Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION 2
CHAPTER ONE - OPPOSITION IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 7
I. OPPOSITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND , CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR 7 OPPOSITION , DISSIDENCE AND RESISTANCE 7 OPPOSITION IN POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 10 OPPOSITION IN EAST GERMANY : EXCEPTIONAL CASE GDR 14 HUMAN RIGHTS IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 23 II. MUTUAL CONTACT IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 27 THE EAST GERMAN REACTION TO MAJOR EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND 28 CONTACTS IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 32
CHAPTER TWO - THE INITIATIVE FRIEDEN UND MENSCHENRECHTE AND THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK OPPOSITION 38
THE HISTORY OF THE IFM 38 CONTACTS OF THE IFM WITH CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE 47 INFLUENCE OF THE CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN OPPOSITION ON THE IFM 53 THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAKIAN OPPOSITION IN THE DAILY PRACTISE OF THE IFM 56 THE IDEALISTIC SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE IFM AND THE POLISH AND CZECHOSLOVAK OPPOSITION 59 THE INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHERS 65 CONCLUSION 68
CHAPTER THREE - POSSIBLE OTHER INCENTIVES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM 70
THE CSCE PROCESS 70 THE AUSREISE ISSUE 72 CONTACTS WITH THE WEST 81 GORBACHEV ’S GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA 85 CONCLUSION 89
CONCLUSION 91
LITERATURE 95
1 Introduction Autumn 1989 the population of Moscow’s most stable sattelite, the GDR, suddenly seemed to wake up out of years of letargy. When the Eastern bloc had caught the world’s attention in 1956, 1968 and 1980/1981, the GDR had remained silently in the background. But in Autumn 1989 the country which had not known any major oppositional events since the early fifties suddenly took lead in a wave of velvet revolutions in the Eastern bloc. Its masses of people on the street in Leipzig and on the Wall that untill that moment had seperated its capital from the West would become the icons of 1989. Of course this sudden rejection of the regime did not come out of nowhere. But while in Poland and Czechoslovakia also before 1989 moveme nts and opposition groups had for years been trying to direct the attention of the masses to their government’s human rights violations and by that had drawn the attention of the West, in the GDR the oppositional milieu had remained relatively tranquile and unknown. In the GDR regime-critical activities centred around entirely other themes and until the mid eighties human rights hardly played a role in the oppositional discourse. According to most historians the first signs of an oppositional movement focussed on human rights appeared in 1986 with the establishment of the Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte (IFM) in East Berlin. This small opposition group has been given an enormous importance in later literature as a big step in the development of the East German opposition. 1 This sudden turn to human rights activism in the GDR is then often attributed to influences from Central Eastern Europe, which had known this kind of opposition for years. In describing the founding of the IFM, many authors immediately stress the inspiration it drew from Central Eastern Europe and the contacts it maintained with groups in these countries. Christiane Olivo for example described the IFM as ‘the first GDR opposition group that consciously placed itself in the tradition of East European antipolitics, focussing on publicizing human rights violations.’ 2 Other authors see the IFM as group that introduced ‘Central Eastern European’ concepts and values such as civil society and a dedication to authenticity and human rights to the GDR: ‘Nur in kleinen Oppositionszirkeln wie der “Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte”, die in Kontakt mit der Dissidenz in Ungarn,
1 Torsten Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition in Ost-Berlin – gestern und heute. Eine Analyse der Entwicklung ausgewählter Ost-Berliner Oppositionsgruppen vor und nach 1989 (Berlin 2000) 9. John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent. The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis, London 1995) 98. Hagen Findeis, Detlef Pollack and Manuel Schilling ed., Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Was ist aus den politisch alternativen Gruppen der DDR geworden? Interviews mit ehemaligen führende Vertretern (Leipzig 1994) 24. Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989. Social Movement in a Leninist Regime (New York 1995) xii, 101-102, 202. 2 Bruce Allen, Germany East, Dissent and Opposition (Québec 1991) 102, 133-135. Sung-Wan Choi, Von der Dissidenz zur Opposition. Die politisch alternativen Gruppen in der DDR von 1978 bis 1989 (Cologne 1989) 76. Gareth Dale, Popular Protest in East Germany 1945-1989 (London, New York 2005) 127-128. Christiane Olivo, Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany. The Case of the Citizen Movements and Alliance 90 (New York etc. 2001) 72, 84.
2 Polen und der ČSSR stand, hat eine nennenswerte Diskussion über das Konzept der civil society stattgefunden.’ 3 The opposition in the GDR had a development that differed significantly from that in its neighbouring countries. In the first place it appeared relatively late. 4 Only since the late seventies substantial, relatively open opposition arose in the form of a peace movement. Human rights became an issue even considerably later. Still the ‘turn to human rights activism’ through the establishment of the small opposition group IFM, has attracted a lot of attention of historians and social scientists at the time and afterwards. Although human rights activism only emerged in second place and with severe delay in the GDR, it is considered very important due to the political implications of this kind of opposition. While peace activism is directed at a worldwide problem which cannot be solved by one country alone and which was, above all, a favourite propaganda topic of the regime itself, human rights activism inevitably draws attention to the abominable human rights situation in the Eastern bloc. Because inherently more GDR-centred issues are at stake, human rights activism is therefore automatically more political and more ‘oppositional’ than peace engagement. 5 The IFM is therefore deemed so important because it should have been the first example of a civil rights movement in the GDR along the lines that had been common in Central Eastern Europe and which would be victorious in 1989. Because of the human rights issue the IFM is sometimes even seen as the only political opposition group in the GDR before 1989, in contrast to Central Eastern Europe where groups like this had come to existence much earlier. 6 Since indeed human rights activism had emerged in Poland and Czechoslovakia long before it first turned up in the GDR, it is not illogical to presume a certain amount of influence. This is however often done too easily and without offering any proof. No substantial research has been done to determine the influence from Central Eastern Europe on GDR opposition groups in general and on the appearance of the human rights theme in particular. The only articles on the subject are, often mainly descriptive, analyses by former opposition members themselves. Also
3 Lothar Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegunge und Perspektiven der Demokratie (Cologne 1993) 77-78. Burkhard Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt. Das Verhältnis zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik Polen 1980-1989 (Osnabrück 2005) 503. 4 Joppke, East German Dissidents , xi, 102. Olivo, Creating , 62. Detlef Pollack, Politischer Protest. Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR (Opladen 2000) 101. 5 Ibidem, 99. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 327-328. Helmut Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit und soziale Bewegungen. Fallstudien über Bürgerbewegungen in Polen und der DDR (Opladen 1996) 209, 211. Karsten Timmer, Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch. Die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR 1989 (Göttingen 2000) 56. 6 Martin Jander, unter Mitarbeit von Thomas Voß, ‘Die besondere Rolle des politischen Selbstverständnisses bei der Herausbildung einer politischen Opposition in der DDR außerhalb der SED und ihrer Massenorganisationen seit den siebziger Jahren’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen abweichenden und widerständigen Verhaltens und oppositionellen Handelns, die friedliche Revolution im Herbst 1989, die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und Fortwirken von Strukturen und Mechanismen der Dikatur. Materialien der Enquete Kommission “Aufarbeitung und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland” (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages). Band VII 1 (Baden-Baden etc. 1995) 896-986, p. 905, 939.
3 on the inherently more descriptive subject of international contacts between the GDR opposition and their Central European counterparts only little has been done. 7 The question to what extend the appearance of the human rights argument on the East German oppositional scene was influenced by Central European oppositional thought and examples therefore still could use some researching. By focussing on the GDR pioneer in this area, the IFM, and exploring its contacts with and similarities and references to Polish and Czechoslovak opposition groups, I would like to find out to what extend these examples contributed to the introduction of human rights opposition in East Germany. I do not doubt that a link that is being presumed by so many different authors and which is, indeed, rather obvious, actually exists. I would however, like to have a close look into the amount of contacts and influence that actually existed and to other possible incentives for the appearance of this subject. This way I will try to come to a more balanced and firmly grounded analysis than until thus far has been made of the issue. In my second chapter I will therefore focus on the IFM and its contacts with Polish and Czechoslovak opposition groups and the influence this brought forth. The third chapter will be dedicated to other possible starting points for the East German interest in human rights issues, such as the CSCE process, the typical East German travel and emigration problem, the reforms of Gorbachev and internal developments inside the GDR opposition itself. This chapter is added to prevent a narrow focus on Central Eastern Europe in which all other influences are blocked out, and as a kind of falsification of the third chapter. My first chapter will prepare the reader for what is to come in these later chapters and slowly zero in on the main issue by introducing necessary concepts and backgrounds such as the history of the opposition in the three mentioned countries, the existing links between them, and the exceptional position of the GDR. As examples of Central European oppositional activity I choose to look at Poland and Czechoslovakia. As the two neighbouring socialist countries to the GDR these are a logical choice. Due to visa-free travelling between 1972 and 1980 with Poland and from 1972 with Czechoslovakia the possibilities of personal contacts with these countries were the greatest. 8 Besides that, these two countries also brought forth two of the most important and well-known opposition movements of the Eastern Block: Solidarno ć and Charta 77 , but also smaller groups
7 There are articles of the former opposition members Ludwig Mehlhorn, Wolfgang Rüddenklau, Gerd Poppe and György Dalos and there is a Diplomarbeit on the subject which can be found in the library of the Freie Universität zu Berlin (Miriam Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen zwischen ostdeutscher und tschechoslowakischer Opposition in der 1980er Jahren. Die Beziehungen zwischen der “Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte” und der ‘Charta ‘77’ (Diplomarbeit ; Berlin 2007)). 8 In autumn 1980 following the Polish developments that summer travelling to Poland was severely obstructed Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? Zur Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Polen’, in: Basil Kerski, Andrzej Kotula and Kazimierz Wóycicki ed., Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Polen 1949-1990 (Osnabrück 2003) 35-40, p. 37-39.
4 such as KOR, VONS and Wolno ć i Pokój , which became international examples. The same exemplary function was bestowed on the philosopher-leaders that gave these movements their theoretical dept and attractiveness such as Václav Havel, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuro . A last interesting feature of these two countries are the strong differences between them: the relatively liberal Poland with its worker’s protests with strong nationalist and catholic overtones, compared to more GDR-like repressive Czechoslovakia with its small, isolated and morally inspired opposition. Taking into account two so apparently different examples shows the broad applicability of the human rights theme to the opposition movements in socialist countries and once more stresses the exceptional position the GDR opposition had in failing to taking up this subject before 1986. With respect to the GDR my research will have to focus on (East) Berlin. This is where human rights activism first took concrete form, although other cities would soon follow. Berlin however was not entirely representative for the rest of the GDR oppositional scene. Its closeness to West-Berlin made it subject to the continued attention of Western journalists and gave it a relatively easy access to Western resources, such as Western literature. 9 That the Berlin oppositional scene in some respects faced more controversies and divisions than other cities in the GDR will also be clear from the following pages. All these exceptions should be kept in mind. Some last words need to be said on the practical basis of my research. I choose to approach my subject more from below than from above, which means that I started from material and pronouncements from the IFM and its members itself, instead of taking the documents of the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (MfS, better known as the Stasi ) as the key to the history of the IFM. The documents of the IFM can be found at the Robert Havemann Gesellschaft in Berlin and several of them are published. 10 Furthermore many members of the East German opposition later gave account of their activities in the years before 1989 in the form of articles, lectures and interviews.
9 Annette Leo, ‘Kulturelle Gegenwelt und schützendes Dach. Kirche als Ort des Widerstandes in der DDR’, in: Wolfgang Benz ed., Selbstbehauptung und Opposition. Kirche als Ort des Widerstandes gegen staatliche Diktatur (Berlin 2003) 33-47, p. 45. Erhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989 (Bonn 1997) 483. Charles Maier, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton 1999) 350. 10 RHG (combination of Robert Havemann Archiv and Matthias Domaschk Archiv), printed versions to be found in Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk ed., Freiheit und Öffentlichkeit. Politischer Samisdat in der DDR 1985-1989 (Berlin 2002). Hirsch, Ralf and Lew Kopelew, Grenzfall. Vollständiger Nachdruck aller in der DDR erschienenen Ausgaben (1986/ 1987). Erstes unabhängiges Periodikum (Berlin 1989). Ralf Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, in: Ferdinand Kroh, ed., “Freiheit ist immer Freiheit…” Die Andersdenkenden in der DDR (Frankfurt , Berlin (W) 1989) 210-233. Wolfgang Templin and Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, in: Eberhard Kuhrt et al. ed., Opposition in der DDR von den 70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft (Opladen 1999) 171-211. www.ddr- samisdat.de . Several documents can be found in English in the magazines Across Frontiers , East European Reporter and Labour Focus on Eastern Europe.
5 I supplemented these sources with some interviews of my own. 11 I am aware of the problems of the use of afterwards obtained oral (or written) accounts of past events. 12 Therefore I will try to find a good balance between contemporary and post-1989 sources and check the evidence against each other. The research will focus on the IFM as the most important GDR example of human rights opposition and as exemplary for the general introduction of human rights activism. The primary sources are therefore studied from the mid 1985 to early 1989. I choose to end my research with the events in the spring of 1989. Around this time the IFM decided to open up its membership to people all over the GDR, through which its activities reached a new level. Only two months later the opposition in general gained ‘neue Qualität’ in observing the Kommunalwahlen of May 1989. 13 By carefully researching the exact contacts and references that existed in the IFM to the Central Eastern European opposition and by considering several other possible influences I hope to come close to the immeasurable concept of influence and to reach a conclusion which contributes to a more nuanced and better researched account than thus far exists.
11 I spoke to Carlo Jordan ( Umweltbibliothek, Netzwerk Arche , Greenway) on 05/03/2008, Ludwig Mehlhorn (Initative Absage an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung and an important contact person for Poland) on 11/03/2008 and Gerd Poppe (IFM) on 27/03/2008. 12 Enough has been said about the advantages and disadvantages of oral history since the seventies. Dorothee Lüke, who interviewed five IFM members for her Magisterarbeit , makes the useful remark that many of these oppositionists have in the meanwhile developed a routine in giving interviews about their experiences. I found close resemblances between my own recordings and accounts of my interviewees in other sources. Dorothee Lüke, Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte - Erste unabhängige Oppositionsgruppe in der DDR 1985-1989/90 ( Magisterarbeit , Humboldt Universität zu Berlin 2000) 15. 13 Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 908.
6 Chapter one - Opposition in Central Eastern Europe Opposition in the GDR and its neighbouring countries was, despite the comparable political framework, remarkably dissimilar. Nevertheless, contacts existed between oppositional move- ments. This chapter aims to provide the necessary background knowledge into the nature of opposition in Central Eastern Europe and the contacts and interest that existed between the different countries, and to explain the exceptional status of the GDR opposition.
I. Opposition and human rights in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR
Opposition, dissidence and resistance There is no lack of concepts referring to oppositional behaviour. Words as opposition, dissidence and resistance are often used interchangeably. Different ways exist to deal with the complex practise of defining, concludes Rainer Eckert, of which the easiest and often chosen way is not to define at all. Some authors however, admits Eckert, compensate the lack of definition of other by building large systems of categories of opposition and dissidence, such as Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk and Erhart Neubert. 14 In order not to get lost in categorisations one should first take a look at the basic principles at stake. The first logical but necessary observation is that opposition in the Western, parliamentarian sense had no chance or place in the Central Eastern European political system. Oppositional activities therefore often took place outside of the political institutions. 15 Several names can and have been applied to these kinds of extra-institutional disagreement with the regime. Opposition and resistance are usually distinguished by the existence of an intention of legal behaviour. Erhart Neubert and Karl Wilhelm Fricke, both writers of standard works on the opposition in the GDR, respectively stress the importance of the ‘Grundlage verbindlicher Normen und verbindlichen Rechts’ which one tries to make the regime adhere to and the relatively legal and open way in which this is done. 16 Resistance entirely renounces this claim of legality or has no possibility to operate openly. Eckert, Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs complete these definitions by stating that resistance pursues the removal of the regime, while opposition could also pursue reform only. All authors however assert that these definitions can change
14 Rainer Eckert, ‘Widerstand und Opposition: Umstrittene Begriffe der deutschen Diktaturgeschichte’, in: Erhart Neubert and Bernd Eisenfeld ed., Macht - Ohnmacht - Gegenmacht. Grundfragen zur politischer Gegnerschaft in der DDR (Bremen 2001) 27-36, p. 27-33. Neubert, Geschichte, 29. Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, East European Fault Lines. Dissent, Opposition, and Social Activism (Boulder, etc 1989) 36. 15 Ibidem, 35. Martin Gutzeit, ‘Der Weg in die Opposition. Über das Selbstverständnis und die Rolle der “Opposition” im Herbst 1989 in der ehemaligen DDR’, in: Walter Euchner ed., Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen 1993) 84-114, p. 84. Karl Wilhelm Fricke, Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR. Ein politischer Report (Cologne 1984) 11-12. Neubert, Geschichte , 29. 16 Ibidem, 29. Fricke, Opposition , 13.
7 according to circumstances, and above all overlap, something which should be kept in mind while assessing the phenomenon. 17 More difficult is the concept of dissidence or dissent. This term is often used by English- writing authors where others would use the word opposition. They also define the word accordingly: ‘Whereas revisionism “assented” to the normative principles underlying the Leninist regime, dissent (or dissidence) places itself outside these principles, claiming an elementary right of difference that is repressed by Leninist regimes,’ states Christian Joppke. 18 Often no real distinction between the two concepts is made, or the difference is seen rather in temporal and organisational dissimilarity than a real distinction in content and form. 19 Only Kowalczuk really makes clear where this definition problem comes from: ‘Mit Dissidenten werden vom Wortursprung her jene Personen bezeichnet, die in einem Gemeinwesen von den herrschenden politischen und weltanschaulichen Grundsätzen abweichen. Seit den sechziger Jahren unseres Jahrhunderts sind als Dissidenten vor allem jene Personen bezeichnet worden, die in Osteuropa zur Bürgerrechtsbewegung zählen.’ Pollack and Wielgohs are almost unique in still using this older definition of dissidence. Kowalczuk himself for example does not hesitate to use this new meaning of the word which means more than deviation, ‘sondern vielmehr noch Ausbruch aus dem gegebenen System.’ Also Klaus Michael states that dissidence has a very different connotation in the West and in Eastern Europe ‘wo er vor allem als eine intellektuelle und moralische Widerstandshaltung gegenüber den Ansprüchen von Partei und Staat verstanden wurde.’ 20 The interesting aspect of the oppositional activity in the GDR is that it would not only fit the new, but partly also the traditional version of the word dissidence. Kowalczuk distinguishes three kinds of ‘political dissidence’ in the GDR: bürgerliche Opposition , Reformsozialismus , and soziokulturelle or gesellschaftliche Opposition . These last two only rejected some aspects of the system
17 Ibidem, 13-14. Neubert, Geschichte , 31. Karl Wilhelm Fricke, ‘Dimensionen von Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR’, in: Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinback and Johannes Tochel, Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 1999) 21-43, p. 24. Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, ‘Introduction’, in: Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs ed., Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe. Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition (Aldershot, Burlington 2004) ix-xviii, p. xii. Eckert, ‘Widerstand’, 35-36. Resistance is here used as the translation of the German word Widerstand . Eckert also distinguishes Resistenz which he defines as ‘ein nicht der Norm entsprechendes Verhalten im Alltag’, ibidem. 18 Joppke, East German Dissidents , 16-18, 187. Cf. the following titles: Barbara J. Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings (Budapest 2003). Jane Leftwich Curry ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York 1983). Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent (my emphasis). 19 Günter Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition in der DDR vor dem Hintergrund der Reformdiskussion in Osteuropa’, in: Edition Deutschland Archiv, Die DDR im vierzigsten Jahr. Geschichte, Situation, Perspektiven. Zweiundzwanzigste Tagung zum Stand der DDR-Forschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16. bis 19. Mai 1989 (Cologne 1989) 60-74, p. 67. 20 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘Gegenkräfte: Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR – Begriffliche und methodische Probleme’, in: Kuhrt ed., Opposition , 47-75, p. 73. Pollack and Wielgohs, ‘Introduction’, xii. Klaus Michael, ‘Zweite Kultur oder Gegenkultur? Die Subkulturen und künstlerischen Szenen der DDR und ihr Verhältnis zur politischen Opposition, in: Detlef Pollack, Dieter Rink ed., Zwischen Verweigerung und Opposition. Politischer Protest in der DDR 1970- 1989 (Frankfurt, New York 1997) 106-128, p. 126.
8 and still sought the answer in the socialist ideology or offered no alternative at all. Only the first kind of opposition radically refused to accept the system and offered an alternative of democratic claims. This kind of opposition however mainly existed in the fifties and virtually ceased to exist after the building of the Wall in 1961. Only from the mid eighties on sporadically and hesitantly this kind of opposition was taken up again. 21 Although both the new and the old version of the word dissidence would fit the different kinds of GDR oppositional behaviour, it would however probably cause less confusion to use the word opposition. This word, as defined by Neubert and Fricke, suits the GDR oppositional scene of the eighties well. Although the opposition of the seventies had functioned only secretly and illegally, by contrast from the early eighties on the activists of the peace movement worked relatively openly and legally. The choice of the peace issue itself - not the most controversial topic, but difficult to criminalise by the regime, as Ludwig Mehlhorn rightfully stresses - was party given in by this desire. One tried not to use illegal methods although the awareness that in the SED regime virtually everything could be criminalised was omnipresent, according to IFM and Frauen für den Frieden member Ulrike Poppe. This was however not always a principally inspired desire to stay legal but also a pragmatic risk evaluation. On the level of conscience the legitimacy principle played an important role. As long as certain rights were not granted by the regime it might not have been strictly legal to use those rights, but still legitimate. Especially the incoherence between certain legal and international standards to which the GDR officially adhered and the oppressive reality made it easy to address the regime on this issue. The only legal means to opposition the regime offered was the writing of petitions, called Eingaben , to official institutions, this was of course eagerly used by oppositionists. According to Ulrike Poppe’s ‘colleague’ Bärbel Bohley this lasting desire to act legally often restrained them too much: ‘wir haben uns immer auf die Einhaltung der Gesetze berufen, und es hat eine Weile gedauert bis wir eingesehen haben, dass man auch manchmal gegen die Gesetze verstoßen muß.’ 22 These principles of legality and legitimacy were of the utmost importance to the IFM. Of equal importance was the desire to work openly and in full publicity. 23
21 Kowalczuk, ‘Gegenkräfte’, 58-61. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘Von der Freiheit Ich zu sagen. Widerständiges Verhalten in der DDR’, in: Ulrike Poppe, Rainer Eckert and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk ed., Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung. Formen des Widerstandes und der Opposition in der DDR (Berlin 1995) 85-115, p. 109-112. 22 Ulrike Poppe, ‘“Der Weg ist das Ziel”. Zum Selbstverständnis und der politische Rolle oppositionaller Gruppen der achtziger Jahre’, in: ibidem, 244-272, pp. 250-251. Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte in der DDR’, in: Gabriele von Arnim et al. ed., Jahrbuch Menschenrechte 1999 (Frankfurt 2000) 247-260, p. 257. Bärbel Bohley, Werner Fischer and Thomas Rudolf in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 54, 101, 194. Olivo, Creating , 64. Christof Geisel, Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg. Das politische Selbstverständnis der DDR-Opposition in den 80er Jahren (Berlin 2005) 90. Susan Buckingham, ‘Freedom to think differently… A report on the latest crackdown on GDR independents’, East European Reporter 3 (1988/89) 2, 55-57, p. 55. 23 Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 211. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 257. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 178
9 This dedication to the principle of legality and openness makes it logical to speak about opposition, when describing the resistant behaviour in the GDR. Besides that, opposition is the term that was largely used by the foreign press in those days, which according to Martin Gutzeit played a role in the self conception of oppositional circles in the GDR. This was however counterfeited by the fact the regime labelled every small act of dissidence or rejection as opposition, something against which the oppositional circles tried to arm themselves by acting legally and openly. Most oppositionists continued to refuse to use the word opposition until the late eighties, something which can also be found for example in the Czechoslovak opposition group Charta 77 . Also the issues that were addressed, such as peace and environment, were more than internal political issues, but global issues, addressing the whole world. The solution was often still sought in socialism. According to Erhart Neubert the rejection of the designation as opposition was mainly self-protection. In the oral traditions of the groups the self-conception as opposition was more accepted. Besides that, there were oppositionists such as Robert Havemann and Rainer Eppelmann that could and would not ignore their status as oppositionists anymore. 24 Although at the time being the oppositionists were only labelled as such by the regime and the West, their activities and aims justify the use of this designation here, not least because it has grown to be the most used description of the oppositional activity in the GDR in the seventies and eighties. Another word that has the benefit of its circulation rather than appropriateness is the term peace movement. This concept, usually applied to describe the anti-missile actions in the West, has often also been extended to describe the peace groups in the East, and will also be used as such here. That the peace engagement in the GDR was definitely too small to speak of a ‘movement’ is taken for granted. 25
Opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia The world east of the iron curtain was marked by an opposition that, despite the apparent different conditions of their countries and oppositional situations and difficulties of contact, showed some remarking similarities. Poland and Czechoslovakia, the two socialist countries with the most well-known oppositional developments, had had a different development since the mid fifties. In the year of the Hungarian Uprising, Poland had known its own upheaval, and since
24 Ibidem, 246, 249-250. Gutzeit, ‘Der Weg in die Opposition’, 85. Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 73. Wolfgang Templin, ‘Nicht nur staatliche Wiedervereinigung, sondern auch gesellschaftliche Neuvereinigung’, in: Eckhard Jesse ed., Eine Revolution und ihre Folgen. 14 Bürgerrechtler ziehen Bilanz (Berlin 2000) 111-112, p. 114. Maier, Dissolution, 171. Neubert, Geschichte , 322-323, 379. Tenley Adams, ‘Charter 77 and the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR). The struggle for human rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland’, East European Quarterly 26 afl. 2 (1992) 219-238, p. 236. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 53. 25 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 15. Fricke, Opposition , 189. Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition’, 72.
10 chosen the more conciliatory path of a more liberal national communism. 26 In Czechoslovakia by contrast, communism enjoyed initial support by many intellectuals, and the strong model of Stalinist communism was continued. 27 Poland was marked by a large feeling of national and religious pride and unity, stimulated by the catholic church: something which in the nationally and religiously more divided Czechoslovakia was impossible. 28 Furthermore, although Czechoslovakia had known the most pronounced and politically active workers’ class before the rise of the communists, only in Poland it would grow out to be a strong and oppositional force in society. Socialist Czechoslovakia lived its finest hour in the spring of 1968 as the reform movement inside the communist party that became known as the Prague Spring, led by Alexander Dub ček, attracted the attention and the hopes of the entire leftwing world. Only a few months later Moscow brutally showed through an invasion by Warsaw Pact troops, that socialist reforms from above did not conform to its ideas. 29 The events of the 21th of August shocked the Eastern and Western world and led many reformist thinkers in the East to fall from their belief that reform from above was possible. In Poland 1968 had known its own events and upheavals of mainly intellectuals and students, and also here among oppositionist feelings ran high about what happened in Prague. 30 Czechoslovakia would plunge into years of strict repression under Gustav Husák: euphemistically described as ‘normalisation’. In Poland by contrast, the first student uprising of 1968, which was not supported by the workers, was followed two years later by a workers’ upheaval ignored by the intellectuals. Strikes on account of rising food prices would become a returning feature of the Polish political world, and as in 1976 again workers choose to strike, a group of intellectuals had learned from the earlier events and formed an oppositional group in defence of the prosecuted workers, named KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotników , Workers’ Defence Committee). As an amnesty for the workers and a severe wave of repression changed the circumstances under which they were working, they changed their strategy to self-defence of
26 Helena Flam, Mosaic of Fear. Poland and East Germany before 1989 (Boulder, New York 1998) xiii, 12, 38. Falk, The Dilemmas , 13-14. 27 Ibidem, 59-61. 28 Ibidem, 18-19. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 59, 61. Flam, Mosaic of Fear, 161. Annabelle Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung. Ein Vergleich zwischen DDR und Tschechoslowakei (Frankfurt, New York, 1999) 14. 29 Oldrich T ma, ‘Czechoslovakia’, in: Pollack and Wielgohs, Dissent , 29-49, p. 34-35. Falk, The Dilemmas , 70-80. 30 Ibidem, 22-27. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 221-222. Stafani Sonntag, ‘Poland’, in: Pollack and Wielgohs, Dissent , 3-27, p. 20.
11 society and renamed their group KSS-‘KOR’ (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej KOR , Committee for Social Self-defence KOR).31 In Czechoslovakia only a year later intellectuals and others would gather as well, this time on occasion of the repression of the underground rock band Plastic People of the Universe. They published a declaration called Charta 77 , signed by more than 200 people, among them prominent oppositionists and politicians of the Prague Spring. 32 Charta would become a successful movement: although it remained marginal in society, it was very meaningful abroad and, seen to the repression it was subjected to, considered a danger by the regime. It had a loose organisational structure with three yearly rotating spokespersons, no official membership, and a large reservoir of more passive supporters: the Charta was signed by hundreds of people in the years after 1977. Charta ’s activity in the years to come consisted of a large output of numbered documents and other independent publications, such as the regular publication Informace o Chart , also known as Infoch , which was issued by an independent group of Charta signatories. 33 Both Charta and KOR had some important intellectuals in their ranks that theorised about the oppositional strategy to choose. Remarking examples are Leszek Kołakowski, Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuro for Poland and Jan Pato čka, Václav Havel and Václav Benda for Czechoslovakia. 34 They concluded that 1968 had shown that reform from above was impossible. Society should emancipate itself from the state through the creation of parallel structures and a strategy of self-defence. The opposition should not address the regime, as it had before, but direct its activity at the wider public. 35 Although these ideas that came into existence in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – described as civil society, antipolitics or parallel structures, by different contemporary and later authors - are often regarded as similar, also considerable
31 Falk, The Dilemmas , 27-40. Jane Leftwich Curry, ‘Polish dissent and the establishment criticism: the new evolutionism’, in: Curry ed., Dissent , 153-172, p. 155, 159. Michael H. Bernhard, The origins of Democratisation in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals and Oppositional Politics 1976-1980 (New York 1993) 45, 77-82, 117-118, 121-123. 32 Falk, The Dilemmas , 84-87. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 221. H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (Londen 1981) 8-14, 39. ‘ Charter 77 – Declaration , 1 January 1977’, in: ibidem, 209-212. 33 Skilling, Charter 77 , 19-20, 39, 51-52, 85-95, 127-128. Chartist Anna Šabatová in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling 1968 und seine Folgen in der CSSR, in den sozialistischen Nachbarländer, insbesondere in der DDR und der VR Polen, sowie im Ost-West Verhältnis” unter der Leitung von Gert Weißkirchen’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Deutschlandpolitik, Innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen. Materialien der Enquete Kommission „Aufarbeitung und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland“ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages). Band V 1 (Baden- Baden etc. 1995) 135-196, p. 143. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 230-231, 236. H. Gordon Skilling, Samizdat and an independent society in Central and Eastern Europe (Hong Kong 1989), 47-49, 71. T ma, ‘Czechoslovakia’, 38. 34 For a reproduction of their ideas see Falk, The Dilemmas or Christie Miedema, De geometrie voorbij. De ontwikkeling van paralelle structuren in Polen en Tsjechoslowakije in theorie en praktijk 1968-1989 (master thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2007). 35 Jan. B. de Weydenthal, ‘The character of East European dissent during the late 1970s’, in: Curry, Dissent, 143-152, p. 144. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 236. Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines , 102-103, 90-91. Helena Flam, ‘Die poröse und die wasserdichte Sinnwelt der Opposition. Der ostdeutsche und der polnische Fall’, in: Pollack and Rink, Zwischen Verweigerung , 145-167, p. 166. Sonntag, ‘Poland’, 14.
12 differences existed. 36 The Czechoslovak thinkers for example often laid more stress on the moral dimension of opposition, such as Havel’s famous appeal to live in the truth. The Polish opposition on the other hand, because its margins were a lot wider, was more focussed on practical issues and the possibilities of the existing conditions. 37 The opposition in both countries however, aimed at a strategy supporting democracy, human rights and the emancipation of society through parallel organisations such as universities, independent publishing and organisations in defence of the prosecuted - such as KOR in Poland and VONS (Výbor na Obranu Nespravedliv Stíhaných , Committee for the Defence of the Unjustly Prosecuted) in Czechoslovakia. 38 They both worked publicly and openly: names were published under declarations and everything was done with as little conspiracy as possible. Both were established shortly after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, which played an important legitimising role. 39 This kind of opposition acquired a whole new quality with the newest workers’ uprising in Poland and the emergence of the independent union Solidarno ć . It turned into a mass movement with ten million members until it was forbidden and struck down in the declaration of martial law of December 1981. 40 Solidarno ć and the aforementioned intellectuals would remain active in the underground and new groups would come to existence in its surroundings, such as the opposition group Freedom and Peace - WiP -, that consisted of conscientious objectors that rejected the obligatory vow of loyalty to the Soviet Union in the Polish army. Its engagement went beyond peace and national liberation and also comprised human rights and environmental issues. 41 Also Charta 77 remained, despite repression, active during the eighties. Some of its internationally most important texts were those aimed at the Western peace movement, such as the Prague Appeal of 1984 and Havel’s ‘Anatomy of a reticence’, in which he explained the Central Eastern European reservation towards the socialist propaganda issue peace and utopian thinking in general. 42 Charta on the other hand propagated the indivisibility of internal and
36 Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 39, 41, 46. Falk, The Dilemmas , 40. Robert Sharlet, ‘Varieties of dissent and regularities of repression in the European communist states: an overview’, in: Curry, Dissent , 1-19, p. 8. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 219, 236. Bernhard, The origins , 9-13. Olivo, Creating , 11-14, 30. 37 Miedema, De geometrie voorbij. 38 Skilling, Charter 77 , 97-99, 114-120. Skilling, Samizdat , 11-14, 21-22, 44-46. Bugajski and Pollack, East Eusopean Fault Lines , 98-99, 227-228. Falk, The Dilemmas , 42-43, 92-95. Bernhard, The origins , 147-150. 39 Ibidem, 88-91. Chartist Zdenek Mlynar in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 191. De Weydenthal, ‘The character’, 147, 149. Curry, ‘Polish dissent’, 156. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 221-222, 228, 233. 40 Falk, The Dilemmas , 45-56. Sonntag, ‘Poland’, 9-12, 17-18. 41 ‘Freedom and Peace: Declaration of Principles’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 2 (1986) spring, 2-5. ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte. Zur Arbeit der polnischen Gruppe Wolno ć i Pokój - Freiheit und Frieden’, RHG WT 08. Skilling, Samizdat , 214-215. 42 Václav Havel, The anatomy of a reticence : Eastern European dissidents and the peace movement in the West (Stockholm 1985) 6-18. Skilling, Samizdat , 63-64.
