55 BEIWEEN THE SPOCIES made by Sandra Harding ( a non-establishment challenge seriously, and many still do not. feminist philosopher)? Profound transforma­ But many did, and quite a number of philoso­ tions have indeed occurred, however. Many of phers may be found today aIOOng the activist philosophy's traditional preoccupations membership of the environmental and antivivi­ still hold sway, but there is also a growing sectionist movements. awareness that philosophy cannot divorce itself from the real world. Thus, recent With some trepidation, but also not a decades have seen the rapid developnent of little smugness, I took on the mantle of fields of "applied philosophy, n such as busi­ . However, Singer's writings un­ ness ethics, environmental ethics, and medi­ settled me, and I soon saw that speciesism cal ethics. But of oucrse, it is not "philo­ was lUltenable. For whatever set of charac­ sophy"--sane abstract entity--that undergoes teristics one might single out that designate tunnoil and radical change but thethought and our species as deserving of full IOOral consi­ lives of individual philosophers. Like mine, deration, one can ask whether it would be for instance. Let me explain. rational to exclude members of another spe­ cies that shared all these characteristics In 1975, when published his (e.g., Martians) from equal consideration just because their physical appearance was book : ~ New Ethics for OUr Treatment of Animals, I was readily able to different. Clearly this would be absurd. dismiss its unorthodox and polemical thesis But I could not yet see that this kind of that "all animals are equal." Singer, who thinking, as well as the hierarchical view of coined the tenn "animal liberation, " also humans as superior to all else in natUre, to popularized another, "speciesism," which he which I still adhered, were indeed analogous defined as "a prejudice or attitude of bias to those specious and loathsome arguments toward the interests of members of one's own used to pranote racism and sexism. (I still species and against those of members of other disagree with Singer on some important species."[1] He claimed that speciesism is points, but at least I've seen the light on analogous to other founs of oppression, such this one.) as racism and sexism. To me, as to most other philosophers at the time, these ideas I carried on in the same vein for seve­ appeared wrongheaded in the extreme. They ral years, publishing papers, speaking at were misguided because of course everybCldy conferences, and serving as a consultant to knows· only humans matter, ethically speaking. various organizations on the subject of the Or so I thought. Animal suffering could and ethics of ani.mal experimentation. All this_ should concern us, because we can empathize activity culrnihated in the publication, early with animals, and we wish to avoid causing or last year, .ofmy book The Case for. Animal pennitting suffering because it is better to Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical bekfud than to be indifferent or cruel. But Perspective. But much happened to me after basically animals, like the rest of nature, that, and the book is now an- embarrassnlEmt to were' understood to have no intrinsic value, me, a work so foreign-sounding that when I only instrumental value, that is, use-value re-read it, it seems as though it must have or else value relative to the enjoyment or been written by someone else. enriclunent they bring to our lives. In spite of my arguments in'the boQk for It seemed easy to write off Singer's IOOre humane animal care and use, including an arguments, falling back on the comfortable appeal for better eduqation for scientists human-centered ethical tradition for conven­ and other animal handlers, tighter legisla­ ient counter-arguments. I was intrigued by tion governing research, and so on, I was the way in which Singer forced his readers to able to say the following: confront some of the IOOst fundamental ques­ tions of ethics and challenged their IOOst beings that are IOOre valuable because deeply-held convictions. One had to ask, for they have the attributes that identify example, What is it that makes something a them as f1J.ll members of the IOOral corrmun­ subject of :noral concern? What is a right? ity [Le. humans] may use less valuable What makes something a possessor of rights? species, which lack some or all of these Is the capacity to suffer the universal cri­ traits, as means to their ends, for the terion for IOOral considerability? Most phi­ simple reason that they have no obliga­ ~osophers, sa:3. to tell, did not take the tion not to do so. BETWEEN THE SPOCIFS 56

