CHINA CHINA STUDIES
volume
REVIEW
STUDIES vol 6 20206 | 2020
Featuring Articles by
Hope Parker Hao Chen REVIEW Jennifer Conrad Qiang Wu Hongyi Lin 2020
volume 6 CHINA
The SAIS China Studies Review © 2020 The China Studies Program of the Johns Hopkins University is a publication of SAIS China and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies China Studies Program at the Publication of SAIS China and the China Studies Program Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School All rights reserved. of Advanced International Studies.
Design: www.SchumannStudioCreative.com Printed on Rolland Hitech - with a minimum of 30% post-consumer fiber, The Review publishes interdisciplinary work STUDIES made using renewable biogas energy. by graduate students conducting research on China, including history, political science, The China Studies Program does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; economics, policy, security, and area studies. the views represented herein are the authors’ own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Johns Hopkins University staff or trustees.
China Studies Program The Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
Rome Building, Suite 606-612 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
+1 202 663 5816 REVIEW [email protected]
For electronic copies of this journal, visit: https://saiscsr.org
i CHINA
About SAIS China Editors Prior to his study at SAIS, Yang worked
for the Financial Times and the research STUDIES unit of a Fortune 500 company cover- China Studies Review is a publication of SAIS China Studies ing Chinese macroeconomic, financial, SAIS China, which encompasses the formal Faculty and Associates in Washington, D.C. Mario Colella and technological issues. At SAIS, he is China-related programs at the Johns Hopkins interested in the interaction between busi- University School of Advanced International Andrew C. Mertha Mario Colella is a second year SAIS M.A. ness and policies in the current world REVIEW Studies (SAIS). SAIS China is anchored by the George and Sadie Hyman Professor candidate with a concentration in China political climate. Lu can be reached at China Studies Program at SAIS in Washington, of China Studies, Studies and a specialization in Quantitative [email protected]. D.C., which offers multidisciplinary graduate Director, China Studies and SAIS China Methods and Economic Theory. A gradu-
courses on U.S.-China relations, China’s ate of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Mario is vol 6 foreign policy, domestic politics, leadership, Madelyn Ross currently working as a research intern with Yiyuan Qi |
environment, economic development, and Associate Director, China Studies the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and 2020 Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Students Executive Director, SAIS China Economics at CSIS. Mario can be reached Yiyuan Qi is a second-year SAIS M.A also complete courses related to the wider at [email protected]. candidate with a primary concentration Asia-Pacific region across the school’s more Carla Freeman in International Political Economy and a than 20 additional areas of study, taught Associate Research Professor specialization in Quantitative Methods by leading scholars and practitioners in Executive Director, SAIS Foreign Policy Matthew Jones and Economic Theory. Having worked at their field. Institute the World Bank and the Atlantic Council, Matthew Jones is a first year SAIS M.A. she is currently working as an economic David Bulman candidate with a concentration in Strategic research assistant at the Institute of Inter- SAIS students have several options to pursue Assistant Professor Studies and a minor in China Studies. He is national Finance. Yiyuan can be reached at coursework in China. The Hopkins-Nanjing a Surface Warfare Officer whose sea assign- [email protected]. Center (HNC) in Nanjing began operations in Ling Chen ments include deployments to the Western 1986 and is the longest-running partnership Assistant Professor, Pacific. He graduated from the University of between a Chinese and American university International Political Economy San Diego with a degree in International Hao Chen in China. It is jointly administered by Nanjing Relations in 2013. He was a 2012 recipient University and Johns Hopkins SAIS. Students Ho-Fung Hung of the Critical Language Scholarship for lan- Hao Chen is a 2020 SAIS M.A. graduate have the option of one- or two-year courses Professor, Political Economy guage study in Xi’an, China. Matthew can with a concentration in China studies and of study in Nanjing, or they can spend one be reached at [email protected].. a minor in Korea studies. He is currently a year in Nanjing and continue their studies at Michael Chase Ph.D. student in history at the University of SAIS centers in Washington, D.C. or Bologna, Adjunct Professor Virginia, with research interests spanning Italy. Students must have intermediate to Laura Becker modern Chinese history, Chinese poli- advanced-level proficiency in Chinese prior to David Keegan tics, and Taiwan studies. Hao earned his beginning study in the certificate or masters’ Adjunct Professor Laura Becker is a first year SAIS M.A. bachelor’s degree in history from Peking programs at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. candidate with a dual concentration in (Beijing) University in China and also stud- Thomas Kellog China Studies and Korea Studies. Laura ied at National Taiwan University. Hao can Adjunct Professor received her B.A. in Chinese from Ham- be reached at [email protected]. The SAIS-Tsinghua Dual Degree Program, ilton College. Prior to SAIS, Laura taught which began enrolling students in 2015, is Shahid Yusuf English in Taiwan through the Fulbright offered by Johns Hopkins SAIS jointly with Adjunct Professor Program. Her research interests include Olivia Negus the International Relations Department at language policy, ethnic minorities in Tsinghua University. Students spend one Deborah Brautigam China, and cross-strait relations. Laura can Olivia Negus is a first year SAIS M.A. can- year at Tsinghua University in Beijing followed Professor, International Political Economy be reached at [email protected]. didate concentrating in China Studies. She by three semesters at SAIS in Washington, Director, China-Africa Research Initiative earned her B.A. in Economics and Chinese D.C. With courses taught in English, this Language from the University of Virginia, program offers the opportunity for students Yang Lu and prior to enrolling at SAIS she worked as to gain both a master of arts from Johns a financial analyst. She is interested in Chi- Hopkins SAIS and a masters of law from Yang Lu is an MIPP candidate with a na’s changing role in global trade, finance, Tsinghua University. concentration in international policy. and economic governance. Olivia can be reached at [email protected]. ii THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS iii CHINA
Editorial Table of STUDIES Board Contents REVIEW Editor-in-Chief Letter from the Editor
Mario Colella Mario Colella
1 vol 6 Editorial Advisors | Carla Freeman Research Articles 2020 Madelyn Ross Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Print Editors Chinese and Japanese Advances Matthew Jones Hope Parker Laura Becker 3 Yang Lu Korea and Taiwan: The Failed Alliance Yiyuan Qi in Non-Communist Asia Hao Chen Hao Chen Olivia Negus 15 The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Online Editors Economic Competition Shuyi Long Jennifer Conrad Karen Lee 31 China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes Qiang Wu 47 Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty Hongyi Lin 63
iv THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS v CHINA
Letter from STUDIES
the Editor
REVIEW It has never been more important to under- uses sophisticated econometric analysis to stand China than now; in the sixth volume of consider the impact of Chinese diplomatic the China Studies Review, our unified anal- confrontations on its trade with neighboring ysis of China as a global force gives us the countries. Wu presents a surprising con- vol 6 capacity to do so. Understanding China as a clusion within his four case studies; hostile |
major power means having a clear grasp of rhetoric has essentially no impact on affected 2020 the dynamics that have shaped the country, trade. Finally, Hongyi Lin’s “Between Harmony to better comprehend the prism through and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy which Chinese policymakers see the inter- in the Ming Dynasty” provides a compelling national sphere. To this end, we hope to shed framework for understanding the inter- light upon China as a global actor through national relations of Imperial China, and multiple lenses: qualitative evaluation and supports his argument that China cannot be quantitative analysis play a vital part in our understood without the best of international interpretation of China’s key actions abroad, and Chinese theoretical approaches-- a valid as do articles focused on the distant past and insight today. the present day. Indeed, the failure to fully understand China Hope Parker’s “Two Paths to the Arctic” and its impact on the wider world has been begins our volume with a comparative study catastrophic; at the current time of writing, of China and Japan in the Artic Ocean. The we do not know how many thousands will divergent approaches taken by these coun- perish from the novel Coronavirus, how many tries in both multilateral forums and direct millions will lose their jobs, or how many interactions with Arctic nations show striking additional months we will remain quaran- differences, deeply influencing China and tined at home. The outbreak of COVID-19 Japan’s reception within the area. Hao Chen’s demonstrates that China will be the shaping “The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia” force of the 21st century, in both action and is an historical analysis of the highest quality, inaction. To fail to understand this, and to arguing for a new interpretation of Cold War disregard the careful analysis of experts on historiography. Hao argues that a full consid- China, would have calamitous implications eration of this time period requires us to go for the international community. beyond simple U.S./Soviet dichotomies; his presentation of the failed alliance between My deepest thanks to all of the writers who the Republic of China and the Republic of submitted material for our consideration, the Korea epitomizes this approach. editors who have shaped it into professional work, and the unstinting support of the China In Jennifer Conrad’s “The Role of Sanctions in Studies Program at SAIS; it is my privilege U.S.-China Economic Competition”, we find to share with you the best of the research a clear-eyed presentation of the impact of conducted on China by graduate students sanctions on the People’s Republic of China, at Johns Hopkins University. focusing particularly upon the role of the United States and the case of Huawei Tech- nologies. Qiang Wu’s “China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes” looks at Mario Colella trade patterns through a different lens—he
1 CHINA
The full members of the Arctic Council are
Two Paths states that possess Arctic territory, including STUDIES the Arctic littoral states of Canada, Denmark, to the Arctic: Norway, Russia, and the United States as well as states with territory within the Arctic Analyzing Chinese Circle: Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. Russia and Canada each lay the largest claims to REVIEW and Japanese territory in the Arctic, but there are many overlapping territorial claims among coun- Advances tries in the Arctic Council and management
of competing claims remains unclear. The vol 6 Arctic Council has yet to determine the legal |
framework under which the Arctic territory 2020 should be governed. Some states advocate for applying the United Nations Convention Hope Parker on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a mech- anism to resolve the disputes,others argue UNCLOS does not completely apply. Fur- Hope Parker is a second-year M.A. can- ther, states with significant territorial claims didate at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, oppose using the UNCLOS legal framework concentrating in International Politics with because it could decrease their unilateral use a minor in China Studies. Her research of the territory.3 focuses on China’s maritime expansion and China-Southeast Asia relations. Previously, Although China and Japan have similar Hope interned at the U.S. Consulate General regional interests and both advocate for Shanghai and currently she is a 2019- using UNCLOS to govern Arctic issues, 2020 Boren Fellow. She can be reached at Arctic states have reacted differently to [email protected]. each country’s respective Arctic interests. Specifically, Arctic states express greater concern about China’s interests and plans Introduction in the Arctic.4 This essay compares China’s and Japan’s Arctic policies to assess how Climate change has led to severe ice melt- each country’s approach may be affecting ing in the Arctic, which has opened up the level of concern among Arctic states. sea-routes for maritime trade and eased Ultimately, this essay finds that China has access to resources in the region. Both a more assertive policy in the Arctic than of these issues are of more than passing Japan does. China has pursued more interest to China and Japan.1 However, as unilateral and bilateral programs in the countries with no territorial claims in the Arctic, whereas Japan has emphasized region, both China and Japan need to its role through the Arctic Council. This cooperate with the states that comprise the more assertive approach on the part of Arctic Council to achieve their respective China has created backlash from the goals in the Arctic region. Arctic states. The difference in methods that each country has used—China’s unilat- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and eral and bilateral approach versus Japan’s Japan applied for permanent observer multilateral-based approach—has led to status in the Council in 2006 and 2009, concern about China and greater accep- respectively. In 2013, the Arctic Council tance of Japan’s Arctic goals. granted them both permanent observer status at the Kiruna meeting.2