13 external human rights, which conflicted with the dominant opinion of the peace movement that peace should be attained first before internal issues such as human rights and democracy could be addressed. 43 The contacts with the West were very important to keep the pressure on the regime. International recognition was an important means of protection against the regime. 44 In Poland it would be a politics of compromises and round table talks that would lead to the partly free elections of the 4 th of June 1989, in which the communists for the first time in forty years in the Eastern bloc lost an election. Czechoslovakia would remain a repressive society up until late in 1989. Czechoslovakia and the GDR, two countries that had for years been similar in their hard-line, repressive fear for changes, both were subject to a wave of demonstrations and went down in a velvet revolution instead of the conciliatory path of the Polish. 45 In a few years moreover, both artificially created countries had ceased to exist.
Opposition in East Germany: exceptional case GDR Despite the diversity of the opposition in its neighbouring countries, the opposition in the GDR can still be seen as a clear exception to the developments in Central Eastern Europe. As has been ascertained before, East German opposition was exceptional in comparison to its neighbouring countries because of the late appearance of opposition in general and especially human rights activism. There were however more features that set the GDR opposition apart from that in Poland and Czechoslovakia, such as the late emergence of samizdat publications - an originally Russian word, which means ‘self publishing house’ - and the continuing belief in the reformability of socialism. In the same year that KOR changed its name and strategy and Charta 77 was established, the most important star at the East German oppositional firmament was Rudolf Bahro who published his reform socialist ideas in the FRG, for which he was imprisoned and released into the FRG. Reform socialist ideas indeed remained strong in the GDR. Joppke even speaks about the turn against socialism and utopia towards human rights activism as ‘an insight that failed to come in East Germany’. 46 These oppositional strategies did not fail to come entirely, but came with considerable delay. GDR oppositionists that already in the eighties closely followed Central Eastern European developments such as Gerd and Ulrike Poppe and Ludwig Mehlhorn advocate the idea of a kind
43 Skilling, Samizdat , 60-61. Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines , 105. 44 Ibidem, 105-106. 45 Bernhard, The origins , 17-23. Falk, The Dilemmas , 56-58, 103-107. 46 Rainer Deppe, Helmut Dubiel and Ulrich Rodel, ‘Einleitung’, in: Rainer Deppe, Helmut Dubiel and Ulrich Rodel ed., Demokratischer Umbruch in Osteuropa (Frankfurt 1991) 7-24, p. 19. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 62. Dieter Rink, ‘Ausreiser, Kirchengruppen, Kulturopposition und Reformer. Zu Differenzen und Gemeinsamkeiten in Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR in den 70er und 80er Jahren’, in: Pollack and Rink ed., Zwischen Verweigerung , 54-77, p. 54. Joppke, East German Dissidents , vii-viii, xi, 69-70, 107. Torpey, Intellectuals, socialism , ix-x. Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 953-954. Olivo, Creating , 61-62.
14 of Verspätungstheorie , according to which the opposition in the GDR in many respects had a similar development to that in Central Eastern Europe, only some seven to ten years later. 47 Other authors reject the exceptional constellation of the East German opposition entirely, such as the absolute prominence of the desire to preserve socialism and the GDR. They however generally only speak about some specific groups in the late eighties, when indeed several exceptional groups abandoned the reform socialist idea. According to one of these authors the East German search for a ‘third way’ was no search for an intermediate form between socialism and capitalism but for an alternative to all existing forms of government. The continuing positive references to socialism should, according to Karsten Timmer, not be understood as ‘Vision der angestrebten Gesellschaft, sondern als pragmatischer Kompromiß hinsichtlich der denkbaren Veränderungen.’ 48 Either way, socialism remained an important point of reference in the East German opposition and human rights and democratisation only developed into important oppositional issues in the mid eighties. Of course consequently the oppositional practise in the GDR developed differently from that in its neighbouring countries. Except for the uprising of 1953 the GDR had not known any major oppositional events, and even that one did not form a point of reference or continuity for the East German opposition. It rather led to more resignation and discouragement than as an incentive to oppositional behaviour. Due to the tabu that existed on the issue the younger generations were moreover never fully informed about the events. 49 The ‘modern’ kind of East German opposition did not centre around the ‘Central Eastern European’ and regime-unfriendly issue of human rights but around the ‘Western European’ peace and disarmament theme that was also one of the regime’s favourite topics. Actually, the contrast between the emphasis the regime put on peace and disarmament in its foreign policy and the great measure of militarization inside the GDR was one of the incentives to the establishment of a large peace movement in East Germany. The East German peace movement came into existence in the church, where, despite the accommodation with the regime in the late sixties, oppositional potential and peace engagement had existed for decades. Although peace activism, such as the relatively successful protests against the draft of Christian conscientious objectors, and local peace groups had existed since the 1960s, the issue really gained momentum in the late 1970s. As the regime tried to
47 Interview Ludwig Mehlhorn, 11 March 2008, Berlin. Interview Gerd Poppe, 27 March 2008, Berlin. Ulrike Poppe, ‘“Freiheit ist immer die Freitheit der Andersdenkenden.” Opposition und Protest in der DDR’, in: Franz-Josef Hutter and Carsten Tessmer ed., Die Menschenrechte in Deutschland. Geschichte und Gegenwart (München 1997) 239-252, p. 251. Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch in Ost- und Mitteleuropa und seine Bedeutung für die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 2 , 1409-1436, p. 1421. 48 Rainer Eckert, ‘Das Programm einer demokratischen Revolution. Debatten der DDR-Opposition in den radix- Blättern 1987-1989’, Deutschland Archiv 32 (1999) no. 5, 733-779, pp. 773, 779. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 42, 50, 63, 71- 73. 49 Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung, 101-102, 153. Neubert, Geschichte , 89-90.
15 introduce Wehrkundeunterricht to East German schools a protest movement in the church came into existence, that institutionalised ever more by the organisation of seminars and umbrella organisations, such as the Friedenswerkstatt and Frieden Konkret , the introduction of the swords to ploughshares symbol and individual contacts to the Western peace movement. This closeness to the Western peace movement turned out negatively as in November 1983 the feared NATO- double-track decision was confirmed by the FRG Bundestag , which was a great backlash not only for the West but also the East German peace movement. The remarkable closeness also led East German activists to take over leftwing, pro-socialist ideas that circulated in the West German peace movement. 50 The peace movement of the early eighties had been of tremendous importance, not only because it formed the cradle of the environmental, human rights and continuing peace groups of the later eighties, but also because for the first time the separated Christian and - mainly conspirative - leftwing intellectual opposition united. This is most clearly shown in one of the most important texts of the peace movement, the Berlin Appeal, which was signed by prominent Christians and the most important dissident socialist of all, Robert Havemann. Olivo stresses the similarities of this document with the Polish opposition in its direction not only at the regime, but also at the people. Probably even more striking however, was that the document, beyond the regular demands of the peace movement, contained the bold proposal to withdraw the allied troops from Germany and guaranty their non-interference. 51 The fact that the opposition in the GDR centred around the peace issue instead of human rights is one of the first striking exceptions of the GDR opposition. While in Central Eastern Europe the peace issue - one of the propaganda themes of the Eastern Block - was watched with scepticism and a peace movement came into existence rather late, in the GDR it was the issue around which the opposition crystallised. The geopolitical situation of the GDR might have played a role here: ‘An der Nahtstelle zwischen den beiden sich hochgerüstet gegenüber- stehenden Blöcken war möglicherweise die Kriegsgefahr allgegenwärtiger’, stated former peace activist Ulrike Poppe in 1997. Also Joppke states that the fear for a nuclear war and the conviction that never again a war should start from German soil was nowhere as great as in the two Germanies. It was here where a possible war would reach its most tragic form: with a divided
50 Joppke, East German Dissidents , 71. Hubertus Knabe, ‘Widerstand und Opposition in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 1 , 76-88, pp. 78-83. Wolfgang Rüddenklau, Störenfried. DDR-Opposition 1986-1989. Mit Texten aus den “Umweltblättern” (Berlin 1992, 2 nd revised edition) 28-32, 51. Gerd Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung internationaler Verbindungen’, 349-377, pp. 351-352. Interview Mehlhorn. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 251. Pollack, Politischer Protest , 96. Eckhard Jesse, ‘Oppositionelle Bestrebungen in den achtziger Jahren und ihre Repräsentanten’, Jesse, Eine Revolution , 257-324, p. 270. Olivo, Creating , 65-66, 81. 51 Ibidem, 68-69. Neubert, Geschichte , 408-409.
16 people on two sides of the combatlines. Indeed the peace movement in the GDR had close similarities to its counterpart in the FRG. 52 The choice for peace instead of human rights ‘underscores the maintenance of revisionism in the East German opposition scene,’ according to Joppke. Instead of human rights - the regime’s ‘Achilles’ heel’ - the peace issue was addressed. Authors have found different reasons for this adherence to revisionism. At the basis of most of this stands the exceptional status of the GDR as country and deficient nation and Germany’s extraordinary history. East Germany’s status as country made out of half a nation, made it impossible to refer to a national framework. The existence of a national identity to fall back upon was an important incentive in other Eastern bloc countries, such as Poland. Since the GDR was defined nationally not by its culture or language, which it shared with the FRG, but by its political system, rejection of socialism would mean rejection of the GDR itself. The opposition of the eighties was mainly made up out of the generation that grew up in the sixties and after. They had no memories of a Germany that was not the GDR and therefore felt no longing for it. Reunification or the German question in general were no issue to them, since both were almost impossible to imagine.53 Also the SED was aware of the fragile position of the GDR. It turned the GDR into one of the strictest countries east of the iron curtain: ‘Die Psychologie der belagerten Festung mit dem Trojanischen Pferd West-Berlin in der Mitte erklärt teilweise die ideologische Verbohrtheit der Führungsschicht,’ concludes György Dalos. According to Günter Minnerup this feeling even went beyond the hardliners at the top: ‘Die durch den Kalten Krieg (…) generierte “Belagerungsmentalität” hatte auch die kritische Teile der Partei und der Intelligenz ergriffen’. From the seventies on references to German unity disappeared from the public discourse and the GDR nation was defined by its socialist ideology. The knowledge that without its socialist legitimation, virtually nothing distinguished the GDR from the FRG, and without the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact it had no chance to survive, turned the GDR into one of the strictest and most obedient Eastern Bloc states. Every thread of reform posed an existential danger to the regime. Consequently, there was very little space for oppositional activity. This fear of reform
52 U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 251. Havel, The anatomy of a reticence , 5-11. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1421. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 354. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 71, 74, 100. 53 Ibidem, 39-40, 187, 190, 198-199, 201. Martin Gutzeit, ‘Widerstand und Opposition in de achtziger Jahren. Von der Formierung der Opposition bis zum Stirz der SED-Opposition’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 1, 235-245, p. 238. Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 953. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 266. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 157. Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung , 14. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 5, 79-80. Jan Faktor, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition und alternative Kultur in der DDR’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 44 (1994) B 10/94, 30-37, p. 31. Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, in: Hubertus Knabe ed., Aufbruch in eine andere DDR. Reformer und Oppositionelle zur Zukunft ihres Landes (Reinbeck bei Hamburg 1989) 171-177, p. 174. Martin Jander, ‘Der Protest gegen die Biermann- Ausbürgerung – Stimulans der Opposition’, in: Henke et al., Widerstand , 281-294, p. 288. Hirsch in Lüke, Die Initiative, 115. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit, 34. Olivo, Creating, 63.
17 even drove the SED into revolt towards the Soviet ‘Big Brother’ as suddenly reforms were propagated from above by Michael Gorbachev. 54 The German question was not only taboo in the propaganda of the regime, but also in the East German opposition. According to prominent oppositionists such as Wolfgang Rüddenklau and Gerd Poppe the German question was only discussed on incentives from abroad, or even not at all. In interaction with Central Eastern European groups however, the issue was discussed by some, such as in the circles around Ludwig Mehlhorn who initiated the Initiative Absage an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung (Initiative APPA). Even he however untill late in 1989 kept severe doubts about a swift German unity. 55 Another aspect that hampered the development of an outright anti-socialist opposition was the fact that the East German opposition had no democratic, or actually no history at all to refer back to. ‘When East Germans looked back, they saw a nation wiped out in total moral and military defeat’, is how Joppke describes the situation. This again contrasts with Central Eastern Europe that not only had a national, but also a historical and, in case of Czechoslovakia, even a democratic framework in which to place their oppositional activities. Instead of offering a heroic example or a national identity to look back on, German recent history in every way discredited nationalism as a possible counter-discourse to socialism and offered a people used to obedience and lack of democracy. Some opposition members even saw the occupation and partition of Germany as righteous punishment for their guilt or that of their fathers. 56 The regime of course, had had the same problem to cope with. In contrast to the FRG the GDR choose to break radically with the past and to opt for re-education and virulent anti- fascism. The GDR was therefore established as an antifascist socialist state by former prisoners and exiles of the Third Reich. This combination of antifascism and utopianism made the GDR attractive to the intellectuals that had fled Hitler and many of them consciously choose a life in the GDR. Most of these intellectuals remained caught in their critical loyalty towards the regime and never turned to real oppositional behaviour, although they were more than once invited to do so by the opposition. Also to younger opposition members however, the antifascist identity
54 Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition’, 71-72. György Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch in Ost- und Mitteleuropa und seine Bedeutung für die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 1 , 540- 557, p. 547. Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 250. Maier, Dissolution , 121-122. 55 Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 13. Neubert, Geschichte , 661, 681. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 355. Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Die DDR-Opposition und die nationale Frage in den achtziger Jahren’, in: Neubert and Eisenfeld, Macht. Ohnmacht, 183-188, pp. 183, 185-188. Eckert, ‘Das Programm’, 775. Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, 171. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 128-129. Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 953-954. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 203. 56 Ibidem, ix, 39, 191, 212. Flam, Mosaic of Fear, 157. Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung , 14. Bärbel Bohley in: ‘Von der Formierung der Opposition bis zum Sturz der SED-Diktatur. Zeitzeugen’, in: Deutscher Bundestag, Möglichkeiten und Formen , 245-306, p. 306. Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, 177. Wolfgang Templin, ‘Bemerkungen zur politischen Orientierung in der Friedensbewegung (1987)’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 157-160, p. 160. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 5.
18 made the GDR the better alternative to the FRG, which was represented as not having entirely broken with the national socialist past. Besides that the suffering of the SED leaders and the Soviet ‘liberators’ during the Hitler period, still made it difficult to resort to total opposition. According to Mehlhorn the GDR opposition never entirely emancipated itself from the antifascist myth. The success of antifascism explains another striking feature of the East German oppositional scene: the absence of prominent intellectuals and other leaders in their ranks, in contrast to the major role of famous intellectuals in Polish and Czechoslovak opposition movements. 57 Indeed the few prominent intellectuals that had emerged during the seventies, such as the Havemann, Bahro, and the singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann, all remained convinced socialists who saw the GDR as the better alternative to the FRG. Still they appeared too dangerous to the regime: Bahro and Biermann were exiled to the FRG in the late seventies. In the case of the latter this even caused a reaction from the ‘critically loyal’ intellectual elite and became a landmark in the oppositional history of East Germany, although these intellectuals would soon return to unshakable loyalty again. Havemann was put under house arrest. He died in 1982, shortly after he had sided with the peace movement in the influential ‘Berlin Appeal’. 58 After the death of Havemann however, no new prominent intellectual would take lead in the peace movement. Appeals to critical intellectuals such as Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym remained useless: they remained loyal to the SED and the antifascist myth. The peace movement was carried by what Joppke calls ‘a younger generation of peculiarly nameless intellectuals’. 59 ‘Die Tabuisierung der “deutschen Frage”, die Aufrechterhaltung des Feindbildes “BRD“ und die zynische Manipulation mit den historisch berechtigten deutschen Schuldgefühlen hat die Entfaltung einer politischen Opposition in der DDR unvergleichbar mehr erschwert als die tatsächliche und potentielle Repressalien’, is the strong conclusion of the Hungarian oppositionist Dalos. 60 It was especially the exceptional situation of the GDR as peculiar cold war construction that brought the GDR oppositionists closer to their regime than the colleagues in Central Eastern Europe. Still another aspect of the GDR’s geopolitical status severely hampered the development
57 ibidem, 5, 8, 79-80. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 71, 72, 76-77. Wolfgang Templin, ‘Antikommunistische opposition in der DDR und in Polen’, in: Kerski et al., Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft?, 167-175, p. 170. Joppke, East German Dissidents , ix, 31-33, 185, 192, 194-196. Ulrike Poppe, ‘“Gesperrt für sämtlichen Reiseverkehr bis zum 31.12.1999”’, in: Jesse, Eine Revolution , 209-221, p. 212. Wolfgang Engler, ‘Stellungen, Stellungnahmen, Legenden. Ein ostdeutscher Errinnerungsversuch’, in: Deppe, Dubiel, Rödel, Demokratischer Umbruch , 48-75, p. 58. Mehlhorn in: “Das freie Wort”, 133. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 147. Olivo, Creating , 63. 58 Ibidem, 65-66. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 73. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 142, Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 111. Jander, ‘Der Protest’, 283-287. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 65-70. 59 Ibidem, 72, 200. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 255. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 198. Jander, ‘Der Protest’, 282, 285, 287. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 76-77. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 79. 60 Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 547-548.
19 of a more radical opposition. Due to the fact that the German nation had only recently been divided over two ideologically adverse countries, the FRG still appeared as a linguistically and culturally similar alternative to the GDR. Compared to the rest of Central Eastern Europe, in the GDR the smallest emotional threshold to emigrate to the West existed. For those who did not believe in socialism or the possibility of change in the GDR at all, the more desirable state was only a border away. Although emigration to FRG was no easy process, still many chose this option and it felt as a serious drain of potential more radical opposition to those oppositionists that stayed behind. In the light of this ‘selection process’ the socialist and reformist nature of the East German opposition and the lack of oppositional continuity are certainly no surprising facts. This process was partly consciously stimulated by the regime by depriving undesirable GDR citizens of their citizenship and by selling political prisoners to the FRG. 61 Prominent examples are Wolf Biermann, whose citizenship was taken from him while on concert in the FRG, and the Jena peace activist Roland Jahn, who was forcibly sent over the border in a train toilet. The regime used emigration of large groups as a safety valve to get rid of unwanted protest, such as after the Biermann Ausbürgerung in 1976 and in 1984. 62 Another effect of the closeness of the FRG and its West Berlin enclave was the possibility to receive Western media in the GDR. Besides that, FRG publications of Western and Eastern literature could be smuggled into the GDR where it could easily be distributed without having to be translated and reprinted. Furthermore, East German opposition members often found a readily listening ear in Western journalists and could spread their message to the West and the East through West German television. Eventually the Western media also proved to have an important protective function for the opposition. Western, als especially FRG, media attention, which in the GDR was always higher than in the rest of Central Eastern Europe, could be a direct influence on the severity of repression. Western attention for example played an important role in the release of Bärbel Bohley and Ulrike Poppe and the other two founding members of Frauen für den Frieden : a group with strong international contacts, in 1983. Opposition members consciously used the moments in which FRG attention was focussed on the GDR, such as the first official visit of Honecker to the FRG in 1987, during which the Olof Palme Peace March, the first oppositional demonstration, took place. These initial advantages turned into a
61 U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 251. Faktor, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition’, 31. Olivo, Creating , 62-63. Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition’, 72. Buckingham, ‘Freedom to think’, 57. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 8. Templin, ‘Antikommunistische opposition’, 170. Interview mehlhorn Not all authors agree with this exit-thesis. Helena Flam on the one side states that not all those who emigrated were potential oppositionists - which is certainly true - and that also many Poles emigrated. The difference between Poland and the GDR lay, according to her, in the protective ‘life world’ of honour and responsibility towards the nation that the Polish opposition created and which worked as a brake on emigration. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 8-10, 102-103, 148, 157, 159, 161. 62 Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 23-24, 33, 50.
20 disadvantage regarding the coming to existence of samizdat publications, which was severely delayed in the GDR in comparison to Central Eastern Europe, partly due to this already existing ersatz public sphere. The Western media were a far reaching, but certainly no objective medium, of which choices and availability one did not want to be dependent. It could not be a substitute for own means of informing and communicating and therefore from the mid eighties on several opposition groups decided that independent GDR internal media were necessary and started a samizdat press. The Western media, that on the one hand turned the East German public into the best informed people east of the iron curtain, on the other hand had a paralysing effect by keeping the population in the illusion that this was enough to escape or outsmart the regime. A large part of the GDR population ‘emigrated’ to the FRG in the evening and were kept in the illusion to have a realistic view on what happened in the West. 63 As the peace movement mainly started in the church, so did the samizdat press. All means of printing and printing material were highly supervised by the state. The church however had access to its own printing machines, and could use a legal loophole that allowed them to print texts for their own use. Consequently only few publications - mostly artistic or IFM samizdat - appeared without the protecting print ‘Nur zum innerkirchlichen Gebrauch’. 64 Also in other fields the church turned out to be more or less fertile soil for oppositional activities. Many of the peace groups and - later - environmental groups and the interregional umbrella organisations such as Frieden Konkret were strongly church-bound. Only few groups distanced themselves from church protection and virtually none functioned without any use of church structures at all. Many call the church a crystallising point for the opposition. The church could play such an important role because it was granted a relative degree of freedom in all its workings. This freedom however, had to be used carefully and therefore the different church levels from the basis to the top often swung back and forth from sympathy for the regime and the oppositional groups or disagreed about which side to support. The church’ relationship with the regime had become clearer after it had reached an accommodation with it in the late sixties, which proclaimed a ‘church in socialism’. This however would not prevent the oppositional activity at the basis in the seventies and eighties. This ambivalent approach caused different reactions in the oppositional groups. Attitudes varied widely from true religious engagement to opportunistic use of church
63 U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 251-252, 255. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 93, 103-104, 107. Mehlhorn and Weißhuhn in: “Das freie Wort”, 112, 120, 128. From the West even sometimes radio programmes were especially directed at the GDR: ibidem, 40-41. Hubertus Knabe, ‘Opposition in einem halben Land. Zur Interdependenz politischen Widerspruchs in beiden deutschen Staaten’, in: Neubert and Eisenfeld ed., Macht, Ohnmacht , 159-160, pp. 165-166. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 38, 111. Hubertus Knabe, ‘“Samisdat”- Gegenöffentlichkeit in den 80er Jahren’, in: Kuhrt, Opposition , 299-314, p. 300. Fricke, ‘Dimensionen’, 32-33. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 163. Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 254-255. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 118. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell“’, 31, 37, 39. 64 Ibidem, 21-22, 77, 81, 100. Knabe, “Samisdat”, 302, 306.
21 possibilities, from critique on church affairs to perfect obedience. In case of the Kirche von Unten discontented religious engagement even led to the establishment of a new oppositional group. 65 The protestant church in the GDR was, besides the catholic church in Poland, the only institution with such an equal position in respect to the state and so much free space. In the GDR however, the church was less independent, more regime friendly and had less mobilising potential or ambitions than the church in Poland. It functioned as a kind of buffer between regime and society, which sometime stood on the one, and sometimes on the other side. 66 The opposition in the GDR successively centred around different cities. The peace movement first gained momentum in Jena: the city of Matthias Domaschk and Roland Jahn. Approaching the mid 1980s East-Berlin became more and more important in the oppositional world. Only in the late eighties a strong oppositional movement would grow in Leipzig, which would become the scene of the large Monday demonstrations of 1989. 67 Also thematically a shift is visible. From the peace theme in the late seventies and early eighties, to the human rights and environment issue in the mid eighties and a heightened attention for the Ausreise question in the later 1980s. This led to the creation of human rights groups in Berlin and Leipzig in 1986 and 1987, to creation of the Umweltbibliothek (UB) in Berlin in 1986 and in other cities the years after and a growing tension between opposition and Ausreise in the later eighties, especially in Berlin. 68 One of the last striking features of the opposition the GDR was the way it was built up. Contrary to the opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia the opposition in the GDR was only made up out of the younger generations that came to age in the later sixties and after. This was the generation that had no access to the jobs taken by the build-up generation shortly after the war and it had hardly any elder oppositionist to look up to because for regime-dissenters emigration had been fairly easy before the building of the Wall in 1961. The age of the IFM members lay between 20 and 45, with 35 as the average, according to the estimates of the members themselves. Again however, having grown up in the GDR and without any memories
65 Ulrike Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential der Gruppen in Kirche und Gesellschaft (1988)’, in: Detlef Pollack ed., Die Legitimität der Freiheit. Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR unter dem Dach der Kirche (Frankfurt 1990) 63-97, p. 66-67, 77. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 60. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 216, 305, 308. Maier, Dissolution , 172. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rusch to Geman Unity (New York, Oxford 1994) 36. Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 225, 255-262. Neubert, Geschichte , 30. Templin, ‘Bemerkungen’, 159. 66 U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 253. Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 547-458. U. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 258. Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition’, 72. Dale, Popular Protest , 103-104, 106. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 278, 310. 67 Ibidem, 236. 68 Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 68-69. Maier, Dissolution , 172. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 504.
22 of a unified or even a democratic Germany as an older oppositionist might have had, it was difficult not to get stuck in the GDR self-conception of the SED. 69 It was however only a very small part of this younger generation that was pushed into the role of opposition. This numerical weakness of the opposition was no exception in the Eastern Bloc, according to Joppke. Especially the oppositional scene in Czechoslovakia was comparable to that in the GDR, although this often surprised GDR oppositionists that had looked up to Charta 77 for years. This largely ghettoised outlook of the opposition was noticed, at least in retrospect, by IFM members such as Bärbel Bohley, Wolfgang Templin and Ulrike Poppe and concerned them. The fact that almost all of them were outsiders, blocked out of society due to their way of living and the successful isolation by the regime, made them loose contact with society and inaccessible to society. 70 What distinguished this kind of opposition from Poland and Czechoslovakia was not so much its isolation but the individual nature of the oppositional activity and considerations. One of its manifestations was the extreme grass roots and divided form the opposition in the GDR took. No leadership or even representatives were accepted and the oppositionists remained shattered over different groups and issues, very unlike the centring of oppositional activity around Charta 77 and Solidarno ć as in the GDR’s neighbouring countries. 71
Human rights in Central Eastern Europe The Eastern Bloc had no easy relation with human rights and the international covenants that guaranteed them. It saw human rights as an internal issue and often stressed the sovereignty principle in respect to human rights. Several socialist states had even belonged to the few countries abstaining votes to the universal declaration of human rights in 1948. Also in content it laid its emphasis differently than the Western countries. Instead of stressing liberal, political ‘freedom rights’, it focussed on the social economical rights where the socialist system derived its legitimacy from. During the sixties and early seventies human rights were still seen in the GDR as a Western invention, which was only useful as a means to criticise capitalist societies. Also in parts of the leftwing West the idea existed that human rights were nothing more than a weapon
69 Joppke, East German Dissidents , 201. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 123, 126, 133. Gutzeit, ‘Widerstand’, 238. Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 253-254. Flam, ‘Die poröse’, 149. Bärbel Bohley and Werner Fischer in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 51, 101. 70 Bohley in: ibidem, 51. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 185. Minnerup, ‘Politische Opposition’, 73. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 58, 208. Klaus Wolfram, ‘DDR-Opposition vor 1989’, in: Bernd Gehrke and Wolfgang Rüddenklau ed., …das war doch nicht unsere Alternative. DDR-Oppositionelle zehn Jahre nach der Wende (Münster 1999) 24-43, p. 42. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 116. U. Poppe, “Gesperrt“, 214. Flam, ‘Die poröse’, 148-149. Templin in Lüke, Die Initiative, 110. Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 97-98. 71 Ibidem, 101-102, 122, 124, 197-198. Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung, 151, 158. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 392. Dale, Popular protest, 116-117. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 37. Templin, ‘Bemerkungen’, 157.
23 in Cold War rhetoric. From the mid seventies on, due to growing détente and international recognition of the GDR, human rights however became more and more important to the international relations and image of the SED regime. In 1975 the GDR signed the Helsinki Final Act and in 1974 it ratified the UN covenants on civic and political and on social and economical rights had signed in 1966. 72 Human rights could not be seen as a mere cynical propaganda weapon of the West anymore. The regime therefore now reacted on accusations of human rights violations with a mix of counter-allegations and presenting an own conception of what human rights actually meant. It was argued that the socialist bloc already had the most progressive societies in which human rights had been established. This was inspired by the belief that social and economical rights were more important than individual political rights. Because this went entirely against the Western conception of human rights, on the international level the GDR stressed the equality and indivisibility of political and social rights. The Soviet bloc often reproached the West for only focussing on political rights and not paying enough attention to their own home and jobless. Another Eastern bloc strategy was what Georg Brunner describes as the free invention of human rights. The most popular of these was the right to peace, which was seen as the basis of all other human rights, because it constituted the basis of life and death. 73 Important turning points in the Eastern European attitude towards human rights were the Helsinki Final Act and the UN covenants of the mid seventies. The Helsinki Final Act was the result of more than three years of intensive negotiations called the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It was signed in August 1975 by 35 states. In Eastern Europe it was celebrated as a diplomatic victory, since it affirmed the status quo, including the division of Germany. The West however, had pressed on the inclusion of a ‘third basket’ of human rights issues, which gave the Final Act a ‘unanticipated boomerang effect’: ‘It conferred vital legitimacy on human rights activists throughout the USSR and its satellites and played a crucial role in helping the system to undermine itself,’ according to Bill Bowring. Especially the regulations on family reunification were a possible time bomb for the GDR, although the participation in the process alone already extremely satisfied Honecker. The CSCE had no protection mechanisms,
72 Georg Brunner, ‘Menschenrechte im Kommunismus: Ideologischer Anspruch – politische Waffe – reale situation’, in: Rudolf Uertz ed., Menschenrechte in Ost und West (Mainz 1989) 105-127, pp. 105, 108. Eberhard Poppe, Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte in der Gegenwart. Vortrag und Diskussionsbeiträge in der Sitzung der Klasse Gesellschaftswissenschaften I der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR am 7. Dezember 1978 (Berlin (E) 1979) 6, 10, 17. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer“, 252. Erhard Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß und die Bürgerrechtsbewegung in der DDR’, in: Henke, et al., Widerstand ‚ 295-308, pp. 296-297. Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘KSZE’, in: Hans Joachim Veen et al. e.d., Lexikon Opposition und Widerstand in der SED-Diktatur (Berlin 2000) 232-234. Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 250- 251, 258-259. Hurst Hannum, ‘The universal declaration of human rights’, in: Rhona K.M. Smith and Christien van den Anker, The Essentials of Human Rights (London 2005) 351-353, pp. 352-353. 73 Brunner, ‘Menschenrechte’, 109, 117-119. E. Poppe, Die Allgemeine Erklärung , 13, 15-17. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE- Prozeß’, 297.
24 but the system of follow-up conferences, turned it into a dynamic process. Of vital importance to the oppositionists in Eastern European countries was the publication of the Final Act in the official press, because this literature was freely accessible and the possession of it could not be prohibited. 74 Another event that both brought international recognition and external human rights standards was the admittance of the GDR and the FRG to the UN in September 1973. This made them also a member to the 1966 covenants on civil and political rights and on economical, social and cultural rights - a distinction which had never been accepted by the socialist states. These covenants entered into force in 1976, ironically by the ratification of Czechoslovakia. 75 To oppositionists the Helsinki Final Act and the UN covenants were an important incentive. In several countries Helsinki committees were established. In Czechoslovakia the end of the CSCE process and the ratification of the human rights covenants coincided and the publication of both in the official press were an important impetus to the emergence of Charta 77 shortly after. Both KOR and Charta referred over and over again to the human rights standards both documents imposed. And on several occasions Central Eastern European groups addressed the CSCE follow-up conferences. According to Christian Domnitz, Helsinki was beyond a body to appeal to a ‘Projektionsfläche für ihre Ziele und Wünsche’, an ideal to built hopes around. 76 The reaction of the opposition in the GDR on the Helsinki Final Act and the signing of the UN covenants was however strikingly less enthusiastic than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Although legally little changed, on account of the Final Act and covenants a human rights discussion in the GDR could not be prohibited anymore and the possession of Neues Deutschland with the printed Helsinki Final Act could certainly not be criminalised. The church especially took up the discussion regarding freedom of religion and consciousness. Grass-roots church groups came into existence that reflected on human rights and also discussed Central Eastern European initiatives such as Charta 77 . The church leadership however had more problems with a free human rights debate in her ranks and was at the same time not so pleased with the effects the Final Act had on Ausreisewilligen, who often sought refuge in the church. 77
74 Floribert Baudet, ‘Het heeft onze aandacht.’ Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972-1989 (Amsterdam 2001) 67-75. Bill Bowring, ‘The organisation for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and human rights’, in: Smith and Van den Anker, The Essentials , 279-282, pp. 279, 281 (quote). Interview Carlo Jordan, 5 March 2008, Berlin. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 295. Geoffrey Edwards, ‘Human rights and Basket III issues: areas of change and continuity’, International Affairs 61 (1985) no. 4, 631-642, p. 631, 633, 636, 639-641. 75 ibidem, 635. Manfred Nowak, ‘The international covenants on civil and political rights and on economic, social and cultural rights’, in: Smith and Van den Anker, The Essentials , 193-196, p. 194. 76 Edwards, ‘Human rights’, 633. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 221, 223-224. Skilling, Samizdat , 55-58. Brunner, ‘Menschenrechte’, 112. Domnitz, ‘Der Traum’, 77-78. 77 Leo, ‘Kulturelle Gegenwelt’, 44. Kowalczuk, ‘KSZE’, 232-233. Neubert, Geschichte , 257-258, 323. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 295, 301. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 245, 298. Beatrice de Graaf, Over de Muur . De DDR, de Nederlandse kerken en de vredesbeweging (Amsterdam 2004) 76-77. Erhart Neubert, ‘Menschenrechte’, in: Veen et al. ed.,
25 Especially those willing to emigrate were quick to make out the possibilities that this adherence to international human rights standards offered. They soon went further than theoretical discussions and choose the frontal attack. Most famous are the civic initiatives of Pirna and Riesa in which respectively 45 and 33 GDR citizens signed a petition referring to international human rights standards to demand one’s own emigration, or even only show solidarity with somebody else’s wish to emigrate. All signed with full name and address. These initiatives became exemplary. 78 In the meanwhile the discussion in the church continued. Marxist, regime-friendly conceptions of human rights and the CSCE and UN declarations faced each other here. Also the regime, willing to push through its own idea of human rights, was not absent from the discussion. Active supporters of human rights and regime critics such as Joachim Fränkel stimulated an intensive occupation with human rights in the church. Others however, such as later Berlin superintendent Günter Krusche and, even higher up in the church hierarchy, Manfred Stolpe, supported a more socialist view on human rights. 79 The church leadership managed, under pressure and with help from the SED and the MfS, to neutralise the human rights discussions in the church in the late seventies and early nineties. From now on human rights according to the church were the human rights as propagated by the SED. Neubert stressed the important consequences of this giving in to the regime: ‘Zu den gravierenden Verluste kirchlicher Selbstbehauptung gegenüber dem SED-Staat gehörte die politische Neutralisierung der Menschenrechtsdebatte durch die offizielle Kirche.’ 80 The human rights debate was maybe made politically redundant, but could never be silenced at all. Around the mid eighties the issue was therefore taken up again in the peace movement and carefully in the church as well. The issue gained momentum in groups that worked in the margins of or even outside the church. The most important of them was the Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte . Soon more human rights groups would be established, such as the active human rights groups in Leipzig. Other existing groups like the Arbeitskreis Solidarische Kirche and Frauen für den Frieden took up the human rights issue. With the growing attention for human rights also the CSCE Final Act gained new importance as point to refer to. In some closely church-bound or leftwing groups, especially in Berlin, the human rights issue however
Lexikon , 256-258, pp. 256-257. Knabe, ‘Widerstand’, 87. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 172. 78 Fricke, Opposition , 165-166, 169-172. ‘Zur vollen Erlangung der Menschenrechte. Dokumentation über Bürgerrechter in der DDR. Petition Riesa. Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte, Frankfurt am Main’, RHG TH 10. Weißhuhn, ‚Menschenrechte’, 251. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 299. 79 Ibidem, 302, 303-306. De Graaf, Over de muur , 77. Neubert, Geschichte , 261-266. 80 Ibidem, 356, 357 (quote). Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 299, 397, 306. Neubert, ‘Menschenrechte’, 258. De Graaf, Over de muur , 77-78. Kowalczuk, ‘KSZE’, 233.