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I was able to conclude that "we have no duty begrudges in principle the humane and decent in the strict rooral sense to prevent animal sentiments he would apply in practice."[2] suffering. " Elsewhere I confidently asserted These did not really hit hane, however, until that a close friend of mine, a woman who is a radical feminist, made me confront the arbi­ natural objects and animals cannot have trariness of the patriarchal, hierarchical, value in themselves, though they can and human-centered ethical theory I had adopted do have value if conscious beings capable and defended for so long, and had lacked the of valuing can perceive and interact with courage to examine fully. Like Kant, I was them or if such beings ' lives can be "awakened frem my dogmatic slumbers," for rejuvenated or enriched by them in sane which my friend deserves the =edit. Natur­ way. • •• [V]alues and value judgments ally, this was quite a jolt, and many person­ arise and • • • talk of them makes sense al as well as philosopucal doubts rose up in only in relation to a being such as Hem:> me. I realized that I had had vague misgiv­ sapiens. ings about my arguments for sane time but that I had avoided any serious questioning of I now look at these arrogant remarks them. with dismay. How was it possible for someone of reasonable intelligence and sensitivity to For several roonths I mulled this over. hold theile views? There are a mUllber of I realized that I had to abandon the anthro­ explanatory factors: personal advantage, pocentric position I had taken. I had to social conditioning, and the way we are face the painful decision to completely re­ taught to do ethics are aroong them. Several vise a new book-length manuscript on environ­

kinds of reinforcement made it possible to mental ethics which was alroost two-thirds live with such a position as well, chief =nplete. I wrote one o~ two things renounc­ aroong them being the fatherly or fraternal ing my previous book which appeared in print. approval I sought and received frem members I did not foresee that thephenemenon of an of the scientific community. academic undergoing a change of mind and publicly acknowledging the fact was so rare Philosophers, by and large, are trained as to be newsworthy. But before long the

to do rooral philosophy as if they were posing media began to cover the "event, II and I felt as judges applying abstract principles to hard put not to have the whole matter turned concrete cases. It is things like consisten­ into a media circus. To attempt to explain cy, objectivity, disinterestedness, imparti­ myself to myself, and to other interested ality, and rules that are drummed into us. persons with whem I'd spent many hours dis-' Against this background, it is easy to get cussing animal research over the past few caught up in an abstract argument, an argu­ years, I fonnulated the position at which I ment for argument's sake; a certain roomentum have now arrived. A version of this follows. carries one along. But roorality is as much a matter of feeling and 8lOOtion as of reason and intellect. (For those who always knew Why Animal Experimentation this and practiced what they believed, my CANNOT Be Justified apologies for taking so long to master this simple point and for dismissing the people On any theory of roorality, a basic prin­ who are roost concerned about ciple is that we have an obligation to avoid as mere sentimentalists.) causing harm to others. Whether this is the roost fundamental moral principle may be de­ I continued on, after the book's appear­ bated, but it is about as important as any ance, basking in the warmth of the benefits that can be formulated. The harm-avoidance that scholarly publications bring to academ­ principle is scmetimes called "the principle ics, and in the general praise it received of nonmaleficence'." It applies straightfor­ frem the scientific community. Then rather wardly of course only on the condition that suddenly my ccmplacency was derailed. A the actual or possible recipients of harm are m.rrnber of critical reviews made me question innocent: it is wrong to harm (injure or my assumptions. One stated that my "philoso­ damage) those who are innocent of any wrong­ phical argument is superficial, dogmatic and doing, but not necessarily wrong to harm unconvincing," and went on to point out that those who seek to harm us. It therefore "Fox [offers] a curmudgeonly philosophy that states a prima facie obliqation.

