Ex-Post Project Evaluation 2015: Package I-5 (Mongolia, Nepal, Bhutan, Indonesia, Tajikistan)

September 2016

JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY ICNET CO.LTD.

EV JR

16-14

Disclaimer

This report compiles the result of the ex-post evaluations. These are conducted by external evaluators to ensure objectivity, and the views and recommendations herein do not necessarily reflect the official views and opinions of JICA. JICA is not responsible for the accuracy of English translation, and the Japanese version shall prevail in the event of any inconsistency with the English version.

Minor amendments may be made when the contents of this report is posted on JICA’s website.

Comments by JICA and/or the Borrower (including the Executing Agency) may be added at the end of the evaluation report when the views held by them differ from those of the external evaluator.

No part of this report may be copied or reprinted without the consent of JICA.

Mongolia FY2015 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project “The Project for Construction of Railway Fly-over in Ulaanbaatar City” External Evaluator: Yuko Kishino and Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited

0. Summary The purpose of this project is to build a new flyover (hereinafter referred to as the Narny Bridge) across the railway in Ulaanbaatar city, thereby making it convenient for road users of the Middle Ring Road going in the north-south direction, stimulating economic activities, and improving the access to social services. This project has been consistent with Mongolia’s development policies both at planning and the ex-post evaluation phase, while it was also consistent with Japan's Official Development Assistance policy at the planning phase and corresponded to the development needs of constructing an efficient road network in the city. Therefore its relevance is high. After the project completion, the Narny Bridge has been fully utilized, and the weight limit for vehicles in the north-south direction has been eased. This led to an increase in the transportation capacity. The existing Gurvaljin Bridge and the Peace Bridge has seen an easing of traffic. Traffic has become smoother. Thus the effectiveness and the impact are high. Both the project cost and project period were within the plan, so efficiency is high. Regarding the maintenance of the Narny Bridge, the Ulaanbaatar City Road Department conducts periodic inspection and repairs, while the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company1 conducts cleaning, daily inspections, and general maintenance work, such as pavement repairs. There is only one flyover besides the Narny Bridge in the city, requiring advanced maintenance technology. However, the Road Department has had little experience on planned operation and maintenance. The city’s tax revenue and funds for road and bridge construction and operation and maintenance (O&M) have increased dramatically, and are expected to be secured at a high and stable level. As such, there were no issues in the institutional and financial aspects, though there is room for improvement in the technical aspects. Therefore, sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

1 The former Ulaanbaatar city operation and maintenance management company. It was restructured in September of 2013.

1. Project Description

Project Location Ulaanbaatar’s flyover (Narny Bridge)

1.1 Background Mongolia, nestled between two great powers of China and Russia, is a landlocked country located in an important geopolitical position. Ulaanbaatar city serves as the center of the country's politics and economy, where its gross regional domestic product (GRDP) accounts for 54.5% of Mongolia's gross domestic product (GDP). In recent years, the city has experienced rapid urbanization, where the population doubled from 660,000 (1995)2 to 1,330,000 (2014)3. The progression of urbanization caused the society to transform into motorization, where the number of vehicle registrations increased from 42,5004 (2000) to 106,8485 (2008), surpassing 100,000 cars. With the rapidly increasing population and vehicles, road maintenance and traffic conditions continued to worsen. In particular, the railway, which has been the most important mode of international transportation, had been dividing the industrial zone of the south and the commercial zone of the north of the Ulaanbaatar city. This had been a big interference to building an efficient road network. Under these conditions, to enhance the north-south direction transportation capacity of Ulaanbaatar, it was necessary to build a new flyover as part of the Middle Ring Road.

1.2 Project Outline The objective of this project in Ulaanbaatar is to facilitate the increase of transportation capacity in the north-south direction by constructing a railway flyover that connects the Ikh Toyruu Street and the Engels Street, thereby contributing to improved convenience by the users of the main road in the north-south directions, to improved access to social services and to a revitalized economy.

2 World Bank statistics. 3 World Bank statistics. 4 Basic Design Study. 5 Basic Design Study.

Note: Red circle indicates project location Source: Basic Design Study Report Figure 1: Ulaanbaatar City and Project Location

E/N Grant Limit or G/A Grant Amount 3,658 million yen / 3,658 million yen / Actual Grant Amount Exchange of Notes Date May 2009 / May 2009 (/Grant Agreement Date) Implementing Agency Ministry of Road Transport Project Completion Date October 2012 Main Contractor JFE Engineering Corporation Main Consultant CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd Basic Design January 2009 Detailed Design July 2009 Technical Cooperation  The Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management (2013-2015) Grant Aid  The Project for Improvement of Water Supply Facilities in Ulaanbaatar (1994)  Rock Asphalt Road Pavement Construction Plan (1994)  The Project for Improvement of Roads in Ulaanbaatar (2000) Related Projects  The Project for Rehabilitation of Railway Facilities (2000)  The Project for Construction of the Eastern Arterial Road and Improvement of the Related Equipment (2005) Other International Organizations and Aid Agencies  World Bank: Silk Road A (1995), Silk Road B (2001), Silk Road C (2004)  Asian Development Bank (ADB): Asian Highway 3-first phase (1996), Asian Highway 3-second

phase (2000)  ADB / Korea International Cooperation Agency: Asian Highway 3-third phase (2006)  Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development: Asian Highway 83 Route Phase 1 (1996), Asian Highway 83 Route Phase 2 (2004), Local roads (2005)  Turkey Bank for International Cooperation: Silk Road (2005)

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study 2.1 External Evaluator Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study Duration of the Study: July 2015 – September 2016 Duration of the Field Study: October 18 - October 30, 2015, January 31 - February 5, 2016

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study None.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: A6) 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③7) 3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Mongolia During the planning phase, the Government of Mongolia promoted regional and rural development as well as infrastructure development based on the “Good Governance for Human Security” (2001). This flyover project was a part of a middle beltway of the “Capital City Ulaanbaatar Master Plan with 2020 as the Target Year” (2002), and thus had high policy significance. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the former plan had been modified to match the rapid population growth and “Ulaanbaatar 2020 Master Plan and Development Approach for 2030” (2013) was being implemented. This plan focuses on expansion and repair of the road networks including bridges, with the goal of building 30 flyovers by 2030. The Government of Mongolia has focused on the development of a road network including bridges consistently since the planning phase, so there is a high relevance between the project and the policy.

6 A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory 7 ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Mongolia As urbanization continued at a rapid pace, Ulaanbaatar's population of the year the project was planned was 1.07 million (2008)8 while the number of vehicle registration surpassed 100,000. The city's road network was insufficient and was not able to respond to the car society. Furthermore, the Ulaanbaatar Railway divided the southern industrial area and the northern commercial area in the heart of the city. Passage between the two areas was possible only through the two existing flyovers, the Gurvaljin Bridge and the Peace Bridge built by reinforced concrete, and two railroad crossings. The Peace Bridge built in 1961 had been aging for quite some time. Large vehicles weighing 15 tons or more were restricted there, and it was unable to secure sufficient traffic function. Against this backdrop, a need to build a new, safe and reliable flyover had been confirmed by the Ulaanbaatar city. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the number of vehicles registered in Ulaanbaatar had increased three-fold to 331,564 (2015)9 compared to figure from the time of planning. The influx of people to urban areas has been increasing by 3%10 per annum. As shown in Table 1, Ulaanbaatar City’s volume of cargo transport by road occupies 12~34% of that of the whole country, though it depends highly on the surge of construction in the capital and on the transportation of mining resources.

Table 1: Cargo Transport Volume by Road (total) (unit: thousands of tons) Ulaanbaatar City’s Ratio of Ulaanbaatar’s cargo volume Year National Ulaanbaatar City Growth Rate against the national 2009 10,564 3,289 N/A 31% 2010 12,610 2,597 -21% 21% 2011 25,635 3,087 19% 12% 2012 32,899 5,206 69% 16% 2013 28,748 9,878 90% 34% Source: Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department

As shown in table 2, the city’s passenger transport volume accounted for around 80% of the national figure, and during the year 2009 to 2014, the annual average growth rate was high at 7%. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the roads and bridges in Ulaanbaatar city were found to be an important transport route. In the east side of the Ulaanbaatar city, in consideration of watershed conservation, etc. there is a need to suppress development compared to the west side. It is expected that the development of the city in the west and southwest, including the access to the new international airport11, will become even more active. The Narny Bridge that connects the south and north is still important because the access to the new international airport

8 Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department 9 Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department. 10 Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department. 11 Under construction during the ex-post evaluation.

5 construction in the western side of the city and development of the south-western areas are expected to surge. In light of the above, the project was evaluated to have a high consistency between the project and development needs.

Table 2: Passenger Vehicle Transport (unit: million people) Year National Ulaanbaatar Growth Rate Ratio of Ulaanbaatar’s passengers to that of national 2009 229 199 N / A 87% 2010 247 221 11% 89% 2011 292 235 6% 80% 2012 314 237 1% 75% 2013 304 263 11% 86% 2014 342 285 8% 83% Source: Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan’s ODA Policy At the time of planning, Japan’s aid policy towards Mongolia outlined in “Mongolia Country Assistance Plan” (formulated in 2004), stipulated that Japan’s overall goal to support Mongolia’s self-help efforts to reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth would be achieved through these four priority areas: (1) support institutional development and human resource development who are the actors responsible for the market economy, (2) support local development, (3) support environmental conservation, as well as (4) support infrastructure development to promote economic activity. This project is consistent with (4).

3.1.4 Relevance to Appropriateness of Project Planning and Approach Figure 2 depicts the possible locations of the flyover at the planning phase. The five flyover construction alternatives include the Gurvaljin Bridge (No. 2 in Fig. 2) on the west and the Naran Tuul market (No. 5 in Fig. 2) to the east. Priorities were placed according to the flyover’s position within the city’s network of roads, increase in the north-south road capacity with regards to the railway cross section, connection to the Narny Zam Street, traffic demand, and traffic volume predictions (Table 3). The conclusion was that the railway flyover connecting the Engels Street and Ikh Toyruu Street (No. 1 in Fig. 2) would be the best suited in terms of the connectivity of the networks of city roads, and was predicted that there would be an increase in the north-south traffic capacity of the railway cross section. Both governments decided to construct a four lane flyover that can withstand the increase in north-south traffic and connects the Narny Zam Street. As one can see, the selection was made after due consideration. The project planning and approach could have been appropriate.

Source: Preliminary Study Report Figure 2: Project Alternatives

As such, this project has been highly relevant to the country’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy. The project planning and approach was also appropriate. Therefore its relevance is high.

Table 3: Flyover Alternatives Map Position Contents of the Study Two ideas including what Mongolia requested (large vehicles had no access to Engels Street and Ikh 1 the industrial roads) and the loop method that connected large vehicles to Toyruu Street industrial road. Replace the bridge due to the significant deterioration of the bridge and terrain 2 Gurvaljin Bridge around the bridge. Because the current bridge seemed to be sufficient for the time being, 3 Peace Bridge construction of a parallel bridge was assumed. Since the west has large buildings, the bridge would be built on the east. 4 Olympic Street Using the current road, consider the development of the railway flyover. Although there is no road connecting to the south, construct a railway flyover 5 Next to Naran Tuul Market using the Ikh Toyruu Street, which is the loop road in the north. Source: Preliminary Study Report

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ③) 3.2.1 Project Outputs Table 4 shows the planned and actual output undertaken by the Japanese. Except for a few areas where there were small changes in the detailed design, the project was implemented as planned.

Table 4: Comparison of Planned and Actual Output Planned Output (basic design study phase) Actual Output (2008) (2012) 1. Railway Flyover (1) Bridge length: 262 m (2) Type of superstructure: 6-span continuous steel I-girder (3) Erection methods: crane with bent and let-off technical method (4)bridge substructure: As planned - Abutment: reinforced concrete Inverted-T type - Pier: steel multi-pillar type 4 pillars (φ=1.5 m) -Foundation: cast-in-place concrete pile (φ=2.5 m), rotary penetration steel pile (φ=1.5 m) (5) Other facilities: street lighting, drainage 2. North Approach Road (1) Road length: 280m [interval with retaining wall:110m, interval without retaining wall: 170m] As planned (2) Channelization length: 428 m (east side extension: 223 m; west side extension: 205 m) (3) Other facilities: drainage, guardrail, road marking, street lighting, skid-resistant pavement, delineator, etc. 3. South Approach Road (1) Road extension:353m [interval with retaining wall: 208m, interval without retaining wall : 145m] As planned (2)U-turn road: 560m (3) Other facilities: drainage, guardrail, road marking, street lighting, delineator etc. 4. Intersection (1) Number of intersections: 2 locations at the crossing point with the approach road and the Narrny Zam Street As planned (2) Other facilities: drainage, guard-pipe, road marking, street lighting, traffic signal, road signboard, etc. Source: documents provided by JICA, Ulaanbaatar Road Department responses to the questionnaire

Narny Zam Street under the Narny Bridge Ikh Toyruu Street, north of Narny Bridge western intersection (ex-post evaluation phase) (ex-post evaluation phase)

The main changes from the detailed design are as follows. They were carried out without any problems. All of the changes intended to respond to the situation appropriately, and all were necessary and reasonable changes.

1. Change in the traffic signal specification and areas of installation: As there was a change in the signal systems, a new signal system was introduced as part of the Intelligent

Transport System12 (ITS) by the South Korea’s technical cooperation. The signals were matched to the newly installed system. 2. Change in the gutter: Since there was a possibility of an increase in the number of vehicles driving over the U-shaped gutter by excessive overtaking, which would add damage to the drainage structure, the U-shaped gutter was changed to an L-shaped gutter in the northern side of the bridge at the east-west junction. 3. Replacement to good quality subgrade material: Since the excavation revealed that there were weak layers in some areas of the west side road in the north of the bridge, soil reinforcement was carried out using good quality subgrade material. 4. Correction of the sliding on the south approach road: A lane was added to the south approach road, and the central divider was constructed. This was planned to be carried out from October 2011 to June 2012 and was carried out without delay. 5. Change in the road marking: Changed the lane marks, partition lines, line type and line width according to the Mongolian standards.

The output borne by the Government of Mongolia is as shown in Table 5. It was carried out without any change or delay.

Table 5: Outputs Obliged by the Government of Mongolia Planned (at the time of the Basic Design Study) (2008) Actual 1. To acquire the additional land and establish the margins of the road. As planned 2. To remove existing utilities. As planned 3. To make the necessary arrangements for vehicles’ detour or diversion at As planned necessary sections during construction. 4. To level the ground and secure temporary yard. As planned 5. To secure the site for disposal of wastes. As planned 6. To make necessary arrangements to control railway operation at sites As planned neighboring the construction work for at least four hours. 7. To secure electric power for lighting, signals and temporary power. As planned Source: Consultant Progress Report

3.2.2 Project Inputs 3.2.2.1 Project Cost Regarding the total project cost, the evaluation was conducted only with the planned Japanese project cost as the Mongolian obligation amount was unknown. The total project cost was 3,752 million yen, where the Japanese planned project cost was 3,658 million yen, the Mongolian planned project cost was 634 million yen. The actual Japanese project cost was 3,210 million yen, which was within the plan (88% of the plan). The reason that approximately 448 million yen had decreased was because the large crane that was not locally available at the

12 Refers to a set of information technology systems and that contributes to the improved efficiency of the transportation volume and comfort. It requires an enhancement to the equipment.

9 time of cost estimation, became available within the country for procurement during the bid phase at a price lower than the planning phase.

3.2.2.2 Project Period Although the project period at the time of plan, including from the detailed design to the main construction works, was 46 months the performance from January 22, 2009 (G/A signed) to October 16, 2012 (date of completion) was 44.8 months. The actual performance was 97% of the plan including Mongolia’s scope of construction works. Though the field work had been limited in the winter from December to March, the construction was completed as expected. Given the above, this project falls within the plan of both the project cost and the project period, and thus efficiency is high.

3.3 Effectiveness13 (Rating: ③) 3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators) The project was intended to achieve an increase in the north-south direction transport capacity and a smooth flow of traffic at the newly constructed Narny Bridge and existing Gurvaljin Bridges and Peace Bridge, located in the central loop of the Ulaanbaatar city. More specifically, it aimed to shorten the travel distance between the Peace Avenue and Chinggis Avenue and achieve a “safe and smooth traffic” that can respond even to an increase in traffic volume for large and heavy vehicles in the north-south direction. At the time of planning, the weight limit of the north-south direction was expected to be relaxed from 15 tons to 40 tons. With this, it was expected that the risk of road closures would be reduced on the Peace Bridge and Gurvaljin Bridge which were in poor shape14. Therefore, in evaluating the effectiveness, the evaluators used the annual average daily traffic of the road that connects to the Narny Bridge as an indicator to verify whether the bridge has been utilized in addition to using the three performance indicators written in the project ex-ante planning table as reference. The evaluators assessed the changes in the annual average daily traffic volume of the Gurvaljin Bridge and Peace Bridge at the time of the ex-post evaluation from the time of planning. By doing so, the evaluators verified the transport capacity of the loop road and the impact of the implementation of the project. In order to verify whether the traffic had become smoother, the evaluators examined the average speed on each bridge and interviewed transportation companies located in Ulaanbaatar city15 to hear the user’s opinion.

13 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact. 14 The Gurvaljin Bridge was repaired in 2010 by the city and 40 ton trucks are now permitted to cross at any time of the day. 15 Interviews were conducted with transportation companies based in Ulaanbaatar city. Five companies were selected randomly from a list of Ulaanbaatar City transportation companies. The evaluators made phone calls to five truck drivers (all male, one person in his 30s, two people in their 40s, two people in their 50s).

(1) Enhancement of the transport capacity of Ulaanbaatar city Middle Ring Road Performance indicators indicated in the project ex-ante planning table are shown in Table 6. After the construction was completed, all of the targets were met.

Table 6: Performance Indicators of the Direct Effect Target Performance Indicators Baseline (2008) (Completion Year) Quantity of a safe and reliable flyover* 0 1 The distance between the Peace Avenue - 4.7 1.8 Chinggis Avenue (km) Alleviation of control to heavy vehicles in the 15 40 north-south traffic (t) *The Peace Bridge is limiting the passage of heavy vehicles, while the Gurvaljin Bridge has deteriorated significantly due to problems in the design and construction. By completing the implementation of this project, the risk of cutting off the safe and smooth north-south traffic is reduced. Source: Project ex-ante planning table

The plan estimated that the annual average daily traffic volume will be 25,600 cars at the Narny Bridge one year after completion if the Narny Zam Street and Ikh Toyruu Street on the north are connected to the Engels Street in the south. The actual annual average daily traffic volume (2013) was almost as planned at 27,000 units, as shown in Table 7 (105% of the plan). Annual average daily traffic volume of the Gurvaljin Bridge continued to increase until 2014, but in 2015, three years after the completion of the project, an alleviation in traffic was observed. At the Peace Bridge near the Narny Bridge, traffic has been easing from 2012, the project completion year. From 2013 onwards, the annual average daily traffic volume stabilized at around 38,000.

Table 7: Annual Average Daily Traffic Volume (unit: vehicles/day) Baseline Target Actual Actual Actual Actual 2008 2013 2012 2013 2014 2015

1 year after Completion 1 year after 2 years after 3 years after Plan completion Year completion completion completion 1.Narny Bridge 0 25,600 23,000 27,000 33,000 25,000 2. Gurvaljin Bridge 21,500 20,400 22,100 25,000 31,000 18,200 3. Peace Bridge 48,200 37,900 31,000 38,600 37,200 38,100 4. Ikh Toyruu 31,100 39,000 27,000 34,700 31,600 40,000 Street 5.Narny Zam 56,300 55,100 28,700 33,500 30,000 41,000 Street (east) 6. Narny Zam 29,100 29,600 31,000 34,800 21,700 25,000 Street (west) Source: Ulaanbaatar City Transportation Center

Figure 3: Annual Average Daily Traffic Volume

The annual average daily traffic volume of the road that make up the Middle Ring Road, was 34,700 (2013) on the Ikh Toyruu Street (actual/plan ratio of 102%), 34,800 on the Narny Zam Street (west) (actual/plan ratio of 118%) in the vicinity of the Narny Bridge (2013). Both actual figures were almost what were originally planned. On the other hand, the volume was 33,500 on the Narny Zam Street (east) with an actual/plan ratio of 61%. The traffic has been greatly alleviated from 56,300 in 2008. The reason for this could be that the Dund Gol Street located on the east of the Narny Bridge (Fig. 4 red line) which used to be two lanes, widened to four lanes in 2013. Also, the Chinggis Avenue (purple line) was widened to two lanes in 2013, as well as the Bogd Mountain Back Road (blue line) opened in 2013. In addition, the street (green line) which passed the east intersection of the Peace Avenue (red dot) was widened from four to six lanes in 2013. As a route connecting the southeastern part of the Peace Bridge to east side of the Narny Bridge was also opened (black line) in September of 2015, it could be thought that the increase in the routes on the east side are likely to have contributed to the decrease in traffic volume.

Source: Ulaanbaatar City Map Figure 4: Ulaanbaatar City Road Map

The weight limit of the Peace Bridge at the time of planning was 15 tons, and traffic regulations for large vehicles had been implemented. Deterioration of the Gurvaljin Bridge was not as serious as the Peace Bridge and as the weight limit was 40 tons, the ratio of large vehicles was high at above 10%. However, for many years repairs for the Gurvaljin Bridge had not been performed. Therefore, there were parts that had corroded from the exposed concrete reinforcing steel of the main girder, as there were parts of the pier exposed. Rehabilitation of these parts were carried out in 2010. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the Narny Bridge has allowed to passage of large vehicles of up to 15 tons from 8am to 8pm and up to 40 tons after 8pm, while the Gurvaljin Bridge continued the passage of vehicles of up to 40 tons at all times. In this way, this project is contributing to the increase in transportation capacity of Ulaanbaatar city Middle Ring Road.

(1) Smoothening of traffic It was not possible to confirm the change in average travel speed on the Gurvaljin and the Peace Bridge, because the data before the project was implemented could not be obtained from the implementing agency. The travel speed survey conducted during the basic design phase, yielded 22.7 to 23.2 km/h at the Gurvaljin Bridge and 20.1 to 23.4 km/h at the Peace Bridge. It can be observed that it was inevitable to drive slowly during peak hours16. The survey calculated the average speed from the total distance using the total time that it took to make

16 Basic Design Study Report (2008) pages 2-5.

13 loops around the Ulaanbaatar city that pass the Gurvaljin and Peace Bridges in two directions during hours of peak traffic. Because the measurement methods are different from each other, a simple comparison could not be done. However, as shown in Table 8, the average traveling speed on each flyover from 2012 onwards increased around 40 km/h to 50 km/h. The traffic is smoother compared to before the project implementation. After the project was completed in October 2012, there seems to have been a positive impact of this project.

Table 8: Average Travel Speed of Flyover (unit: km/h) 2012* 2014 2015

Narny Bridge 46.5 N/A 47.7 Gurvaljin Bridge 40.0 N/A 39.9 Peace Bridge 49.5 44.0 N/A Source: Ulaanbaatar City Transportation Center *data after the completion of the project

After the evaluators reviewed the results of the interviews for the transportation companies, response included “there was a 25% increase in transport volume” and “traffic congestion was reduced, and the travel time was reduced.” It can be seen that the transportation companies experienced traffic congestion easing first hand through the flyover and road constructions. Regarding traffic safety, because no planned and periodic maintenance was carried out, Gurvaljin and Peace Bridges had deteriorated significantly. This did not ensure the safe passage of the traffic. The newly constructed Narny Bridge permits large vehicles of 40 tons to pass safely. In the beneficiary survey17, 90 out of 95 local residents responded that the area near the flyover has become safer in response to the question asking “whether safety has been improved in the vicinity of the flyover after the implementation of this project.” This reveals that the residents’ satisfaction towards safety has become higher18. As described above, the transport capacity of the north-south direction seems to have improved. As this facilitation of transportation was achieved, the effectiveness is high.

3.4 Impacts 3.4.1 Intended Impacts In this evaluation, a beneficiary survey targeting the Ulaanbaatar city residents and data collection were carried out in order to confirm the three impacts that were expected during

17 The beneficiary survey was carried out on residents who have lived in the vicinity of this project site from the time before the project was implemented. The population was set as approximately 480,000. Twenty-five people each from the northern, southern, eastern and western part of the Narny Bridge of Sükhbaatar, Khan Uul, and Bayangol districts, were selected so as to obtain a total number of valid responses of 100. Responses were obtained from two households from each floor of apartment buildings, passers-by near their homes. The interviews were conducted to people older than high school students from Sunday to Saturday during the day. The final number of valid responses was 95, consisting 31 men and 72 women. The breakdown by age groups (percentage) are: five 15-19 years old (4%), 38 20-29 years old (27%), 23 30-39 years old (22% ), 11 40-49 years old (11%), 14 50-59 years old (14%), six 60-69 years (6%), 5 70-79 years old (4%), one 80-89 years old (less than 1%). 18 There were no differences observed in the satisfaction between the men and women.

14 planning phase. The following are the results.

(1) Improvement of the User's Convenience in the North-South Direction of the Main Road Population rapidly increased in 2014, and reached 1.4 times more compared to that of 2008 before the project was implemented, in new residential area of the Khan Uul district located in the southern part of the bridge (Fig. 4 light purple)19. After the project was implemented, in years 2013 and 2014 the districts with the highest population growth rate were in Songino Khairkhan, followed by Khan Uul20.

Table 9: Population Growth Rate of Each District of Ulaanbaatar Songino Bayangol Bayanzürkh Sükhbaatar Khan Uul Chingeltei Khairkhan District District District District District District 2007 3% 5% 4% 5% 4% 2% 2008 3% 6% 5% 3% 4% 3% 2009 3% 6% 4% 2% 5% 1% 2010 6% 6% 5% 1% 8% 4% 2011 4% 7% 2% 1% 7% 4% 2012 0% 4% 2% -4% 6% 1% 2013 4% 3% 6% 1% 3% 1% 2014 4% 1% 7% 2% 6% 2% Source: Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department

According to the interviews with the implementing agency, the southern side of Ulaanbaatar has an increasing number of construction for new residential area than before the project was implemented. Also, construction of an exclusive residential area has been increasing in the south. In the vicinity of the Narny Bridge, construction of apartment buildings is swiftly underway. This construction boom is thought to have been the impact of constructing the convenient Narny Bridge. On the other hand, responding to the question regarding improvement in the convenience of getting to places, 60% of residents living in the new residential area said that access to stores to buy the products improved21. It may be possible to think that the project improved the convenience for the users of the north-south main road.

(1) Economic Revitalization and Improved Access to Social Services (decrease in travel time) Table 10 shows the contents and results of the beneficiary interviews22. The flyover is

19 Ulaanbaatar City Statistics Department (2015). 20 The central area of Ulanbaatar city is comprised of six districts (Bayangol, Bayanzürkh, Songino Khairkhan, Sükhbaatar, Khan Uul, Chingeltei). The municipal government office is located in Sükhbaatar district. 21 There were no observed differences in the answers between the men and women. 22 There were no observed differences in the answers between the men and women.

15 utilized well for providing goods and services, access to the workplace. In all cases, the travel time decreased. There were nearly no changes in the transportation methods pre-and post-implementation. Decrease travel time cannot be concluded as either due to the construction of Narny Bridge. However, compared to situation where the Narny Bridge did not exist, there was mitigation in the traffic congestion and decrease in distance travelled. It can be inferred that this has improved peoples access.

Table 10: Decrease in Travel Times Proportion of Narny Travel time Travel time Content Bridge usage (before implementation) (after implementation) To the workplace 60% 31 minutes 28 minutes Transportation of goods and services 70% 32 minutes 26 minutes To the government offices 30% 23 minutes 20 minutes To educational facilities 20% 26 minutes 23 minutes To the hospital 30% 29 minutes 22 minutes To the market 40% 23 minutes 20 minutes Source: Beneficiary survey result

(2) Reduction of the environmental burden by reduced emissions 23 According to the National Meteorological Agency, the average concentration of NO2 until October 2012 emitted mainly by normal car engines in Ulaanbaatar city, was 43μg/m3, while it was 45μg/m3 after November 2012 when the Narny Bridge opened until September 2015. The decrease of regular vehicle emission could not be confirmed. Emissions from diesel engines contain a large amount of fine particulate matter (PM10). The average concentration of PM10 in Ulaanbaatar until October 2012 was 221μg/m3, and 182μg/m3 from November 2012, after the Narny Bridge opened, until September 2015. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the average concentration of PM10 of the intersections were 187μg/m3 and 175μg/m3 for each of the time periods. Since many of the ger dwellings on the western part of the flyover are burning coal for heating, this is also believed to have led to the mass emissions of air pollutants24. Because the emissions also depend on the direction of the wind, the emissions at the Narny Bridge is not necessarily due to the vehicles using it.

3.4.2 Other Impacts 3.4.2.1 Impacts on the Natural Environment During the planning phase, it was thought that the project would have little negative

23 A fixed-point observation is being carried out every day by the city near the flyover and the intersection of the 3 3 Peace Avenue. The average NO2 concentration was 90μg / m until October 2012 and 110μg/m from November 2012 to September 2015. 24 A ger is a traditional portable dwelling used by nomads in the steppes of Mongolia. In Ulaanbaatar, many people live in these gers owing to a recent population influx. Because there is no central heating, coal is the major heating fuel for the long harsh Mongolian winter. For this reason, the air pollution caused by soot discharged from many gers has been serious.

16 influence on the environment. In order to reduce the environmental burden during construction, the implementing agency had been submitting the environmental protection plan and environmental monitoring reports of the Narny Bridge construction to the Ministry of Nature and Environment from October to December of each year. According to these reports, the soil, noise, water quality, air, and sanitary conditions of the workers that were monitored were all within the national standards. Also, safety signage and waste were properly installed and managed. There were no issues against natural environment that were confirmed during and after the project implementation. According to the beneficiary survey, no negative impact on the environment had been indicated. As such, there was no significant impact on the environment.