26 remained controversial. They agreed with leftwing groups in the West that peace was the more important issue, which should be established first before one could pay attention to the more rightwing issue human rights. This was even more the case as in the later eighties human rights were used more and more again by the organising Ausreise movement. 81 The question where this revival of the human rights theme came from, will be researched in the next chapter on the basis of the first exemplary group, the IFM.
II. Mutual contact in Central Eastern Europe Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR had a shared history, but definitely not an easy one. As satellite states of the same superpower after the war however, they were forced into friendship and quietly had to forget the mutual difficulties such as the memory of the German invasions and the post-war border changes and expulsions. 82 The relationship between the GDR and its neighbouring countries to the south and east were not always easy. Conflicts about the strictness of policy and hard feelings about Polish and Czechoslovak contacts with the FRG appeared again and again during the years. 83 Despite these difficulties in January 1972 the important step was taken to grant visa-free travelling with Poland and Czechoslovakia. This led to a strong increase in mutual tourist visits and personal contacts. In case of Poland, this was not destined to last: in October 1980 the border was closed again out of fear for Solidarno ć . According to Mehlhorn after 1980 the border to Poland was even tighter than the Western border. Good or disturbed contacts on the official level were of vital importance for the maintainance of personal contacts. 84 Although travelling became generally easier during the seventies and eighties, this was not the case for everybody. For most members of the independent peace movement during the
81 Ibidem, 233. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß, 307-309. Neubert, Geschichte , 592-594, 603, 646, 724-5, 729. Ralf Hirsch in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 114. Martin Jander, Formierung und Krise der DDR-Opposition. Die “Initiative für unabhängige Gewerkschaften” – Dissidenten zwischen Demokratie und Romantik (Berlin 1996) 41. Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 88. Interview Poppe. Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 211. 82 Basil Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Polen – Versuch einer Bilanz’, in: Kerski et al., Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? , 9-25, p. 15. Wolfgang Schwarz, ‘DDR und ČSSR: Eine sozialistische Vernunftehe mit Beziehungskrise’, in: Walter Koschmal, Marek Nekula, Joachin Rogall ed., Deutsche und Tschechen. Geschichte – Kultur – Politik (München 2001) 408-417, p. 409. 83 Ibidem, 410-415. Markus Meckel in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc 1980/1981 und die Folgen in Polen, in den sozialistischen Nachbarländern, insbesondere in der DDR, sowie im Ost-West Verhältnis”’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Deutschlandpolitik , 197-237, p. 197. Piotr Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle in der DDR und in der Volksrepublik Polen. Ihre Gegenseitige Perzeption und Kontakte’, in: http://docserver.bis.uni- oldenburg.de/publikationen/bisverlag/unireden/2000/ur101/pdf/zaricn.pdf , 7-51, p. 12-13. Mehlhorn, ‘Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft?’, 35, 37. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 16-17. 84 Ibidem, 18-19. Mehlhorn, ‘Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft?’, 37-38. Czesław Os kowski, ‘Der pass- und visafreie Personenverkehr zwischen der DDR und Polen in den siebziger Jahren. Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Auswirkungen’, in: Kerski et al., Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? , 123-133, pp. 126, 130, 133. Wolfgang Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft – Osteuropäische Emanzipationsbewegung und unabhängiges Denken in der DDR seit Beginn der achtziger Jahre’, in: Deutschland Archiv, Die DDR im vierzigsten Jahr , 58-65, p. 61-62. Torpey, Intelectuals, Socialism , 83. Mehlhorn in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung, 158.
27 eighties all visa applications for other socialist countries were turned down and at the border with Czechoslovakia they were simply sent back. These Reisesperre made it difficult to maintain the contacts that had been established during the more liberal travelling policy of the seventies and sometimes made the continuation of existing contacts impossible. Also members of the Czechoslovak and Polish opposition faced this problem, sometimes already since the early seventies. Differentiation was however possible, and indeed several activists from Poland and some from the GDR, were still able to travel. Those, for example from Hungary, that were not prohibited to go by their own regime, could face an Einreiseverbot from the GDR authorities. 85 Another problem was the difficult shared history and the persistent prejudices with which the people in the different countries had been raised, more or less stimulated by the regime, and against which the oppositionists had to struggle. According to Mehlhorn the difficult shared history made many in Central Eastern Europe reluctant to speak with Germans, and if one would like to take up contact with them, than rather with West Germans, who could speak out freely. The discussion about German history was taken up several times in the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition and churches and discussed openly, sometimes even together with Germans. 86 Also more contemporary issues made the discussion more difficult. The level of oppositional thinking and activity was so different between Poland and the GDR that it was not easy to find a common ground. For a long time Polish oppositionists did not find comparable groups in the GDR to contact. Besides that, GDR citizens were often seen by the Polish as the most obedient people of the Eastern bloc. GDR oppositionists on their part sometimes projected this role on the Czechs. 87
The East German reaction to major events in Czechoslovakia and Poland Two events during the later years of communism drew heightened attention of GDR citizens and the world in general towards Czechoslovakia and Poland: the Prague Spring of 1968 and the emergence of Solidarno ć between 1980 and 1981. Because these oppositional manifestations had
85 Wolfgang Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte der DDR-Opposition’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Dikatur 4 (1995) nr. 2, 31-34, p. 32. Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, 172. Seydlowksy, Die Verbindungen, 55. Interview Carlo Jordan. Interview Gerd Poppe. Mikoláš Chadima, ‘Mein “Ringen” mit dem „deutschen Problem“’, in: Doris Liebermann, Jürgen Fuchs and Vlasta Wallat ed., Dissidenten, Präsidenten und Gemüsehändler. Tschechische und ostdeutsche Dissidenten 1968-1998 (Essen 1998) 19-25, p. 21-22. 86 Ibidem, 19-20. Michal Reimann, ‘Die deutsche Einheit und der tschechische Dissent’, in: Liebermann o.a., 211- 216, pp. 211, 213. Jan Šimsa, ‘Die Zusammenarbeit tschechischer und deutscher Protestanten’, in: ibidem, 224-226, 225. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 431-432. Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle’, 8-9,11,13. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 21-22. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1417-1418, 1424. Eppelmann and Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc“’, 228, 231. Interview Mehlhorn. 87 Ibidem. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 19, 21. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 431-432. KAMA, ‘Unlock the Borders. Interview with GDR activist’, East European Reporter 1 (1985) no. 3, 20-22, pp. 21
28 an impact on the entire GDR population and were known beyond the oppositional layer, such as was not the case with KOR or Charta, first the reaction in the GDR on these two important events will be examined. In the course of 1968 the Czechoslovak communist party under the leadership of Dub ček headed towards a more and more reformed socialism. In the GDR the SED reacted with concern and critique. The media in the GDR strongly disapproved of the reforms and Walter Ulbricht asked for an invasion. As that invasion came on the 21th of August, the SED was relieved. The concern about the sympathy amongst the population however had not ended. Large campaigns of propaganda messages and declarations of agreement were staged and repression and expulsion waves followed the invasion. 88 In contrast to the SED, the population and especially the opposition followed the events in Prague with interest, approval and mounting hopes. Especially students and intellectuals spent their days in discussions about the possibility and the form of a reformed socialism. Many young people travelled to Prague during the summer of 1968 to buy Western records and books and sense a hint of freedom. Official Czechoslovak publications such as the German language Prager Volkszeitung were suddenly the centre of the hopeful attention of GDR intellectuals and the repressive interest of the GDR authorities. 89 The repression grew stronger as after the invasion of August a part of the population openly expressed its discontent with the events. Although the situation remained relatively tranquil and no spectacular actions occurred, as in some other Eastern European countries, the MfS still expressed its dissatified with the amount of incidents by 1969. Especially young people and workers expressed themselves in isolated and ill-organised actions, such as the spreading of pamphlets, the refusal to sign declarations of agreement, small demonstrations and the signing of protest resolutions in the Czechoslovak embassy. The MfS reacted quickly and harshly. Although the ideals of the Prague Spring had appealed to many intellectuals as well, they mainly kept silent or even tuned in with the official propaganda campaigns. 90
88 Schwarz, ‘DDR und ČSSR’, 415. Stefan Wolle, ‘Die DDR-Bevölkerung und der Prager Frühling’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42 (1992) B 36/92, 35-45, p. 36, 40-42, 44. Stefan Wolle, ‘Die versäumte Revolte: Die DDR und das Jahr 1968’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51 (2001) B 22-23/2001, 37-46, p. 42. Neubert, Geschichte , 166. ‘Ich unterschreibe nicht’, in: http:/ / www.jugendopposition.de/ index.php?id=2895 . 89 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘“Wer sich nicht in Gefahr begibt…” Protestaktionen gegen die Intervention in Prag und die Folgen von 1968 für die DDR-Opposition’, in: Henke et al., Widerstand , 257-274, p. 258, 264. Wolle, ‘Die DDR- Bevölkerung’, 37-39. Wolle, ‘Die versäumte Revolte’, 43. Neubert, Geschichte , 163-164. G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 146. ‘Reisen in die ČSSR’, in: http:/ / www.jugendopposition.de/ index.php?id=3569 . 90 Kowalczuk, “Wer sich nicht”, 259-264, 270, 273. Neubert, Geschichte , 165, 167. Wolle, ‘Die DDR-Bevölkerung’, 35, 41-45. Bernd Gehrke, ‘Die 68-er Proteste in der DDR’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 58 (2008) B 14-15/2008, 40-46, p. 42-44. Schwarz, ‘DDR und ČSSR’, 416. ‘Reisen in die ČSSR’. ‘Bettina Wegner: Solidarität mit dem Prager Frühling’, in: http:/ / www.jugendopposition.de/ index.php?id=3402 . ‘Ich unterschreibe nicht’. ‘Reaktionen in der DDR’, in: http:/ / www.jugendopposition.de/ index.php?id=2886 .
29 Although overall the situation remained relatively quiet in the GDR, the impact in the longer run should not be underestimated. The repercussions of the Prague Spring lasted into the eighties, especially in the GDR where discussions about the possible reform of socialism remained omnipresent, although the issue was heavily tabooed by the regime. One lesson of the Prague Spring that however was taken up better in the rest of Central Eastern Europe, was that reforms had no chance if they came from above: they should come from below. 91 Many of the opposition members of the eighties saw the events of 1968, in the West, but mainly in Prague, as one of their key experiences. Important later IFM members such as Wolfgang Templin and Gerd and Ulrike Poppe stressed the importance of 1968 for their personal development. 92 For Gerd Poppe the deliverance of a protest in the Czechoslovak embassy was his first public oppositional deed. 93 To these oppositionists a new impulse from Czechoslovakia came with the appearance of Charta 77 , something which made a huge impression on the opposition and raised the fears of the regime again. 94 Twelve years after the Prague events, things came to a head in the GDR’s other neighbouring socialist country. Although the leadership in the GDR had changed from Ulbricht to Honecker, the reaction was basically the same. The GDR resumed to its hard-line position, severely criticised the Polish communist party and demanded an intervention. The SED judged the situation even worse than in 1968. The fear was great that the ‘Polish bacillus’ would spread to the GDR and therefore, after a period of total silence, a strong propaganda campaign was set up that stressed traditional German prejudices about the Polish and encouraged fears about the influence of the Polish strikes on the GDR economy. 95 This campaign did not remain without effects on the GDR population at large. Never had the population their hopes placed on Solidarno ć as much as they had on the Prague Spring. The reaction was generally less enthusiastic and interested. Mehlhorn describes the phases through which the population went: a short period of respect and hopes soon turned into concern and incomprehension. Prejudices were picked up again, fear for the own economical situation became more and more important and it was heard again and again that those lazy Poles should get back to work. After the declaration of martial law of the 13 th of December relief and satisfaction
91 Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Osteuropäische Einflüsse’, in: Veen et al. ed., Lexikon , 277-279, p. 278. G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 147. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1413. Kowalczuk, “Wer sich nicht“, 268, 273. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 75. Wolle, ‘Die versäumte Revolte’, 46. 92 Ibidem. Gutzeit, ‘Widerstand’, 239. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 111. G. Poppe in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung, 177. U. Poppe, ‘Gesperrt’, 211. Wolle, ‘Die DDR-Bevölkerung’, 35. Gutzeit, ‘Der Weg in die Opposition’, 85. G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 110. 93 G. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 287. Interview Gerd Poppe. 94 G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 148. Schwarz, ‘DDR und ČSSR’, 416. 95 Allen, Germany East, 84-86. Wilke, ‘Die Solidarno ć ’, 250-253, 257-258. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 104, 125. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 81-82. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 18-19.
30 prevailed. Also the strong nationalist and catholic undertones of Solidarno ć made the movement difficult to understand for the GDR population. Of course this can not be generalised for the whole population, among parts of it indeed a fascination existed, and dissatisfaction with the East German official union started to emerge. Large actions of solidarity however, failed to appear. 96 In the opposition interest in the developments in Poland were great and closely followed through the Western media. The opposition saw it as its role to enlighten the population. There were acts of solidarity with the Polish events and protest actions against martial law, such as the spreading of pamphlets or the action of Roland Jahn who attached a Solidarno ć flag to his bike and drove through Jena with it. Also material help was organised without the propagandistic undertone of the official stately help to Poland. To the opposition the closing of the border and the imposition of martial law meant certainly no relief, but a severe drawback for the existing contacts with the Polish opposition. 97 According to Bruce Allen also the impact on the development of the opposition was fairly less than the impact of the Prague Spring had been. Although the tremendous radiation of the Prague Spring maybe cannot be superseded, Solidarno ć however was extremely influential as well, according to most other authors. Even Allen himself acknowledges that ‘the Polish Crisis (…) produced a social movement that directly encouraged and, to a degree, facilitated the rise of a movement of democratic opposition which spanned Central and Eastern Europe and included the DDR and Hungary.’ According to others, Solidarno ć had had a catalysing function on the opposition and the GDR. According to Helmut Fehr concrete influence was difficult to proof with programmes in hand, but certainly existed. Also the completely different circumstances made it difficult to take over concrete elements directly, influence was however unmistakably present, according to many, such as Burkhard Olschowsky and Ludwig Mehlhorn. Methods were taken over and lessons were learnt about how opposition against a communist regime could and should be staged. 98 Oppositionists such as Gerd Poppe and Markus Meckel praised the huge personal influence Solidarno ć had had on them. And Christoph Geisel, who held a survey among 142 former members of the opposition in July 2003 about several issues, had 89.2% of them
96 Ibidem, 19. Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 208-210. Neubert, Geschichte , 385. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 359. KAMA, ‘Unlock the Borders’, 20-22. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt, 104, 106, 108-109, 123, 126, 239. Dale, Popular Protest , 74. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, 81. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1222- 1423. 97 Ibidem, 1423-1424. Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 210. Neubert, Geschichte , 386-388. KAMA, ‘Unlock the borders’, 20-21. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 19-20. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt, 105, 109. 98 Ibidem, 496. Allen, Germany East , 83, 173-174. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 35, 59 293. Helmut Fehr, ‘Die Macht der Symbole. Osteuropäische Einwirkungen auf den revolutionären Umbruch in der DDR’, in: Konrad H. Jarausch and Martin Sabrow ed., Weg in den Untergang Der innere Zerfall der DDR (Göttingen 1999) 213-238, p. 227-228. Mehlhorn, ‘Zwangsverodnete Freundschaft’, 39-40. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1422, 1424. Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 212-215. Manfred Wilke, ‘Die Bewertung von Opposition und Widerstand in Ungarn, Polen und die Tschechoslowakei, durch die Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED- Diktatur in Deutschland” des 12. Deutschen Bundestages’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 227-235, pp. 232, 235.
31 responding that the events in Poland were very important to them among the conflicts and political issues of the eighties. Striking however for the enormous significance of the Prague Spring is that is was mentioned spontaneously by 4 of the 142 respondents as very important, although the question was explicitly about the eighties. ‘Das ragte seit 68 bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein,’ someone justified his unusual choice. 99 Circumstances however remained entirely different, and although the events of 1980 stimulated critique on the own union, it was still in October 1989 deemed too dangerous for the first independent union in the GDR to mention Solidarno ć as an example. 100 Both the Prague Spring and Solidarno ć made a lasting impression on the GDR population, although the reactions differed. For the opposition however the events were of the utmost importance and its exemplary function served as another incentive to look for contacts and information abroad.
Contacts in Central Eastern Europe Sympathisers and oppositionists not only watched the events in Poland and Czechoslovakia from a distance. Parallel to the official relations also contacts on a lower level were established. The Hungarian former opposistionist Dalos even speaks about a trend, visible from the late seventies. 101 Charta 77 for example explicitly saw itself as a part of an international movement for human rights. It felt closely connected to KOR and in 1978 representatives of the two groups were able to meet at the Polish-Czechoslovak border. Also in their everyday work they exchanged solidarity declarations and samizdat. Over the years joint declarations were issued, information was exchanged and since 1981 even a Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity group had existed. 102 It was more difficult to maintain contacts with other countries. Charta 77 had relatively good contacts with the Hungarian opposition. Solidarno ć could smuggle some texts into the neighbouring Soviet Republics. Contacts with other countries in the Soviet Bloc were even more sporadic. Some important documents were issued however with support from Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary and sometimes even other Eastern and Western countries such as commemorative declarations to the Hungarian uprising and the Prague Spring, a memorandum to the CSCE conference in Vienna and a feminist declaration on disarmament. Not only contact
99 G. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 288. Meckel, ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 198. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 260-261. 100 Jander, Formierung , 61. Dale, Popular protest , 74. 101 Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 554. cf. also Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle’, 38. 102 Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines , 102-103. Skilling, Samizdat , 58-59. Skilling, Charter 77 , 171-173. ‘East - East contacts here to stay’, East European Reporter 3 (1987-1988), no. 3, 59-60, p. 59.
32 but also mutual influence existed. Solidarno ć was an example for many in Eastern Europe, but also Charta had an exemplary function in Hungary and Rumania. 103 In Central Eastern Europe the contacts between Czechoslovakia and Poland were the closest. To Charta 77 second was, together with Hungary, the opposition in the GDR. In the seventies these contacts were still relatively limited but they would grow more intensive and institutionalised during the eighties. Paradoxically as the circumstances grew more and more difficult due to Reisesperren and other measures, the contacts only became more intense. In the late seventies several GDR oppositionists travelled to Prague to meet Petr Uhl and Anna Šabatová on their famous address Anglická 8. Amongst them were later IFM members such as Gerd Poppe, Peter Grimm, Wolfgang Templin and Ralf Hirsch. Prominent Jena peace activist Matthias Domaschk travelled to Prague in 1977 after a wave of arrests in Jena, and published a Charta document on the issue. Other contacts existed, for example by the writer Rainer Kunze, who had a Czech wife, and of oppositionists from the Jena and Leipzig opposition groups. At this moment contact still had a largely individual basis. The contacts were made while travelling was still possible to many in the GDR, as however their oppositional engagement started to develop in another direction, travelling became impossible but the contacts became more important. These however, could not be maintained personally anymore, only written communication could continue. According to Mehlhorn one should be realistic in assessing the contacts: ‘es gab Verbindungen so weit die auch technisch und politisch möglich waren.’ 104 Charta for its part showed solidarity with the opposition in the GDR. This ranged from from a protest against the conviction of Bahro in the late seventies to declarations of solidarity with the imprisoned in Leipzig early in 1989. Solidarity was also shown in the other direction as well and after a nation-wide action day for Czechoslovakia in the GDR, Charta 77 wrote a letter to show its gratitude. When possible, even actions were made together, such as a declaration against the stationing of Soviet missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR. This declaration was signed by 16 important Chartists, including Uhl and Sabatová, and 13 activists from the East German peace movement. 105 Although clearly contacts between Czechoslovakia and the GDR existed, never a bilateral network was established as in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia. 106
103 Skilling, Samizdat , 59-62. Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines , 102. De Weydenthal, ‘The character’, 144-145. Anna Šabatová in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling“’, 144. Allen, Germany East , 117. Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen, 58. 104 Interview Gerd Poppe. Renate Ellmenreich, ‘Begegnungen in Prag’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 37-40, pp. 39-40. Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen, 54, 56-57, 65. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 300. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 132. Jander, ‘Der Protest’, 291. Interview Mehlhorn. ‘East - East’, 59. Gert Weisskirchen in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 141. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 349. 105 ‘‘Friedensgruppen aus DDR und CSSR gegen Stationierung sowjetischer Raketen’, friedenspolitischer kurier nr. 48 19.11.84’, RHG GP 021. Allen, Germany East , 123. ‘Chartists / East German Independents Call For Nuclear-Free Europe’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 1 (1985) winter/spring, 12. The many mistakes this English
33 Contacts were not only established by the opposition in the strict sense. Also the church, which facilitated much of the opposition in the GDR, Poland, and some in Czechoslovakia maintained international contacts. Some of these contacts were officially prescribed from above. Others were more informal and could be of use to the opposition. Those contacts existed between the GDR and Czechoslovakia, but even on a larger scale between the GDR and Poland. From 1968 to 1984 the Polenseminare organised by the church in the GDR were very important to establish contacts with critical catholic thinkers and later on Solidarno ć . After 1984 these seminars were continued under the name Anna-Morawska-Seminar , a Polish journalist that stimulated the German-Polish dialogue, by the church-bound organisation Aktion Sühnezeichen , which also had contacts with the catholic semi-oppositionist Znak group. Especially the personal contacts of Ludwig Mehlhorn, an Aktion Sühnezeichen collaborator, played a large role here. In the later eighties these seminars turned more and more political. 107 Just as in the case of Czechoslovakia, also in relation to Poland these individual contacts were very important. Poland was a popular holiday destination and GDR oppositionists discovered the oppositional milieu in Poland while travelling was still possible. Contacts with KOR were established, independent from each other, by Ludwig Mehlhorn and Wolfgang Templin and the East German opposition became well informed about its goals - as was the case with Charta 77 as well. Also here contacts were made in the seventies that were maintained under the difficult circumstances of the eighties. Already in seventies however, these contacts were sometimes turned into practical action. Several groups in the GDR raised money for KOR. Texts of both KOR and Charta 77 were translated and spread by typewriter. As most important contact persons usually Mehlhorn and Templin are mentioned, who both spoke Polish. But others, such as again Domaschk also played a role here. 108 These contacts worked out on the oppositional groups the persons were active in. Mehlhorn was one of the initiators of the initiative APPA in 1986. This was a proposal to the church to speak out against the negative effects of the German division and the lack of freedom magazine dedicated to opposition in Central Eastern Europe made in the German names (e.g. Antje and Martin Dotkger, Stefan Pickhart, Catja Havemann) showes how unknown these opposition members still were abroad. The equally difficult, but better known, Czech names are, except for Czech punctuation, correct. 106 G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 373. Anna Šabatová in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 145. Doris Liebermann, ‘Vorwort’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 7-10, p. 10. 107 Neubert, Geschichte , 200, 322, 388, 561, 611. Jan Šimsa, ‘Die Zusammenarbeit tschechischer und deutscher Protestanten’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 224-226, p. 224. Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen, 55. Kerski, ‘Die Beziehungen’, 20-21. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1417. ‘Das Anna-Morawska-Seminar Berlin, Kurzinformation, Ludwig Mehlhorn’, RHG UP 019. Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle’, 37, 43-44. Olschowsky, Einvernehmen und Konflikt , 496-497. 108 Ibidem, 495-496. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 359. Ludwig Mehlhorn, ‘Osteuropäische Einflüsse’, 278. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1420-1421. Renate Ellmenreich, ‘Begenungen in Prag’, 40. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 32. Interview Gerd Poppe. Neubert, Geschichte, 322-323, 719. Mehlhorn in: “Das freie Wort”, 107. Markus Meckel in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 199. Dale, Popular Protest , 74.
34 of travel. It was rejected by the church, which only further encouraged the activity of the group members. Reinhard Weißhuhn explicitly mentions this group of one of the few human rights groups in the GDR in the eighties. Initiative APPA and its members practised a kind of opposition which showed similarities to the Polish opposition and was partly inspired by it, such as samizdat without church protection and awareness of the division of Germany and Europe in general. 109 In other aspects however APPA remained caught in the GDR oppositional scene: it was church-bound, explicitly choose not to use the Western media and adhered to the idea of a democratic socialism. 110 It was furthermore no coincidence that it tried to draw attention to the travel problem. Mehlhorn himself could travel to Poland again for the first time in 1988. 111 During the major part of the eighties however, it was impossible to all these oppositionists to travel abroad. Contacts usually had to be maintained with Western help. Exiled oppositionists such as Jürgen Fuchs played an important role here. In West-Berlin they could more easily get into contact with Central Eastern European opposition members, for example over exiles from these countries. This way the discussion with Central Eastern Europe could even be intensified. 112 The difficulty of direct bilateral contact also raised the importance of international, partly Western, networks that could work as an intermediate. In the earlier days of the peace movement the British peace organisation European Nuclear Disarmament (END) played a large role. The plea not to be loyal to the East or the West but to each other particularly appealed to the East German activists. END especially gained great importance for the East German peace movement as it staged its second yearly convention in West Berlin and several peace activists made their way to East Berlin to hold an alternative peace meeting with the activists there, such as Bohley and the Poppes. Eastern bloc opposition movements were often invited to attend the peace conventions themselves. Since they were practically always prevented from doing do by the regime, they could mostly only be represented by written contributions or exiled group members. Two currents however existed in the peace groups visiting END conventions: those only agitating versus Western missiles, who saw the Soviet Bloc as a possible ally, and those opposing all armament, who supported the Eastern European opposition. On the 1984 conference in Perugia this difference of opinion came to a head as both the official Eastern European peace counsels and the unofficial peace groups had been invited, but only the first ones had been able
109 Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 64-69. Neubert, Geschichte , 678-682, 718. Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 257. Olivo, Creating , 85. Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle’, 38. 110 Mehlhorn and Findeis in Findeis, et al. ed., Die Entzauberung , 156, 158, 250. Maier, Dissolution , 172. Fehr, ‘Von de Dissidenz’, 316. 111 Neubert, Geschichte , 718. Interview Gerd Poppe. 112 Jürgen Fuchs, ‘Wo ist diese Verbundenheit geblieben?’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 11-18, p. 14. Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 554. Neubert, Geschichte , 322. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 59, 62. Bugajski and Pollack, East European Fault Lines , 105-106. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 360.
35 to come. The peace groups from the second current revolted and started a new organisation, called the European Network for the East-West-Dialogue. This organisation with its associated peace groups, such as a part of END, the Dutch IKV, and Eastern European exile organisations, were very important in keeping contacts between East and West and East and East as well. The END conferences itself would become less and less important due to these conflicts.113 Equally important as these international networks were for the peace groups, was Greenway for the environmental movement. This was an almost exclusively Eastern European Network, established in 1985 in Hungary. It soon spread over the whole Eastern Bloc, but from the West only included Dutch activists. The network was an important means of contact and information exchange. 114 Through these networks not only contacts with Poland and Czechoslovakia existed, but also with other countries such as Hungary and the Baltic States. Although they are not the subject of this study, especially the contacts with Hungary cannot remain unmentioned. Several later IFM members such as Reinhard Weißhuhn and Gerd Poppe had travelled to Hungary in the seventies and gathered important contacts and inspiration there. Also the close contact with György Dalos, who wrote for the samizdat magazine Ostkreuz , can be seen as an important stimulus. Although Hungarian contacts also contributed to the ‘Eastern European-mindedness’ of several GDR oppositionists, the opposition in Hungary was considerably different from and less organised than the opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia. 115 The affinity with Poland and Czechoslovakia of the GDR opposition is demonstrated by Geisel’s questionnaire. 68.3% of the questioned oppositionists admitted to have felt particularly connected with Poland, a surprising 0.7% above the FRG. Czechoslovakia scored 44.4% and Hungary 31% together with the Netherlands: maybe because of the active contacts with the peace and environmental movement there. 116 More important than many of these individual and sporadic or more institutionalised contacts, according to Neubert, was the philosophical influence. Texts from Poland and Czechoslovakia were spread in the GDR opposition, and often widely read. Especially texts of Havel such as ‘The power of the powerless’ and ‘Anatomy of a reticence’ were of great importance to the East German opposition. Many different oppositionists admit to have been
113 Ibidem, 353, 356. Interview Gerd Poppe. ‘Initiative für Europäische Nukleare Abrüstung (END). Brief an die unabhängige Friedensbewegung in Osteuropa (Grenzfall 8/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 95-96. De Graaf, Over de muur, 141-145, 192, 195, 244-245. Allen, Germany East , 120-123. Interview Poppe. Neubert, Geschichte , 717. Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen, 65. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1425-1426. For the persons involved see: ‘Gerd Poppe an Georg Breuer, Berlin (DDR), d. 11.8.86’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 163. 114 Interview Carlo Jordan. Jordan, ‘Akteure und Aktionen’, 55-65. Dalos, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 555. 115 Ibidem, 554-555. Interview Poppe. ‘Ostkreuz. Politik. Geschichte. Kultur. Januar 1989’, RHG TK 09. 116 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 262.
36 influenced by the developments and philosophy from Central Eastern Europe. Former oppositionists as Mehlhorn, Neubert and Gerd Poppe often stress the influence of Central Eastern Europe in different issues. 117 ‘Das Beispiel der osteuropäischen und russischen Dissidenten schärfte bei den Distanzierten die Einschätzung der Situation in der DDR und die eigene Selbstwahrnehmung in der Gesellschaft,’ states Isabelle Lutz. Mehlhorn even stated in 2001 that without the incentives from Poland he would probably have gone to the West. 118 Except for the establishment of human rights activism - an issue that will be taken up in the next chapter - this influence was mainly very important for the opening up of the tabooed discussion around the German division. 119 Influence however also occurred the other way around. East German had always been an exceptional case, with its strong peace movement and initial lack of attention for human rights. After some early doubts towards the peace issue, as described by Havel, some in Poland and Czechoslovakia started to learn from the East German opposition as well. Especially the Solidarno ć members that would form WiP, but also members of Charta , looked at East Germany as relatively late, in the later eighties, peace and environment movements came into existence in these countries. 120 Strikingly also the 1989 November events in Czechoslovakia were highly inspired by what had happened in the GDR shortly before. 121 As can be seen the contacts that were established during the seventies were extended and institutionalised during the eighties. Except for Mehlhorn and the Greenway network especially the Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte and the Leipzig human rights groups would play an important role in this. 122 To the influence of Central Eastern Europe on human rights activism in the GDR in the form of the IFM, we shall now turn.
117 Neubert, Geschichte , 322-323, 728. Reinhard Weißhuhn, Ludwig Mehlhorn and Stephan Bickhardt in: “Das freie Wort“, 107, 109, 111. Edgar Dusdal, Jochen Läßig and Mehlhorn in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 67, 129, 155. Mehlhorn, ‘Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft?’, 39-40. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1425, 1427. Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 213-215. Interview Mehlhorn. Faktor, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition’, 30. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 360, 364. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 285-286. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 59- 61. Jander, ‘Der Protest’, 292. Olivo, Creating, 70. Lutz, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung , 138-139 118 Ibidem, 131. Mehlhorn in: “Das freie Wort”, 131. 119 Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1430. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 355. Mehlhorn, ‘Die DDR-Opposition’, 186-187. 120 Petr Uhl in: ‘Dokumentation. Begenung tschechischer und deutscher Bürgerrechtler im Schloß Bellevue am 7. November 1996’, in: Liebermann et al., Dissidenten , 243-274, p. 255. Fehr, ‘Die Macht’, 232. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1432. Baudet, ‘Het heeft onze aandacht’ , 178. ‘Declaration on Conscientious Objection, proposed by the group “Peace and Human Rights” of the GDR and adopted unanimously by the seminar’, East European Reporter 2 no. 4, 13. Skilling, Samizdat , 214. Allen, Germany East, 154. De Graaf, Over de muur , 141. Zariczny, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle’, 41. 121 T ma, ‘Czechoslovakia’, 43. 122 Neubert, Geschichte , 718-719.
