Arendt and Macintyre on the Enlightenment's Failure
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												  Liberalism, Neutrality and the Politics of VirtueKoray Tütüncü Liberalism, neutrality and the politics of virtue Abstract The relationship between politics and virtue has been a controversial issue. Some significant scholars make a sharp distinction between what is political and what is not, but others underline the impossibility of separating politics from virtue. This article aims to re-consider the problem of virtue in terms of liberal politics. In doing so, it distinguishes three different arguments, namely the ‘inescapability of virtue’, ‘virtue lost’ and ‘reclamation of virtue’ arguments. The first argument underlines the impossibility of separating politics from virtue; the second shows the impossibility of virtuous politics in modern liberal politics; while the third criticises liberal neu- trality and individualism which undermines virtue politics. This article offers in their place a Rawlsian solution which centralises justice as the first virtue of a well-or- dered liberal society. It argues that, without negotiating fundamental rights and equal liberties, a Rawlsian solution transcends the limitations of liberal neutrality by articulating political virtuousness into liberalism. The result is that it concludes that liberal democracies would be politically virtuous without imposing any particular virtuous life conceptions. Keywords: virtue, liberal politics, good life, procedural and substantive neutrality, inequalities, justice, rights, perfectionism, freedoms, obligations, relativism, utili- tarian, Kantian, communitarian, individualism Introduction The relationship between politics and virtue has long been a controversial issue. Some significant political scholars make a sharp distinction between what is political and what is not, and consider morality and virtues as apolitical issues,1 while others underline the impossibility of separating politics from virtues, despite a unity of polit- ical and virtuous lives having been more apparent in ancient and medieval times.2 Some argue that modernity aims to separate politics not only from the religious but also from the virtuous.
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												  After Virtue Chapter GuideAfter Virtue After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre. Wikipedia has a very useful synopsis (permalink as accessed Dec 9 2008). Citations refer to the 1984 second edition, ISBN 0268006113. Chapter Summary A note and disclaimer about the chapter summary: This summary is intended only to supplement an actual reading of the text. It is not sufficient in and of itself to understand MacIntyre's theory without having read the book, and even having read it, this guide is not sufficient to understand it in its entirety. A necessary amount of detail and nuance was eliminated in order to create the guide. Its intended purpose is to aid in comprehension of this complex but profoundly significant work during and after the process of reading it. I would suggest reading the synopsis of each chapter after reading the chapter. The goal is to present the outline of MacIntyre's claims and arguments with only a minimal gloss on the justifying evidence at each point. Thus, hopefully, the guide should prove reasonably sufficient to help a reader retain the crucial parts of MacIntyre's argument, and the text can be returned to for a full justification. It is easy to get bogged down in this book, but just take your time. No portion of his argument can be fully understood without understanding the whole— nevertheless, certain chapters deserve particular attention: Chapters 1-5, 9, 14, and 15. Enjoy. —Ari Schulman ([email protected]), Dec 9 2008 Chapter 1. A Disquieting Suggestion MacIntyre imagines a world in which the natural sciences "suffer the effects of a catastrophe": the public turns against science and destroys scientific knowledge, but later recants and revives science (1).
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												  3 Reading Arendt's on Revolution After the Fall of the Wall3 READING ARENDT’S ON REVOLUTION AFTER THE FALL OF THE WALL Dick Howard* RESUMO – O artigo revisita a obra de Hannah ABSTRACT – The article revisits Hannah Arendt’s Arendt On Revolution e os eventos históricos da On Revolution and the historical events of the revolução americana, de forma a reformular os American revolution so as to recast what Arendt chamados “problemas da época”. Embora todo ator called “the age’s problems”. Although every político reivindique que as suas políticas sejam a political actor claims that its policies are the encarnação da vontade unida da nação em uma incarnation of the united will of the nation in a democracia, abre-se a porta da antipolítica na democracy, the door to antipolitics is opened if the medida em que a natureza simbólica – e portanto symbolic – and therefore contested – nature of the contestada – do povo soberano é reduzida à sua sovereign people is reduced to its temporary reality. realidade temporária. Tal é a lição crucial a ser That is the crucial lesson to be drawn still today extraída ainda hoje da obra The Origins of from The Origins of Totalitarianism, which can be Totalitarianism, que pode ser lida como uma read as an attempt to think the most extreme tentativa de pensar a expressão mais extrema da expression of antipolitics. antipolítica. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Antipolítica. Arendt. Demo- KEY WORDS – Antipolitics. Arendt. Democracy. cracia. Revolução. Revolution. Introduction: From where do you speak, comrade? Two decades after the fall of the Wall seemed to announce – by default, as an unexpected gift – the triumph of democracy, optimism appears at best naïve, at worst an ideological manipulation of the most cynical type.