3.4.2.2 Land Acquisition and Resettlement During the planning phase, ten land acquisition and one company relocation were planned under the mayoral orders. In October 2008, talks of compensation and costs for dismantling commenced. The company located in the south site had an old building that was encroaching on to the road, and was scheduled to be moved back from the road site. According to the interviews with the Ulaanbaatar City Land Management and Registration Department, following the mayoral order, the city paid the company a compensation, including the dismantling cost based on the market value of the site and buildings an approximate sum of 450 million MNT (about 29million yen25). However, the company only responded to the dismantling half of the building. After a year and a half, because the relocation and removal were as not completed, the police were mobilized on May19, 2011 and a forced displacement was carried out. According to the interviews to the Land Management and Registration Department, there were no problems between the residents and the city in the process of land acquisition in regards to the ten cases of land acquisition. However, the two ger households that were squatting had not registered the land from 2005 to 2009 after the land ownership law was enacted in 2003, so they were outside the scope of compensation26.

3.4.2.3 Unintended Positive/Negative Impact In terms of the traffic safety on flyover, the changes in the number of traffic accidents were checked on the Narny, Gurvaljin and Peace Bridges. This had increased since 2014 on all of the bridges. This is due to the 2013 amendment on the automobile insurance law that requires drivers to report any accidents, even small accidents, to the police. According to interviews with the Traffic Police station, the actual number of accidents did not increase. While traffic volume has been increasing due to the implementation of the project, no serious accidents have

25 1 MNT = 0.065 yen (as of 2009). 26 However, at the time of the basic design, both the city and the owners of the gers agreed to suspend the permit to use the land and had agreed to hand over the land before construction started.

17 increased, and thus has not generated negative impact. In addition, the results of the beneficiary survey show that 10 out of the 95 respondents complained about the noise and vibration from the flyover and the surrounding roads during the construction phase, but there were no other positive or negative impacts indicated. As described above, nearly equal amount of actual traffic volume as expected was achieved on the Narny Bridge, and an easing of the traffic volume was observed on the existing Gurvaljin and Peace Bridges. Nearly the same amount of traffic volume as planned was achieved on the approach road. Thus, the project’s objectives to mitigate traffic and increase transportation capacity in the north-south direction were achieved. As the Narny Bridge is part of the loop through the city center, it is thought to play a role in improving access to social services. Therefore effectiveness and impact are high, because the effects that were planned were mostly produced through the implementation of this project.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②) 3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance As expected from the planning phase, the project implementation unit, comprised of the Road Construction Section of the Road and Transportation Policy and Coordination Department under the Ministry of Road and Transport was responsible for the managing the construction until the completion of the bridge in October 2012. After the hand off, the Narny Bridge was transferred to the Ulaanbaatar city Road Department, where the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Division has been implementing periodic inspections ever since. An organizational chart of the Ulaanbaatar Road Department is shown in Figure 5. The composition of the Operation and Maintenance Division of the Road Department remained the same as during project planning with one manager, one senior engineer, six road test engineers, four road use section officers, with a total of 13 personnel. The Road Department outsources small-scale repair and urgent rehabilitation of the bridge maintenance work to state-owned or private companies. A planned preventive management through inspection of bridges, planning, repair, and evaluation based on the “Bridge Management Cycle” has not started. To respond to this situation, JICA implemented the “Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management in Mongolia” from 2013 to 2015. The project established a system that first trained master trainers in areas such as bridge inspection, bridge health evaluation, bridge repair method selection, and bridge maintenance management database. Then the master trainers carried out the technology transfer to others. This way, the technology transfer would spread efficiently throughout the country. From the Road Department, five people participated in the project, of which two passed the master trainer certification exam. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, there were ongoing discussions to secure bridge O&M personnel within the organization. Thus, there appears to be no problem with the institutional

18 structure.

Source: JICA reference Figure 5: Road Department Organizational Chart (no changes since 2013)

In September 2013, three municipal companies that were responsible for road cleaning and repair of drainage and ditch embankments, greening, and cleaning were merged to create the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company. It has an agreement with the Ulaanbaatar City Operation and Maintenance Division to carry out maintenance work such as daily inspections and cleaning, cleaning of approach roads and sidewalks, restoration of damaged road facilities, traffic management facilities, signal, road signs, and cleaning of drains on the 240 km of the 645 km of the total city road27. The organizational structure includes 900 - 1,100 staff. The city divided by zones into six jurisdictions and two branches for the east and west. There are 30 – 70 people placed in each zone. Cleaning of the Narny Bridge is the responsibility of the 5th zone of the West Branch. In regard to bridge repairs, the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company lists the areas for repair through their daily inspection in the previous year, which is inspected again to determine the need for repair by the engineer of the city’s Operation and Maintenance Division. This is reflected in the annual contract at the beginning of the year. There are no issues with the institutional aspects of O&M including contract management. The organizational chart of the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company is shown in Figure 6.

27 Annual contract for the cleaning of the road including bridges. The outsourced amounts are 7.894 billion MNT (2014), 6.588 billion MNT (2015). Large-scale bridge rehabilitations are outsourced to 7-8 road and bridge inspection repair companies, while simple repairs are outsourced to the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company.

Source: Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company provided material Figure 6: Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company Organizational Chart

Daily inspection and cleaning Pedestrian intrusion ban sign around the Removing a business poster pedestrian stairs of the bridge (At the time of ex-post evaluation) (At the time of the ex-post evaluation)

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance Bridge projects and maintenance in Mongolia, including the Ulaanbaatar city, have low priority compared to that of roads. The city28 has 70 bridges, of which 70% are 50 m or shorter. Compared to the city’s roads, there are fewer and smaller bridges. Therefore, bridge experts need a comprehensive and in-depth knowledge on bridges ranging from simple bridges to

28 In Ulaanbaatar city, 93% of the bridges are made of concrete. Two bridges, including the Narny Bridge that opened in 2012, are made of steel, while one bridge is wooden. The oldest bridge in Ulanbaatar was built in 1960. In recent years, there has been an increase in the replacement of old bridges and construction of new bridges. 43% of the bridges there were built after 2000. The bridges are relatively short; 71% of the bridges are less than 50 m long. (Source: Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management in Mongolia Project Completion Report)

20 flyovers. The Narny Bridge, in particular, is one of the few steel bridges in Mongolia, and to institute proper maintenance, additional training is required. Development of an O&M system in the Road Department that includes medium- and long-term budgeting process has become a pressing issue. Under such circumstances, the Ministry of Road and Transport and the Road Department are working on the establishment of technical standards, and are expected to standardize them in the medium- and long-term, in order to institute the O&M specialized for bridges proposed by the “Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management in Mongolia.” In addition, through that project, a database of all of the bridges of Ulaanbaatar was created. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, this database is functioning without any problems29. The Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company West Branch that is responsible for the day-to-day cleaning has no issues with technical aspects because no special technology is required for cleaning and painting, and etc. As described above, the Operation and Maintenance Division has minimal expertise required for operations, but it is necessary to develop their expertise. Thus, the technical aspects has room for improvement.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance The financial trends and the breakdown of Ulaanbaatar City Road Department and Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company are analysed. The budget of Road Department shown in Table 11 is comprised of general revenue, city road fund, funds from the Mongolia Development Bank, regional development investment fund, and the national budget. The budget has been experiencing volatility in the recent years.

Table 11: Budget of Ulaanbaatar City Road Department (unit: millions of MNT) 2016 2013 2014 2015 (estimated value) Ulaanbaatar general revenue 116,117 89,291 53,515 21,126 Ulaanbaatar road fund 15,528 26,833 30,945 33,979 Mongolia Development Bank 221,279 27,200 7,475 9,898 Regional development investment fund N/A N/A 4,175 N/A National budget 16,066 5,346 N/A 250 Total 368,990 148,670 96,110 65,253 Source: Ulaanbaatar City Road Department

According to the interviews with the Road Department, the general revenue of the city has been decreasing because of the slowing of the economy from 2014 causing a decrease in tax revenue. On the other hand, the city road fund has been increasing due to the tax rate hike in

29 Although the Road Department had a road maintenance database that had been developed by ADB in 2005, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, there were not sufficient updates performed. According to the Department staff in charge of the database, the database usability was poor and the data from 2011 to 2012 is insufficient.

2014. As the allocation from the Mongolia Development Bank is determined by the investment projects on a yearly basis, there is a volatility. The Regional Development Investment Fund, which was established by the Mongolian government in 2013 was a measure to encourage foreign direct investment. There is a budget allocation on an irregular basis to the Road Department. The national budget is related to the finances of the country, and majority of revenue depends on mineral resources such as coal and copper, and due to the influence on fluctuations in the international prices of mineral resources, the allocation to Ulaanbaatar also is affected. The Ulaanbaatar Road Fund was established for the purpose of stabilizing the financial resources of the road sector. The municipal government collects vehicle tax, annual license procedure fees, and road tolls30 to carry out the road maintenance. Table 12 shows the execution of the fund. As one can see, there is a significant increase in 2014 due to the tax rate hike. In particular, the road maintenance cost has increased by six fold compared to that of 2011, and after 2012, it had remained a high level. From this fund, 500 million MNT is distributed annually as a bridge maintenance budget. In addition to this, a part of the national budget has been appropriated for replacing and large-scale rehabilitation work on the major bridges.

Table 12: Expenditure of the Ulaanbaatar Road Fund (unit: Millions of MNT) Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 - Road maintenance 1,303 2,432 2,454 2,704 3,948 1,948 11,774 12,433 13,083 16,221 - Road construction 1,528 388 1,404 1,777 966 5,715 N/A 364 10,651 7,841 - Traffic control N/A 60 46 694 N/A 279 550 150 212 330 - Traffic safety 248 290 299 350 778 478 650 2,580 2,886 6,553 - Other 200 547 149 338 328 1,040 971 N/A N/A N/A Total 3,279 3,717 4,352 5,863 6,020 9,460 13,945 15,527 26,832 30,945 Source: Ulaanbaatar City Road Department

On the other hand, the Ulaanbaatar road and bridge maintenance budget, in particular the maintenance budget of main roads had increased ten-fold from 2012 to 2013 (Table 13). According to the interviews to the implementing agency, the Road Department has been following the master plan and conducting a targeted rehabilitation and repair work on significantly dilapidated roads and bridges. In 2015, the bridge O&M cost31 was 5.508 billion MNT, which was 1.7 times more than the estimated O&M cost of 3.219 billion MNT.

30 Two toll booths located in the east and west part of Ulaanbaatar. 31 In the JICA “Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management in Mongolia” the estimated bridge O&M costs would be 3,219 (2015), 4,500 (2016), 4,740 (2017), 13,684 (2018), 9,340 (2019), 5,388 (2020) (all millions of MNT).

Table 13: Ulaanbaatar Road and Bridge O&M Budget (unit: millions of MNT) Breakdown / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Main roads and bridges 1,040 1,600 1,614 1,877 1,200 12,323 12,833 13,704 Roads in the gers and residential areas 728 500 1,220 3,345 8,315 3,205 3,000 9,400 Total 1,768 2,100 2,834 5,222 9,515 15,528 15,833 22,104 Source: Ulaanbaatar City Road Department

After the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company reorganized, the road maintenance budget was allocated according to the road area. According to the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company, the actual budget was 22.376 billion MNT32 in 2014, while it is expected to be 24.8 billion MNT in 2016 for the jurisdiction of 4.8 million square meters, and for the future, the budget will remain high. Therefore, it is thought that there are no issues with the financial aspects of the O&M. In summary, judging from the road bridge maintenance costs within the city’s finances, and the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company’s recent budget increases, there are no issues with the financial aspects of the O&M.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance The Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company provided the following answers on issues pointed out in the defect inspection report in 2013. During the site reconnaissance, out of the five points that was indicated in the defect inspection report, the evaluator was able to confirm the re-installation of signage that prohibits pedestrians and repair of damaged portions of the safety fence.

Findings Response Clean drainage of the bridge and approach road Carrying out every June and August Remove and clean anti-freeze to steel parts Carrying out cleaning and removal every spring Repair damaged parts of the safety fence of the bridge, replace The safety fence has been repaired. Performing lost parts, and conduct continuous maintenance daily inspections and monitoring. Re-install pedestrian intrusion prohibition sign Implemented without delay Replace damaged curb and interlocking Implemented from areas that require it.

Although there were several cracks found on the approach road, the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company repairs the areas they decided required repair in the following year. The cracks are expected to be sequentially addressed. Periodic inspections in principle are to be carried out every three years, but according to the Road Department, because of the deficiencies in inspection equipment, there have been no prospects just yet. Immediate action is required to resolve this issue, because early detection of problems through periodic inspection is imperative in order to extend the life of the bridge.

32 The Ulaanbaatar City road maintenance budget in Table 13 does not include the budget of Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company.

In light of the above, some minor problems have been observed in terms of technical aspects. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion The purpose of this project is to build a new flyover across the railway in Ulaanbaatar city, thereby making it convenient for road users of the Middle Ring Road going in the north-south direction, stimulating economic activities, and improving the access to social services. This project has been consistent with Mongolia’s development policies both at planning and the ex-post evaluation phase, while it was also consistent with Japan's Official Development Assistance policy at the planning phase, and corresponded to the development needs of constructing an efficient road network in the city. Therefore its relevance is high. After the project completion, the Narny Bridge has been fully utilized, and the weight limit for vehicles in the north-south direction has been mitigated. This led to an increase in the transportation capacity. The existing Gurvaljin Bridge and the Peace Bridge has seen an easing of traffic. Traffic has become smoother. Thus the effectiveness and the impact are high. Both the project cost and project period were within the plan, so efficiency is high. Regarding the maintenance of the Narny Bridge, the Ulaanbaatar City Road Department conducts periodic inspection and repairs, while the Ulaanbaatar City Public Service Company conducts cleaning, daily inspections, and general maintenance work, such as pavement repairs. There is only one flyover besides the Narny Bridge in the city, requiring advanced maintenance technology. However, the Road Department has had little experience on planned operation and maintenance. The city’s tax revenue and funds for road and bridge construction and operation and maintenance have increased dramatically, and are expected to be secured at a high and stable level. As such, there were no issues in the institutional and financial aspects, though there is room for improvement in the technical aspects. Therefore, sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency This project was highly rated on four items, but rated as fair on sustainability. The reason behind this is while the Narny Bridge is made of steel, many of the city bridges are short and made of concrete, making it necessary to allocate specialists with high degree of expertise for the O&M of the Narny Bridge. In order to improve the technical level of O&M, it is necessary to develop the human resources over a long time. The JICA technical cooperation demonstrated the importance of an institutional strengthening on preventive and systematic plans for O&M,

24 inspections required for road and bridges O&M, evaluation of the inspection results, improvement of technology regarding the preparation for a repair plan, and developing a relevant database, for bridges including simple bridges and Narny Bridge comprehensively. In order to further strengthen the bridge O&M capacity, it is desired that the implementing agency utilize the results of the technical cooperation such as the bridge O&M and inspection training, bridge inspection manual, bridge condition evaluation, bridge repair, and operation of the bridge database.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA None.

4.3 Lessons Learned Plans to comprehensively support the Road Department until the establishment of an O&M system There has been a dissemination of the concept of bridge O&M cycle through the technical cooperation “Project for Capacity Development on Bridge Maintenance and Management in Mongolia” and support to improve the bridge O&M capacity. Support for both infrastructure and capacity building led to a synergistic effect, resulting in a high overall rating. But in general, it takes a long time to establish an O&M management system. Therefore, JICA regional department, JICA overseas office, and the implementation agency should develop a comprehensive support strategy to establish systems and technology required in the long term from the planning stages of a grant aid. It is desirable then to be able to implement this support through a scheme that is appropriate at each step. After implementation of the technical cooperation on O&M, to the extent that the budget permits, it is important to implement the next phase of the bridge maintenance technical cooperation project or send bridge experts to Japan for the bridge engineer training or dispatch a bridge expert to give technical guidance for long-term human resource development, or implement an additional policy support.

End

Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal FY2015 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project “The Project for Construction of Sindhuli Road (Section 2 (Phase3/3) and Section 3)” External Evaluators: Yuko Kishino and Ryuji Kasahara, IC Net Limited

0. Summary The objective of this project is to reduce travel time and improve transport safety by opening the entire length of Sindhuli Road that connects Kathmandu, the capital, with Terai Plain in Southern Regions and with the Indian border through construction of Section 2 and Section 3, thereby contributing to realizing stable transportation of goods, promoting industries, vitalizing local economies, and improving living conditions of the citizens who live along the route. It was found that this project had been highly relevant to Nepal’s development plan and development needs both at the time of planning as well as at the time of the ex-post evaluation, and Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. Therefore, its relevance is high. Although there were no changes in the length of the road itself, and the project cost was lower than the plan, as the project period exceeded the plan, the efficiency of the project is fair. The distance and time of travel between Kathmandu and Terai Plain were both reduced, attaining the target value. Sindhuli Road has seen increase in traffic volume and has not experienced any road closure due to bad weather: indicating Sindhuli Road is being used as a route to move people and goods, and thus supports Nepal’s economy. Therefore, this project has been highly effective and has had high impact. Concerning the sustainability of the effects of this project, although generally there are no major issues, because of a few challenges in institutional aspects, technical aspects and financial aspects, the sustainability of the project effects is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1. Project Description

China Project Site Sindhuli Road (All Sections) Nepal （Please refer to Figures 1 for detail）

India

Project Location1 Road Improved by this Project2

1 Marked on a blank map (https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=9506560) (as of 15 March, 2016) 2 Provided by JICA (April 13, 2010 after work completion; the switchback section, Phase 3/3, Section 2)

1.1 Background Nepal is a landlocked country situated south of the Himalaya Mountains, along whose border lie China in the North and India in the South. Nepal has an elongated territory that stretches about 885 km from east to west, and about 193 km from north to south. Its topography changes from the north to south: from the steep mountainous topography (in Northern Regions), then lower hills (in Central Regions), and to the plains (in Southern Regions). Because of those topographical characteristics, the majority of Nepal’s transport system relies on road transportation. During the monsoon period from June to September, precipitation causes landslide or river erosion in the mountainous region, often blocking transport. For that reason, improvement of existing road networks and construction of new road networks are significant developmental challenges that the Nepalese Government faces. About fifty percent of Nepal’s GDP comes from agriculture, and Terai Plain is Nepal’s main agricultural region. Meanwhile, majority of international goods are traded with India (about 45% is imported and 70% is exported).3 Thus, improving the flow of goods between Kathmandu, the national capital, and the Southern Regions (the Terai Plain) was one of the priority challenges in building stable road networks in Nepal. The Japanese Government carried out a feasibility study in 1986-88, which confirmed the relevance of Sindhuli Road construction. Although the plan had been frozen for some time because of political and financial reasons, the second study “Aftercare Study for the Sindhuli Road Construction Project” was conducted in 1992-1993. In response to the study results the Japanese Government launched the support for the construction of Sindhuli Road through Grant Aid projects, the first of which started in 1995. The total length of Sindhuli Road is approximately 160 km. From the starting point at Bardibas in Terai Plain to the terminus at Dhulikhel, the entire route was divided into four project sections from Section 1 to Section 4,4 each of which was constructed with aid from the Japanese Government and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The scope of this evaluation (Section 2 (Phase 3/3)5 and Section 3 (all Phases)) was the final sections of the construction of Sindhuli Road which had started in 1995.

3 Base on the information from the Government of Nepal, Seventh Fiver Year Plan (1985-1990) 4 Section 1 (Bardibas — Sindhuli Bazaar), Section 2 (Sindhuli Bazaar — Khurkot), Section 3 (Khurkot — Nepalthok) and Section 4 (Nepalthok — Dhulikhel) 5 The work for Section 2 (35.8 km) was done over three construction phases. Phase 1/3 covered the 12.5 km stretch from Sindhuli Bazaar; Phase 2/3 covered the 13.5 km stretch between the 12.5 km point and the 26 km point; and Phase 3/3 covered the remaining 9.8 km stretch between the 26 km point and the 35.8 km point.

Sunkoshi Bridge at Khrukot Sindhuli Road Capital to Terai Plain (main route) Mid-hill East-west Corridor Kathmandu Dolalghat ｇ Naubise Banepa Muglin Dhulikhel

Nepalthok

Khurkot Narayangadh Sindhuligahi

Tribhuwan Highway Hetauda Sindhuli Bazar

Bardibas Pathalaiya Mahendra Highway

Birgunj Terai Plain India

Source: Map from Section 3 Basic Design Study Report (modified) Figure 1: Sindhuli Road and Other Main Roads of Nepal

E/N Grant Limit or G/A Section 2 (Phase 3/3): 2,588 million yen (E/N) / 2,584 million yen Grant Amount / Actual Section 3 (Detailed design): 50 million yen (G/A) / 49 million yen Grant Amount Section 3 (Phase 1/2): 4,333 million yen (G/A) / 4,053 million yen Section 3 (Phase 2/2-1st half): 577 million yen (G/A) / 576 million yen Section 3 (Phase 2/2-2nd half): 4,096 million yen (G/A) / 4,092 million yen Exchange of Notes Date Section 2 (Phase 3/3): June 2005 (/ G/A not exchanged) (/Grant Agreement Date) Section 3 (Detailed design): February 2009 (/ February 2009) Section 3 (Phase 1/2): June 2009 (/ June 2009) Section 3 (Phase 2/2-1st half): February 2012 (/ February 2012) Section 3 (Phase 2/2-2nd half): July 2012 (/ July 2012) Implementing Agencies  Department of Road (DoR), Ministry of Physical Infrastructure & Transport (Changed in July 2013)  Former DoR, Ministry of Physical Planning, Works & Transport Management (Charged in June 2012)  Former DoR, Ministry of Physical Planning & Works (Original) Project Completion Dates Section 2 (Phase 3/3): March 2009 Section 3 (Phase 1/2): June 2012 Section 3 (Phase 2/2-1st half): July 2013 Section 3 (Phase 2/2-2nd half): March 2015 Main Contractor Section 2 (Phase 3/3): Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. Section 3 (Phases 1/2, 2/2-1st half & 2/2-2nd half): Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. Main Consultants Section 2 (Phase 3/3): Joint Enterprise of Hazama Corporation and Taisei Corporation Section 3 (Phases 1/2, 2/2-1st half & 2/2-2nd half): Hazama Ando Corporation (Joint enterprise of former Hazama Corporation and former Ando Corporation, name changed as of April 2013)

Basic Design Section 2 (Phase 3/3): February 1999–January 2000 Section 3 (Phase 1/2): March 2008–December 2008 Section 3: August 2011–January 2012 (preliminary study) Detailed Design Section 2 (Phase 3/3): May 2000–October 2000 Section 3: March 2009–October 2009 Related Projects 【Expert】  Road policy maintenance management advisor (2003) 【Technical Cooperation Projects】  The Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road (2011–2016)  The Project for the Master Plan Study on High Value Agriculture Extension and Promotion in Sindhuli Road Corridor (2011–2014)  Sindhuli Road Corridor Commercial Agriculture Promotion Project (2015–2020) 【Grant Aid Projects】  Project for the Construction of Sindhuli Road, including Section 1, Section 4, Section 4 Emergency Recovery Project, and Section 2 Slope Countermeasures (1995–2014)  The Project for the Improvement of Kathmandu - Bhaktapur Road (2008)  Community Access Improvement Project (2010) 【Others by International Agencies, Aid Agencies, etc.】  Aid for building anew or repair of main trunk routes such as the Mid-Hill Corridor (approximately 17,500 km) (The World Bank and Asia Development Bank)  District Road Support Program (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation)

1.2 Project Outline The objective of this project is to reduce travel time and improve transport safety by opening the entire length of Sindhuli Road that connects Kathmandu, the capital, with Terai Plain through construction of Section 2 (35.8 km between Sindhuli Bazar and Khurkot) and Section 3 (36.8 km between Khurkot and Nepalthok), thereby contributing to realizing stable transportation of goods, promoting industries, vitalizing local economies, and improving living conditions of the citizens who live along the route.

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study 2.1 External Evaluators Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited Ryuji Kasahara, IC Net Limited

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study This ex-post evaluation study and related field studies were carried out as follows: Duration of the Study: July 2015–September 2016 Duration of the Field Study: November 24-30, 2015 and February 6-14, 2016

2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study Although the works whose costs were borne by the Japanese side were completed in March 2015, the project works for the Nepalese side related to development of Sindhuli Road (hereinafter referred to as the “Sindhuli Road Project”6) is still ongoing. As the budget of the Sindhuli Road Project is covering some of the maintenance activities, such state differs from the normal institutional setup for maintenance, in which the maintenance costs would be paid only by the Nepal Road Board. The institutional setup after the completion of the said project in July 2018 has yet to become concrete. The evaluation was carried out against this limited institutional setup after the completion in which many uncertainties were present. With regard to the financial sustainability of operation and maintenance after July 2018,7 the evaluators referred to the data of normal institutional setup for maintenance, which the maintenance costs are paid by the Nepal Road Board.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B8) 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③9) 3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Nepal At the time of both planning and the ex-post evaluation, the Nepalese government’s development policy documents10 identified road development as one of the priority policies, therefore, this project had been highly relevant to Nepalese policy. Priorities in road development are as follows: (1) development of a north-to-south road to connect the mountainous areas (Northern Regions) with the plains (Southern Regions); (2) road development in the regions without road access; and (3) development of an east-to-west road in the hill country (hereinafter referred to as “Mid-Hill Corridor”)11. This project will: (1) join the Kathmandu Basin (Northern Region) and Terai Plain (Southern Region); and (2) connect the Sindhuli District, which has not been served by any main road, to the road network. Also, the section between Dhulikhel and Khurkot in this project becomes (3) a part of the

6 In this report, the term “Sindhuli Road Project” is used to refer to the Nepalese project. The Nepalese share of costs for the “Project for Construction of Sindhuli Road” is paid from the budget of the “Sindhuli Road Project.” At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the main work of the “Sindhuli Road Project” concerned maintenance and safety measures. 7 The Nepalese fiscal year starts on July 16 in a given year and ends on July 15 in the following calendar year. 8 A: Highly satisfactory; B: Satisfactory; C: Partially satisfactory; D: Unsatisfactory 9 ③: High; ②: Fair; ①: Low 10 The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997/98-2002/03) at the time of the study for Section 2 Basic Design, the interim Three-Year Plan (2007/08-2010/11) at time of the study for Section 3 Basic Design, and the interim Three-Year Plan (2014/15-2016/17) at the time of the ex-post evaluation. 11 At the time of the ex-post evaluation, Nepal, a country elongated from east to west, had only one road that connected Eastern Nepal with Western Nepal. The road named Mahendra Highway also called the “East-West Corridor” runs in the southern side of the country from east to west. If there is hindrance in one section of Mahendra Highway, it would impact the entire country. Therefore, development of another east-west road network (Mid-Hill Corridor) in addition to Mahendra Highway is required to solve this problem. Mid-Hill Corridor is to be built not by construction of new roads but by joining existing roads in the hill area (Mid-Hill).

Mid-Hill Corridor. This project meets the priorities described above and therefore is highly relevant.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Nepal At the time of planning, there was practically only one route: a main trunk road that connects Kathmandu, the capital, and Terai Plain, and then reaches the town of Birgunj at the Indian border which is a primary gate for international cargo distribution. As marked on Figure 1, the route is a long detour using the Prithibi Highway and Mahendra Highway (approximately 230 km long) on the following route: Kathmandu— Naubise — Mugling — Narayangadh — Hetauda — Pathalaiya — Birgunj.12 This route was closed by natural disasters in 1993 and in 2000, both of which resulted in the capital being isolated from the distribution networks for approximately three weeks and two weeks, respectively. This experience proved the development need for this road at the time of planning, which was to construct a road that would not suffer from natural disasters and would offer an alternative route to connect Kathmandu, with Terai Plain, Nepal’s main agricultural region. The importance of Terai Plain at the time of planning was unchanged at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Terai Plain produces about 70% of the total rice production of Nepal. The central and eastern Terai Plain, near Sindhuli Road, accounts for over 50% of Terai Plain’s rice production.13 At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the main trade route that connected Kathmandu with Terai Plain was still the Prithibi Highway route discussed above. Moreover, the need for Sindhuli Road as its alternative is also unchanged. Therefore, the project’s relevance to the development need is high both at the planning stage and at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan’s ODA Policy The 2009 ODA Data Book states Japan’s basic ODA policy for Nepal at the time of the planning for Section 2 was “to accelerate the country’s democratization and peace building, thereby to reduce poverty through economic growth.” One of the focus areas for that goal was “to improve socio-economic infrastructure,” including road development. Therefore, this project is relevant to Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning.

3.1.4 Appropriateness of Project Planning and Approach According to the demand projection of traffic volume made at the time of Basic Design, road design standard was set to be a 1.5-lane vehicle road of 4.75 m wide,14 designed for travel

12 Tribhuwan Highway (Naubise-Hetauda section) is too steep for heavy vehicles, and therefore cannot become a main transport route. 13 Statistical Yearbook of Nepal (2013) 14 Small vehicles can pass each other, while larger vehicles need to have vehicles in one lane stop and wait while vehicles in the other lane pass.

at 30 km/h. From the beginning, some debated that the road should be developed as a double-lane road (single lane for either direction). However, taking into consideration the traffic demand projection made at the time and the budget constraint, it was decided that the road width would be 1.5-lane. The actual traffic volume at the time of the ex-post evaluation exceeded the demand projection. Here are the events that likely caused it: the Sunkoshi River near Khurkot located between Section 2 and Section 3 was bridged in recent years, connecting Sindhuli Road to the road linking to the Ramechhap District, and the Sindhuli Road was linked to the road heading to Ghrumi also near Khurkot, making that section a part of the Mid-Hill Corridor. However, at the time when the study for Basic Design of Section 3 was taking place, the information concerning those two linkages was insufficient. Therefore, it was unavoidable that the information could not be taken into consideration when projecting the demands at the time of Basic Design. Sindhuli Road development did not forcibly cut through mountains to construct a straight road. It constructed a road on the route traditionally used by the locals, who avoided the land prone to natural disasters. As a result, Sindhuli Road is resilient against natural disasters. With regard to the road design against earthquake-resilience, as Sindhuli Road was not damaged as much to be closed during the catastrophic quake that hit in April 2015, it is fair to say that the project plan and its approach are relevant.