37 Chapter two - The Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte and the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition
The history of the IFM The Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte is often credited with being the first human rights group in the GDR. Some authors and several of its members however reject that the IFM was an opposition group in the more strict sense. One important feature, which is often repeated by individual IFM members, was the absence of formal membership. Member could be anyone who supported the group’s aims and showed this by contributing the needed commitment. 123 Former UB member Rüddenklau describes the IFM as nothing more than a Mantel for a few remarkable individuals and their actions. The regularly meeting ‘normal groups’ was highly infiltrated by IM and in this theory only played a marginal role. 124 This would explain ill-discussed and semi- individual actions that regularly characterised the IFM and its members. Occasionally, speaking of the individual members might raise more understanding for what happened in the IFM, than stubbornly attaching to the word ‘group’. The IFM was a small group consistent of a few prominent opposition members, such as Ralf Hirsch, Peter Grimm, Bärbel Bohley, Gerd and Ulrike Poppe, Wolfgang and Lotte Templin, Martin and Antje Böttger, Werner Fischer, Katja Havemann, Reinhard Weißhuhn and Peter Rölle. Less prominent members and a large number of Informelle Mitarbeiter (IM) of the MfS found their place in the little-defined ranks of the IFM. Prominence was reached by some of these IM as well, such as Ibrahim Böhme, Monika Haeger and Reiner Dietrich. Since the IFM worked more or less as the cover of a number of important opposition members almost all of them had a history of oppositional activity behind them. Wolfgang Templin for example had, as SED member, been part of dissident Marxist circles, Gerd and Ulrike Poppe had opened a Kinderladen and organised cultural events in their apartment and Ulrike Poppe and Bärbel Bohley had been two of the founders of the important opposition group Frauen für den Frieden . According to Michael it was exactly this kind of cultural activities where the major part of the later IFM met. Besides that, IFM members often remained active in other groups such as the Initiative APPA and Frauen für den Frieden and therefore good contacts existed with these and other groups such as the Umweltbibliothek, whose rooms they used. 125
123 ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Berlin, 11. März 1989’, in: Kuhrt, Opposition , 201-203. Thomas Rudolf (IFM-member from Leipzig since this GDR-wide opening) in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 193. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 153. 124 Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 285. cf. also Peter Grimm in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 129. 125 Interview Poppe. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 86-87. Joppke, East German Dissident , 93, 107. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 114. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 164- 165. Michael, ‘Zweite Kultur’, 117. Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, 176.
38 In the years immediately preceding the establishment of the IFM, its later members were active in a variety of initiatives. Ralf Hirsch for example had co-initiated several appeals such as the open letter on occasion of the UN Year of Youth in 1985. Already here the decision was made to stop publishing anonymously, to prevent ringing hollow. At the same time here the first signs of affinity with Central Eastern European groups can be discerned. 126 Other later IFM members, such as Gerd Poppe, showed their affinity with Central Eastern Europe by composing a reply to the Prague Appeal of 1985. The Prague Appeal might have played a role in the later establishment of the IFM. The indivisibility of peace and human rights and ideas about overcoming the confrontation of the two blocks in Europe can later be found back in IFM documents. 127 The interest in Central Eastern Europe and human rights is also apparent from Ralf Hirsch’s membership in the Arbeitsgruppe Menschenrechte und Gesellschaft and Gerd Poppe, Martin Böttger and others’ membership of a contact group to Charta 77 . Martin Böttger had already conducted sensational actions for human rights in the seventies. 128 The interest in human rights issues however took a new turn as mid 1985 an idea for a human rights seminar in November of that year arose. At the Friedenswerkstatt a Vorbereitungsgruppe was established. 129 These preparations caused severe concerns in the MfS, which led to strong pressure on the church leadership. The congregation that had before agreed to the use of its rooms consequently cancelled the seminar a week before the scheduled date. At the next meeting of the Vorbereitungsgruppe three spokespersons were appointed to facilitate the communication with the church. Also a ‘Stellungnahme’ was prepared in which the informally made charges of the church against the seminar were softened or denied. According to the church the news had ‘leaked out’ that guests and journalists from West Germany had been invited and allegedly the establishment of a Charta 85 had been planned. Besides that, a protest letter was sent to the Church Synod. 130 These declarations were not undisputed and the first signs of a divide in the Vorbereitungsgruppe became clear. 131 In January 1986 these spokespersons spread a declaration in
126 A. Wynton Jackson, ‘GDR: Appeal on the occasion of UN Peace Year’, Eastern European Reporter 2 (1986-1987) no. 1, 60-61. ‘Ralf Hirsch an Frieder, Berlin, den 7.09.1985’, RHG SWV 04. Allen, Germany East , 134-135. Neubert, Geschichte , 596-597. Boria Sax, ‘East Germany’s Democratic Movement: “Human Rights GDR”’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 2 (1986) spring,13-14. 127 Christian Domnitz, ‘Der Traum von Helsinki. Bürgerrechtler entwickeln Ideen einer neuen europäischen Ordnung’, Deutschland Archiv 40 (2007) no. 1, 76-86, p. 79, 82. Gerd Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung internationaler Verbindungen’, in: Kuhrt, Opposition , 349-377, p. 360, 374-376. 128 Neubert, Geschichte , 596. Neubert, Eisenfeld ed., Ohnmacht , vi-vii (between pp. 24-25). 129 The beginnings of the Human Rights seminar including the members and the conflicts are described in a detailed manner in Francesca Conti, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca. Dissenso e opposizione negli anni ottanta (Cosenza 2001) 100- 101. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 173. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 51-52. 130 Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 211-212. ‘Sprecher des Vorbereitungskreises für ein Menschenrechteseminar Peter Grimm, Ralf Hirsch, Wolfgang Templin, an die Synode der Evang. Landeskirche Berlin-Brandenburg, Berlin den 18.12.1985’, RHG WT 07. 131 Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 173.
39 the name of the Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte” (Menschenrechtsseminar) . This had not been discussed appropriately within the whole group, and, to the great indignation of the more leftwing part of the Vorbereitungsgruppe , it was even without discussion presented to the Western press. This declaration was labelled ‘Dokument III’ which with retrospective effect turned the first two declarations in Documents I and II - one other point that presumably had not been sufficiently debated. In ‘Dokument III’ the three spokespersons stated that conscience about the indivisibility of peace and human rights was growing inside the peace movement. It introduced several ‘working groups’ on human rights issues and aspired GDR-wide activity. 132 Attempts to overcome the break inside the Vorbereitungsgruppe were doomed to fail and not always desired. As Torsten Moritz rightfully stresses, this was more than one of the regular quarrels in the Berlin opposition scene, but a real difference in content. According to John Torpey however, it still looked like a typical example of the querelles berlinoises to the outside world.133 The split, that had been imminent from the end of 1985, eventually took place in March 1986. The part of the Vorbereitungsgruppe that Rüddenklau describes as the social revolutionary wing, gave out a statement in which it denounced the workings of the spokespersons and announced the willingness to organise a new seminar. 134 This took place in the autumn of 1986, totally according to the church’s conditions and with a highly Marxist human rights interpretation. At the end of the seminar this led to disagreements with IFM members and the whole happening was very critically assessed, not only by IFM members, but also by others in the opposition. Neubert even calls it a fiasco and ‘einem schweren Rückschlag für die sich gerade entwickelnde Menschenrechtsbewegung’. After this seminar the organisers established the group Gegenstimmen .135 Shortly after the establishment of the IFM, some of its members concluded that the creation of an own public sphere was important for the GDR opposition and in line with the aims of the IFM. In Central Eastern Europe samizdat had proven a successful means to this goal. To prevent long discussions about it inside the Initiative, they launched it as an independent group in the peace movement. The magazine was called Grenzfall and first appeared at the
132 ‘Sprechergruppe der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte” (Menschenrechtsseminar), Dokument III, Berlin, den 24.01.1986’, RHG GP 006. ‘Erklärung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars “Frieden und Menschenrechte”, Berlin, den 6. März 1985 (sic!)’, RHG WT 07. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 52-53. 133 ‘Rainer Eppelmann, Berlin den 1.4.1986’, RHG WT 07. ‘Lieber Reiner (sic!)’, RHG WT 07. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 93. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 95. Neubert, Geschichte , 599. 134 The date of March 1986 has been mentioned by Rüddenklau and Neubert and is confirmed by the date on the declaration of the dissenting members (‘Erklärung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars’, RHG WT 07, on some of the versions of this declaration in the RHG the year (1985) is rightfully changed to 1986, cf. RHG RSch 21). Templin and Weißhuhn however speak about a split in November 1985 already: Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 173. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 53-54. Neubert, Geschichte , 598. 135 Ibidem, 603-604. ‘Das erste Menschenrechtsseminar “Da kannste nicht abstimmen, da mußste gehorchen” (Grenzfall 3/86)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 16. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 76-77, 86-89, 91-92. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 116.
40 Friedenswerkstatt of 29 June 1986. In the first issue, that amounted of 50 photographically multiplied copies, Grenzfall described its goals as the building of a GDR-wide information network to facilitate the exchange and understanding between different independent groups and the researching of the ‘Strukturaufbau und die Strukturveränderungen des gesellschaftlichen Überbaus in der DDR.’ 136 This first issue, and the IFM as a whole, was supposed to be presented at the Friedenswerkstatt but this was prevented by church superintendent and IM Krusche. 137 As first samizdat magazine of the GDR peace movement Grenzfall appeared without the protecting predicate ‘nur für innerkirchlichen Gebrauch’. This was a bold step outside the church, partly made necessary because no church community dared to host the publication. 138 After the first few issues of bad quality and small quantity, Grenzfall could soon be printed on machines which allowed to make 700 to 1000 copies of each issue, which answered to the growing demand: a demand that in the end could only be satisfied by asking people not to archive the magazines, but pass them on, through which it reached the furthest corners of the GDR. 139 After three issues in 1986, Grenzfall was able to appear monthly in 1987. Only in the seventh issue the Grenzfall redaction made itself known as members of the IFM. This however did not change the goals mentioned in the first issue nor made Grenzfall the official IFM organ; it only meant an extra way of contacting the redaction. 140 In the meantime Grenzfall often published the petitions of the IFM and documented its activities. Among the most important documents of these first two years were the Declaration to the UN Peace Year of January 1986, the Eingabe to the XIth Partycongress of the SED, the ‘Willenserklärung zu einer Volksabstimmung’, the Hungarian Appeal and the Letter to Charta 77 . The first can be seen in line of earlier appeals of soon-to-be IFM members in 1985. 141 The Eingabe was an impressive analysis of GDR society, signed by 21 members of the peace movement, including their addresses. Neubert described this document as ‘ein regelrechtes Programm zur Demokratisierung’. Joppke however treats it rather as an example of reform socialism engagement. Typical was the long list of human rights violations in the GDR with which the document ended. No answer of the SED was received, only in leftwing circles inside
136 Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell” bis “Zwischenruf”. Politischer Samisdat in der DDR’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 21-104, p. 88-89. ‘Grenzfall 1/86’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 1. Hirsch in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 117. Neubert, Geschichte , 753. 137 Ibidem, 578. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 66. 138 Ibidem. 139 ‘Editorial (Grenzfall 6/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 65. ‘Peter Grimm: Der Grenzfall ’, in: http://www.jugendopposition.de/index.php?id=71 . 140 ‘Editorial (Grenzfall 4/87)’, in: ibidem, 46. Peter Grimm in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 129-130. 141 Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 214-217.
41 the opposition the document was being discussed, often critically. 142 The ‘Willenserklärung’ was the IFM’s reaction to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, which caused high activity inside the GDR opposition. It distinguished itself from other initiatives by the stress on the possibility of a plebiscite: a sign of the IFM’s democratic-mindedness. 143 Furthermore the IFM distinguished itself by giving out documents that dealt with Central Eastern European issues; together with Central Eastern European groups and alone, it published declarations in commemoration of the Hungarian Uprising, the end of the Prague Spring and the establishment of Charta 77 . This international cooperation, with as its first form the Hungarian Appeal, was seen by the opposition as a very significant step. That its importance was also recognised by the regime is shown by the insinuation of fascist links by an article in the Weißenseer Blätter . An attempt to report this as defamation was rejected by the regime, ironically by invoking the freedom of speech. 144 The activities of the IFM however, went further than words. One of its main goals from the beginning had been the documentation of human rights violations in the GDR. 145 This continuing, more silent activity was sometimes complemented by actions aimed at publicity. One of the most striking examples was the action in which a group of peace activists, mainly IFM members, decided to draw attention to their difficult travel situation by booking a flight to Prague. All potential travellers were told by the MfS that their right to visa-free travelling was temporarily withdrawn. On the day itself most activists were arrested near their homes. Only five of them managed, under protection of Western journalists, to get to the airport, but were successively taken into custody there. 146 This action not only drew attention to the difficult situation of the GDR opposition and showed the methods of the Stasi , it also demonstrated the IFM’s willingness to engage in public actions and call in the help of Western journalists. Other activities that aimed at receiving - Western - publicity were the delivery of a letter to Gorbachev at the Russian embassy, the attempt to hand over a document to the GDR human rights
142 ‘Eingabe an die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Berlin den 2.4.1986’, RHG RG/B 001/01. ‘In der DDR ist eine Diskussion… - Diskussionsbeitrag von Uwe Bastian’, RHG RG/B 001/01. Neubert, Geschichte , 600. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 74-75. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 103. 143 ‘Nach Tschernobyl. Willenserklärung (Grenzfall 1.86)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall, 4. ‘Anhang (Grenzfall 4/87)’, in: ibidem, 51-51. Allen, Germany East, 140. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 61, 63. 144 ‘Auch in der DDR…’, RHG RB/B 001/01. ‘ Weißenseer Blätter 5/87 “Vorläufige Anmerkungen zum Fall “Grenzfall” Hanfried Müller”’, RHG BBo 57. ‘Gerd Poppe, Artikel 27, Werter Herr Staatsanwalt!’, RHG RB/B 001/01. ‘Hungarian Appeal’, Across Frontier s: for solidarity - east and west 3 (1987) spring, 1-2. ‘Prüfet alles; und das Beste behaltet (Grenzfall 6/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 70-71. 145 For example: ‘Zugriff hinter der Mauer (Grenzfall 1/87)’, in: ibidem, 22. ‘Die “Internationale” hinter dem Reichstag (Grenzfall 6/87)’, in: ibidem, 64. ‘Vernissage gewaltsam aufgelöst (Grenzfall 6/87)’, in ibidem, 69. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 151. 146 Very typical was also the ironical assessment of the event in Grenzfall : ‘Nur Fliegen ist schoner (Grenzfall 5/87)’, in: ibidem, 55-56. A. Winton Jackson, ‘The New Samizdat’, Across Frontiers 4 (1988) winter, 15-21, p. 20-21.
42 committee on UN Human Rights Day in 1987 and the handing out of a declaration on the Solidaritätsbasar of the League of journalists on the Berliner Alexanderplatz. 147 An event that definitely drew a lot of attention, both in the West German press and the East German opposition was the meeting of Rainer Eppelmann and a few members of the IFM and the Samaritergemeinde with CDU/CSU representatives. To discuss human rights in the GDR with members of a party that supported the regimes in South Africa and Chile was unacceptable to members of several groups in the opposition movement. 148 Gerd Poppe, who had been present at the meeting, in a (self)critical way tried to defend the motives of the IFM in a Vorabdruck of Grenzfall by stating that looking for dialogue with equally-minded only would be too easy. 149 The incident was however soon overshadowed by more severe developments which restored the unity inside the Berlin opposition scene. The MfS had closely followed Grenzfall and the IFM from the beginning and did not like what it saw. In the autumn of 1987, after the return of Honecker from his first trip to the FRG, it got green light to strike against the magazine. Through the IM inside the redaction the MfS was informed that the publication would be printed in the Umweltbibliothek . Due to risk calculations and unforeseen circumstances, the printing of Grenzfall was postponed to the early morning hours at which the Grenzfall redaction would not be present. 150 As at midnight the MfS started Aktion Falle and fell into the rooms of the Zionskirche , only members of the Umweltbibliothek printing the semi-legal Umweltblätter were present. The material for the upcoming issue of Grenzfall and the printing machine were of course found, but the goal to catch the board of editors in the act had clearly failed. 151 The failure of the MfS even worsened as in the following days the GDR oppositional scene suddenly forgot its quarrels and mobilised en masse for the imprisoned UB members. 152 After a
147 ‘An den Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU, Berlin 27.05.87’, RHG RB/B 001/01. ‘Brief an Gorbatschow in der SU-Botschaft übergeben (Grenzfall 6/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 67-68. ‘Editorial (Grenzfall 9/87)’, ibidem, 100. ‘Dialog in der Zelle (Grenzfall 11-12/87)’, ibidem, 143-144. ‘Erklärung zur Arbeit der Massenmedien 28.8.87’, RHG RB/B 001/01. ‘Erklärung der Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte zum UNO- Tag der Menschenrechte’, RHG RB/B 001/01. Jens Schöne, Stabilität und Niedergang. Ost-Berlin im Jahr 1987 (Berlin, 2nd Edition 2007) 69. 148 ‘Erklärung der Gruppe Gegenstimmen zu den Vorgängen am 12. September 1987 und ihrer “Würdigung” in westlichen Medien’, RHG BBo 57. ‘ Der Tagesspiegel 14.10.87 “CDU/CSU-Abgeordnete trafen erstmals Vertreter der DDR-Friedensbewegung”’, RHG BBo 57. Neubert, Geschichte , 662, 730-731. 149 ‘Dialog oder Abgrenzung? (Grenzfall-Vorabdruck 11/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 131-133. 150 Detailed insider’s accounts that explain the decisions and coincidences that led to the failure of the MfS are written by Peter Grimm (Grenzfall) and Wolfgang Rüddenklau (UB): Peter Grimm, ‘Erfolgloses Drehbuch. Die Aktion “Falle” und ihr Scheitern. Ein Zeitzeugenbericht’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED- Dikatur 16 (2007) no. 2, 56-57. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 115-119, 151-157. The MfS let the magazine be assessed by some specialists who concluded that it contained antisocialist propaganda: ‘DDR-Gutachten über das Oppositionsblatt “Grenzfall”’, Deutschland Archiv 26 (1993) no. 5, 624-632, p. 631-632. 151 This was however still presumed in Neues Deutschland: ‘ND 25.11.87 “Auf frischer Tat ertappt“’, RHG BBo 57. 152 Buckingham, ‘Freedom to think’, 55-56. ‘Umweltbibliothek (Grenzfall 11-12/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 136-143. Neubert, Geschichte , 694.
43 few days they had to be released and Aktion Falle therefore ended, in the eyes of many, as the MfS’ first defeat by the opposition. It even brought the GDR opposition an unknown amount of good-will and publicity in circles in the GDR and the West that could not be reached before. 153 It would not take long however before the Stasi would strike again. The group of Ausreisewilligen that had emerged in the second half of 1987 and called itself Arbeitsgruppe Staatsburgerschaftsrecht der DDR decided in December 1987 to join the official annual demon- stration in commemoration of the death of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht with own slogans. The other independent groups in Berlin decided not to participate. 154 The Stasi accepted the challenge and arrested dozens of Ausreisewilligen who were quickly released in the FRG. A few days later however, also Bärbel Bohley, Werner Fischer, Lotte and Wolfgang Templin and Ralf Hirsch of the IFM were arrested and together with the artist couple Freya Klier and Stephan Krawczyk charged of treason. The whole system of solidarity vigils was activated again. But the imprisoned, unaware of the wave of solidarity, were put under great pressure to emigrate. Despite repeatedly stated wishes to stay in the GDR all were released in the FRG. Some of them had, for the first time, managed to keep their GDR passports and negotiate a return date: Werner Fischer and Bärbel Bohley moved to England for half a year; the family Templin was due to stay in the FRG for two years. 155 Had the MfS affair of November 1987 been a victory for the opposition, this time the independent groups were ‘disheartened’ and ‘intimidated’. Some authors however see this set- back as an important experience on the way to political oppositional activity. 156 Especially the IFM had lost a large part of its core activists, while the - exceptionally large - number of IM stayed the same. The first half of 1988 was used for internal evaluation and attempts to secure the return of Fischer and Bohley in August. 157 Due to the events of November and January, the regular issuing of Grenzfall came to an end. The publishing activity of the IFM presented itself now in fußnote 3 , an account of the Luxemburg/Liebknecht events in July 1988, and the magazines Ostkreuz and Václav Havel in January and March 1989. 158 According to Reinhard
153 Buckingham, ‘Freedom to think’, 56. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 96. Neubert, Geschichte , 694-696. Schöne, Stabilität , 59-60. 154 Conti, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca , 108-109. 155 See for their own account of the decision to agree with emigration: ‘Bärbel Bohley, Werner Fischer 9. März 1988’, RHG GP 006. ‘Bärbel und Anselm Bohley, Werner Fischer, Regina & Wolfgang Templin, Ettlingen, am 6.4.1988’, RHG GP 006. Jan Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition of the GDR’, East European Reporter 3 (1987-1988) no. 3, 65-68, p. 66- 67. Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 232-233. 156 Buckingham, ‘Freedom to think’, 57. Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 103. Neubert, Geschichte , 724 157 Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 91-92 (on page 91 a list of IM inside the IFM can be found. Some of the most prominent were Monika Haeger and Manfred/Ibrahim Böhme). Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 239-240, 285. 158 ‘fußnote 3’, RHG HL 207. ‘Ostkreuz. Politik. Geschichte. Kultur. Januar 1989’, RHG PS 084/01-084/02. ‘Vaclav Havel, März 1989’, RHG MBi 32. Four numbers of Grenzfall were published after January 1988: 1-12/88, 1-5/89, 6/89 and 7-10/89 (all three to be found at the RHG). The first issue of 1989 was published by “IFM Suhl” and had
44 Weißhuhn these publications, especially those of 1988, were important to show that the opposition had not ended with the events of early 1988. 159 The remaining members of the IFM tried to give the group a new impulse and to return to the initial goals in March 1989 by publishing an extended self-conception, which was ahead of its time, according to Neubert. With this Aufruf it opened itself to members GDR-wide. 160 Although this was an important symbolic step, the actual structure of the new IFM remained unclear until the first GDR-wide meeting on the 28 th of October. In May of that year IFM members unsuccessfully tried to put independent candidates to the vote and, together with other members of the opposition unmasked the election fraud of the communal elections. 161 With this a process was started, that led to the incredible and entirely unforeseen events of the autumn of 1989. During these months many IFM members would play important roles as co-founders of the democratic movements such as Neues Forum and Demokratie jetzt . Also the IFM itself would live to see the new GDR. It was represented at the Round Table sessions and even, in the persons of Gerd Poppe and Marianne Birthler, would form an important part of the Bündnis 90 fraction in the new unified German Bundestag . Most authors give the IFM the credits of being the first democratic movement in the GDR, something which they often link to the democratic opposition in Central Eastern Europe. Allen for example calls the IFM ‘an integral part of a growing, multinational democratic movement which was now highly active across most of Central and Eastern Europe’. 162 Indeed in its two most important self-descriptions - its Vorstellung at human rights day in the Gethsemanekirche in 1987 163 and the Aufruf of March 1989 - democracy is presented as an important goal. In the text of 1987 the importance of the link between working for peace and social changes such as human rights is again stressed: ‘Wir sehen zwei große Aufgabenkomplexe in der Gesellschaft: 1. Herstellung von Rechsstaatlichkeit, 2. Demokratisierung.’ Because this cannot be expected from the “allmächtigen” perfekten Staat’, this should be reached through self-organisation of society. By stimulating independent publishing and events the IFM wanted to
nothing to do with IFM and Grenzfall in Berlin. This and other information and issue numbers of IFM publications can be found in Kowalcczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell” bis”Zwischenruf”’, 54, 59, 60-62, 67. 159 Weißhuhn in: ‘“Das freie Wort war die schärfste Waffe der Opposition” Rundtischgespräch am 3. April 2001 in den Raumen des Matthias-Domaschk-Archivs in Berlin mit Stephan Bickhardt, Ludwig Mehlhorn, Torsten Metelka, Gerd Poppe und Reinhard Weißhuhn’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 105-136, p. 120. 160 ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 201-203. Neubert, Geschichte , 724. 161 Martin Böttger in: Karin Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! Das politische Vermächtnis von Oppositionsgruppen und der Bürgerbewegung in der DDR (Berlin 1997) 13. 162 Allen, Germany East, 172. 163 Neubert calls this one of the ‘politisch ausgereiftesten Texten der DDR-Opposition.’ Neubert, Geschichte , 723.
45 create an independent public sphere, a second layer of culture. 164 Its conviction that peace and human rights were closely connected with the goals of Rechtsstaatlichkeit , democratisation and plurality of opinions was repeated in 1989. 165 In the early days of the IFM Templin and Hirsch stressed to a West German paper that one of their goals was to introduce the human rights issue in existing oppositional groups. In the same interview they stressed that the issue had not been addressed in the peace movement before out of fear to appear too liberal or bourgeois and concerns for the establishment of a kind of Charta 77 in the church. 166 Indeed the methods and goals of the IFM were not always undisputed in the peace movements, not only in the case of the meeting with Christian Democratic politicians or in the eyes of Gegenstimmen . Especially its ‘Western’ concept of human rights remained contested. Above all, there was fear that human rights activism would be easier to criminalise. Wolfgang Templin described in 1999 how the IFM members ‘in Teilen des Kirchenraumes als Individualisten und profilsüchtige Abenteurer verschrieen und von Linksoppositionellen als “bürgerliche Abweichler” und “Diskussionsdemokraten” abgestempelt [wurden].’ 167 Although the IFM’s conceptions of activism and its good contacts with Western journalist, which they did not hesitate to use, 168 were controversial in the GDR opposition and the Church, its general contact with them was not particularly bad. Conflicts with the church existed and the IFM and Grenzfall were amongst the first oppositional bodies to function explicitly outside of its protecting space, but the IFM still made use of church rooms and structures such as the Friedenswerkstatt and Frieden Konkret . The church was seen as a temporary ersatz public sphere: something it saw as one of its own tasks to create itself. 169
164 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte” zum Tag der Menschenrechte am 10.12.1987 in der Gethsemanekirche’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , vii-viii. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 51-52. 165 ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 201-202. 166 ‘Ronald Frisart, Art 13/210 Grp: RFR Afz: RFR Dat: 18/06’, RHG RG/B 001/03. 167 Fischer in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 100. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 115. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 95. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 179. Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 939. Neubert, Geschichte , 646, 725, 729. Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 309. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 62. 168 Geisel contradicts this: Geisel, Auf der Suche , 143. But many former IFM-members are rather convinced: cf. G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 127-128. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 362, 371. W. Templin, R. Weißhuhn and U. Poppe in Lüke, Die Initiative, 108, 121, 124. U. Poppe in ‘Von der Formierung’, 276. Böttger in: Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! , 12. Also in the Gutachten about Grenzfall it was noticed that ‘die Initiatoren von “Grenzfall” umfangreiche und auch sehr schnell funktionierende Verbindungen zu Medien der BRD besitzen und auch – teils offen – nutzen.’ ‘DDR-Gutachten’, 632. 169 Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 95. Neubert, Geschichte , 655. U. Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential’, 66. Leo, ‘Kulturelle Gegenwelt’, 44. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 177, 179-180.
46 Contacts of the IFM with Central Eastern Europe In ‘Dokument III’ the IFM declared that it would focus on human rights work in the GDR, but this did not have to exclude occupation with other countries. 170 This is no surprise, since many of the IFM members already had contacts abroad, mainly from the two countries with which visa- free travel was or had been possible. Gerd Poppe, Reinhard Weißhuhn and Wolfgang Templin were mentioned by Mehlhorn as the IFM members with the most Central Eastern European contacts. The IFM occupied an exceptional position in the GDR oppositional scene regarding its degree of Central Eastern European contacts. Gerd Poppe mentioned Templin, Weißhuhn and Mehlhorn as the most important contact persons in the entire Berlin scene. 171 The person inside the IFM with the most valuable or at least most vivid contacts with opposition members from one of the neighbouring countries was probably Templin. He had studied in Warsaw in the mid seventies where he had witnessed the establishment of KOR. 172 There were also contacts between Templin, Grimm and Hirsch and the Chartist Petr Uhl. He and his wife Anna Sabatová were the most likely spokespersons inside Charta for the IFM, being two of those few Chartists who spoke German. 173 Thanks to Templin, language was less a problem referring to Poland. A bigger problem than possible language barriers, were the travel restrictions imposed by the regime. Not only was visa-free travel with Poland adjourned in 1980, most opposition members faced individual travel restrictions as well. In 1976, as an outwardly loyal SED member, it had still been possible for Templin to study in Warsaw. After leaving the party and becoming more openly oppositional in the 1980s even a short holiday in Poland had become impossible. 174 Ulrike Poppe could not travel to Central European countries anymore after 1984. After the Wende she found out through her Stasi files that all travel would have stayed prohibited to her until 2000. 175 All members of the IFM faced the same kind of restrictions, and they often published lists with names of opposition members that had been turned down at the Czechoslovak border or requesting visa to other Eastern Bloc countries. 176 Repressive measures however led to creative ways around it. Although the contacts with Central Eastern Europe were not very institutionalized before 1986, still some cooperation had been possible and later IFM members had been active participators. More than half of the signatories of the 1984 declaration against the stationing of
170 ‘Dokument III’, RHG GP 006. 171 Interview Mehlhorn. Interview Poppe. 172 Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 113-114. 173 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 66. Seydlowski, Die Verbindungen, 54. Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 225. 174 Torpey, Intellectuals , Socialism , 86-87. Wolfram, ‘DDR-Opposition’, 27, 35. 175 U. Poppe, “Gesperrt”, 208. 176 See for example ‘Namensliste von DDR-Bürgern, denen ohne Begründung die Reisemöglichkeit ins sozialistische Ausland nicht gestattet wird’, RHG BBo 56. Olivo, Creating , 76.
47 missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR were later members of the IFM. 177 Contacts and cooperation had existed before the establishment of the IFM, be it on a largely personal basis. Both were elaborated further after the IFM had come into existence. Among the IFM’s documents at the Robert Havemann Gesellschaft however, little direct proof of contacts between the IFM and Central European opposition groups can be found. This is no surprise, since the foreign contacts counted to the most conspirative aspects of the East German opposition, according to Rüddenklau. 178 An exception is the Polish letter of July 1986 in which the IFM introduced itself to an unmentioned Polish opposition group and declared its solidarity with the democratic movement in Poland. 179 That however more contacts existed than this single letter may suggest, is shown by the many combined declarations that were issued by the IFM and fellow opposition groups in other countries. Several authors state that the IFM tried to stimulate the interest in Central Eastern European issues and from the beginning through ‘symbolische Aktionen und Stellungnahmen’ stressed its similarities with the Central Eastern European opposition. 180 The two most important examples of this kind are the declarations commemorating historic events. The ‘Hungarian Appeal’ from 23 October 1986 was signed by activists from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and GDR. Almost all 16 GDR signatories were active IFM members. They designated the Hungarian revolution as ‘our common heritage and inspiration’. The declaration in remembrance of the Warsaw Pact invasion in Prague of 1988 called the Prague Spring a continuing source of inspiration and hope and was signed by over 200 opposition members from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union and the GDR. 181 Sometimes actions went beyond the participation in declarations and events were staged simultaneously. The action at Human Rights Day in 1987 was meant to be accompanied by actions in other Central Eastern European countries at the same time. 182 Although contacts were sporadic and difficult to maintain, Central Eastern European opposition groups kept trying to issue declarations together and make the text subject to a border-crossing discussion. Despite existing difficulties drafts were thought over internationally and proposals for improvement were made. The first text to which opposition groups of all Central European countries had contributed was a memorandum to the CSCE follow-up
177 ‘Chartists / East German Independents’, 12. 178 Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 31. 179 ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Drodzy Przycaciele (sic!), Berlin, 12.7.86’, RHG RG/B 001/01. It is not clear whether and to whom the letter was ever sent and if received an answer. 180 Fehr, ‘Die Macht’, .225. Allen, Germany East , 166. 181 ‘Hungarian Appeal’, 1-2. ‘Gemeinsame Erklärung zum Gedenken an den 20. Jahrestag der Invasion des Warschauer Paktes in der Tschechoslowakei zum 21. August 1968’, Grenzfall 1-12/88’, RHG. 182 Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 229. Neubert, Geschichte , 722.
48 conference in Vienna called ‘Giving real life to the Helsinki Final Act’. The IFM contributed eagerly to this initiative and all its text proposals were accepted. 183 This document was signed not only by groups from the communist bloc, but also from Western Europe. The initiative lay with the European Network for the East-West-Dialogue, the organisation that had been established after the END convention in 1984. Gerd Poppe and others had had many contacts with END since 1981 and repeatedly stressed the importance of this international network of peace activists for the East German opposition. 184 Without the help of these and other sympathisers from the West, such as exiled East German and Central Eastern European opposition members, 185 Western journalists and politicians, the continuation of international contacts would have been much more difficult. Contact was often maintained through couriers, preferably with diplomatic passes, over West Berlin or the FRG. Contacts by mail or telephone were maintained with extreme caution or conducted over London where the Czechoslovak exile organisation Palach Press performed important coordinating functions. The exchange of invitations, ideas and magazines would have been practically impossible without these exile offices abroad. Jan Kavan of the Charta office in London and Jan Minkiewicz of the Amsterdam Solidarno ć office had even visited the house of the Poppes in the later eighties. 186 Through these bypasses contacts with opposition groups in neighbouring countries could be maintained despite the Reisesperre - under which also opposition members in other countries suffered. According to Werner Fischer in 1988 the IFM had the best contacts with Poland, followed by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. According to Gerd Poppe these contacts were mainly with Charta 77 and WiP. Solidarno ć did not appear particularly interested in contacts with the East German opposition. 187 In some exceptional cases meetings could be arranged. In 1986 there appeared an article in Grenzfall about a visit to Poland in which was reported about the work of WiP, the immense possibilities of the independent press in Poland and the usefulness of these kind of exchanges of
183 ‘Stephan Bickhardt & Martin Böttger an Lothar, Berlin, 20.10.’87’, RHG WT 02. ‘Stephan Bickhardt, Martin Böttger, Lieber Ibrahim, Berlin, den 20.10.87’, RHG MaB 40. G. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 289. ‘Das Helsinki-Abkommen mit wirklichem Leben erfüllen (Grenzfall 3/86)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 15. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 357. ‘Georg Breuer, “How the Memorandum originated” (Draft)’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 123. 184 Gerd Poppe, ‘Zur Entwicklung des grenzüberschreitende Dialogs’, in: Gerda Haufe and Karl Brückmeier ed., Die Bürgerbewegungen in der DDR und in den ostdeutschen Ländern (Opladen 1993) 201-218, 211-212 (this article was originally written in 1987). Interview Poppe. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 353, 357-358. Böttger in: Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! , 12. 185 Examples are Jürgen Fuchs, Roland Jahn and from 1988 Ralf Hirsch, Wolfgang Templin and Freya Klier (Neubert, Geschichte , 717). Of the exiled Chartists Jan Kavan was especially important. 186 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 66-67. Templin und Weißhuhn in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 108, 121. Interview Poppe. ‘Jan Kavan to gerd Poppe, 21 May 1988’, GP 022. Seydlowski, Die Verbindungen, 59-61. 187 Ibidem, 55. Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 66. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 360-361. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1431.