57 BEl'WEEN THE SPOCIES Now why might it be thought that the singularly equipped to survive and dcminate. principle of nonmaleficence states our most All species have their strengths and weaknes­ fundamental moral obligation? sane litera­ ses, and none is inherently superior or in­ ture on the subject suggests that the reason ferior to any other. If we choose to cele­ is that in the scale of things, it is a more brate life, then how can we avoid affirming serious wrong to cause saneone to be worse the equal intrinsic value of all organisms? off than he/she would have been otherwise than it is simplyto fail to help him/her. Whether or not animals ' lives and exper­ The assumption here is that when one "merely iences have intrinsic value, however, does emits to perform a morally desirable act, not affect the central issue. For if we others are usually no worse off than they agree that their lives may be made either were before the emission--they have just lost better or worse by us, that they have a out on sane further benefits they might have welfare or wellbeing that may be injured by enjoyed had the action been perfoJ:med." [3] us, then few would disagree that we can harm animals and have an obligation to avoid doing Should the principle of nonmaleficence so. Furthermore, it may be argued (and hu­ be extended to animals? This question may be mane scientists would agree) that we have a met'with a question: can animals be harmed? more positive obligation toward them, namely, If they can be, then what reason could there to protect or prcmote their welfare. But we' be for not extending the principle to them? cannot carry out this obligation by first But clearly animals ~ be harmed. How can subjecting them to harmful acts. this best be understood? Charles Fried de­ fines "physical harm" as "an impingement upon Perhaps hanns are an inevitable part of the body which either causes pain or impairs life. In human society policies and deci­ functioning. " [4] Fried, being a legal philo­ sions seldan, if ever, benefit everyone sopher, recognizes that hanns ccmprise a equally. Sane group or groups always suffer broader category of wrongs, including, for a negative impact. Is it ever morally ac­ example, damage to one's reputation and simi­ ceptable or right to benefit fran the suffer­ lar intangibles. others, like , ings or disadvantages of others? I think we link hanns to having any sort of interest; feel intuitively that this is wrong. Yet anything that has at least one kind of inte­ most, if not all of us, do so benefit. rest, namely, an interest in its own welfare, Ideally, we would try to address this problem according to this theory, can be harmed. To by attempting to ccmpensate in' sane other way have an interest in this sense just means those who lose something when a . particular that the being in question is capable of social policy or decision goes into effect. faring well or faring ill, and to say that it Sanetimes this works, sometimes not. To the may be hanned is to say that actions of ours degree that it does not work, or we do not may cause it to fare ill in some significan try to make it work, we have an unjust socie­ way. [5] Many experience pain, and some suf­ ty. fer psychologically as well. When we inflict pain or suffering on animals, we harm them. In addition to the hanns that result But harm may also result when we confine or from the operation of social policies, there socially isolate them, deprive them of the are also the direct or indirect hanns we ability to behave in ways natural to their cause each other. Here it is more manifest species, or kill them. Are these lesser that ~, not some impersonal bureaucracy, are wrongs when the recipients of our harmful the agents of harm. For this reason, it is behavior are animals than when they are hu­ more obvious that, as a rule, we act wrongly mans? when we benefit fran the harm we cause. [6] Whether this kind of wrong can be mitigated Sane have argued that hanns caused to by ccmpensation, I am not sure, but let us animals are of little or no ethical concern. suppose, for the sake of argument, that it This is because they believe that animals' can be. lives and experiences are of no intrinsic value, or of lesser value than those of hu­ When we require animals to make sacri­ mans., But animals are living things, in many fices for us, what ccmpensation do we offer and essential respects very much like our­ them? None. So how can it ever be morally selves. They also possess unique character­ acceptable to benefit from their suffering? istics as much as we do. No species is When we perform cost/benefit analyses on

BE'IWEEN THE SPEX::IES 58

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animal research, if we consider the animals of animal experimentation in spite of the I

at all, our assessment is primarily in tenns rroral argument against it? Away to live I of the cost to them versus the benefits for with our consciences might be to do only us. Sanetirnes we consider the benefits for those experiments that are deemed rrost cru­ them as well, but generally we justify the cial, to rethink the entire range of ques­ research if the benefits for us outweigh, by tions concerning the "need" for animal exper­ some arbitrary, humancentered measure, the imentation, to seriously seek alternatives at costs to them. Nor do they have any say in every opportunity, and to ccmnit ourselves to the matter. a finn policy of phasing out animal research as rapidly as possible. What does it mean to seek a justifica­ tion for using animals as means to our ends? Another way might be to try to define To justify, in this context, is to show that the class of experiments (for which there are sc:mething which appears, prima facie, to be at present no alternatives to the use of wrong is not wrong, or at any rate is less animals) that might be I1Drally justified. A wrong than it seemed to beJ it is also (rrore tentative list of these is the following: importantly) to free ourselves frc:m blame or guilt. But if animals are capable of being 1. Experiments that cause no hann (e.g., hanned, are beings that have intrinsic value, those that are noninvasiveJ clinical and cannot be or are not compensated for the observations of nonnal and pathological banns we cause them, where is the justifica­ conditionsJ field studiesJ those that tion to come frc:m? I see no answer to this utilize alternatives to live animals). question. 2. Experiments that benefit the indivi­ Humans are currently the dc:minant spe­ dual experimental an.i.!nals. cies on earth and exercise a great deal of power and control over nature. But very few 3. Experiments in which animals wil­ believe might makes right, so the fact that lingly participate, where "willingly" we have greater power cannot enter into a does not mean that some trivial "reward" justification of our use and treatment of is offered to a previously deprived animals. Rather, where other beings are animal (e.g., ape language learningJ under our power, we should feel obligated to dolphin training). show self-restraint and to act out of mercy and canpassion. 4. Experiments where hann is caused but for which offsetting (canpensating) be­ We cannot avoid causing hann to other nefits are given to the subjects. beings in the process of living our own lives. Nor does rrorality consist in trying 5. Experiments that benefit other ani­ to be perfect and pure. But we can adopt an mals of the same or different species. orientation toward minimizing the arrount of harm we cause and taking full responsibility 6. Experiments that are life-saving, and for it, seeing it for what it is. where widespread loss of human life is threatened directly by animals (e.g., as To justify animal experimentation is to disease carriers). start at one end of a continuum. Much of what we do will be rrorally acceptable (in our (Classes 4 through 6, however, strike me as eyes), and we will chip away at the extremity doubtful candidates.) where what we do shades into cruelty. I no longer believe that a general rroral justifi­ *** cation of animal experimentation can be given. Suppose, then, that we begin at the This is as far as I have gotten to the