As described above, this project has been highly relevant to Nepal’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ②) 3.2.1 Project Outputs Tables 1 and 2 show the project outputs of the Japanese side and the comparison between planned and actual data. Although some changes in the outputs were made, for which a part of road construction works initially planned for Section 2 was moved to Section 3, most project outputs were completed as planned.

Table 1: Section 2 (Sindhuli Bazar – Khurkot) Facility Category Plan Actual Changes Road construction Road extension (entire Section 2) 39.7 km 35.8 km Reduced by 3.9 km Road extension (Section 2 Phase 3/3) 13.7 km 9.8 km 3.9 km reduction done in Section 3 Phase 1/2 Causeway construction Structure Continuous Continuous As planned box culvert box culvert No. 3 (Phase 3/3) extension 130 m Moved to Section 3 Some changes No. 4 (Phase 3/3) extension 30 m Moved to Section 3 Some changes No. 5 (Phase 3/3) extension 50 m Moved to Section 3 Some changes Source: Planned and actual data both from documents provided by JICA, or obtained by interviews at the Implementing Agency.

Table 2: Section 3 (Khurkot–Nepalthok) Facility Category Plan Actual Changes Road construction Road extension (entire length) 36.8 km 36.8 km As planned Road extension (Phase 1/2) (1) 14.3 km 14.3 km As planned Road extension (Phase 2/2-1st half) 3.6 km 3.6 km As planned Road extension (Phase 2/2-2nd half) 18.9 km 18.9km As planned Causeway construction Structure Continuous Continuous As planned box culvert box culvert No. 3 (Phase 1/2) extension (2) 130 m 130.0 m As planned No. 4 (Phase 1/2) extension (2) 30 m 30.0 m As planned No. 5 (Phase 1/2) extension (2) 50 m 50.0 m As planned No. 1 (Phase 1/2) extension 30 m 30.8 m 0.8 m No. 2 (Phase 2/2-2nd half) extension 190 m 190.0 m As planned No. 3 (Phase 2/2-2nd half) extension 20 m 20.0 m As planned No. 4 (Phase 2/2-2nd half) extension 50 m 50.0 m As planned No. 5 (Phase 2/2-2nd half) extension 90 m 90.0 m As planned No. 6 (Phase 1/2) 40 m 40.8 m 0.8 m No. 7 (Phase 1/2) 60 m 60.8 m 0.8 m No. 8 (Phased 1/2) 70 m 70.8 m 0.8 m No. 9 (Phase 2/2-1st half) 90 m 90.0 m 0.8 m Source: Planned and actual data are both from documents provided by JICA, or obtained by interviews at the Implementing Agency. Note 1: The 14.3 km included the 3.9 km moved from Section 2 (Phase 3/3) Note 2: Moved from Section 2 (Phase 3/3)

The change mentioned above concerned the 3.9 km stretch of road extension planned for Section 2 (Phase 3/3) and construction of the flood relief culverts (under causeway) planned in that 3.9 km stretch: both works were shifted to Section 3 (Phase 1/2).15 This change was caused by the construction cost being found to exceed the Exchange of Notes (E/N) Grant Limit, and was approved before the Section 3 Basic Design Study (2008). The factors that caused the construction cost to exceed E/N Grant Limit were as follows: (1) changes in the construction market such as rise in consumer price as well as the minimum wage paid to the workers; (2) additional security expenditures in view of the worsened public order; and (3) changes in construction methods in consideration of the matters identified in stretches already completed such as pouring additional concrete for the foundation of the valley-side retaining wall, and changing the pavement structures at the sharp part of the hairpin curve. These factors occurred during the nearly five-year period between the Basic Design Study (February 1999) and the Detailed Design Study (May 2000), and the start of the main works for Section 2 (Phase 3/3) in December 2005. (1) and (2) were matters which were beyond the control of the project agencies such as the Department of Road, and (3) were appropriate changes which were led by the necessity of fine-tuning the road construction method to meet the status of the sites. The road extension whose portion was reduced in Section 2 was incorporated in Section 3 design and construction. Thus, it is fair to say that appropriate measures were taken. As discussed above, with regard to outputs, the planned works were almost all carried out, while the reduction of road extension and accompanying changes are considered reasonable. Photographs 1 and 2 below compare the same site before and after the Section 3 works.

Photograph 1: Before the Construction16 Photograph 2: After the Construction17

15 The 3.9-km stretch is situated between Section 2 and Section 3. As this stretch is in an area with only a few houses, and was already served by a 4WD-vehicle-only route commonly called “the truck road” before the start of construction of Section 3, it is likely that delay of its work had limited negative impact on the effect of the project. 16 Provided by JICA (July 18, 2012; before project work: View from the upstream left side of the Sadhi River over the site for causeway structure No. 9) 17 Provided by JICA (July 8, 2014; after completion (at the time of fault inspection): View from the upstream left side of the Sadhi River over causeway structure No. 9)

3.2.2 Project Inputs 3.2.2.1 Project Cost As the data on the Nepalese share were not available, the project cost evaluation was analyzed with only the data on the Japanese share. Table 3 shows a summary of the Japanese share of the project cost: planned and actual data and their comparison. The actual cost of Section 3 was lower than planned, at 88% of the planned figure. However, the actual cost of Section 2 (Phase 3/3) was 120% of the planned cost.18 The reason for Section 2 exceeding the planned cost was, as described in the section under “3.2.1 Project Output,” the need to address the changes in situations that occurred after starting the works. It was unforeseeable as of 1999, and therefore seemed unavoidable. The actual overall project cost for the sections evaluated was lower than planned, at 94% of the planned cost.

Table 3: Project Cost Section 2 (Period 3/3) Section 3 Total Planned (E/N, GA) 2,158 (1) 9,942 12,100 Actual 2,584(1) 8,770 11,354 Actual-to-Planned Ratio 120%(1) 88% 94% Source: Documents provided by JICA, Unit: million yen Note 1: This figure for “Planned” cost was obtained by subtracting the assumed portion for the reduced section (430 million yen) from the initial planned figure at the time of E/N signing (2,588 million yen).

3.2.2.2 Project Period The actual duration for each section of this project exceeded its planned duration. For Section 2 (Phase 3/3), the actual duration was 45.5 months, 147% of the planned duration (31 months); for Section 3 (all Phases), the actual duration was 72.6 months, 117% of the planned duration (62 months). Overall, the actual duration was 116.9 months, 125% of the planned duration (93 months). Table 4 shows a summary of project periods showing the planned and actual durations and their respective comparison rates. The work for Section 2 (Phase 3/3) took longer than the planned duration, by 14.5 months. The project monthly reports for this Section reported some work stoppages caused by the following: delays with tree felling work (31 days); political protest actions (124.5 days); natural disasters within the section area (16 days); other disasters (approximately 110 days); and accidents at work sites (51 days). Except for the accidents, many of those causes for delays were beyond the control of the project contractors and project management consultants. To catch up with the work days that had been lost due to those delays, various measures were put in place, including (1) laying of construction service roads, (2) extending work hours, and (3)

18 The figure of planned project cost of Section 2 (Phase 3/3) (2,158 million yen) was obtained by subtracting the assumed portion for the reduced section (430 million yen) from the initial planned figure at time of E/N signing (2,588 million yen). The figure120% is the ratio of the actual amount of spent money against the figure of planned project cost of Section 2 (Phase 3/3) (2,158 million yen).

securing transport routes during the monsoon period.19

Table 4: Project Period Comparison Date started Date completed Duration Actual/Planned Year/Month/Day Year/Month/Day (Months) (%) Section 2 (Phase 3/3) Planned - - 31.0 - Actual 2005/06/09 2009/03/24 45.5 147 Section 3 (all Phases) Planned - - 62.0 - Actual 2009/02/12 2015/03/01 72.6 117 Total Planned - - 93.0 Actual 2005/06/09 2015/03/01 116.9 125 Source: Documents provided by JICA

As described above, although the project cost was within the plan, the project period exceeded the plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair.

3.3 Effectiveness20 (Rating: ③) 3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators) Although this evaluation is for Section 2 (Phase 3/3) and Section 3 (Phases 1/2 and 2/2), the project’s effectiveness evaluation used the three effect indicators stated in the Ex-Ante Evaluation of Section 3 (Phases 2/2). The three Effect Indicators are as follows: travel distance (Indicator 1); required travel time (Indicator 2); and annual number of days closed by natural disasters (Indicator 3).21 Access improvement was evaluated by comparing those indicators for two travel routes between Kathmandu and Terai Plain between those for the route via Prithibi Highway (Kathmandu—Naubise —Muglin— Narayangadh—Hetauda—Pathaliya—Bardibas), and those for the route via Sindhuli Road (Kathmandu—Dhulikhel—Bardibas). In addition, average daily traffic volume in a year, a typical indicator of operation, was used to identify how the road is used, as referential information for the evaluation.

19 To put the matter in context, when one subtracts the number of work stoppage days (worth about nine months) that are beyond the control of project contractors and/or project management consultants from the actual duration of construction period (from the day when the work was started to the day the work was completed), one finds the delay is only about two months long. 20 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact. 21 At the time of the ex-ante evaluation, the measurement points for the sections of Indicator 1 and Indicator 2 were not clearly indicated. Although the section was indicated as “Bardibas Intersection—Kathmandu” in the Ex-Ante Evaluation, it was unclear which intersection in Kathmandu should be used as the reference point. Therefore, the measurement points which were defined in a JICA Technical Cooperation Project, “Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road,” were applied in the ex-post evaluation. Accordingly, measurement was taken between the Koteshwor Intersection in Kathmandu and the Bardibas Intersection in the Terai Plain.

(1) Improvement of Transport Access between Kathmandu and Terai Plain Targets for respective outcome indicators have been set as the figures to be attained in three years after the originally planned project completion (2018). However, this ex-post evaluation was conducted in 2015, the year of project completion. For that reason, the targets (2018) and the actual data at the time of the ex-post evaluation (2015) were compared for evaluation. Table 5 shows baseline, target, and actual figures for the respective indicators.

Table 5: Output Indicators Baseline Target Actual

2011 2018 2015

Basic 3 Years After Year of Design Completion Completion Indicator 1: Distance traveled (km)

A. via Prithibi Highway 333 － 368 B. via Sindhuli Road － 189 195 Indicator 2: Time required to travel (hours) A. via Prithibi Highway 8 － Approx. 8 B. via Sindhuli Road － 5 Approx. 5 Indicator 3: Number of days closed by natural disasters in a year A. via Prithibi Highway 20 (1993) － Unknown B. via Sindhuli Road － 2 0 Source: JICA Technical Cooperation Project, “The Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road” Progress Report, and interviews at the Department of Road

Indicator 1: According to the data from a study conducted by the JICA Technical Cooperation Project, the distance traveled (km) has been reduced as anticipated. Indicator 2: According to the data from a study conducted by the JICA Technical Cooperation Project, the time required to travel (hours) has also been reduced as anticipated. In addition, similar information about travel time reduction was received from share taxi drivers, who were interviewed as a part of the ex-post evaluation study. The transport service from Kathmandu, the capital, to southern Terai Plain started using Sindhuli Road about nine years ago. Around that time, before the start of Section 3 construction works, the route commonly known as “Truck Road”22 opened and had allowed 4WD access. Until then, according to the drivers, it had taken 12 hours to travel from the capital to the south via Prithibi Highway.23 Using the Truck Road, it took 8–9 hours to complete the trip. Later, after completion of the

22 The Truck Road and Sindhuli Road do not follow the same route. They may be parallel or cross each other in some sections. 23 The travel time for Kathmandu—Terai Plain via Prithibi Highway route took 12 hours in 2007, which was the information offered during the interviews. However, the travel time given for Indicator 2 in 2011 was 8 hours. Therefore, there is a difference between the travel time in 2007 and 2011.

Section 3 construction, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, it had become possible to travel from the capital to the south in about 5 hours. Indicator 3: As the data on the number of days closed by natural disasters in a year for the Prithibi Highway route were not available, it is not possible to compare the Prithibi Highway route with the Sindhuli Road route. However, according to the Department of Road, the number of days closed by natural disasters in a year for Sindhuli Road is zero.24 Therefore, even if the Kathmandu-Terai Plain route via Prithibi Highway becomes impassable, travel through the route via Sindhuli Road would be possible. From the above, it is fair to say the transport situation has improved, compared to the time when travel from the Kathmandu to Terai Plain became impossible after the natural disaster of 1993.

(2) Average Daily Traffic Volume in a Year No target was set for the average daily traffic volume in a year in the Ex-Ante Evaluation (Section 3 Phase 2/2). Consequently, as a practical alternative, the evaluators used the value of projected demands found in the Report of the Study for Basic Design for Section 3 to compare with the actual traffic volume study data attained from JICA’s “Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road.” Chronological changes for average daily traffic volume in a year on Sindhuli Road were confirmed at the southern starting point (Bardibas Intersection) and northern starting point (Dhulikhel Intersection) (Figure 2)25. By 2012, whose data on traffic volume study by the mentioned project are available, the actual traffic volume data at both Bardibas and Dhulikhel exceeded the projected volume. A further increase in traffic volume was observed between 2014 and 2015 in both locations. However, the increase in recent years may be influenced by bridging of the Sunkoshi River near Khurkot located between Section 2 and Section 3, which connected Sindhuli Road to the road linking to the Ramechhap District, and by linking of the same section near Khurkot to the road heading to Ghrumi, which has made that section a part of the Mid-Hill Corridor (see the map in Figure 1).26 As described above, Sindhuli Road has made sizable contribution to the movement of people and goods, offering more value than anticipated.

24 Following the April 2015 earthquake, the route was reportedly closed for 72 hours for inspection. As that was a road closure for inspection, those days are not included in “Number of days closed by natural disasters in a year.” 25 As the actual figures between 2009 and 2011 are missing, the average figures of the years prior to and following those three years are used instead. 26 Those two links have been outside the scope of this project, but were carried out by other projects.

Traffic Volume 6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Expected (B) Actual (B) Expected (D) Actual (D)

Note: the horizontal axis indicates year of observation, while the vertical axis indicates number of vehicles traveled at each point. Solid lines indicate actual data, while dotted lines indicate projections. Triangles represent the data observed at Dhulikhel Intersection, while the circles represent the data observed at Bardibas Intersection. Figure 2: Average Daily Traffic Volume in a Year

3.3.2 Qualitative Effects See the sections under the heading “Impacts”

3.4 Impacts 3.4.1 Intended impacts The impacts intended by this project were as follows: 1) to stabilize transportation of goods between the capital and Terai Plain; and 2) to vitalize local economies. The evaluators conducted a questionnaire study on the beneficiaries and an interview study on related parties to confirm those impacts.

(1) To vitalize local economies A questionnaire study was conducted on the beneficiaries (local citizens) in Section 3. The main categories of the questions were as follows: 1) matters related to changes in local citizens’ behaviors (e.g., use of road and time of travel), and 2) matters related to changes with goods. Sampling for the study assumed the valid response number of 100.27 28 The target areas for this study were three local governments (the Village Development Committees). Sample size was decided based on the number of households in each of the electoral wards (nine

27 If the level of significance i.e. confidence level is 95%, the upper and lower standard error is 10%, and the proportion is 50%; the required sample size for interval estimation of the proportion (infinite population) is 97. 28 The actual sample size was 133. The genders of those who took part in the study were 68 men and 66 women. The age ranges were as follows: 11 people were 20–29 years old; 22 were 30–39 years old; 37 were 40–49 years old; 35 were 50–59 years old; 24 were 60 years old or older; and three people of unknown age. The three VDCs where the study was conducted were: 1) Jhangajholi Ratamata, 2) Purano Jhangajholi, and 3) Sitalpati. The number of people who took part in respective VDCs was 51, 41 and 41, respectively. Although the data on household number at the Ward level in those VDCs were obtained, the resident register data could not be obtained. For each VDC as well as each Ward, the number of households was divided by the sample size, so that house-to-house visits were conducted with method of equal interval sampling. As no baseline study was conducted, the pre-project information was collected by asking the participants to recall their past memories.

Wards) that constitute each local government. Sampling was conducted within the boundaries of the respective Wards. However, because of a limitation with the range of data obtained by this study, it is difficult to discuss the contributions on vitalizing local economies by distinguishing the attribution of this project from other factors. Accordingly, the discussions on the project’s contributions shall take that into consideration. The results of the study are as stated below. (i) Changes in local citizens’ behaviors The study collected data on whether the road is used or not, and changes in time needed to travel for five main behaviors: 1) travel to workplace (commuting to work); 2) travel for delivery of goods and/or services; 3) travel to local government offices including the district offices; 4) travel to the district hospitals and/or a regional hospital; and 5) travel to schools (commuting to school). (a) Changes in road use status (used or not) When compared to ten years ago, there has been a slight increase in users of Sindhuli Road after the opening of Sindhuli Road except for those who use it for commuting to work and school. The reason for the decrease in numbers of people who use it for commuting to work and school may be a change in occupation or the effect of a new school built near their local community, but precise factors are unclear. (b) Changes in time needed for travel Approximately 90% of the people who used the road said, after the project, that the travel time to the district office or hospital became shorter than it had taken before the project. No major changes were observed in commuting or student transport time; reason for that may be the lack of necessity to use Sindhuli Road for those purposes, therefore, those respondents did not benefit from Sindhuli Road opening in form of reduced travel time. However, whether the Road is used or not and changes in time travel stated above seem to indicate the possibility that the development of Sindhuli Road by this project may have influenced people’s behaviors. (ii) Changes in quantity and diversity of daily commodities Those who participated in the study were asked about the changes in quantity and diversity of daily commodities between before and after the project. Approximately 90% answered that they increased and became more diverse. These results seem to indicate a possibility that transportation of goods became more active and sales transaction for daily commodities was increased. It is necessary to keep in mind that this study alone can hardly distinguish the contributing factors by this project with other factors. However, an overall trend in the local citizens’ voices heard through this beneficiary study can be interpreted to suggest a possible contribution to “vitalizing local economies” made by the opening of the entire Sindhuli Road by this project.

(2) To stabilize transportation of goods The events behind planning of Sindhuli Road Construction, i.e., closures of Prithibi Highway and Tribhuwan Highway due to natural disasters as well as subsequent interruptions in transportation of goods to the capital, have not occurred since 2001. Therefore, no record exists for Sindhuli Road having been used as an alternative route in case of an interruption to transportation of goods to the capital. However, Sindhuli Road’s contribution to stabilizing transportation of goods was heard during interviews as described in the following paragraph. In the interviews at Kalimati Market (the Central Market), the Imported Fruits Market, and an agricultural company in Kathmandu,29 it was heard that the majority of crops produced in Terai Plain was transported on large vehicles via Mahendra Highway and Prithibi Highway, and that Sindhuli Road is not used for mass transport of produce from Terai Plain to the capital, as it cannot be used by large vehicles. According to the information provided by or interviews at the Trade and Export Promotion Centre, two-thirds of international traded goods are imported from India. Those imported goods go through the customs station in the southern town of Birgunj, and then are transported by large vehicles via Mahendra Highway and Prithibi Highway to the capital, while Sindhuli Road is not used as it cannot be used by large vehicles. However, Sindhuli Road is used for transportation of produce from the Sindhuli District. According to the information gained in interviews at an agricultural company in the Sindhuli District30, large vehicles were used to transport fruits to the capital via Mahendra Highway and Prithibi Highway, which took a long time before the Sindhuli Road opened. However, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, it had become possible to use medium size vehicles on Sindhuli Road for delivery in a shorter time. In addition, it has been heard that, when Mahendra Highway was blockaded near Birgunj in September 2015 for about five months due to a political protest action, the route for transportation of goods from a part of the Southern Region to the capital was switched to Sindhuli Road. It is not just the transport from the South to the metropolitan zone that uses Sindhuli Road. According to the information heard during the interview at Central Fruit Market, the imported fruits delivered to the capital are then delivered to the consumers in the Sindhuli District via Sindhuli Road. In addition, the non-governmental organization (NGO) that responded to the April 2015 Earthquake also used Sindhuli Road to transport post-quake aid goods from the capital to the Sindhuli District. As described above, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, Sindhuli Road had established itself as an essential part of the road network east of Kathmandu, and Sindhuli Road’s design

29 The Central Market (Kalimati Market) is a vegetable and fruit market in the Capital, Kathmandu, said to meet 60-70% of vegetable and fruit demands of the Capital. The Imported Fruit Market is the depot for the fruits imported mainly from India. An agricultural company visited was Balkhu Agriculture & Vegetables Market. 30 An interview was conducted at Junar Central Co-operative Union Ltd. in the Sindhuli Bazaar. This organization presides over the Sindhuli District junar producers’ cooperatives whose main produce are citrus fruits called junar.

withstands natural disasters, contributing “to stabilize transportation of goods.” The primary significance of Sindhuli Road is that it functions even at the time of natural disaster. The fact that Sindhuli Road was usable in the catastrophe caused by the April 2015 Earthquake suggests that Sindhuli Road has fulfilled its significant role.

3.4.2 Other Impacts (1) Impacts on Natural Environment Section 2 (Phase 3/3): Environmental Impact Assessment (hereafter referred to as the “EIA”) for Section 2 (entire length) was carried out in 1999 prior to the start of the work for Section 2. According to the report of that EIA, it was planned to establish a Monitoring Cell in the Sindhuli Road Project office. However, it was actually the construction contractor who carried out environmental monitoring, and submitted monthly reports to the Sindhuli Road Project office. Field study for this ex-post evaluation was unable to obtain those reports; therefore, the evaluators have not confirmed the content of that environmental monitoring. According to the monthly report by the construction management consultant, no particular negative environmental impact was reported when the Ministry of Environment site inspection team visited in December 2006. Section 3: For Section 3, EIA was carried out at the time of the project appraisal. As a result, an Environmental Certificate was obtained, and due procedure was completed. Initially it was planned to establish a specific team (Environment Monitoring Unit) within the Sindhuli Road Project office to carry out the task of environmental monitoring. However, this did not materialize during the Section 3 project period. Nonetheless, the Environment Compliance Monitoring Report stated that the monitoring task was carried out by the Sindhuli Road Project office in Section 3 (Phase 1/2) and by the construction contractor in Section 3 (Phase 2/2). Incidentally, the environmental monitoring was supported by the Geo-Environmental and Social Unit (hereafter referred to as the “GESU”) of the Department of Road HQ. An interview at GESU revealed that a GESU environment expert carried out on-site inspections to confirm compliance of the Sindhuli Road Project approximately November 2012 According to the Environment Compliance Monitoring Report for Section 3 and the abovementioned GESU expert, no case of major negative environmental impact occurred in Section 3.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement Section 2 (Phase 3/3): According to the first monthly report submitted by the construction management consultant to the Department of Road, land acquisition was completed before December 2005, when the work for Section 2 (Phase 3/3) started. The said reports do not state what process was taken concerning this land acquisition; therefore, its details cannot be confirmed. Section 3: Land acquisition also took place for Section 3. About 80% of the lands for Phase

1/2, all of the land for Phase 2/2-1st half, and about 60% of the land for Phase 2/2-2nd half were acquired prior to the start of the construction work. A JICA-supported preliminary study was included in the process to inform the local citizens. The acquisition price adjustment was done by a committee which consists of members including the Head of District Administration. The process of the land acquisition followed the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1977, and therefore is deemed appropriate.31

(3) Unintended Positive or Negative Impact During Section 2 (Phase 3/3), two accidental falls occurred that killed workers who were employed by the construction contractor. 32 Reports of those accidents inform that the contractors revised the measures to prevent accidents, implemented the revised measures, and worked harder for prevention.

3.4.3 Positive or Negative Impact on Women and the Maternal and Child Health (1) Impact on Women The data obtained through the abovementioned beneficiary study were analyzed with a focus on gender differences. With regard to changes in road use status under each purpose and the travel time needed for each of those, no positive or negative impact on either gender was confirmed. Also concerning changes in access to, and variety and quantities of daily commodities, no positive or negative impact on either gender was confirmed. Additionally, when asked whether the project helped improve road safety, most beneficiaries answered that the roads as a whole become safer after the project. However, the answers showed no gender-related difference.

(2) Impact on the Maternal and Child Health Among those participated in the beneficiary study, this survey targeted the families with women who had given birth to check if there were any changes between before and after this project regarding healthcare service use. However, because of the factors that limited analysis of this aspect of the study, such as sample size, sampling practice,33 and impacts from other projects, it should be noted that the results of this survey do not indicate a direct impact of this

31 The beneficiary study participants (in Section 3) were asked about experience with resettlement and land acquisition, as well as the details and results of their resettlement and land acquisition experience. Among the 133 study participants, the category of re-settlers applied to eight of them. According to those eight re-settlers, their resettlement and land acquisition process followed the rules. Five of them said their lives had improved as a result of resettlement. These answers suggest that the due process was followed adequately. 32 September 2006 accident: the victim fell from the scaffolding for slope protection work. August 2008 accident: the victim, who was walking up a section of the road on a steep slope, fell off from the road. 33 Although the completion of this project was in March 2015, each stretch of road in Section 3 was opened as soon as the work for the stretch was completed. Also, at the time of the Study for Basic Design in 2008, the Truck Road was already open. For those reasons, the subject for this analysis was households of families with child (ren) younger than six years old. Among those who took part in the beneficiary study, 18 families fit the said criteria for this analysis.

project on maternal and child health. To the question on whether they received antenatal and/or postnatal health checks, 30% of the survey respondents answered that they did. However, no behavior difference was observed between before and after this project.34 Of those who answered the previous question about whether they had received antenatal and/or postnatal health checks, 80% used the road, while less than 50% of those answered that they had not received health checks had not used the road. With regard to the use of Sindhuli Road when traveling to a primary health clinic, more than 60% of the survey respondents answered they used it. However, no behavior difference was observed between before and after this project. Incidentally, when asked about the time needed for travel to their respective primary care clinics, those who used the Road said the average time needed travel to their respective primary care clinics after the project became shorter than it had taken them before the project. Interviews with doctors were also conducted at a university hospital at Dhulikhel.35 In Nepal, although difficult birth cases are handled at major facilities such as a district hospital (where Caesarian Section would be performed), many women gave (natural) birth at such places as a clinic near their house. The evaluators found that district hospitals have seen an increase in the number of patients who underwent Caesarian section after the opening of Sindhuli Road.36 As described above, this beneficiary study found that there has been no major change between before and after this project for the antenatal and postnatal health checks, which are conducted in areas near where mothers live, and therefore it is less likely they need to use Sindhuli Road directly. However, when Sindhuli Road was used, a shorter travel time was observed. An increase in number of patients at major facilities that accept emergency cases were also observed, which suggests an improvement in the state of the maternal and child health.

In light of the above, implementation of this project has largely achieved its objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness and impacts of the project are high.

34 In this analysis, the criterion for “before” or “after” project is whether it was before or after the time of the Truck Road opening. 35 Two doctors were interviewed. 36 The evaluators could not obtain the data on the increase in number of patients.

Column: Japanese Civil Engineering Technology Contributing to the Development of Road Construction Technology in Nepalese Mountains The Project for Construction of Sindhuli Road is a landmark project building a 160-km road with an altitude difference of 1,300 m crossing the Nepalese mountains that exceed 2,000 m in height. The project was completed 30 years after the planning stage. Under difficult geological and natural conditions such as fragile soil and steep and unstable slopes, the project overcame various natural calamities such as the road being washed away by heavy flood and large-scale collapse of a slope in a trans mountain area. In 2016, the project earned the Technical Award from the Japan Society for Civil Engineers37, a long-standing and prestigious award in Japanese civil engineering. The project was evaluated highly in two aspects: technology and socio-economic development. Specifically, the project contributed significantly to the development of road construction technology in Nepal while adopting locally available technologies as much as possible, such as making full use of the locally procurable construction materials and equipment. It introduced new Japanese technologies to make possible the construction of the road while overcoming steep escarpment and slopes that are prone to collapse. In addition, it contributed to the socio-economic development of the roadside regions and ensuring a stable transportation route to the capital of Nepal.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②) 3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance With normal road construction projects by the Department of Road, the 34 Division Road Offices of Department of Road, located across the nation, are instituted to perform maintenance of roads after project completion. However, the Sindhuli Road Project (the Nepalese side of the project) is yet to be completed at the time of the ex-post evaluation, and the evaluators found an institutional arrangement in which the Sindhuli Road Maintenance Unit under the abovementioned project was covering maintenance for the Sindhuli Road. According to the people involved in the abovementioned project, the said institutional arrangement is set to continue until July 2018, when funding of the maintenance cost from the Project Budget of the abovementioned project ends. After that, the Division Road Offices at Khurkot, Janakpur, and Bhaktapur plan to perform maintenance for Sindhuli Road.38 In addition, it is assumed that the functions at the Ramtar Office, which has been established at a halfway point on Sindhuli Road with support by JICA’s “Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road (2011-2016),” will be transferred to the Khurkot Division Road Office. However, when asked about staff, heavy machinery, and equipment that belong to the Ramtar Office at the time of the ex-post evaluation, varying responses were received from the concerned people at the Department of Road. Therefore the evaluators were unable to know their clear policy on the matter. Figure 3 shows the institutional arrangement of Sindhuli Road maintenance at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

37 The award is given to milestone projects that are deemed to have contributed significantly to the development of civil engineering technology and society. http://www.jsce.or.jp/prize/prize_list/p2015.shtml#s02 (June 5, 2016) 38 It is assumed that maintenance of the sections that were subjects of this project will become the responsibility of the Khurkot Office.