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												  Prof. Dr. Dr. Jörg Monar Recteur/Rector 13 November 2019 OPENING CEREMONY ACADEMIC YEAR 2019-2020 Dear President of TheProf. Dr. Dr. Jörg Monar Recteur/Rector 13 November 2019 OPENING CEREMONY ACADEMIC YEAR 2019-2020 ALLOCUTION PROMOTION HANNAH ARENDT Dear President of the European Council, Dear President of the Administrative Council, Mijnheer de Gouverneur, Mijnheer de Burgermeester, Your Excellencies, Dear Friends and Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Students, One of the most well-known and often-cited concepts of political anthropology is Aristotle’s classification of the human being as a ζῷον πολιτικόν, as a “political animal” or perhaps better, “living being”, in his Πολιτικά written around 330 BC. According to him - who we can regard as the father of political science - it is only through man being part of a political community, the πόλις, that he can fully realise his nature and potential. The history of mankind has shown, and our world of today keeps showing, that this political dimension of our existence accounts for much of what we have been able to achieve as humans in terms of social, legal, scientific, economic, organisational and even the moral progress, well beyond the horizons of the Greek city-states which formed the basis of Aristotle’s analysis. Yet at the same time this political dimension has also all too often been a pathway to the abysses of human nature, to unrestrained barbarism and the infliction of boundless suffering by some on their fellow human beings. │Hannah Arendt – PATRONNE OF THE PROMOTION 2019-2020] 2 How can it happen, how can it be explained that what belongs to our essence, what accounts for so much of the positive potential of our living together, the political dimension of our existence, can turn into the large-scale destruction of values and lives, the generation of evils poisoning an entire generation or more? In 1933 a 26-year old, intellectually wide awake and strongly-willed young researcher, Hannah Arendt, was confronted with one of those turns of politics into hell, arguably one if not the most calamitous in history, the coming into power of the Nazi regime in Germany.
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												  A Critique of the Learning BrainA CRITIQUE OF THE LEARNING BRAIN JOAKIM OLSSON Department of Philosophy Master Thesis in Theoretical Philosophy (45 ECTS) Autumn 2020 Supervisor: Sharon Rider Examiner: Pauliina Remes Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 1.1 A Brief Overview ............................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Method, Structure and Delimitations ............................................................................... 4 2. BACKGROUND ON THE LEARNING BRAIN ............................................................. 8 2.1 The Learning Brain and Its Philosophical Foundation .................................................... 9 2.2 Cognitivism’s Three Steps: Mentalism, Mind-Brain Identity and Computer Analogy . 14 3. A CRITIQUE OF COGNITIVISM .................................................................................. 24 3.1 A Critique of Mentalism ................................................................................................ 24 3.1.1 The Exteriorization of the Mental ........................................................................... 25 3.1.2 The Intentionality of Mind Seen Through Intentional Action ................................ 32 3.2 A Critique of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory .............................................................. 54 3.3 A Critique of the Computer Analogy ............................................................................
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												  Reading Arendt's on Revolution After the Fall of the WallKeeping the Republic: Reading Arendt’s On Revolution after the Fall of the Wall Dick Howard Introduction: From where do you speak, comrade? Two decades after the fall of the Wall seemed to announce – by default, as an unexpected gift – the triumph of democracy, optimism appears at best naïve, at worst an ideological manipulation of the most cynical type. The hope was that the twin forms of modern anti-politics – the imaginary planned society and the equally imaginary invisible hand of the market place – would be replaced by the rule of the demos; citizens together would determine the values of the commonwealth. The reality was at first the ‘New World Order’ of George H.W. Bush; then the indecisive interregnum of the Clinton years; and now the crass take over of democratic rhetoric by the neo-conservatives of George W. Bush. ‘Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains,’ wrote Rousseau at the outset of The Social Contract; how this came about was less important, he continued, than what made it legitimate: that was what needed explanation. So it is today; what is it about democracy that makes it the greatest threat to its own existence? In this context, it is well to reread Hannah Arendt’s On Revolution, published in 1963. On returning recently to my old (1965) paperback edition, I was struck by the spare red and black design of the cover, which was not (as I thought for a moment) a subtle allusion to the conflict of communism and anarchism for the realization of ‘true’ democracy, but simply the backdrop against which the editor stressed these sentences: ‘With nuclear power at a stalemate, revolutions have become the principal political factor of our time.