49 information and experience. In 1987 Martin Böttger managed as a member of a Friedensrat delegation to cross the border with Czechoslovakia and visit Uhl and Sabatová. Also in the early eighties some later IFM members had been able to avoid their Reisesperre , but all these meetings remained incidents. Sometimes people were sought who were able to travel, and they were given tasks to carry out. Besides that, before and after the establishment of the IFM the house of the Poppe’s was one of the meeting points in the GDR for international guests. 188 That these personal contacts were valued highly is shown by the regret that Bärbel Bohley felt about not being able to visit her Chartist friends upon returning to the GDR over Prague in August 1988 and the fact that the airplane action was presumably aimed to visit friends of Charta 77.189 According to Wolfgang Templin these contacts gave a sense of a shared task and international acknowledgement. 190 Gerd Poppe stated on several occasions that more meetings were planned. The contacts would have existed to stage a border meeting with Charta 77 as had also taken place at the Polish-Czechoslovak border. Such a meeting had allegedly already failed to take place in the early eighties and due to timely problems did so again in the later eighties. 191 Through the same ways that contacts were maintained, information was exchanged. Werner Fischer stated in 1988 that the IFM received most documents ‘fairly quickly’, after which they were translated and spread further. In exchange publications of the GDR opposition were sent abroad. Also Gerd Poppe stresses that one received information relatively easy and quickly, especially in Berlin: ‘Wir haben auch vom Anfang an immer die entsprechende Literatur gehabt. Ost-Berlin war im Grunde genommen natürlich ganz gut dran, verglichen mit der übrigen DDR. Eigentlich alles was wir bekommen wollten an Zeitschriften und Literatur haben wir dann doch irgendwie auf irgendwelche Umwegen uns besorgen können. (…) Wer es wirklich wollte, konnte diese Dinge lesen, und, ich weiß es noch genau, ich hatte damals drei Wochen nach der Unterzeichnung der Charta 77, das war ein Unterzeichnung in Januar glaub ich, hatte ich diese ersten Unterschriftenlisten.’ 192 These statements are supported by the large amounts of info bulletins and other literature of Charta 77 , WiP and Solidarno ć both in the original languages and in English that can be found in the individual files of IFM members at the Robert Havemann
188 Björn, ‘Reiseimpressionen aus Polen oder Eine Lektion Zivilcourage (Grenzfall 3/86)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 14-15, p.14. Martin Böttger, ‘Reise in die CSSR (Grenzfall 10/87)’, ibidem, 119-120. Seydlowski, Die Verbindungen, 56-57. Interview Poppe. 189 ‘Bärbel Bohley, Liebe Freunde, Lieber Janek, Berlin, den 3. 9. 88’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 166. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 64. 190 Templin, ‘Antikommunistische opposition’, 173. Peter Wensierski, ‘Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft. Interview von Peter Wensierski mit Regine Templin’, Grenzfall 1-5/89, RHG. G. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 295. 191 Interview Poppe. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 362. Neubert, Geschichte , 480. 192 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 9. Interview Poppe. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 32. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 127-128. Ostkreuz and an issue of Grenzfall are for example to be found in the archives of the exile organisation of Solidarno ć founded by Jan Minkiewicz in Amsterdam: IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 164 and 165.
50 Gesellschaft .193 One of the main objectives of Grenzfall and the IFM in general was to inform about opposition groups in Central Eastern Europe and the ‘white spots’ in its history. 194 Therefore a large part of the magazine was dedicated to Central Eastern European issues, something which was also noticed by the MfS. In 1987, the only year in which the periodical appeared in a regular monthly pattern, 112 longer and shorter articles about Eastern Europe were published. In comparison: 62 articles where dedicated to human rights issues in the GDR and 76 to other various other issues, such as Chernobyl and the church. The countries most reported about were the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. 195 Gerd Poppe remarked about Grenzfall: ‘Die Herausgeber des “Grenzfall” waren über das, was in Rußland, Polen oder der Tschechoslowakei geschah, gut informiert. (…) Die Idee des “Grenzfall” [war] nicht ohne Einflüsse von dort [Czechoslovakia] geboren worden,’ and it was therefore logical that texts from these countries were being translated and printed in it. According to Fischer this reporting was effective: ‘Interest is increasing. Four years ago the Initiative had to argue that East European issues were important but now people come to us and demand more information.’ 196 After Grenzfall ceased to appear regularly, other magazines were started, such as Ostkreuz , which especially focussed on Central Eastern Europe and was meant to stimulate international cooperation. For the first issue somebody had even travelled to Prague to ask Ji í Dienstbier if he could deliver an article. Further cooperation was indeed set up, according to Poppe: after the idea of Petr Uhl an international oppositional magazine was planned in cooperation of six different countries. The preparations took rather long however, and that is why the plan was made redundant because of the events of 1989. 197 The articles about Central Eastern Europe in Grenzfall often focussed very explicitly on fellow opposition groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia: VONS and WiP for example, were introduced in the magazine, documents and info bulletins of Charta 77 and VONS were translated and published and calls for solidarity for members of WiP and Charta 77 were printed when needed. 198
193 The individual documentations of Gerd Poppe (GP 18/1, 18/2, 021 and 022), Wolfgang Templin (WT 12, 13) Bärbel Bohley (BBo 129, 130), Ralf Hirsch (RHi 05) and Ulrike Poppe (UP 046) can be found at the RHG. 194 Wolfgang Templin and Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte. Die erste unabhängige DDR-Oppositionsgruppe’, in: Helmut Müller-Ensbergs, Marianne Schulz, Jan Wielgohs ed., Von der Illegalität ins Parlament (Berlin 1991) 148-156, p. 145. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 177. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 63. 195 ‘DDR-Gutachten’, 625, 628-629. Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , passim. 196 G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 115. Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 11. This is also stated by Allen, Germany East , 166. 197 G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 116, 133. Interview Poppe. Olivo, Creating , 76. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwiclung’ , 632. 198 See for example: ‘10 Jahre Charta 77 (Grenzfall 1/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 25. ‘10 Jahre Verlag NOWA (Grenzfall 2/87)’, in ibidem, 32-33. ‘Vorgestellt: Komitee zur Verteidigung zu Unrecht Verfolgter (VONS), (Grenzfall 3/87)’, in ibidem, 43. ‘Zur Arbeit von Freiheit und Frieden in Polen (Grenzfall 4/87)’ and ‚Prozess gegen Jazz-Sektion (Grenzfall 4/87)’, in: ibidem, 48-49.
51 Solidarity played an important role in the international contacts of the IFM. In its presentation to human rights day in the Gethsemanekirche in 1987, which can be seen as one of its most important self-conceptions, it designated solidarity as one of the essential aspects of its work. Its solidarity with WiP and Charta 77 was explicitly mentioned. 199 Letters to fellow opposition members in Poland and Czechoslovakia were signed with the formula ‘For your and our freedom’. 200 These words turned into action in case of repression. In Grenzfall and between the IFM documents at the Robert Havemann Gesellschaft plenty of letters to Polish and Czechoslovak authorities and calls to action can be found. 201 Sometimes bigger actions were carried out such as the GDR-wide ‘Aktionstag für die aus politischen und religiösen Grunden Inhaftierten’ in Czechoslovakia: a cooperation between several GDR opposition groups, including the IFM. 202 Also the publication Vaclav Havel was made as a reaction to the new detention of Havel and other Czechoslovak activists and dedicated to all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience in Czechoslovakia. 203 According to Ralf Hirsch solidarity belonged ‘zum Grundanliegen der Initiative .’ 204 Solidarity was no one way street. After major crackdowns on the GDR opposition, the imprisoned could also count on letters and protests of fellow opposition members abroad. The most striking example of this kind was the declaration of opposition members from five Eastern European countries after the detentions of January 1988. 205 This was highly valued in the GDR opposition. 206 It was even used to reprobate the imprisoned how they could have given in so easily while those 250 Central Eastern European activists that had signed the petition together had endured more than 1000 years of prison. 207
199 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. 200 ‘Drodzy Przycaciele’, RHG RG/B 001/01 and ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, 10 Jahre Charta 77, Berlin, den 10.01.1987’, RHG RG/B 001/01. 201 Examples are: ‘Katja Havemann & Barbel Böhley, Offener Brief an V. Havel, Berlin, den 23.2.89’, RHG RHi 01. ‘Liebe tschechische und slovakische Freunde, Berlin, den 22.1.89’, RHG RHi 05. ‘Erklärung’, RHG UP 019. ‘Brief an den polnischen Generalstaatsanwalt (Grenzfall 2/86)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 10-11. ‘Solidarität mit Petr Pospichal’, Grenzfall 4/87, in: ibidem 48-49. 202 ‘Varia. Arbeitstexte zum DDR-weiten Aktionstag für die aus politischen und religiösen Grunden Inhaftierten in der CSSR’, RHG GP 021. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 64. 203 ‘Vaclav Havel’, RHG MBi 32. 204 Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 225. 205 Anna Sabatová in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 145. ‘Erklärung aus fünf Ländern Mittel- und Osteuropas, in: fußnote 3’, RHG HL 207. 206 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 67. 207 This highly controversial statement was made by Reinhard Schult in the Friedrichsfelder Feuermelder and unleashed a discussion in the opposition. Ferdinand Kroh, ‘Havemanns Erben’, in: Kroh, “Freiheit ist immer”, 10-58, p. 53-54. Rüddenklau, Störenfried, 223-231.
52 Influence of the Central Eastern European Opposition on the IFM It may be clear that contacts, affinity and solidarity with the opposition movements in Poland and Czechoslovakia existed in the IFM. Contact and solidarity however, were a process that came from two sides and did not have to presume influencing. That the example of the Central Eastern European opposition did play an important role in the coming to existence of the IFM has been stated by several IFM members after 1989. Wolfgang Templin stated in 1999 how important it had been for him to be confronted with KOR during his study in Poland in the seventies and how his later engagement in the GDR peace movement, including the establishment of the IFM were influenced by that. His friend and fellow member of his ‘conspirative circle’ in the seventies, Klaus Wolfram, described in the same year how Templin could not free himself from his Polish experience and how this led him to bid farewell to his double life of party membership and secret opposition. 208 In later articles Templin, alone or together with Reinhard Weißhuhn, often described the influence of the examples of the Central Eastern European opposition on the IFM: ‘Die IFM war sich der Tatsache bewußt, daß die Opposition in der DDR aus verschiedenen Gründen schwächer, jünger und im traditionellen Sinne linker war als in den meisten anderen Ostblockstaaten. Mehrere ihrer Mitglieder hatten persönliche Kontakte zu Oppositionellen in Polen, der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn (…). Besonders die Charta 77 , ihr Selbstverständnis, ihre Ziele und ihre Aktivitäten hatten enorme Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der IFM (…). Der Einfluß der Diskussionen in der Charta 77 , des KOR und der demokratischen Opposition in Ungarn auf das politische Selbstverständnis der IFM (…) ist nicht zuletzt diesen Kontakten zu verdanken.’ 209 Also Gerd Poppe was very clear about the influence of the Central Eastern European Opposition on himself and the IFM. In 2001 he stated that he had been reading Central Eastern European samizdat since the seventies and how he had been impressed by the developments there. He wanted something similar for the GDR and wondered if that time had already come. According to Rüddenklau he wanted to catch up with the Central Eastern European human rights discussion in the GDR. In 1999 he called the IFM ‘sichtbarster Ausdruck des Einflusses der Charta 77’ and in 2008 he stressed the ‘eindeutige Orientierung auf die Charta 77’: ‘Ich verbinde diese starke Zuwendung zu Menschenrechtsthemen, die dann zu diese Gruppe mit dem entsprechenden Namen führt, immer mit den Impulsen aus Ostmitteleuropa.’210
208 Templin, ‘Nicht nur ’, 113-114. Wolfram, ‘DDR-Opposition’, 35. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 89. 209 Templin, ‘Antikommunistische opposition’, 172. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’(1991), 150. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’(1999), 177 (quote). 210 Gerd Poppe in: ‘Das freie Wort’, 106. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 358, 360, 364. Rüddenklau ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 32.
53 Not only the general idea of the IFM was, according to these former members, influenced by the examples of its neighbours, also its structure was strongly influenced by it. Ralf Hirsch stated in 2000 and again in 2007 how he and others were inspired and impressed by Charta 77 : ‘Nicht umsonst ist ja die Gründung der IFM in Anlehnung an die ‘Charta ‘77’ passiert. Also wir haben die natürlich schon ein bisschen bewundert.’ 211 Gerd Poppe repeatedly stressed the organisational example Charta had been for the IFM and even called the IFM a belated effect of Charta 77 . 212 These are all statements made after 1989, after which the Central Eastern European style citizen movements had proved to be successful. Of course it was easy to point at an early insight in this matter. Also in contemporary documents however, explicit allusions at the Central Eastern European influence on the IFM were made. In its declaration to the ten year existence of Charta 77 the IFM designated Charta and other human rights initiatives in Eastern Europe as ‘eine Ermutigung und eine “Quelle der Inspiration”’. The IFM not only gave account of this ‘source of inspiration’ to its fellow oppositional organisations, but also to the Soviet regime, which could be more dangerous. In the open letter to Gorbachev of 27 May 1987 the IFM stated that her ideas of ‘innergesellschaftliche Kontrolle’ and open Dialogue ‘sich viele unabhängige Gruppen in Ost und West verpflichtet [fühlen], wie die Bewegung “Freiheit und Frieden” in der VR Polen, die “Charta 77” in der CSSR und die Vertrauensgruppen in der UdSSR.’ 213 Explicit confessions to the influence of Central Eastern European human rights initiatives can thus be found both in contemporary and post-1989 sources. In the former is mainly being spoken of Central Eastern European groups as an encouragement and inspiration for certain ideas. In posterior statements, these movements were not only seen as a great personal inspiration but also as an organisational example. This last assumption is however contradicted by several pre-1989 documents. In the above quoted letter to Charta 77 the presumption of direct influence on the establishment and organisation of the IFM is being denied: ‘Am Anfang selbstständiger Menschenrechtsarbeit in der DDR stand oft der Vorwurf, die Charta 77 kopieren zu wollen. Dies war auf Grund unserer Voraussetzungen weder möglich, noch wollten wir es.’ 214 A year later this position was repeated by Fischer: ‘We in the Initiative have, of course, closely followed Charter 77’s work and the courage of some Charter signatories is exemplary to us. But we didn’t look up to Charter 77 as
211 Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen, 43 and 75. Hirsch in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 114. Interview Poppe. 212 G. Poppe, ‘Begründungen und Entwicklung’, 360. G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 148. Interview Poppe. 213 ‘10 Jahre Charta 77’ and ‘An den Generalsekretär des Zentralkomitee der KPdSU, Berlin 27.05.87’, RG/B 001/01. 214 ‘10 Jahre Charta 77’, RG/B 001/01.
54 our teachers and simply copy what they said.’ 215 These statements are in line with the assurances of the Vorbereitungskreis at the Church leadership after the cancellation of the seminar. The establishment of a Charta 85 ‘war weder Anliegen des Seminars, noch wäre sie aus der Verantwortung der Teilnehmer heraus zugelassen worden. Es hat weder in der Vorbereitungs- gruppe, noch unter den Freunden, die das Seminar vorbereiteten (inhaltlich), eine solche Idee gegeben.’ 216 That the intention to establish a Charta 77 -based oppositional organisation was being denied in 1985 can be contributed to the need to find a consensus between the two factions in the Vorbereitungsgruppe and the fear of criminalization by the regime. 217 The explicit denials of 1987 and 1988 however, are more surprising seen to the fact that they were addressed to (exiled) Chartists and not to a GDR institution. Fear of further criminalization could still have played a role here, although the IFM already was one of the most surveilled groups in the GDR. 218 Even more surprising ist he assertion of Templin in 1989 that none of the neighbouring countries could provide the GDR with a modell to overcome its problems and of Templin and Weißhuhn in 1991 that the IFM put itself ‘in den Kontext der demokratischen Opposition Mittelosteuropas, ohne jedoch deren Traditionen und Besonderheiten zu kopieren.’ 219 It may be clear that different pronouncements were made by the former IFM members, which cannot entirely be divided in before and after 1989, although Central Eastern European influences were more virulently denied before the Wende . Before and after 1989 the IFM appeared willing to name the opposition in the neighbouring countries as a source of inspiration, but it presumably wanted to keep up her independence and be more than a simple copy of Charta 77 . Only Gerd Poppe still referred to these initial statements after the Wende , and states that they were made out of tactical grounds: ‘Trotzt der Dementis, die wir damals verbreiteteten, hat sich die IFM, wenngleich in einem kleineren Rahmen mit viel weniger Personen, ganz deutlich an der Charta 77 orientiert.’ 220 However still because of these conflicting statements the actual influence of the Polish and Czechoslovak movements should be determined another way. More closely should be looked at how before 1989 in less explicit ways the affinity with and influence from Central Eastern Europe was shown. Only an analysis of the actual similarities of the IFM
215 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 66. 216 ‘Sprecher des Vorbereitungskreises für ein Menschenrechteseminar Peter Grimm, Ralf Hirsch, Wolfgang Templin an die Synode des Evang. Landeskirche Berlin-Brandenburg, Berlin, den 18.12.1985’ (also known as Dokument II ) RHG WT 07. 217 The former assumption is being supported by the use of the addition ‘(inhaltlich)’ which points at the separation of the Vorbereitunskreis in a part dealing with the organisation and another with the content of the seminar. These groups cooperated badly and this division of the group foreshadowed the later schism. This is being described by the organisers of the 1986 human rights seminar in March 1986: ‘Erklärung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars’, RHG WT 07. 218 Some of its members later described the IFM als ‘Staatsfeind Nummer 1’. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 114. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 154. Cf. also Joppke, East German Dissidents , 114-115. 219 Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 65. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 152. 220 G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 115 (quote). Interview Poppe.
55 with and the references to the Central European opposition groups could shed more light on the question of the concrete influence of Charta 77 and other groups on the establishment of the IFM.
The Polish and Czechoslovakian opposition in the daily practise of the IFM Although direct influence was often denied in public statements of IFM members before 1989, the influence of Central Eastern European thoughts and examples can be demonstrated in other ways. Its importance is clear in the large part of Grenzfall that was dedicated to Central Eastern European issues, but also from references in other texts by IFM members. That indeed informing about Central Eastern Europe was seen as an important task of the IFM is shown by the fact that when Grenzfall ceased to appear regularly, IFM members such as Gerd Poppe and Richard Weißhuhn sought for other ways to spread the Central Eastern European message. The magazines Ostkreuz and Vaclav Havel were the result. 221 This large amount of attention to the Central Eastern European opposition was linked to a feeling of admiration for the opposition in the GDR’s neighbouring countries. In his travel impressions from Poland, the author Björn was highly impressed by the quality and quantity of the Polish samizdat and of the amount of solidarity for the opposition among the people. He therefore called his voyage a ‘lesson of civil courage’. 222 Also Gerd Poppe almost jealously referred to the development of parallel structures by intellectuals in Central Eastern Europe, while in the GDR most intellectuals kept far from the independent groups. 223 Other IFM members were aware as well that these other groups were often much further with respect to many issues, which caused a kind of arrogance with respect to the GDR opposition, for example in Hungary or Poland. 224 Despite this, admiration prevailed, especially regarding the preparedness to suffer long prison sentences, which in the GDR was often avoided by emigration to the FRG. In later interviews, several IFM members showed their respect for this attitude. 225 It is therefore no surprise that IFM members often referred to fellow opposition groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia to strengthen their message. The open letter of August 1987 in which
221 ‘Vaclav Havel’, RHG BBo 130. ‘Vaclav Havel’, RHG MBi 32. ‘Ostkreuz. Januar 1989’, RHG PS 084/01-084/02. In a letter that is probably written by Lotte Templin, it is described that with Ostkreuz ‘finally’ an independent magazine about Eastern Europe appeared in the GDR. Also the difficulty to collect articles is described and the idea that Wolfgang Templin could go to Poland and write about it since he lived in the FRG now. ‘Liebe Barbara, lieber Janek!’, IISH Solidarno ć Nederland 164. 222 Björn, ‘Reiseimpressionen aus Polen’. 223 G. Poppe, ‘Zur Entwicklung’, 206-207. 224 Hirsch in Bärbel Bohley et al. ed., 40 Jahre DDR …und die Bürger melden sich zu Wort (Berlin (W), Frankfurt 1989) 170, 172. Fischer in Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 66. This was also mentioned by Mehlhorn: Interview Mehlhorn. 225 Hirsch on 09-03-2007 in Seydlowski, Die Verbindungen, 75. Gerd Poppe in: ’Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 148. Fischer in Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 66. Hirsch in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 114.
56 the IFM elaborated some of its general demands, started with a quote from one of Charta 77 ’s documents. The ‘airplane action’ of 1987 admittedly had to aim at Czechoslovakia, because it was the only country with which visa-free travel existed. The message was however strengthened and the action made more offensive to the MfS by the fact that the goal, according to Wolfgang Templin, was a meeting with Chartists. Another striking example is the appearance of a text of the Plastic People, the band that formed the occasion for the founding of Charta 77 , in the very first edition of Grenzfall . Even before the coming to existence of the IFM references to Central Eastern Europe were made: for the human rights seminar of 1985 a session about Central Eastern Europe had been planned; something which was missing entirely at the 1986 version. 226 The IFM not only often referred to the opposition groups in Central Eastern Europe, it also resembled it in several ways. These similarities could be the key to reveal the true influence of the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition on the IFM. Despite conflicting statements before and after 1989 about the direct influence of Charta 77 on the organisational structure of the IFM, a close observation of the workings of the early Initiative speaks for the later pronouncements. The Vorbereitungsgruppe named three spokespersons who in January 1986 declared themselves to be the spokespersons of the Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte” (Menschenrechtsseminar) and called it a yearly rotating function. 227 Despite all declarations of independence from Charta 77 a clearer organisational imitation of this Czechoslovak opposition movement is hardly thinkable. Maybe the later stress of the own GDR traditions also resulted from the failing of this structure in the case of the IFM. The spokespersons would never play the role they did in Charta and the first rotation would only take place in October 1989. 228 Although in Charta 77 the rotation of the function of spokesperson did not work as smooth as it should have either, throughout its existence the functions were kept intact and indeed rotated among the Chartists. Among these spokespersons could be found famous names such as Václav Havel, Ji í Hajek and Ladislav Hejdánek. 229 Both the IFM and Charta however had, besides this representative function, no organisational structures or formal membership. Charta described in its first declaration: ‘Charter 77 is not an organisation; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It embraces everyone who agrees with its ideas, participates in its work and supports it.’ The IFM formulated it as follows in its Aufruf of March 1989: ‘Die “Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte” (IFM) ist weder eine Organisation noch eine Partei. Um sich ihr anzuschließen, bedarf es keiner
226 ‘Offener Brief, Berlin den 15.8.1987’, RHG RG/B 001/01. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, p. 64. ‘Sie fürchten die Arbeitenden…’ (Grenzfall 1/86), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 5. ‘Ralf Hirsch an Frieder’, RHG SWV 04. 227 ‘Sprechergruppe der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte” (Menschenrechtsseminar), Dokument III’, RHG GP 006. 228 G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 360. Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen , 43. 229 Skilling, Charter 77 , 19-28.
57 eingeschriebenen Mitgliedschaft. Ihr gehören Menschen an, die der Überzeugung sind, daß auch in der DDR tiefgreifende Veränderungen notwendig sind.’ Those who were considered IFM members were the people that delivered the large amount of work and involvement that came with it. 230 Another clear rapprochement to the workings of Charta was the copying of the term ‘Documents’ for the Initiative’s publications. The publication of numbered ‘Documents’ was - with the yearly rotating Sprechergruppe and other complaints - one of the things the dissenting group members protested against and which also for years already had been a practise of Charta 77 . 231 Also this however, was not continued regularly by the IFM. Another important new feature taken up by - future - IFM members was the publication of addresses on statements; also one of the striking characteristics of Charta 77 and the Polish opposition. This was first done by the group around Ralf Hirsch who later described that ‘ein Grundprinzip war, wir unterschreiben hier nicht mehr als irgendeine Kirchengruppe, sondern alle namentlich, und das hat auch jeder zu verantworten (…) wir müssen uns dazu klar bekennen, ähnlich wie die anderen das auch machen. Wir können nicht, wenn Russen die viel gefährdeter sind, oder Tschechen, denen es viel schlimmer geht als uns, wenn die Zivilcourage beweisen, und ihre Sachen mit Namen unterzeichnen, uns irgendwo verstecken.’ 232 The personal signing of documents with name and address was something which did survive the initial stage of the IFM as an opposition group and which even, according to Torsten Moritz, became a style characteristic for the IFM. 233 Similarities can also be discerned between Infoch and Grenzfall ; especially in the focus on the documentation of human rights violations at home and abroad, but also in the fact that is was launched and maintained by an independent group inside respectively Charta and the IFM.234 Another important feature in the working of Charta which was taken over by the IFM was the determination ‘noch nicht zugestandene Rechte so wahrzunehmen, als seien sie bereits zugestanden,’ as it was formulated in its Vorstellung in the Gethsemanekirche in 1987. This principle was often repeated by its members and others both before the Wende - such as Ulrike Poppe in 1988 and Hirsch in June 1989 - and after 1989. Martin Böttger formulated in 1997 the idea behind this principle, which is also strikingly similar to that of Charta 77 : ‘Wir wollten nicht nur fordern, sondern auch leben was wir forderten.’ 235
230 ‘Charter 77 – Declaration’, 212. ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 201. cf. footnote 122. KOR did have formal membership, but no other organisational formalities: Bernhard, The origins , 83-84. 231 ‘Erklärung zur Vorbereitung eines Seminars’, RHG WT 07. 232 Wynton Jackson, ‘GDR: Appeal’, 61. Mlynar in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 191. Bernhard, The origins , 83- 84. Mehlhorn in: ‘Podium “Solidarnosc”’, 213. Interview Poppe. Hirsch in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 115. cf. also ‘Ralf Hirsch an Frieder’, RHG SWV 04. 233 Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition, 101. 234 Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen , 52-53. 235 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. U. Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential’, 73. Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 225. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiatieve Frieden und Menschenrechte’(1999), 178. Torpey,
58
The idealistic similarities between the IFM and the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition This is more than just an organisational similarity. Here the same moral vision on opposition and the world in general collide. The similarities between the IFM and the Central European opposition indeed go further than mere organisational parallels. As was stressed in the above chapters the Central Eastern European opposition had a dedication to human rights, democracy, civil society and openness which was largely unknown to the GDR peace movement. The IFM not only took up the interest for human rights, but also stressed other ‘typical’ Central European oppositional features. Once again this can most clearly be shown from the presentation in 1987. Here the IFM stressed its demand for the coming to existence of ‘eine breite Öffentlichkeit, die eine wirksame Kontrolle ausüben kann’. This is unthinkable without the guaranteeing of human rights. Human rights, Rechtsstaatlichkeit , Öffentlichkeit and democratisation were frequently repeated as aims of the IFM in both contemporary and later documents of IFM members. 236 One of the most important contributions of Charta 77 to the discourse of the peace movement was the principle of the indivisibility of peace and human rights, of external and internal peace as it was called. This is also one of the IFM’s basic principles, stressed both in Dokument III , the Vorstellung of 1987, and the Aufruf of 1989 and many times in between and after by individual IFM members. It had also already been mentioned in some of the declarations of the groups around Hirsch in 1985. The importance of the principle is stressed by the fact that Dokument III actually starts with the remark that the consciousness of the interdependence of peace and human rights is growing in the peace movement. 237 These and other similarities were also noticed before 1989, for example by exiled Chartist Jan Kavan, who stated to Fischer that things as ‘the indivisibility of peace and human rights, overcoming the division of Europe, the link between peace and within society and international peace and so on (…) evoke numerous Charta 77 documents.’ 238
Intellectuals, Socialism , 98. Werner Fischer in Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 101. ‘Peter Grimm: Der Grenzfall’. Böttger in: Lange, Wir bleiben hier!, 12-13. 236 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, vii. ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 202-203. ‘Erklärung 15. April 1989’, RHG GP 006. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 155. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’(1999), 174, 176, 178. Helmut Fehr, ‘Von der Dissidenz zur Gegen-Elite: Ein Vergleich der politischen Opposition in Polen, der Tschechoslowakei, Ungarn und der DDR (1976 bis 1989)’, Poppe et al., Zwischen Selbstbehauptung , 301-334, p. 323. Fehr, ‘Die Macht ’, 225. G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 132. 237 Mient Jan Faber, De Invloed van Charta op IKV & Pax Christi. Lezing door Mient Jan Faber ter gelegenheid van de uitreiking van de Erasmusprijs aan Vaclav Havel (The Hague 1986) 1-2, 4-5. Skilling, Charter 77 , 170-171. ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, vii. ‘Dokument III’, RHG GP 006. ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’, 202. ‘Peter Grimm u.a., Brief an die Teilnehmer der XIII. Weltfestspiele der Jugend und Studenten in Moskou, Juli 1985, in: Spuren (1988), 70-72, 72’, www.ddr-samisdat.de . Hirsch, ‘Die Initiative’, 211. Böttger in: Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! , 12. Fischer and G. Poppe in: Findeis et al., Die Entzauberung , 99, 124. 238 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 9. cf. also Allen, Germany East , 134-135.
59 These aspects are stressed both by (former) IFM members and later authors, whereby sometimes explicitly the Central Eastern European connection is presumed. These are however all inherent features of a democratic opposition and are a logical consequence of the initial choice to turn to human rights activism. It therefore, despite the striking similarities, cannot automatically be ascribed to Central Eastern European influences. This might be easier referring to some more specific characteristics of the Central Eastern European opposition such as the idea to create a second or parallel culture. This project, described by several Central Eastern European philosophers, was mentioned by IFM members and ascribed to them by different authors. In the Vorstellung of 1987 the IFM went even as far as asking for ‘gesellschaftlichen Selbstorganisation’. 239 Another striking feature that is often ascribed to the Central Eastern European opposition was the refusal of utopian thought that was so clearly voiced by Havel in ‘Anatomy of a reticence’. 240 Fehr, Neubert and former Chartist Jan Faktor state that the IFM declined an ideological or utopian way of thinking and according to Templin and Weißhuhn ‘hatten alle Mitglieder der IFM genügend Erfahrung mit Visionen, um nicht zu wissen, wie gefährlich Erlösungsvorstellungen sind.’ 241 In the Vorstellung of 1987 the IFM stated that human rights engagement meant that one would not measure social developments to an ideological or utopian image of society anymore. Ulrike Poppe even explicitly stressed the link to the contacts of the IFM with the Central Eastern European opposition: ‘Diejenigen, die Kontakte zur Dissidenz in Osteuropa hatten, das waren diejenigen, die am wenigsten in ideologischen Denkmustern befangen waren.’ And also Gerd Poppe stresses that ‘wir uns von diesen starken ideologischen Debatten wegbewegt haben zu diesen doch eher pragmatischen Verhältnissen, wie Demokratieforderung, Forderung nach Gewaltenteilung, Forderung nach elementaren Menschenrechten’. 242 Although a rejection of utopianism based on Central Eastern European experiences is very well possible, one should keep in mind that these are all statements made after 1989. Different ideas and definitions of utopia could exist, as appears from Reinhard Weißhuhn’s contrary statements after the Wende . In 2000 he stated firmly: ‘allen diesen Utopien, den habe ich nicht getraut, eben weil sie Utopien waren und ich die Erfahrung gemacht hatte (…) wie man Utopien umsetzt’, not long after however he asserted that the IFM did not look for an alternative
239 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1411. Olivo, Creating , 77. Fischer in: Findeis et al., Die Entzauberung , 101. Michael, ‘Zweite Kultur’, 114. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 104. 240 Ibidem, 183-184. Havel, ‘The anatomy’, 13-18. Neubert, Geschichte, 719 241 Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 212. Neubert, Geschichte , 619, 723. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 185. Reinhard Weißhuhn in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 119-120. Faktor, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition’, 34. 242 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. U. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 275. Interview Poppe.
60 to the Western system, which it partly rejected, but to utopias. Also Werner Fischer in 1990 did not deny being a utopian. Furthermore there are at the same time plenty of authors that see ‘Mangel an Reflexion’, ‘nonutopian’ thinking and even Theoriefeindlichkeit as a characteristic of the GDR opposition in general. 243 Moreover the general lack of theoretical thinking seems contrary to another distinctive feature of the GDR opposition that has been sketched before: the continuing belief in reform socialism. Where opposition groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia already parted from these ideas in the late sixties and early seventies, socialism remained dominant in the GDR opposition until autumn 1989. Some authors see an exceptional position for the IFM here as well and again link that to Central Eastern European influences. One of its most virulent advocates is Fehr, who repeatedly states how reform socialist ideas for the IFM ‘keine handlungsleitende Rolle [mehr spielten].’ 244 He is not the only one representing this opinion. Martin Jander attributed to the IFM a reorientation process comparable to that of KOR in the 1970s, since which socialism was no objective anymore. Moritz calls the ‘Abschied von der Sozialismus-Utopie’ typical for the IFM. 245 These assertions however, are contested by other authors. Geisel still sees clear anti- capitalist attitudes inside the IFM. According to him the only group that withdrew itself from the ‘realsozialistischen Status quo’ during the summer of 1989 was not the IFM but the SDP. 246 Also other authors do not presume a rejection of socialism - not to be confused with real existing socialism - in the IFM. 247 Even Fehr admits that, although socialism was no goal, its abolishment was no issue inside the IFM. 248 The variety of opinions suggests that the matter may be more difficult than a simple adoption of the rejection of reform socialism from Central Eastern Europe. The end of the belief in socialism was a highly personal process and this might not have occurred simultaneously in every member, or be remembered correctly afterwards. Templin and Weißhuhn recognise the difficult position this issue had inside the IFM when they speak about the IFM’s declaration of March 1989: ‘Ein Erkenntnis für oder gegen den Sozialismus wurde weder formuliert noch gefordert. Dies entsprach sowohl dem Diskussionsstand in der IFM als auch dem Ziel möglichst breiter Resonanz.’ Ulrike Poppe called it typical for the opposition groups in the GDR to have
243 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 194. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 10. Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 392. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 269. Weißhuhn in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 119-120. Weißhuhn in: “Das freie Wort”, 110-111. Fischer in: Findeis et al., Die Entzauberung , 106-107. 244 Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 210-212. Fehr, ‘Die Macht’, 225, 228. Fehr, ‘Von der Dissidenz’, 315. 245 Jander, Formierung , 41. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 9, 93, 95. Neubert, Geschichte , 723. 246 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 83, 94. The SDP was the newly established social democratic party in the GDR. 247 Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 99. Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 224. cf. Stephan Bickhardt, who was affiliated to the IFM in: Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! , 10-11. 248 Fehr, ‘Von der Dissidenz’, 328.