Roles related to maintenance

Planning and Design Road Sector Development Developing staff Branch Skill Unit competency

Adjusting

Maintenance Branch maintenance work

(Budget allocation)

Strengthening maintenance

Bridge Branch competency by JICA Technical Cooperation ↓ Department of Road Performing Foreign Co-operation Sindhuli Road Maintenance maintenance work Branch Unit (until mid-July, 2018) (until July 2018) Ramtar Office functions to be

transferred (plan) Providing heavy

Mechanical Branch machinery and ↓ technology/skills ↓

Performing Regional Road Three Division Road Offices maintenance work Directorates (1) (from July 2018)

Sources: Documents provided by the Implementing Agency Note: Branches that are not involved in maintenance of Sindhuli Road are omitted. Note 1: the three Division Road Offices refers to those at Khurkot, Janakpur, and Bhaktapur. Among those three, the Division Road Office at Khurkot will receive the functions of the Ramtar Office, whose maintenance competency was strengthened by a JICA technical cooperation project. Figure 3: Department of Road: Chart of the Department Organizations that Were Involved in Maintenance of Sindhuli Road and Roles of Each Branch, Unit, or Office

In light of the above, it is fair to say that there are some issues because of the presence of uncertainties concerning the institutional aspects of maintenance of Sindhuli Road in two years, although the current institutional aspects of road maintenance at the Department of Road itself are firmly established.

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance (1) Level of technical expertise of the Department of Road employees The staffing structure at the Department of Road consists of engineers/technologists (university graduate level), assistant engineers (vocational college graduate level) and other employees (such as accounting clerks and drivers). The institutional arrangement is that those engineers/technologists become administrators at Central Branches/Units Regional Road Directorates, or Division Road Offices, and administers the Department of Road as a whole. As all engineer/technologist posts are filled at the Division Road Offices that will become responsible for maintenance of Sindhuli Road from July 2018 (at Khurkot, Janakpur, and

Bhaktapur), the institutional setup with engineer/technologist posts is ensured, although each has a few vacancies at assistant engineer posts. As described above, the functions of the Project Office at Ramtar, whose maintenance competency was strengthened by a JICA technical cooperation project, are scheduled to be transferred to the Khurkot Division Road Office, which presumably will enforce the office’s technical competencies. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the works for repairs of the roads under the Department of Road were supposed to be carried out by outsourcing on a contractual basis. Mainly the engineers/technologists at Division Road Offices supervise the works done by those contractors. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, neither interviews at the Department of Road nor on-site field work confirmed delays or other issues with maintenance due to limited technical level of Department of Road employees.

(2) Strengthening Department of Road employees’ competencies The Road Sector Development Skill Unit under the Planning and Design Branch of the Department of Road carries out training to strengthen competencies of the employees, following the Department of Road’s own employee training plan. According to the employees at the said unit, the unit carries out management of the content and quality, and mainly contracts outside lecturers to deliver lectures in accordance with manual(s) and/or guideline(s). However, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, recruiting and contracting outside lecturers were not going smoothly, because the remuneration conditions for outside lectures specified by the Ministry of Finance in 2014 were different from those on the Department of Road’s training plan, reducing the unit price of the wage the department could pay the lecturers. The abovementioned unit now uses its own employees as lecturers to carry out a part of the training.

(3) Competencies of Sindhuli Road Maintenance Unit The terminal evaluation of JICA’s “Project for the Operation and Maintenance of Sindhuli Road” suggested that, because of the support by the said project, the Sindhuli Road Maintenance Unit developed the competency to formulate an appropriate Annual Road Maintenance Plan for Sindhuli Road. According to the Department of Road, it takes time to procure the contractors for the range of tasks after the identification of sites needing repairs; meantime the sites needing repairs would further deteriorate. For that reason, the said project supported the development of an institutional aspect in which the Department of Road itself could carry out small repairs. The Department of Road said it intended to maintain that institutional aspect even after completion of the Sindhuli Road Project. In light of the above, although some adjustments are needed in institutional aspects for future training, maintenance of the project effects is considered technically sustainable.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance In accordance with the Roads Board Act of 2002, the costs of road maintenance in Nepal are funded by specific sources, i.e., taxes on fuel and vehicle registration and toll charge to use specified roads. Those funding sources are managed by the Nepal Roads Board. To allocate maintenance cost budget to the Department of Road, the Department needs to follow the process below: first, respective Division Road Offices at the Department of Road formulate their own Annual Road Maintenance Plans, and then the Maintenance Branch of Department of Road consolidate those plans into its Integrated Annual Road Maintenance Plan, which is submitted to the Nepal Roads Board. Although the Annual Road Maintenance Plan is normally prepared by the Division Road Offices, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, the Sindhuli Road Project also prepared one and received maintenance funding directly from the Neal Roads Board. That is because the Sindhuli Road Project was allowed to formulate its own Annual Road Maintenance Plan for the purpose of maintenance cost application for Section 1 and Section 4. As a result, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, maintenance of Sindhuli Road was funded by the Nepal Roads Board budget as well as from the project cost of the Sindhuli Road Project. This arrangement to receive allocation from two sources will end with the 2017/18 budget. After that, the funding will be provided within the scope of the budget of the Khurkot Division Road Office, which will inherit the responsibilities for the part of Sindhuli Road (the Sections built by this project). At the time of the ex-post evaluation, there were six forms of categories for budgeting purposes regarding road maintenance in Nepal, as shown in Table 6.39 According to the information obtained by interviews at the Nepal Roads Board, although budget for Routine Maintenance and Recurrent Maintenance was almost 100% allocated to respective Division Road Offices, according to Integrated Annual Road Maintenance Plan, budget allocation was insufficient for Specific Maintenance, Periodic Maintenance, or Emergency Maintenance.

39 Routine Maintenance, Recurrent Maintenance, Specific Maintenance, Periodic Maintenance, Emergency Maintenance, and Rehabilitation

Table 6: Forms of Maintenance and Budget Allocation Status

Budget Form Content allocation

1 Routine Weeding, roadside channel clearing, removal of the debris coming Sufficient Maintenance down from hillside, etc. 2 Recurrent Small repairs such as repair of small pot holes, tire track Sufficient Maintenance depressions, road shoulder damages, etc. 3 Specific Major road surface damage repairs, construction of retaining wall, Insufficient Maintenance major roadside channel repairs, installation of new safety fences, etc. 4 Periodic Overlaying of asphalt (low cost road surface treatment) and Insufficient Maintenance repainting of signage, etc., that are done every 5 to 8 years 5 Emergency Emergency repairs such as disaster recovery work Insufficient Maintenance 6 Rehabilitation Budget to “catch up” with the periodic maintenance work that had Unknown not been done due to budgetary shortcomings (in place since 2012) Source: Documents from the Implementing Agency, and documents from the Nepal Roads Board

In light of the above, although there is no financial issue with Routine Maintenance and Recurrent Maintenance, it is uncertain whether Specific Maintenance and/or Periodic Maintenance can be performed when necessary, and therefore there are some problems with Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance Routine Maintenance and Recurrent Maintenance are carried out according to the Integrated Annual Road Maintenance Plan. For Routine Maintenance, cleaning contractors are assigned for specific stretches of road40. Such tasks as removing landslide debris are meant to be handled speedily by respective Division Road Offices. Recurrent Maintenance tasks are outsourced to contractors. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the evaluator on an on-site inspection field trip (Dhulikhel—Sindhuli Bazar stretch; Sections 2 – 4) observed some roads with surface damages in the Section 4, which was completed in March, 2003. However, no such damages in Section 2 or 3 were observed. Meanwhile, because of traffic volume greater than that of the demand projection and unanticipated use by overloaded vehicles, sealed road surface was being worn out faster than anticipated. Although the permission has not been granted for large vehicles’ operation on Sindhuli Road, the reality is the traffic restriction against large vehicles is not fully complied. The restriction on overloaded vehicles needs to be tightened. One may say that this constitutes more challenges in operation and maintenance of the road.

40 Called “Length Worker”

In light of the above, some minor problems have been observed in the institutional, technical, and financial aspects of operation and maintenance. Therefore, the sustainability of the project effects is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion The objective of this project is to reduce travel time and improve transport safety by opening the entire length of Sindhuli Road that connects Kathmandu, the capital, with Terai Plain in Southern Regions and with the Indian border through construction of Section 2 and Section 3, thereby contributing to realizing stable transportation of goods, promoting industries, vitalize local economies, and improving living conditions of the citizens who live along the route. It was found that this project had been highly relevant to Nepal’s development plan and development needs both at the time of planning as well as at the time of the ex-post evaluation, and Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. Therefore, its relevance is high. Although there were no changes in the length of the road itself, and the project cost was lower than the plan, as the project period exceeded the plan, the efficiency of the project is fair. The distance and time of travel between Kathmandu and Terai Plain were both reduced, attaining the target value. Sindhuli Road has seen increasing traffic volume and has not experienced any road closure due to bad weather: indicating Sindhuli Road is being used as a route to move people and goods, and thus supports Nepal’s economy. Therefore, this project has been highly effective and has had high impact. Concerning the sustainability of the effects of this project, although generally there are no major issues, because of a few challenges in institutional aspects, technical aspects and financial aspects, the sustainability of the project effects is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency The road surface is being badly damaged, as the volume of traffic that travels on Sindhuli Road has increased more than the demand projection at the time of planning, and due to lack of sufficient enforcement of the restriction on overloaded vehicles. As a short-term measure, it is crucial to strengthen enforcement of restriction on overloaded vehicles. Other medium- to long-term measures such as road repairs, are desirable to address this issue,. With regard to maintenance cost, although it may generally be managed on a single fiscal year basis by the Integrated Annual Road Maintenance Plan, for Recurrent Maintenance and other forms of multi-year maintenance, it is desirable to have the budget information of Recurrent Maintenance appear on the Annual Road Maintenance Plan so that the budgetary demands for later years can be grasped.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA Until June 2018, maintenance of Sindhuli Road will be continued to be funded from the Nepalese share of the project costs of the Sindhuli Road Project, therefore it is assumed that a certain level of intensive maintenance actions are possible. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, however, what becomes after July 2018 on some of the institutional aspects of the road maintenance, as well as the ownership of or responsibility for the equipment, etc., provided by the Technical Cooperation project, were not fully clear. Consequently, this matter needs to be followed up.

4.3 Lessons Learned Significance of grasping the public finance administration system of the partner country in the viewpoint of sustainability At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the maintenance of the road constructed by this project is funded by the Capital Budget of the Nepalese Government (the project cost) and from a specific fund (Nepal Roads Board). However, the funding source will become limited to the specific fund in two years’ time. Consequently, budget allocations for such works as periodic maintenance are highly likely to become insufficient. Generally, in a country that receives Grand Aid cooperation, there tends to be a lack of adjustment between an infrastructure development project funded by Capital Budget and ex-post maintenance plan funded from Current Budget, and this often results in lack of maintenance budget. What JICA should consider to improve the sustainability is to gain a systematic understanding from the basic design stage as to how the partner country government would operate and maintain the road, bridge(s), and/or such other assets developed by the Japanese Government. To achieve this objective, it is important for JICA to become able to grasp the systems related to public finance administration and public investment administration in the partner country government.

End

26 Kingdom of Bhutan FY2015 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 3)” External Evaluators: Yuko Kishino and Ryuji Kasahara, IC Net Limited

0. Summary The project was implemented in order to secure stable transportation of people and goods, and contribute to the improvement of the local economy by reconstructing six temporary bridges (Lawakha Bridge, Basochu Bridge, Nyarachu Bridge, Burichu Bridge, Chanchey Bridge, and Loring Bridge) into permanent bridges. The bridges are located along National Road 5, one of the main roads running north and south in Bhutan. The project has high relevance because it is in accordance with the road development plan and development needs of Bhutan at the time of both planning and the ex-post evaluation as well as with Japan’s aid policy at the time of planning. Although the output as a whole was not changed and the project expense was kept within the budget, the project period was extended from the original plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair. Target values of travel distance for large-sized vehicle and maximum vehicle tonnage that can pass over the bridges have been set as indicators of output, and were achieved. Stable transportation of people and goods as well as improvement of the local economy have been confirmed by the results of interviews with the stakeholders and a survey of beneficiaries. Therefore, the project achieved high effectiveness and impact. Although the bridges that were reconstructed in the project have been maintained on a daily basis, they have some problems in terms of institution, technology, and finance for carrying out periodic and other necessary maintenance. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1. Project Description

Project Site China The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 3) （Please refer to Old Loring Bridge Figures 1 and 2 for detail） Bhutan

India New Loring Bridge

Project Locations1 The Roads Improved by the Project2

1 Processed a blank map (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0) (as of March 15, 2016)The red lines indicate the

1 1.1 Background Most parts of Bhutan are in a mountainous area and road traffic is the only mode of transportation. Development of roads and bridges is always a prioritized issue of development in Bhutan. The Government of Bhutan has been developing an arterial road network that connects main cities across the country. However, many of the bridges along the arterial roads were temporary bridges constructed from 1970 to 1980.3 They have been deteriorating and have reached the end of their life cycle. Under these circumstances, upon a request from the Government of Bhutan, the Government of Japan researched the relevance of reconstructing the bridges by conducting the “Study on National Highway Bridge Construction” (from 1997 to 1998) on the 22 bridges that are considered to have urgent needs of reconstructing. Subsequently, out of the 22 bridges researched, “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges” (from 2001 to 2003) for the most prioritized five bridges and “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2)” (from 2005 to 2007) for three other bridges were implemented and completed through grant aid. Following the two grant aid projects above, the project focused on the remaining eleven bridges out of the 22 bridges along National Road 5, and reconstructed six bridges with Japanese grant aid and five bridges with funds from Bhutan.4 Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the locations of the bridges in the project as well as the road network of Bhutan.

arterial road network of Bhutan. 2 Document provided by JICA (taken around March 2013.) The new Loring Bridge is at the front and the old Loring Bridge is at the back in the photograph. The old Loring Bridge was removed after the completion of the new Loring Bridge and does not exist anymore. 3 For an image of a temporary bridge, please refer to Picture 1. The bridge is called Bailey Bridge by the local people. 4 Among the five bridges, the reconstruction of Hesothangkha Bridge was implemented as a part of the Phunatshangchu Hydropower Project aided by the Government of India.

Source: Edited the map in Basic Design Study Report on The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 3), JICA (2008) [Legend] Br.: Bridge, NR: National Road Note: The yellow boxes indicate the bridges constructed by Japan, and the brown boxes indicate the bridges constructed by Bhutan. The bridge marked by a white box (Wakleytar Bridge) was reconstructed under the “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2)”. Figure 1: Location Map of the Bridges Reconstructed in “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 3)”

Wangdi Trongsa Thimphu National Rd. 1 インドがManaged by Northern EW Corridor 運営維持管理India Paro Hesothangkha Trashigang Haa 4 National Rd. 5

National Rd. 2 National Rd. 4 Mongar Managed by National Rd. 3 India Hilley Damphu 3 2 1 Southern EW Corridor Rinchending Sarpang Gelephu Phuentsholing Jigmiling 317A Samdrup Jongkhar 31C 127C 127D

◆1：Greenfield Airport Construction Project 31C 31C ◆2：Jigmiling Industrial Estate Construction Project India ◆3：Dagacchu Hydropower Project ◆4：Phunatshangchu Hydropower Project (PHP) Source: Edited the Map of Data Collection Survey on Road Connectivity in the Kingdom of Bhutan, JICA (2014) [Legend] EW corridor: East-West Corridor, Rd.: Road, Red marks  indicate major cities, blue marks  indicate observation points for traffic counts survey, and the yellow marks  indicate locations of development projects. Note: Southern East-West Corridor, shown by the dotted line, is not completed yet. Figure 2: Major Roads in Bhutan and Locations of the Project (National Road 5)

3 E/N Grant Limit or G/A Grant 62 million yen / 61 million yen (Detailed Design) Amount / Actual Grant Amount 2,494 million yen / 2,432 million yen (Actual Project) Exchange of Notes Date June 2009 (/Grant Agreement Date) (/ June 2009) Implementing Agency Department of Roads, Ministry of Works and Human Settlement Project Completion Date March 2013 Main Contractor Dai Nippon Construction Project Main Consultants Joint venture of INGÉROSEC Corporation and CHODAI CO., practitioners LTD. Basic Design From March 2008 to December 2008 Detailed Design From March 2009 to September 2009 Related Projects Technical cooperation  Senior Volunteers (Department of Roads, Job category: Construction; Subject of instruction: Bridge design from 2013 to 2015) Grant Aid Projects  The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Road Construction and Maintenance (1987)  The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Road Construction and Maintenance (Phase 2) (1995)  The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (From 2001 to 2003)  The Project for Improvement of Machinery and Equipment for Road Construction (2003)  The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2) (From 2005 to 2007)  The Project for Restoration and Improvement of Vital Infrastructure for Cyclone Disasters (From 2011 to 2014)

1.2 Project Outline The objectives of the project are to secure stable transportation of people and goods and to contribute to the improvement of the local economy by reconstructing six temporary bridges (Lawakha Bridge, Basochu Bridge, Nyarachu Bridge, Burichu Bridge, Chanchey Bridge, and Loring Bridge) into permanent ones at four Districts (Wangdi District, Dagana District, Tsirang District, and Sarpang District) along National Road 5, one of the main roads running north and south in Bhutan.

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study 2.1 External Evaluator Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited Ryuji Kasahara, IC Net Limited

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study For this ex-post evaluation, the study was implemented as follows: Duration of the Study: July 2015–September 2016 Duration of the Field Study: October 23–November 5, 2015 and February 1–6, 2016

4 3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B5) 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③6) 3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Bhutan At the time of both planning and ex-post evaluation, the road development including bridges was a priority issue for Bhutan, a country that has no major means of transportation other than road. Bhutan has five main national roads, and the roads that link the capital Thimphu to India are National Road 2 and 5. National Road 5, with bridges having been improved under the project, is the only government-managed national road that links the capital city to India.7 Furthermore, the Tenth Five Year Plan (2008–2013), a national development plan at the time of planning, prioritized the construction of a road8 that provides accesses to a hydropower generation site. National Road 5 is used for the transportation of materials to the hydropower generation site. Thus, the project can contribute to the objectives of the national development plan. According to an interview with the Department of Roads, the development of National Road 5 has been systematically implemented as a part of the road network development in Bhutan together with maintenance projects of National Road 4 and rural roads by other donors’ aid.9 In other words, the project can be evaluated to show high relevance with the development policy of Bhutan because it constitutes an important part of a major road development plan.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Bhutan At the time of both planning and ex-post evaluation, the project met the development needs of Bhutan, and it was a prioritized project for the Government of Bhutan. At the time of planning, only vehicles of 18 tons or less could pass over the bridges on National Road 5, and National Road 2 was the only passable road for large-sized vehicle of the roads that connected the capital city with the southern area. Therefore, the project was also expected as the development of an alternative road to National Road 2 that connects Thimphu, the capital city of Bhutan, with India. At the time of ex-post evaluation, the roads that connect Thimphu with India are still National Road 2 and 5 only, and the importance of National Road 5 has not changed. Neighboring development projects along National Road 5 (for example, 3 and 4 in Figure 2)10 and those in the southern area (for example, 1 and 2 in Figure 2)11 have high demand for

5 A: Highly satisfactory; B: Satisfactory; C: Partially satisfactory; D: Unsatisfactory 6 ③High; ② Fair; ① Low 7 National Road 2 is operated and maintained by an Indian project . 8 In Bhutan, hydropower generation is a major source of electricity in domestic consumption as well as an important means to acquire foreign currency by selling electricity to India. At the time of the Tenth Five Year Plan, the Electric Power Sector accounted for 25% of GNP and 40% of the national revenue. Development of hydropower generation plays a significant role in the economic growth of Bhutan. 9 Second Rural Access Project (World Bank), Rural Road Project between Gelephu and Trongsa (Asian Development Bank) 10 Mainly Phunatshangchu Hydropower, Dagachhu Hydropower, and the development project of rural village roads in Tsirang District and Dagana District

5 transportation of materials and heavy equipment by large-sized vehicle. Therefore, the project, which improved the load-bearing capacity of the bridges along National Road 5, met the demand. However, according to the interview with the Department of Roads and a constructor, despite an increase in transportation of materials via National Road 2 and National Road 5 from India to the southern area, the main transportation route to import materials for development projects is a direct route via Gelephu to the southern area. Thus, use of the bridges reconstructed in the project is limited.12 Before the reconstruction, narrow widths of the bridges caused restriction of two-way traffic, leading to traffic accidents. To improve traffic ability and safety, demand was high for widening the bridges at the time of planning. Since the reconstruction, the bridges have sufficient width to allow small vehicles to pass safely in two-way traffic.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan’s ODA Policy The rolling plan toward Bhutan (final version on March 2008) at the time of the Basic Design (2008) stated that “the road network was the only means of transportation in Bhutan, where no railroads or domestic flights were available, and it was in very poor condition and drastically insufficient.” It also declared continuous implementation of reconstruction of the bridges. Therefore, it can be evaluated that the project was relevant to Japan’s ODA Policy at the time of planning.

3.1.4 Relevance to Appropriateness of Project Planning and Approach As a direct effect of the project, Basic Design cited that the travel distance of large-sized vehicle (of 18 tons or over) between the capital city (Thimphu) and the local city (Gelephu) would shorten through switching the route from National Road 2 via India to National Road 1 and 5. Therefore, here it will be confirmed whether the following items are appropriate for making the effect mentioned above visible: 1) choice of the six bridges to be reconstructed in the project, and 2) setting the load-bearing capacity to 40 tons.

(1) Appropriateness of choosing the six bridges to be reconstructed There are also some bridges with a load-bearing capacity of 18 tons or less along National Road 5, which are located outside the section improved by the project (Sarpang-Gelephu). Thus, completion of the project alone does not mean that reconstruction of all bridges between Thimphu and Gelephu, as stated in the Basic Design Report, has been completed and large-sized vehicle can pass over all bridges along National Road 5.

11 Jigmiling Industrial Estate Construction Project and Greenfield Airport Construction Project 12 For details on the change in the traffic volume, please refer to “3.3 Effectiveness 3.3.1 (2) Annual average daily volume of traffic.”

6 Actually, two bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu, namely Dolkhola Bridge and Jigmiling Bridge, were reconstructed in “The Project for Restoration and Improvement of Vital Infrastructure for Cyclone Disasters” (2011–2014), a grant aid project implemented after the project,13 and this strengthened the load-bearing capacity of the two bridges to 70R (100 tons)14, which enabled large-sized vehicle to pass over all bridges along National Road 5. Regarding these circumstances, an interview revealed the recognition by the Department of Roads that “load-bearing capacity of the two bridges did not hinder transport of materials by large-sized vehicle at the time of Basic Design of the project because the low water level of the river during the dry season allows large-sized vehicle to cross the river directly without the two bridges.” In addition, the consultant of construction management stated that “conducting consultation including the bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu could also have been considered. However, in consideration of the budget limit, consultation on the project made progress by providing other cooperation to the bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu.” Based on the above, it has been found that reconstruction of the bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu had not been a major point of the project from the beginning of the project planning and people who were involved in the project did not recognize the bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu as a big obstacle to the traffic of large-sized vehicle at the time of the Basic Design. In other words, among the bridges on National Road 5, it was the targeted bridges of the project that hindered large-sized vehicle from passing through. Therefore, it can be said that the project appropriately dealt with the issue.

(2) Appropriateness of load-bearing capacity A load-bearing capacity of 40 tons was set as the standard for reconstruction by Japan in the project after consultation between the Department of Roads and the JICA study team at the time of the Basic Design. Although the Department of Roads requested a load-bearing capacity of 70R (100 tons) at the consultation, the two parties have reached an agreement on a load-bearing capacity of 40 tons for the following two reasons: 1) The load-bearing capacity of Wakleytar Bridge, already reconstructed under “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges, (Phase 2)”, is 40 tons. Therefore, the whole of National Road 5 would lack consistency in the load-bearing capacity if a load-capacity of 70R (100 tons) was set for the project. 2) One vehicle of 70R (100 tons) can pass over the bridges with a load-bearing capacity of 40 tons, which is the standard proposed by JICA, if the vehicle passes slowly with the utmost caution.

13 The ceremony for the completion of the bridges was held in March 2013. 14 Road Design Standard of India (Indian Road Congress: IRC). A bridge designed with 70R will have a load-bearing capacity of up to 100 tons (vehicle with wheels.)

7 However, there is inconsistency in design because the bridges funded by Bhutan have been designed with load-bearing capacity of 70R (100 tons) in accordance with the standard for a bridge on national roads. The Department of Roads recognized that there was substantially no problem because the bridges funded by Bhutan followed the national standard, and the bridges funded by Japan had the capability to endure vehicles of 70R (100 tons). As seen above, this project has been highly relevant to Bhutan’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy through the appropriateness of project plan and approach. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ②) 3.2.1 Project Outputs Table 1 and Table 2 show a comparison between the plans and results in project output. There were no changes in output that would affect the project objectives, which are actualization of large-size vehicle traffic and shortening of travel distance between Thimphu and Gelephu. As the cutting of the mountain slope posed a risk of falling rocks at Loring Bridge, two construction works for slope protection and one additional construction work to prevent the bridge from being damaged by falling rocks were carried out. These construction works can be seen as a plan to reinforce the project impact, which is to secure the stable transportation of people and goods, rather than as a change of output. As seen above, outputs were implemented mostly as planned.

Table 1: Plans and Results in the Project Output (Six Bridges Funded by Japan) Plan Result Any change Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned 1. Lawakha Bridge Length 45.0 m 45.0 m As planned Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned 2. Basochu Length 40.0 m 40.0 m As planned Bridge Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned 3. Nyarachu Length 40.0 m 40.0 m As planned Bridge Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned 4. Burichu Length 50.0 m 50.0 m As planned Bridge Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned 5. Chanchey Length 45.0 m 45.0 m As planned Bridge Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned 6. Loring Load-bearing capacity 40 tons (IRC Class A) 40 tons (IRC Class A) As planned Length 70.0 m 70.0 m As planned Bridge Width 6.0 m (two-lane) 6.0 m (two-lane) As planned Source: Basic Design Report; materials provided by JICA

Table 2: Plans and Results in the Project Output (Five Bridges Funded by Bhutan) Plan Result Any change Load-bearing capacity 70 R (100 tons) 70 R (100 tons) As planned 1. Hesothangkha Bridge Length 31.0 m 31.0 m As planned Width 7.0 m (two-lane) 7.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 70 R (100 tons) 70 R (100 tons) As planned 2. Rurichu Length 30.0 m 30.0 m As planned Bridge Width 7.0 m (two-lane) 7.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 70 R (100 tons) 70 R (100 tons) As planned 3. Baichu Length 16.0 m 16.0 m As planned Bridge Width 7.0 m (two-lane) 7.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 70 R (100 tons) 70 R (100 tons) As planned 4. Kamichu Length 21.0 m 21.0 m As planned Bridge Width 7.0 m (two-lane) 7.0 m (two-lane) As planned Load-bearing capacity 70 R (100 tons) 70 R (100 tons) As planned 5. Mechiikora Length 21.0 m 21.0 m As planned Bridge Width 7.0 m (two-lane) 7.0 m (two-lane) As planned Source: Materials from the implementing agency

Photograph 1 and Photograph 2 show a comparison of before and after the construction work of Burichu Bridge.

Photograph 1: Before Construction Work15 Photograph 2: After Construction Work16

3.2.2 Project Inputs 3.2.2.1 Project Cost The total cost of the project17 amounted to 2,493 million yen, 97% of the budget of 2,556 million yen at the time of planning. Table 3 shows a summary of planned cost, actual cost, and percentage against the planned cost borne by Japan and Bhutan. The cost borne by Japan was lower than planned, totaling 98% of the planned cost. According to an interview with the Department of Roads, the unit costs of the materials used for bridges funded by Japan were higher than those used for other bridges. In contrast, the Department of Roads recognized that using high-priced materials lowered maintenance cost. Therefore, it is fair to say that the investment (cost) from Japan is appropriate.

15 Materials provided by JICA (Burichu Bridge, a condition before construction work) 16 Materials provided by JICA (Burichu Bridge, a condition after construction work) 17 Including the cost of the detailed design and the cost borne by Bhutan

9 The cost borne by Bhutan was higher than planned, totaling 154% of the planned cost when calculating in the local currency. The main reason for this is that the cost for the reconstruction of five bridges implemented by Bhutan was higher than planned. It was 94% of the planned cost when calculated in yen currency owing to a strong yen. In addition, construction insurance covered the cost for countermeasure construction against falling rocks, so that the project cost itself has not been affected. Thus, it can be said that the project cost stayed within the planned amount.