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												  The Limits of Nonviolence in Arendt's 'Civil Disobedience'From Resistance to Revolution: The Limits of Nonviolence in Arendt’s ‘Civil Disobedience’ Caroline Ashcroft Queen Mary University of London [email protected] Abstract: Arendt’s work on civil disobedience sets out an optimistic portrayal of the possibilities of such forms of action in re-energizing the spirit of American politics in the late twentieth century. Civil disobedience should not simply be tolerated, she argued, but incorporated into the legal structure of the American political system. Her work is usually seen to promote an idea of civil disobedience that is thus bound to existing constitutional principles and essentially nonviolent. However, by looking at Arendt’s discussion and critique of various practices of civil disobedience in 1960s and 1970s America, specifically in relation to the nonviolence movement influenced by Martin Luther King, and on the other side, the more militant Black Power movement, a different idea of civil disobedience emerges. This paper argues that whilst, for Arendt, civil disobedience within America certainly possesses the constitutionally restorative potential she assigns to it, in a broader sense – theoretically, globally, and even in terms of alternative ideologies within America – her conception of civil disobedience is in itself neither necessarily constitutional, nor nonviolent. It is, instead, a form of revolutionary action, whose limits are set only by politics itself, and specifically, Arendt’s criterion of publicity. Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Civil Disobedience, America, Publicity, Martin Luther King, James Forman 1 From Resistance to Revolution: The Limits of Nonviolence in Arendt’s ‘Civil Disobedience’ 1. The Legitimacy of Civil Disobedience Hannah Arendt famously saw in civil disobedience a means by which to reenergize the American political system: to restore to it its original spirit through the political actions of the people.
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												  The Idea of a Communitarian MoralityThe Idea of a Communitarian Morality Philip Selznickt During the past few years, and especially since the publication of Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue in 1981, we have seen a renewed attack on the premises of liberalism.' There is nothing new about such criticism. A long list of writers-Hegel, Marx, Dewey, and many others, including several Popes-have recoiled in various ways from what seemed to be an impoverished morality and an inadequate understanding of human society. The contemporary criticism has raised some new issues and has been sparked, in no small degree, by a spate of impressive writing in legal, moral, and social philosophy-writing that has reaf- firmed the liberal faith in moral autonomy and in the imperatives of rationality. I refer, of course, to the work of John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin. The new critics are called communitarian, an echo of similar views expressed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by English liberals like John A. Hobson and L.T. Hobhouse, and American pragmatists, especially John Dewey. Yet the communitarian idea is vague; in contemporary writing it is more often alluded to and hinted at than explicated. Furthermore, there are communitarians on both left and right. The quest for a communitarian morality is a meeting ground for conservatives, socialists, anarchists, and more ambiguously, welfare liber- als. Serious issues of social policy are at stake. It seems important, there- fore, to explore what a communitarian morality may entail. For if we shoot these arrows of the spirit we should know, as best we can, where they will light.
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												  Theory, Totality, Critique: the Limits of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Marxism and ModernityStudies in 20th Century Literature Volume 16 Issue 1 Special Issue on Contemporary Spanish Article 11 Poetry: 1939-1990 1-1-1992 Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity Philip Goldstein University of Delaware Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl Part of the German Literature Commons, and the Modern Literature Commons This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. Recommended Citation Goldstein, Philip (1992) "Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity," Studies in 20th Century Literature: Vol. 16: Iss. 1, Article 11. https://doi.org/ 10.4148/2334-4415.1297 This Review Essay is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Studies in 20th Century Literature by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity Abstract Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity by Douglas Kellner. Keywords Frankfurt School, WWII, Critical Theory Marxism and Modernity, Post-modernism, society, theory, socio- historical perspective, Marxism, Marxist rhetoric, communism, communistic parties, totalization, totalizing approach This review essay is available in Studies in 20th Century Literature: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol16/iss1/11 Goldstein: Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Cr Review Essay Theory, Totality, Critique: The Limits of the Frankfurt School Philip Goldstein University of Delaware Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity.