61 members with a wide range of different opinions. 249 It might be concluded that the rejection of socialism was no general feature of the IFM, but a highly individual issue - as Peter Grimm describes it: ‘so viele Modelle wie Mitglieder’. 250 Most members had an ambivalent but not entirely negative attitude towards socialism. Especially the difference between the Realsozialismus practiced by the regime and the ideas of a reformed democratic socialism of 1968 and beyond was important. Ulrike Poppe for example stated in 2000 that most IFM members did not believe in big social concepts, but the reformation of socialism remained an issue. Bärbel Bohley stated some years before that the word socialism was questioned more and more in the eighties, but that she still believed in third way options. 251 Also Werner Fischer was ambivalent to the concept of socialism. Joppke quotes him as standing ‘firmly on the ground of socialism’. It may however be clear that this did not refer to the SED interpretation of socialism - which according to him ‘nur noch eine leere Worthülse war’ - but to a democratic socialism. About the IFM in general he asserts: ‘den Sozialismus in Frage zu stellen, war nie Anliegen der Initiative. Wir haben immer darauf hingewiesen, daß das, was man uns hier als Sozialismus verkauft hat - um mit Biermann zu sprechen - der falsche Hut ist.’ 252 Equally ambivalent about the opinion of the IFM about socialism is Wolfgang Templin. According to him the IFM had no ready concept for society. He described the general attitude as follows: ‘Es ist jedem, der in dieser Gruppe mitmacht, unbenommen, von mir aus auch so eine, sogar marxistische, Revolutionshoffnung zu haben, oder sie nicht zu haben und eine andere zu entwickeln und miteinander darüber zu diskutieren, aber das ist für das Gruppenverständnis, und das, was wir gemeinsam ausdrücken, überhaupt nicht das Wichtige.’ Socialism was not at stake at all. Although there were ideas of a reformed socialism or a third way and the word socialism was still used positively, the only thing important for Templin was that rights would be claimed and Öffentlichkeit established by the IFM. 253 In the texts he wrote about the IFM together with Reinhard Weißhuhn, he was more outspoken about the attitude towards socialism in the IFM. In these texts they stress the IFM’s ‘Überwindung traditioneller linker Denkmuster,’ in which it allegedly showed analogies to Central Eastern European opposition groups. ‘Nicht ein perfektionierter Sozialismus, sondern eine demokratische Gesellschaft mündiger Bürger stand im Zentrum der Veränderungsansprüche.’
249 Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 183. cf. Templin in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 110. 250 Peter Grimm in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 131. 251 U. Poppe, “Gesperrt”, 213-214. Bohley in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 302. 252 Fischer in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 102. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 103. 253 Templin in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 110-111 (quote). Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 116.
62 They nevertheless recognise that compared to Central Eastern Europe the IFM came to this insight relatively late. 254 Gerd Poppe is also rather outspoken about his, or what he perceives as the IFM’s, attitude towards socialism. According to him it was only a small minority of the opposition that still wanted to reform socialism and the IFM was careful to use the word because it was heavily discredited. He however acknowledges that this was a slow and difficult process. In the mid nineties he described to the Enquetekommission of the German Bundestag how in 1984 in their answer to the Prague Appeal he and his co-authors had still advocated the mentioning of democratic socialism, something which was missing in the Prague Appeal itself. In the Vorstellung of the IFM in 1987 however, which Poppe also co-authored, the concept of socialism was missing as well. He tells that the process had gone so gradual, that he had not noticed this presumably revolutionary step until it was pointed out to him by an MfS officer. 255 Indeed in the Vorstellung of 1987 reforms ‘from above’ are rejected, but the IFM is just as reluctant to accept a Western-style parliamentary system. And also in Grenzfall critical assessments of both capitalist and Marxist thought can be found. 256 The conclusion may be drawn that pluralism, one of the main goals of the IFM, was indeed abundant in this opposition group. The rejection or reform of socialism does not appear to have been a very important issue inside the IFM, and opinions therefore could vary. One’s attitude and hopes towards socialism appears to have been a highly individualised issue, which of course indivually, might have been influences by Central Eastern European examples. This idea is being confirmed by the fact that Gerd Poppe, Wolfgang Templin and Reinhard Weißhuhn, three of the IFM members with the best Central Eastern European contacts, seem to be have been the members that most virulently reject the idea of socialism. That many authors see the rejection of socialism as a general feature of the IFM may be attributed to the fact that the most important texts about its history have been written by these three members. Interesting to notice is that in case of Central Eastern Europe reality was more complex as well. Plurality, also often seen as one of the important characteristics of not only the IFM but also of the Central Eastern European opposition, was also not unknown in the neighbouring countries: while Havel had never supported communism at all, Uhl kept on stressing socialist
254 Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 152, 156. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 184-185. 255 G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 109, 133. G. Poppe in: Findeis et al. ed., Die Entzauberung , 180. G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 148, 150. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 180. 256 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. Cf. Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 23-24, 40-41. The reservations regarding a parliamentary system were still confirmed by Fischer in 1990: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 105.
63 visions. Although the rejection of reform socialism was far more common here than in the GDR also for these countries no generalisations can be made as has often been done. 257 A similar difficult issue is the self-conception as opposition. As has been established before the word ‘opposition’ was hardly used in the East German independent groups and many of these groups did not see themselves as such. The IFM is often presumed to have constituted the exception here. 258 This is confirmed by statements of IFM members Wolfgang Templin and Reinhard Weißhuhn shortly after 1989 who stated that the IFM had been ‘eine der ersten Gruppen in der DDR, die sich öffentlich als politische Opposition artikulierte.’ Marianne Birthler stated firmly around the same time: ‘Die IFM versteht sich als Opposition, hat das immer getan.’ Athough it had not been easy to admit to be opposition, according to her the IFM had been the first one to do so. Later in the nineties Templin still asserted: ‘Natürlich plädierten die Vertreter der IFM dafür, sich der unvermeidlichen Gegnerschaft zum System und der Oppositionsrolle zu stellen, statt dort auf Einsicht zu setzen, wo keine mehr zu erwarten war.’ 259 Also this however appears to be a rather individual case, since other opinions existed among other IFM members. Bärbel Bohley for example was more ambivalent. In 1990 she adhered to the position that also former oppositionist Neubert took: ‘Wir haben uns als Opposition verstanden, aber es wurde nicht ausgesprochen.’ A few years after however she asserted: ‘Wir waren ja nicht so sehr von unserem eigenen Selbstverständnis her Oppositionelle, sondern wir sind wie Oppositionelle behandelt worden.’ 260 Ulrike Poppe was clearer in het opinion that she did not perceive herself as opposition although se gives different reasons for it. In 1991 she asserted to Joppke: ‘In the beginning, I did not see my peace engagement as being in opposition to the state; it was more like setting a different accent while pursuing a common goal.’ In other accounts she stresses that up until 1989 she kept believing in reforms, the usefulness of dialogue and the possibility to change together with the state, instead of against it. Only once she points at the tactical value of the denial of an oppositional self-conception. 261
257 Skilling, Charter 77 , 43-51. Mlynar in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 191. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 73. 258 Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 905. Torsten Moritz, ‘Vom Ostdeutschen “Versuch in der Wahrheit zu leben”. DDR-Oppositionsgruppen als Beispiel “alternativloser” Zivilcourage’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur 11 (2000) no. 2, 20-25, pp. 20-21. Hans Michael Kloth, ‘Initiative Frieden und menschenrechte (IFM)’, in: Veen et al.ed., Lexicon , 185. Jander, Formierung , 27. 259 Marianne Birthler in: Findeis, Pollack and Schilling, Die Entzauberung , 41. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 154. Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 115. Also Ralf Hirsch and Peter Grimm still defended this idea in 2000: Lüke, Die Initiative, 114, 128. 260 Bohley in: Findeis et al. ed., Die Entzauberung , 52. Bohley in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 279. Neubert, Geschichte , 379, 647. 261 U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 249-250. U. Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential’, 65. U. Poppe in: Joppke, East German Dissidents , 95. U. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 262.
64 The more tactical version is also repeated by Templin and Weißhuhn, who furthermore describe an IFM confident of its oppositional self-conception: ‘Trotzt dieses relative entwickelten und reflektierten Selbstverständnisses erklärte sich die IFM als Ganzes nicht ausdrücklich als Opposition. Der Grund dafür liegt allerdings weniger darin, dass sich die Mitglieder der Gruppe nicht als Oppositionelle verstanden, als darin, dass sie aus taktischen Gründen diese für die SED extrem provokante Wort vermeiden wollten.’ That, wether the opposition saw itself as such or not, the word was hardly used is also shown by the appeal of Weißhuhn that appeared in Grenzfall as late as May 1989 to lift the ban on the use of this word in the oppositional scene. 262 Apparently also in the IFM the self-conception as opposition was hardly proclaimed. Out of fear for criminalisation the word itself was, just as in the rest of the East German opposition, hardly used. Therefore it turned, just like the attitude towards socialism, into an individual issue. Striking is that again some of the members with the best Central Eastern European contacts such as Templin and Weißhuhn are the most outspoken advocates of an outwardly oppositionist IFM, also before the Wende. Also here of course the simplified Central Eastern European image could be nuanced. As has been remarked in chapter one, also in Czechoslovakia the word opposition was often avoided and a dialogue with the state was one of the goals. That the oppositional self-conception was more outspoken than in the GDR, especially in Poland, could however be presumed. 263 The influence of the Central Eastern European opposition is unquestionably present in the initial organisational structures of the IFM, with the remark that not everything worked out the same under GDR circumstances. Other issues that are often named as influences of Central Eastern Europe, such as the rejection of utopian and reform socialist thought and the self- conception as opposition cannot be generalised for the entire IFM as many authors try to do. For some members individual or typical GDR-related experiences played a role here. It is however striking that those inside the IFM who are most convinced of these presumably typical Central Eastern European traits, are also the ones who kept and most valued these contacts.
The influence of Central European philosophers The opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia can hardly be separated from the well-known philosophers in their ranks. While Charta 77 or Solidarno ć served as a practical example of how
262 Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 179. ‘Die Gesellschaft als Ziel oder bevor sie demokratisiert werden kann, muß eine Gesellschaft vorhanden sein’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 177-179. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 179. 263 Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 313. Falk, The Dilemmas , 253. Skilling, Charter 77 , 66. ‘Charter 77 – Declaration’, 212. Skilling, Samizdat , 49-50. Adams, ‘Charter 77’, 231. Bernhard, The origins , 83. T ma, ‘Czechoslovakia’, 38.
65 opposition could function, these philosophers offered the moral imperatives and intellectual ideas behind it. The texts of Havel, Michnik, Kuro and others were widely available in the GDR opposition. East Germany had the advantage above other countries that most of these texts could easily be imported from the FRG without going through the difficulty of having to translate and publish these texts in samizdat. Of course everybody knew these books were forbidden, but according to former oppositionists Ludwig Mehlhorn and Doris Liebermann, they were widely read in the opposition. 264 That these texts were apparently valued is shown by the attempts to spread it further and to inform about its authors. IFM members such as Gerd Poppe, Peter Grimm and Reinhard Weißhuhn composed the samizdat publications Vaclav Havel and Ostkreuz in which texts of Havel, Kuro , Uhl and Dienstbier appeared and also in Grenzfall some of their texts were published. 265 The existing interest in and knowledge of these authors amongst IFM members is shown by the references they made in texts both before and after 1989. Václav Havel is the philosopher that was named the most. His influential thoughts, such as his description of the attempt to ‘live in the truth’, were still attractive enough to refer to after 1989 for IFM members such as Gerd and Ulrike Poppe and Wolfgang Templin. 266 Texts referring to Havel from before the Wende are available again from Gerd Poppe and Wolfgang Templin and from Katja Havemann and Bärbel Bohley who wrote in a letter to Havel in February 1989: ‘Ihre Ermutigung zum “Versuch in der Wahrheit zu leben” ist in vielen sozialistischen Ländern eine hoffnungsvolle lebendige Kraft geworden.’267 Less frequent, but also available, are references to other Central Eastern European philosophers such as Michnik and Kuro . Ulrike Poppe still referred to them years after the Wende , Wolfgang Templin and Gerd Poppe already mentioned them a decade before. The latter
264 Seydlowsky, Die Verbindungen , 28. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 30-31. Liebermann, ‘Vorwort’, 9. Interview Mehlhorn. Neubert, Geschichte , 719. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 63. 265 ‘Vaclav Havel’, RHG BBo 130. ‘Vaclav Havel’, RHG MBi 32. ‘Ostkreuz. Politik. Geschichte. Kultur. Januar 1989’ and ‘Ostkreuz. Politik. Geschichte. Kultur. August 1989’, RHG PS 084/01-084/02. This last issue of Ostkreuz with articles of Uhl and Kuro , which was entirely ready, was prevented from appearing by the MfS. Adam Michnik, ‘Der große Gegenreformator (Grenzfall 9/87)’, in Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 104-106. Only IFM affiliated samizdat is named here, also other samizdat-publications tried to familiarise a larger public with Central Eastern European thought, such as Radix-Blätter. 266 Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 115. G. Poppe, ‘Begründung und Entwicklung’, 350. U. Poppe, “Gesperrt”, 213. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 246, 249. U. Poppe, ‘Der Weg ist das Ziel’, 250. 267 G. Poppe, ‘Zur Entwicklung’, 210, 213. Gerd Poppe, ‘Unser “gemeinsames europäisches Haus”’(February 1989), in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit, 559-564, p. 564. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 60. ‘Havemann & Bohley, Offener Brief an V. Havel’.
66 was moreover, the only IFM member who admitted to have been strongly influenced by the Mitteleuropadebatte held by these same thinkers. 268 Not only did these opposition members often refer to intellectuals such as Havel and Michnik, also the influence from their ideas can easily be discerned in several contemporary texts. This is above all remarkable in the texts of Ulrike Poppe and Bärbel Bohley; two IFM members with interest in Central Eastern Europe, but without the marked ‘specialisation’ in this direction of Wolfgang Templin and Gerd Poppe. Especially Havel’s idea of living in the truth seems to have been influential here. Bärbel Bohley for example described in September 1989 that in the GDR the truth could only be whispered between four walls. She described the samizdat publication in which she wrote this as ‘Widerstand in einem Land der Sprachlosigheit und der Lüge.’ The exposure of the truth was, according to Bohley, the most important effect of this project, in which GDR citizens were, for the first time, given the change to speak out.269 Ulrike Poppe generally applied these ideas to the whole GDR opposition. She did this in 1988 by stressing the opposition’s rejection of conformism, its high moral standards and thereby its inherent danger to the structures of power. After the Wende she made this even more explicit by unambiguous references to the ideas of parallel structures and civil society and by stating that the real meaning of the opposition groups of the eighties was their laying claim to the right to an own independent opinion. ‘Die Mitglieder der oppositionellen Gruppen führten vor, daß es durchaus möglich war, sich nicht dem Regime verfügbar machen zu lassen, nicht im Strom der Lüge mitzuschwimmen, sich ein Stück Freiheit zu erobern. 270 Not only the ideas about living in truth, but also the ideas of an emancipated parallel society were taken up in the GDR. Reinhard Weißhuhn answered in 1987 to questions of the historian H. Gordon Skilling about the existence of an independent society in the GDR, that the idea was still largely unknown in the GDR, but the first steps had been taken.271 After 1989 authors were more willing to see the concepts of parallel structures and a second cultural layer in the GDR oppositional reality. Fehr, Mehlhorn, Timmer and Moritz describe how ideas of the creation of free spaces, societal self-organisation, ethical imperatives of truthful acting and the recapturing of the public space played a role in the opposition in general and the IFM in particular, with credits
268 U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 247. U. Poppe in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 126. Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 61. G. Poppe, ‘Zur Entwicklung’, 214. G. Poppe, ‘Unser “gemeinsames”’, 561. Interview Poppe. 269 Bohley et al. ed., 40 Jahre DDR , 5-7, 186. This edition is a contemporary print of the samisdat-publication Urkunde , which only reproduces the text. 270 U. Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential’, 64. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel”, 257-258, 261-262. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 245. 271 Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Eine unabhängige Gesellschaft in Osteuropa – Samisdat und die zweite Kultur’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 348-350.
67 to the influence of Central Eastern European. 272 Gerd Poppe stated in 2008 that already relatively early he and the people around him came to the conclusion that out of the system itself no changes could be expected: ‘Die einzige Chance die es gibt ist wenn wir uns eben selber organisieren, wenn wir sozusagen auch sowie in Polen oder Tschechien oder Ungarn diese Art von Parallelgesellschaft entwickeln.’ Poppe stresses that all these ideas were so important because they appealed to shared ideas and experiences. 273 Other authors are however more careful to label the GDR opposition like this. Lothar Probst rightfully stresses that for the opposition in general also protestant ethics played a large role in the creation of its high moral claims, even in groups that tried to free themselves from too close links with the church. Reform socialist thinking was still very important for a large part of the opposition. This is also stressed by Geisel, who states that the late GDR opposition might not have produced a new Bahro, but a civil society such as in Poland or Havel’s living in the truth, never became a reality in the GDR either. 274 It is striking, that while Central Eastern European contacts usually seemed to be only the occupation of just a few IFM members such as Wolfgang Templin and Gerd Poppe, the ideas of Central Eastern European philosophers were just as eagerly taken up by members as Ulrike Poppe and Bärbel Bohley, who occupied themselves less virulently with contacts to the east. Although these writers were influential in the whole opposition, they were most influential in the human rights groups, according to Neubert. 275 Little references to these Central Eastern European philosophers can be found however from the earlier years of the IFM. The obvious influencing of IFM members by Central Eastern European thinkers of the late eighties therefore cannot automatically be presumed for the early years of the IFM.
Conclusion The IFM was an important step in the introduction of human rights activism. Its members had a new and refreshing view on oppositional activity in which human rights, democracy and publicity played an important role. That the IFM was indeed new in this is shown by the controversy that her existence and methods aroused in the rest of the peace movement. Exemplary for the status of the IFM is the contrast to the seminar that the later members of Gegenstimmen staged in 1986.
272 Fehr, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit , 285-286, 292-294, 296, 314. Fehr, ‘Von der Dissidenz’, 322. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1409-1436, p. 1411, 1415-1417, 1427. Moritz, ‘Vom Ostdeutschen “Versuch”’, 20-21. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch, 50, 55, 62-63. 273 Interview Poppe (quote). G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 116. 274 Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 55. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 338. 275 Neubert, Geschichte , 719.
68 In contrast to the IFM this seminar remained caught in a strongly Marxist way of thinking and according to some even meant a backlash for human rights activism in the GDR in general. The IFM however did something new which reminds of the workings of opposition groups in Central Eastern Europe. This similarity is noticed by many different authors. That this resemblance could be the effect of direct influencing by Central Eastern Europe is suggested by the large personal and ever more institutionalised contacts that, despite major difficulties, existed with the opposition in Central Eastern Europe: before and after 1986 opposition members exchanged papers and ideas, cooperated where possible and showed solidarity with and interest in each other. This presumption of possible influencing is being confirmed by several statements of IFM members who explicitly admitted they had taken Central Eastern European groups as an example. At the same time however, there exist conflicting statements that deny the direct influence of Central Eastern European groups. Despite these rejections, the organisational closeness of the initial IFM to Charta 77 is so clear, that the latter statements should be attributed to wishes to avoid criminalisation or accusations of foreign influence. Other features that are often named as typical characteristics of the Central Eastern European opposition and at the same time attributed to the IFM are more difficult to link. The rejection of utopian and reform socialism thought and the self-conception as opposition are often mentioned by IFM members before and mostly after 1989. Other statements of IFM members however less easily fit in this picture. It is more likely that these convictions are the result of individual processes, in which the influence from Central Eastern Europe might have played a role - for example in the cases of Wolfgang Templin and Gerd Poppe. This however does not necessarily lead to the exemplary results often mentioned: also in 1989 there were still IFM members that believed in a form of reform socialism, and a call to identify with the word opposition still appeared necessary. This does not change that Central Eastern European ideas played a large role in the daily practise of the IFM and its members and that they all, in one way or another, were influenced by it and took inspiration from it. The IFM passed this on by asking attention for Central Eastern Europe in its actions and publications. In its contacts with and valuation of the opposition in the neighbouring countries the IFM was one of the most active in the GDR opposition. Above all it has played an important role in spreading ideas and methods that before 1986 had largely been unused in the GDR and starting a new kind of oppositional activity on the basis of ideas of human rights that were far too liberal for a large part of the leftwing opposition in Berlin.
69 Chapter three - Possible other incentives for human rights activism
It may be clear that the Central Eastern European opposition constituted an important source of inspiration both practically and idealistically for the IFM. As we have seen in chapter one however, human rights were not an entirely new issue in the GDR opposition although it definitely received a new impulse in in the mid eighties. One could therefore question if the Central Eastern European example was the only or most important factor in the turn to human rights opposition in the GDR in these years. To make this thesis more than a simple self- confirming story and to falsify the theory that Central Eastern European examples posed the decisive incentive to human rights activism in the GDR, it is important to see if there are possible other reasons, apart from the oppositional practice in the neighbouring countries, that could have played a role in this process. Several possible other incentives for taking up the human rights issue can be thought of. The most important of these is the CSCE process that led to the Helsinki Final Act and the ensuing follow-up conferences. Another important, typical GDR issue that raised the awareness of the importance of human rights was the Ausreise issue, which had been recognised as a human right in Helsinki’s third basket and in the UN human rights covenants. This raises the question whether other GDR-typical features and developments in the oppositional sphere itself could have been an important contribution to the discovery of this issue. This could mean individual and collective experiences with repression and GDR society in general, but also the possible influence of domestic philosophers: if Havel why not Havemann, if Benda, why not Bahro? This logically leads to the next question if and why Central Eastern European influence was more important than influences from the West, which had always played a very important role in the GDR opposition. Last but not least, influences further from beyond Central Eastern Europe are assessed: because also the emergence of Gorbachev - roughly around the same time as the IFM - could have played a role in the new issues in the GDR opposition.
The CSCE process The CSCE process was an important encouragement both to the regime and the opposition. It was celebrated as a victory for the Eastern bloc regimes, and played an important role both in the press and the Central Eastern European oppositional circles. Contrary to the opposition in the neighbouring countries the GDR opposition paid relatively little attention to the CSCE process. In the Prague Appeal of 1985 Charta 77 called ‘the demand that governments live up to the obligations they themselves have undertaken (…) a hitherto little utilized opportunity for the peace movement.’ In the answer formulated to this by East German opposition members this
70 was confirmed. They stressed the difficulty for the GDR peace movement to believe that Helsinki could really change something in a world dominated by block confrontation. Helsinki did not change the status quo. In the future however the use of the CSCE Final Act to keep to governments to their words should further be discovered as was done in Czechoslovakia. 276 This initial scepticism towards the use of the Helsinki Final Act was not uncommon for the East German opposition. The double meaning of Helsinki as confirmation of the status quo and reference for the opposition made it difficult to freely use all the opportunities it offered. Helsinki and its possibilities were being discussed, but the ambivalence towards it remained great. Practical use of it was almost only made by Antragsteller. Scepticism towards Helsinki also existed in several groups in Czechoslovakia and Poland, but others in these countries such as KOR and Charta did not hesitate to use it and put their hopes in it. The fact that the regime also used the Final Act in its propaganda even made this easier. 277 The hesitant attitude of the GDR opposition however changed in the mid eighties. As the human rights issue appeared on the East German oppositional stage, also Helsinki and the other human rights covenants were rediscovered. This was done by the signatories of the answer to the Prague Appeal, by the group of human rights activist around Hirsch and, after its establishment, by the IFM. The Letter to the participators of the XIIth world festival of youth in July 1985 and the open letter to the GDR government of September 1985 for example referred explicitly to several international treaties. So did the appeal to the UN peace year, as many other IFM documents such as the open letter to Honecker after the ‘airplane’ action of April 1987 and the declaration to human rights day the same year. It was mentioned in the Vorstellung in the Gethsemanekirche on the same day and in 1989 the IFM proposed it as a subject for ‘Frieden Konkret’, after which Gerd Poppe mentioned it in its lecture there. 278 Another important incentive to the Helsinki discussion was the international memorandum to the CSCE conference in Vienna. This initiative was discussed in working groups during Frieden Konkret and signed by several dozens of East German peace activists, the majority of them IFM members. The
276 Ji í Dienstbier, Eva Kant rková, Petruška Šustrová, ‘The Prague Challenge’, in: Havel, The anatomy of a reticence , 1-4, p. 2. ‘“… die KSZE-Schlußakte starker als Instrument nutzen …” Antwort aus der DDR-Opposition auf den Prager Appell vom 8. Juni 1985 (Auszug)’, in: Kuhrt, Opposition , 376-377, p. 376. U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel“, 284. 277 Domnitz, ‘Der Traum von Helsinki’, 76-81. ‘Wolfgang Templin, ‘On Petr Uhl’s Essay “Human Rights and Political Revolution”’, in: Bulletin of the European Network for East-West Dialogue (1987) Trail Number, 24-26’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 127. G. Poppe and H. Koschyk in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 149-150, 157, 180. 278 Sax, ‘East Germany’s Democratic Movement’, 14. Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 104. ‘An den Generalsekretär des ZK der SED Erich Honecker, Berlin, den 24.04.87’, RHG RG/B 001/01. ‘An den Minister für Nationale Verteidigung Heinz Keßler, Berlin 7.3.1989’, RHG KM 03. ‘Brief an die Teilnehmer der XII. Welfestspiele der Jugend und Studenten’, www.ddr-samisdat.de . ‘Erklärung der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte zum UNO- Tag der Menschenrechte (Grenzfall 11-12/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 144. ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Entwurf: Themenvorschlag für “Frieden Konkret 1989”, Berlin, d. 17.11.88’, RHG GP 006. G. Poppe, ‘Unser “gemeinsames”’, 559-560, 564.
71 continuing ambivalent attitude towards Helsinki is shown by the fact that the memorandum was not accepted by the congress as a whole. 279 The IFM went even further. After signing the document, it had a meeting in East Berlin with the American delegation to the CSCE congress in Vienna to which it handed over the paper. 280 For the IFM the Helsinki Final Act and other human rights covenants and declarations were important to stress the claims it made in the field of human rights. 281 It may be clear that to the IFM Helsinki Final Act and other international human rights standards were no unknown territory. Although scepticism towards Helsinki had existed in the GDR opposition, this had largely ceded around the time the human rights issue was taken up. Some of the most important incentives to look at Helsinki, such as the Prague Appeal, again came from Central Eastern Europe. On the other hand the human rights discussion had never entirely been silenced in the church and the peace movement and the revival of the issue interestingly coincides with a heightened interest in the issue due to the ten year anniversary of the Final Act. Such a wave of attention had however also existed during other CSCE events, such as influential follow-up conferences, and never led to the radical turn to human rights activism that was made in the mid eighties. 282 Therefore still occupation with Helsinki, which was indeed relatively important to the IFM, rather seems to be one thing more that can be attributed to influence from Central Eastern Europe than the outcome of a genuine East German occupation with the issue.
The Ausreise Issue As we have seen, the Helsinki Final Act was only used hesitantly and with considerable delay in the GDR. The Final Act was mainly used to give more legitimacy to the Ausreise issue. The GDR, a state made out of only half a nation, had, more than other communist countries, always faced an emigration problem. Before the building of the Wall in 1961 100.000s yearly fled to the West, which made emigration at the same time an oppositional safety valve and a political ‘Abstimmung mit den Füßen’. After August 1961 illegal emigration turned into an extremely risky undertaking which became more and more rare. Legal emigration through official application became more common, despite the fact that such an Ausreiseantrag could last for years and in the meantime Ausreiseantragsteller were highly discriminated by the regime. At the other hand emigration was
279 ‘Erstunterzeichner/innen des Memorandums ‘Das Helsinkiabkommen mit wirklichem Leben erfüllen’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 125. ‘Gerd Poppe an Georg Breuer, Berlin (DDR), d. 11.8.86’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 163. Neubert, Geschichte , 655. 280 ‘Der Tagesspiegel 14.10.87 “CDU/CSU-Abgeordnete”’, RHG BBo 57. Interview Poppe. 281 Ibidem. G. Poppe in: ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling”’, 148. 282 Interview Poppe. Neubert, Geschichte , 592. Ohse, ‘German Democratic Republic’, 78.
72 used by the regime through the Ausbürgerung of politically undesirable GDR citizens or the selling of political prisoners to the FRG. 283 The rejection of the freedom of travel and emigration was one of the human rights violations with which GDR society was confronted daily. It would therefore seem logical that this issue, which played such an important role in GDR reality, also contributed to the taking up of the human rights issue in the GDR opposition. This presumption is strengthened by the fact that the initial human rights seminar of 1985 was organised in cooperation with Reverend Hilse; someone who was very occupied with the Ausreise issue. 284 Besides that, the citizen initiatives of Riesa and Pirna formed the first example of an open, public kind of opposition that the IFM would advocate in the later eighties. Another favourable factor is that shortly before the taking up of human rights activism in 1985-1986 a huge emigration wave drew the attention to this issue again. Francesca Conti advocates the idea that the Ausreisewelle of 1984 made clear that those who wanted to stay should be more than an anti-missile movement, by paying attention to human rights. This was facilitated through the examples from Central Eastern Europe, but the incentive came from the GDR itself. 285 Also other authors, all former opposition members, acknowledge that the confrontation with this issue led to debates in the opposition and to the recognition of freedom of travel and the free choice of residence as human rights. 286 The difference with Conti is that in the case of these former opposition members a ‘but’ can be heard; a ‘but’ that appeares to be pretty strong. The Ausreisewelle of 1984 had not only once again shown the importance of human rights and of the Ausreise issue in particular, but had also affected the opposition in another way. The mass emigration of 1984 had not only shown its urgency, but also the effects for the opposition. As never before the opposition felt to have been weakened by the emigrating oppositional forces and potential. These negative effects overshadowed the human rights implications of the issue, and made the Ausreise problem controversial even to human rights groups Furthermore 1984 had had another effect than the regime hoped for: instead of getting rid of a large reservoir of Ausreisewilligen , the ‘success’ of 1984 only attracted more potential Ausreiser. 287
283 Ibidem, 133-135, 338-340. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 127. Dale, Popular Protest , 87. Michael J. Sodaro, ‘Limits to dissent in the GDR: fragmentation, cooptation, and repression’, in: Curry ed., Dissent , 82-116, pp. 84, 90. 284 Reverend Hilse is mentioned in relation to the seminar by: Conti, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca , 100. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 51. His occupation with Ausreisewilligen is highlighted in: Werner Hilse, ‘Die Flucht- und Ausreiseproblematik als innenpolitischer Konfliktstoff in der DDR und innerhalb der DDR-Opposition’, Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 1, 390-397. 285 Conti, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca , 100. 286 U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel“, 263-264. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 172. Neubert, Geschichte , 531. 287 Ibidem, 527, 300. Rink, ‘Ausreiser’, 54, 59. Günter Jeschonnek, ‘Die Selbstorganisation von Ausreiseantragstellern in den achtziger Jahren in der DDR’, in: Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen 1 , 397-405, p. 400.
73 The difficult relationship that most opposition members had with Ausreiseantragsteller was not only caused by this loss of potential. Even when Ausreisewilligen engaged themselves in oppositional groups they were mistrusted. It was widely known that political activity could considerably speed up the emigration process. Besides that they had nothing to lose, after having become a social outcast by applying for emigration in the first place. With the recklessness that could result from this situation they could harm the opposition. ‘In den oppositionellen Gruppen löste es zuweilen Bitterkeit aus, daß dieser Mut und klarer Haltung; der Mut zur Wahrheit bei vielen erst dann aufkam, wenn sie für sich die DDR abgehakt hatten,’ states Ulrike Poppe. In the opposition the accent lay on staying in the GDR to resist and reform the system. That was difficult to combine with the wishes of the Ausreisewilligen who had given up the hope that the GDR could be reformed and only wanted to get out. Especially as the Ausreise movement started to organise itself in the second half of 1987 and to overshadow the regular opposition, anxiety inside the opposition groups and the church grew. 288 Some authors tend to soften the contrast between the two groups. Helena Flam states that ‘those who stayed did not see these exits as a political but rather as a personal matter. They regretted them sadly, felt abandoned as persons, but did not attach any strong negative political meaning to them.’ This might have been true for the population in general, but not for the opposition, whom she speaks about. Neubert, who admits that the conflict existed, states that from 1987 on most oppositional groups worked together with Ausreisewilligen . Groups that virulently refused, such as the Umweltbibliothek, the Kirche von Unten and the Friedrichsfelder Friedenskreis , where exceptions. 289 In the oppositional milieu of Berlin however, these were some of the most prominent groups. Their outright refusal must have been the top of an iceberg. Indeed also the IFM was not entirely convinced of the good intentions of the Ausreiseantragsteller and the benefits of cooperation. The clear exception to this rule were Wolfgang and Lotte Templin, whose engagement for the rights of Ausreisewilligen and their attempts to mobilise the IFM on this issue are confirmed by many different authors. 290 In a reaction to an article of Petr Uhl, Templin rejected the taboo on the Ausreise question in the peace movement.291 However, also in the IFM the issue was not uncontroversial. The two ardent advocates Wolfgang and Lotte Templin could not prevent that also here the general trend in the peace movement was visible. Although the Templins tried to let the nascent movement of
288 U. Poppe, “Der Weg ist das Ziel“, 263-265. Carlo Jordan, ‘Akteure und Aktionen der Arche’, in: Jordan and Kloth ed., Arche Nova , 37-70, p. 50. Rink, ‘Ausreiser’, 59, 60, 68, 69, 72. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer”, 240. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 123. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 128-129. Interview Poppe. 289 Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 121. Neubert, Geschichte , 671-673. 290 Wolfram, ‘DDR-Opposition’, 38. Jordan, ‘Akteure und Aktionen’, 50. Neubert, Geschichte , 672. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 113. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 123. 291 ‘Templin, ‘On Petr Uhl’s Essay’, in: Bulletin , 24-26’, IISH Solidarnosc Nederland 127.