opposite end of the continuum. No animal present time. The task before me now is to experiments can be rrorally justified~ We act see whether the position I've arrived at wrongly when we do them. Does this mean that stands up to criticism and to explore its we should all became antivivisectionists or implications. For one thing, I have trouble abolitionists? Yes. with the idea that humans are always in the wrong insofar as what they do adversely af­ What if we refuse to forego the benefits fects the lives or welfare of other organ­

59 BE.'IWEEN THE SPOCIES isms. Albert Schweitzer, who spent consider­ to ask ourselves which beings affected by our able time trying to develop a "reverence for actions matter ethically and take their wel­ life ethic," maintained that humans are al­ fare into account as IlUlch as our own. What ways "guilty" with respect to their actions bothers me about the way scientists look at that have a negative impact of any kind on the ethics of animal exPerimentation is that nature or parts of nature. But he acknow­ they generally asslU1le that using other spe­ ledged that we do these things (or some of cies for research is justified if the bene­ them at any rate) out of "tragic necessity," fits to humans (and/or animals) "outweigh" as when we kill things in order to feed and the harms caused to the animals exPerimented clothe ourselves. For him, "Reverence for - continued to p. 75 ­ life is an inexorable creditor!" These ideas remind me too much of the destructive myth of SOCIEI'Y FOR THE STUDY "Original Sin," fram which we can never find OF ETHICS AND ANIMALS expiation. But I understand the reason for Schweitzer's anguish nonetheless. Let me CALL FOR PAPERS hasten to point out that while Schweitzer wasn't IlUlch of a philosoIiJ,er, perhaps, he was for no fool. It is no answer to his concern to point out that after all., he was himself Pacific Division Meeting inconsistent in eradicating disease germs and in shooting predatory animals that threatened Portland, Oregon his jungle camps. For as he observed, one March, 1988 who commits these deeds "is conscious of acting on subjective grounds and arbitrarily, Papers on any topic impacting ethi­ and knOlV'S that he bears the responsibility cal issues concerning non-human animals for the life which is sacrificed."[7] are welcome. Possible topics include: The rroral (in)significance of being Humans differ fram other animals, it is natural (as opposed to domesticated or said, by virtue of having a conscience, and genetically engineered) hence by being able to assess their own be­ Are activities havior ethically. It is possible for us to consonant with an ethic? look at the whole of which we are part and Historical studies of conceptions of judge that our impact upon it is rrore harmful the rroral standing of animals. than not. But we are nevertheless part of the total picture, for the time being at Papers must be double-spaced and be least, and therefore have as much claim to ten to fifteen pages in length. Those exist and flourish as any other species. interested in submitting papers should Does this entail doing animal experiments? make their intention, along with an indi­ This is the second thing that troubles me. cation of the projected topic, known as For I knOlV' that much animal-based research soon as that is possible. Final papers, has been life-saving and life-enhancing for or substantive drafts, IlUlSt be received both humans and animals. And some would by September 15, 1987. argue that if we fail to do things that we know or reasonably believe would save lives Send statements of intent and papers or alleviate suffering, we would be causing to: harm by omission, and hence acting wrongly in this way. But perhaps the answer to our Prof. Steve F. Sapontzis dilermna is first to abandon the notion that DePartment of PhilosoIiJ,y animal experimentation is generally justifi­ california State University able rrorally, and then to examine each case Hayward, california 94542. on its own merits, being prePared to admit that we will sometimes act wrongly when we Those interested in chairing the decide to place our interests above those of session or in being cormnentators should members of other species. Thus we might contact Prof. Sapontzis by September 15. appeal routinely to a utilitarian form of the principle of nonmaleficence: that we "ought (Paper(s) and cormnents will be PUb­ not to act in a way which will do rrore harm lished in .) than good." [8] But in assessing this we have BEIWEEN THE SPECIES 60

