Spinoza's Miracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical

Oded Schechter Spinoza’sMiracles: Scepticism, Dogmatism, and Critical Hermeneutics

Introduction

An old riddle, which was first formulatedbyLeo Strauss,¹ has resurfaced in the last decade, capturingthe imagination of several prominent scholars:² is Spinoza’sinterpretation of miracles consistent with his literal sense hermeneutics?Areview of the rhetoric used by several scholars when depicting this problem provides sufficient evidence in order to indicate the fundamentality of the philosophical beliefs that this puzzlement undermines. Thus, Warren Zev Harvey speaks about it in terms of ‘enigmatic statements,’³ stating that ‘Spinoza is playing agame—but what?’⁴ Steven Nadler speaks about ‘the perplexity generated by these anomalous passages,’⁵ con- cludinghis paper discussing the question in terms of mystery:

It is still a mystery whySpinoza believes, as he argues in chaptersix, that as amatter of fact Scriptureitself—or,rather,its prophetic authors—when properlyinterpreted does in fact ascribe natural causes to all events,eventhose it presents as miracles.⁶

Criticalhermeneutics requires the reader to look for the meaning of prophecyand biblical teaching within onlythe biblical text.How can one derive the meaning of the biblical prophecyfrom the Bible itself?The first stage, accordingtoSpinoza, is ach-

Iamgreatly thankful to the anonymous reader,Racheli Haliva,Zev Harvey,Ilil Hoz, Yitzhak Melamed, Amanda Parris, and StephanSchmid, fortheir helpful comments.

 Cf. Steven Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProbleminSpinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 639, n. 40: ‘Foralongtime, and as far as Icould tell, onlyLeo Strauss took the incongruity of these passageswith Spinoza’s “whole principle of interpretation, that objective truth maynot be used as the keyfor interpreting Scripture” seriously. But Strauss onlyconcluded that all this shows is “how little Spinozafinds himself at ease in [his] critique of miracles.”’  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 623 – 642; Carlos Fraenkel, “SpinozaonMiracles and the Truth of the Bible,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 643–658; Michah Gottlieb, “Spinoza’sMethod(s) of Biblical Interpretation Reconsidered,” JewishStudies Quarterly 14 (2007): 286–317; Warren Zev Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” Jour- nal of the HistoryofIdeas 74.4 (2013): 659 – 675.  Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 659,673 and 675.  Ibidem,667 (myitalics).  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 623(my italics).  Ibidem,641– 642(my italics).

OpenAccess. ©2018 Oded Schechter,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. Unauthenticated https://doi.org/10.1515/978-3-11-057768-6-006 Download Date | 12/23/18 9:11 AM 90 Oded Schechter

ieved by using his literal sense method, i.e. deciphering the meaning of biblical prophecyrequires us to studythe prophetic statement taking its linguistic use as a starting point.Ifweknow how aparticularlanguagewas usedatthe specific time of the prophecy,wecan reconstruct the its meaning.Spinoza posits his critical hermeneutics in stark contrast to dogmatic hermeneutics, which he defines as anyinter- pretation which deciphers meaning accordingtothe interpreter’sown alreadyestab- lished philosophical opinions rather thanderiving it from the biblical text itself.⁷ Spinoza’shermeneutics is compatible with his separation thesis; theologyand philosophyare two distinct domainsthat should not be conflated. Thus, aprophet’s claim should not be explicated by means of aphilosophicalclaim, and aphilosophical claim should not be addressed in atheological manner.Accordingtothe separation thesis,regardlessofwhatever philosophicalthesis the prophet holds (even an entirelyfalse one), it does not implythathis prophecy contradictsorconflicts with the true philosophical view;the prophet’sopinion is as little apart of the theological aspect of his prophecy as, for instance, the length of his hair; the onlyprophetic teachingistheological, and theological teaching has nothing to do with philosophical teaching. Now,here is the question that puzzlesscholars: when analysed philosophically, Spinoza argues, miracles are absurd and impossible; we would not have expected him to formulate it anydifferently. However,strangelyenough, Spinoza claims that because miracles are impossible, we have to interpret the biblical miracles in such away thatthe biblical text does not implyanything which is not in accordance with reason. Moreover,Spinoza claims that miracles are, in fact,aphilosophical issue, and hence that we should explain the meaning of aprophetic statement in away which would not resultinacontradiction between the philosophical view of miracles and the prophet’sview of miracles. Hence, the riddle that Spinoza’sreader is faced with is this: what reason could Spinoza have that would explain his deviation from critical hermeneutics, namely what reason could he have for applying dogmatic hermeneutics to the biblical miracles?Although the riddle focussesonmiracles, Harvey claims, in aStraussian spirit, that Spinoza deliberatelypresented this contradiction in order to teach the reader how the TTP should be read as awhole. Harvey compares Spinoza’smanner of com- posing acontradictory text to thatofMaimonidesinhis Guide. Other scholars have offered other resolutions,⁸ but they all agree that 1) Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles is

 Iskip the important discussion concerning Spinoza’shermeneutics, as it is not essential for the purpose of this paper. Forthe sake of the main argument in this paper,Idistinguish between literal sense method and critical hermeneutics as follows: literal sense method concerns the meaning of specific phrase or passage,whereas critical hermeneutics ascertains the prophetic/philosophic natureof the biblical expression or passage.  Foraninterestingdiscussion of the different approaches,see Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Mira- cles,” 672ff.; Harvey names three types of resolution: the biographical (Strauss and Fraenkel), the harmonizing (Nadler), and the dialecticalone (Harvey).

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dogmatic to some extent,and 2) the dogmatic interpretationofmiracles stands in contrast to his critical hermeneutics, which requires us to studythe prophet’sview in light of the literal sense rule. In contrast to this widelyshared agreement,Iwould like to suggest an alternative interpretation which consists of the following theses: 1. Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles is, in fact,anexpression of his anti-dogmatic com- mitments. 2. Spinoza’sclaim that the prophets were, in fact,committed to the same Spinozian view of miracles is the result of his critical hermeneutics. 3. Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles can contributetoanunderstanding of the biblical conception of miracles.