74 Ausreisewilligen become a part of the IFM and convince the IFM of the shared hardship of the Ausreiseantragsteller and the opposition, this was rejected by the other members. Just as the other opposition groups in Berlin they decided that the Ausreisewilligen should build their own organisation. As this new group, the Arbeitsgruppe Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht , decided to join in the annual Luxemburg-Liebknecht demonstration the IFM, just like all the other Berlin groups, decided not to participate. After the demonstration the IFM distanced itself from the group and explicitly stated that it did not form a sub-group of the IFM.292 The fact that this explicit rejection was necessary however, suggests that among other opposition groups the idea that the Staatbürgerschaftsrecht group formed a part of the IFM could have existed. This is confirmed by the controversial article of Reinhard Schult after the 1988 events in which the Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht group was designated as a sub-sub group of the IFM. He however asserted that other IFM members did not agree with the actions of the Templins. The IFM, with its concern for human rights, was indeed among the larger Berlin opposition groups probably the one the most similar to and with the most sympathy for the Ausreisewilligen and one of the first ones to work with them. 293 The discussion about the issue inside the IFM was difficult. In other groups however, the issue was not discussed at all. Although it was not always wholeheartedly, the IFM had to admit that the right to travel, emigration and the free choice of residence belonged among the human rights they were fighting for. 294 Some authors tend to attach more meaning to this than the IFM probably did itself and speak of solidarity and cooperation with Ausreisewilligen .295 The difficulty of the situation regarding Antragsteller is being described by Joppke as follows: ‘Because political opposition was premised on rejecting the exit alternative, it was consequent not to make common cause with would be emigrants. But in doing so [the] IFM undermined its own claim of unconditional human rights advocacy, and implicitly sided with the regime that it so adamantly opposed.’ 296 In the longer run however more cooperation came into existence. For the IFM dealing with the wish for emigration was part of a learning process. Reverend Hilse, who led a group of Ausreisewilligen , told in 1994 how he once tried to discuss the issue with opposition groups. The first time he approached Bärbel Bohley she did not want to speak with Ausreiseantragsteller at all. After she came back from her involuntary exile in England she became more nuanced in her opinion. In an interview in October 1988 she stated: ‘Am Recht der Ausreise muß unbedingt
292 Wolfram, ‘DDR-Opposition’, 37-38. Jeschonnek, ‘Die Selbstorganisation’, 399. ‘Erklärung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte“, Berlin, den 19.1.1988’, RHG GP 004. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 121, 130. 293 Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 224. Jordan in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 300. 294 Torpey, Intellectuals , Socialism , 113. U. Poppe, ‘Der Weg ist das Ziel’, 263-264. U. Poppe, “Freiheit ist immer“, 240. U. Poppe in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 125. U. Poppe in: Lange ed., Wir bleiben hier! , 30. 295 Dale, Popular protest , 88. Neubert, Geschichte , 627. 296 Joppke, East German Dissidents , 202.
75 festgehalten werden. Die Würde und Entscheidungsfreiheit des Einzelnen steht am höchsten. Mit diesen Recht muß aber gekoppelt sein, dass die Leute wieder zurückkehren können (…) die Person gehört ja nicht dem Staat.’ Incidentally some attention was paid to the issue before 1989 and in the course of 1989 more and more actions were carried out in favour of Ausreisewilligen .297 The IFM’s main concern in relation to the travel issue however was not the right to travel West, which none of its members wanted, but the right to travel East, which was denied to all IFM members. This issue played a vital role in the whole opposition, but to the IFM in particular, since it attached great importance to contacts with Charta 77 and the Polish opposition. A large number of articles, declarations and actions, such as the ‘airplane action’, were dedicated to it. 298 This is confirmed again by Geisel’s questionnaire. In the list of factors that were important for the oppositional engagement of the questioned opposition members the wish to leave the GDR was labelled as unimportant by 91.3% of the respondents. The lack of freedom of travel in general in contrast was seen as an important factor by more than 80% of the respondents. 299 As Moritz rightfully notices, this issue was unimportant to the population at large since they had not lost their right to travel to the socialist East through undesirable behaviour. The failure to adopt the Ausreise issue prevented the opposition groups from overcoming their isolation from the population, according to Joppke. 300 Although the Ausreise issue was apparently not an important reason for the IFM to turn to human rights activism, it did become an important incentive to others. The Staatsburgerschaftsrecht group, established in the second half of 1987, was the first organised gathering of Ausreiseantragsteller . They referred to the CSCE Final Act and UN conventions to strengthen their case and fought for human rights. The difference with the regular opposition was, according to group founder Günter Jeschonnek, that the members of his groups ceased to believe that the establishment of human rights in the GDR was possible at all. 301 The Ausreisewilligen could have formed an incentive to human rights activism in the GDR; an incentive that however was not
297 Hilse, ‘Die Flucht- und Ausreiseproblematik’, 392. Bärbel Bohley in ‘Über das Nein hinaus. Aufrisse zwei, Oktober 1988’, RHG TK 009/01. Neubert, Geschichte , 627. ‘Mitglieder der Initiative für Frieden und Menschernerchte fordern die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung mit der Ausreiseproblematik und ihren Ursachen’, RHG RG/B 001/03. Fischer in: Findeis et al., Die Entzauberung , 103. ‘Rainer Eppelmann, Ralf Hirsch, An die Volkskammer der DDR, Berlin den 20.07.1986’ RHG GP 006. 298 Cf. ‘Nur Fliegen ist schöner’ and ‘Offener Brief zu Reiseverboten’ (Grenzfall 5/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 55-56. Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Reiseverboten sind in unserem Land kein Einzelfall’ (Grenzfall 9/87), ibidem, 103-104. ‘Eingabe an die SED’, RHG RG/B/001/1. ‘An den Vorsitzenden des Ministerrates der DDR Willy Stoph’, RHG KM 03. ‘Bärbel Bohley, an Generalstaatsanwalt der DDR, Berlin, den 13.10.85’, RHG UP 019. Other groups that were particularly occupied with the travel issue, because of their Central Eastern European contacts, were the Initative APPA and Netzwerk Arche cf. Carlo Jordan and Hans Michael Kloth ed., Arche Nova. Opposition in der DDR. Das “Grün-ökologische Netzwerk Arche” 1988-90. Mit den texten der ARCHE NOVA (Berlin 1995) 234, 267-269, 289, 428. 299 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 279-282. 300 Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 105. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 121. 301 Ibidem, 128. Jeschonnek, ‘Die Selbstorganisation’, 398, 401. Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 89.
76 picked up by the opposition at large. Through their wish to leave and lack of believe in change, they could not and did not form this opposition themselves. To others the occupation of those Ausreisewilligen which whom they did want to associate, might have worked more as another reason not to turn to human rights activism, than as an incentive to advocate human rights. 302 The Ausreise issue certainly drew attention to human rights, but it probably hampered the issue more than it helped. “Made in the GDR” Apart from the Ausreise issue, there are more issues in the GDR opposition itself that could have led to human rights opposition. ‘In der DDR ist die Menschenrechtsarbeit als eigener Bestandteil einer breiten, unabhängigen Friedensbewegung gewachsen,’ stated the IFM in its letter to Charta 77 to show that Charta 77 had not been the direct example to the IFM. Although chapter three has shown otherwise, still the importance of the influence of the independent peace movement in the GDR should not be underestimated. It forms the background against which East German human rights activism came into existence and without which it cannot be understood. 303 Indeed several authors place the taking up of the human rights issue in 1985 in the light of the decline of the peace movement after November 1983. New oppositional input was needed and found in the form of human rights activism. Rüddenklau describes how the founders of the IFM thought that the peace movement lost its resistance potential and looked to the opposition in Central Eastern Europe for a ‘grundsätzlichen Neuorientierung’. ‘After their failure to prevent a new round of nuclear rearmament in 1983/4 and in light of the obvious unwillingness of of the party state to enter into a “dialogue” with its opposition, East German peace activists looked for new modes and fields of activity’, which led to a turn to the East, is also the opinion of Joppke and other authors. This is confirmed by Gerd Poppe, who stated that in the mid eighties ‘die Raketen standen und Vielen haben sich dann irgendwie anderen Themen zugewandt. In der DDR war es natürlich nicht so, wir konnten nicht einfach sagen das ist nun vorbei jetzt ziehen wir uns in unsere Kämmerchen zurück, es gab jetzt sehr starke Orientierung auf Themen wie Menschenrechte, Umwelt, ja und Europa.’ 304 Also feelings of discontent with the way of working of the peace movement and the idea that one could not go one like this, led some to conclude
302 Olivo, Creating , 63. 303 ‘10 Jahre Charta 77 (Grenzfall 1/87)’, in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 25. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 172. 304 Rüddenklau, Störenfried, 51. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 100. Interview Poppe. Similar statements are made by: Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 73. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 92-93. Conti, Reppublica Democratica Tedesca , 100. Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 238-239. Olivo, Creating , 73. Marc-Dietrich Ohse, ‘German Democratic Republic’, in: Pollack and Wielgohs ed., Dissent , 73-93, p. 78.
77 that another way should be chosen. 305 The decline of the peace movement was indeed an important reason to look for a new kind of activism. All authors see it as nothing more however than the incentive to look at the examples from Central Eastern Europe. Not only the decline of the peace movement can be seen as an incentive for human rights activism. Fricke, whose standard work on the opposition in the GDR appeared as early as 1984, named Havemann as the example for civil rights initiatives in the seventies that, just like him, did not hesitate to publish their appeals with full names in the Western press. 306 These features that until now had been presumed to be typical for both the Central Eastern European opposition and the IFM, appear to have older roots in the GDR. Indeed Havemann played an influential role for IFM members, at least in their early days, as he has for the whole opposition, according to Torpey. Especially Gerd Poppe, who had been in contact with him, names him as an influential personality. 307 Geisel’s questionnaire however suggests that in the opposition at large Havemann was seen as signifantly less influential than Havel, Solzhenitsyn and - admittedly - Bahro. 308 Bahro and Havemann were above all, convinced socialists who were not very likely to develop ‘bourgeois’ ideas of civil society and liberal democratisation. To compare Havemann with Kuro , as Manfred Wilke does, means therefore forging links that are not there. 309 Although Havemann and his outright, open and self-confident way of opposition certainly might have influenced IFM members and their methods, it is unlikely that the human rights issue itself had been inspired by this socialism dissident. The lack of further references to him, compared to the bulk of references to Central Eastern Europe, leads to the conclusion however that the influence of Havemann on the establishment of the IFM was probably in no way decisive. The human rights issue however came to the GDR opposition in another, very direct way: ‘Bei einer Füller praktizierter Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die einzelnen am eigenen Leibe in wachsendem Maße zu spüren bekamen, wurde das neuralgische Thema Menschenrechte immer drängender,’ stated Templin and Weißhuhn in 1991. ‘Eventually, Stasi repression of peace activities transformed dissent into a question of civil rights’, concludes Konrad Jarausch and also Allen states that ‘the bitter experiences of the autonomous peace movement in being the object
305 Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 114. Winton Jackson, ‘The New Samizdat’, 16. 306 Fricke, Opposition und Widerstand , 211-212. 307 Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, 96. G. Poppe in: Findeis, et al., Die Entzauberung , 177. Interview Poppe. ‘Peter Grimm’. 308 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 245-252. 309 Neubert, ‘Der KSZE-Prozeß’, 301. Manfred Wilke, Der SED-Staat. Geschichte und Nachwirkungen (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna, 2006) 248.
78 of repression by the state were conducive to and a prerequisite for the initiation of concerted human rights activity in the GDR.’ They are confirmed in this opinion by more authors. 310 For several individual IFM members repression might have been the final incentive to turn to human rights activism. An example of such a case is Marianne Birthler who came into contact with the IFM throught the Arbeitskreis Solidarische Kirche . The limits that were put on opposition in the GDR led her to the issue of democratisation and human rights: ‘Die enge Grenzen der DDR führten schnell dazu, daß wir uns nicht nur auf unsere eigene Themen beschränkten, sondern schnell auch die Grenzen thematisierten, die uns von Polizei, Partei, Staat oder Lehrern gesetzt wurden.’ 311 Ulrike Poppe stated similarly in 1991: ‘By being incriminated and persecuted, we were pushed into a frontal opposition to the regime. This is how we discovered the issue of human rights. 312 Although this issue definitely played a role in the process of realisation of the importance of human rights, repression had been a constant feature of oppositional activity in the GDR during its whole existence and was equally endured by peace and environmental activists that never choose the human rights path. In Geisel’s questionnaire the confrontation with human rights violations in the GDR was seen as one of the most important factors that led to the oppositional behaviour together with the obvious militarization of society. This however apparently not always led to human rights activism.313 There are no signs that it played a role in the establishment of the IFM as a whole. In individual cases it might however have been the decisive incentive and the politicising potential of repression in general of course should not be underestimated. 314 A more coherent theory about how human rights activism was ‘made in the GDR’ is introduced by Timmer. His ideas entirely contradict those that stress the importance of reform communism in the GDR opposition. 315 According to Timmer theories of civil society have played an important role in the East German opposition in the eighties and were decisive in 1989. Also he sees 1985/1986 as an important year in the history of the opposition of the GDR. The difference with Central Eastern Europe is however, that the human rights issue was not constitutive for the opposition, but emerged in an existing oppositional milieu. Although 1985/1986 formed a thematic reorientation, it was no break in the development of the East
310 Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1991), 149. Jarausch, The Rusch , 37. Allen, Germany East , 134. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 94. Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 61. 311 Marianne Birthler, ‚“Wir hatten diese DDR satt!”’, in: Jesse, Eine Revolution , 63-72, p. 64. Marianne Birthler in: ‘Dokumentation. Begegnung tschechischer und deutscher Bürgerrechtler’, 253. Findeis, Pollock, Schilling, Die Entzaubering , 35. 312 U. Poppe in an interview with Joppke (9 July 1991) in: Joppke, East German Dissidents , 95. 313 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 279-281. This is also confirmed by Flam, Mosaic of Fear , 135. 314 Cf. Christian Halbrock, ‘Störfaktor Jugend. Die Anfänge der unabhängigen Umweltbewegung in der DDR’, in: Jordan and Kloth ed., Arche Nova , 13-32, p. 22. 315 Such as Geisel, Auf der Suche . And Joppke, East German Dissidents .
79 German opposition, ‘sondern nur der explizite Ausdruck der Tatsache, daß die Friedensbewegung in der Praxis von Beginn an eine zivilgesellschaftliche Opposition darstellte.’ In the early eighties however the opposition perceived itself as a movement that occupied itself with global crisis phenomena. Only after the mid eighties this changed to an occupation with GDR internal problems. This change in theme and outlook was according to Timmer caused by the repression of the state which made it necessary for ‘system-indifferent activists’ to occupy themselves with the problems of rights, freedom and democratisation. Timmer goes even further by stating that, although the Central Eastern European ideas were known in the GDR, they did not play a large role in this: ‘Vieles deutet darauf hin, daß die Entwicklung der DDR- Friedensbewegung einer eigenen, inneren Logik folgte und durch die Rezeption der osteuropäischen Theoretiker eher unterstützt als verursacht wurde.’ Central Eastern European ideas of civil society were important for the East German opposition, but the whole process was eventually entirely GDR intrinsic. 316 Timmer is definitely right in his interesting observation that the human rights issue did not constitute the beginning of opposition in the GDR. That is why East German human rights activism cannot be seen out of the context of the earlier peace movement: not without a reason the first human rights initiative was called Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte . Timmer however is too radical in his proclamation about the importance of theories of civil society in the GDR opposition during the eighties and the insignificance of reform socialism. Up until the decisive months of 1989 and 1990 reform socialism remained a striking feature of the East German opposition and indeed the crucial difference with - a large part of - the Polish and Czechoslovak opposition. Human rights activism along the lines of the opposition in these two countries however remained largely confined to some isolated groups such as the IFM and the Leipzig human rights groups that were often denounced in their actions and deeds by more socialist peace and environmental group such as - in Berlin - the Friedrichsfelder Friedenskreis , the Kirche von Unten and the Umweltbibliothek. Timmer too easily generalises the importance of those few human rights and civil society initiatives for the East German opposition. Probst is more nuanced: he confirms the existence of the beginnings of a human rights oriented opposition in the GDR in the mid eighties, but ‘trotzt dieser positiven Ansätze in einem kleinen Segment der Oppoaition kann man in der DDR von der Formierung einer breiten, demokratischen orientierten Bürgerrechtsbewegung, deren Programmatik vor allem auf die Durchsetzung der universellen Rechte der Menschenrechtscharta zielte, erst seit Mitte 1989 sprechen.’ In the same way Timmer hastily denies the role of the Central Eastern European opposition: although the texts were
316 Timmer, Vom Aufbruch, 50-63. cf. also Olivo, Creating , 61.
80 available in the GDR, the effect of the reception ‘ist letzlich nicht ekzakt zu beurteilen. Das gilt nicht zuletzt auch für den Einfluß, den Wolfgang Templin, Reinhard Weißhuhn oder Gerd Poppe in der IFM und Ludwig Mehlhorn im Arbeitskreis “Absage an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung” hatten.’ 317 Indeed, influence and reception can never be determined exactly, as has been stated before. If one however does not consider theories of civil society as characteristic for the East German opposition in general, but just for a few more radical groups, one suddenly sees that such groups, such as the IFM, have a concentration of people in it that are highly influenced by Central Eastern European ideas. Although the decline of the peace movement was an incentive to look for new kinds of activism and Havemann and especially experienced repression might have played an important role for certain individuals, without the influence of Central European ideas of human rights activism, this kind of oppositional activity would have had an entirely different face.
Contacts with the West It seems to be a paradox that the incentive for democratic-minded human rights opposition would have to come from the similarly dictatorial East, while the democratic West was so close to the GDR. Why did the IFM look to the East and not to the ‘other Germany’ that had already reached democracy and human rights? As has been stated before, the East German peace and environmental movements were unique in the Eastern Bloc due to the large influence of the West German single issue movements on the opposition in the GDR. ‘Situated at the borderline between East and West, East German dissidents had to be especially receptive to Western influence’, states Joppke. The peace and environment movements were indeed influenced by and partly modelled on their West German examples and the rebellious East German youth was also inspired by their counterparts in the West. 318 Contacts existed with the West German peace movement, especially until 1983. These were however held on a personal level out of fear for criminalisation. This was no superfluous measure. Because in the viewpoint of the MfS opposition could not be a result form GDR society itself, it had to be attributed to influences from abroad. 319 The contacts with the West German außerparlamentarische Opposition did not remain without effect. West German leftwing texts and theories were widely read. Critical opinions on capitalism and the political system of the FRG were imported and often accepted as one’s own. An anti-FRG attitude was
317 Timmer, Vom Aufbruch , 63. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 79. 318 Pollack, Politischer Protest, 101. Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 184. Halbrock, ‘Störfaktor Jugend’, 19. Knabe, ‘Opposition’, 159-160. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 71, 82. 319 Ibidem, 145-146. Conti, Reppublica Democratica Tedesca , 98. Rüddenklau , Störenfried , 36.
81 not uncommon in the oppositional scene of the GDR and amongst its intellectuals, not only thanks to the strategies of the SED but mostly to the contacts with critical groups in the West. According to Torpey this rejection of the FRG and its political system was one of the things that separated the opposition from the general population. 320 In West Germany a remarkably positive vision of the GDR existed in leftwing circles, which was secretly stimulated by the MfS. This sometimes caused communication problems with the GDR opposition, but also might have encouraged the positive appreciation of the GDR compared to the FRG in some opposition groups. 321 This positive stance towards the socialist East in a large part of the peace movement led to the break in END in 1984. The question whom one should speak with in Central Eastern Europe had been a fundamental question in the Western peace movement for years, something which was difficult to understand for many Central Eastern European opposition members who already knew the answer. For some groups, such as the Dutch church-bound peace groups IKV and Pax Christi, the dilemma was solved in favour of the Central Eastern European opposition after Martial Law was pronounced in Poland in 1981. They turned away from the idea that peace went above freedom and accepted Charta 77 ’s indivisibility of peace. Other groups remained fond of the saying ‘Better red then dead!’, which was incomprehensible to many east of the iron curtain. Especially the West German peace activists considered stability and disarmament as more important than human rights and contacts with the official GDR Friedensrat as more important than contacts with the opposition. 322 West Germany however, was the most logical Western partner for the East German opposition who needed the West to escape from its isolation. 323 Fortunately there were also West Germans that were prepared to help the East German opposition survive. The most important among them were the Grünen : a leftwing political party that, just like most leftwing groups in the GDR, had a pro-GDR faction and a number of IM among its ranks, but also some important sympathisers with the opposition. The most important among them was Petra Kelly who, after she became a Bundestag member, used her new privileges for provocative actions towards the SED and material help for the opposition. 324
320 Faktor, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition’, p. 30, 32-33. Probst, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen , 73. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 63, 142. Jesse, Eine Revolution , 268-270. Knabe, ‘Opposition’, 160. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism , 117. Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 954-955. Flam, Mosaic of fear , 101. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 31. 321 Neubert, Geschichte , 640. Knabe, ‘Opposition’, 157. De Graaf, Over de Muur , 188. Interview Poppe. 322 Havel, The anatomy of a reticence , 6-9, 22. Faber, De Invloed van Charta, 1-2, 4-5. Baudet, ‘Het heeft onze aandacht! ’, 178. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 78. De Graaf, Over de Muur , 135-136, 140-145, 195. 323 Ibidem, 188. 324 Ibidem, 142, 187. Rüddenklau, Störenfried , 36-37. G. Poppe, ‘Zur Entwicklung’, 209. Neubert, Geschichte , 638, 667. ‘Die Grünen und die DDR-Friedensbewegung’, in: http://www.jugendopposition.de/index.php?id=192 . Interview Poppe.
82 Contacts to other parties were more difficult to establish. The SPD was, with the exception of some of its members, more interested in contacts with the SED, which was highly criticised by East German opposition members. Some sporadic contacts existed with the CDU. Most West German political parties, except the Grünen were judged unfavourably by the East German opposition. 325 The contacts with the West were especially important because of the practical support. Without the help of members of the Grünen and exiled East German opposition members such as Roland Jahn and Jürgen Fuchs, significantly less would have been achieved. Without Western couriers and printing machines, the IFM and many other opposition groups could not have functioned as they did. Gerd Poppe is still greatfull for the foreign support: ‘wir bekamen Materialien davon, wir bekamen auch einfache Druckmaschinen. Wir bekamen sogar ein Kopiergerät, was noch völlig exotisch war für die damalige zeit in der DDR.’ 326 Also signs of solidarity from abroad were of the utmost importance in case of arrests: international attention contributed considerably to an early release. Jahn, Fuchs and others had good contacts to the Western press and thereby the public attention for the GDR opposition could be enlarged. Grenzfall had even been presented on the television; something by which it reached an entirely new public in the GDR as well. 327 According to Neubert, Jahn and Fuchs even tried to influence the content of the East German opposition by stressing the importance of human rights. 328 The influence this had on the IFM cannot be ascertained. The contacts the East German opposition maintained with the West, especially with West Germany, seemed to have brought benefits on a material level. On the theoretical level it rather appeared to have stimulated a SED-like view on human rights and the GDR than an appreciation of ‘Western’ human rights and democracy. There were however also other ways in which the West could have influenced a democratic-mindedness in the East German opposition and population. Detlef Pollack is an advocate of the idea that when the turn to human rights activism came in the mid eighties, the democratic ideas did not come from Central Eastern Europe, but had been present all the time in the GDR over the Western media. 329 Through the media, but also though personal contacts and the remaining feeling of cultural similarity, the influence of the
325 Ibidem, 639, 665-666. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 34. G. Poppe in ‘Podium “Der Prager Frühling“’, 149. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 164. De Graaf, Over de muur , 187, 247. 326 Conti, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca, 98. Bohley et al. ed., 40 Jahre DDR , 168. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 33. Bohley in ‘Von der Formierung’, 297. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 78. Interview Poppe. Templin and Weißhuhn, ‘Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte’ (1999), 177. 327 ibidem. De Graaf, Over de Muur , 192. Interview Poppe. Rüddenklau, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte’, 34. Kowalczuk, ‘Von “Aktuell”’, 38-39. G. Poppe in: “Das freie Wort”, 127. Neubert, Geschichte , 638. 328 Ibidem, 482. 329 Pollack, Politischer Protest , 101. cf. also Weißhuhn, ‘Menschenrechte’, 254-256.
83 FRG on East Germans remained great. 330 Almost 85% of the respondents in Geisel’s questionnaire saw Western television as important for their political engagement. Also personal contacts and the Western written press were important. They all ranged higher than the importance of contacts with former GDR citizens, leftwing movements and the Grünen - respectively 59.7, 60.7 and 42.3%.331 The East German opposition did not only receive an anti-capitalist, pro-GDR view through its oppositional contacts in the West, but through personal contacts, the Network for the East West Dialogue and the Western media also received a positive view on democracy and ‘bourgeois’ human rights. What influence did this have on the IFM? Was maybe its human rights activism not only stimulated from the East but also from the West? The IFM did have good personal contacts with the West. The existence of contacts with the West however does not have to presume actual influencing. Two kinds of influencing can be presumed here: anti-Western-capitalist and pro-Western-democratic. The former kind of influen- cing does not seem to have been typical for the IFM. Although according to Geisel anti-capitalist feelings were not absent inside the IFM, it was hardly anti-Western in its use of Western contacts and media. Also the IFM was not entirely free of fears for instrumentalisation by the West, but the CDU incident in 1987 shows that IFM members thought a lot more freely in this than many other opposition members in the GDR. 332 That distrust towards the West had existed in the IFM but was overcome in the end, is shown by a statement of Templin in 1999: ‘innerhalb der IFM setzte sich - relative spät, aber noch vor der Zusammenbruchsphase der DDR - die Einsicht durch, daß der Westen in Sachen Freiheitsrechte und Demokratie einen mindestens relativen Fortschritt bot und mit dem Verständnis einer oppositionellen Menschenrechtsgruppe das elementare Recht auf Freizügigkeit nicht einfach diskreditiert oder heruntergestuft werden konnte.’ 333 An interesting view is brought forward by Christian Domnitz, who states that the idea of the indivisibility of human rights did not come from the East but from the West, from Mient Jan Faber of the Dutch IKV. 334 Since this principle was one of the most important idealistic concepts taken over from Central Eastern Europe by the IFM, it would shed an entirely different light on the influence the IFM endured from the East. Faber himself however traces the peace and freedom issue back to Charta 77 . And also to Gerd Poppe it is very clear that the idea of the
330 Knabe, ‘Opposition’, 154-155. 331 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 272-274. 332 Geisel, Auf der Suche , 143. ‘Erklärung der Gruppe Gegenstimmen’, RHF BBo 57. 333 Templin, ‘Nicht nur’, 116. 334 Domnitz, ‘Der Traum’, 80.
84 indivisibility of human rights came from the East. 335 In one thing Domnitz is indeed right; on account of the important communication function organisations as END and the IKV had for the exchange of information between Eastern European countries in the perception of some oppositionists ‘Eastern’ ideas indeed could have come ‘from the West’. The IFM’s stance towards the West was ambivalent. While on the one hand the Western political and economical system was watched with caution and mistrust,336 on the other hand the one-sided policy of many peace groups was criticised and the possibilities of western publicity were used. 337 The IFM was not entirely free of the prejudices about the West that were widespread in the East German opposition. Seen to this ambivalence, it is unlikely that the incentive for human rights activism came from the West. This is confirmed by the marginal level of informing about Western issues in Grenzfall compared to the abundance of information about Central Eastern Europe. 338 A last important thing to notice is that although the IFM might have had a relatively ‘Western’ human rights conception, in many ways it went further than the ‘Western’ idea of human rights. The typically socialist idea of the indivisibility of human rights was for example not absent from the ideas of the IFM. 339 It is therefore more likely that the IFM received her main inspiration from Central Eastern Europe then from Western Europe, although international discussion possibilities, such as offered by END and the Network for the East West Dialogue, might also have played a role in spreading ideas of peace and human rights from the East and the West. Generally one could conclude that from the West came the material help without which the IFM could not have functioned as it did. From the East however came its inspiration, without which it would have become an entirely different opposition group.
Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika An important phenomenon, that appeared almost simultaneously with human rights opposition in the GDR and could therefore count as an incentive, was Michail Gorbachev who was elected secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party in March 1985. Although initially little change was noticed in the GDR, eventually his politics of glasnost and perestroika would make a huge impression on the people of the GDR who had become used to the idea that any change in their
335 Faber, De invloed van Charta , 1-4. Interview Poppe. 336 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. ‘Arbeiterkritik am wirtschaftlichen Ausverkauf’ (Grenzfall 3/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 41. A representative democracy along Western European lines was not the dream of the opposition in for example Czechoslovakia either: Timmer, Von Aufbruch , 45. 337 G. Poppe, ‘Die VI. END-Konferenz’ (Grenzfall 9/87), in: ibidem, 111-113. Weißhuhn in: Lüke, Die Initiative, 116. The ambivalence is very clear in the statements of Hirsch in: Bohley et al., 40 Jahre DDR , 168. 338 Besides the two abovementioned articles, there are a few articles more about Western of Western-related subjects, such as the END, the IMF and the visit of the CDU/CSU representatives. 339 Moritz, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition , 101. ‘Dokument III’, RHG GP 006. ‘Aufruf’, 202.
85 monolithic regime was impossible. More and more people started to hope again that reform was an option, because this time the incentive came from the ‘Big Brother’ in the East. The propaganda slogan ‘Von der Sowjetunion lernen, heißt siegen lernen’ suddenly acquired an entirely new taste. 340 Jander sees the politics of Gorbachev together with the examples from Central Eastern Europe as one of the catalysts for the establishment of the IFM. 341 Other than in Central Eastern Europe, where these attempts to reform the system ‘from above’ were often critically evaluated by the opposition, the opposition in the GDR was generally positive about Gorbachevs plans. 342 In Geisel’s questionnaire 97.1% of the questioned opposition members saw Gorbachev’s politics of perestroika as an important event of the eighties that influenced their oppositional behaviour. This was only surpassed with 2 percent by the Solidarno ć events - both percentages worthy Eastern bloc election results. Gorbachev’s ideas were spelled out in documents of the opposition and, according to Neubert, seen as a new way to legitimise oneself vis-à-vis the SED regime. 343 In Grenzfall several examples of this ‘Gorbi-mania’ in the East German opposition and population in general are mentioned, such as posters or banners with images or slogans of Gorbachev that could be found on the streets in Berlin. 344 One of the most important effects of Gorbachev to the opposition in general was that Gorbachev’s plans and the resistance to it by the SED regime made people more receptive to ideas of change and reform, that it bestowed a little bit more legitimacy on the claims of the opposition and that it opened up some space in society by weakening the repression. As Poppe formulates it: ‘Wir haben es nicht als neue Hoffnung für einen sozialistischen Modellversuch gesehen, aber als eine Möglichkeit dass dadurch Lockerung herbei zu führen war.’345 The references of the IFM and Grenzfall went beyond simple registrations of the mood of the population. Already the Appeal to the UN peace year of January 1985, one of the first IFM documents, referred to Gorbachev’s peace proposals as a ‘beachtenswerten Vorschlag’. According to Neubert, this was one of the first times the opposition referred explicitly to Gorbachev. 346 Also in later issues of Grenzfall IFM members commented on the secretary- general’s policy. Gorbachev’s attempts were generally reviewed positively and in most articles no
340 Schöne, Stabilität , 74. Werner Fischer, ‘Irritation bei der SED?’ (Grenzfall 2/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 28-29. Neubert, Geschichte , 635-636. 341 Jander, ‘Die besondere Rolle’, 939. 342 Ibidem, 719. Mehlhorn, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, 173. Geisel, Auf der Suche , 64-65. 343 Ibidem, 260-261. Neubert, Geschichte , 637. 344 György Dalos, ‘“Grenzfall”, “Umweltblätter”, und die anderen. Die DDR-Szene im Selbstbildnis ihrer Veröffentlichungen’, in: Kowalczuk, Freiheit , 320-331, p. 321-323. ‘Kampfdemonstration ohne Glasnost’(Grenzfall 5/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 54. ‘Keine Gorbatschowbilder’ (Grenzfall 5/87), in: ibidem, 55. ‘Die “Internationale“ hinter dem Reichstag’ (Grenzfall 6/87), in: ibidem, 64. Monika Haeger, “Die unbesiegbare Inschrift“, in: ibidem, 68. (Monika Hagen was IM of the MfS, known as IM Karin Lenz). 345 Pollack, Politischer Protest , 96. Maier, Dissolution , 121-122. Neubert, Geschichte , 637, 645. Mehlhorn, ‘Der politische Umbruch’, 1433. Ohse, ‘German Democratic Republic’, 82. Interview Poppe. 346 ‘Appell zum UNO-Jahr des Friedens’ (Grenzfall 1/86), in: ibidem, 1. Neubert, Geschichte , 636.