Table 3: Project Cost (Unit: million yen) % against Planned Cost Actual Cost the planned

cost A Cost borne by Japan (million yen) 2,556(1) 2,493(2) 98% B Cost borne by Bhutan (1,000 Nu) 39,747(3) 61,243(4) 154% C Cost borne by Bhutan (million yen)(5) (6) 114(3) 107(3) 94% D Total cost (A+C=D) 2,670(3) 2,600(3) 97% Source: Materials provided by JICA and the implementing agency Note 1: G/A Grant Amount (including Detailed Design); Note 2: Including the Detailed Design; Note 3: Planned value at the time of Basic Design; Note 4: From material of the 1st Field Study; Note 5: Planned value: Basic Design (At the time of adding: May 2008, exchange rate: 1US$ = ¥107.97, 1Nu. = ¥2.87 (average value from November 1, 2007 to April 30, 2008) Actual value: the 1st Field Study (average value from June 19, 2009 to March 21, 2013, exchange rate: 1Nu.*= ¥1.74)* Using India currency, calculate with 1BTN = 1IDR because exchange data of IMF does not have information about Bhutan’s currency; Note 6: Hesothangkha Bridge was reconstructed as a part of a hydropower development project aided by India. Therefore, the Department of Roads was not involved in the reconstruction of the bridge.

3.2.2.2 Project Period The actual period of the project was 48.3 months, slightly longer than the planned period of 45 months, 107% of the planned time.18 Table 4 shows a summary of the planned period, actual period and percentage against the planned period. Because the planned period for construction funded by Bhutan is not available, it is impossible to compare the planned period with the actual period. However, it is known that all construction of the bridges funded by Bhutan was completed before the construction funded by Japan had been completed. Thus, the project period for construction funded by Bhutan did not give a negative impact on the project results.

18 When not including detailed design and looking at only the construction period, it was 109% of the planned period including countermeasure construction against falling rocks of Loring Bridge, and 103% not including countermeasure construction against falling rocks. From these results above, the actual period was slightly longer than the planned period.

10 Table 4: Project Period Actual % against Plan Result the planned (month) (month) period Project Period (Detailed design + main construction) (1) 45.0 48.3 107% Reference data: main construction period Period when cost was borne by Japan (not including countermeasure construction against falling 37.5 38.5 103% rocks)(2) Period when cost was borne by Japan (including countermeasure construction against falling 37.5 41.0 109% rocks)(3) Period when cost was borne by Bhutan(4) – 31.5 Unknown Source: Materials provided by JICA and the implementing agency Note 1: Whole project (detailed design and main construction) Plan: March 13, 2009 (concluding G/A) up to 45 months Actual result: March 13, 2009 (concluding G/A) to March 21, 2013 (completion date) (including countermeasure construction against falling rocks), 48.3 months Note 2: Main construction only (when not including countermeasure construction against falling rocks) Plan: October 26, 2009 (date of starting construction) up to 37.5 months Actual result: October 26, 2009 (date of starting construction) to January 10, 2013, 38.5 months (completion date of Loring Bridge) Note 3: Main construction only (when including countermeasure construction against falling rocks) Plan: October 26, 2009 (date of starting construction) up to 37.5 months Actual result: October 26, 2009 (date of starting construction) to March 21, 2013, 41.0 months (completion date) Note 4: April 22, 2010 (starting construction of Baichu Bridge and Kamichu Bridge) to December 3, 2012 (completion of Hesothangkha Bridge)

Consequently, although the project cost remained within the plan, the project period exceeded the plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair.

3.3 Effectiveness19 (Rating: ③) 3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators) The effectiveness of the project was evaluated by reference to the two output indicators written in the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation (made at the time of basic design). The indicators are as follows: Indicator 1: maximum number of tons of trafficable vehicles; and Indicator 2: travel distance (large-size vehicles).20 Also, as reference information, the travel time (Effect Indicator) and the annual average daily volume of traffic (Operation Indicator) were adopted. Table 5 shows the baseline, the target and the results.

(1) Improvement of access by large-size vehicles Indicator 1: The maximum number of tons of trafficable vehicles is reinforced to 40 tons as projected, accomplishing the goal at the time of the project completion and the ex-post evaluation. The load-bearing abilities of five bridges reconstructed by Bhutan were all reinforced

19 Rating for judgement of effectiveness is made in consideration of Impact. 20 In the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation (made at the time of the basic plan) the passage route of large-sized vehicles starting from the capital Thimphu to Gelephu is supposed to change from Thimphu → National Road 2 → via India → Gelephu to Thimphu → National Road 1 → National Road 5 → Gelephu.

11 to 70R (100 tons). This has made it possible for large-size vehicles to run safely and smoothly on all the twelve bridges along National Road 5 between Wangdi and Sarpang, including Wakleytar Bridge which was reconstructed under “The Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2)”. Indicator 2: The target value of the travel distance (large-size vehicles) was achieved. As the definition of a large-sized vehicle was not made clear at the time of planning, it has been defined as “a vehicle of more than 18 tons and equal to or less than 40 tons” as a matter of convenience for the evaluation. On the basis of the definition, the target length for which the project would make it possible for large-size vehicles to run smoothly is not “about 260 km from the capital (Thimphu) to the southern city (Gelephu)” as shown in the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation, but it is actually 160 km, which does not include about 70 km along National Road 1 from the capital Thimphu to Wangdi and about 30 km from Sarpang to the southernmost town (Gelephu) along National Road 5 where bridge reconstruction was not carried out under the project21. As a result of the project, the 160 km became trafficable for large-size vehicles. In addition, according to the parties involved, the load-bearing capacity of the two bridges between Sarpang and Gelephu was strengthened by the “Project for Restoration and Improvement of Vital Infrastructure for Cyclone Disaster”, a grant aid project of JICA implemented between 2011 and 2014, and completed after the project, and it was possible at the time of the ex-post evaluation for large-size vehicles that weigh between 18 and 40 tons to run smoothly on the nearly 260-km road between Thimphu and Gelephu. Reference Indicator: An interview on travel time was conducted with taxi drivers and transport operators.22 It was found that the travel time between the capital Thimphu and Sarpang23 used to take nearly ten hours but had shortened by about an hour and a half and was eight and a half hours in the case of using National Road 5 at the time of the ex-post evaluation. However, it is necessary to note that the reduction has been caused not only by the project but also the national governmental projects and the road widening under the hydropower generation project supported by the Indian government.

21 After the capacity of flyover at Semtokha located near to Thimphu was enhanced by Department of Roads in 2004, the loading capacity of National Road 1 was improved. However, as the bridge reconstruction of this section was included in the project (phase 3), the length 70km was excluded from the project indicator. 22 A questionnaire survey was carried out for 30 taxi drivers at a taxi stand in Thimphu. Also interviews were conducted on four transport operators. 23 In the hearing survey, information about travel time between Thimphu and Sarpang was collected.

12 Table 5: Effect Indicator Baseline Target Result Result 2008 2012 2013 2015 Expected Target Baseline Completion Completion After Achieve- Year Year Year Completion ment Indicator 1: Maximum number of tons of trafficable vehicles 18 A. Support by Japan (6 bridges) 40 40 40 achieved (minimum) 8 B. Operation by Bhutan (5 bridges) Not set 100 100 achieved (minimum) Indicator 2: Travel distance (km) About About About About Thimphu  Gelephu achieved 380(1) 260(2) 260(2) 260(2) About About About (Wangdi  Sarpang) 160(3) 160(3) 160(3) Reference Indicator: travel time (hours) A1. National Road 2 About 7 Not set About 5.5 About 5.5 A2. Via India About 5 Not set About 5 About 5 B. National Road 1-Via National Road 5 About 9.75 Not set About 8.25 About 8.25 shortened Source: documents provided by JICA, documents provided by the Department of Roads, survey on parties involved Note 1: Thimphu – National Road 2 – via India – Gelephu Note 2: Thimphu – National Road 1 – National Road 5 – Gelephu Note 3: Target zone of the project

(2) Annual average daily volume of traffic As for the annual average daily volume of traffic, the target was not set in the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation (made at the time of the basic design) and no study was carried out on traffic demand forecast at the time of the basic design. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the increase and decrease of vehicles before and after the project was confirmed using the number24 of vehicles running on the roads measured twice a year by the Department of Roads. The four observation points of the Department of Roads used for the ex-post evaluation were as follows: (1) Hesothangkha (the north end of the northern zone), which is a point along National Road 5 near Wangdi; (2) Hilley (the north end of the southern zone); (3) Jigmiling (southern area); and (4) Rinchending, which is a point along National Road 2 near Phuentsholing, near the Indian border (point  on the map in Figure 2) .25 Figure 3 shows the information before and after26 the project of each point.

24 The Department of Roads conducts a fixed-point observation of vehicles running on roads for two weeks around February and September every year. As the observation time is during 6 a.m. and 6 p.m., the number of vehicles running after 6 p.m. has not been counted. 25 The observation points (1), (2) and (3) were chosen on the assumption that changes in the zones by reconstruction of the project could be observed, and the point (4) on the assumption that changes on National Road 2 could be observed. 26 “Before” shows the average of the four measured values from the basic design survey and the detail design survey in 2008 and 2009, and “after” shows the average of the four measured values in 2014 and 2015 in consideration of the project having been finished in 2013. However, information on the following points has not been included as it was not obtained, and these are missing values: (1) the survey results from the first observation in 2008 and the second in 2009 at the Hesothangkha point; (2) the survey results from the first and the second in 2015 at the Hilley point; (3) the

13 In comparison of the traffic volume between before and after the project at the observation points (1), (2), and (3) along National Road 5, the traffic volume has increased overall. Large-sized vehicles using the roads have also increased, though the rate of increase is not as high as that for private vehicles. The information of the observation point (4) indicates clearly that the traffic volume on National Road 2 increased at the same time; however, it is not clear whether some shifted to National Road 5 as an alternate road. The comparison of the results from the observation points (1), (2), and (3) indicates that the traffic volume at point (2) is less than the one at point (1) in the north end of National Road 5, and the one at point (3) in the southern area. Thus, it is fair to say that the traffic volume in the middle point tends to be less than other areas along National Road 5.

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 2008-2009 2014-2015 2008-2009 2014-2015 2008-2009 2014-2015 2008-2009 2014-2015 (1) Hesothangkha (NH5) (2) Hilley (NH5) (3) Jigmiling (NH5) (4) Rinchending (NH2) Heavy Vehicle Medium and Light Vehicle Others

Source: documents provided by the Department of Roads Note: “Heavy Vehicle” means a motor vehicle exceeding 10 tons gross vehicle weight (which is not a bus) or a bus seating more than 25 adults (including the driver), “Medium Vehicle” means a motor vehicle (which is not a bus) exceeding 3 tons but not exceeding 10 tons gross vehicle weight or a bus seating between 13 and 24 passengers, “Light Vehicle” means a motor vehicle (which is not a two-wheeler) seating not more than 12 adults (including the driver) and not exceeding 3 tons gross vehicle weight. Figure 3: Annual Average Daily Volume of Traffic before and after the Project

3.3.2 Qualitative Effects Please refer to the section on Impact.

3.4 Impacts 3.4.1 Intended Impacts In the project “realizing (1) improvement of running performance and safety and (2) improvement of regional economy” were expected to be achieved by reconstructing bridges along National Road 5. In the ex-post evaluation, the following were confirmed about the above two impacts by means of an interview and questionnaire survey for parties involved.

survey results from the first observation in 2008 and the second in 2009, and the second in both 2014 and 2015 at the Jigmiling point; and (4) the survey results from the first and the second in 2015 at the Rinchending point.

14 (1) Improvement of running performance and safety In the interview survey for drivers of hospital ambulances, taxies and buses and a construction company 27 , the problems concerning the makeshift bridges before the project were pointed out as follows: “There was a risk of tire blowouts because of nails protruding from joint and fix boards over the bridges”, “To convey heavy machinery, we had to unload it, and the truck and a Photograph 3: Material Transportation machinery had to run separately over (Burichu Bridge) the bridges”, “It took longer time to pass over the bridges because only one vehicle could go at a time owing to their narrow width and unsteadiness”. These indicated less convenience caused by weight limitation and aging. On the other hand, after the project, comments such as “the risk of a blowout has disappeared”, “It is now possible to pass over the bridges with heavy machinery on a truck”, and “Two-way traffic is now possible in two lanes for small-size vehicles” were made, proving that the above problems had been solved by the reconstruction. In the beneficiary survey explained in (2) below, to the questions about safety improvements made by the project, 90% of respondents answered “improved”. This reflects the same results of the above interview survey and shows that the reconstruction of bridges by the project could have contributed to the stable transportation of people and materials. Photograph 3 shows a truck running on the reconstructed bridge.28

(2) Improvement of regional economy The beneficiary survey with questionnaire was conducted on residents in Tsirang (partially Dagana) where National Road 5 passes through. The questions were about behavioral changes of the residents (whether they use the bridges, change of time taken in their behavior) and change of commodity quantity, etc. Sampling29 was taken with the valid responses set at 100.30 As there are some limitations to acquiring information, it is difficult to distinguish the

27 A questionnaire survey was conducted on 30 taxi drivers at a taxi stand in Thimphu. Also, an interview survey was conducted on ambulance drivers working for a municipal hospital in Dagana. A hearing survey was also conducted at Construction Development Corporation Limited (CDCL), which lends and maintains equipment. 28 The photograph was taken at Burichu Bridge in October 2015. 29 A sample size of 97 people is necessary if the ratio significance level is set at 95%, the margin of error is 10% and the population rate is 50%. 30 The sample size actually collected was 131 people. (65 male, 66 female) (14 between 20 and 29 years old, 33 between 30 and 39, 42 between 40 and 49, 22 between 50 and 59, 19 over 60, 1 uncertain age) (40 households in rural areas and near the bridge, 41 households in rural areas and away from the bridge, 50 households in urban areas) It was possible to obtain information of the number of households at the level of an administrative village (Gewog), but not to obtain the population registry. Sampling was carried out by means of dividing the number of households by sample size by an intended administrative village, fixing an interval and visiting houses at the intervals. Incidentally, no differences between men and women were seen in the beneficiary survey results.

15 attribution of this project from other factors on “influences of bridge reconstruction on stimulation of the regional economy” only by the survey. Therefore, the analysis is limited to indicating only the possibility of “positive or negative influences of bridge reconstruction on activation of the regional economy”, by comparing the behavior and recognition of the beneficiaries before and after the project.

(i) Behavioral change of the residents The questions of the survey were about 1) travel to work, 2) supply of commercial goods / services, 3) travel to administrative institutions, 4) travel to educational institutions, 5) travel to hospitals, 6) travel to markets for shopping, etc. The results of the survey about whether they used the reconstructed bridge by the project for the above purposes five years ago and at the time of the ex-post evaluation made it clear that there was almost no change. The bridge was mainly used for three purposes; 2) supply of commercial goods and services (about 50% of the survey respondents), 5) travel to hospitals (about 20%) and 6) travel to markets for shopping, etc. (about 30%). In contrast, a certain tendency could be seen in changes in required time for each behavior of those who answered that they used the bridge. Respondents were asked to answer how many hours (or minutes) were necessary to travel each time before and after the bridge reconstruction. For example, as for the comparison of time for supply of commercial goods and services, about 80% of respondents of households in urban areas and about 60% in rural areas answered that travel time after the reconstruction was shorter than that before. As for travel to markets for shopping, etc., about 80% of the households in rural areas near the bridge and all the households in urban areas answered that travel time after the reconstruction was shorter than that before. These results mean that the project has contributed to reducing travel time of those who use the bridge. As they use it mainly for the behaviors related to economic activities such as 2) supply of commercial goods and services and 6) travel to markets for shopping, etc., it is fair to say that the project could have contributed to stimulating the market.

(ii) Change of commodities The questions asked about changes in variety and quantity of daily commodities. Between 60 and 70 % of respondents answered that there were wider variety and larger quantity. Table 6 shows the response rates to each question. It is considered that these show the possibility that the bridge reconstruction by the project could have contributed to improving the quality and quantity of people’s daily commodities.

16 Table 6: Change of Commodities (unit: %) Variety of daily Quantity of daily commodities commodities More 69 63 Same 28 16 Less 3 21 Total 100 100

From the results of the beneficiary survey above, the possibility was confirmed that the project could have had positive impacts to “improvement of running performance and safety” and “improvement of regional economy” at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Because the appearance of the impacts are involved with not only the bridge reconstruction but also other factors such as the economic situation of the whole nation, improvement of access and quality of roads, development of transport operators, and others, it is difficult to conclude that there were impacts only from the results of this beneficiary survey. However, when considering comprehensively the information from the above interviews mentioned in 3.4.1(1), it is reasonable to assume that the bridge reconstruction may have some contributions to contribute to “improvement of running performance and safety” and “improvement of regional economy.” The reason why it was not confirmed whether the project had directly contributed to behavioral change of the residents was that the access itself to daily necessities and public services had been ensured using the old bridge even before reconstruction. The project is not new bridge construction but reconstruction, and the objective is to improve passing possibility of large-size vehicles. In other words, the project has contributed not to ensuring access but to the reduction of travel time and to the improvement of convenience and safety of access.

3.4.2 Other Impacts (1) Impacts on the Natural Environment Before starting the project, the Department of Roads applied the Checklist for Environmental Clearance, which corresponded to the Initial Environmental Examination of Bhutan and acquired an Environmental Clearance Certificate on December 19, 2007. According to an interview from Environment Section, Policy and Planning Division, Ministry of Works and Human Settlement, which issued the certificate, it had been supposed that the Environment Section execute environmental monitoring. However, there were no records, and whether regular monitoring was carried out could not be confirmed. According to the Policy and Planning Division, because the expiry date of the Environmental Clearance Certificate of environmental appraisal was set at halfway during the project (December 31, 2010), another environmental appraisal was conducted at that point.31 From

31 In the second Environmental Clearance Certificate (issued on December 1, 2010, expired on December 31, 2012), there were no suspected large environmental impacts. As the completion date of the project was on March 21, 2013, it was necessary to conduct an environmental appraisal to ensure that another Environmental Clearance Certificate was

17 December 19, 2007, when the first certificate was issued, to December 1, 2010, when the second appraisal was conducted, it is considered that there was no large negative impact on the natural environment by the project. After December 2010, there was no report of environmental monitoring by the Policy and Planning Division, and it could not be confirmed in writing at the time of the ex-post evaluation. However, there was no report either about any large negative impacts on the natural environment, according to the Department of Roads.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement As far as the above Environmental Clearance Certificate can be confirmed, there were no land acquisitions or resettlements.

According to the above, this project has largely achieved its objectives. Therefore effectiveness and impact of the project are high.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②) 3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance The organization of the head office of the Department of Roads at the time of the ex-post evaluation consisted of four departments: the Design Division, Road Division, Bridge Division and Maintenance Division. Daily maintenance of bridges such as cleaning and clearing earth and sand is carried out by regional offices of the Department of Roads. And adjustment of bridge maintenance by each regional office is supervised by the Construction and Maintenance Section under the Bridge Division. The Maintenance Department is in charge of restoration works after cyclone disasters. Figure 4 shows the outline of the organization chart and the institutional aspects of maintenance of the Department of Roads. Of the bridges reconstructed by the project, Lawakha Bridge, Basochu Bridge, and Nyarachu Bridge are maintained by Lobesa Office and Burichu Bridge, Chanchey Bridge, and Loring Bridge are maintained by Sarpang Office on a daily basis. As mentioned in the next article 3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance, there are some civil engineering technicians in each regional office, where they can deal with simple maintenance on site. Therefore, it can be said that the institutional aspects and personnel for each unit necessary for maintenance are in place. However, the result of the interview from the personnel of the Department of Roads has shown that some matters under their jurisdiction are not clear, and some information is scattered and lost owing to the influence of several organizational changes over the years. In consideration of experiences during the former organizational system, which had executed daily maintenance and restoration works against natural disasters appropriately, they would be reissued by December 31, 2012. However, an appraisal and reissuance for this were not confirmed according to collected information from the Environmental Section and the Department of Roads.

18 able to do the same under the new system, if the personnel understood matters under their jurisdiction through training in the future and operations could get on the right track. Under the present circumstances, some problems have been observed in the institutional aspects of maintenance.

Role concerning

maintenance

Design Division Survey & Design Section

Bridge Division Trail Bridge Section

Department of Roads Adjustment of Road Division Construction & Maintenance maintenance Section

Execution of

Maintenance Division restoration works

after natural disasters

Execution of daily Regional Offices maintenance Source: documents provided by the implementing agency Figure 4: Organization Chart and Roles of Bridge Maintenance

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance (1) Level of Technical Aspects of the Department of Roads The number of the staff members in the Department of Roads was 506 at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Out of those, 243 staff members are engineers who have graduated from technical high school or university. Each section office under the regional offices manages daily maintenance of bridges as well as roads, and they assign engineer-level officers as managers of district offices. However, the number of engineers specialized in bridges (design, construction and maintenance, etc.) in the Department of Roads is limited and some regional offices have a situation where they do not know the necessary items of the bridge to be checked regularly. Although the Department of Roads intends to increase bridge experts in the future, it has no regular training system for its personnel and the Department of Roads needs to set up systems to improve its expertise of bridge maintenance.

(2) Maintenance Manual The Maintenance Manual designed under the “Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2)”, and the Maintenance Manual for PC Bridge32 under the project (Phase 3) were delivered to

32 PC bridge means a bridge using prestressed concrete. PC is concrete given stress in advance. It is reportedly able to overcome the weakness of concrete that it is strong in pressure but weak in tension. (reference: Japan Prestressed Concrete Contractors Association http://www.pcken.or.jp/pubinfo/pcinfo/) (as of April 15, 2016)

19 those involved. However, interviews conducted at the head office of the Department of Roads and regional offices found that they had not been sufficiently used. Items to be checked for bridges were not arranged, and checklists were not made on the basis of those manuals. The Department of Roads explained that they were not used because of scattered information in the organization due to several organizational changes over the years. The Department of Roads intends to share guidelines within Department of Roads’ officials again in the future. According to the above, it is fair to say that the organization maintains basic knowledge about civil engineering, as about half of all the officers are engineers and they are assigned to the maintenance sites. Nevertheless, because it is necessary to use the existing manuals in the days ahead and nurture bridge experts, some problems have been seen in technical aspects of maintenance.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance The budget for the day-to-day maintenance of roads and bridges conducted by regional offices of the Department of Roads is secured. The maintenance expenditure is allocated to each regional office based on the category and length of a road and the number of bridges. This maintenance expenditure is allotted for minor maintenance. Although this cost is divided between different budget sections for roads and bridges, reallocation is possible within these sections and to use the budget flexibly to some extent. The budget for confirmation of disaster situations and restoration of roads and bridges damaged by monsoons conducted by the Maintenance Division of the Department of Roads is secured separately from the abovementioned maintenance expenses. However, the restoration expenses are lacking overall, and only half of the necessary budget is allocated according to an interview with the Maintenance Division of the Department of Roads. According to the chief engineer of the Maintenance Division, bridge restoration is a matter of a priority, and the budget for it after disasters are secured under the category of Restoration Costs for Bridges. In relation to other restoration works, application must be made from the regional office to the Department of Roads, from the Department of Roads to the Ministry of Works and Human Settlement, and from the Ministry of Works and Human Settlement to the Ministry of Finance to secure budgets. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, it was not confirmed that the Department of Roads had received a maintenance plan of bridge restoration works or secured the necessary budget for periodic maintenance (e.g., restoration works every five years) for each bridge in a planned manner. Bhutan does not have a system for collecting special tax or usage fees for maintenance of roads and bridges. Nevertheless, when it is clear which entity uses roads or bridges, it occasionally bears the maintenance cost for the part used. For example, the Phunatshangchu Hydropower Project bore the damage restoration cost for a part of the road and the bridge along

20 National Road 5 that it was using. Therefore, a budget system for periodic maintenance has not been established, though budget for daily maintenance and restoration after disasters has been secured. It is necessary to establish such a system based on a maintenance plan. Thus, a few problems have been observed in financial sustainability.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance It was confirmed that checks and maintenance of road paving on bridges were carried out. For example, maintenance work is planned for road paving on Lawakha Bridge and Nyarachu Bridge because the roads started to be denuded by heavy traffic of vehicles carrying construction materials to the construction site near the bridges. During the on-site inspection, cleaning as daily maintenance work was confirmed on bridges as well as National Road 5. The cleaning is conducted by cleaning personnel (called National Work Force) staffed at certain locations. According to interview with regional offices in charge of bridge maintenance, checks on bridge shoes,33 which is one of the items necessary for bridge maintenance to be checked every year, has not been conducted. Offices explained that they could not do it because they did not know the necessary items to be checked and did not have any checklists. According to the Bridge Division and Maintenance Division of the Department of Roads, the Department of Roads tries to renew Bridge Lists (inventory) 34 regularly. To the extent that can be confirmed from the inventory, it seems that the items to be maintained for the bridges are not checked, though an on-site inspection was carried out for all the bridges upon renewal of the inventory. The latest inventory was made in FY 2013/2014, and the next is planned for FY2016/2017 according to the Department of Roads. According to the above, some problems have been observed in institutional, technical and financial aspects of the operation and maintenance system. Therefore, the sustainability of the project effects is fair.

Paving Condition of a Road

33 A bridge shoe is a member fixed between the upper and lower structure (abutment or pier) of a bridge. The basic functions are to (1) transfer the load transferred from the upper structure to the lower one without fail and (2) conform to expansion, contraction and revolution of upper structure due to live load or temperature change, etc. and absorb relative displacement of upper and lower structures. (reference: Handbook of Shoes of Roads and Bridges, Japan Road Association) 34 Apparently, senior JICA volunteers deployed in the Department of Road advised them to create a format of the inventory.

21 4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion The project was implemented in order to secure stable transportation of people and goods, and contribute to the improvement of the local economy by reconstructing six temporary bridges (Lawakha Bridge, Basochu Bridge, Nyarachu Bridge, Burichu Bridge, Chanchey Bridge, and Loring Bridge) into permanent bridges. The bridges are along National Road 5, one of the main roads running north and south in Bhutan. The project has high relevance because it is in accordance with the roads development plan and development needs of Bhutan at the time of both planning and the ex-post evaluation as well as with Japan’s aid policy at the time of planning. Although the output as a whole was not changed and the project expense was kept within the budget, the project period was extended from the original plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair. Target values of travel distance for large-size vehicle and maximum vehicle tonnage that can pass over the bridges have been set as indicators of output, and were achieved. Stable transportation of people and goods as well as improvement of the local economy have been confirmed by the results of interviews with the stakeholders and a survey of beneficiaries. Therefore, the project achieved high effectiveness and impact. Although the bridges that were reconstructed in the project have been maintained on a daily basis, they have some problems in terms of institution, technology, and finance for carrying out periodic and other necessary maintenance. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency (1) Capacity Building of Personnel The implementing agency is expected to set strategies and systems for capacity building of personnel. The interview in the ex-post evaluation has made it clear that the Department of Roads does not have long-term strategies and systems for organization reinforcement. In the short term, it seems practical to share knowledge and information of bridge maintenance by means of staff training and manuals. Meanwhile, when organizational reform takes hold, it is necessary to establish systems for regular training and prepare a framework based on a long-term perspective.

(2) Management of documents and data It has been found that information such as manuals and data were scattered and lost in the process of organizational reforms, which the Department of Roads has implemented relatively frequently. From here on, establishing a system to manage information without being subject to excessive influence of organizational reforms is necessary. It is also necessary to examine how it

22 should manage information as an organization.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA In light of the systems (institutional, technical, and financial) of the Department of Roads at the time of the ex-post evaluation, it is possible to execute daily maintenance of roads and bridges, but not periodic maintenance adequately. To secure the output, the impacts and sustainability of this project and the past bridge reconstruction projects, support for reinforcement of maintenance systems would be desirable.

4.3 Lesson Learned Necessity of Following up the Recommendations In the ex-post evaluation (2012) of the “Project for Reconstruction of Bridges (Phase 2)”, prior to this project, it was recommended to the Department of Roads that guidelines, including items to be checked regularly and work procedure by reference to the Maintenance Manual developed in that project, be set in order to establish a system for periodic checking of bridges. Nevertheless, the ex-post evaluation of this project has made it clear that the Maintenance Manual has not been used adequately and a system for periodic checking has not been established, which means that the results of the ex-post evaluation have not been sufficiently acted on. Action based on recommendations by the ex-post evaluations is usually entrusted to the implementing agency. However, especially in case of supporting the same implementing agency continuously, as with this project, it is desirable to devise ways to improve the sustainability of project effects, such as by strengthening the follow-up and monitoring recommendation contents and responses of the implementing agency by JICA overseas offices.

End

23 Republic of Indonesia FY2015 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project “The Project for the Improvement of Bridges in Nias Island” External Evaluators: Yuko Kishino and Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited

0. Summary This project was implemented in Nias Island of the Republic of Indonesia to ensure safe and efficient traffic by reconstructing six bridges1 that were damaged by the earthquakes2 and were in a structurally dangerous condition, thereby contributing to improving accessibility to public services for residents and the reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities. This project is highly relevant to the development policy of the country both at the time of the project planning and at the time of the ex-post evaluation, as well as Japan’s ODA policy at the time of the project planning, and responds to Indonesia’s development needs. Therefore, the relevance of this project is high. The effectiveness and impact of this project are high because the six bridges are fully used, and safe and efficient traffic has been secured by implementing this project. The project cost of the Japanese side was within the planned amount, however the project period exceeded the planned time. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair. Five bridges on national roads are maintained under a stable personnel structure by the Nias Branch of the national implementing agency, the Ministry of Public Works (Pada Pelaksana Kegiatan, hereinafter referred to as “PPK”), which is the subordinate organization of the North Sumatra Province, the Directorate General of Highways of the Ministry of Public Works (Balai Besar Pelaksanaan Jalan Nasional-1, hereinafter referred to as “BBPJN1”) and the Medan Office of National Road and Bridge Design and Supervision Bureau of the North Sumatra Province, the Directorate General of Highways of the Ministry of Public Works (Perencanaan dan Pengawasan Jalan Nasional, hereinafter referred to as “P2JN”). Although Nou A Bridge was transferred to Gunung Sitoli City from the Ministry of Public Works, procedures for asset registration have not been done yet and the maintenance has not been implemented. Although no major problems have been found in the technical and financial aspects for maintenance, improvement of the institutional aspect is indispensable. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1 The six bridges are Nou Bride, Nou A Bridge, Gido Si’ite Bridge, Idano Gawo Bridge, Mezaya Bridge and Sa’au Bridge. 2 The North Sumatra Offing Earthquake (December 2004) and the Northern Nias Offing Earthquake (March 2005)

1. Project Description

Project Location Gido Si’ite Bridge improved by this project

1.1 Background Nias Island is an isolated island located 125 kilometers west off-shore from Sumatra Island of the Republic of Indonesia3 and is included in the jurisdiction of the North Sumatra Provincial Government. The island is one of the poorest areas in the country: the GDP per capita of the island in 2014 was US$ 3904, which is about 31% of the national average (US$ 1,283)5. Roads on the island consist of national roads (No. 75, 77, 78 and 79)6 covering the periphery of the island except for a part on the west side, and the national road (No. 76) crossing the central part of the island (Figure 1) where large and small bridges exist. These bridges had deteriorated markedly and had problems that were previously identified from the perspective of construction and maintenance. There have also been many natural disasters. In 2001, an unprecedented flooding occurred, which caused damage to the pile heads of bridge foundations and inclination of piers and abutments because of ground settlement and flow, while abutment was slanted along with superstructure collapsing. Such situations were coped by emergency restoration and construction of bailey bridges7, however the prospect for full-scale recovery and reconstruction could not be foreseen.