3 CHINA
Frosty Reception China’s goals in the Arctic.10 In articles other groups to cooperate on Arctic issues China
about China’s Arctic program, China has (i.e., the United Nations and the Interna- STUDIES Russia and Canada initially resisted Chi- been characterized as “The Dragon [that] tional Maritime Organization).13 Although Interests in the Arctic nese and Japanese participation in the Looks North” and “The Dragon [that] Eyes these ideas generally apply to all of the East Arctic Council due to fears of internation- the Top of the World.”11 Some Arctic states Asian observer states, they do not address China has a high dependence on foreign alizing disputes over competing territorial are concerned that China is interested in the specific concerns that each state intro- energy imports and the Chinese economy claims and decreasing their own agency having more influence in the Arctic Council duces. Given differing reactions to China and is reliant on international trade, making the REVIEW over those disputes.5 However, both states than its permanent observer status pro- Japan, research should differentiate between Arctic region important to the Chinese eventually relented and admitted China vides. In contrast, the media has paid less the two countries. government.14 In 2018, China consumed and Japan as permanent observer states attention to Japan’s Arctic policies. Further, 13.5 million barrels of oil per day.15 Chi-
to the Arctic Council due to new rules gov- when considering Asian states’ applications This essay hypothesizes that the differing na’s metal consumption has also increased vol 6 reactions to China and Japan are based on with economic development. Whereas in |
China’s more aggressive Arctic policy and the late 1990s, China was responsible for 2020 behavior. If correct, the goals articulated ten percent of world metal consumption, by As countries with no territorial claims in the region, in Chinese policy documents, and China’s 2010 they were responsible for 25 percent, actions in the Arctic, will be broader and indi- and in 2014 that number had reached 46 both China and Japan need to cooperate with cate more interest in participating in Arctic percent.16 As the Arctic territory is rich in the states that comprise the Arctic Council to achieve governance than Japan’s documents and previously unreachable energy resources actions. Policies express what a government and precious metals, resource extraction their respective goals in the Arctic region. plans to do and how it will attempt to reach in the territory could help China diversify its goals, which could prompt concern from its growing foreign resource dependency other countries. In assessing China’s and away from Middle East imports. As these erning the status of permanent observers to the Arctic Council, members were more Japan’s Arctic programs, this essay consults resources are necessary for China’s contin- and because both Russia and Canada willing to accept Japan and South Korea, each state’s primary Arctic policy documents ued economic growth and stability, China need foreign support for investment and but debated China’s potential influence in in addition to analyzing the tools and capabil- has an interest in obtaining its resources development of the Arctic.6 Specifically, the Arctic.12 Representatives of the Arctic ities that each has developed for Arctic travel from more stable regions.17 In 2017, trade the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the states themselves have shown more con- and exploration. comprised 38 percent of China’s GDP.18 Of Northwest Passage (NWP) both require cern over China’s Arctic policies than those the world’s top twenty shipping container significant foreign financial investment of Japan. The following sections will first outline China’s terminals, seven are Chinese ports.19 In in order to develop them into profitable Arctic interests, actions, and policies before terms of manufactured goods and maritime sea-lanes.7 Consequently, although grant- ing permanent observer status to China Arctic Programs in Japan and and Japan would open up governance China: Theoretical Approaches of the territory to more voices, Russia and Canada agreed because it would help The research examining China’s and Japan’s The route from Shanghai to Hamburg via the NSR is them achieve their own goals related to entry into the Arctic Council and participa- 3,455 nautical miles shorter than the route that uses the sea-route development. tion in Arctic affairs often bundles China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea together, Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. Conversely, the Nordic states hoped to studying Northeast Asian programs collec- improve the Arctic Council’s governance tively, rather than the actions of individual capabilities and importance through more countries. This method limits understand- international participation.8 Nordic states ing of each state’s behavior and how it turning to those of Japan. After explaining the trade, the Arctic routes could significantly were particularly interested in Northeast has affected the Arctic states’ reception of status of each state’s Arctic program, the next shorten the distance that Chinese ships Asian countries’ participation because them individually. The literature on Nordic section compares the two states to shed light and products need to cover. The route these countries have strong research, countries’ interests in China’s and Japan’s on how their differing policies and behaviors from Shanghai to Hamburg via the NSR knowledge, and technological capabilities participation in Arctic affairs focuses on may affect their respective receptions. The is 3,455 nautical miles (nm) shorter than for polar conditions.9 Through cooperation three areas: the economic and strategic final section returns to the initial hypothesis: the route that uses the Strait of Malacca with Northeast Asian countries, the Nordic benefits that China and Japan may bring; that China’s pursuit of unilateral and bilateral and the Suez Canal. Passage through the states could improve their own capabili- maintenance of peace and stability in the Arctic programs, in lieu of multilateral coop- Barents Sea also reduces this trip by over ties and research in the Arctic. However, region by avoiding exclusivity; and the fear eration, has created doubt about the state’s 3,955 nm.20 they too have expressed concern over of pushing Northeast Asian states toward future intentions in the eyes of Arctic states.
4 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Chinese and Japanese Advances 5 CHINA
Consequently, China argues that the Arctic of land in Iceland, including one attempt exploitation of resources (oil, gas, mineral, resources in the region. The sea route
should be governed by the UNCLOS, which to buy 115 square miles of Icelandic farm- and other non-living resources), develop- between Hamburg and Yokohama via the STUDIES grants innocent passage rights through land. The government prevented the sale ing the Arctic tourism industry as Chinese Suez Canal is about 11,500 nm, whereas international straits and gives high sea by invoking Icelandic law, which states that tourists visit the Arctic, as well as participat- the NSR decreases that length by about 40 status to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).21 only Icelandic nationals, citizens of the Euro- ing in Arctic governance and international percent to about 6,900 nm.36 The shorter In effect, putting the Arctic area under the pean Economic Area, or foreigners who governance.34 This final goal refers to Chi- route would be advantageous for Japan’s UNCLOS regime would give China and have resided in Iceland for at least five years na’s status in the Arctic Council and their shipping industry. In addition to having REVIEW other non-Arctic states the right to use the may purchase land.29 In 2013, the Chinese bilateral cooperation programs, such as major exports of manufactured goods, such Arctic sea routes as they would use any phone company Huawei also expressed the 2012 Framework Agreement on Arctic as vehicles and electronics, the maritime other international shipping lane. Arctic its goal to establish broadband service in Cooperation between China and Iceland shipping industry itself has a strong pres-
30 states have not achieved agreement on the all of Svalbard. Svalbard is not a heav- and the Sino-Russian Arctic dialogues ence in Japan’s economy and therefore has vol 6 applicability of the UNCLOS to the Arctic ily populated area, prompting questions dating back to 2013.35 influence over political decisions. Shorter |
region—China’s stance agrees with some about why Huawei believes broadband 2020 Arctic states, but opposes others, includ- service is necessary in the region. Overall, ing Russia and Canada.22 these actions imply that China’s interests go beyond research and determining a China’s self-bestowed title of “Near-Arctic State,” Maneuvering in the Arctic Territory governance framework for the region. For the plans for a Polar Silk Road, and the idea that a non-Arctic state, China has strong capa- After being awarded observer status in bilities for travel into the Arctic and clearly they plan to extract resources from the region, pose the Arctic Council in 2013, China began plans to make use of the territory through a challenge to the idea that Arctic states should have pursuing closer relations with Iceland and the North Korean Port of Rason and estab- Norway.23 China has also invested in bilat- lishing a business presence there. preference in determining governance eral relationships with Iceland and Norway. and usage of the territory. In the 2008 financial crisis, China offered China’s Policies in the Arctic Iceland assistance through a currency swap program.24 China has also conducted In China’s 2018 White Paper on Arctic formal dialogues with Norway about Arctic Policy, the government describes China Given that China possesses no Arctic routes would save trade ships time, energy, issues to improve their relations.25 In 2010, as “an active participant, builder and con- territory, some claim that China has no and money. In terms of energy resources, China positioned itself for better access to tributor in Arctic affairs.”31 The government rights to usage or governance of the ter- after the Great East Japan Earthquake in the Arctic via the Sea of Japan by beginning also refers to China as a “Near-Arctic State,” ritory, except those that Arctic states have 2011 and the subsequent nuclear acci- a ten year lease of the Port of Rason in North a term used for the first time in the White granted it. In contrast, China claims it does dent in Fukushima, Japan shut down most Korea.26 China has also conducted Arctic Paper. The White Paper asserts China’s have rights to participate in Arctic affairs, of their 54 nuclear power plants, forcing research at a research base in Ny-Alesund, rights in “scientific research, navigation, largely through the claim that portions of them to look for other energy sources.37 Svalbard, and through expeditions.27 China overflight, fishing, laying of submarine the territory should be considered high Arctic resources could fill the gap in Japan’s has relatively robust Arctic capabilities as a cables and pipelines in the high seas and seas and exclusive economic zones. China’s energy supplies without requiring as much non-Arctic state—it has four icebreakers in other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, self-bestowed title of “Near-Arctic State,” foreign dependence. From Japan’s point total and two icebreakers that are intended and rights to resource exploration and the plans for a Polar Silk Road, and the idea of view, increased cooperation with Arctic primarily for use in polar regions: Xuelong exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties that they plan to extract resources from states could ease access (in the form of and Xuelong II.28 Icebreakers improve such as the UNCLOS and general interna- the region, pose a challenge to the idea licensing and bilateral agreements) to the operability of a country’s ships in the tional law.”32 In the policy statements, China that Arctic states should have preference Arctic energy resources that are currently Arctic. Although sea-lanes are emerging positions itself as a stakeholder in Arctic in determining governance and usage of under national control.38 In addition, as the perennial ice melts, ships may still affairs, claims rights to economic interests the territory. applying Article 136 of the UNCLOS legal encounter ice as they pass through the in the Arctic, and asserts that the UNCLOS framework would free areas up to inter- sea-lines, requiring some ice-breaking is the proper framework to govern the national drilling.39 The country’s research capabilities in order to clear the way for Arctic territory. China’s Arctic policy also Japan programs focused on energy resources in trade and research ships. States with more expresses the country’s intentions to build a the Arctic demonstrate its interest in using icebreakers are better prepared for Arctic Polar Silk Road as part of the Belt and Road Interests in the Arctic Arctic resources to fulfill its energy needs.40 trade and exploration. Initiative, entailing a trade route with inter- national cooperation through the Arctic.33 Japan’s interests in the Arctic lie in the Like China, Japan also argues that the Additionally, Chinese investors have The White Paper asserts three other goals shorter trade routes that the region may Arctic should be governed by the UNCLOS expressed interest in buying large pieces for China in the Arctic: exploration and afford it, as well as the newly accessible and be considered “part of the common
6 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Chinese and Japanese Advances 7 CHINA