86 doubt about his good will exists. Criticism was mainly aimed at the reluctant attitude of the SED regime and the possibilities that lower officials in the USSR would fail to carry out the reforms. Articles even received cynical titles such as ‘Frühling in Moskau – im demokratischen Berlin weiterhin bewölkt’ or lyrically described the discovery of the word ‘Glasnost’ written on a wall. The sincerity of Gorbachev’s proposals was believed by Werner Fischer: ‘Nimmt man die Äußerungen Gorbatschows Ernst, und man sollte das tun, dann hat er sich Forderungen zu eigen gemacht, die von demokratisch gesinnten Menschen auch unseres Landes seit Jahren erhoben werden und deswegen sie deshalb (sic!) inhaftiert, ausgebürgert, totgeschwiegen oder mit anderen repressiven Methoden daran gehindert werden, ihre Forderungen nach einem demokratischen Sozialismus öffentlich zu vertreten.’347 In the interview with Jan Kavan a year later, Fischer contradicts alleged optimistic assertions of IFM members as Bohley and Weißhuhn that glasnost and perestroika were already being established in the GDR. According to Fischer glasnost and perestroika were not likely to be established from above any time soon, as long as the attempts to introduce it from below were being repressed by the regime. 348 The clearest reference to Gorbachev was however made in the letter the IFM wrote to him on occasion of his visit to the GDR in 1987. Also in this letter the IFM approves the policy of the secretary-general and compares it to ideas that existed before in the East German opposition. They warn against scepticism that sees these proposals only as a project of a small group at the top and state at the same time that reform ‘from above’ can only be successful with the help of an emancipation movement ‘from below’. Gorbachev is approached with offers of dialogue and good counsel. This letter was offered to the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, who according to the IFM accepted this letter consciously and without reservations. Reservations however were again to be found in the oppositional scene of Berlin in a reaction of the group Gegenstimmen .349 Although in this letter the IFM warns for scepticism, feelings of doubt were also not uncommon in the IFM itself. These feelings of doubt towards reform ‘from above’ appear later in 1987, when the first feelings of euphoria probably had passed. In the Grenzfall of September that year a large article is published with Michnik’s nuanced but not altogether cheering opinion
347 Fischer, ‘Irritation bei der SED?’ (Grenzfall 2/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 28-29. ‘!!!...durch nichts zu ersetzen’ (Grenzfall 3/87), in: ibidem, 39. ‘Neues im Osten’ (Grenzfall 3/87), in: ibidem, 41-42. ‘Frühling in Moskau – im demokratischen Berlin weiterhin bewölkt’ (Grenzfall 5-87), in: ibidem, 59. Haeger, “Die unbesiegbare Inschrift“ (Grenzfall 6/87), in: ibidem, 68. The fact that Haeger was IM (see footnote 17) seems to be unimportant in this case, since no apparent advantage for the MfS in publishing this text can be discovered. ‘Aufruf der Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Berlin 11. März 1989’. 348 Kavan, ‘Hidden opposition’, 65. 349 ‘Brief an Gorbatschow’ (Grenzfall 6/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 66-67. ‘Brief an Gorbatschow in de SU-Botschaft übergeben’ (Grenzfall 6/87), in: ibidem, 67-68. Knud Wollenberger, ‘Petze, Petze ging zur Botschaft’, 97-98. Wollenberger was IM of the MfS.
87 about Gorbachev and his reception in Poland. 350 Later that year, in the Vorstellung at human rights day the IFM not only spoke out reservations towards the Western parliamentary system; ‘Andererseits stehen wir auch Reformen von oben skeptisch gegenüber, werden sie doch das System einer alles umfassenden Verstaatlichung nicht abschaffen, sondern allenfalls im Interesse größerer Effizienz perfektionieren.’ 351 Also in later interviews and articles published in the West, IFM members uttered their doubt about Gorbachev’s policy. Wolfgang Templin for example wrote in 1989 that a few years ago scepticism about Gorbachev had been widespread. This had now made place for euphoria, which blurred the eye for the importance of the Central Eastern European emancipation movements, which he obviously valued higher. In this time of changing systems in the Eastern bloc, he stated that the GDR needed democratisation as wel, but: ‘Keines ihrer Nachbarländer kann ihr dazu ein Modell liefern, weder der polnische noch der ungarische Weg sind realistisch, und auch ein deutscher Gorbatschow gehört ins Reich der Träume.’ 352 Also in the article in the Tageszeitung of August 1987 the author stated about the redaction of samizdat publications as Grenzfall and Umweltblätter : ‘Auf Glasnost von oben wollen sie nicht warten und praktizieren deshalb ihre eigene Glasnost von unten.’ 353 Sceptic attitudes toward Gorbachev were also shown by Gerd Poppe and Bärbel Bohley after 1989. The truth of these assertions for the time before the Wende are however difficult to determine. 354 Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika had positive and negative effects for the IFM. Its ambivalent attitude towards it is therefore no surprise. On the one hand Gorbachev’s proposals favourably changed the people’s consciousness. It definitely helped the IFM in some way. Sung- Wan Choi states that the discussion about democratisation in the GDR in 1986 was still only a topic in the IFM circle itself. From 1987 on however, it gained momentum in wider circles in the GDR, thanks to Gorbachev. Joppke states that glasnost and perestroika made the oppositional turn to the East more attractive and enabled the opposition to face the regime with new claims. 355 On the other hand Gorbachev favoured a very specific kind of democratisation from above. According to Templin and Neubert the introduction of Gorbachev’s reform policy over- shadowed the issues were the discussion should really be about: ‘Die Konzepte zur Veränderung durch politischen Druck über die Öffentlichkeit wurden seit dem Auftreten von Gorbatschow in der UdSSR von der Frage überlagert, wie der Anschluss an die Reformbewegung in der UdSSR zu gewinnen sei.’ 356 Gorbachev was therefore only an ambivalent help to the introduction of the
350 Michnik, ‘Der große Gegenreformator’ (Grenzfall 9/87), in: Hirsch and Kopelew, Grenzfall , 104-106. 351 ‘Vorstellung der Initiative “Frieden und Menschenrechte”’, viii. Neubert, Geschichte , 723. 352 Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 59, 65. 353 ‘Karla Trux, “Wir sind kein Untergrundblatt“, taz 08-09-1987’, RHG BBo 057. 354 G. Poppe in: ‘Von der Formierung’, 288. Bohley in: Schöne, Stabilität , 77. 355 Choi, Von der Dissidenz , 80-81. Pollack, Politischer Protest , 96. Joppke, East German Dissidents , 100. 356 Templin, ‘Zivile Gesellschaft’, 59. Neubert, Geschichte , 729 (quote).
88 human rights issue and democratisation in general to the opposition in the GDR and was definitely not the initial spark.
Conclusion The inspiration from Central Eastern Europe is not the only possibile incentive to human rights activism in the GDR, althought the contacts to and similarity between the IFM and the opposition groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia were great. The Helsinki Final Act for example, that was so important in Central Eastern Europe, was also important for the IFM. Since however in the larger peace movements this document was largly ignored as an instrument of Ausreisewilligen only, this again seems to have been something that was rather taken from the Central Eastern European example than an independent incentive. The Ausreise issue itself was highly controversial in the opposition movement. Also the IFM could not escape from this milieu. Althought some of the Antragsteller and individual IFM members tried to agendise the issue as a human rights problem, it was not entirely accepted as a field of action by the IFM and definitely did not form the initial reason to turn to human rights. Also several other GDR-internal issues could have played a role in the awakening of human rights opposition. One of these that was the decline of the peace movement. This caused several oppositionists to look further towards human rights activism and Central Eastern European examples. Also the experiences with repression played an important role, although mainly on the individual level. On this level for some the philosopher Havemann might still have been important, but the influence of this convinced Marxist that died in 1982 should not be oversetimated. The same way as contacts existed with the East, also contacts with the West existed. Instead of stimulating a pro-democratic view on ‘liberal’ human rights, these contacts however mainly encouraged an anti-capitalist view of the FRG. Only the Western media gave a wider view. To the IFM contacts with the West were indispensible to continue their work as they did and to keep contact with the East. It however hardly seems to have formed an inspirational source. Last but not least also the appearance of Gorbachev almost simultaneously with the human rights issue strikes the eye. Gorbachev’s proposals caused great enthusiasm in the East German population, in contrast to Central Eastern Europe. In the IFM enthusiasm could be found al well, but also scepticism. Although Gorbachev favourably changed the mood of the people, on the other hand it distracted from what was really inportant and put every card on the, by the IFM mistrusted, reforms from above. Gorbachev was closely monitored but probably no initial incentive to human rights opposition.
89 The Central Eastern European example still appears to have been the most important reason for the IFM to take up human rights activism. On the other hand also other factors, such as the decline of the peace movement and experiences of repression might have played a role in the decision that is was time to imitate the opposition in the neighbouring countries. While the attitude to other factors, such as Helsinki, the Ausreise issue, Gorbachev and the West remained ambivalent, they all played a more or less important role in the actual practical human rights work of the IFM.
90 Conclusion
The opposition in the GDR was remarkably different from that in its neighbouring countries. Due to the GDR’s peculiar condition as a Cold War border state which shared a language and a nationality with an ideologically adverse state, it had no national or historical framework to fall back upon and a continued emigration problem. To deal with this the SED regime had developed a self-conception encompassing a strict form of socialism and a myth of antifascism which did not remain without effect on the opposition. Consequently, the GDR opposition was more socialist-oriented, regime-friendly and anti-Western than the opposition in its neighbouring countries. It had crystallised around the peace issue which was one of the favourite subjects of both the Western one issue movements and the propaganda of the East German regime. This in contrast to the opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia which had chosen human rights as major issue: a topic with a lot more political implications that was much more difficult to contain by the regime. Human rights were no easy issue in the Eastern bloc. Since the mid seventies the countries east of the iron curtain had obliged themselves to more and more international human rights standards, but that did not change the fact that they rather spoke about social and economical rights and the right to peace than about the ‘Western’ freedom rights. The GDR regime might have used human rights to come back on their favourite propaganda issue of peace, in the opposition the development worked the other way. In the mid eighties, with considerable delay compared to Poland and Czechoslovakia, out of the peace movement human rights activism emerged. In 1986 the Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte came into existence in East Berlin as the first explicit and outspoken human rights opposition group. Because it resembled the already existing opposition groups in Czechoslovakia and Poland both in topic and methods, influence from Central Eastern Europe on its establishment is often readily assumed. To what extend however, was the turn to human rights activism, exemplified by its first prominent example, the IFM, really influenced by examples of Central Eastern Europe? Contacts between opposition groups in Central Eastern Europe experienced an upswing from the seventies on. Travelling between the GDR and Poland and Czechoslovakia became easier and a lot of personal contacts were established. In the GDR the interest in the neighbouring countries in the opposition was stimulated by major oppositional events such as the Prague Spring and the emergence of Solidarno ć . Between the Polish and Czechoslovak oppositions contacts were even to a large degree institutionalised. In the eighties, travelling
91 became impossible to most opposition members in the GDR and the maintenance of contacts became more difficult. The meaning of these contacts however increased. This was especially the case for the IFM. In this group oppositionists such as Wolfgang Templin, Gerd Poppe and Reinhard Weißhuhn had a large interest in what happened in the oppositional scene in the other countries east of the iron curtain. The personal contacts these persons had maintained since the seventies were institutionalised through the IFM: magazines, information, and solidarity were exchanged and the groups cooperated by issuing declarations together and, if possible, even visiting each other. Because direct contact was hardly possible these links were largely maintained with the help of Western couriers and contacts. That contacts existed is easy to establish. The immeasurable concept of influence is however more difficult to proof. This is even hampered further by the fact that conflicting statements exist about the actual influence of Central Eastern Europe on the IFM. After 1989 many former IFM members assert to have been heavily influenced by examples from Central Eastern Europe in their oppositional behaviour and they even state that the IFM was explicitly modelled on Charta 77 . Before 1989 however, only the inspiration received from Central Eastern Europe was admitted. Every allegation of direct influence or copying was virulently denied. This can, as Gerd Poppe stated, be attributed to the wish to avoid further criminalisation by the regime. It however also necessitates a further look into the daily practise and the idealistic principles of the IFM. A closer look at the beginnings of the IFM shows clear similarities with the organisational structure of Charta 77 : three spokespersons, numbered documents, no formal membership and signing with full name and address. The IFM moreover often refers to Poland and Czechoslovakia and adhere to the same principle of legality. Other similar principles can be found such as the indivisibility of peace and human rights and the dedication to democratisation, openness and the creation of a second, independent layer in society. Also Central Eastern European philosophers had a large influence in the IFM and the opposition in general. More difficult are some other principles that are often attributed to the Central Eastern European opposition such as the rejection of utopian and socialist thought and the self- conception as opposition. In the GDR utopianism and socialism were still abundant in the opposition, which usually did not perceive itself as such. Several authors presume that the IFM constituted the exception in this, due to its contacts with Central Eastern Europe. A closer look at the IFM however shows that generalisations like this cannot be made. Utopian thought was rejected by many in the IFM, after the example of Havel, but some still on occasion resorted to this term. Socialist reformism and the oppositional self-conception were even more controversial
92 issues about which no consensus existed and which differed from person to person. The only conclusion that can be made is that those who do fit in the vision of the IFM as exceptional case in these issues, are those with the closest contacts to the East. Since however the IFM consisted of several remarkable individuals with their own strong opinions and actions, these personal differences are no surprise. It however needs mentioning that pluralism and lack of consensus on these issues was also not uncommon in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The close contacts the IFM maintained with Central Eastern Europe, the clear organisational resemblance with Charta 77 and the similarities in principles and conceptions between the opposition in Poland and Czechoslovakia and the IFM or some of its members suggest that the establishment and workings of the IFM and thereby the first turn to human rights activism was considerably influenced by the examples in its neighbouring countries. An interesting test-case is the Initiative APPA in which the other important contact person with the Central Eastern European opposition in East Berlin, Ludwig Mehlhorn, was active. This group certainly took over some aspects of the Central Eastern European opposition such as the topics they addressed and the samizdat they created. Other things, such as the adherence to socialism and the rejection of the use of Western media, were strikingly GDR-typical. To falsify this thesis also other possible influences have been assessed such as the CSCE process, the Ausreise and other GDR internal issues, possible influence from the West and the reform proposals of Gorbachev. The CSCE process which had formed one of the most important incentives to human rights activism in Poland and Czechoslovakia received little attention in the GDR at first. The IFM did make use of it, ten years after the beginning of the process, but was stimulated to do so by the Prague Appeal of Charta 77 . The Helsinki Final Act and human rights activism in general were before mainly taken up by the ever growing group of Ausreisewilligen . This however probably did not influence others in the opposition to turn to human rights issues. Ausreise was assessed critically in the opposition due to the difference in goal and the fear of criminalisation by the cooperation with Ausreisern. The IFM recognised Ausreise as a human right, but with the exception of the Templins, kept just as far from the Ausreise issue as the opposition in general. The use of the human rights issues by the Ausreisewilligen made have done more to defame the topic than to promote it. Other developments in the GDR opposition might have contributed more to the turn to human rights opposition. The decline of the peace movement and disagreement with its workings created the space for other issues, which led to the copying of the Central Eastern European-style of human rights activism. Also the experience of human rights violation and the strictness of the GDR regime might have been the final incentive to turn to human rights activism for individual
93 IFM members. Others might have found inspiration in Havemann for their openly oppositional self-conception. He is however less likely to have contributed to the choice of the topic. Besides contacts with the East also good contacts with the West existed. The contacts with the Western peace movement however rather stimulated a socialist reformist anti-FRG attitude that valued the peace issue more than human rights activism. The IFM was ambivalent in its assessment of the West and its political system. It was however clear in its appreciation of the parts of the Western peace movement that had a positive attitude towards the Eastern European opposition movements, which helped the IFM with material, continued media attention and the maintenance of contacts with the West and the East. Through these organisations ideas about human rights and democratisation from the East and the West might have spread. This was more readily accepted than the new incentive from the East. Gorbachev’s ideas were welcomed in the GDR. The IFM however also here remained ambivalent: Gorbachev certainly made more possible, but also overshadowed the issues that were truly important. It can therefore be concluded that the most important influence on the emergence of human rights activism in the GDR in the form of the IFM was the example from Central Eastern Europe. The space and acceptance for this issue however had been created by the decline of the peace movement and the continuing human rights violations the oppositionists themselves had been subjected to. Above all this influencing and the ensuing developing human rights activism in the GDR had been impossible without good contacts with and help from the West who have been indispensable for the contacts between East and the East and the development of the IFM.
94 Literature
‘Chartists / East German Independents Call For Nuclear-Free Europe’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 1 (1985) winter/spring, 12. ‘Declaration on Conscientious Objection, proposed by the group “Peace and Human Rights” of the GDR and adopted unanimously by the seminar’, East European Reporter 2 (1986-1987) no. 4, 13. ‘DDR-Gutachten über das Oppositionsblatt “Grenzfall”’, Deutschland Archiv 26 (1993) no. 5, 624- 632. ‘East - East contacts here to stay’, East European Reporter 3 (1987-1988), no. 3, 59-60. ‘Freedom and Peace: Declaration of Principles’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 2 (1986) spring, 2-5. ‘Hungarian Appeal’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 3 (1987) spring, 1-2. Adams, Tenley, ‘Charter 77 and the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR). The struggle for human rights in Czechoslovakia and Poland’, East European Quarterly 26 afl. 2 (1992) 219- 238. Allen, Bruce, Germany East, Dissent and Opposition (Québec 1991). Baudet, Floribert, ‘Het heeft onze aandacht.’ Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972-1989 (Amsterdam 2001). Bernhard, Michael H., The origins of Democratisation in Poland. Workers, Intellectuals and Oppositional Politics 1976-1980 (New York 1993). Bohley, Bärbel et al. ed., 40 Jahre DDR …und die Bürger melden sich zu Wort (Berlin (W), Frankfurt 1989). Brunner, Georg, ‘Menschenrechte im Kommunismus: Ideologischer Anspruch – politische Waffe – reale Situation’, in: Rudolf Uertz ed., Menschenrechte in Ost und West (Mainz 1989) 105-127. Buckingham, Susan, ‘Freedom to think differently… A report on the latest crackdown on GDR independents’, East European Reporter 3 (1987-1988) 2, 55-57. Bugajski, Janusz and Maxine Pollack, East European Fault Lines. Dissent, Opposition, and Social Activism (Boulder, etc 1989). Choi, Sung-Wan, Von der Dissidenz zur Opposition. Die politisch alternativen Gruppen in der DDR von 1978 bis 1989 (Cologne 1989). Conti, Francesca, Repubblica Democratica Tedesca. Dissenso e opposizione negli anni ottanta (Cosenza 2001). Curry, Jane Leftwich ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York 1983).
95 Dale, Gareth, Popular Protest in East Germany 1945-1989 (London, New York 2005). Deppe, Rainer, Helmut Dubiel and Ulrich Rodel ed., Demokratischer Umbruch in Osteuropa (Frankfurt 1991). Deutscher Bundestag ed., Deutschlandpolitik, Innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen. Materialien der Enquete Kommission „Aufarbeitung und Folgen der SED- Diktatur in Deutschland“ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages). Band V 1 & 2 (Baden- Baden etc. 1995). Deutscher Bundestag ed., Möglichkeiten und Formen abweichenden und widerständigen Verhaltens und oppositionellen Handelns, die friedliche Revolution im Herbst 1989, die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und Fortwirken von Strukturen und Mechanismen der Dikatur. Materialien der Enquete Kommission „Aufarbeitung und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland“ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages). Band VII 1 & 2 (Baden-Baden etc. 1995). Eckert, Rainer, ‘Das Programm einer demokratischen Revolution. Debatten der DDR- Opposition in den radix-Blättern 1987-1989’, Deutschland Archiv 32 (1999) no. 5, 733-779. Edition Deutschland Archiv, Die DDR im vierzigsten Jahr. Geschichte, Situation, Perspektiven. Zweiundzwanzigste Tagung zum Stand der DDR-Forschung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 16. bis 19. Mai 1989 (Cologne 1989). Edwards, Geoffrey, ‘Human rights and Basket III issues: areas of change and continuity’, International Affairs 61 (1985) no. 4, 631-642. Faber, Mient Jan, De Invloed van Charta op IKV & Pax Christi. Lezing door Mient Jan Faber ter gelegenheid van de uitreiking van de Erasmusprijs aan Vaclav Havel (The Hague 1986). Faktor, Jan, ‘Intellektuelle Opposition und alternative Kultur in der DDR’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 44 (1994) B 10/94, 30-37. Falk, Barbara J., The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe. Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings (Budapest 2003). Fehr, Helmut, ‘Die Macht der Symbole. Osteuropäische Einwirkungen auf den revolutionären Umbruch in der DDR’, in: Konrad H. Jarausch and Martin Sabrow ed., Weg in den Untergang Der innere Zerfall der DDR (Göttingen 1999) 213-238. Fehr, Helmut, Unabhängige Öffentlichkeit und soziale Bewegungen. Fallstudien über Bürgerbewegungen in Polen und der DDR (Opladen 1996). Findeis, Hagen, Detlef Pollack and Manuel Schilling ed., Die Entzauberung des Politischen. Was ist aus den politisch alternativen Gruppen der DDR geworden? Interviews mit ehemaligen führende Vertretern (Leipzig 1994). Flam, Helena, Mosaic of Fear. Poland and East Germany before 1989 (Boulder, New York 1998).
96 Fricke, Karl Wilhelm, Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR. Ein politischer Report (Cologne 1984). Gehrke, Bernd, ‘Die 68-er Proteste in der DDR’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 58 (2008) B 14- 15/2008, 40-46. Geisel, Christof, Auf der Suche nach einem dritten Weg. Das politische Selbstverständnis der DDR- Opposition in den 80er Jahren (Berlin 2005). Graaf, Beatrice de, Over de Muur . De DDR, de Nederlandse kerken en de vredesbeweging (Amsterdam 2004). Grimm, Peter, ‘Erfolgloses Drehbuch. Die Aktion “Falle” und ihr Scheitern. Ein Zeitzeugenbericht’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Dikatur 16 (2007) no. 2, 56-57. Gutzeit, Martin, ‘Der Weg in die Opposition. Über das Selbstverständnis und die Rolle der “Opposition” im Herbst 1989 in der ehemaligen DDR’, in: Walter Euchner ed., Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich (Göttingen 1993) 84-114. Haufe, Gerda and Karl Brückmeier ed., Die Bürgerbewegungen in der DDR und in den ostdeutschen Ländern (Opladen 1993). Havel, Václav, The anatomy of a reticence: Eastern European dissidents and the peace movement in the West (Stockholm 1985). Henke, Klaus-Dietmar, Peter Steinback and Johannes Tuchel, Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 1999). Hirsch, Ralf and Lew Kopelew, Grenzfall. Vollständiger Nachdruck aller in der DDR erschienenen Ausgaben (1986/ 1987). Erstes unabhängiges Periodikum (Berlin 1989). Jander, Martin, Formierung und Krise der DDR-Opposition. Die “Initiative für unabhängige Gewerkschaften” - Dissidenten zwischen Demokratie und Romantik (Berlin 1996). Jarausch, Konrad H., The Rush to Geman Unity (New York, Oxford 1994). Joppke, Christian, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989. Social Movement in a Leninist Regime (New York 1995). Jordan, Carlo and Hans Michael Kloth ed., Arche Nova. Opposition in der DDR. Das “Grün- ökologische Netzwerk Arche“ 1988-90. Mit den texten der ARCHE NOVA (Berlin 1995). Jesse, Eckhard ed., Eine Revolution und ihre Folgen. 14 Bürgerrechtler ziehen Bilanz (Berlin 2000). KAMA, ‘Unlock the Borders. Interview with GDR activist’, East European Reporter 1 (1985) no. 3, 20-22, p. 20. Kavan, Jan, ‘Hidden opposition of the GDR’, East European Reporter 3 (1987-1988) no. 3, 65-68. Kerski, Basil, Andrzej Kotula and Kazimierz Wóycicki ed., Zwangsverordnete Freundschaft? Die Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und Polen 1949-1990 (Osnabrück 2003).
97 Kowalczuk, Ilko-Sascha ed., Freiheit und Öffentlichkeit. Politischer Samisdat in der DDR 1985-1989 (Berlin 2002). Kroh, Ferdinand ed., “Freiheit ist immer Freiheit…” Die Andersdenkenden in der DDR (Frankfurt, Berlin (W) 1989). Kuhrt, Eberhard et al. ed., Opposition in der DDR von den 70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft (Opladen 1999). Lange, Karin ed., Wir bleiben hier! Das politische Vermächtnis von Oppositionsgruppen und der Bürgerbewegung in der DDR (Berlin 1997). Leo, Annette, ‘Kulturelle Gegenwelt und schützendes Dach. Kirche als Ort des Widerstandes in der DDR’, in: Wolfgang Benz ed., Selbstbehauptung und Opposition. Kirche als Ort des Widerstandes gegen staatliche Diktatur (Berlin 2003). Liebermann, Doris, Jürgen Fuchs and Vlasta Wallat ed., Dissidenten, Präsidenten und Gemüsehändler. Tschechische und ostdeutsche Dissidenten 1968-1998 (Essen 1998). Lüke, Dorothee, Die Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte - Erste unabhängige Oppositionsgruppe in der DDR 1985-1989/90 ( Magisterarbeit , Humboldt Universität zu Berlin 2000). Lutz, Annabelle, Dissidenten und Bürgerbewegung. Ein Vergleich zwischen DDR und Tschechoslowakei (Frankfurt, New York, 1999). Maier, Charles, Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton 1999 2 nd revised edition). Mehlhorn, Ludwig, ‘Berlin-Warschau’, in: Hubertus Knabe ed., Aufbruch in eine andere DDR. Reformer und Oppositionelle zur Zukunft ihres Landes (Reinbeck bei Hamburg 1989) 171-177. Miedema, Christie, De geometrie voorbij. De ontwikkeling van paralelle structuren in Polen en Tsjechoslowakije in theorie en praktijk 1968-1989 (master thesis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2007). Moritz, Torsten, Gruppen der DDR-Opposition in Ost-Berlin – gestern und heute. Eine Analyse der Entwicklung ausgewählter Ost-Berliner Oppositionsgruppen vor und nach 1989 (Berlin 2000). Moritz, Torsten, ‘Vom Ostdeutschen “Versuch in der Wahrheit zu leben”. DDR- Oppositionsgruppen als Beispiel “alternativloser” Zivilcourage’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur 11 (2000) no. 2, 20-25. Neubert, Erhart, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989 (Bonn 1997). Neubert, Erhart and Bernd Eisenfeld ed., Macht - Ohnmacht - Gegenmacht. Grundfragen zur politischer Gegnerschaft in der DDR (Bremen 2001).
98 Olivo, Christiane, Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany. The Case of the Citizen Movements and Alliance 90 (New York etc. 2001). Olschowsky, Burkhard, Einvernehmen und Konflikt. Das Verhältnis zwischen der DDR und der Volksrepublik Polen 1980-1989 (Osnabrück 2005). Pollack, Detlef, Politischer Protest. Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR (Opladen 2000). Pollack, Detlef and Dieter Rink ed., Zwischen Verweigerung und Opposition. Politischer Protest in der DDR 1970-1989 (Frankfurt, New York 1997). Pollack, Detlef and Jan Wielgohs ed., Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe. Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition (Aldershot, Burlington 2004). Poppe, Eberhard, Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte in der Gegenwart. Vortrag und Diskussionsbeiträge in der Sitzung der Klasse Gesellschaftswissenschaften I der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR am 7. Dezember 1978 (Berlin (E) 1979). Poppe, Ulrike, ‘Das kritische Potential der Gruppen in Kirche und Gesellschaft (1988)’, in: Detlef Pollack ed., Die Legitimität der Freiheit. Politisch alternative Gruppen in der DDR unter dem Dach der Kirche (Frankfurt 1990) 63-97. Poppe, Ulrike, ‘“Freiheit ist immer die Freiheit der Andersdenkenden.” Opposition und Protest in der DDR’, in: Franz-Josef Hutter and Carsten Tessmer ed., Die Menschenrechte in Deutschland. Geschichte und Gegenwart (München 1997) 239-252. Poppe, Ulrike, Rainer Eckert and Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk ed., Zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anpassung. Formen des Widerstandes und der Opposition in der DDR (Berlin 1995). Probst, Lothar, Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegunge und Perspektiven der Demokratie (Cologne 1993). Rüddenklau, Wolfgang, ‘Außenpolitische Kontakte der DDR-Opposition’, Horch und Guck. Zeitschrift zur kritischen Aufarbeitung der SED-Dikatur 4 (1995) nr. 2, 31-34. Rüddenklau, Wolfgang, Störenfried. DDR-Opposition 1986-1989. Mit Texten aus den “Umweltblättern” (Berlin 1992, 2 nd revised edition). Sax, Boria, ‘East Germany’s Democratic Movement: “Human Rights GDR”’, Across Frontiers: for solidarity - east and west 2 (1986) spring,13-14. Schöne, Jens, Stabilität und Niedergang. Ost-Berlin im Jahr 1987 (Berlin, 2nd Edition 2007). Schwarz, Wolfgang, ‘DDR und ČSSR: Eine sozialistische Vernunftehe mit Beziehungskrise’, in: Walter Koschmal, Marek Nekula, Joachin Rogall ed., Deutsche und Tschechen. Geschichte – Kultur – Politik (München 2001) 408-417. Seydlowsky, Miriam, Die Verbindungen zwischen ostdeutscher und tschechoslowakischer Opposition in der 1980er Jahren. Die Beziehungen zwischen der “Initiative Frieden und
99 Menschenrechte” und der ‘Charta ‘77’ (Diplomarbeit ; Otto Suhr Institut Freie Universität zu Berlin 2007). Skilling, H. Gordon, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (London 1981). Skilling, H. Gordon, Samizdat and an independent society in Central and Eastern Europe (Hong Kong 1989). Smith, Rhona K.M. and Christien van den Anker, The Essentials of Human Rights (London 2005). Templin, Wolfgang and Reinhard Weißhuhn, ‘Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte. Die erste unabhängige DDR-Oppositionsgruppe’, in: Helmut Müller-Ensbergs, Marianne Schulz, Jan Wielgohs ed., Von der Illegalität ins Parlament (Berlin 1991) 148-156. Timmer, Karsten, Vom Aufbruch zum Umbruch. Die Bürgerbewegung in der DDR 1989 (Göttingen 2000). Torpey, John C., Intellectuals, Socialism and Dissent. The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis, London 1995). Veen, Hans Joachim et al. e.d., Lexikon Opposition und Widerstand in der SED-Diktatur (Berlin 2000). Weißhuhn, Reinhard, ‘Menschenrechte in der DDR’, in: Gabriele von Arnim et al. ed., Jahrbuch Menschenrechte 1999 (Frankfurt 2000) 247-260. Wilke, Manfred, Der SED-Staat. Geschichte und Nachwirkungen (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 2006). Winton Jackson, A., ‘The New Samizdat’, Across Frontiers 4 (1988) winter, 15-21. Wolfram, Klaus, ‘DDR-Opposition vor 1989’, in: Bernd Gehrke and Wolfgang Rüddenklau ed., …das war doch nicht unsere Alternative. DDR-Oppositionelle zehn Jahre nach der Wende (Münster 1999) 24-43. Wolle, Stefan, ‘Die DDR-Bevölkerung und der Prager Frühling’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 42 (1992) B 36/92, 35-45. Wolle, Stefan, ‘Die versäumte Revolte: Die DDR und das Jahr 1968’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 51 (2001) B 22-23/2001, 37-46. Wynton (sic!) Jackson, A., ‘GDR: Appeal on the occasion of UN Peace Year’, Eastern European Reporter 2 (1986-1987) no. 1, 60-61. Zariczny, Piotr, ‘Intellektuelle Oppositionelle in der DDR und in der Volksrepublik Polen. Ihre Gegenseitige Perzeption und Kontakte’, in: http://docserver.bis.uni- oldenburg.de/publikationen/bisverlag/unireden/2000/ur101/pdf/zaricn.pdf , 7-51. Archives International Institute for Social History (IISH) Stichting Informatieburo NSZZ Solidarno ć Nederland: 122-126 : Stukken betreffende de samenstelling van het memorandum ‘Giving real life to the Helsinki Accords’, 1985-1986,
100 127 : Stukken betreffende het ‘European Network for East-West Dialogue’ en het ‘Ost- West Forum’. 1986-1990, 162-165: Stukken betreffende de situatie in diverse landen: Duitse Demokratische Republiek (DDR), 1985-1989, 166 : Ingekomen brieven van Bärbel Bohley, 1988. Robert Havemann Gesellschaft (RHG) DDR-Opposition bis 1989: RG/ B 001/ 01 : IFM (1) April 1986 - März 1989, RG/ B 001/ 03 : IFM (3) Ohne Datum. SWV 04 : Menschenrechtsseminar Berlin-Friedrichsfelde, 1986. Grenzfall 1-12/88. Grenzfall 1-5/89. Estate Manfred ‘Ibrahim’ Böhme: MaB 40 : IFM 1985-1989. Personal archive Bärbel Bohley: BBo 56 : Verschiedene Unterlagen, DDR-Opposition (2) 1985- 1986, BBo 57 : Verschiedene Unterlagen, DDR-Opposition (3) 1987, BBo 129 : Osteuropa (1) 1978-1988, BBo 130 : Osteuropa (2) 1989-1995. Personal archive Gerd Poppe: GP 004 : DDR Friedens- und Oppositionsbewegung 1988-1989, GP 006 : IFM (1) 1986-1989, GP 18/ 1 : Osteuropa: Polen (1), 1981-1989, GP 18/ 2 : Osteuropa: Polen (2) 1985-1989, GP 021 : Osteuropa: CSSR (1) 1984-1987, GP 022 : Osteuropa: CSSR (2) 1988-1989. Personal archive Heiko Lietz: HL 207 : Samisdat (3) 1984, 1988, 1989. Personal archive Kathrin Menge: KM 03 : IFM 1989-1991. Personal archive Marianne Birthler: MBi 32 : Materialsammlung IFM 1989-1990. Personal archive Ralf Hirsch: RHi 01 : Korrespondenz 1986-1988, RHi 05 : Kontakte Osteuropa 1985-1989. Personal archive Reinhard Schult: RSch 21 : Menschenrechtsseminar 1986 1985-1987. Personal archive Ulrike Poppe: UP 019 : DDR-Opposition 1985-1989, UP 044 : Materialsammlung zur Menschenrechtsproblematik, UP 046 : Materialsammlung zu Osteuropa 1986-1988. Personal archive Wolfgang Templin: WT 02 : Korrespondenz 1988-1993, WT 07 : Menschenrechtsseminar 1985-1986, WT 12 : Osteuropa: Polen (2) 1987-1989, WT 13 : Osteuropa: CSSR 1983-1989. Samisdat in der DDR: PS 084/ 01-084/ 02 : Ostkreuz. TK 009/ 01 : Depesche (1989). Interviews Interview Carlo Jordan, 5 March 2008, Berlin. Interview Ludwig Mehlhorn, 11 March 2008, Berlin. Interview Gerd Poppe, 27 March 2008, Berlin.
101 Internetsites www.ddr-samisdat.de This website is a cooperative project of archives and institutions that have collected GDR samizdat and hereby made it available online. The cooperating organisations are the Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig e.V., the Robert-Havemann Gesellschaft e.V. , the Thüringer Archiv für Zeitgeschichte “Matthias Domaschk” , Zeitgeschichte(n) e.V. Halle , the Umweltbibliothek Großhennersdorf e.V , and the Martin-Luther-King-Zentrum für Gewalrtfreiheit und Zivilcourage e.V. – Archiv der Bürgerbeweging Südwestsachsens. www.jugendopposition.de This website is made by the Robert-Havemann Gesellschaft e.V. and the Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung . It gives a lot of information about opposition in the GDR through the years with additional picture material and interviews with eyewitnesses.
102