This alternative interpretation willhelp in resolving the puzzle. Theorder of presen- tation Iwill take in this paper will be: 1. The puzzle: Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles as aviolation of his critical hermeneutics. 2. Miracles as aproblem for Spinoza’shermeneutics. 3. ShowingSpinoza’sway out—Spinoza’shermeneutics actuallyinformsour understanding of biblical miracles. 4. Claiming thatSpinoza’sanalysis of miracles is, in fact,aclear expression of his commitment to anti-dogmatic hermeneutics.

The Puzzle: Spinoza’sAnalysisofMiracles as aViolation of his Critical Hermeneutics

Forthe sake of clarity,Iwill brieflypresent the link between Spinoza’s separation thesis and his literal sense method. Then, Iwillpresent the puzzling deviation of Spino- za’sanalysis of miracles from his critical hermeneutics.

Critical hermeneutics and the separation thesis

Spinoza’scritical hermeneutics can be crudelyexplained as consistingoftwo parts: 1. Application of the separation thesis—theologyand philosophyare two distinct domains, distinguishedinthe following way: I) Each has its own sourceofknowledge:the sourceoftheological knowledge is prophetic revelation, whereas the sourceofphilosophical knowledge is the natural light of reason. II) Theology’smedium for thinking the world is imagination, whereas philosophy’sisreason. III) The aim of philosophyistruth, whereas the aim of theologyisobedience and piety.

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According to the separation thesis,the prophetic aspect of the Bible should consist of teachingsinwhich the medium of thinkingisimagination. The kind of teachingorknowledge thatprophecyconveys has to do with piety and obedience.⁹ 2. Literal sense method—the literal sense method enables the reader to separate the theological content of the prophet’sexpression from its philosophical content.Thus, the critical reader is not bothered by the truth or falsityofthe prophet’sexpressions;the philosophical value of the prophet’sopinion does not affect the theological value of prophetic expression,e.g., the prophet’sview of God maybeinvalid philosophically, but entirelyvalid theologically.

Miracles: aDeviation from Critical Hermeneutics

Iwill now focus on two central discussions: the first is Nadler’sdiscussion of Spino- za’sdeviation and the second is Harvey’sdiscussion of Spinoza’s apology. Letmejust brieflyelaborate on them.

Nadler’sQuestion: Spinoza’sDogmatic Deviation

Nadler’sdiscussion bringsthe reader directlytothe heart of the problem. Summaris- ing it,hesays:

The issue is whySpinoza believes that Scripture’sauthenticallyprophetic authors cannot pos- siblyassert anythingabout miracles that is ‘contrary to reason.’¹⁰

Let us now examine Spinoza’sdogmatic thesis, the argument he provides to support it,and Nadler’squestion. Concerningthe biblical view of miracles, Spinoza says:

If anythingshould be found [in scripture] which can be conclusively demonstrated to be contrary to the laws of nature, or to have been unable to follow from them,wemust believewithout reservation that it has been added to the Sacred Texts by sacrilegious men. Forwhatever is con- trarytonatureiscontrarytoreason; and what is contrarytoreason is absurd,and thereforeto be rejected. (TTP,6[51]; my italics)

Spinoza’sconclusionhere is that anypassagefound in the Bible which conveys the opinion that something happens which is ‘contrary to the laws of nature’ must be

 Iwill skip the discussionastohow the mind’spossession of revealed knowledge and the person’s disposition to obey this knowledge areactuallyone and the same according to Spinoza. Spinoza does have an argument in store in favour of this equation, but it is beyond the scopeofthis paper.  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 639.

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considered acorrupt passage. He supports this claim by arguingthat ‘whatever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; and what is contrary to reason is absurd.’ Now,does the argument support the thesis?Itseems that according to Spinoza’s own objection to dogmatic interpretation, his argument does not support his conclu- sion, since the fact that from the perspective of reason nothing can be contrary to nature does not necessarilyentail thatthe prophet cannot believethat this is exactly the case. Nadler puts this question very convincingly,saying:

Giveneverythingthat Spinoza has said about the natureofprophecy,the content of the prophetic writings,and the interpretation of Scripture, it is very surprising to see him saywhat he does in passage C.¹¹ In fact,itwould seem to be preciselywhatheshould not say, sinceitisincon- sistent with his overall accountofthe interpretation of Scripture. His remarks in this passageare somethingthat we might expect from MaimonidesorMeijer,but not from Spinoza.According to Spinoza’sconsideredaccount of Scripture, it is perfectlyreasonabletoexpect the Bible’suntu- tored authors to regardevents as havingsupernatural causes and thus sincerely to narratethem in such away that they ‘contravene the laws of Nature,’ or to possess an understanding of things that is ‘contrary to reason’ and, from reason’sperspective, ‘absurd’.But the prophets werenot intellectuallygifted individuals,much less Spinozist philosophers who identify God with Nature. Thus,there is no reason to expect,asamatter of principle, that the prophets believed that every event has anatural cause or can be explained throughthe laws of nature. Why, then, should it not at least be possible to find ‘somethinginScripturecontrary to the light of Nature’ without suspectingthe piety of its author?AsSpinoza himself says,inhis objections to Maimonides’s view that ‘thereisnothinginScripturewhich contradicts reason,’‘Iinsist that Scriptureexpress- ly affirms and teaches that God is jealous [. ..]this is contrary to reason.’¹²

Spinoza’sthesis here is apparentlyadogmatic one; however,his argument does not seem to support his thesis. Moreover,the reason for his deviation is quite puzzling: what could have been his reason for introducing such adogmatic thesis that explic- itlycontradicts his own critical hermeneutics and possiblyjeopardizes the aim of the TTP,namelythe separation thesis?

Harvey’sQuestioning of Spinoza’s Apology

In apassagethatHarvey describes as Spinoza’s apology,Spinoza explicitlyaddresses our question. YetHarvey claims that instead of offering an answer,Spinoza’s apology onlyexpands the question. AccordingtoHarvey,Spinoza’s apology is so puzzling that we must assume that Spinoza was playing agame which needs to be explained in adifferent way. Letusfollow Spinoza’s apology and Harvey’squestion. Spinoza’s apology reads:

 Referringtothe passageIhave just quoted above.  Nadler, “Scriptureand Truth: AProblem in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” 637.