heritage of mankind.”41 Overall, Japan’s for- Route Program (JANSROP).48 JANSROP has in the capital city of Tokyo.55 Although to environmental problems. Japan’s plans
eign policy is guided by an “Iron Triangle:” researched the feasibility of the Japanese the resource extraction and shorter sea- for research in combination with its multi- STUDIES the civil service, politicians, and business.42 shipping industry’s use of the NSR.49 From routes are of immediate interest to Japan, lateral methods present a relatively small Although businesses are not part of the 2002 to 2006, JANSROP brought together “Japan’s Arctic Policy” and the country’s challenge to Arctic states and their interests government, their interests are important to scientists and experts from Russia, Norway, “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” both point in the region. government agencies; in this instance, the Canada, and Japan to study the eastern out that environmental management and business interests of the shipping indus- part of the NSR and the Sea of Okhotsk sustainability are of prime concern as REVIEW try have pushed Japan’s government into as well as to update the information on well. “Japan’s Arctic Policy” claims, “Japan The Environment and a more active Arctic policy.43 In addition natural resources in the area.50 Japan also is called upon to recognize both the Arc- Cooperation versus the tic’s latent possibilities and its vulnerability Economy and Assertiveness
to environmental changes, and to play a vol 6 leading role for sustainable development China and Japan lay out very similar |
in the Arctic in the international community reasons for wanting more access to the 2020 with foresight and policy based on science Arctic. For China, international trade is a Japan makes an effort to emphasize its interest in and technology that Japan has advantage key economic driver, and shorter trade environmental issues in the Arctic. in order to achieve sustainable develop- routes would decrease costs, benefiting ment.”56 These policy documents highlight the economy. Japan has a large shipping Japan’s involvement in Arctic research and industry, which would also benefit from the development, such as establishing research shortened trade routes in the north and networks and an observation station, ded- which has some influence over foreign to its significant interests in shipping and contributed to the Arctic Monitoring and icating resources to training researchers, policy through business interests. Although energy resources, Japan makes an effort to Assessment Program (AMAP), a work- and considering the development of a new China’s trade volume is much larger than emphasize its interest in the environmen- ing group on the Arctic Council.51 AMAP research vessel for the Arctic.57 Japan’s, trade-related industries are a sig- tal issues in the Arctic. The country’s Arctic provides guidance on policy through its nificant percentage of both economies: in policies highlight the need for multilateral research specifically on the effects of pol- Japan’s “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” places 2018 China’s trade comprised 38.246 per- environmental cooperation for sustainable lution and climate change on the Arctic a higher emphasis on Japan’s cooperation cent of GDP and Japan’s trade comprised global development and the need to stay region.52 In addition to these research with other states and involvement in inter- 36.641 percent of GDP.62 Additionally, each in line with the Kyoto Protocol.44 This focus programs, Japan owns three icebreakers: national organizations in the Arctic. The advocates the use of the UNCLOS in gov- is in stark contrast to that of China: China’s Shirase, a part of the Japan Maritime Self plan stresses that “science and technol- ernance of the Arctic region. However, they policies reference environmental concerns, Defense Force, as well as Soya, and Teshio, ogy are Japan’s greatest strength[s]” and have used differing methods to achieve but it is not a focus of the country’s pro- both of which are owned by the Japanese they can use those strengths to carve out their similar goals. grams in the territory. Coast Guard and used as patrol boats, a role for Japan in Arctic governance, by limiting their usage.53 Article 9 of Japan’s benefiting other states.58 “Japan’s Arctic Based on policy documents and actions, Maneuvering in the Arctic Territory Constitution restricts the country’s use of Policy” and the “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” China is pursuing more of its interests force to self-defense purposes and the express goals of: establishing more interna- bilaterally and unilaterally. While Japan After attaining permanent observer status coast guard is meant to patrol the country’s tional research collaboration, in particular is looking to strengthen its Arctic posi- on the Arctic Council in 2013, Japan’s coastline, assuaging any fears that Japan increasing research on the social and eco- tion through the Arctic Council, China is programs in the Arctic have focused on might militarize the Arctic or have undue nomic impacts of Arctic issues; developing attempting to do the same through bilateral its well-developed science and technol- presence in the region.54 Consequently, satellites, research stations, research rigs, relations with Arctic states and by making ogy sector.45 The country established a Japanese actions in the Arctic are com- and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles itself more important in the region (i.e., research station at Ny-Alesund on Sval- paratively restrained as opposed to those (AUVs); and upgrading microwave radi- through the Polar Silk Road). Some may bard in 1991.46 The Ocean Policy Research of China. ometers for sea ice observation.59 Japan point out that Japan has been developing Foundation (OPRF) is a Japanese think tank will pay attention to the Arctic Council and bilateral and multilateral ties with foreign and lobbying organization which cooper- Japan’s Policies in the Arctic participate in Arctic governance through countries for a longer period of time, mean- ated with the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in this framework.60 The government is inter- ing (1) foreign countries already have more Norway and the Central Marine Research In Japan’s policy documents, the govern- ested in developing more international trust in Japan and (2) Japan has more of a and Design Institute in Russia to research ment focuses on environmental concerns rules through bilateral dialogues to pro- foundation on which to improve multilateral environmental concerns in the Arctic.47 Two and how the country’s research capabilities tect freedom of navigation based on the relations and achieve goals multilaterally. of the major research programs include the can benefit Arctic management. Since the UNCLOS.61 These policies place an empha- However, this counterargument overlooks International Northern Sea Route Program mid-1980s, sea-levels in Japan’s coastal sis on research projects to understand the each country’s present-day behavior. (INSROP), and the Japan Northern Sea regions have consistently risen, including Arctic region and its potential relevance China has opportunities to pursue its goals
8 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Chinese and Japanese Advances 9 CHINA
multilaterally—through its observer status policy paper analyses are only the product 5 Kaisa Pulkkinen, “The Arctic Council and the Policy 39, no. 12 (December 2011): 7613,
Northeast Asian Observers” (Stockholm, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.033. in the Arctic Council—but has continued of China’s visible promotion of its actions, STUDIES to favor unilateral and bilateral methods. even this publicity testifies to a stronger, Sweden, November 2013), 262. Japan has expressed interest in developing more aggressive policy in the Arctic from 18 Trade (% of GDP) | Data,” World Bank, more capabilities for the Arctic, while China China than from Japan. China’s unilateral 6 Observer states may not make financial accessed May 24, 2019, https://data. contributions to Arctic Council work that are worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS. REVIEW greater than those from Arctic states unless ZS?locations=CN. given approval. Per Erik Solli, Elana Wilson Rowe, and Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, “Coming 19 Nong Hong, “The Melting Arctic and Its Japan’s pursuit of its goals through the existent into the Cold: Asia’s Arctic Interests,” Polar Impact on China’s Maritime Transport,”
Geography 36, no. 4 (December 2013): 256, Research in Transportation Economics 35, no. vol 6 multilateral Arctic Council poses less of a challenge to the https://doi.org/10.1080/10837X.2013.825345. 1 (May 2012): 51, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
retrec.2011.11.003. | Arctic states’ own interests than does China’s approach. 2020 7 Kaisa Pulkkinen, “The Arctic Council and the Northeast Asian Observers,” 36. 20 Hong, 52.
8 Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace,” 44. 21 Tom Røseth, “Russia’s China Policy in the has asserted its rights under the UNCLOS, and bilateral methods in comparison to Arctic,” Strategic Analysis, November 18, 2014, unilaterally named itself a “Near-Arctic Japan’s multilateral approach provides 9 Kaisa Pulkkinen, “The Arctic Council and the 852, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10. State,” begun the Polar Silk Road project, a link between each country’s Arctic pro- Northeast Asian Observers,” 43. 1080/09700161.2014.952942. explored energy resources in the region, grams and their differing reception from and developed tourism resources for Chi- Arctic States. Japan’s pursuit of its goals 10 Michael Wills et al., “Polar Pursuits: Asia 22 Hiromitsu Kitagawa, “Arctic Routing: nese tourists. through the existing multilateral Arctic Engages the Arctic,” Asia Policy, no. 18 (July Challenges and Opportunities,” WMU Journal Council poses less of a challenge to the 2014): 49. of Maritime Affairs 7, no. 2 (October 2008): Other countries largely have not accepted Arctic states’ own interests than does Chi- 498, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03195147; or approved of these initiatives proposed na’s approach. 11 Michael Wills et al., 49. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” 73. by China. The “Near-Arctic State” title has not gained traction in international forums 12 Michael Wills et al., 20. 23 Tonami, “The Arctic Policy of China and Japan,” and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 1 Kenneth J. Bird et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource\ 105. went so far as to actively reject the title Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and 13 Kaisa Pulkkinen, “The Arctic Council and the during a speech in Finland.63 China’s Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” U.S. Geological Northeast Asian Observers,” 5. 24 Tonami, 108. White Papers have claimed that their Arctic Survey Fact Sheet 2008-3049, July 23, 2008, programs are partially meant to facilitate https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/. 14 Gang Chen, “China’s Emerging Arctic 25 Margaret Blunden, “Geopolitics and the Chinese tourism in the region, but Arctic Strategy,” The Polar Journal 2, no. 2 (December Northern Sea Route,” International Affairs states have opposed and prevented actions 2 India, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and 2012): 367, https://doi.org/10.1080/21548 (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) by the government, businesses, and pri- Singapore were also granted permanent 96X.2012.735039. 88, no. 1 (2012): 127. vate individuals that might attract Chinese observer status at the Kiruna meeting. Aki tourism. Beyond media- and rhetoric-based Tonami, “The Arctic Policy of China and 15 Geoffrey Kemp, ed., “Strategic Issues and 26 It is unclear whether China is planning to disputes, Iceland and Norway each showed Japan: Multi-Layered Economic and Strategic the Maritime Environment: Cooperation, renew the lease in 2020. Blunden, 127. concern about Chinese involvement in the Motivations,” The Polar Journal 4, no. 1 Competition, and Conflict,” inThe East Moves territory through efforts to stop land sales (January 2, 2014): 105, https://doi.org/10.1080 West, 2nd ed., India, China, and Asia’s Growing 27 State Council Information Office of the and the Huawei deal. /2154896X.2014.913931. Presence in the Middle East (Brookings People’s Republic of China, “White Paper: Institution Press, 2012), 174–228, http://www. China’s Arctic Policy” (2018), http://english. Japan’s goals are based on cooperation, 3 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown - The jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt4cg8h3.11. gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/ international interests, and mitigation of Economic and Security Implications of Global content_281476026660336.htm. climate change. Japan has framed itself Warming Essay,” Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 116. 16 “Commodity Special Feature,” World Economic as a potential leader in research and Outlook, October 2015, 44. 28 Nuclear power gives icebreakers a longer technology through its policy papers, but 4 Leiv Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace: Why the range of travel and more power. In contrast, has not taken the same recent actions as Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic 17 ZhongXiang Zhang, “China’s Energy Security, the United States has five total icebreakers, China to lead projects it is interested in. Table,” Asia Policy 18, no. 1 (2014): 44, https:// the Malacca Dilemma and Responses,” Energy none with nuclear power, and four of the Although some observers claim that these doi.org/10.1353/asp.2014.0020. five are smaller than all of China’s. Caitlin
10 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Chinese and Japanese Advances 11 CHINA
Campbell, “China and the Arctic: Objectives un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/ 58 “The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,” 106.
