 38 5 Finland 34 28 3 France 28 26 3 Germany 24 17 2 Greece 22 13 1 Hungary 19 43 5 Ireland 35 61 5 Italy 14 12 1 Latvia 24 26 3 Lithuania 29 31 4 Luxembourg 33 39 5 Malta 13 20 2 Netherlands 31 24 3 Poland 20 31 4 Portugal 14 18 2 Slovakia 15 38a 5 Slovenia 21 10 1 Spain 29 19 2 Sweden 31 30 4 United Kingdom 32 36 4 Eurostat Labor Force Survey a. Foreign number, not third country national

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Access to Education Country Access to & Support for Access to Compulsory- Support to Access Access to Access to Participate Overall Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Pre-Primary Education Age Education Secondary Education Vocational Training in Higher Education Score Austria 100 5 50 3 50 3 50 3 100 5 3.8 Belgium 50 3 100 5 100 5 50 3 50 3 3.8 Cyprus 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 3 Czech Republic 0 1 100 5 0 1 0 1 50 3 2.2 Denmark 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 50 3 3.8 Estonia 50 3 100 5 0 1 50 3 100 5 3.4 Finland 100 5 50 3 50 3 100 5 100 5 4.2 France 50 3 50 3 0 1 50 3 50 3 2.6 Germany 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 3 Greece 50 3 100 5 50 3 50 3 50 3 3.4 Hungary 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 Ireland 50 3 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.2 Italy 50 3 100 5 0 1 50 3 0 1 2.6 Latvia 0 1 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.8 Lithuania 0 1 50 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.4 Luxembourg 50 3 100 5 50 3 0 1 50 3 3 Malta 50 3 50 3 0 1 50 3 0 1 2.2 Netherlands 100 5 100 5 50 3 50 3 100 5 4.2 Poland 50 3 100 5 50 3 50 3 50 3 3.4 Portugal 50 3 100 5 100 5 100 5 100 5 4.6 Slovakia 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 Slovenia 100 5 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.6 Spain 50 3 100 5 50 3 50 3 50 3 3.4 Sweden 50 3 50 3 100 5 50 3 50 3 3.4 United Kingdom 50 3 50 3 100 5 50 3 50 3 3.4 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Data

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Supporting Measures Country Measures to Support Migrants in Measures to Promote Social Overall Rating Rating the Education of their Children Integration through Education Score Austria 0 1 0 1 1 Belgium 50 3 50 5 4 Cyprus 0 1 50 5 3 Czech Republic 0 1 0 1 1 Denmark 100 5 50 5 5 Estonia 50 3 0 1 2 Finland 100 5 0 1 3 France 0 1 0 1 1 Germany 50 3 50 5 4 Greece 0 1 25 3 2 Hungary 0 1 0 1 1 Ireland 0 1 0 1 1 Italy 50 3 50 5 4 Latvia 0 1 0 1 1 Lithuania 0 1 0 1 1 Luxembourg 50 3 0 1 2 Malta 0 1 0 1 1 Netherlands 0 1 50 5 3 Poland 0 1 0 1 1 Portugal 50 3 0 1 2 Slovakia 0 1 0 1 1 Slovenia 0 1 0 1 1 Spain 50 3 0 1 2 Sweden 100 5 50 5 5 United Kingdom 0 1 50 5 3 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

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Social Inclusion/Culture Data At-Risk of Poverty Rate Country Third Country Overall Native Born Gap Gap Score Rate Score Nationals Score Austria 10.9 33.9 -23.0 2 3 2.5 Belgium 11.8 49.8 -38.0 1 1 1 Cyprus 15.4 35.7 -20.3 3 2 2.5 Czech Republic 7.2 20.3 -13.1 3 4 3.5 Denmark 13 32.5 -19.5 3 3 3 Estonia 18.7 25.6 -6.9 4 4 4 Finland 13.7 40.0 -26.3 2 2 2 France 10.2 43.8 -33.6 1 1 1 Germany 15.5 28.7 -13.2 3 3 3 Greece 17.7 36.5 -18.8 3 2 2.5 Hungary 10.5 19.3 -8.8 4 5 4.5 Ireland 13.6 17.4 -3.8 5 5 5 Italy 16.3 31.5 -15.2 3 3 3 Latvia 25.4 28.8 -3.4 5 3 4 Lithuania 19.6 10.9 8.7 4 5 4.5 Luxembourg 7.9 39.6 -31.7 1 2 1.5 Malta 13.3 12.2 1.1 5 5 5 Netherlands 9 28.3 -19.3 3 3 3 Poland 16.1 16.9 -0.8 5 5 5 Portugal 16.9 11.8 5.1 4 5 4.5 Slovakia 9.7 14.1a -4.4 4 5 4.5 Slovenia 10.8 35.4 -24.6 2 2 2 Spain 17.4 30.9 -13.5 3 3 3 Sweden 11.6 46.2 -34.6 1 1 1 United Kingdom 15.4 27.8 -12.4 3 3 3 Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions a. Foreign-born data, not third country national 147