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BeforeIend this chapter, there’ssomethingelse Iwant to note.I’ve proceeded regarding miracles according to amethod completely different from the one Ifollowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningProphecyIaffirmed nothingbut what Icould infer from foundations revealed in the SacredTexts.But here I’ve elicited the main points onlyfromprinciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. ForsinceProphecysurpasses man’spower of understanding, and is apurelyTheological question, Icould affirm nothingabout it,nor even know in what it chiefly consisted,except from the foundations which have been revealed. Iwas compelled to put together ahistory of Prophecy, and to formulatecertain doctrines from it,which would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy,asfar as this can be done. [66] But concerning miracles what we areaskingiscompletelyphilosophical:can we grant that somethinghappens in naturecontrary to its laws,orsomethingwhich couldn’tfollow fromthem?SoIdidn’tneed anythinglikethat.(TTP,6[65–6])

Spinoza is thus completelyaware that in his analysis of miracles, he deviates from the critical hermeneutics which he used for the analysis of prophecy.Harvey boldly questions Spinoza’sdistinction between miracles and prophecy, saying:

The apologiabegins with Spinoza’sadmission that he has treatedthe subject of biblical miracles completelydifferentlyfromthat of biblical prophecy.Heexplains that in discussing prophecyin chapterone he had based himself on ‘foundations revealed in Sacred Writ,’ for prophecy is a ‘purelytheological’ subject,but in discussing miracles he has based himself on ‘foundations known by means of the lumen naturale,’ for the subject of miracles is ‘plainlyphilosophical.’ The petitio principii hereissoflagrant that it must be supposed to be intentional. Spinoza is playingagame—but what?One would have thought that the subjects of prophecy and miracles arefor Spinoza very similar.Prophecy maybeunderstood as beingrational and natural (e.g., the natural knowledgeofthe intelligent individual) or imaginary and supernatural (e.g., the visions of the biblical prophets which aresaid to be ‘beyond the limits’ of natural knowledge and inexplicable by ‘the laws of human nature’); and so toomiracles maybeunderstood as beingrational and natural (e.g.,the extra light at Gibeon was caused by the hail) or imaginary and supernatural (e.g., the light was caused by the sun’sstandingstill in the heav- ens). Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecyis‘theological’ because it ‘surpasses human knowledge’ (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is ‘philosophical’ because it involves the philosophical question of ‘whether we can concede that somethingmay happen in Naturethat contravenes its Laws.’ However,hemight just as easilyhavesaid: the subject of prophecy is ‘philosophical,’ for it involves the philosophical question of whether there can be suprarational knowledge,whereas that of miracles is ‘theological,’¹³

Harvey’spuzzlement assumes that Spinoza’scritical hermeneutics provides no reason to explicate miracles and prophecydifferently; if what is at stake is the difference between natural light and supernatural light (reason or imagination), then both prophecyand miracles can be addressed either philosophicallyortheologically. Spi- noza’sclaim that miracles are the object of philosophywhereas prophecyisthe object of theologyisasarbitraryasitgets. Ithink we are now in aposition to summarise the different aspects of the main problem, which is Spinoza’sinconsistency:despite his strongcommitment to his own

 Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 666–667.

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critical hermeneutics, his analysis of miracles is committed to dogmatic hermeneutics. More specifically, there are two issues: 1. That the prophet’sunderstanding of miracles is compatible with the philosophical one. Thus, in cases wherewecannot explain abiblical paragraph concerning miracles in aphilosophicalway,wehavetocensor this paragraph. 2. Spinoza’sdistinction between miracles and prophecy on the basis of reason and the prophetic kind of cognition does not make anysense.

Miracles as aProblem forSpinoza’sHermeneutics

In this part,Iwill suggest the following thesis: amiracle—when interpreted according to Spinoza’sliteralsense method—is apparentlyasignificant problem for Spino- za’scritical hermeneutics, if we suppose that the latter assumes thatthe literal sense method and the separation thesis are compatible. In his apology,Spinoza states: ‘Iaffirmednothing but what Icould infer from foundations revealedinthe Sacred Texts’ (TTP,6[65]). It might be helpful to review the lastparagraph of chapter 2, in which Spinoza summarises the thesis he infers from his analysis of prophecy:

Although onlythe thingswehavesaid about the Prophets and Prophecypertain particularlyto my purpose of separating PhilosophyfromTheology, nevertheless,because Ihavetreated Prophecygenerally, Iwant to ask now whether the gift of Prophecywas peculiar to the Hebrews or whether it was common to all nations.Wealso need to ask whatwemust maintain about the callingofthe Hebrews.That’sthe object of the followingchapter. (TTP,2[58])

Spinoza’sclaim is quite explicit: the literal sense analysis of prophecyisintended to support the separation thesis. Now,how does it achieve this?Spinoza brieflyexplains the separation thesis in the preface:

Havingshown the fundamentalsoffaith [in chapter14], Iconclude finallythat revealed knowledge has no object but obedience, and indeed that it is entirely distinct from natural knowledge, both in its object and in its foundation and means.Revealed knowledgehas nothing in common with natural knowledge,but each is in charge of its own domain, without anyconflict with the other.[In chapter15Ishow that] neither oughttobethe handmaid of the other.(TTP,preface [27]; my italics)

The separation thesis,then, stipulates that the distinction between revealedknowledge and natural knowledge (theologyand philosophy) is clear-cut: these are two completelydistinct domains of knowledge which have ‘nothing in common’ with each other and cannot conflict.The first twochapters on prophecy and the prophet are rich in content.However,accordingtoSpinoza’sclaim, all of the discussions con- cerningprophecyweredesigned to support his separation thesis. How do they support it?Skipping adetailed analysis,Iwill point out two kinds of discussions which do so:

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1. The analysis of prophecyshows that the foundationsofrevealed knowledge are different from the foundations of natural knowledge.Thus, since revealed knowledge is knowledge of the imagination, one should not takethe prophet’sphilosoph- ical opinions to have anytheological validity.For instance, regardingthe revelation to Cain, Spinoza says:

Forexample, the revelation to Cain [Genesis 4:6– 7] teaches us only that God warned him to lead atrue life, for that was the onlyintent and substanceofthe revelation, not teach the freedom of the will or Philosophic matters. So even though the freedom of the will is contained very clearly in the wordsand reasonings of that warning, we arepermitted to think the will is not free, since those words and reasonings wereonlyaccommodated to Cain’spower of understanding. (TTP,2 [53]; my italics)

2. Critical hermeneutics can disclose the meaninginwhich revealed knowledge is a domaininand of itself. Thus, for instance, by disclosing the manner in which arevelation is validated, we see that revealed knowledge does not appeal to reason. One of Spinoza’smain discussions revolves around the sourceofcertainty.Liter- al sense hermeneutics,heargues, helps us to decipher the inner criteria for certainty with regards to revealedknowledge.Spinoza concludes the first chapter with the following tellingpassage:

As aresult, we’re now forcedtoask how the Prophets could have come to be certain of things they perceivedonlythrough the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind. But whatever we can sayabout this,wemust seek from Scripture. As we have alreadysaid, we do not have true ’knowledge of this matter,orwecannot explain it through its first causes. What Scrip- ture teaches concerning the certainty of the Prophets,Ishall show in the followingchapter, where Ihavedecided to treat of the Prophets. (TTP,1[48])

Certainty,accordingtoSpinoza, accompanies anypiece of knowledge which is de- duced by reason. [See TTP,2[4–6]] There is no need for anyfurther act of the mind in order to become certain of the truth of anypiece of knowledge which is de- rivedbyreason. In contrast, knowledge achieved by imagination requires an addi- tional element in order to be endowed with certainty. It is important to note here that Spinoza’scomment—‘we’re now forced to ask how the Prophets could have come to be certain of thingsthey perceivedonly through the imagination, and not from certain principles of the mind’ (TTP,1[48]) —turnsout to be very telling.Why are we forced to ask this when the certainty is com- ing from the imagination, but not when it comesfrom the principles of the mind?If we weretoderive this certaintyfrom our principles of reason, then the separation thesis could not be as strongasSpinoza claimeditwas,namelywecould not claim that ‘revealedknowledge has nothing in common with naturalknowledge, but each is in charge of its own domain, without anyconflict with the other’ (TTP, preface[27]). Thus, being committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis, Spinoza has to reject the premise that prophecy obtains its certaintyfrom certain

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principles of the mind. To summarize: Spinoza’sstrong separation thesis is intimately linked with his view thatthe certaintyofprophecy cannot originateinreason. Yettocome to our point now:Spinoza claims that in order to determine the sourceofcertaintywhen it comes to revealed knowledge,wemust read the Bible using his method.

Certainty and Revealed Knowledge

In the lastsection, we showed the significance of Spinoza’shermeneutics to his separation thesis. Moreover,wehaveseen that Spinoza is committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis,namelythatrevealedknowledge should not be supported by means of reason. AccordingtoSpinoza, it is part of the task of chapter 2to show that the certainty which accompanies revealedknowledge is not being in- formedthrough reason. If we fail to make this distinction, we will not be able to abide by the strongversion of the separation thesis. So, what is it indeed that endows revealed knowledge with certainty?

But first Imust treat the certainty of the Prophets,both because it concernsthe theme of this chapter, but also because it will help in some measuretoget to the conclusionweintend to dem- onstrate. [4] Unlike aclear and distinct idea, asimple imagination does not,byits nature, involvecertainty.Sotobeable to be certain of things we imagine, we must add somethingto the imagination—viz., reasoning.Itfollows that,byitself, Prophecycannot involvecertainty. As we’ve shown, it depended onlyonthe imagination. So the Prophets were not certain about God’srevelation by the revelation itself, but by some sign. (TTP,2[3–4])

The certainty which accompanies revealedknowledge is not revelation, but asign. After giving different examples from the Bible, Spinoza concludes:

This shows that the Prophets always had some signbywhich they became certain of the things they imagined Prophetically. That’swhy Moses warns [the Jews] to seek asign from [anyone claimingtobe] aProphet,viz. the outcome of some future event (Deuteronomy18:22).[6] In this respect,then, Prophecyisinferior to natural knowledge,which needs no sign, but of its own nature involves certainty.(TTP,2[5–6])

Indeed, the certaintywhich accompanies revealed knowledge is inferior to the certainty which accompanies natural knowledge.Yet Spinoza has successfullyshown that this certainty does not come from reason. The certaintytowhich the prophet as- pires is achieved through asign which is as imaginary as prophecyitself. To summarise: accordingtoour explication,the onlyway we can account for the certainty of revealed knowledge without violating the strongversion of the separation thesis is by pointingour the exact role of the sign plays in endowing certainty to prophetic knowledge;wecan understand the role of the sign onlybycloselycrit- icallystudying the biblical text.

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Signsand Miracles

But what is the kind of sign thatendow prophetic revelations with certaintyaccord- ing to Spinoza?Interestingly enough, at least in certain cases, Spinoza identifies miracles as signs.For instance, in chapter 2, it reads:

Indeed, this Prophetic certainty was not mathematical, but onlymoral, as is evident from Scrip- ture itself. ForinDeuteronomy13[:2] Moses warns that anyProphet who wants to teach new Gods should be condemned to death, even though he confirms his teachingwith signs and miracles. ForasMoses himself goes on to say, God also uses signs and miracles to test the people. (TTP,2[7])¹⁴

Moreover,laterinthe chapter Spinoza says:

Similarly, the sign of the backwardmotion of the shadow was revealed to Isaiah according to his power of understanding, viz. as abackwardmotion of the sun [cf. 2Kings20:8 – 12 with Isaiah 38:7– 8]. Forhetoo thoughtthat the sun moves and that the earth is at rest.Asluck would have it,henever thought of parhelia,not even in adream. We arepermitted to maintain this without anyhesitation because the sign could reallyhappen, and be predicted to the kingbyIsaiah, even though the Prophet did not know its true cause. (TTP,2[28])

Spinoza notes that having to explicate ‘the backward motion of the sun’ in terms of imagination does not necessarilymean that it could not be explained by reason. However,inchapter 6, Spinoza refers to the sameevent,saying:

We ought not doubt that manythings arerelated as miracles in the Sacred Texts whose causes can easilybeexplained according to known principles of natural things.Wealreadyhinted at this in Ch. 2when we spokeabout the sun’sstandingstill in the time of Joshua, and its going backwardinthe time of Ahaz. But we’ll soon treat this morefully, when we discuss the interpretation of miracles,asI’ve promised to do in this chapter. (TTP,6[15])

Here, Spinoza discusses the same event,but in terms of miracle. So, if miracles can be asign, Isuggest we turn now to discuss the place of miracles in revealed knowledge.

 Cf. TTP,6[31]: ‘Forhesaysthat (even if)asign and awonder he has predictedtoyou should happen, etc., do not (nevertheless) assent to the wordsofthis Prophet etc., because the Lord your God testsyou etc. (Therefore) let that Prophet be condemned to death etc.From this it clearlyfollows that even false Prophets can performmiracles,and that unless men arewell protectedbythetrue knowledge and loveofGod, miracles can lead them to embrace false Gods as easilyasthe True God. ForMoses adds sincethe Lordyour God is testing you, to know whether youlovehim with all your heart and all your soul.’

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Miracles as Signs: the First Problem

Amiracle can serveasasign, but what is amiracle? Ithink we are now in aposition to see the difficulties thatmiracles createinSpinoza’sdual commitment,namelyto both literal sense hermeneutics and his separation thesis. If we return to the scholars previouslydiscussed, Ithink we can saythatamira- cle is an event perceivedbyboth the Bible and the prophet as violating the lawof nature. Now,ifwesay that asign is amiracle, how does it contributetotheology? To answer this question, we would have to explore how amiracle can endow the prophet’srevelation (or his audience) with certaintythat the sign is indeed amiracle. Amiracle shows thatprovidence can violate the natural order;providence’sinterfer- ence with the natural order is asign that adds certainty to the content of revelations. If we are correct in our interpretation of Spinoza as being committed to astrong version of the separation thesis,which requires (as we have suggested) arevelation to be explained without anyreference to reason, then amiracle qua sign willnot be very helpful. Afterall, the prophet’sentireconviction is based on an argument of reason which roughlyclaims: youhaveseen an event,and youknow that events gener- allyfollow the natural law, the laws of reason. However,what youhaveseen here is a miracle, which means that providence can bend the laws of nature; this is asign telling youthat prophetic revelation is true. If we accept this explicationofmiracle and sign, we see that miracles—when interpreted according to the literal sense method— present aserious difficulty to Spinoza: this kind of certaintywould be explicitlyin- formedbyanargument from reason. However,there is one good reason to reject my interpretation, because by adopting dogmatic hermeneutics, Spinoza falls down yetanother pit.Let me elaborate: if we accept Spinoza’sposition on miracles, then the Bible and the prophet agree with him and miracles are not events which are bent by providence to violate laws of nature. So, what is the contribution of non-existent miracles to prophetic certainty? Let me suggest arevised version of this refuted interpretation of mine.

The Sceptic and the Dogmatic

Spinoza posits his critical hermeneutics in opposition to two hermeneutical schools. We have alreadydiscussed the opposition to dogmatic hermeneutics. In chapter 15, Spinoza posits critical hermeneutics against sceptical hermeneutics. Spinoza depicts the sceptic’sreadingofthe Bible in the following way:

Those who don’tknow how to separate PhilosophyfromTheology debatewhether Scripture should be the handmaid of reason, or reason should be the handmaid of Scripture—that is, whether the meaningofScriptureought to be accommodated to reason, or reason oughtto be accommodated to Scripture. The skeptics, whodenythe certainty of reason, defend the ac- commodation of reason to Scripture. (TTP,15[1])

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Spinoza is aware of the fact that the sceptic is following literal sense method to a certain extent.Inchapter 15,hemakesthe following comment on the sceptic:

Insofar as he wants to explain ScripturebyScripture, Ipraise him. But I’mamazed that aman endowed with reason should be so eager to destroy reason. It’scertainlytrue that Scripture oughttobeexplained by Scripture, so long as we’re onlyworkingout the meaningofthe statements and the Prophets’ intention. (TTP,15[8])

Before Iturntodiscuss Spinoza’sobjection to the sceptic, let me just point out that Spinoza’sadversary in his discussion of miracles is very likelyasceptic. Spinoza describes the common people as those who have the tendency to claim that miracles are God’sactions thatviolate the natural order (TTP,6[2–5]). Spinoza explains the motivation driving them in the following manner:

So the common people call unusual works of nature miracles, or works of God. Partlyfromde- votion, partlyfromadesiretooppose those whocultivatethe natural sciences, they don’twant to know the natural causes of things.They long to hear onlythe thingsthey’re most ignorant of, which they’re most amazed by.(TTP,6[3])

The desire to ‘oppose those who cultivatethe natural sciences’ is quite similar to the depiction of the sceptic’smadness in chapter 15:

Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslysay goodbyetoreason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denythe certainty of reason?(TTP,15[38])

In fact,the sceptic’sresemblancetothe miracle advocate comes up in acontext that is more significant to our discussion. In chapter 15,Spinoza says:

Who but someone desperate and mad would want to recklesslysay goodbyetoreason, or to scorn the arts and sciences, and denythe certainty of reason?[…]They want to call upon reason to repudiatereason,and by acertain reason make reason uncertain.While they’re tryingtoshow the truth and authority of Theology by mathematical demonstrations,and to take away the authority of reasonand the natural light,all they’re doingisdraggingTheologyunder the control of reason. They clearlyseem to suppose that Theologyhas no brillianceunless it’silluminated by the natural light.(TTP, 15 [38–9])