~, .t .,Q ( - continued from p. 60 ­ FOX upon. The deeper question, raised earlier, THE EYE OF THE is never even asked: Is it ever rrorally acceptable for some beings to benefit from the harms they cause to other beings? WHALE Would biomedical and behavioral research cane to a halt if the above question were (dedicated to Paul Watson and the Sea Shefilerd) asked and the result were that animal experi­ mentation ceased? Probably not, but this is much too large an issue to get into here. However, suppose it did cease. The human I looked into the eye of the whale . species would doubtless continue to exist, and saw the person looking back at me, just as it did before animal experimentation and she said to me, began, with a d:iminished lifespan and quality "You are witness. of life, to be sure. Yet other institutions, You cannot now turn away, II fr01l1 which humans individually and collec­ Nor could I. tively have benefited--for example slavery-­ Cords of light-­ have bee!?- abandoned for rroral reasons. And cords of steel many rrore should be, for similar reasons, bind me to her such as the oppression of women, children, for all time the elderly, and marginal peoples, and the and wherever I am pursuit of "superiority" in nuclear weapons. and wherever she is. I am not arguing here that animal experimen­ They are my burden tation should be stopped, only pointing out and my joy. that the fact that stopping it would cause us much inconvenience and even misery is not the end of the matter. PAULETTE CALLEN

- continued to p. 80 ­ - continued from p. 74 ­ SAPONTZIS in rroral fililosofily that has already happened in biology: the evolution of our concept of ANIMALS. animals will merge with the evolution of our Do they matter? concept of humanity, and we will cane to An exciting new awareness is recognize that together we all form one liv­ unfolding about our relationship ing, rrorally significant and worthy corrmunity with animals and thE' rest of the natural world. Read aonul it in of interests on this planet. TIlE ANIMALS' AGENDA. BOOKS RECEIVED

Randall L. Eaton Zen and the Art of : A Personal --Search for EnVlronmental Values Reno: Carnivore Press, 1986 73p, epilogue $10.00 paper

Randall L. Eaton

~ Animals ~ ~ Teachers Reno: Carnivore Press, 1986 80p $10.00 paper o Here's 5:2 - Send me ;a sample copy and more information Jeremy Rifkin NAME _ Time Wars: The Primary Conflict in Human History STREET _ New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1987 210p, notes, selected bibliography,

ern" ~,.An: __ZlP _ index THE ANIMALS' AGENDA $18.95 ______P.U. Box 52:l4. Westp"n. cr cW,&il J L 75 BEIWEEN THE SPOCIES Given current international tensions, one may ultimately of empirical denonstration. Every. legitimately doubt our ability to think be­ finding of the science of·ecology reinforces yondlX)litical borders, much less biological our convron planetary destiny, and I have no ones. doubt that someday it will be CClIlllron know­ ledge that all species "are in this toge­ But I am concerned with lX)ssible accomp­ ther" • But it is a further step to get lishments, not just easy ones. It seems to humans to act for the convron good. I agree me that if Americans can be taught to think with Bellah et. al. that to do so we must of their duties to the 'Hider corrmunity of revive the submerged language of civic virtue which they are a part, and if their notion of --the republican tradition. Only with the com'llllility can be expanded to encompass our restoration of the public lX)lity can Ameri­ fragile planet's other inhabitants, basic and cans create a humane oommunity. radical changes will take place. The task is two-fold: to restore our sense of reslX)nsi­ bility for our common life, and to expand our Notes notion of the COIllllOn to include our fellow­ travelers on this blue-green ball. 1. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven The second step-expanding our notion of M. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individu­ oommllility--is a matter of education, and alism and Caumitment in American Life (Berke­ ley: University of California Press, 1985).

2. Ibid: 15-16.

THE CALF'S 3. Ibid: 16. PRAYER 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. REBECCA CHAPMAN 6. Ibid: 335.