Children at-Risk of Poverty Rate Country Foreign-Born Normal Native Parents Gap Rating Total Score Parents Rating Austria 9.8 32.4 -22.6 2 2 2.0 Belgium 10.4 33.6 -23.2 1 2 1.5 Cyprus 9.5 22.9 -13.4 3 4 3.5 Czech Republic 12.1 35.7 -23.6 1 2 1.5 Denmark 7.9 26.2 -18.3 2 3 2.5 Estonia 20.7 16.3 4.4 4 5 4.5 Finland 9.5 34.2 -24.7 1 2 1.5 France 12.3 32.9 -20.6 2 2 2.0 Germany 14.5 18.3 -3.8 4 4 4.0 Greece 20.2 38.9 -18.7 2 1 1.5 Hungary 20.5 13.4 7.1 4 5 4.5 Ireland 20.7 12.9 7.8 4 5 4.5 Italy 22.0 34.0 -12.0 3 2 2.5 Latvia 26.2 22.1 4.1 4 4 4.0 Lithuania 22.6 26.8 -4.2 4 3 3.5 Luxembourg 12.4 28.2 -15.8 3 3 3.0 Malta 21.4 19.8 1.6 5 4 4.5 Netherlands 13.6 28.9 -15.3 3 3 3.0 Poland 23.9 11.6 12.3 3 5 4.0 Portugal 22.6 22.6 0.0 5 3 4.0 Slovakia 16.8 13.6 3.2 5 5 5.0 Slovenia 9.9 17.2 -7.3 4 5 4.5 Spain 21.6 42.6 -21.0 2 1 1.5 Sweden 8.9 25.9 -17.0 2 3 2.5 United Kingdom 18.9 28.2 -9.3 4 3 3.5 Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions

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Overcrowding Country Third Country Normal Total Gap Gap Rating Total Score Nationals Rating Austria 13.0 44.3 -31.3 2 2 2 Belgium 3.9 21.5 -17.6 4 4 4 Cyprus 2.6 6.2 -3.6 5 5 5 Czech Republic 26.6 39.1 -12.5 4 2 3 Denmark 7.8 29.2 -21.4 3 3 3 Estonia 41.2 51.5 -10.3 4 1 2.5 Finland 5.9 13.3 -7.4 5 4 4.5 France 9.6 37.2 -27.6 3 2 2.5 Germany 7.0 21.7 -14.7 4 4 4 Greece 25.0 60 -35.0 2 1 1.5 Hungary 46.8 58.6 -11.8 4 1 2.5 Ireland 3.7 6.3 -2.6 5 5 5 Italy 23.3 51.5 -28.2 3 1 2 Latvia 56.3 57 -0.7 5 1 3 Lithuania 48.1 53.9 -5.8 5 1 3 Luxembourg 6.4 27.2 -20.8 3 3 3 Malta 3.8 6.6 -2.8 5 5 5 Netherlands 1.7 0 1.7 5 5 5 Poland 49.1 19 30.1 2 4 3 Portugal 14.1 37.9 -23.8 3 2 2.5 Slovakia 39.7 40.9a -1.2 5 2 3.5 Slovenia 38.0 88.3 -50.3 1 1 1 Spain 5.2 17.2 -12.0 4 4 4 Sweden 10.5 30.6 -20.1 3 3 3 United Kingdom 7.2 20.8 -13.6 4 4 4 Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions a. 2008 Eurostat data for overcrowding