and Obstacles,” April 13, 2012, 4, http:// texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. STUDIES library.arcticportal.org/1677/1/China-and- 59 “The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,” 109. the-Arctic_Apr2012.pdf; Franz-Stefan Gady, 40 “Japan’s Arctic Policy” (Longyearbyen “China Launches First Domestically Built Polar Research Site, National Institute of Polar 60 “The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,” 107. Icebreaker,” The Diplomat, accessed May Research, October 16, 2015), 6. REVIEW 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/ 41 Blunden, “Geopolitics and the Northern Sea 61 “Trade (% of GDP) - China, Japan,” accessed china-launches-first-domestically-built- Route,” 125. January 26, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/ polar-icebreaker/; William Woityra, “Major indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?locations=CN-JP. Icebreakers of the World,” May 1, 2017. 42 Blunden, 125.
62 David Auerswald, “China’s Multifaceted Arctic vol 6 29 Ragnhildur Sigurdardottir, “Iceland Plans to 43 Tonami and Watters, “Japan’s Arctic Policy,” 94. Strategy,” War on the Rocks (blog), May 24,
Shut the Door on Chinese Investors, Again,” 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/ | 2020 Bloomberg Businessweek, September 6, 44 “Japan’s Arctic Policy,” 3. chinas-multifaceted-arctic-strategy/. 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2017-09-05/iceland-plans-to-shut-the- 45 Ohnishi, “The Process of Formulating Japan’s door-on-chinese-investors-again. Arctic Policy,” 3.
30 Lunde, “The Nordic Embrace,” 44. 46 Ohnishi, 2.
31 State Council Information Office of the 47 Tonami, “The Arctic Policy of China and People’s Republic of China, White Paper: Japan,” 119. China’s Arctic Policy, 2. 48 Tonami, 119. 32 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2–3. 49 Michael Wills et al., “Polar Pursuits,” 48–49.
33 State Council Information Office of the 50 Kitagawa, “Arctic Routing,” 491–92. People’s Republic of China, 3. 51 Solli, Wilson Rowe, and Yennie Lindgren, 34 State Council Information Office of the “Coming into the Cold,” 258. People’s Republic of China, 8. 52 “About | Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 35 State Council Information Office of the Programme | AMAP,” accessed February 4, People’s Republic of China, 8. 2020, https://www.amap.no/about.
36 Fujio Ohnishi, “The Process of Formulating 53 Tonami, “The Arctic Policy of China and Japan’s Arctic Policy: From Involvement to Japan,” 116. Engagement,” East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics, 54 “Sea Level (around Japan)” (Tokyo, Japan, November 2013, 4. February 15, 2019), https://www.data.jma. go.jp/gmd/kaiyou/english/sl_trend/sea_level_ 37 Aki Tonami and Stewart Watters, “Japan’s around_japan.html. Arctic Policy: The Sum of Many Parts,” in Arctic Yearbook 2012, 2012, 55. 55 “Japan’s Arctic Policy,” 2.
38 Michael Wills et al., “Polar Pursuits,” 57. 56 “Japan’s Arctic Policy,” 7.
39 “Convention on the Law of the Sea” (United 57 “The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,” May 15, Nations, November 1, 1994), 70, http://www. 2018, 37.
12 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Two Paths to the Arctic: Analyzing Chinese and Japanese Advances 13 CHINA
contradictions between aggressively
“One Arch Enemy” or anti-communist states, namely Taiwan and STUDIES South Korea, created tensions between “Two-Fold Danger”: these two normally cooperative allies, and decreased the chances of building The Failed Alliance in a multilateral alliance. Deviating from the U.S.-centric view of the non-communist REVIEW Non-Communist Asia world, this paper examines the ideas cir- culated among these states beyond the binary framework of Cold War confronta-
tion and tries to analyze the transnational vol 6 cultural background in a broader context. | Hao Chen 2020 Setting the Stage
Hao Chen is a second-year SAIS M.A. stu- By the time World War II ended in 1945, dent concentrating in China studies with a China had supported Korea’s movement minor in Korea Studies. His research inter- for independence from Japan for over two ests span modern Chinese history, Chinese decades, beginning in the Sun Yat-sen politics, and Taiwan studies. Hao earned his era.1 The Republic of China (ROC) estab- bachelor’s degree in history from Peking lished a close patron-client relationship (Beijing) University in China and also stud- with the exiled Provisional Government of ied at National Taiwan University. the Republic of Korea (led by Kim Koo ( )), during the war. With the Japanese 김구 defeat, many observers expected that a peaceful and prosperous China, as well as Introduction a united and independent Korea, could be established; however, the outbreak of the This research examines the formation of an Chinese Civil War and Korea’s national divi- Asian anti-communist alliance, promoted sion soon shattered this dream. The world by the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the order had shifted dramatically in the con- Republic of Korea during the early Cold text of the Cold War and their domestic War period. By analyzing the issues that situations had become interwoven with the triggered significant conflicts between strategic landscape in a broader sense. non-communist and anti-communist Asian countries, this paper argues that the ideas At that time, US policymakers were sharply of national independence and libera- divided over how to evaluate China’s stra- tion were widespread, so much so that tegic value. In light of the disastrous failure anti-imperialism and decolonization were of Chiang Kai-shek’s military actions against interwoven with the topic of communism the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dip- in discussions of alignment. This led to lomats such as George Kennan raised the widely divergent views among non-com- idea of abandoning Chiang; in February munist Asian countries about existing 1948, Kennan argued that the United States dangers, the severity of these dangers, should “liquidate as rapidly as possible and creating national policy to combat our unsound commitments in China and these possible threats. Due to their diverse recover, vis-à-vis that country, a position historical experiences, non-communist of detachment and freedom of action.2 countries held considerably different On the Korean peninsula, the ROK gov- views about the nature of their overarch- ernment in the south faced a tremendous ing concern, independence. This caused threat from its communist counterpart to
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 15 CHINA
the north; despite this danger, the United the anti- or non-communist world, existing a prospect-threat alliance model. They To fill a gap in the existing research, and
States shifted its attention to Japan and the works overwhelmingly focus on the United combine prospect theory from political taking inspiration from the works men- STUDIES Philippines to avoid unnecessary confron- States, Europe, or other anti-communist psychology and a balance of threat theory tioned above, this paper re-evaluates tations with the Soviet Union and its Asian allies’ relations vis-à-vis the United States— from political science.8 Through this model, the relations among anti-communist and communist allies.3 In order to maintain or how US policies affected their own. policymakers calculate trade-offs between non-communist Asian states, as well as their the strategic status quo, the United States The study of interactions solely between freedom of action and assistance of greater efforts to create an alignment. Through added the objective of “terminating the non-communist Asian countries remains a powers, and then choose to form multilat- analysis of the historical facts, it reconsiders REVIEW military commitment” in Korea and began relatively neglected subfield. eral or bilateral alliances based on their topics of national liberation, anti-imperial- to withdraw its troops, opting for “a middle assessment. High threats frame politicians ism, and decolonization, emphasizing the course” to “establish within practicable and Existing works in the Korean and Chinese in a domain of losses, and multilateral distinction between non-communism and
4 feasible limits conditions of support.” literature have already established a body alliances tend to be favorable, while low anti-communism and the differing perspec- vol 6 of knowledge on the formation of anti-com- threats position leaders in a domain of tives of the two anti-communist allies of |
In 1949, the ROC and ROK briefly consid- munist unions in the Asia-Pacific region. gains, which leads to the opposite out- Taiwan and South Korea. The three threads 2020 ered forming a military alliance; however, Many scholars focus on the Pacific Pact due to their divergent interests and a lack discussed by President Elpidio Quirino of of US support, the proposal was unfin- the Philippines, Chiang Kai-shek, and Syn- ished by the time of the Korean War and gman Rhee in 1949;6 some extend to the indefinitely suspended thereafter. The idea APACL and its founding in 1953.7 These To fill a gap in the existing research, this paper of forming a regional anti-communist alli- pieces tend to emphasize the impact of re-evaluates the relations among anti-communist ance re-emerged in Seoul and Taipei after American involvement, yet few scholars the war’s end, but with the guarantee of the have explored the history from different and non-communist Asian states and their efforts US-ROK military treaty, Korean policymakers lenses or examined other factors, including to create an alignment. did not see it as essential to their national the attitudes among other regional players security. Instead, a civil organization called and tensions between the two anti-commu-
come. Their research provides a significant of national liberation, anti-imperialism, and alternative to rationalism and constructiv- decolonization were intertwined in policies In 1949, the ROC and ROK briefly considered forming ism in the realm of international relations dealing with communism. In the minds of a military alliance; however, due to their divergent to answer a key question—Why is there no ROC and ROK policymakers, the perceived NATO in Asia? Charles Kraus’s paper uses dangers were pluralized and interwoven; interests and a lack of US support, the proposal was the correspondence between Syngman their views of these intricately arranged unfinished by the time of the Korean War and indefinitely Rhee and Choi Duk-shin from 1955-1957 threats often failed to accord with each about a potential military alliance in East other, thereby decreasing the incentive to suspended thereafter. and Southeast Asia to argue that Rhee’s forge a multilateral alliance. This analysis worldview on both the Cold War and decol- also moves the discussion away from a onization inhibited efforts to cooperate with Washington-centric perspective, the Cold the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League nist partners—the ROK and ROC. Moreover, other countries.9 Kraus’s work calls for an War dichotomy of communism versus cap- (APACL) was founded in 1954. From 1955 most of the literature views the issue as a integration of the Cold War and decoloniza- italism, and the preconception of a closely onward, ROK President Syngman Rhee tried simple military calculation and fails to posi- tion, contending that Rhee regarded these cooperative relationship among nations in to forge a mutual defense pact among “free tion the issue in a broader historical context two topics similar in significance. Torben the same bloc. Asia,” particularly with Taiwan and South or to flesh out the issues surrounding neu- Gülstorff focuses on globally operating Vietnam.5 Rhee’s efforts ultimately failed in trality and Japan’s role in the alliance. anti-communist networks, including the spite of escalating confrontation across the APACL.10 By examining these organizations, United in Anti-Communism Iron Curtain. Gülstorff illustrates the globally organized A New Perspective on the anti-communist movement and pursues At the beginning of 1949, both domestic Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, Historical Record a historical view of the international Cold politics and US policies compelled Chiang many scholars have paid renewed atten- War. Internationalized research provides an Kai-Shek and Syngman Rhee to consider tion to Cold War historical research. This In recent years, several innovative studies opportunity to rethink the Cold War and its potential cooperation. As ROC Minister interest comes primarily from access to look at relevant historical facts through global and transnational impact. of Foreign Affairs Vi Kyuin Wellington new archival records, especially from the new lenses. Kai He and Huiyun Feng build Koo (Gu Weijun 顾维钧) later recalled, former communist bloc countries. As for on previous scholarship by introducing while Korea was very enthusiastic about a