3 The Republic of Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic country composed of approximately 18,000 islands. The area of the country is about 1,940,000 square kilometers (about five times as large as Japan) with a population of 222 million in 2006, which is the fourth largest in the world. 4 Statistics Office of Nias Island 5 Data from the World Bank 6 The roads were promoted to national roads from provincial roads in 2012. 7 A bailey bridge is a pre-fabricated bridge that is easy to construct.

2 Source: Basic Design Study Report Figure 1: Project Bridges (at the time of project planning)

National road No. 75 is a major artery linking Gunung Sitoli, the largest city on the island, with Teluk Dalam, the second largest city on the island, and 500,000 residents, about 70% of the island population, live along this road. After the earthquakes, reconstruction by the World Bank and the Government of Indonesia went ahead until 2009, though some bridges with fallen girders and inclined abutments remained. These bridges had the risk of falling during the next earthquake and early recovery was called for.

1.2 Project Outline The objective of this project is to ensure safe and efficient traffic in Nias Island by reconstructing Nou Bridge, Nou A Bridge, Gido Si’ite Bridge, Idano Gawo Bridge, Mezaya Bridge and Sa’au Bridge which were damaged by the earthquakes of the North Sumatra offing and the Northern Nias offing and are in a structurally dangerous condition, thereby contributing to improving the accessibility to public services for residents and the reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities.

E/N Grant Limit/ 1,522 million yen/1,265 million yen Actual Grant Amount Exchange of Notes Date/ Mar. 2009 (detailed design), Dec. 2009 (main construction)/ (/Grant Agreement Date) Mar. 2009 (detailed design), Jan. 2010 (main construction) Implementing Agency Directorate General of Highways, the Ministry of Public Works

3 Project Completion Date January 2013 Main Contractor Katahira & Engineers International Main Consultant Takenaka Civil Engineering & Construction Co., Ltd. Basic Design October 2008 Detailed Design September 2009 Related Projects 【ODA loan】  Rehabilitation of Bridges for Java North Line (II) (1995 – 2002)  Twelve Provinces Bridge Replacement & Rehabilitation project (1995)  Heavy Loaded Road Improvement Project (II) (1992)  Road Maintenance Improvement Project (II) (1996)  Rural Road Project (III) (1997)  Sumatra East Coast Highways Project (1996)  Urban Arterial Roads Improvement In Metropolitan And Large Cities Project (1996)  Construction Project of the Northern Extension of the South-West Arc (1994)  North Java Corridor Flyover Project (2005)  Tanjung Priok Access Road Construction Project (Phase-I) (2005)  Tanjung Priok Access Road Construction Project (Phase-II) (2006) 【Grant aid】  The Project for Bridge Construction in the Central and North Sulawesi Provinces (2003)  The Project for Bridge Construction in the Province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (2006)  The Project For Construction of Bridges in The Province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (2006) 【Other international organizations and aid organizations, etc.】  Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias, Government of Indonesia: Earthquake Disaster Reconstruction Project (2005)  The World Bank: Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program (2006)

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study 2.1 External Evaluators Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study In the ex-post evaluation this time, the study was implemented as follows. Duration of the Study: July 2015 – September 2016 Duration of the Field Study: November 15–29, 2015; February 13–23, 2016

4 2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study In the first field study of this evaluation, there was limited cooperation by the implementing agency in regards to the questionnaire survey. Interviews with relevant organizations were also limited. In the second field survey, cooperation was obtained from the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City, which is the maintenance organization for Nou A Bridge. However, detailed information of the five bridges other than Nou A Bridge remained lacking. Under such circumstances, during this evaluation, information was supplemented by literature searches, a questionnaire survey to a Japanese construction management consultant and a beneficiary survey in addition to fragmentary information obtained in the field. Therefore, it was not possible to conduct a full analysis of the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability, and a decision was made based only on the limited information available. Accordingly, the possibility of bias in the results of the evaluation cannot be denied.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B8) 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③9) 3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of the Republic of Indonesia At the time of project planning, the National Development Plan was formulated under the Suharto regime based on the “National Long Term Development Plan (RPJPN) of 25 years” and the “National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN) of 5 years.” Under the “National Medium Term Development Plan (2004–2009)”, the government highlighted poverty reduction and positioned economic growth as its means. In the wake of the great earthquakes in December 2004 and March 2005, the Government of Indonesia started to move toward the reconstruction of disaster-stricken areas with the aim of improving Aceh and Nias Island to a condition better than the pre-disaster one. The government established the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, hereinafter referred to as “BRR”) and formulated, together with the ministries and agencies concerned, the master plan “Rehabilitation and Restoration Plan of Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam Province and Nias Island” for recovery and reconstruction after emergency relief. Under the plan, the agency implemented reconstruction programs comprised of the following four pillars: (1) reconstruction of houses and communities, (2) recovery of infrastructures, (3) development of local economy, and (4) enforcement of organization and human resource development. This project was intended to support the earthquake reconstruction project of the Government of Indonesia. The long-term development plan at the national level of Indonesia at the time of the ex-post evaluation was the “National Long Term Development Plan (RPJPN 2005–2025)” which came into force in 2007. In the plan, the improvement of large-scale infrastructure networks, such as

8 A: Highly satisfactory; B: Satisfactory; C: Partially satisfactory; D: Unsatisfactory 9 ③: High; ②: Fair; ①: Low

5 roads connecting the entire island and the irrigation system, was indicated to be important. The “National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN 2015–2019)” focuses on the following five points: maritime country initiatives; modernized industry; sovereignty of Indonesia, regional development; and improvement of infrastructure investment environment. Above all, regarding regional development, importance is placed on the construction of 2,000 kilometers of roads, expansion of economic growth from the center to the regions, distribution of profits through economic growth, and linking the major industrial areas of each region to promote connectivity throughout Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia emphasizes on the poverty reduction through promoting the connectivity of the entire country both at the time of the project planning and at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Therefore, this project is highly relevant to the country’s development plan.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of the Republic of Indonesia After the earthquakes, BRR, which was established under the direction of the National Development Planning Agency of the Government of Indonesia (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, hereinafter referred to as “BAPPENAS”), carried out repairs to roads and bridges damaged by the earthquakes as part of the infrastructure recovery project of Nias Island. However, the project was not completed before the time limit of dismantling BRR because of substantial delays in the processes. Thus, the World Bank provided support for the construction of roads and bridges which BRR was not capable, and implemented repairs to 98 kilometers of roads, repairs to 28 kilometers of local roads and construction of 11 bridges through its Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Program. This project was implemented to support a series of these earthquake restoration projects of the Government of Indonesia. Nou Bridge and Nou A Bridge crossing the central part of Gunung Sitoli City in Nias Island play an important role in stimulating the economic activities of residents as access roads to the market. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the project national road was designated as an evacuation route in case of disaster, and it is considered that bridge repairs under this project were essential to improve the level of disaster prevention and to secure routes for evacuation and transporting relief goods in the event of a disaster. Out of the project bridges, five bridges are supporting socio-economic development of the project area as part of the major artery connecting Nias/Gunung Sitoli airport, Gunung Sitoli port and Teluk Dalam port in the south. In this way, the project bridges are important routes for the reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities and fully align with the development needs of Indonesia consistently from the time of the project planning to the time of the ex-post evaluation.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan’s ODA Policy In “Japan’s Country Assistance Program for the Republic of Indonesia in 2005,” which was

6 Japan’s ODA policy at the time of the project planning, a subprogram for post-independence Aceh recovery and reconstruction support was planned as peace-building and reconstruction assistance under the important area of “peace and stability.” At the same time, urgent recovery and reconstruction support for the disaster caused by the earthquake and tsunami off the coast of the Northern Sumatra was also placed importance. This project, which aims to “ensure safe and efficient traffic, thereby contributing to improving accessibility to public services for residents and the reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities,” is relevant to Japan's ODA policy at the time of the project planning. In light of the above, this project has been highly relevant to Indonesia’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ②) 3.2.1 Project Outputs Table 1 shows the planned and actual outputs of this project. The project outputs of the Japanese side were implemented wholly as planned. According to the construction management consultant, these bridges adopt a structure that reduces maintenance cost and has an excellent durability of 50 years, unless there is any large-scale salt damage, water immersion, earthquake or deterioration caused by overloaded trucks.

Table 1: Plans and Actual Results of the Project Outputs (unit: meters) Gido Si’ite Idano Gawo Mezaya Item Nou Bridge Nou A Bridge Sa’au Bridge Bridge Bridge Bridge 41.5 49.5 40.0 151.0 94.0 53.5 Bridge length As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0

Carriagewa y As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned

width 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Bridge Sidewalk As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned Approach road 70.8 90.5 180.0 209.0 181.0 186.5 length As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned Approach 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 carriagewa As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned y 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0

Road width Shoulder As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned Approach road 39.0 73.0 0.0 0.0 95.0 129.0 retaining wall As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned As planned length Source: Materials provided by JICA

There were three changes from the detailed design that were implemented without any problems in response to requests from the Government of Indonesia. Here is an outline of the changes. (1) Change of the pier foundation at Nou A Bridge and Sa’au Bridge (approved on March 24,

7 2011). Change was proposed to use steel tubes with a thickness of nine millimeters instead of pipes for the bridge pier piles and to keep the piers after placing the concrete. There were no changes in the main body and such change was judged to be appropriate to improve the safety and reliability of the river works. (2) Change of revetment of PC sheet piles10 at Nou Bridge (approved on September 24, 2012): When implementing the temporary bypass of water pipes which were the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia, the installation position of a temporary water pipe bridge was changed for cost reduction. In line with the change, the need to shorten the PC sheet piles to protect the abutments of Nou Bridge occurred. (3) Addition of PC sheet piles to the revetment at Sa’au Bridge (approved on September 24, 2012): The impact from waves and tides was larger than the initial estimate and construction works were found to be difficult under the initial design. Therefore, sand movement was prevented by placing PC sheet piles as shielding layers. These were necessary measures for the construction work and local materials were diverted. The design changes were fully discussed between the construction management consultant and JICA, and such changes were found to be appropriate. Matters that were the responsibility of the Indonesian side included compensation for land acquisition and resettlement, relocation of telephone lines, electric poles and water pipes, and removal of existing bridges. These matters were implemented as planned.

Nou A Bridge in Gunung Sitoli City Idano Gawo Bridge (at the time of the ex-post evaluation) (at the time of the ex-post evaluation)

10 PC (pre-stressed concrete) sheet piles increase the bending strength by causing tension on the PC cables and by introducing compression force to the concrete.

8 3.2.2 Project Inputs 3.2.2.1 Project Cost This evaluation was judged only from the cost of the Japanese side because the amount of the Indonesian side for the total cost was unknown. The total projected cost was planned at 1,566.8 million yen (1,555 million yen on the Japanese side and 11.8 million yen on the Indonesian side). The actual cost of the Japanese side was lower than planned at 1,265 million yen (81% of the plan). According to the construction management consultant, competitively quoted prices could be obtained because the builder was in a good financial position and proposed good payment conditions to local subcontractors who had a proven track record. Moreover, site management cost could be curbed by building the construction management system with a higher ratio of local staff through the long-term employment of local workers and continuous business transactions with good subcontractors.

3.2.2.2 Project Period The project period was planned to last 34 months from March 2009 to December 2011, but actually took 47 months from March 13, 2009 (signing of the Grant Agreement) to January 23, 2013 (completion date). The project was implemented at 138% of the plan including the work that was the responsibility of the Indonesian side. The background of this were delays in land acquisition by local governments, delays in relocation of existing lifelines, and delays due to disturbance by residents’ throwing stones and floods and landslides caused by heavy rains, all of which accumulated to a total of ten months delay. Consequently, although the project cost was within the plan, the project exceeded the plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair.

3.3 Effectiveness11 (Rating: ③) 3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators) Indicators set for the ex-ante project evaluation were “number of lanes,” “load limit” and “traffic speed.” That is to say, by replacing each bridge, it was anticipated to increase the number of lanes, shorten the traveling time from Gunung Sitoli City to Teluk Dalam by improving the travelling performance, and making it passable for large vehicles, which were expected to increase because of the restoration works. Replacing each bridge was also aimed to secure safe and efficient traffic, evacuation routes in the event of a disaster, and transportation routes for relief goods. In the evaluation of effectiveness, whether or not the indicators mentioned above actually attained their target was identified in order to determine any “improvement of travelling performance” first. Secondly, “average daily traffic volume” was added as an indicator to

11 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact.

9 identify whether traffic demand on this major artery had increased and whether appropriate traffic diversion had been carried out. Moreover, “transportation volume of passengers and goods” was set to identify whether efficient city transportation had been secured.

(1) Improvement of travelling performance Before the implementation of this project, the bridges had been damaged by the earthquakes and vehicles were forced to travel at low speeds. Because the width of Nou A Bridge in Gunung Sitoli City and Sa’au Bridge near Teluk Dalam City with heavy traffic volume was only for a single lane, traffic jams occurred during peak times. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, although the traffic volume on the bridges does increase substantially, traffic jams do not occur, as shown later. Table 2 shows the baseline and the target for indicators shown in the ex-ante project evaluation. According to the interview from the implementing agency, two vehicle lanes and a load limit of 20 tons were established as planned. As for the traveling speed, because no data were available, the time required to travel the 100.4 kilometers between Nou A Bridge in Gunung Sitoli City and Sa’au Bridge12 was actually measured at the time of the ex-post evaluation. The results were that it took 137 minutes during morning peak time (southward) and took 134 minutes during afternoon off-peak time (northward) with no impact from traffic jams being seen. The average traveling speed on the six bridges was about 45 kilometers per hour. During the field survey, no traffic jams were seen on each bridge even during peak times and it was possible to travel safely at the same speed as the target value. Because road repair works were implemented by the Ministry of Public Works at two points between Mezaya Bridge and Idano Gawo Bridge, areas of about 50 meters were gravel road. However, this did not have much effect on the travelling performance. It is fair to say that the replacement of the bridges has helped secure safe and efficient traffic.

Table 2: Plans and Actual Results of Quantitative Effect Indicators Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target Actual* 2008 2014 2008 2014 2008 2014 2015 3 years 3 years 3 years 4 years after after after after completion completion completion completion Bridge name/Indicator Number of lanes (lanes) Load limit (tons) Traveling speed (km/h) name Nou Bridge 2 2 20 20 20 30 30 Nou A Bridge 1 2 15 20 20 30 30 Gido Si’ite Bridge 2 2 20 20 20 60 60 Idano Gawo Bridge 1 2 6 20 10 60 60 Mezaya Bridge 1 2 20 20 5 40 40 Sa’au Bridge 1 2 6 20 5 40 40 Source: Ex-ante project evaluation * Actual measurment taken during the ex-post evaluation field survey between Nou A Bridge and Sa’au Bridge

12 From the 0.6 km point on the Nou A Bridge to the 101.0 km point on the Sa’au Bridge.

(2) Increase in average daily traffic volume As shown in Table 3, the average daily traffic volume in 2014 increased substantially to 1.5- to 5.3-fold over 2008, at the time of planning. Such an increase is considered to be generally attributable to the increase in registered vehicles13 in Nias Island and the increase in population of Gunung Sitoli City14, the largest city in Nias Island, but the effect of the completion of this project in 2013 is notable. Because traffic was controlled for reconstruction work of this project from 2011 to 2012, traffic volume decreased compared to that of the time of project planning. After completion of the project, however, traffic controls were lifted and it became possible to drive smoothly across each bridge.

Table 3: Average Daily Traffic Volume (unit: vehicles/day) BaselineNote1 Estimate Actual Actual Actual Actual 2008 2018 2011 2012 2013 2014 5 years after 2 years 1 year after 1 year before Completion completion before completion completion year Bridge name completion Nou Bridge 17,227 22,170 3,781 7,026 35,364 44,785 Nou A Bridge 3,371 10,788 1,839 5,056 9,091 11,381 Gido Si’ite Bridge Note2 2,578 4,125 Note2 700 1,011 3,060 3,825 Idano Gawo Bridge 1,815 2,903 Mezaya Bridge Note3 1,232 1,972 Note3 438 1,480 5,942 6,485 Sa’au Bridge 1,619 2,591 Source: Baseline and Estimate figures are from the basic design study report. Actual figures are from materials provided by P2JN Note1: Based on the traffic volume survey implemented at the time of the basic design survey. The measurement value is in 12-hour (6:00-18:00) measurements. Daily traffic volume indicates 24-hour traffic volume in both directions (1.3-fold of the 12-hour traffic volume) Note2: Actual figures of both Gido Si’ite Bridge and Idano Gawo Bridge are the same because there is only one monitoring point on the road section, including both bridges. Note3: Actual figures of both Mezaya Bridge and Sa’au Bridge are the same because there is only one monitoring point on the road section, including both bridges.

Looking at each bridge individually, Nou Bridge, which has the highest traffic volume, reached 44,785 vehicles in 2014 and became 2.6-fold over the 2008 level and 2-fold over the estimate of 2018. The daily traffic volume of Nou A Bridge in 2014 was 11,381 vehicles, which is 3.4-fold over the 2008 level and about 10% more than the estimate value of 2018. The traffic volumes of Gido Si’ite Bridge and Idano Gawo Bridge in 2014 were 3,828 vehicles, and the traffic volume of Gido Si’ite Bridge became 1.5-fold over the 2008 level although it did not exceed the estimate of 2018. On the other hand, the Idano Gawo Bridge, became 2.1-fold over the 2008 level and slightly exceeded the estimated volume of 2018. The traffic volume of Mezaya Bridge and Sa’au Bridge in 2014 increased 4 to 5-fold compared to that of 2008, and exceeded the

13 The number of registered vehicles of all vehicle types including trucks, passenger cars and motorcycles was recorded at almost 40,000 units each year and this increasing tendency is not slowing down. 14 Population in 2014 was 790,000 and shows a 1% growth each year on average from 750,000 in 2010 (Statistics Office of Nias Island).

11 estimated traffic volume in 2018 by 2 to 3-fold. In this way, the traffic volume of all bridges except Gido Si’ite Bridge exceeded the estimated value of 2018 by 2014, which shows the substantial increase in the traffic volume. It is because vehicles must cross the Nou Bridge to go north by National Road No. 75 from the south part of the island, which is behind the high traffic demand flowing into Gunung Sitoli City. Traditionally, traffic volume outgoing from the central part of the city is lower than the incoming traffic volume. Therefore, the increase rate of Nou A Bridge (3-fold) was lower than that of Nou Bridge.

It should be noted that the said two bridges became one-way traffic from December 2014, and traffic is controlled by the traffic flow incoming to the central part of the city crossing over Nou Bridge and by traffic flow outgoing from the city crossing over Nou A Bridge (Figure 2). At Sa’au Bridge close to Teluk Dalam City and Mezaya Bridge around Source: Basic design study report Note: Blue arrows show the parts where two-way traffic was the city, the average daily traffic changed to one-way traffic under city traffic control. volume in 2013 became 4-fold over the Figure 2: Traffic Guidance of Nou Bridge and Nou previous year. In the past, traffic volume A Bridge used to decrease as one moved further south from Gunung Sitoli City. However, the increase in traffic volume was also seen in the south part due to repairs of these bridges. According to BAPPENAS of South Nias Regency, they say that traffic demand within Teluk Dalam City increased in line with the development of the city itself. On the other hand, Gido Si’ite Bridge and Idano Gawo Bridge which are located in the middle between the said two cities showed low values compared to other areas because there are less facilities there that are involved with urban functions. Looking at the daily average traffic volumes by type of vehicle in Figure 3, the traffic volume of motorcycles, which are indispensable for the everyday traveling of island residents, increased sharply after the completion of all bridges for the project. According to port-related people and carriers, the loading weight limitation was eased to 20 ton-level from 8 tons-level because of the implementation of this project. Thus, the number of large trucks delivering motorcycles to the city center increased, which were shipped by container ships.

12 50,000 15,000 40,000 30,000 10,000 20,000 5,000 10,000 0 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014

motorcycles cars motorcycles cars buses trucks buses trucks total total

Nou Bridge Nou A Bridge Note

6,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 4,000 2,000 2,000

0 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 motorcycles cars motorcycles cars buses trucks buses trucks total total

Gido Si’ite Bridge, Idano Gawo Bridge Mezaya Bridge, Sa’au Bridge

Source: Materials provided by P2JN Note: Lack of 2015 data Figure 3: Daily Average Traffic Volume by Type of Vehicle

(3) Increase in the volume of cargo transportation in Nias Island Table 4 shows the changes in the volume of cargo transportation in Nias Island at Gunung Sitoli Port. The volume of cargo transportation increased by 20% to approximately 270,000 tons in 2014 from approximately 230,000 tons in 2010. Traditionally, 98% of goods transported from outside Nias Island passed through Gunung Sitoli Port and were transported to each commercial area of the island by large trucks along National Road No. 75. According to port-related people and carriers, many trucks were replaced by 20 ton-level trucks because of the increased loading limitation to 20 ton-level on National Road No. 75 after completion of the bridge repairs. Although the data before 2008, the commencement of the project was not confirmed, it can be said that distribution within the island which passes through Gunung Sitoli Port has been vitalized and the volume of cargo transportation within Nias Island increased.

13 Table 4: Cargo Transportation Volume in Nias Island at Gunung Sitoli Port (unit: tons/year) Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 3 years before 2 years before 1 year before 1 year Completion year completion completion completion after completion 228,738 245,667 249,456 266,283 274,769 Source: Materials provided by Gunung Sitoli Port

Loading cargos at Gunung Sitoli Port Transport trucks at Gunung Sitoli Port

3.4 Impacts 3.4.1 Intended Impacts The intended impacts of this project at the time of the project planning were as follows: (1) accessibility to public services for residents are improved; (2) socio-economic activities are reconstructed and revitalized; and (3) bridges are used as evacuation routes in the event of a disaster and transportation routes for relief goods. To identify these impacts, a beneficiary survey15 and an interview survey to carriers16 were conducted along the national road from Gunung Sitoli City to Teluk Dalam City, and the perception of the road users was identified. The contents of the beneficiary survey were about the frequency of using the bridges in traveling in everyday life17 and traveling methods both at the point of 2010 and at the point of the ex-post evaluation. The results found that almost no change was seen between the said two points. In

15 The population of direct beneficiaries of this project is about 500,000 people along the project roads of the entire Nias Island. Among them, sampling was carried out in accordance with each population rate. The interviewer visited the houses of 35 residents in the vicinity of Nou Bridge and Nou A Bridge within 1 kilometer radius close to the bridges in the center of Gunung Sitoli City, 20 residents in the vicinity of Gido Si’ite Bridge and 20 residents in the vicinity of Idano Gawo Bridge in the central part of the island, 20 residents in the vicinity of Mezaya Bridge and 25 residents in the vicinity of Sa’au Bridge in the south part of the island, and hearing survey was carried out on weekdays and holidays. The number of valid responses was 99 people. The breakdown is as follows: 64 men (65%) and 35 women (35%); two people in the teens (2%), 28 people in the 20s (28%), 30 people in the 30s (30%), 26 people in the 40s (26%), 11 people in the 50s (11%), one person in the 60s (1%) and one person in the 70s (1%). No differences between men and women were seen in the beneficiary survey results. 16 Interview survey was implemented for five carriers in Gunung Sitoli City by using questionnaire regarding maintenance cost, fuel cost, business performance and fare before and after the project. 17 The following six items: traveling to workplace; traveling at the time of providing products and services, etc.; traveling to government offices; traveling to educational institutions; traveling to hospitals; and traveling to market for shopping, etc.

14 addition, for the impacts that involved data that were not obtainable through these surveys, statistical data were used for analysis.

(1) Accessibility to public services for residents are improved More than 60% of beneficiaries replied that community offices, hospitals and schools are in the same village and they do not use the bridges. Also, for residents who do use the bridges, there was almost no difference in time required for each journey. Therefore, the improvement of accessibility to public services for residents due to the replacement of bridges under this project is regarded to be limited.

(2) Socio-economic activities are reconstructed and revitalized According to data from the Statistics Office of Nias Island as shown in Table 5, the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) between 2012 and 2014 has grown each year. The growth rate of the regional economy is at the 5% level, which shows the growth is at a pace slightly higher than that of the national Indonesia average which is at the 4% level.

Table 5: GRDP within Nias Island and the Growth Rate (unit: 1 billion rupiah) Area 2012 2013 2014 Gunung Sitoli City 2,276 2,418 2,565 Nias Regency 1,776 1,889 1,992 West Nias Regency 878 923 971 North Nias Regency 1,646 1,750 1,843 South Nias Regency 3,074 3,218 3,357 Total 965,052 1,019,775 1,072,721 Growth rate of Nias Island 5.7% 5.2% N/A Domestic growth rate 4.6% 4.2% 3.7% Source: Statistics Office of Nias Island, World Bank statistics

In the beneficiary survey, questions were asked about the ease of access to stores selling daily commodities, the quantity, types and prices of daily commodities, and any change in purchase cost of daily commodities. For ease of access, and quantity and types of daily commodities, all people responded “access became easier,” 60% responded “quantity has increased” and more than 90% responded “varieties increased.” Concerning the prices of daily commodities, on the other hand, nearly 60% responded “prices became cheaper” and 90% responded that their expenditure “increased.” These answers seem to indicate the possibility that the replacement of bridges under this project has contributed to increasing the quality and quantity of people’s daily commodities. Also, in the survey of carriers, all five carriers responded “monthly maintenance cost reduced by 500,000 rupiah on average” although the transport distance did not change because of this project. To the question on what change, if any, occurred to their business performance after the

15 implementation of the project, all five carriers replied that their business performance “improved.” Although it is unknown how much this project affected the reduction of maintenance cost and improvement of business performance, all five carriers responded that their degree of satisfaction with this project was satisfactory (four carriers) or highly satisfactory (one carrier).

(3) Bridges are used as evacuation routes in the event of a disaster and transportation routes for relief goods After repairs to the bridges, no large-scale disasters have occurred. Thus, the bridges had not been used either as evacuation routes or for the transportation of relief goods at the time of the field survey. According to each regency and the Department of Disaster Assistance of Gunung Sitoli City, tsunami/flood evacuation route maps have been prepared for the national roads where the bridges were improved so that these roads and bridges are ready for use as the route to transport relief goods. Evacuation route signs and evacuation towers are currently being placed on this national road.

In light of the above, although an impact on “the improvement of accessibility to public services for residents” is limited, it can be inferred that positive impacts are provided in relation to “reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities” and “use as evacuation routes in the event of a disaster and transportation routes for relief goods.” Therefore, it can be said that there is a certain level of impact in general.

3.4.2 Other Impacts 3.4.2.1 Impacts on the Natural Environment This project involved repairs to existing bridges and did not include construction of new bridges. Accordingly, the impacts on the natural environment were considered to be minor. This was confirmed with the implementing agency during the field survey, and no environmental problems were found to have occurred. In addition, no negative impacts on the environment were found during the field inspection. According to the construction management consultant, environmental monitoring was carried out regularly and no problems have been found.

3.4.2.2 Land Acquisition and Resettlement Land acquisition and resettlement were planned for one house located at Nou A Bridge and two houses adjacent to Mezaya Bridge. The Government of Indonesia has no records regarding resettlement and provided no information on the resettlement. Therefore, the situation is unknown regarding the resettlement and the restoration of the resettled residents’ livelihoods.

16 3.4.2.3 Unintended Positive /Negative Impacts According to personnel related to Nias Regency BAPPENAS, a university, which was planned to be built in Gunung Sitoli City, was changed to be newly built near Idano Gawo Bridge because the transportation environment had improved substantially. The Ministry of Public Works is now implementing a feasibility study regarding a plan to expand the width of the bridge. In addition, two bridges were newly built in Nias Regency and another two bridges in South Nias Regency with designs similar to the bridges that were improved under this project. According to the Public Works Department of each regency, the departments intend to build bridges with a higher degree of earthquake resistance based on the Japanese design. They showed a strong desire to learn bridge design technologies continuously into the future.