The sceptic in chapter 15 is actually the one who ‘calls upon reason to repudiatereason.’ If we return to Spinoza’smiracle adversary,wesee that he meets the sceptic’s criteria. In chapter 6, Spinoza depicts the miracle advocate:

Next,weknow that nothingagrees with nature (or is contrary to it) except whatwehaveshown to agreewith those principles (or to be contrary to them). So if we could conceive that by some power (whatever in the end it was) somethingcould happen in naturewhich was contrary to nature, that would be contrary to those first notions,and we would have to reject it as absurd—either that,orwewould have to doubt the first notions (as we have just shown) and con- sequently, doubt God and all things,however they might have been perceived. (TTP,6[18])

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Thus, Spinoza states here that anyone who claims that miracles are events that violate the laws of nature (i.e. the miracle advocate) is actuallyclaiming that reason refutes reason (i.e. the sceptic).We see, then, thataccording to Spinoza, when someone claims that miracles are contrary to the natural order,what he is saying is actuallya statement about knowledge.

Critical Hermeneuticsand the Sceptic’sArgument from Miracles

Is Spinoza’sthesis regarding the compatibility between literal sense hermeneutics and the separation thesis in danger,ifSpinoza’smiracle adversary is indeed the sceptic?AsSpinoza grants, the sceptic’sapproach is quite similar to his own when it comes to the literal sense interpretation. (TTP,15[8]) So, let us reconstruct the sceptic’sargument and review Spinoza’sanswer. Let us first acompareSpinoza’sanswer to the sceptic concerning prophecywith his answer concerning miracles. In the case of prophecy,the sceptic’sargument would be the following:the literal sense impliesthat prophecyistrue, and since prophetic knowledge is different from natural knowledge,accepting prophetic truth im- plies that naturalknowledge is subordinatetonatural knowledge.Spinoza’sanswer to this is thatcritical hermeneutics indeed confirms thatprophetic knowledge is valid. However,italso confirms that revealed knowledge is made valid by imagination; hence it does not implyanything concerning reason. As long as we can keep the domains of theologyand philosophyseparate, namelyaslongasthey do not inform each other,then thereisnobasis for the sceptic’sposition, justasthere is no basis for the dogmatic one. What is the case for miracles?The sceptic’sargument would be that the certainty of the revelation is endowedbythe sign or the miracle. If we go back to Spinoza’s claim that amiracle is an action on the part of providence against the order of nature—which is tantamount to the claim that reason refutes reason—then the biblical teachingsupportsscepticism. Can Spinoza refute the sceptic’sargument by arguing from the separation thesis? In contrast to the case of prophecy,inthe case of miracles, the answer seems to be no. It seems to be the case that theological knowledge is informed by reason, and since certainty of revealedknowledge is dependentonthe insight that knowledge of reason is invalid, the separation thesis cannot hold. Now we can return to our original difficulties: does Spinoza have areason to adopt dogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretation of miracles?The answer is yes; if he does not adopt this kind of hermeneutics, the literal sense method is in support of the sceptic. — Does Spinoza have areason to claim that the prophets hold the sameviews as he does concerning miracles?Yes: if theologyadmits that miracles implyaninterrup- tion of the natural order,then the separation thesis is disproved (remember thatin

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order to refute the separation thesis,weonlyneed to show that theologyisnot supported by its own means). — Does Spinoza have agood reason to distinguish between miracles and prophecy,stating thatthe question of miracles is philosophical, whereas the question of prophecyisapurelytheological?Yes: prophetic knowledge can be entirelyexplained as proceeding from the foundations of theology, hence investigatingits teachingin accordancewith the literalsense method makessense; however,since miracles cannot explain theologywithout relying on natural knowledge,they cannotqualify as revealed knowledge. — Does Spinoza have agood reason to suggest applying censorship in case the Bible impliesthat miracles support theology? Yes, otherwise we would have to agree with the sceptic that biblical teaching is dependent on knowledge of reason.

Should We Accept that Spinoza’sAnalysisofMiracles is a Dogmatic One?

Our interpretation challenges the scholars’ claim thatSpinoza had no good reason to adopt adogmatic hermeneutics in his interpretationofmiracles.Incontrast,our interpretation shows that he had very good reasons for adopting dogmatic hermeneutics. Contrary to the scholars’ claim that the reason for adopting adogmatic hermeneutics has nothing to do with Spinoza’sown hermeneutics,wehaveseen that Spinoza’sreason for doing so was his own literalsense method. As appealing as our interpretation maybefor explaining Spinoza’sreason for his deviation from the literal sense method,itremains very weak: what kind of answer would that be on Spinoza’spart?Merelyclaiming thatthe literal sense method should not be usedinthat particularcase just because it violatesanother thesis is an interpretation which could perhaps sound convincing to certain historians of philosophy, but would Spinoza qua philosopher also be convinced? If we wish to interpret Spinoza qua philosopher,wehavetoaddress the following two challenges to our interpretation: 1. Can Spinoza’sexplication of biblical miracles be supported from his critical hermeneutics? 2. Does Spinoza have an answer to the sceptic’schallengefrom miracles which does not suspendthe literal sense method when it comes to miracles?

Spinoza’sExplication of Miracles Reconsidered

Up until now,wehaveaccepted the scholars’ premise thatSpinoza’sinterpretation of miracles is indeedadogmatic one. Yetour interpretation,which identifies Spinoza’s miracle adversary as the sceptic, can serveasthe pivotalpoint for turning our per- ception of Spinoza’sview of miracles upside down. Iwillargue that using our inter-

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pretation, we can show that Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles does not necessitate the suspension of the literal sense method;rather,Spinoza has agood answer to the sceptic which keeps the literal sense methodineffect. The philosophical challengethatSpinoza faces is how to show thatamiracle can support the certaintyofrevealedknowledge from its own domain. Another question is: how can miracles support theologyifwedonot assume that they violate the natural order?