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												  Arendt's Violence/Power Distinction and SARTRE's Violence/Counter-Violence Distinction: the Phenomenology of Violence in CoCHAPTER SIX ARENDT’S VIOLENCE/POWER DISTINCTION AND SARTRE’S VIOLENCE/COUNTER-VIOLENCE DISTINCTION: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN COLONIAL AND POST-ColonIAL CONTEXTS Kathryn T. Gines The theme of violence can be traced throughout Hannah Arendt’s major political writings such as The Human Condition and On Revolution where she draws connections between war, violence, and necessity (or libera- tion from necessity); The Origins of Totalitarianism where she examines Europe’s uses of violence in concentration camps, as well as massacre and imperialism in Africa; and, of course, On Violence where she condemns the violence of the Black Power movement and of anti-colonialism. The essay that follows will take as its starting point the violence/power dis- tinction and then the appropriate uses of violence versus non-violence as presented in Arendt’s On Violence. I argue that this distinction between violence and power is misapplied in Arendt’s critique of Jean-Paul Sar- tre and Frantz Fanon’s analyses of anti-colonial revolutionary violence in Algeria. Arendt wrongly interprets Sartre and Fanon’s analyses of violence and counter-violence in The Wretched of the Earth and Critique of Dialecti- cal Reason and her critique of violence proves to be unbalanced. On my view, she rejects their analyses because they argue for the use of violence by the oppressed to overcome the violent system of colonialism. I con- tend that it is because they argue for revolutionary violence (or counter- violence) against their oppressors that Sartre and Fanon are accused of glorifying violence for violence’s sake. In the concluding section of the essay, I briefly consider the possibil- ity that while Arendt’s critique of anti-colonial violence is misguided, her analysis might prove helpful when applied to the post-colonial context in which former anti-colonial leaders fighting for independence strike out violently against the people.
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												  The Critique of Real Abstraction: from the Critical Theory of Society to the Critique of Political Economy and Back AgainThe Critique of Real Abstraction: from the Critical Theory of Society to the Critique of Political Economy and Back Again Chris O’Kane John Jay, CUNY [email protected] There has been a renewed engagement with the idea of real abstraction in recent years. Scholars associated with the New Reading of Marx, such as Moishe Postone, Chris Arthur, Michael Heinrich, Patrick Murray, Riccardo Bellofiore and others,1 have employed the idea in their important reconstructions of Marx’s critique of political economy. Alberto Toscano, Endnotes, Jason W. Moore and others have utilized and extended these theorizations to concieve of race, gender, and nature as real abstractions. Both the New Reading and these new theories of real abstraction have provided invaluable work; the former in systematizing Marx’s inconsistent and unfinished theory of value as a theory of the abstract social domination of capital accumulation and reproduction; the latter in supplementing such a theory. Yet their exclusive focus on real abstraction in relation to the critique of political economy means that the critical marxian theories of real abstraction -- developed by Alfred Sohn- Rethel, Theodor W. Adorno and Henri Lefebvre -- have been mostly bypassed by the latter and have largely served as the object of trenchant criticism for their insufficient grasp of Marx’s theory of value by the former. Consequently these new readings and new theories of real abstraction elide important aspects of Sohn-Rethel, Adorno and Lefebvre’s critiques of real abstraction; which sought to develop Marx’s critique of political economy into objective-subjective critical theories of the reproduction of capitalist society.2 However, two recent works by 1 Moishe Postone’s interpretation of real abstraction will be discussed below.
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												  Arendt on the Crime of CrimesGeorgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2015 Arendt on the Crime of Crimes David Luban Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1473 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2588537 Ratio Juris (forthcoming) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons ARENDT ON THE CRIME OF CRIMES David Luban* [Forthcoming in Ratio Juris] Genocide is sometimes called the “crime of crimes,” but explaining what makes it the crime of crimes is no easy task.1 Hannah Arendt tried, but the claim of this paper is that she failed. The claim is simple, but the reasons cut deep. And I will argue that her failure has something to teach us about the difficulty of trying to find a stable position between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. I The Epilogue to Eichmann in Jerusalem offers Arendt’s analysis of the legal issues in the Eichmann trial. In light of the book’s reputation as an unsparing critique of the Eichmann trial, the most surprising feature of the Epilogue is that most of it (22 pages out of 27) mounts a spirited defense of the trial against critics of its legitimacy. Only in the final five pages does Arendt turn to “the failure of the Jerusalem court” in “not coming to grips with three fundamental issues…: the problem of impaired justice in the court of the victors; a valid definition of the ‘crime against humanity’; and a clear * University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center; Class of 1984 Distinguished Visitor in Ethics, Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, United States Naval Academy.