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Ratio of Property to Non-Property Owners Country Third Country Gap (Total- Normal Overall Total Gap Score Nationals TCN) Score Score Austria 1.3 0.1 1.2 5 1 3 Belgium 2.5 0.5 2 4 2 3 Cyprus 3.2 0.5 2.7 3 2 2.5 Czech Republic 3.5 0.8 2.7 3 3 3 Denmark 1.9 0.5 1.4 5 2 3.5 Estonia 6.7 13.2 -6.5 1 5 3 Finland 2.4 0.4 2 4 2 3 France 1.5 0.4 1.1 5 2 3.5 Germany 1 0.4 0.6 5 2 3.5 Greece 3 0.3 2.7 3 1 2 Hungary 9.2 3.5a 5.7 1 5 3 Ireland 2.8 0.2 2.6 3 1 2 Italy 2.5 0.4 2.1 4 2 3 Latvia 7 6.6 0.4 5 5 5 Lithuania 10.2 26.2 -16 1 5 3 Luxembourg 2.2 0.8 1.4 5 3 4 Malta 4.1 1.6 2.5 4 5 4.5 Netherlands 2.2 1.3 0.9 5 5 5 Poland 2.2 1.5 0.7 5 5 5 Portugal 3.1 0.7 2.4 4 3 3.5 Slovakia 8.3 3.9a 4.4 2 5 3.5 Slovenia 4.6 0.6 4 2 2 2 Spain 4.7 0.6 4.1 2 2 2 Sweden 2.1 0.8 1.3 5 3 4 United Kingdom 2.4 0.5 1.9 4 2 3 Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions a. Foreign-born, not third country national

150

Political Data Naturalization Rate Country Acquisition of Number of Estimated Score Citizenship Foreign Citizens Naturalization Rate Austria 7,113 852,604 0.83% 1 Belgium 26,567 1,009,055 2.63% 2 Cyprus 1,746 124,649 1.40% 1 Czech Republic 879 407,541 0.22% 1 Denmark 6,370 320,033 1.99% 2 Estonia 1,667 214,437 0.78% 1 Finland 2,972 142,288 2.09% 2 France 120,239 3,750,406 3.21% 3 Germany 81,505 7,185,921 1.13% 1 Greece 16,462 929,530 1.77% 2 Hungary 1,737 186,365 0.93% 1 Ireland 4,271 579,770 0.74% 1 Italy 53,590 3,891,295 1.38% 1 Latvia 3,225 382,704 0.84% 1 Lithuania 203 30,907 0.66% 1 Luxembourg 1,352 214,848 0.63% 1 Malta 615 16,791 3.66% 3 Netherlands 20,844 637,136 3.27% 3 Poland 2,292 48,167 4.76% 4 Portugal 23,671 440,277 5.38% 4 Slovakia 169 52,545 0.32% 1 Slovenia 1,571 70,554 2.23% 2 Spain 78,522 5,386,661 1.46% 1 Sweden 21,449 547,664 3.92% 3 United Kingdom 196,849 4,184,106 4.70% 4 Eurostat, Acquisition of Citizenship Statistics

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Citizenship Laws Country Loss of Foreign Citizenship Dual Nationality Allowed Overall Rating Rating for First Generation for 2nd/3rd Generation Rating Austria 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Belgium 100 4 100 4 4 Cyprus 100 4 0 1 2.5 Czech Republic 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Denmark 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Estonia 0 1 0 1 1 Finland 100 4 0 1 2.5 France 100 4 100 4 4 Germany 50 2.5 50 2.5 2.5 Greece 100 4 100 4 4 Hungary 100 4 0 1 2.5 Ireland 100 4 100 4 4 Italy 100 4 100 4 4 Latvia 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Lithuania 0 1 0 1 1 Luxembourg 100 4 100 4 4 Malta 100 4 0 1 2.5 Netherlands 50 2.5 100 4 3.25 Poland 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Portugal 100 4 100 4 4 Slovakia 100 4 0 1 2.5 Slovenia 50 2.5 0 1 1.75 Spain 0 1 50 2.5 1.75 Sweden 100 4 100 4 4 United Kingdom 100 4 100 4 4 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

152

Local Voting Rights Country Local Voting Rights for Third Country Type of Requirements Rating Nationals Austria None N/A 1 Belgium Local voting rights with requirements Duration (5 years) 2.5 Cyprus None N/A 1 Czech Republic Local voting rights with requirements Reciprocity 1.5 Denmark Local voting rights with requirements Duration (3 years) 3.5 Estonia Local voting rights with requirements Long-term residence 2 Finland Local voting rights with requirements Duration (4 years) 3 France None N/A 1 Germany None N/A 1 Greece None N/A 1 Hungary Local voting rights with requirements Long-term residence 2 Ireland Local voting rights with requirements Registration 4 Italy None N/A 1 Latvia None N/A 1 Lithuania Local voting rights with requirements Long-term residence 2 Luxembourg None N/A 1 Malta Local voting rights with requirements Reciprocity 1.5 Netherlands Local voting rights with requirements Duration (5 years) 2.5 Poland None N/A 1 Portugal Local voting rights with requirements Duration (3 years) 3.5 Slovakia Local voting rights with requirements Long-term residence 2 Slovenia Local voting rights with requirements Long-term residence 2 Spain Local voting rights with requirements Reciprocity 1.5 Sweden Local voting rights with requirements Duration (3 years) 3.5 United Kingdom Local voting rights with requirements Registration 4 Kees Groenendijk, “Local Voting Rights for Non-Nationals in Europe: What We Know and What We Need to Learn,” Migrant Policy Institute