16 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 17 CHINA
potential Pacific Pact suggested after the as Chiang strategy to use the two lead- War fundamentally transformed their Korea sent several officials and groups to 20
UN meeting in January 1949, other coun- ers to bolster relations with Washington. international environment. The United Southeast Asia from December 1953 to STUDIES tries were uninterested.11 In the context of Rhee also tried to secure America’s writ- States modified its previous non-involve- April 1954, including Lee Bum Young ( 이범 NATO’s creation in early 1949, nations all ten commitment to a collective regional ment policy toward Asia and significantly ) and Choi Duk Shin ( ). The Korean 영 최덕신 over the world were having conversations security system under the leadership of increased assistance to the regional government also asked Taiwan to mobilize about regional unions; Turkey and Greece the United States.21 As for Quirino, US partners. Rhee’s and Chiang’s different overseas Chinese in support of the initia- lobbied for a Mediterranean treaty, and policy-makers thought he “[had] fallen positions on the communist threat and tive.31 On June 15, 1954, the first APACL REVIEW Australia and New Zealand proposed a in with Chiang’s (and Rhee’s) flattering national division further strained the conference was held in Chinhae, Korea. Southeast Asian treaty. At the New Delhi suggestion…not only from genuine con- relationship between them. When the Twenty-two delegates from eight East Convention, the Philippine representative cern for Philippine security, but because Korean War entered a stalemate in mid- Asian states, Southeast Asian states, and
32 Romulo presented the idea of an Asian his emergence as an Asian leader would 1951, the previous discussions about other territories came to the conference, vol 6 bloc.12 Approximately two months later, improve his political prospects.”22 the Pacific Pact continued.26 In 1952 and to discuss the organization’s principles
33 |
President Quirino of the Philippines shared 1953, several Korean congressmen called and objectives. The APACL consisted of 2020 his vision of a Pacific Pact, and Syngman Little progress toward a mutual alignment for the signing of a military alignment with anti-communist societies from different Rhee responded positively.13 In June 1949, was made after the 1949 meetings. Noting Taiwan and contacted the ROC ambassa- countries; although they were connected the soon-to-be ROC ambassador to Korea the Americans’ lack of support for both the dor, Wang Dongyuan (王东原).27 Before with governmental officials of their respec- Shao Yulin (邵毓麟)14 proposed his East- Pacific Pact and Chiang’s regime, the Philip- Rhee’s visit to Taipei in November 1953, tive states,34 these groups were able to Asian policy and persuaded Chiang to ally pines altered the course formulated at the Taiwan’s Secretary-General of the Presi- maintain unofficial and nongovernmental with other anti-communist countries.15 Baguio meeting and prepared for a union dential Office Wang Shijie 王世杰( ) and the status, which was exactly why those South- that should be “publicized as non-commu- Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted a Pacific east Asian nations agreed to participate.35 On July 10, 1949, Chiang Kai-shek trav- nist rather than anti-communist.”23 South Mutual Assistance Treaty, which included Moreover, most participants were overseas eled to the Philippine summer capital of Korea and the ROC carried out some mili- the article of mutual defense.28 However, Chinese, so the ROC played a prominent Baguio, to discuss with Quirino “how to tary cooperation: Rhee asked for weapons organize and mobilize Far East countries to assistance, while Chiang aimed at utiliz- unite.”16 They agreed to invite Rhee to build ing Korean territory to support air force an anti-communist alliance collectively.17 attacks against the CCP.24 Though the US South Korea responded positively to the attitude served to push the two anti-com- The year 1950 was a watershed moment for the ROC and Chiang-Quirino proposal and invited munist leaders closer, the alignment treaty the ROK, as the Korean War fundamentally transformed Chiang to visit Korea.18 After arriving in was never negotiated. Observers such as their international environment.
Though the US attitude served to push the two the Korean government did not express role.36 ROC domination of the APACL con- anti-communist leaders closer, great enthusiasm for signing such a deal. tributed to ongoing friction between the Instead, Rhee wanted a people-to-people ROC and ROK. the alignment treaty was never negotiated. union, especially given the fact that South Korea understood the US stance on Korea’s Rhee promoted potential military collab- military affairs as a check on aggressive oration in 1955, particularly with Taiwan actions against North Korea; additionally, and South Vietnam. In addition to the Korea at the coastal city of Chinhae ( ambassador to Korea John Muccio argued the US-ROK mutual defense treaty had just existing threat from North Korea and its 진 ), Chiang released a statement claim- that Rhee did not want to be directly successfully concluded.29 allies, Japan’s political situation was a 해 ing the visit would include discussions involved in the Chinese civil war and thus legitimate concern for South Korea. In about organizing an anti-communist antagonize the CCP.25 The fact that Chiang What Rhee proposed eventually ended December 1954, Ichiro Hatoyama ( 鳩山 league among East Asian nations.19 It and Rhee faced different enemies on differ- became the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Commu- ) began his two-year tenure as Prime 一郎 was explained as an attempt to encour- ent stages, with Chiang’s defeat and Rhee’s nist League (APACL). At the time, South Minister, and fundamentally shifted the age more American aid for the regional war not yet begun, further limited incen- Korea lacked connections with Southeast foreign policy of his predecessor (Shigeru quasi-allies. At that time, Rhee and tives for forming a formal alliance. Asia; therefore, the ROC Foreign Minister, Yoshida, 吉田茂). Hatoyama intended to Quirino both enjoyed closer relations George Kung-chao Yeh (叶公超), suggested improve Japan’s relations with commu- with America than Chiang did, and the The year 1950 was a watershed moment that his Korean counterpart send an ambas- nist states, thereby helping Japan return United States saw this alliance proposal for the ROC and the ROK, as the Korean sador-at-large to contact those countries.30 to the international community. Japan
18 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 19 CHINA
tried to repair its relationship with the partners rather than a formal alignment. culture of Dabuping ( , or helping policy due to the ROC’s domestic rivalry 打不平
PRC by increasing bilateral trade and The ultimate failure of the proposal indi- victims of injustice). He maintained that Asia with the CCP. More importantly, the rela- STUDIES people-to-people exchanges. After nego- cated how severe the divergences actually was the source of human culture, unjustly tionship between anti-communism and tiations, Japan and the Soviet Union signed were, even though all actors were in favor of oppressed by imperialists in modern his- anti-imperialism was intertwined. The KMT the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration in a free Asia— and it is vital to examine these tory. Japan’s prosperity in the early 20th viewed the CCP’s occupation of Mainland 1956 and normalized diplomatic relations. differences. The early period of the Cold century boosted Asian people’s confidence China as a Soviet invasion, so the struggle Japan attained UN membership after the War in Asia witnessed several attempts to and hope. Hence, China and Japan were was twofold—anti-CCP as well as resistant REVIEW Soviet Union pledged to support it. As the forge an anti-communist alliance. Although leading powers to launch united move- to the USSR.47 The perception that Asia was resumption of trade contacts considerably American policies influenced certain coun- ments in Asia. Sun even tried to connect the preferred global target of communism improved the Japan-North Korea relation- tries, differences among regional actors with the Japanese government to create a served to intertwine the KMT’s anti-commu-
43 48 ship, South Korea’s distrust of Japan grew were the primary reason for this failure. In “Greater Asian League.” nist policy and strict “Asia first” strategy. vol 6 exponentially, and bilateral negotiations analyzing their strategies, it is necessary to Chiang also nursed grievances towards
37 |
between the two countries collapsed. dig into national ideologies and practical Chiang Kai-shek inherited Sun’s ideology European and American imperialism. After 2020 objectives, including national liberation and enshrined it as the KMT’s fundamen- signing the joint declaration with Quirino tal guide. His Asian policy was reflected in 1949, Chiang thanked God for blessing in China’s assistance to the Korean inde- the Eastern states so that they could unite pendence movement, India, and Vietnam and not be bullied by the West.49 When The early period of the Cold War in Asia witnessed during WWII. China was able to play a Chiang encountered US and British oppo- several attempts to forge an anti-communist alliance. world-class leadership role in World War sition to the proposed alliance, he furiously II, especially in maintaining stability in criticized it as a white people’s traditional Although American policies influenced certain countries, Asia (according to the post-war blue- policy, which would never allow Asia to differences among regional actors were the primary print), thereby encouraging China to view have a united organization.50 He felt that reason for this failure. The APACL envisioned itself as an alternative to the In November 1955, the Korean ambassa- and independence, anti-imperialism, and Non-Aligned Movement, although others saw the dor sent a letter to George Kung-chao Yeh, decolonization. Particular idiosyncrasies saying that South Korea would be willing to and historical grievances heavily influenced organization as against the European colonial powers ally with Taiwan militarily if Taiwan pledged each country’s objectives. and the United States. to maintain distance from Japan.38 In April 1956, Rhee again ordered his aide Choi Duk-shin to travel to Southeast Asia. Anti-Communist ROC and ROK: Rhee reported, “Sentiment is growing in Interwoven Ideologies itself as a leading power.44 For instance, in imperialists wanted to enslave “yellows” favor of a mutual defense pact being 1947, although Chiang had a limited rela- and make Asia