In light of the above, although information regarding resettlement and land acquisition was not obtainable, in other aspects this project has largely achieved its objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness and impact of the project are high.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ②) 3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance Concerning the maintenance of the project bridges after construction, at the time of the project planning, it was planned that maintenance of the five bridges on a local road in Gunung Sitoli City except Nou A Bridge was to be implemented by the North Sumatra Provincial Road & Bridge Maintenance for Nias Branch, and maintenance of Nou A Bridge was to be implemented by the Nias Regency Housing and Infrastructure Department. As a result of the progress made in restructuring the ministries and agencies as part of the decentralization of Indonesia, the maintenance organizations have also been changed as shown in Table 618. In 2012 during the period of project construction, provincial roads were promoted to national roads and the local road where Nou A Bridge passes was designated as a city road. Therefore, the five bridges except Nou A Bridge were placed under the jurisdiction of the national government from the jurisdiction of the North Sumatra Provincial Government. Apart from this, BRR, which was the reconstruction operating entity, was dismantled in 2009 and its personnel were moved to PPK Nias Branch. Accordingly, it was decided that maintenance of the five bridges, instead of the North Sumatra Provincial Road & Bridge Maintenance for Nias Branch, was to be carried out by PPK Nias Branch, which is a subordinate organization of BBPJN1, and P2JN; daily maintenance/simple repairs by PPK Nias Branch and periodic inspections/large-scale repairs19 by P2JN.

18 Three administrative regions of West Nias Regency, North Nias Regency and Nias Regency were created in 2011 in Nias Regency in line with the population increase. Moreover, Nias Island is anticipated to be designated as a Province within one year from 2016 due to the population increase. 19 PPK Nias Branch carries out site supervision at the time of large-scale repairs.

Table 6: Change of Maintenance Organization for Each Bridge (At the time of the project planning and at the time of the ex-post evaluation) At the time of the project Name of bridge At the time of the ex-post evaluation planning Nou Bridge North Sumatra Provincial P2JN Periodic inspections (twice a Gido Si’ite Bridge Road & Bridge year), large-scale repairs, traffic Idano Gawo Maintenance for Nias surveys, design/planning, Bridge Branch contract management20 Mezaya Bridge PPK Nias Branch Daily maintenance/simple Sa’au Bridge repairs, site supervision of large-scale renovations and new constructions Nou A Bridge Nias Regency Housing and Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City Infrastructure Department Source: Prepared by the evaluators

Concerning Nou A Bridge, Gunung Sitoli City took over the bridge from the Ministry of Public Works in an agreement concluded in December 2013. According to the Mayor of Gunung Sitoli City and the Ministry of Public Works, the Mayor has not yet filed an application with the Ministry of Finance pertaining to the transfer and the bridge has not been recognized as an asset of Gunung Sitoli City at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Gunung Sitoli City needs to start asset transfer procedures to the Ministry of Finance as soon as possible. According to the Mayor, the maintenance budget for Nou A Bridge has not been appropriated. However, the Mayor said that budgetary action would be taken as soon as the formal asset delivery is carried out so that cleaning and daily inspections would be ready to be carried out immediately. After 2010, PPK Nias Branch carried out the cleaning, painting and other maintenance of the five bridges except Nou A Bridge with 36 people, four times a year. More than half of the personnel are engineers. These engineers are dispatched for on-site works and carry out cleaning and simple repair work. The number of personnel is appropriate and no major problems have been identified from an institutional aspect. On the other hand, the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City, the agency in charge of cleaning, painting and other maintenance of Nou A Bridge, has 9 civil engineers and 8 to 12 cleaning staff members. Information was not obtainable concerning the number of bridges subject to maintenance. According to the interview with the maintenance manager, however, the minimum required organizational system and personnel in each section are in place even if Nou A Bridge is added. Accordingly, no major problems have been identified from an institutional aspect other than the transfer of Nou A Bridge.

20 When building a new bridge or replacing a bridge, there are several bridge maintenance subcontractors in the island and full technical capabilities can be ensured.

Source: Materials provided by PPK Nias Branch *denotes one person concurrently serves on these positions. Figure 4: Organizational Chart of PPK Nias Branch

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance At the time of the project planning, a contract was signed with the contractors in North Sumatra Province as well as Nias Regency and South Nias Regency, who carried out large-scale roads and bridge rehabilitation works. Because special technologies are not necessary for cleaning, painting and other daily maintenance of facilities that were built under this project, it was considered that there would be no technical problems using a traditional maintenance system. A well-coordinated system that includes the following aspects has been established: P2JN has inspection manuals according to the scale of the roads and bridges, and engineers implement periodic inspections every year using these manuals with inspection records being electronically documented. P2JN carries out the basic design of large-scale repairs or replacement works of bridges and formulates the budget necessary for such works, and then the works are implemented by work contractors. P2JN has much experience of bridge renovations and no major problems have been identified from a technical aspect. According to the interview with PPK Nias Branch, the branch carries out only cleaning, painting or site supervision of the renovation works. Repair works are entrusted to several local island companies. The section manager of PPK Nias Branch liaises and closely coordinates with P2JN regarding repair works and no major problems have been identified regarding the contract management and work management. By contrast, the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City is considered to have many issues with periodic inspections although no major problems have been identified regarding

19 bridge cleaning/painting or daily inspection. The city has been maintaining mainly wooden bridges and it is difficult to say that the city has enough knowledge and information about concrete bridges. An interview with the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City has revealed that the department has no maintenance inspection manuals or hammers or other inspection equipment. It is important for the department to obtain the knowledge and techniques necessary for maintenance and to create a system. In light of the above, problems remain regarding the maintenance of Nou A Bridge because the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City does not have the appropriate technical capabilities as part of its operations.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance A survey was conducted on the change of BBPJN1’s budget and PPK’s road maintenance budget from the financial aspects of operation and maintenance of this project (Table 7). At the time of the project planning, the estimated annual cost necessary for maintenance, including periodic inspections of the five project bridges was 75 million rupiah. The Nias Island maintenance budget of the Directorate General of Highways of the Ministry of Public Works fully satisfied this estimate at the time of the project planning. According to BBPJN 1 and PPK Nias Branch, the annual budget for simple maintenance which was estimated at the time of the ex-post evaluation has been secured. They say that the maintenance budget is expected to increase as the construction of roads and bridges are predicted to increase in the future.

Table 7: Budget of BBPJN1 (unit: 1 billion rupiah) Ratio of Nias Island maintenance Year Budget of PPK Nias Branch (A) Budget of BBPJN1 (B) cost to budget of BBPJN1 (A/B) 2010 183 18,341 1.00% 2011 298 27,975 1.07% 2012 403 40,339 1.00% 2013 390 38,834 1.00% 2014 403 42,754 0.94% 2015 574 N/A N/A Source: BBPJN1 Note: Nias Island maintenance budget of the Directorate General of Highways under the Ministry of Public Works is included in BBPJN1.

On the other hand, the maintenance budget of the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City which is to maintain Nou A Bridge is shown in Table 8. According to the Public Works Department, the amount to be appropriated for the maintenance budget of roads and bridges in the city fluctuates every year, but the amount necessary to carry out cleaning and simple repairs/daily inspections has been secured, and the budget is totally executed. Replacement of bridges is executed using the regular budget of the city. If the amount exceeds the budget, however, an application is filed with the national government. Applications are filed every year

20 and the total amount is almost always appropriated. According to the interview with the Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City where most of the bridges are wooden bridges, if large-scale renovation takes place for a concrete bridge like Nou A Bridge, the necessary amount would be appropriated from the national special budget. The maintenance cost is estimated at 12 million rupiah annually. According to the interview with the Mayor, the maintenance budget of Nou A Bridge has not been appropriated. However, the Mayor said that budgetary action would be taken as soon as the formal asset delivery is carried out. In light of the above, no major problems have been identified from a financial aspect of the maintenance system.

Table 8: Maintenance Budget of Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City (unit: 10,000 rupiah) Public Works Department Road and bridge maintenance Ratio of maintenance budget Year accounting for the total budget budget and execution amount budget and execution amount (%) 2011 68,124 33,079 49% 2012 80,054 8,905 11% 2013 95,889 11,748 12% 2014 131,555 17,450 13% 2015 142,992 31,390 22% 2016 190,454 18,650 10% Source: Public Works Department of Gunung Sitoli City

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance At the time of the ex-post evaluation, P2JN carried out periodic inspections of the five bridges every year. Although operation and maintenance records were not disclosed by PPK in the field survey, the engineers reportedly kept records of cleaning works on photos. Weeding around the drainage ports and trash cleanup, etc., were carried out four times a year for all bridges. For the periodic inspections implemented at the time of the ex-post evaluation, no problems were identified for any of the five bridges.

A PPK worker is carrying out weeding work at Nou Bridge Sa’au Bridge (at the time of the ex-post (at the time of the ex-post evaluation) evaluation)

PPK Nias Branch carries out cleaning of the bridge surface/catch basin, cleaning the side ditches of the approach road, mowing the shoulder four times a year, and repainting of the guardrails and edge stones, and inspections for road surface cracks, deformation and destruction of the bridge structure, destruction of the slopes and loss of erosion protection structures, etc., are carried out twice a year. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, five bridges were found to be in good condition because not so much time had passed since completion of this project. However, the nameplates of Gido Si’ite Bridge and Mezaya Bridge showed external damage and the national flags were peeled off.

At the time of the ex-post evaluation survey, the Mayor of Gunung Sitoli City made remarks to the effect that daily inspections, cleaning, painting and other maintenance of Nou A Bridge will be implemented when the transfer procedures have been completed. The Ministry of Public Works also explained that the sharing of technical manuals will be promoted. In the near future, the institutional and technical aspects are expected to be improved.

In light of the above, some minor problems have been observed in terms of the institutional and technical aspects of the operation and maintenance system. Therefore, the sustainability of the project effects is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion This project was implemented in Nias Island of the Republic of Indonesia to ensure safe and efficient traffic by reconstructing six bridges that were damaged by the earthquakes and were in a structurally dangerous condition, thereby contributing to improving accessibility to public services for residents and the reconstruction and revitalization of socio-economic activities. This project is highly relevant to the development policy of the country both at the time of the project planning and at the time of the ex-post evaluation, as well as Japan’s ODA policy at the time of the project planning, and responds to Indonesia’s development needs. Therefore, the relevance of this project is high. The effectiveness and impact of this project are high because the six bridges are fully used and safe and efficient traffic has been secured by implementing this project. The project cost of the Japanese side was within the planned amount, however the project period exceeded the planned time. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is fair. Five bridges on national roads are maintained under a stable personnel structure by PPK Nias Branch, which is the subordinate organization of BBPJN1, and P2JN. Although Nou A Bridge was transferred to Gunung Sitoli City, procedures for asset registration have not been done yet and the maintenance has not been implemented. Although no major problems have been found in the

22 technical and financial aspects for maintenance, improvement of the institutional aspect is indispensable. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency (1) Immediate action on asset transfer procedures According to the interview survey to the Ministry of Public Works, cleaning and inspection have been implemented four times a year and twice a year respectively for the five bridges on roads which were promoted to national roads from provincial roads in 2012, and no problems have been observed in the sustainability of this project. As for the remaining Nou A Bridge, however, the Department of Public Works of Gunung Sitoli City has not been carrying out maintenance except for the installation of outdoor lights to reduce traffic accidents, although the bridge was delivered to Gunung Sitoli City from the national government in 2013. To secure sustainability of the project effects, regular maintenance work needs to be implemented by taking immediate budgetary measures for the maintenance of the said bridge. Gunung Sitoli City needs to apply for asset registration of the bridge with the Ministry of Finance through the Mayor. The city is expected to initiate procedures during the present mayor’s office term.

(2) Technical transfer on bridge maintenance from the Ministry of Public Works to the city It has been stated above that it is vital for the Public Work Department of Gunung Sitoli City to improve their technical maintenance capabilities. The department does not have maintenance inspection manuals or inspection equipment such as hammers. Because the maintenance of Nou A Bridge can be carried with relative ease, deterioration or damage is less than it would be for a regular bridge. However, as stated above, a concrete bridge’s maintenance and inspection cycles are largely different from those of a wooden bridge. The department can handle daily inspection and cleaning within the scope of everyday works, but it does not have enough knowledge or experience of periodic inspections. It must also improve its recordkeeping capabilities. On the other hand, P2JN, which implements similar maintenance of five bridges in Nias Island, has much experience and knowledge, such as bridge inspection manuals and inspection record formats, as well as an electronically-documented information management system. It is desirable that the Ministry of Public Works share these to improve the technical capabilities of bridge maintenance and carry out training. This would lead to extending the life of bridges involved in this project and ensure sustainability of the project effects.

23 4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA None.

4.3 Lessons Learned Support concerning asset transfer accompanying decentralization Amid the ongoing decentralization in the Republic of Indonesia, there are cases where public properties are transferred either from the nation to a province, from a province to a regency, or from a regency to a city. In this project, an agreement for transferring Nou A Bridge to Gunung Sitoli City from the Ministry of Public Works was signed. However, the city has either not fully recognized that fact, or has not understood the procedures necessary to register the bridge as an asset of the city. Therefore, Nou A Bridge is still not being maintained. Newly established regencies and cities through decentralization have only a short administrative history and do not have much knowledge and information about administrative procedures. Moreover, in Gunung Sitoli City of Nias Island and other cities far from the capital city, it is difficult to obtain information. Therefore, support from the Ministry of Public Works is necessary to process these transfer procedures smoothly. In this way, in a country where decentralization is ongoing, the administrative bodies are restructured and applications for asset registration and other procedures are likely to become more complicated. To cope with such situations, it is essential to share information between the implementing agency and JICA from the stage of project planning, identify the administrative procedure concerned with any asset transfer which might be anticipated in the future, and incorporate the system for managing such procedures into the document, such as the Minutes of Discussion between the implementing agency and JICA. During implementation of the project, the implementing agency must not fail to work with any organization to which authority is transferred in accordance with the agreed plan with JICA even when decentralization is accelerated. Furthermore, it is important that the implementing agency improves the system through which guidance and support can be provided regarding maintenance after completion of the asset transfer, and shares information with the organization which has taken over the asset. It is expected that JICA will consider a technical assistance project or provide other maintenance support, as necessary, so that maintenance can be implemented as planned even after the transfer.

End

24 Republic of Tajikistan FY2015 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project “The Project for Rehabilitation of Kurgan Tyube-Dusti Road (Phases I & II)” External Evaluators: Yuko Kishino and Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited

0. Summary This project was implemented in order to secure stable transportation of people and goods and contribute to local development, correction of regional disparities, and market zone expansion by rehabilitating the road between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti in the Khatlon Region in south Tajikistan. Both at the time of planning and at the time of the ex-post evaluation, this project is evaluated as having high relevance because it meets development policy and development needs of Tajikistan, as well as being in accordance with Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. The targeted road of the project has been fully used with a large increase in the freight volume. After the completion of the project in 2014, the economic growth rate of the Khatlon Region is higher than that of the whole country. The project may have partially contributed to vitalizing social and economic activities. For example, in a beneficiary survey, many road users replied that access to public facilities has been improved. Thus, the project has achieved high effectiveness and impact. However, influenced by price escalation, the project cost was found to exceed the limit of a grant aid project at the time of the detailed design. Therefore, the original plan was modified and the project was divided into two phases for implementation. Consequently, although the project outputs were accomplished mostly as planned, both the project cost and the project period exceeded the plan by large margins. Therefore, the efficiency of this project is low. The State Enterprises on Highway Maintenance (SEHM) of three Districts are in charge of operation and maintenance of this project, and conduct regular inspection under the jurisdiction of Kurgan Tyube State Enterprise for Transport Management (SETM). Holding necessary personnel, the SEHMs have no problem with the operation and maintenance system. They secure the cost for operation and maintenance, and the budget is expected to increase in the future as well. No major problems have been observed in the institutional, technical, and financial aspects of the operation and maintenance system. Consequently, the sustainability of the project effects is high. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

1 1. Project Description

The Road Improved by This Project Project Location (At the 52 km point)

1.1 Background Tajikistan is a country in Central Asia, located roughly in the heart of the Eurasian Continent. With a road network of approximately 26,507 km, the national roads including arterial roads comprise about 5,423 km (2016)1. The Khatlon Region in the south is the only large fertile plain in the country, where 2.97 million people2 (2014) live. A motorway passing from Kurgan Tyube, the capital city of the region, to Nizhniy Pyandzh near the border, includes the targeted road of this project. The motorway, constructed in 1940, was deteriorating; meanwhile, the volume of freight transportation was growing. Therefore, it had been considered that rehabilitation of the roads was necessary for securing a safe transportation route. Some parts of the road between Dushanbe (the capital city of Tajikistan) and Kurgan Tyube was rehabilitated with financing from the Asian Development Bank (hereafter referred to as the “ADB”) from 2001-2007, while the US constructed a bridge over the Panj River that crosses the Afghan border from southern Nizhniy Pyandzh from 2004-2007. The “Project for the Improvement of Dusti-Nizhniy Pyandzh Road: Phase I (2006–2007), Phase II (2009–2011),” a grant aid project of Japan, has improved the road between Dusti and Nizhniy Pyandzh. With the completion of the road rehabilitation between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti, the road rehabilitation from Dushanbe to the Afghan border was supposed to be completed. Under these circumstances, the Government of Tajikistan requested the Government of Japan to rehabilitate the said section.

1.2 Project Outline The objective of this project is to secure stable transportation of people and goods by rehabilitating the road between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti (59.9 km) in the Khatlon Region, thereby contributing to local development, correction of regional disparities, and market expansion.

1 Source: Ministry of Transport, Tajikistan 2 Source: World Bank

2 Source: Basic Design Report Figure 1: Roads to be Rehabilitated in this Project

E/N Grant Limit / Actual 63 million yen (detailed design) Grant Amount 3,432 million yen (Phase I) / 1,889 million yen (Phase II) Exchange of Notes Date December 2007 (detailed design) (/Grant Agreement Date) May 2008 (Phase I) / December 2011(Phase II) N/A (Phase I) / December 2011 (Phase II) Implementing Agency Ministry of Transport Project Completion Date November 2011 (Phase I) / June 2013 (Phase II) Phase I: Dai Nippon Construction / NIPPO Main Contractor CORPORATION (Joint venture) Phase II: Dai Nippon Construction Main Consultants Phase I: INGÉROSEC Corporation Phase II: Katahira & Engineers International Basic Design June 2007 Detailed Design June 2008 Related Projects 【Grant Aid Project】  The Project for the Improvement of Dusti-Nizhniy Pyandzh Road (Phase I: 2006, Phase II: 2009)  The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Road Maintenance in the Khatlon Region and Districts of Republican Subordination (2013)  The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Road Maintenance in the Sughd Region and the Eastern Part of the Khatlon Region (2016) 【Technical Cooperation Project】  The Project for Improvement of Road Maintenance (2013-2016)

3 【 Other International Institutions, Aid Agencies, and others】  Asian Development Bank: Rehabilitation of Dushanbe - Kurgan Tyube - Dangara - Kulob Road (2001-2007)  Asian Development Bank: Rehabilitation of Dushanbe - Kyrgyz border Road Phase I (2003-2009)  Asian Development Bank: Rehabilitation of Dushanbe - Kyrgyz border Road Phase II (2005-2010)  Asian Development Bank: Road Rehabilitation of CAREC Corridors 3 and 5 (2013-2017)  Islamic Development Bank: Rehabilitation of Murgab - Kulma Road (2000-2002)  Islamic Development Bank: Shagon - Zigar Road Construction Project Phase I (2003-2005)  Islamic Development Bank: Shagon - Zigar Road Construction Project Phase II (2005-2007)  Islamic Development Bank: Shagon - Zigar Road Construction Project Phase III (2011-2013)  Iran: Anzob Tunnel Construction Project (2004-2008)  The USA and Norway: Construction of Bridge in Nizhniy Pyandzh (2004-2007)

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study 2.1 External Evaluators Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited Makiko Oleynikov, IC Net Limited 2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study For this ex-post evaluation, the study was implemented as follows: Duration of the Study: July 2015-September 2016 Duration of the Field Study: November 1-13, 2015 and February 7-12, 2016

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: B3) 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③4) 3.1.1 Relevance to the Development Plan of Tajikistan Based on the long-term strategy, “National Development Strategy 2015,” (2006)” targeting 2015, the Government of Tajikistan has drawn up a “Long-term Transportation Development Plan” every five years. To promote road investment for improving the transportation network as one of the main activities for facilitating economic growth, the plan was set to improve infrastructure systematically. The Ministry of Transport (hereafter referred to as the “MOT”), in charge of road improvement, has drawn up the “National Investment and Technology Program 2005-2007,” aiming at improving the road and railway network for promoting economic growth.

3 A: Highly satisfactory; B: Satisfactory; C: Partially satisfactory; D: Unsatisfactory 4 ③: High; ②: Fair; ①: Low

4 Meanwhile, the improvement work of three highways of AH7, AH65, and AH66 in Tajikistan had been sequentially ongoing in Asian Highway Network5 (hereafter referred to as “AH”) promoted by UN initiatives. Especially, AH7 is an international road with a total length of 5,000 km including the targeted road of this project, which connects Yekaterinburg of Russia with Karachi of Pakistan. The ADB had been rehabilitating a part of the road between the capital city of Dushanbe and Kurgan Tyube since 2005, and the rehabilitation of the road between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti, positioned as an important route, was expected to enable the smooth flow of traffic.

Source: Material provided by ADB Figure 2: Asian Highway Network

5 This refers to the improvement project of the 140 thousand km of roads that run across 32 Asian countries. It aims to serve as the modern Silk Road by mainly using the existing road network.

5 The targeted road of the project at the time of the ex-post evaluation corresponds to the target section of the AH plan. Moreover, the project is also promoted as a part of the program of Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (hereafter referred to as “CAREC”), which is conducted in cooperation with the ADB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank6. In addition, the “National Target Development Strategy for Transport Sector of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Year 2025 (2011)” emphasizes the need to improve transportation infrastructure that forms the foundation of economic growth, including the aging roads developed during the Soviet era and the roads devastated by civil war. The national midterm action strategy formulated in 2013, “Living Standard Improvement Strategy (2013-2015),” cites betterment of the economic environment by improving transportation infrastructure with road rehabilitation as an important issue in order to enhance connectivity between regions and to upgrade the living standard. As seen above, the importance of this project has consistently been high at the time of both planning and the ex-post evaluation. This project is relevant to the development plan and the sector plan of Tajikistan.

3.1.2 Relevance to the Development Needs of Tajikistan At the time of planning, the road between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti targeted by this project was an important route as the south route section of a major arterial road network that radiates in four cardinal directions from the capital city of Dushanbe, as well as a road that connects the landlocked country of Tajikistan to the Arabian Sea. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the economy of Tajikistan showed noticeable slowdown due to the recession of the Russian Federation from 2014 and also to a weakened Tajik currency (somoni). Thus, trade with neighboring countries is becoming more important. The targeted section of this project is a part of key arterial roads that lead to the neighboring country of Afghanistan and the surrounding countries as well as connecting the capital city with the Khatlon Region. The role as a road that addresses the growing traffic volume is becoming significant. Along with the economic growth of the Khatlon Region centering on agriculture, the domestic freight transportation volume of Tajikistan increased more than twofold from 30,466 tons at the time of planning to 73,201 tons (estimated value7) in 2015. In addition, the number of registered automobiles per thousand people is 47 (estimated value8), a 1.5-fold increase from 31 at the time of planning. As seen above, this project is considered significant in terms of regional development as well.

6 CAREC focuses on transportation, trade promotion, energy, and trade policy as priority areas and in the transportation area develops the policy to improve six wide-area arterial roads. The targeted road of the project fall under Corridor 5 and Corridor 6 of CAREC.

7 The value during 2015 calculated by the evaluators based on data from Statistic Bureau of Tajikistan at the time of the ex-post evaluation. 8 The value during 2015 calculated by the evaluators based on data from Statistic Bureau of Tajikistan at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

3.1.3 Relevance to Japan’s ODA Policy In the Country Assistance Program for the Republic of Tajikistan in April 2009, the Government of Japan aimed to implement assistance that would enable the promotion of regional cooperation in Central Asia by linking cities with road transportation infrastructure and promoting long-term improvement in distribution systems. Consequently, this project was highly relevant to Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning.

In the light of the above, this project has been highly relevant to Tajikistan’s development plan and development needs both at the time of planning and ex-post evaluation, as well as Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. Therefore, its relevance is high.

3.2 Efficiency (Rating: ①) 3.2.1 Project Outputs The main outputs of this project were 59.9 km road improvement and rehabilitation of culverts9. Table 1 summarizes the planned and actual project outputs. The project was divided into Phase I and Phase II for implementation, which was not originally planned. At the stage of the detailed design of Phase I, the cost was found to exceed the E/N limit because of soaring prices. As a result, Phase II was separated. Despite some changes in the number of places for rehabilitation of crossing drainages in Phase II10, the outputs were mostly completed as planned.

Table 1: Planned and Actual Project Outputs Actual result Actual result Initial plan Improvement item (Phase I) (Phase II) 2008 2011 2013 Targeted section of 59.9 km 42.0 km 17.9 km this plan Pavement Surface Asphaltic concrete surface course, 5 cm As planned As planned structure work (main track) Asphaltic concrete binder course, 5 cm (main As planned As planned track) Road Two-layered asphalt surface treatment: As planned As planned bed DBST (road shoulder) work Upper layer roadbed 20 cm (crushed rock As planned As planned with particle size controlled) Lower layer roadbed 4 – 24 cm As planned As planned Formation width Width of main track: 7.0 m (two lines × 3.5 As planned As planned m) Width of road shoulder: standard 2.5 m As planned As planned Rehabilitation of 40 places 38 places crossing drainage Rehabilitation of Rehabilitation of the existing 14 bridges Rehabilitation of the 5 bridges (Span: 5.5 - bridges (Span: 3.3 - 42.0 m) existing 9 bridges 26.9 m) (Span: 3.3 - 42.0 m)

9 Culvert refers to a structure made of reinforced concrete for a ditch under a road, railway, or embankment. 10 No information was available about the reason for the decrease in the number of places where crossing drainages were rehabilitated.

7 Source: Materials provided from JICA

The following are the changes in construction method from the detailed design in Phase I. The construction method for the section of 1.1 km in Kurgan Tyube City was changed from road base macadam to asphalt leveling11, and pavement method on the surface of the road shoulder was changed from DBST12 to asphalt. Change of the surface of the road shoulder aimed to enhance reliability, and was appropriate for this project that handled arterial roads.

Appearance of the upper part of culvert 5, at Appearance of culvert 5, at the point 45 km the point 45 km away from Kurgan Tyube away from Kurgan Tyube (starting point) (starting point) (at the time of the ex-post evaluation) (at the time of the ex-post evaluation)

3.2.2 Project Inputs 3.2.2.1 Project Cost As for the project cost, the initial plan has been compared with the total actual result in Phase I and II. Because no information on the amount of the actual cost borne by the Tajikistani side was available, only the cost borne by the Japanese side has been evaluated. The total cost at the time of planning was 3,549 million yen, with 3,495 million yen borne by Japan (including the cost of the detailed design) and 54 million yen borne by Tajikistan. As shown in Table 2, the actual cost borne by Japan was 5,288 million yen (the total of Phase I, Phase II, and the detailed design). In 2008, when the detailed design began, inflation of 20% per year occurred. When considering the consumer price index in 2005 as 1.0, the index significantly rose to 2.1 in 2013. Although the exchange rate between USD and yen leaned to a strong yen from the time of planning13, the cost borne by Japan at the time of basic design was significantly higher than planned, with a 151% rise over the initial plan due to a sharp increase in prices.

11 Regarding the construction method for parallelizing to the surface layer with changing pavement thickness at the bottom layer, leveling using asphalt was carried out instead of road base using macadam. 12 DBST is an abbreviation of Double Bituminous Surface Treatment. It is a simpler pavement method than that using asphalt. 13 The average exchange rate in 2011 for Phase I was USD 1.00= 76.6 yen, and that in 2013 for Phase II was USD 1.00 = 97.63 yen, which leaned to strong yen compared with USD 1.00= 121.14 yen at the time of planning (2007).

8 Table 2: Planned and Actual Project Cost (unit: million yen) Initial plan Phase I Phase II Phase I and At the time of Phase II Compared Actual result Actual result planning Total of actual with plan 2011 2013 2007 results Detailed design 63 63 63 100% Cost borne Main body 3,432 3,353 1,872 5,225 152% by Japan Subtotal 3,495 3,416 1,872 5,288 151% Cost borne by Tajikistan 54 No data No data - - Total project cost 3,549 - - - - Source: Materials provided from JICA

3.2.2.2 Project Period The planned project period was 57 months in total from December 21, 2007 (Exchange of notes date of the detailed design) to July 2011. In contrast, the actual result was 66.2 months (116% of the planned one), from December 21, 2007 to June 24, 2013 (completion date of Phase II construction), which was longer than planned.

Table 3: Planned and Actual Project Period Phase Plan Actual result Actual result (total) From Dec. Dec. 2007 – (re-tendering in April 2009) – Nov. 2011 (49 Dec. 21, 2007 to Phase I 2007 to July months, 31 months from re-tendering to completion) June 24, 2013 2011 (66.2 months) Phase II (57 months) Dec. 2011 – June 2013 (18 months) Source: Materials provided from JICA

According to the implementing agency, repeated failure of tender in Phase I brought about the delay in the start of construction work because of revision of cost and delayed asphalt material procurement from a neighboring country; however, the construction period was within the scope of the plan. The construction period of Phase II was within the scope of the plan as well. Thus, despite the fact that the project period exceeded the plan, it is fair to say that the construction itself was implemented without any major problem.

Consequently, both the project cost and project period significantly exceeded the plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is low.

3.3 Effectiveness14 (Rating: ③) 3.3.1 Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators) It was expected that stable transportation of people and goods would be secured through implementing this project. In the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation Report of Phase II, improvement of the average traveling speed between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti was set up as an evaluation indicator. Since data of the

14 Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact.