153

Jus Soli Laws Country Score 2nd Score 3rd Overall Jus Soli 2nd Generation Jus Soli for 3rd Generation Generation Generation Score Austria No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Belgium more than ten years residence registration or declaration required 2 3.5 2.75 Cyprus No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Czech Republic No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Denmark No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Estonia No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Finland No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 France No provisions Unrestricted 1 4 2.5 Germany 6-10 years or permanent residence No provisions 3 1 2 Greece more than ten years residence registration or declaration required 2 3.5 2.75 Hungary No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Ireland registration or declaration required No provisions 3.5 1 2.25 Italy No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Latvia No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Lithuania No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Luxembourg No provisions Unrestricted 1 5 3 Malta No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Netherlands No provisions Unrestricted 1 4 2.5 Poland No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Portugal 6-10 years or permanent residence Unrestricted 3 4 3.5 Slovakia No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Slovenia No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 Spain No provisions Unrestricted 1 4 2.5 Sweden No provisions No provisions 1 1 1 United Kingdom 6-10 years or permanent residence No provisions 3 1 2 CITLAW

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Political Liberties Country Right to Right to Membership in Right to Create Overall Score Score Score Association Political Parties Media Score Austria 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Belgium 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Cyprus 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Czech Republic 50 2.5 0 1 100 4 2.5 Denmark 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Estonia 50 2.5 0 1 100 4 2.5 Finland 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 France 100 4 100 4 0 1 3 Germany 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Greece 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Hungary 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Ireland 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Italy 100 4 100 4 0 1 3 Latvia 50 2.5 0 1 100 4 2.5 Lithuania 50 2.5 0 1 100 4 2.5 Luxembourg 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Malta 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Netherlands 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Poland 50 2.5 0 1 100 4 2.5 Portugal 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Slovakia 50 2.5 0 1 50 2.5 2 Slovenia 100 4 0 1 100 4 3 Spain 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Sweden 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 United Kingdom 100 4 100 4 100 4 4 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

155

Attitudes of Host Countries Data Eurobarometer Questions Country Elected Leader Different Immigrants Increase Immigrants Enrich Rating Rating Rating than Ethnic Majority, 1-10 Unemployment (Agree) Cultural Life (Agree) Austria 4.6 2 42% 5 29% 2 Belgium 5.5 3 59% 3 44% 3 Cyprus 3.5 1 90% 1 30% 2 Czech Republic 4.6 2 65% 3 37% 3 Denmark 7.2 5 38% 5 65% 5 Estonia 6.1 3 50% 3 52% 4 Finland 5.5 3 31% 5 72% 5 France 7.3 5 44% 4 64% 4 Germany 5.2 2 44% 4 61% 4 Greece 4.2 1 81% 1 28% 2 Hungary 5.4 2 57% 3 40% 3 Ireland 6.5 4 65% 3 47% 3 Italy 5.6 3 47% 4 39% 3 Latvia 5.4 3 56% 3 56% 4 Lithuania 5.2 2 59% 3 46% 3 Luxembourg 6.5 4 46% 4 59% 5 Malta 4.4 2 69% 2 7% 1 Netherlands 6.4 4 38% 5 66% 5 Poland 7.2 5 48% 4 57% 4 Portugal 6.4 4 62% 3 49% 3 Slovakia 5.5 3 59% 3 48% 3 Slovenia 5.9 3 52% 4 44% 3 Spain 7.1 5 57% 3 62% 4 Sweden 8.0 5 31% 5 80% 5 United Kingdom 7.0 4 59% 3 52% 4 Eurobarometer

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Specialized Equality Agency Present in Country Country Mandate to Combat Power to Assist Quasi- Legal Standings to Engage Power to Instigate Total Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Discrimination Victims Judical in Proceedings Proceedings Rating Austria 50 3 100 5 0 1 0 1 100 5 3 Belgium 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 50 3 3.8 Cyprus 100 5 50 3 100 5 0 1 50 3 3.4 Czech Republic 50 3 50 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.8 Denmark 50 3 50 3 50 3 50 3 0 1 2.6 Estonia 50 3 100 5 50 3 0 1 0 1 2.6 Finland 50 3 100 5 100 5 0 1 0 1 3 France 100 5 100 5 0 1 0 1 100 5 3.4 Germany 50 3 50 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.8 Greece 50 3 100 5 0 1 100 5 0 1 3 Hungary 100 5 100 5 100 5 100 5 100 5 5 Ireland 100 5 100 5 100 5 50 3 100 5 4.6 Italy 0 1 50 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.4 Latvia 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 0 1 3.4 Lithuania 100 5 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 4.2 Luxembourg 50 3 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.2 Malta 0 1 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.8 Netherlands 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 100 5 4.2 Poland 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1.8 Portugal 100 5 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 4.2 Slovakia 100 5 100 5 0 1 50 3 100 5 3.8 Slovenia 100 5 50 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.2 Spain 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 Sweden 100 5 100 5 0 1 100 5 100 5 4.2 United Kingdom 100 5 100 5 0 1 0 1 0 1 2.6 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