Miracles and Certainty of Revealed Knowledge

Philosophicallyspeaking,our interpretation of Spinoza will be more solid if we show that miracles can be signs which endow prophetic knowledge with certainty. Now, even if we accept the common reading,namelythat Spinoza’sinterpretation of miracles is adogmatic one, we still have to explain how miracles qua signs createcertain- ty in the prophet’s(or the believer’s) mind. Now,evenifwedoaccept this view,weshould keep in mind Spinoza’sfirm theses that 1) the prophets themselvesbelieved that miracles werenot an interruption to the natural order,and 2) biblical teachingortheologyagrees with philosophyinre- jecting miracles (assuming that the meaningofthe latter is an action of providence which interruptsthe natural order). Yetwhat could amiracle be, if we reject the latter understanding of miracles?Can amiracle have anytheological meaning (in terms of imagination) which would not implyaviolation of the natural order? Spinoza suggests acertain mental affect caused by miracles.Inchapter 1, the text reads:

That’salso whythey called miracles works of God, i.e., works to be astonished at.For of course, all natural things areGod’sworks, and exist and act onlythrough the divine power.It’sinthis sense that the Psalmist calls the miracles of Egypt God’spowers, because in asituation of ex- treme dangerthey opened up the waytodeliverance for the Hebrews, whowere expectingnoth- ing likethem, and hencewere amazed by them. (TTP,1[30])

Thus, astonishment or amazement are affects that can be triggered by miracles. Yet the fact thatamiracle causesastonishment and amazement does not bring us much further: it is possible thatthe effect of amazement is actuallythe resultofrea- soning that providence is interferingwith the natural order.But if we can show that miracles can be understood to support theologywithout having to depend on reason, our interpretation will not violate the separation principle. In fact,Spinoza explicitlyclaims thatwhen we referto‘amazement’,weare not in violationofthe separation principle. In chapter 6, he says:

Though the voicethe Israelites heard[on Mount Sinai] could not give them anyphilosophical or mathematical certainty about God’sexistence, still, it was enough to makethem wonder at God, insofar as they had previouslyknown him, and to motivatethem to obedience. That was the pur-

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pose of that manifestation. God did not want to teach the Israelites the absoluteattributes of his essence. (Hedid not reveal anyofthem at that time.) He wanted to break their stubborn heart and win them over to obedience. So he addressed them with the sound of trumpets,with thun- der,and with lightning, not with arguments. (TTP,14[36]; my italics)

Spinoza’sargument here givesusseveral clues which could be helpfulinour analysis of miracles. He begins by noting thatweshould not assume that arguments play anyrole in the wayinwhich miracles are related to revealed knowledge.Inaccord- ance with the latter claim, Spinoza is using ‘amazement’ to mean ‘that which con- nects the imaginary mind to revealed knowledge.’ In addition, Spinoza explains the role of miracles on Mount Sinai in the following way: the people alreadyknew God, namelymiracles wereinnoway supposed to conveythe knowledge of God. However,the fact that they alreadyknew that God existed did not make them readytoaccept the knowledge revealedonMount Sinai or to follow it; the miracles on Mount Sinai, then, weresupposed to connect the people to the revealed knowledge.¹⁵ To recapitulate what we have just unpacked from chapter 6: we can keep the domains of philosophyand theologyentirely distinct if we understand miracles onlyin terms of imagination (the affect of wondering). Miracles connect aperson’smind to the content of the revelation by the affect of amazement(imagination). Now,let us see how the aforementioned insight can help us to understand the prophet’scertainty in revealed knowledge.Certainty,orthe prophet’sreadiness to commit himself to the knowledge revealed to him, is achieved through the amazement which accompanies the miracle. We still have to account for two points: 1. What is it about the affect of amazement which accompanies miracles that con- nects the beholder to revealed knowledge? 2. Can we account for the role of miracles in achieving certaintywhen the prophet conceivesamiracle as merelyanatural event (as we explained with reference to Nadler,Spinoza states thatthe prophets agreed with him that miracles are natural events).

Is the Mind CapableofPerceiving an Event as Both Natural and Miraculous?

Spinoza claims thatmiracles are events which cause us to be amazed, yetthe prophet can wonder at the event and simultaneouslyhold the view that it is entirelynatural. However,isthis not an emptyformula?Can we reallywonder at an event,see it as a sign, and the same time perceive it as being entirely natural?

 Spinoza’spreferencefor the term ‘sign’ over ‘miracle’ will also getclearer by our interpretation.

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In fact,Iwould arguethatSpinoza is referring to avery common state of mind. Think of the following two examples. In the first case, Iwin the lottery,Ifeel really fortunate, and Isay: ‘God reallyloves me. Iamblessed.’ Now consider the second case, which conveys an opposite view of myself: Iamanacademic and all my efforts over manyyears to obtain aprofessorship at the university have been futile. Iamun- employed and Isay: ‘Iamsounlucky,God reallyhates me, Iamcursed.’ Can Inot think, in the first case, both that my winning the lottery maybeexplained by the laws of causality which govern the lottery machine and yetatthe sametime feel that Iamlucky,that Iamblessed, and thatGod loves me? Consider now the second case: can Inot admit that the reason Idid not obtain aprofessorship is because—in accordancewith the natural order—onlythosewho are endowed with professorial wisdom obtain this position, and Iamnot one of them?And can Inot think at the same time that Iamunlucky,unfortunate, and cursed by God? Let us now apply thatstate of mind to the prophet: knowledge is revealedtothe prophet through imagination, but he still lacks certainty.Hethen wins the lottery;he sees it as asign that God is in direct contact with him, that God is interested in him, that God loves him, that he is very special to God, etc. If this is the prophet’sstate of mind, it is possiblefor him to consider the event as both something which does not violate the natural order and yetasasign thatGod has aspecial relationship with him.