9 average traveling speed are not available from the implementing agency, the changes before and after this project were examined by conducting an on-site survey on average traveling speed including an urban area as well as that excluding an urban area. In addition, this evaluation examined the extent to which the transportation volume has changed, using the annual average daily traffic and freight transportation volume in major sections as indicators.

(1) Improvement of average speed The implementation of this project was expected to improve the average traveling speed. The table below is a summary of baseline values and target values at the time of planning, and actual values at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

Table 4: Plans and Actual Results of the Effect Indicators Baseline Target value Note Actual value value 2008 2016 2015 At the time of Three years after Two years after planning completion completion Improvement of the average traveling speed that makes it possible to travel safely from a starting point (Kurgan 30 km/h 73 km/h 80 km/h Tyube) to an end point (Dusti) (excluding an urban area) Improvement of the average traveling speed from a starting point (Kurgan Tyube) to an end point (Dusti) (including an 20 km/h 40 km/h 60 km/h urban area) Source: Ex-Ante Project Evaluation Report, the answers of questionnaires to the implementing agency, and results of field survey conducted by study team Note: The year of completion was 2013. The target completion year was 2016 in the Ex-Ante Project Evaluation Report. Actual values were as of November 2015.

In a running inspection conducted by a local consultant, the average traveling speed in the target sections excluding an urban area was 80 km/h, and the average traveling speed in the target sections including an urban area was 60 km/h, both of which exceed each target value (73 km/h and 40 km/h). The results show that the average traveling speed was improving.

(2) Increase in the annual average daily traffic and transportation volume of passengers and freight Table 5 shows the annual average daily traffic volume15 in the major sections. The daily traffic volume between Dusti and Kolkhozabod increased by 22% from 6,920 vehicles of baseline value in 2007 to 8,420 vehicles in 2016. The traffic volume during the same period between Kolkhozabod and Kurgan Tyube has roughly tripled, and the traffic volume in the city of Kurgan Tyube has approximately quadrupled. The increase in traffic volume in Kurgan Tyube, the capital city of the region, may have been caused by the rapid economic growth of the Khatlon Region. The possible reasons that the increase in traffic volume in Dusti, an endpoint of

15 However, the data from 2014 and 2015 are annual average daily traffic volumes, while the data from 2008 and 2016 are only from a day traffic.

10 the road, is lower than that of other areas are that it is easily influenced by public safety around the border, and, according to a road expert, the registered number of the ordinary passenger cars has not increased in this area.

Table 5: Annual Average Daily Traffic Volume (unit: vehicle/day) Baseline value Actual value Actual value Actual value 2007 2014 2015 2016Note 2 One year after At the time of Two years after Three years completion planning completion after completion Note 1 1. Dusti - Kolkhozabod 6,920 5,160 6,162 8,420 2. Kolkhozabod- Kurgan Tyube 5,740 8,409 12,740 16,575 3. Kurgan Tyube City 9,671 31,305 36,351 31,818 Source: Baseline values are from the Basic Design Report, and actual values are from the Kurgan Tyube State Enterprise for Transport Management. Note 1: The completion year indicates 2013 when Phase II was completed. The Ex-Ante Project Evaluation Report set 2016 as the target year. Note 2: The values were obtained by measuring the daily traffic volume all day (24 hours) in the middle of February 2016. Because it is daily traffic volume in winter, the values are considered to be lower than the annual average daily traffic volume.

Looking at the freight transportation volume in Table 6, an increase in the whole nation can be seen while rail transportation is partially shifting to road transportation. Road freight transportation approximately doubled from 33.19 million tons in 2008 to 68.14 million tons in 2014. By contrast, as seen in Table 7, the freight transportation volume in the Khatlon Region rose more than threefold from 5.8 million tons in 2008 to 18.9 million tons in 2014. It exceeded 18.4 million tons in 2011 when the first phase was completed. Although the traffic volume and the freight transportation volume are largely influenced by factors other than this project, roads improved by this project may have contributed to an increase in the freight volume through facilitating smooth transportation by truck.

Table 6: Freight Transportation Volume from 2007 to 2015 (by means) (unit: ten thousand tons) FY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 4,500 4,773 5,686 6,119 6,166 6,840 7,225 7,469 8,000 -Road 3,047 3,319 4,231 5,075 5,240 5,999 6,551 6,814 7,320 -Rail 1,453 1,454 1,455 1,045 926 841 674 654 680 -Air 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 Source: Documents from Statistics Bureau

Table 7: Freight Transportation Volume in the Khatlon Region (unit: ten thousand tons) Baseline value Actual value Actual value Actual value Actual value 2008 2011 2012 2013 2014 Increase At the time of Two years before One year before Completion One year after rateNote planning completion completion year completion 580 1,842 1,984 1,806 1,890 326% Source: Ex-ante project evaluation table, Statistics Bureau of the Khatlon region Note: Comparison between baseline value and actual value in 2014

11 3.4 Impacts 3.4.1 Intended Impacts Intended impacts caused by this project have been classified into the following four categories: “vitalization of social and economic activities,” “expansion of market zone as a result of correction of regional disparities,” “improvement of accessibility to medical and educational facilities,” and “reduction of transportation cost of agricultural products.” To confirm these, analysis using statistical data, an attitude survey by the beneficiary survey16, and a survey on transportation businesses17 have been conducted. The results are described below.

(1) Vitalization of Social and Economic Activities Table 8 shows changes of population, regional GDP, and annual income per capita from 2008 to 2014 in the Khatlon region. Maintaining more than 20% in the growth rate of annual income per capita, a solid economic growth rate has been maintained in the entire region as well. This shows that the economy in the Khatlon region except for the year 2013 has been rapidly vitalized compared with the 4-7% GDP growth rate of the entire country. Although causal relationship with this project is unclear, it is reasonable to consider that the enhanced efficiency in transportation of freight and passengers by road improvement facilitated economic growth as initially planned.

Table 8: Population and Economic Situation in the Khatlon Region Whole Khatlon Region country Year Population Regional GRP Annual income per capita GDP (Thousand (Million Growth rate Growth rate (Somoni) Growth rate Growth rate people) somoni) 2008 2,642 - 4,904 - 1,828 - - 2009 2,700 2% 5,207 6% 2,233 22% 4% 2010 2,694 0% 6,495 25% 2,796 25% 7% 2011 2,766 3% 8,051 24% 3,600 29% 7% 2012 2,832 2% 9,800 22% 4,381 22% 7% 2013 2,899 2% 10,224 4% 6,047 38% 7% 2014 2,972 3% 11,693 14% 7,383 22% 7% Source: Data on Khatlon Region- Statistics Bureau, National GDP data growth rate – World Bank

16 As for the beneficiary survey, in cooperation with the government of the Khatlon Region, four places (Rumi District, Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District, Vakhsh District, and Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District) were selected. With the support of the chief of each city or district, a study team visited the central part of the city and district on the day designated by the chief to conduct an interview with the adults who applied to the interview at the local government office. Vakhsh District was not included in the target area of this project; the evaluators intended to compare the changes in the target area and those in other areas. Because of the time constraints on conducting the beneficiary survey, valid responses numbered only 69 under the support from a district chief. The breakdown was 47 men (68%) and 22 women (32%). By area, distribution was 17 from Rumi District (25%), 17 from Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District (25%), 17 from Vakhsh District (25%), and 18 from Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District (25%). Therefore, the survey samples have not been selected truly at random. The results may be reflected by the extreme intention of the residents who feel positive or negative impacts and who are willing to express their opinion. Thus, it is highly possible that both extremely positive and negative opinions noticeably appear. 17 A questionnaire survey was conducted on five transportation companies (two in Kurgan Tyube City, two in Qumsangir District, and one in Vakhsh District) at three major city blocks along Kurgan Tyube - Dusti road in the Khatlon Region.

12 (2) Expansion of market zone as a result of correction of regional disparities In the beneficiary survey, use (or non-use) of the targeted road in this project and transportation means both before the implementation of this project and at the time of the ex-post evaluation have been checked in 1) access to products and service, 2) going to a market including shopping, 3) commuting to workplace, 4) going to a local government office. The results reveal that 90% of the residents in Rumi District, Mehrobod village, and Kurgan Tyube City were using the road. In the survey, 47 beneficiaries who are using the road in Kurgan Tyube City and two Districts excluding Vakhsh District were asked whether the access to the shop in which they purchase daily necessities had become convenient and whether price, range, volume, and purchasing cost of daily necessities in the store have changed. To the question above, they gave the following comments: the time required for purchasing daily necessities has been reduced, or the access to the shop has become easier compared to before the project was implemented (46 out of 47), daily necessities became less expensive (35 out of 47), and cost for purchasing goods has reduced (26 out of 47). It is assumed that the project implementation led to promotion of distribution of goods by truck through smooth road transportation and reduction of transportation cost, thereby increasing the quantity of materials that have been delivered to the shops in the target area. In other words, it indicates the possibility that this project has contributed to an increase in the range and quantity of daily commodities. Table 9 shows the changes in the average time required for going to their workplace and market. All the road users responded that the average time required for going to their workplace and market has been reduced after the project was implemented; therefore, there is a possibility that this project has contributed to reduction of the average time required for going to their workplace and market. In contrast, many citizens do not use the targeted road of this project when they go to a local government office, both before the project was implemented and at the time of the ex-post evaluation even when they live near the targeted road of this project.

Table 9: Average Time Required for Going to Workplace and Market (unit: minute) Workplace Market

Before the After the Before the After the District/City project project project project Rumi District 26 17 35 21 Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District 22 19 23 16 Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District 25 22 16 12 Source: Beneficiary survey

(3) Improvement of accessibility (required time) to medical and educational facilities As shown in Table 10, the beneficiary survey revealed that the time required for each action tended to be reduced in going to a medical facility. Forty respondents (10 in Rumi District, 13

13 respondents in Mehrobod village, and 17 in Kurgan Tyube City)18 who answered that they use the roads for going to a medical facility, were asked to answer how much time (minutes) is required for going to the nearest medical facility in their district both before and after this project.

Table 10: Changes in Average Time Required for Going to a Medical Facility (unit: minute) Before the After the District/City project project Rumi District 24 17 Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District 27 21 Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District 18 13 Source: Beneficiary survey

In Mehrobod village, the average required time has been reduced by 6 minutes from 27 minutes before this project to 21 minutes. In Rumi District, the average required time has been reduced by 7 minutes from 24 minutes before this project to 17 minutes. The citizens of Kurgan Tyube, who use this road for going to a medical facility, reduced the average required time by 5 minutes from 18 minutes to 13 minutes. Consequently, there is a possibility that this project has led to reduction of the required time by smooth road traffic. Meanwhile, questions about the access to an educational facility were also asked. It was confirmed that many of the citizens did not use the roads both before the project and at the time of the ex-post evaluation even though they lived near the targeted road of this project. Out of 69 families, 60 students (elementary, junior high, and high school students) go to school on foot without using the roads. However, all nine students who use the roads in relatively large cities including Mehrobod village and Kurgan Tyube City take a bus. The average time required for going to school with this road has been reduced from 18 minutes to 13 minutes. As seen above, there is a possibility that road rehabilitation of this project improved trafficability, thereby contributing to reduction of required time for going to school or a medical facility.

(4) Reduction of transportation cost of agricultural products According to the interviews with five transportation businesses of agricultural products (14 years in business on average), no change was seen in the travel distance between before and after this project. All five companies responded that the maintenance cost for their trucks

18 The breakdown of the sexes in each district is as follow; Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District 13 people (five men, eight women), Rumi district 10 people (six men, four women), Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District 17 people (ten men, seven women).

14 decreased by 500 somoni (approximately 9,000 yen19) per month on average compared to that before this project. There is a possibility that improvement of road pavement by this project lowered the cost of repairing vehicles, thereby reducing the maintenance cost.

3.4.2 Other Impacts (1) Impacts on the Natural Environment At the time of planning, this project was evaluated to have little negative impact on the natural environment because it was rehabilitation of the existing road. An Environmental Management Plan and Environmental Monitoring Plan were submitted by the implementing agency to the Environmental Management Agency, and a project implementation permit was issued on June 200820. In the beneficiary survey, what the largest number of respondents pointed out as a negative impact was noise and vibration during operation of the project (17 out of 52). At the time of the ex-post evaluation, no negative impact was pointed out in the beneficiary survey.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement The targeted road of this project was on the existing road, and the width for the targeted road of this project had been secured. Thus, no land acquisition or resettlement took place, and there was no problem throughout the project.

(3) Others At the time of planning, it was indicated that it would be necessary to control the negative impact on traffic safety because the targeted road of this project, which would ease the bottleneck, would cause cars to go faster and trucks to drive easily. It was advised that the Tajikistan government should note setting up traffic safety facilities as soon as possible and carrying out traffic safety education. Through the beneficiary survey and interviews with the traffic police during this field assessment, it was indicated that driving manner should be improved, as traffic safety education and awareness-raising activities were not carried out.

3.4.3 Positive/Negative Impacts on Women and Maternal and Child Health (1) Impact on Women As for impact of this project on women, the following items were examined with data obtained from the beneficiary survey: income improvement by gender; time required for going

19 1 somoni = approximately 16 yen (As of November 2015) 20 Though there was no information provided by the implementing agency on the EIA report, the mitigation measures on the basis of the environmental management plan and environmental monitoring plan, nor on the status of implementing monitoring activities or status of measures against the environmental impact, according to the construction supervision consultants, there were no environmental problems due to the implementation of this project.

15 to various places; whether or not the access to a shop for purchasing daily necessities mentioned above becomes convenient; whether any difference can be seen in daily necessities in the store with regard to price, range, volume, and purchasing cost. However, no gender difference was found in data, and no impact on women could be confirmed in these points. However, as described below in (2) Impact on Maternal and Child health, thanks to the implementation of this project, it was confirmed that there was a high possibility that the travel time to the medical facility by pregnant women had been reduced. So with such specificity, it can be said that there was a positive impact on women.

(2) Impact on Maternal and Child Health Regarding impact of this project on maternal and child health, the following analyses were employed: 1) comparative analysis of macroeconomic indicators, 2) beneficiary survey and Focus Group Discussion. In a macro-data survey, data from 2008 to 2015 on maternal and child health of national average and Rumi District, Qumsangir District, and Bokhtar District in the Khatlon Region were obtained21.

21 However, by omitting the data from Bokhtar District, a two-prefecture average was used. According to JICA, the Bokhtar District Central Hospital is used by one-third of the population, while the remaining two-thirds of the population give birth in a state hospital in Kurgan Tyube city using the targeted road of the project. The population that uses the District Central Hospital, do not live by the targeted road of this project. When residents travel there for giving birth, they not use the project road. For this reason, the data from Bokhtar District was not used.

16 Hospital Delivery Rate(%) Maternal Mortality Rate (per 100,000 women) 94 50 92 40 90 30 88 86 20 84 10 82 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 National Average National Average Average of 2 districts Average of 2 districts

Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 births) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

National Average Average of 2 districts

Source: Material from the Khatlon Region Ministry of Health Figure 3: Changes in Macro Indexes of Maternal and Child Health

As shown in Figure 3, although the hospital delivery rate in two Districts has tended to rise year by year, it fell a little after the implementation of the project, and then turned to a rise a year later.22 The maternal mortality rate fell by 25 points from 35 per 100,000 live births in 2014 to 10 in 2015, two years after the implementation of the project, showing a substantial improvement. The average child mortality rate in the target area became lower than that of the national average a year after the implementation of the project (2014). Since then, it has shown a tendency to decline. It is assumed that improvement of access to medical facilities through using the targeted road of the project led to an increase in the number of women who hoped to give birth at a hospital instead of at home. In fact, the number of hospital deliveries increased. Thus, maternal and child mortality rates may have declined.

22 It is difficult to compare the national average with the two districts because some national macro data are missing.

17 In the beneficiary survey regarding impacts on maternal and child health23, interviews were conducted with women who had experience of pregnancy and childbirth in the past five years. Upon examining the time required for going to a medical facility for maternal medical checkups, it shortened by an average of 16 minutes in Rumi District, and by an average of 12 minutes in Kurgan Tyube City, as seen in Table 11. In contrast, it shortened by only two minutes in Vakhsh District where the targeted road of this project was not used. Consequently, the implementation of this project may have helped reduce the time required for going to a medical facility for maternal medical checkups.

Table 11: Changes in the Time Required for Going to a Medical Facility 24 for Medical Checkup before and after Childbirth (unit: minutes) Medical facility

District/City Before the project After the project Rumi District 33 26 Kurgan Tyube City 31 19 Vakhsh District 16 14 Source: Beneficiary survey on maternal and child health Note: Vakhsh District is not included in the target area of this project.

According to the Focus Group Discussion among obstetrician-gynecologists and nurses at the medical facilities in Rumi District and Kurgan Tyube City,25 before the project, the average time required for moving between a local hospital in Rumi District and the central hospital in Kurgan Tyube City was 40 to 45 minutes. After the project, it was shortened by 30 minutes to 10 to 15 minutes. In addition, when a woman with a complication gives birth, time required for moving to the central hospital has been shortened. Therefore, improvement of access to health service by implementation of this project enabled early treatment of delivery with a complication. Therefore, the project might have partially contributed to improving health

23 In this survey, interviews were conducted with mothers and children who lived in Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District, Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District, and Rumi District, which were in the target area, as well as Vakhsh District, which was not in the target area, in the Khatlon Region. As with the beneficiary survey, it was conducted in cooperation with the regional government. The interviews were conducted under the assistance of the deputy director of the Bureau, asking the government to invite women who had experience of childbirth in the past five years. Out of 51 total interviewees, 13 women live in Kurgan Tyube City in Bokhtar District, 13 women live in Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District, 13 women live in Vakhsh District, and 12 women live in Rumi District. The interviews were conducted with the women who came to each governmental office on the issues related to obstetrics and gynecology as well as infants. The questions of the interview include access to a medical facility, transportation means to the facility, medical checkup before and after childbirth, hospital delivery, and costs of pregnancy and delivery. There is a possibility that interpretation of evaluation based on the survey result would be overrated, because the surveyed women were cooperative. 24 This analysis is exclusive of the data from Mehrobod village in Bokhtar District. According to JICA, pregnant women who go to a medical facility for medical checkup before and after childbirth at Bokhtar District Central Hospital do not reside along the project road. For a medical checkup, the women usually go to a regional hospital or a health center close to their home, and the women who live in Bokhtar District rarely use the project road to go to those medical facilities. 25 Under the aid from the Director of Medical Service Bureau of Ministry of Health located in Kurgan Tyube City, a Focus Group Discussion with medical service workers of the central hospital was conducted at Rumi District and Bokhtar District twice. In the 1.5-hour discussion, comments about changes in care and emergency medical service related to before childbirth and delivery, as well as changes in conditions of expectant and nursing mothers comparing before and after road improvement, were received from six doctors, three nurses, and one midwife.

18 condition of mothers and infants.

As seen above, this project greatly improved the average traveling speed between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti, and shortened the required time to a market or a medical facility. An increase in the transportation volume of people and goods has been confirmed through changes in the freight transportation volume and the annual average daily traffic. The result of the beneficiary survey described above shows the possibility that this project has a positive impact on vitalization of social and economic activities and reduction of transportation cost, as well as partial contribution to improvement of maternal and child health indexes. However, the survey results may be biased due to the sampling of the beneficiary survey, and factors other than road rehabilitation, for example, the economic growth rate of the whole nation and access from a house to the targeted road of this project, are associated with these impacts. Therefore, it cannot be asserted that the project has had an impact with only the survey results.

Consequently, this project has largely achieved its objectives. Therefore, the effectiveness and impact of the project are high.

3.5 Sustainability (Rating: ③) 3.5.1 Institutional Aspects of Operation and Maintenance The MOT, the implementing agency of this project, has set up the Road Construction and Maintenance Department under the direct control of the First Deputy Minister as an institution that governs the matters regarding road construction. Six SETM are set up under the Road Construction and Maintenance Department to carry out maintenance of roads and bridges. The MOT commissions technical work of roads including research, planning, and design to the Road Design and Research Institute that was privatized in 2006.

Source: prepared from the documents provided by the implementing agency Figure 4: Relationship Diagram of the Organizations Related to the Project in the Ministry of Transport (MOT)

The Kurgan Tyube SETM, one of the six SETMs, operates SEHMs located in 13 Districts of west Khatlon Region. The target section of this project (Kurgan Tyube-Dusti) extends over the three Districts of Bokhtar District, Rumi District, and Qumsangir District in the Khatlon Region, and SEHMs of these three Districts carry out maintenance of 15 km, 30 km, and 15 km respectively. The SEHM of each District consists of the Construction and Maintenance Division, Personnel Division, Administration Division, Machinery Division, Equipment Division, and Material Management Division, with 5-6 managers, 8-16 engineers, 6-11 operators, and 16-21 workers. The total number of personnel in SEHM hovers around 42-46, keeping about the same number of personnel at the time of planning. According to the MOT, road maintenance is implemented smoothly. As seen above, no problem is seen in the institutional aspect.

3.5.2 Technical Aspects of Operation and Maintenance Each SEHM frequently conducts road inspection, and grasps the damaged condition of road surfaces. It can be also inferred from on-the-spot survey that inspection and cleaning are mostly carried out without any problems. “The Project for Improvement of Road Maintenance,” a JICA technical cooperation project that was ongoing at the time of the ex-post evaluation, is carrying out inspection of pavement and improvement of capability to repair pavement for the Kurgan Tyube SETM, along with the Hissar SETMs, and during fiscal year 2016, also added the Khujand and Kulyab SETMs as the new target areas. Support provided includes establishment of a maintenance cycle, and support for preparing a guideline for repairing pavement/pavement inspection. “The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Road Maintenance in Khatlon Region and Districts of Republican Subordination,” a JICA grant aid project, provided 118 items of equipment for road repairs, including an asphalt plant, and the equipment was operated

20 by the engineers who received technology transfer at the project for improvement of road maintenance. As seen above, no major problem is found in the technical aspect.

3.5.3 Financial Aspects of Operation and Maintenance Changes and details in the finance of SEHM and the MOT that supervises operation and maintenance of this project have been analyzed. Budget for maintenance of national roads is allocated from the National Treasury Bureau of Ministry of Finance upon application from the MOT. This budget for road maintenance is reallocated to the SETMs and SEHMs every year. As shown in Table 12, in recent years, the budget of the whole MOT stays around 4% of the national budget. The budget for road maintenance has been at the level of about 9% of the whole MOT budget from 2008 to 2016 on average. By contrast, the growth rate of the budget has been slowing down from 2013 to 2015/2016. According to the person in charge of finance, this was to adjust against business slowdown, and the necessary budget for maintenance cost of this project is secured. In the future, no drastic change in annual budget, income, and expenditure is expected.

Table 12: Budget and Executed Amount of the MOT (unit: ten thousand somoni Note 1) 2016 Items / Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (amount applied) Annual National 447,600 557,900 653,600 829,200 1,016,000 1,205,800 1,390,100 1,527,800 1,833,000 Budget Budget and executed amount 27,400 36,400 36,200 42,400 50,400 54,400 61,400 63,700 64,500 of MOT Proportion of MOT budget that accounts for 6% 7% 6% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% national budget (%) Road maintenance budget of MOT 2,500 3,000 3,400 3,800 5,000 5,600 5,700 6,000 6,000 and executed amountNote 2 Proportion of maintenance budget that 9% 8% 9% 9% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% accounts for MOT budget (%) Growth rate of MOT 20% 13% 12% 32% 12% 2% 5% 0% maintenance budget (%) Source: MOT Note 1: 1 somoni = approximately 14 yen (as of February 2016) Note 2: According to the MOT, the budget amount and executed amount are the same.

At the time of planning, the annual maintenance cost of the targeted road of the project was estimated to be approximately 0.24 million somoni. This was equivalent to 1.1% of the annual

21 road maintenance budget of the MOT, which was about 20.9 million somoni, in 2006, and it was considered that the MOT would be able to fully bear the cost. Along with an increase in the overall maintenance budget of the MOT, the maintenance budgets of the SEHMs of Bokhtar District, Rumi District, and Qumsangir District are consistently increasing. As shown in Table 13, the 2015 total budget for road maintenance of the three Districts was 0.84 million somoni, and accounted for 1.4% of the annual budget (60 million somoni) for road maintenance of the MOT in 2015. The budget is somewhat rising compared to the expectation at the time of planning, which is within the scale that can be borne for maintenance work. In addition, according to the implementing agency, the targeted road of this project has high priority in maintenance because it is regarded as a key arterial road. On the whole, although the growth rate of the budget for road maintenance of the MOT is declining, the budget and executed amount of SEHM that manages the targeted road of this project have been maintained at a high level at the moment. Therefore, there is no problem in the financial aspects.

Table 13 Maintenance Budget and Executed Amount in SEHM of Each District Note (unit: ten thousand somoni)

Detail / FY 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Bokhtar District total 40 57 61 65 66 - Road maintenance (A) 22 33 35 32 36 Rumi District total 39 48 50 53 57 - Road maintenance (B) 21 23 23 23 26 Qumsangir District total 47 53 58 61 66 - Road maintenance (C) 26 26 29 29 32 Total road maintenance 69 82 87 84 94 (A+B+C) Source: Prepared by evaluators based on documents provided from the Ministry of Transport Note: According to the MOT, budget amount and executed amount are equal.

3.5.4 Current Status of Operation and Maintenance The Defects Inspection Report in 2013 pointed out that judging from weeds in side ditches and slopes as well as cleanliness of the road, the road condition was not considered satisfactory and needed improvement. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, cleaning staff members cleaned this national road every day. The necessary maintenance work including weeding of side ditches, preventing plant from overgrowth, sediment removal, and water leakage control were being carried out. In contrast, some cracks in the road as well as at the joint part between culvert and road, which were generated through normal use, were found here and there. These cracks had already been confirmed at the inspection held every spring and fall, and repair works for them will be successively implemented within a year. Based on these above, no issue can be found in operation and maintenance.

Repairing the cracks of the road surface by sealing Road condition after repair (At the time of the ex-post evaluation) (At the time of the ex-post evaluation)

Consequently, no major problems have been observed in the institutional, technical and financial aspects of the operation and maintenance system. Consequently, the sustainability of the project effects is high.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations 4.1 Conclusion This project was implemented in order to secure stable transportation of people and goods and contribute to local development, correction of regional disparities, and market zone expansion by rehabilitating the road between Kurgan Tyube and Dusti in the Khatlon Region in south Tajikistan. Both at the time of planning and at the time of ex-post evaluation, this project has high relevance because it meets the development plan and development needs of Tajikistan, and is in accord with Japan’s ODA policy at the time of planning. The targeted road of the project has been fully used with a large increase in the freight volume. After the completion of the project in 2014, the economic growth rate of the Khatlon Region is higher than that of the entire country. The project may have partially contributed to vitalizing social and economic activities. For example, in the beneficiary survey, many of road users replied that access to public facilities has been improved. Thus, the project achieved high effectiveness and impact. However, influenced by soaring prices, this project cost was found to exceed the limit of grant aid project at the time of the detailed design. Therefore, the original plan was divided into two phases for implementation. Consequently, although the project outputs were accomplished mostly as planned, both the project cost and the project period greatly exceeded the plan. Therefore, the efficiency of the project is low. The SEHM of three Districts are in charge of operation and maintenance of the project, and conduct regular inspection under the jurisdiction of the Kurgan

23 Tyube SETM. Holding necessary personnel, the SEHMs have no problem with maintenance system. They secure the cost for maintenance, and the budget is expected to increase in the future as well. No problems have been observed in the institutional, technical, and financial aspects of the maintenance system. Consequently, the sustainability of project effects is high. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency None

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA None

4.3 Lessons Learned (1) Necessity of close examination of the priority of the targeted road in a project and support for medium-term capacity improvement related to maintenance In this project, SEHMs of the Districts handle maintenance in a steady manner because they fulfilled various conditions including appropriate staff size, assigning the right person in the right place, stable organization, and sufficient maintenance budget. Furthermore, presumably, it is mainly because the improvement of medium term maintenance capacity by a technical cooperation project led to strengthening the management capacity of SEHMs of the Districts. In addition, it is fair to say that the following factors brought about high evaluation rate on sustainability: - This project had politically high priority because it was a part of an international corridor, thereby given high priority in rehabilitation by the MOT and major donors, and - The importance of securing the maintenance budget had been indicated from the time of planning. As mentioned above, when implementing a project of road improvement and rehabilitation, JICA needs to examine carefully the significance level of the targeted road of the project as well as the budget allocation for maintenance cost from the planning stage, and to consider the necessity of support for medium-term capacity improvement, including technical support to maintenance organizations.

(2) Enhancement of the project cost estimation and equipment procurement methods for minimizing the impact on the project cost variation due to external factors The project cost during the detailed design stage was influenced by inflation, whereby the prices soared beyond the limits set by the exchange of notes. As a result, the project was divided

24 into two phases. Nevertheless, there was failure in bidding due to the cost divergence between the estimated cost and inflated costs. There were also construction delays due to the delay in material procurement from neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. All of this resulted in a lower efficiency rating of the project. In a country such as Tajikistan where there is a concern about social and economic factors, it is important for JICA to carry out a feasibility study and detailed design study with risks in mind such as inflation of materials and equipment prices and the repeated unsuccessful bidding due to unavoidable factors unforeseeable in the planning stage. For example, JICA should consider various risks in the project's target countries by incorporating the knowledge of experts, and carry out an analysis of the probability of inflation in the materials and equipment prices, such as the analysis of the factors that cause the fluctuation of the project cost during the detailed design stage, and carefully verify the validity of the project cost estimation. In addition, it is also important to secure multiple routes to procure materials and equipment first based on past experience, and then to promptly respond to issues that arise and expedite paperwork in order to minimize the influence of the fluctuation of project costs during the project implementation.

End