their colony forever.51 Thus, concluded among Vietnam, Formosa The two firmly anti-communist parties tionship with Rhee, Chiang assisted when Chiang believed not only in fighting for Chi- [Taiwan], and Korea.”39 After settling in also upheld the ideologies of anti-impe- Rhee had to travel back to Seoul due to na’s freedom and independence, but in the Saigon, Choi was able to connect with dif- rialism and de-colonialization. Although conflicts with the US military government in liberation of other Eastern nations as well; this ferent states’ personnel in the capital and the existing literature commonly asserts Korea.45 Chiang invited Rhee to Shanghai, was his guiding focus when he was dealing cultivate cordial relationships with them. that exchanges between Chiang, Quirino, met him for the first time, and sent him to with foreign affairs. The APACL envisioned There was some progress in terms of mil- and Rhee were the starting point of the Korea using a personal airplane. Chiang itself as an alternative to the Non-Aligned itary exchange with South Vietnam,40 but proposed Asia-Pacific alliance, this paper told Rhee he would take responsibility for Movement, although others saw the orga- the Vietnamese government refused to argues that the origins lie deeper, in earlier Korea’s independence in order to carry out nization as against the European colonial sign a military alliance. Disappointed by notions of anti-imperialism and indepen- the ideas of the party,46 showing that the powers and the United States.52 both the Vietnamese and the American dence before the war. The ideological views origins of the later cooperation were far ambassador, Rhee ordered Choi in June of the ROC government can be traced more than an extemporaneous situation. After several decades as a Japanese colony, 1956 to cease lobbying South Vietnam back to the founding father Sun Yat-sen’s the Republic of Korea viewed Japan in for the creation of a defense pact in “Great Asianism” (大亚洲主义),42 which The original purpose of aligning the Asian terms of anti-imperialism and de-colonial- June 1956.41 After that point, Rhee and proposed building a united region. Sun nations, as indicated in Sun’s “Greater ization. Since the gradual erosion of Korean Choi focused on promoting substantive argued that all oppressed Asian nations Asianism,” was anti-imperialism, but sovereignty and its final annexation in 1910, connections among the anti-communist should unite and connect, calling for a anti-communism was later added into ROC Korean nationalist thinkers had ceaselessly
20 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 21 CHINA
promoted the idea of national indepen- establishing political parties and organiz- forgotten the danger of Japan.” Therefore, proposed to exclude Japan absolutely, and
dence; the 1919 March First Movement ing revolutions. The aforementioned “Great South Korea worked to make its allies real- also target Japanese imperialism outside STUDIES spread the idea of independence across Asianism” of Sun Yat-sen argued for Japan’s ize Japan’s evil nature. When Rhee visited of communism: “This twofold threat—of the entire nation. As a result, Koreans’ atti- leadership role in Asian revitalization and Taipei in 1953, his foreign minister Byeon Communist or Japanese dominance, or tudes toward Japan were unique in the called for a united Asia led by Japan and Yeong-tae ( ) responded to his coun- both—can be met through the medium of 변영태 Cold War era. As an anti-Japanese leader, China. After retreating to Taiwan, anti-com- terpart Kung-chao Yeh’s suggestion that collective security.”67 Rhee advocated Korean sovereignty after munism was foremost in Chiang’s mind, and South Korea normalize its relationship REVIEW fighting the Japanese invasion and colo- he tried to establish Japan as a member with Japan, saying that “being cunning When the “pro-Japan” ROC encountered nization for half a century. The views in his of the anti-communist free world. Chiang and opportunist has become a second the determinedly anti-Japan ROK, pre- early book were maintained throughout wanted to quickly normalize the ROC-Ja- nature to the Japanese, and they will dictable frictions complicated the mutual
60 his whole political career: “The tens of pan relationship for the sake of further inevitably become invaders.” In South security alignment. For example, the only vol 6 thousands of words ultimately boil down cooperation. When Chiang implemented Vietnam, Rhee focused on educating the actual byproduct, the APACL, ran straight
53 |
to this one idea—independence.” The the “rendering good for evil” policy and Vietnamese to help them “fully understand into the serious problem of Japanese mem- 2020 defeat of Japan in the war did not dimin- did not demand reparations from Japan, he what Japan is after,”61 especially Japan’s bership. In 1954, the ROC intended to invite ish the grievances of Rhee and the Korean said, “We must avoid adopting the measure economic ambition beneath the trading a Japanese delegation to participate in the people. In contrast with Chiang, who of demanding a large amount of reparation relationship. South Korea emphasized that 1955 second APACL conference; however, conflated anti-communism with national and weakening Japan. For Asia’s stability, Japan was seizing the natural resources the negotiation with Korea was unsuccess- independence, Rhee believed that “the we must make Japan a powerful anti-com- of Asia and dominating technology, and ful.68 Korea would not accept a Japanese danger is two-fold: the Communist threat munist state.”55 His adviser Shao Yulin “the next step for economic domination delegation that had observer status and on one side and Japan’s rapid expansion concluded that policy toward Japan and military supremacy is the political con- said it would refuse to participate if Japan on the other.”54 In his mind, both Japa- would be developing future coopera- quest,”62 which was “nothing more than the joined.69 Thus, the second conference had nese imperialism and Korean communism tion on anti-communism and resisting old Asian ‘Co-prosperity-sphere’ under a to be postponed. The ROC received the threatened the independence of Korea; Russia, while those old scores, namely new name.”63 Japanese delegation and traveled to the countering these two threats was his defi- Japan’s responsibilities in WWII, could island. Chiang told them the trilateral con- nition of the Cold War struggle. be written off.56 From Chiang’s perspec- South Korea’s aversion to Japan was certed anti-communist struggle suffered tive, Japan should be included in the aggravated by Rhee’s anti-communist sen- from the unfortunate Japan-Korea problem, prospective anti-communist union. The timents. Since Japan pragmatically tried and the ROC would continue to cooper- Conflicts between the CCP criticized this approach as conspir- to engage with the Soviet Union, the PRC, ate with Japan as well as make suggestions two Anti-Communist States ing with Japanese “reactionaries.”57
Although the two anti-communist leaders Few regional leaders shared Chiang’s atti- genuinely believed in their missions of tude towards Japan, particularly South national independence and fighting against Korea. South Korea was extremely con- The ROC’s position that “Asia has only one arch communism, one can hardly conclude that cerned about Japan’s economic revival, enemy,”conflicted with the ROK view that they were of the same mind. In fact, their remilitarization, and increasing political different viewpoints on identifying ene- participation in the international arena. “the danger is two-fold.” mies and prioritizing degrees of severity Rhee deeply believed that Japanese contributed to the conflicts and disagree- imperialism was preparing for the domi- ments not only between non-communist nation of Asia after Japan recovered from and anti-communist nations, but, more its postwar destruction.58 The United North Korea, and other communist coun- to Korea.70 The next year, in anticipation importantly, between the two anti-commu- States supported Japan’s resurgence and tries, it was “clearly not anti-communistic of the postponed second conference, a nist parties. The essential issue was Japan. intended to make Japan the center of Asian in its attitude,”64 and was even “certainly Korean governmental newspaper com- policy after WWII, alarming South Korea. pro-communist and gradually entering the mented that the ROC must make a choice The KMT’s relationship with Japan was Rhee was suspicious of the peace-mak- Red camp.”65 As these two dangers merged between Japan and free Asia, and it was complicated. Japan’s invasion of China left ing process led by the United States in in Rhee’s thinking, he felt that the Japanese possible that Korea might build another deep enmity between the two countries, 1950 and said, “We are struggling with were cooperating with communist powers organization with other free states.71 During but the KMT’s early revolution was largely the pro-Japan Americans.”59 Rhee viewed to invade free Asia. If Chiang and other the conference, the ROC tried to discuss supported by the Japanese, and many persuading prospective regional anti-com- leaders believed Moscow was cooperating new membership issues, but the Korean KMT leaders were educated in Japan. Sun munist allies of the danger posed by Japan with Beijing to expand in the region, Rhee delegation strongly opposed Japan’s par- Yat-sen had deep connections with Japa- as more important than trying to convince wanted to add Tokyo to this axis.66 There- ticipation. Given the fact that the league nese society, and Japan was his base for the patron ally, because “Americans [had] fore, he wanted the alignment South Korea was dominated by the ROC, South Korea
22 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 23 CHINA
raised the rumor that Taiwanese chairman communism and Japanese expansion, such an alliance.77 This paper broadens the 2 Report by the Policy Planning Staff, February
24, 1948, PPS/23, Foreign Relations of the Ku Cheng-kang ( ) was courting other inevitably failed. concept of “the enemy,” which does not STUDIES 谷正刚 representatives to oppose Korea.72 In the solely refer to communism in the frame- United States (FRUS), 1948, General; the end, Korea successfully blocked the exten- When we move away from Washing- work of the Cold War, but includes more United Nations, vol. 1, bk. 2 (Washington: sion of an ROC-backed invitation to Japan ton’s policies and military calculation, issues that might violate the preservation Government Printing Office, 1983), 523-525. to the APACL for the entire Syngman Rhee the multi-faceted ideas of these Asian of independence, a fundamental concern REVIEW era. Japan finally joined the league in June nations are revealed: for them, the histor- for the Asian nations. The diverse threats 3 Note by the Executive Secretary of the 1960—the month following Rhee’s exile to ical period defined as the Cold War was that could lower the sense of a common National Security Council (Souers) to President the United States. not just a time of binary rivalry between danger among the Asian nations made Truman, April 2, 1948, NSC 8, FRUS, 1948, The communism and capitalism, but also a fight the leaders disinclined to form a multilat- Far East and Australasia, vol. 6, bk. 2, 1164-
Friction between the two anti-communist for national independence and liberty. eral alliance, especially given the fact that 1169. Report by the National Security Council vol 6 partners over Japan was not exclusive to Therefore, the competition between com- the alliance would greatly challenge the to the President, March 22, 1949, NSC 8/2,
FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. | the APACL. As mentioned above, after nor- munism and anti-communism overlapped degree of freedom available for making 2020 and implementing decisions. 7, bk. 2, 970-978.