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Appendix III Independent Variables Percentage of Percentage of Integration Integration Economist Multicultural Right Wing GDP per Western Colonial Countries Population Total Immigrants Policy Prior to Policy Prior to Democracy Policies Party Capita Country Country Muslim Non-EU 2000 1990 Score Austria Weak Yes 30,800 4.23% 39.96% Yes No No No 8.49 Belgium Modest Yes 29,200 2.59% 47.67% Yes Yes Yes Yes 8.05 Cyprus Weak No 18,700 24.42% 35.03% Yes No No No 7.29 Czech Republic Modest No 11,100 0.01% 71.23% No No No No 8.19 Denmark Weak Yes 36,900 1.59% 50.11% Yes No Yes Yes 9.52 Estonia Weak No 8,100 0.15% 53.23% No No Yes No 7.68 Finland Strong No 29,700 0.45% 63.65% Yes No Yes No 9.19 France Weak Yes 27,000 5.50% 66.25% Yes Yes Yes Yes 7.77 Germany Weak No 27,900 4.92% 52.74% Yes Yes No No 8.38 Greece Weak No 18,200 2.77% 65.89% Yes No No No 7.92 Hungary Weak Yes 8,700 0.24% 44.32% No No Yes No 7.21 Ireland Modest No 36,400 0.48% 27.35% Yes No No No 8.79 Italy Weak Yes 23,200 0.06% 66.53% Yes Yes Yes No 7.83 Latvia Modest No 5,900 0.09% 82.59% No No No No 7.05 Lithuania Weak No 6,900 0.10% 84.33% No No Yes No 7.24 Luxembourg Modest No 63,700 2.59% 18.27% Yes No Yes No 8.88 Malta Weak No 12,900 0.24% 54.74% Yes No No No 8.28 Netherlands Weak Yes 32,700 5.71% 43.79% Yes Yes Yes Yes 8.99 Poland Weak No 7,800 0.13% 73.07% No No Yes No 7.05 Portugal Modest No 14,600 0.14% 71.43% Yes Yes Yes No 8.02 Slovakia Weak No 8,600 0.07% 52.42% No No No No 7.35 Slovenia Modest No 15,200 2.39% 93.13% No No No No 7.69 Spain Modest No 20,700 1.40% 66.06% Yes Yes No No 8.16 Sweden Strong No 32,600 1.60% 67.83% Yes No Yes Yes 9.5 United Kingdom Modest No 30,200 2.63% 64.42% Yes Yes Yes Yes 8.16 Eurostat; Multiculturalism Policy Index; Politis Project; Art, David. The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

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Multiculturalism Scores Countries Affirmation School Curriculum Media Exemptions Dual Citizenship Funding Ethnic Groups Bilingual Education Affirmative Action Total Classification Austria 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 1 0 1.5 Weak Belgium 1 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1 6.5 Modest Cyprus 0 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 1 2.5 Weak Czech Republic 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.5 4 Modest Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Weak Estonia 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 2.5 Weak Finland 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 6 Strong France 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 Weak Germany 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 1 0.5 0 2.5 Weak Greece 0 0.5 0.5 0 1 0 0 0.5 2.5 Weak Hungary 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 2.5 Weak Ireland 0 0 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 3 Modest Italy 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Weak Latvia 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 1 0 3 Modest Lithuania 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 2 Weak Luxembourg 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5 5.5 Modest Malta 0 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 0 2.5 Weak Netherlands 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 Weak Poland 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.5 2.5 Weak Portugal 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 1 0 0 3.5 Modest Slovakia 0 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 2 Weak Slovenia 0 0.5 1 1 0 0.5 0.5 1 4.5 Modest Spain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 0.5 3.5 Modest Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 Strong United Kingdom 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 Modest Multiculturalism Policy Index, Migrant Integration Policy Index Note: Scores for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia estimated using data from MIPEX