Re-examination of Spinoza’sDogmatism

Let us now proceed to re-examine Spinoza’sanalysis of miracles in chapter 6inlight of our interpretation. Spinoza’stheses—1) that the prophets consider miracles to be natural events and 2) that the Bible must teach that miracles are natural events—are defendable if Spinoza is committed to the strongversion of the separation thesis;ac- cordingly,the contribution of miracles qua signs to the certainty of revealed knowledge can be accounted for onlyfrom the realm of imagination. Thus, if we account for the certaintyofprophecy by assumingthat amiraculous event provides evidence for the superiority of revealed knowledge over natural knowledge,weviolate the separation thesis. The aforementioned theses are in perfect accordancewith Spinoza’sliteral sense method.Aswehaveseen, at the end of chapter 2, Spinoza claims thathis analysis of prophecyinchapters 1and 2supports the separation thesis. We therefore concluded that the separation thesis is derived from the biblical text in accordance with the literal sense method.¹⁶ Forthat very reason, the certainty of the sign must be accounted

 This claim does not entail that aderivation of the separation thesis from reason is excluded according to Spinoza; our claim hereisonlythe following: the separation thesis can be derived—and Spinoza does in fact derive it—from theological principles, independentlyofits derivation from reason, and vice versa.

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for from theological theses only. We have shown that Spinoza indeed accounts for the certainty asign lends to revealed knowledge exclusively from the principles derived from prophetic revelation. In his apology,Spinoza states that miracles are the object of philosophyalone and thatthereforethey should be addressed with reason alone. We reviewed two difficulties: 1. Nadler’sobjection:—is thatthesis not aviolation of Spinoza’sliteral sense method? 2. Harvey raised the following difficulty:

Spinoza claims that the subject of prophecy is ‘theological’ because it ‘surpasses human knowledge’ (captum humanum superat), whereas that of miracles is ‘philosophical’ because it involves the philosophical question of ‘whether we can concede that somethingmay happeninNature that contravenes its Laws.’ However,hemight just as easilyhavesaid: the subject of prophecyis ‘philosophical’,for it involves the philosophical question of whether therecan be suprarational knowledge,whereasthat of miracles is ‘theological’.¹⁷

Acareful examination of Spinoza’s apology in light of our interpretation resolves both Nadler’sand Harvey’squestions. It is worthwhile to quoteSpinoza’s apology once again:

I’ve proceeded regarding miracles according to amethod completely different from the one Ifol- lowed regarding Prophecy. ConcerningProphecyIaffirmed nothingbut what Icould infer from foundations revealed in the Sacred Texts.But hereI’ve elicited the main points onlyfromprinciples known to the natural light.Idid this deliberately. ForsinceProphecysurpasses man’s power of understanding,and is apurelyTheological question, Icould affirm nothingabout it,nor even know in what it chieflyconsisted, except from the foundations which have been revealed. Iwas compelled to put together ahistory of Prophecy, and to formulatecertain doctrines from it,which would teach me the natureand properties of Prophecy, as far as this can be done. [66] But concerningmiracles what we are askingiscompletely philosophical: can we grant that somethinghappens in nature contrary to its laws, or something which couldn’tfollow from them?SoIdidn’tneed anythinglikethat.Indeed, Ithought it wiser to unravel this question according to foundations known to the natural light,asthose which aremost known. Isay that I thought it wiser,for Icould easilyhaveresolveditsolelyfromthe doctrinesand foundations of Scripture. (TTP,6[65–6])

We have shown that 1) Spinoza’sclaim that amiracle is the result of providence’sin- terruption of the law of nature is actuallythe sceptical claim that natural knowledge is inferior and should therefore be corrected by revealedknowledge.Wehavealso claimed that2)the sceptic’sargument is to use reason to counter reason. Now,in the apology,Spinoza says: ‘But concerning miracles what we are asking is completely philosophical: can we grantthat something happens in nature contrarytoits laws,or something which couldn’tfollow from them?’ (TTP,6[66]; my italics). Thus, the thesis

 Harvey, “Spinoza on Biblical Miracles,” 666–667.

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of Spinoza’sadversary regarding the ‘interruption of the natural order’ would indeed be the sceptic’sthesis. As we have shown, the sceptic’sthesis is one that is derived from reason, and hence Spinoza is entirelyjustified in claiming that such an understanding of miracles—‘thatsomething happens in naturecontrary to its laws’— should in fact be approached and answered from reason. This is preciselywhat Spi- noza is doing when he examines the theses which are apparentlyderived from this understanding of miracles. Our interpretation ultimatelyresolves both Nadler’sand Harvey’sobjections: Spinoza does not violate the literal sense method,but rather refutes the sceptic’stheses with philosophical arguments,and this approach is in fact the proper one, because the sceptic’sunderstanding of miracles is derived ‘from reason.’ This would also explain whyhesaysthat in this respect,the issue of miracles is aphilosophical matter,whereas the issue of prophecyisatheological one. The interpretations we have reviewed and rejected consider Spinoza’sstance on miracles to be adogmatic one. Ithink we have explained our objections. As amatter of fact,our interpretation yields an interesting result: Spinoza’sexplication of miracles in chapter 6isanti-dogmatic. His argument against the sceptic shows that the sceptic’sexplication of miracles onlymakes sense if we assume that ‘something happens in nature contrary to its laws,’ but in Spinoza’sterms, this would be aphilosophical claim. Thus, the sceptic is, in fact,the one who is committed to dogmatic hermeneutics. This might seem like apurelyformal claim, but Ithink that our interpretation proves that this is exactlythe case in terms of actual biblical interpretation. The sceptic’sdogmatic understanding of miracles actuallyimposes an anachronistic interpretation of the Bible. In other words, by adopting the dogmatic view that miracles are ‘something thathappens in nature contrary to its laws,’ the sceptic subjects the Bible to aphilosophical problematic which is mostlyamedieval one; from the critical point of view thereisnoreason to attribute such aviewtothe prophets.Con- versely, we have shown that Spinoza’sclaim that the prophets are in agreementwith the view that miracles are not an interruption of the natural order is what ultimately liberated him from the view that miracles should be regarded as biblical teaching. Once free from this view,weare able to grasp the differencebetween prophecy and miracles; onlythen is it possible to examine the role miracles playinthe Bible, to understand the differencebetween signs and revealedknowledge,etc.

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