The origins, process, and result of build- 4 Report by the National Security Council, March ing an Asian anti-communist alignment 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949 The most significant incentive for a mutual security are exemplary of this complex historical period and encourage a strengthening 5 Letter from the President (Syngman Rhee) to Lt. treaty, a single shared enemy, was absent in Asia; of the scholarship on Cold War his- General Choi Duk-shin, April 05, 1956, History this is the reason for the lack of such an alliance. tory. Cold War historiography requires and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, a departure from America- or Sovi- B-333b-091, The Korean Legation in Vietnam, et-centric perspectives that primarily Reports from the Korean Mission to the United emphasize uni-directional power- and Nations and Republic of Korea Embassies and policy-projections. Looking at the ideas Legations, Syngman Rhee Institute, Yonsei malizing relations with the Soviet Union, with colonization and decolonization, as and problems circulated within the third University. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. Japan had an opportunity to join the UN. well as imperialism and anti-imperialism. world and delving into the relationships org/document/121025. In November 1956, South Korea asked the In this sense, identifying the dangers, among these anti- or non-communist ROC to veto Japan’s application to the UN prioritizing their severity, and adopting states can internationalize the historical 6 David W. Mabon, “Elusive Agreements: The Security Council and used Taiwan’s willing- practical solutions to address these dan- research based on multi-archival studies. Pacific Pact Proposals of 1949–1951”Pacific ness to sign a friendship treaty vis-à-vis gers triggered divergent views among This paper tries to break some habitual Historical Review 57:2 (1988), 147–177. Korea to add pressure on Taipei.73 Appar- non-communist Asian countries. The limits of Cold War research. Broadening Mabon’s work emphasizes the policies of the ently, Taiwan did not veto the proposal, and divergences were a result of various the origins of the alignment discussion United States, the United Kingdom, and other Japan entered the UN in December. factors such as historical experiences, can break down the barrier of Cold War powers towards the proposed Pacific pact, ideological lines, personal worldviews, periodization and contribute to historical but the sources used are dated. Jin Jingyi temporary urgencies, domestic politics, continuity. More importantly, it avoids the 金景一, “Qianlun chaoxian zhanzheng qian Conclusion: and understandings of regional futures. traditional notion of the Cold War, as a jiangjieshi yu lichengwan guanxi de hexin Asian Cold War Perspectives dualistic capitalist-communist clash or xiansuo” 浅论朝鲜战争前蒋介石与李承晚关系 When considering the conflicting opin- “big power rivalry.” When we focus on 的核心线索 [Discussion on the Core Clue of In conclusion, the ROC’s position that ions among Asian nations and the failure the non-communist third world, struggles the Relationship between Chiang Kai-shek “Asia has only one arch enemy,”74 con- to foster a regional security pact, scholars independent of pro- or anti-communism and Syngman Rhee before the Korean War], flicted with the ROK view that “the danger tend to argue that non-communist Asian emerge in the shadow of the traditional Studies of International Politics 国际政治研 is two-fold.”75 The ROC government viewed states were fighting against different com- framework, thereby enriching this histori- 究; 2002, 4: 127-134. Jin argues that the core Japan as an anti-communist bulwark and munist threats, like the PRC, North Korea, cal period and widening the scope of the clue of the relationship was zaoshi (造势, “make supported Japan’s economic rejuvenation and other communist guerrillas. This dif- current research. the situatio”), but the paper largely relies as well as its international political partic- fered from Europe, which was commonly on a single source—Chinese ambassador ipation. However, such a positive attitude seen as facing only the threat from the 1 Min Shilin闵石麟, Zhonghan guanxi shihua Shao Yulin’s memoir and lacks other towards Japan made Rhee conclude that Soviet Union. Therefore, the most sig- 中韩外交史话 [A Historical Account of Sino- supportive documents. Wang Xiaoping 汪小 Taiwan was pro-Japanese.76 Hence, the nificant incentive for a mutual security Korea Diplomacy] (Chongqing: Dongfang 平, “Gouxiangtongmeng: 1950 nianqianhou prospective alliance proposed by Seoul, treaty, a single shared enemy, was absent chubanshe东方出版社, 1942), 26-27. yuandong ‘taipingyanggongyue’ wenti yu which was aimed at fighting against both in Asia; this is the reason for the lack of meiguo duitai zhengce” 构想同盟:1950 年前
24 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 25 CHINA
后远东“太平洋公约”问题与美国对台政策 Facts of Anti-Communist Cooperation among Détente,” Wilson Center CWIHP Working Paper 16 Visit to the Philippines, President Chiang’s
[Conceived Alliance: the Far East “Pacific Pact” Taiwan, Japan, and Korea Series #75, (2015). Record, July 1949, 002-080106-00073-004, 戦後中華民國の反 STUDIES Issue and American Policies towards Taiwan (Taipei: Archive of Academia Historica. 共連合政策—臺日韓反共協力の実像 before and after 1950], Youth Academic Forum Northeast Asia Regional Studies, Academia 11 Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Gu Weijun huiyilu 顾 of the Institute of Modern History, Chinese Sinica 中央研究院东北亚区域研究, 2001). 维钧回忆录 [The Memoir of Vi Kyuin Wellington 17 Draft of the China-Korea-the Philippines Academy of Social Sciences 中国社会科学院 Using archives in Taiwan, this Japanese book Koo], vol. 7, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中华书 Mutual Assistance Treaty, July 1949, 11-01-03- REVIEW 近代史研究所青年学术论坛, (2010): 385-409. discusses the failure of the Taiwan-Korean , 1985), 289. Relevant history can also refer 06-01-002, 012/0001, Archive of the Institute 局 Kiyoung Rho, “The Development of Pacific Pact military alliance as well as the collaboration to archival records. Telegram from Stevenson of Modern History, Academia Sinica. Policy and the Plan of Regional Security in the between Taiwan and Japan, respectively. to Foreign Office, January 12, 1949, FO Syngman Rhee Regime.” The Journal of Korean Chen Tzu-chi 陈孜绮, “Zhanhou taiwan duihan 371/75799, F1306/10124/10, British Foreign 18 Shao Yulin, Shihan huiyilu (Taipei:
History, 11 (2002), 186–223. Jeong-Bae Kim, zhengce xingcheng yu bianqian (1945-1960)” Office Records. Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, 1980), 112. vol 6 “The Nature of the ‘Pacific Union’ Discussions 战后台湾对韩政策形成与变迁 (1945-1960) [The
in the Light of American Global Strategy,” Formation and Change of Korea Policy in Post- 12 The Chargé in the Philippines (Lockett) to the 19 Chiang Kai-shek Publicized a Statement when | 2020 (MA thesis, Pusan National University, 1990.) War Taiwan (1945-1960)], (MA thesis, National Acting Secretary of State, January 15, 1949, Arriving, President Chiang’s Document, August Jin-Hee Park, “Syngman Rhee’s Recognition Taipei University, 2018). This recent thesis 890.00/1–1549, FRUS, 1949, The Far East and 6, 1949, 002-080106-00068-004, Archive toward Japan and Pacific Pact,”Historical primarily draws from Taiwanese published Australasia, vol. 7, bk. 2, 1115-1117. of Academia Historica. Also see Shao Yulin, Criticism 76 (2006), 90–118. Kim and Park and unpublished records and thoroughly Shihan huiyilu (Taipei: Zhuanjiwenxue chu- analyze Taiwan’s relations with Japan and the emphasizes the overall bilateral relations in 13 Syngman Rhee, Collection of President Rhee banshe, 1980), 115-116. United States during the discussion of the Rhee’s era. Muhyung Cho, “The Establishment Syngman’s Statements (Seoul: Ministry of Pacific Pact. and Decline of APACL—Conceptualizing Information, 1953): 144, cited in Junghyun 20 Chiang-Quirino Proposal for a Pacific Union, ROK-US Conflict based on Role Theory,” Park, “Frustrated Alignment: The Pacific Pact State Department Office of Chinese Affairs 7 Junghyun Park, “Frustrated Alignment: The Journal of World Politics 29 (2008), 187-239. Proposals from 1949-1954 and South Korea- memorandum, July 19, 1949, Records of Pacific Pact Proposals from 1949-1954 and Youngho Choi, “Rhee Syngman Regime’s Taiwan Relations,” 217-237. the Office of Chinse Affairs 1945-1955 South Korea-Taiwan Relations,” International Ideas of Pacific Alliance and the Asian People (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989), Journal of Asian Studies xxii, no. 2 (2015), Anti-Communist League’s Birth,” Korea Journal 14 Shao was invited by Kim Koo to serve as reel 7. 217-237. Park’s work tries to jump out of the of International Relations 39 (1999), 165-182. consultant to the Provisional Government and Washington-centric circle and view the issue Haruka Matsuda, “‘Pacific Pact’ and ‘The Asian helped the government to participate in the 21 Junghyun Park, “Frustrated Alignment: The via bilateral relationship; however, he fails to People Anti-Communist League’: American international stage using his dual role as both Pacific Pact Proposals from 1949-1954 and look at the Pacific Pact in a broader sense, Reactions to the Proposals of the Two Security the Chinese official and Korean representative. South Korea-Taiwan Relations,” International regardless of if it is an Asian non-communist Pacts by ‘Outpost Countries’ in East Asia.” In January 1945, Shao traveled to the United Journal of Asian Studies, xxii, no. 2 (2015), world, or the third world. Steven Phillips, Pacific and American Studies 5(2003), 135–52. States to participate in the Pacific Conference, 217-237. “‘Yuandong de beiyue’: guomindang yu quyu Cho, Choi, and Matsuda’s research analyzes which discussed the post-war Korean issue, junshi hezuo” ““远东的北约”: 国民党与区域军 the transformation from the Pacific pact to the and to try to coordinate the divisive America- 22 Memorandum by the Policy Information Officer 事合作 [“A Far Eastern NATO”: The Nationalists APACL, Rhee’s own role in the course, and the based Korean independence groups. He met of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Fisher) to and Regional Military Cooperation], Studies regional security collaboration at that time. with Rhee several times, which was the first the Director of the Office (Butterworth), July of Social Sciences (Sichuan Academy of Social time Rhee had contact with an official from the 15, 1949, 890.00/1–1549, FRUS, 1949, The Far Sciences) 社会科学研究（四川省社会科学 8 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “‘Why Is There No ROC. Letter from Kim Koo to Wu Tiecheng, East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2, 1162. 院) 2010, 6: 133-141. Phillips focuses on the NATO in Asia?’ Revisited: Prospect Theory, December 9 1944, 特17/34.5, KMT Party History mutual distrust and conflicts between Chiang Balance of Threat, and US Alliance Strategies.” Office Archive. Shao Yulin Shihan 23 The Chargé in the Philippines (Lockett) to the 邵毓麟 and the United States through the fact that European Journal of International Relations, 18, huiyilu [Memoir of an Ambassador Secretary of State, July 25, 1949, 890.20/7– 使韩回忆录 the proposed military alliance ended up with no. 2 (2012): 227-250. to Korea] (Taipei: Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe 2549, Ibid, 1174-1175. 传 APACL, a people-to-people organization. , 1980), 52-62. 记文学出版社 Wang Enmei 王恩美, [Contradictions and 9 Charles Kraus, “‘The Danger is Two-Fold’: 24 Telegram from Shao Yulin to Chiang Kai-shek Conflicts between Korea and the ROC on Decolonisation and Cold War in Anti- 15 Telegraph from Shao Yulin to Chiang Kai-shek, about the Weapon Assistance List Asked by the Dominant Power around Asian Nation’s Communist Asia, 1955-7,” The International President Chiang’s Document, June 6, 1949, Korea, President Chiang’s Document, August Anti-Communist League (1953-1956)], Seoul: History Review 39 (2017), no. 2: 256-273. 002-080106-00068-001, Archive of Academia 2, 1949, 002-080106-00068-006, Archive of Studies of Asia, 56:3 (2013). Wang discussed Historica. Shao Yulin, Shihan huiyilu (Taipei: Academia Historica. The Ambassador in Korea the conflicts between the two parties in the 10 Torben Gülstorff, “Warming Up a Cooling War: Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, 1980), 103-106. (Muccio) to the Secretary of State, September APACL, particularly the issues of dominance An Introductory Guide on the CIAS and Other 19, 1949, A-282, Ibid, 1080-1084. and the problem of Japan. Wu Ruiyun吴瑞云, Post- Globally Operating Anti-communist Networks war ROC’s Anti-Communist Alliance Policy—the at the Beginning of the Cold War Decade of