Shall I be born unto this land Of majestic mountains and fruited plains? - continued from p. 75 ­ FOX '1'0 stand on eager, fragile limbs? To breathe the spirit of life? Finally, to be consistent, the argument that benefiting from harms caused to other Oh, Bother, you are warm beside me fu.imals is always wrong should be applied to And your milk flows sweetly. other parts of one's life, as much as lX)ssi­ ::: v/ould not stray, ble. This means giving up animals and animal But close to you, I learn our way. products for food, clothing, and so on, ex­ cept when it is absolutely essential to use Nay vIe frolic in the soft meadow them. It would also require an entire re­ Wf18re Sllil p:>urs forth ulX)n the grass? evaluation of one's relationship to nature. Together graze and linger? It means, in short, nothing less than the Taste of the clear brook? search for a whole new way of life. To avoid the negativisrn of b'1e vie\" that we are always Wf" gather with our kind in the wrong in our dealings with the envi­ Beneath the sheltering tree ronment, let this be thought of as learning And. as twilight scents the air to live in harmony with nature. Your loving comforts me.

Awaiting with bowed heads Notes 'Ehe dawning of tomorrow, In t...he dark we dream and pray: 1. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New Let not the hand of man take us away. York: Avon Books, 1975): 7.

- continued to p. 82 ­

BE'IWEEN 'THE SPEX:IES 80

; ; ty rather·than of inner peace. Injustice, disharrrony, waste and wanton destruction arise from hurran ignorance. It is the wisdom of enlightened self-interest that recognizes the importance of obe:lience to the Law that Bill Neidjie so vividly details for his peo­ ple who have lived for some 50,000 years in civilized harrrony with their environment.

As the lKung bushmen see it, we are all part of the same dream that is dreaming us (i.e., of the same creation). We destroy this dream when we do not live according to - continued from p. 80 ­ the Law. FOX 2. Jerrold Tannenbaum, Review of Mi­ '!be reality of dream-time is difficult chael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experi­ for non-native westerners to comprehend. Poet mentation, The Scientist 1 (oct 20, 1986) : Rainer Marie Rilke in the Duino Elegies comes 19, 22. close to it, referring to it as the invisi­ ble. He observes: 3. Robert E. Goodin, "Ethical Princi­

ples for Environmental Protection, II in Robert Transitoriness is everywhere plunging Elliot and Arron Gare, eds., Environmental into profound Being. Nature, the Philosophy (University Park: Pennsylvania things we move about am::mg and use are State UniversityPress, 1983): 15 (author's provisional and perishable; tut so long eIf\Phasis). as we are here, they are our possession and our friendship, sharers in our trou­ 4. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Carn­ ble and gladness, just as they have been bridge: Harvard University Press, 1978): the confidants of our ancestors. There­ 30. fore, not only must all that is here not be corrupted or degraded, tut, just 5. Tom Regan, The-- ---Case --for ---Animal because of that very provisionality they Rights (Berkeley: University of California share with us, all these appearances and Press, 1983). things should be comprehended by us in a most fervent understanding and trans­ 6. To deliberately cause harm to others formed. Transformed? Yes, for our task with no desire for personal gain is p.Jre is to stamp this provisional, perishing maliciousness and evil. To deliberately earth into ourselves so deeply, so pain­ cause harm with the sole intent of benefiting fully and passionately, that its being from another's suffering is using another as nay rise again "invisibly" in us. a mere means to one's own ends and is at least as evil. one can think of examples In other words, we must consciously where it is not wrong to benefit from an­ become part of the dream that is dreaming us other's suffering, but these would generally all, or at least obey the Law, even if we do have to do with self-defense or self-protec­ not apprehend its source and wisdom. This is tion. the path to world peace, the way of beauty, justice, humility, compassion and love. Lao 7. The quotations are from Albert Tzu called this quite simply, Tao. And the Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics (The Law of the Tao for all civilizations is to Philosophy of Civilization, Part III) , 2nd respect that the loving harrrony of hurranity ed., trans. C. T. Campion (London: A. & C. and Nature (symbolized in the embrace of yin Black, 1929): 260, 264, and ~ ~ and and yang) is the way of fulfillment for the Thought, trans. C. T. Campion (London: A. Y whole of creation-and for the "Dreamer of C. Black, 1933): 271. the dream that is dreaming us" everywhere. Notes 8. John Passmore, Man's ReSponsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western 1. In Kadaku Man (N.S.W. Australia: Traditions, 2nd 00. (London: Duckworth, Mybrood pIL, Inc., 1985). 1980): 84.

BErWEEN THE SPEX::IES 82

J Ai xt