26 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 27 CHINA
25 The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the the invitation. Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist 交努力 [Great Power Cognition and Actions: 26 1957, B-334-001, Wilson Center CWIHP,
Secretary of State, September 19, 1949, A-282, League, December 1953-May 1955, 11-13- Positioning China’s International Role and https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ STUDIES FRUS, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, vol. 13-02-001, Archive of the Institute of Modern Diplomatic Efforts in the Late Anti-Japanese document/121035. 7, bk. 2, 1080-1084. History, Academia Sinica, 106. War], Studies of Modern History 近代史研究 36 Torben Gülstorff, “Warming Up a Cooling War.” 2006,4. 55 Chiang Kai-shek’s Secret Record—Testimonies 26 Kiyoung Rho, “The Development of Pacific Pact of the 80-years Sino-Japan Relations. vol. REVIEW Policy and the Plan of Regional Security in the 37 Yin Xizhen 尹錫貞,“李承晩政権の対日外 45 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korea War, 2 (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1971), 411, Syngman Rhee Regime,” The Journal of Korean 交”, [Syngman Rhee Administration’s Japan vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, cited in Chen Fenglin 陈奉林, “‘Ritaitiaoyue’ History 11 (2002), 197-198, cited in Junghyun Diplomacy], (PhD diss.Keio University, 2016) 1981), 148-154. Shao Yulin, Shihan huiyilu yu zhanhou ritai guanxi” “日台条约”与战后 Park, “Frustrated Alignment: The Pacific Pact 92-102. (Taipei: Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, 1980), 日台关系框架 [“Japan-Taiwan Treaty” and the
Proposals from 1949-1954 and South Korea- 85-92. Hsiao-ting Lin, Kunshou yu fangong: Framework of the Post-war Japan-Taiwan vol 6 Taiwan Relations,” 226. 38 Letter from Kim Hong-il to Kung-chao Yeh, lengzhanzhong de Taiwan xuanze (Beijing: Relations], Journal of China Foreign Affairs
Sino-Korean Relations, November 26, 1955, Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2017), 43. University 外交学院学报 2004, 12: 63. | 2020 27 Wang Doongyuan 王东原, Fusheng jianshu 11-01-03-06-01-004, Archive of the Institute of 浮生简述 [Brief Narration of My Life] (Taipei: Modern History, Academia Sinica, 142-143. 46 Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, April 14, 56 Shao Yulin, Shihan huiyilu (Taipei: Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe 传记文学出版社, 1947, Archive of Hoover Institution, Zhuanjiwenxue chubanshe, 1980), 316-319. 1987), 107. 39 Letter from the President (Syngman Rhee) Stanford University. to Lt. General Choi Duk-shin, April 5, 57 Xinhua News Agency, “American Imperialists’ 28 Abstract and Draft of the Pacific Mutual 1956, B-333b-091, Wilson Center CWIHP, 47 Chiang Kai-shek, Fangongkange jibenlun 反共 New Scheme against Chinese People and Far Assistance Treaty Delivered by Wang Shijie https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ 抗俄基本论 [Basic Theory of Anti-Communism East People” 美帝国主义反对中国人民和远东人 to Chiang Kai-shek, President Chiang’s document/121025. and Resisting to Russia] (Taipei: Zhongyang 民的新阴谋, July 17 1949, ed, Central Archives, Document, November 2, 1953, 002-080106- wenwu gongyingshe 中央文物供应社, 1953) Selected Documents of CCP Center 中共中央 00069-011, Archive of Academia Historica. 40 CDS Report No. 23 from Choi Duk Shin to 文件选集, vol. 18, (Beijing: CCP Central Party the President (Syngman Rhee), November 48 West German Embassy in Manila to School Publishing House, 1992), 534-535. 29 Chen Tzu-chi, “Zhanhou taiwan duihan 8 1956, B-333a-016, Wilson Center CWIHP, department II 3 (West German Foreign Office), zhengce xingcheng yu bianqian (1945-1960),” https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ September 27 1965, the archive of the West 58 Conversation Record between Dong 84-85. document/120975. German Foreign Office (PA AA, AA), B 40, 34, Xianguang and Syngman Rhee, October 29, 106-109, cited in Torben Gülstorff, “Warming 1953, 11-01-03-06-03-101, Archive of the 30 Conversation Summary between Kung-chao 41 Letter from the President (Syngman Up a Cooling War.” Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Yeh and Byeon Yeong-tae, President Chiang’s Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi, June 06, 44. Document, November 28, 1953, 002-080106- 1956, B-333b-070, Wilson Center CWIHP, 49 Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, July 11, 1949, Archive 00069-015, Archive of Academia Historica. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ of Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 59 Seoul: Donga ilbo [East Asia Daily], 동아일보 document/121020. January 7 1950. 31 Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League, 50 Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, August 31, December 1953-May 1955, 11-13-13-02- 42 Sun Yat-sen, “Speech to Kobe Business Council 1949, Archive of Hoover Institution, 60 Conversation Summary between Kung-chao 001, Archive of the Institute of Modern History, and Other Five Groups at the Kobe Senior Stanford University. Yeh and Byeon Yeong-tae, President Chiang’s Academia Sinica, 105-106. Girl’s School” [在神户高等女校对神户商业会 Document, November 28, 1953, 002-080106- 议所等五团体演讲] November 28 1924, in 51 Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, January 1, 00069-015, Archive of Academia Historica. 32 Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League, ed. Qin Xiaoy i秦孝仪, Guofu quanji 国父全集 1950, Archive of Hoover Institution, December 1953-May 1955. [Complete Works of the Founding Father], vol. Stanford University. 61 Letter No. 79 from the President (Syngman 3, (Taipei: Jindai zhongguo chubanshe 近代中 Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi, July 26 33 Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist Conference, 国出版社, 1989) 535-542. 52 Torben Gülstorff, “Warming Up a Cooling War,” 1957, B-331-038, Wilson Center CWIHP, Press Release No.4, June 17 1954, B-387-012, 32. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ Wilson Center CWIHP, https://digitalarchive. 43 Telegram to Li Liejun for Leaving in Japan and document/120950. wilsoncenter.org/document/118314. Launching Asian Great League, October 13, 53 Syngman Rhee, translated by Han-Kyo Kim, 1924, Qin, Guofu quanji, 544. The Spirit of Independence: A Primer of 62 CDS Report No. 52 from Choi Duk Shin to 34 Torben Gülstorff, “Warming Up a Cooling War.” Korean Modernization and Reform, (Honolulu: the President (Syngman Rhee), August 15 44 Wang Jianlang 王建朗, “Daguoyishi yu University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 53. 1957, B-331-023, Wilson Center CWIHP, 35 After it was confirmed by Taiwan and the daguozuowei: kangzhan houqi de zhongguo https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ United States that the organization was a civil guoji jiaose dingwei yu waijiao nuli” 大国意识 54 Letter No. 104 from the President (Syngman document/120943. society, the Philippines and Thailand accepted 与大国作为: 抗战后期的中国国际角色定位与外 Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi, December
28 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS “One Arch Enemy” or “Two-Fold Danger”: The Failed Alliance in Non-Communist Asia 29 CHINA
63 CDS Report No. 59 from Choi Duk Shin to 71 Relations in the APACL, January 1956- and responses to U.S. sanctions; it suggests
the President (Syngman Rhee), October 18 August 1960, 11-01-03-07-02-009, Archive The Role of that a more aggressive US posture is push- STUDIES 1957, B-334-044, Wilson Center CWIHP, of theInstitute of Modern History, Academia ing China to work toward a global financial https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ Sinica, 13. Sanctions in system less dependent on the dollar and document/121055. the leadership of the United States, which 72 Sino-Korea Relations, October U.S.-China in turn could weaken the effectiveness of REVIEW 64 Letter from the President (Syngman Rhee) 1953-November 1957, 11-01-03-06-01-004, American sanctions. to Lt. General Choi Duk-shin, April 5 Archive of the Institute of Modern History, Economic 1956, B-333b-091, Wilson Center CWIHP, Academia Sinica, 199-201. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ Competition Department of Justice
document/121025. 73 Sino-Korea Relations, September Puts Chinese Firms on vol 6 1954-October 1956, 11-01-03-06-01-005, Notice: The Huawei Case
65 CDS Report No. 8 from Choi Duk Shin Archive of the Institute of Modern History, | 2020 to the President (Syngman Rhee), July 6 Academia Sinica, 4-5. On December 1, 2018, Meng Wanzhou, 1956, B-333b-048, Wilson Center CWIHP, CFO of Chinese telecommunications com- https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ 74 Asian Peoples’ Anti-communist Conference, Jennifer Conrad pany Huawei and daughter of its founder, document/121008. Draft Resolution Submitted by the Chinese was arrested by Canadian authorities, car- Delegation, June 16, 1954, B-389-035, rying out a request from the United States.1 66 CDS Report No. 47 from Choi Duk Shin Wilson Center CWIHP, https://digitalarchive. Jennifer Conrad is a master of arts candi- Meng faces extradition to the United States to the President (Syngman Rhee), July 11 wilsoncenter.org/document/118340. date in China Studies at the Johns Hopkins for allegations that from 2009 to 2014 her 1957, B-331-045, Wilson Center CWIHP, University School of Advanced International company used a Hong Kong subsidiary to https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ 75 Letter No. 104 from the President (Syngman Studies (SAIS). In the summer of 2019, she deceive banks— “victim institutions,” in the document/120952. Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi, December interned for the State Department at the words of John Gibb-Carsley, an attorney 26 1957, B-334-001, Wilson Center CWIHP, American Institute in Taiwan. Prior to SAIS, for the Canadian Justice Department—into 67 Draft Letter from Choi Duk Shin to the https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ she was the head of fact-checking for Vogue clearing Huawei transactions that violate President (Syngman Rhee), December document/121035. and spent three years covering art and American sanctions against Iran.2 Some 1957, B-334-002, Wilson Center CWIHP, youth culture in China, including editing journalists have suggested the Huawei https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ 76 Letter No. 104 from the President (Syngman the music section of Time Out Beijing. charges have less to do with reining in document/121036. Rhee) to Minister Duk Shin Choi, December Tehran’s nuclear ambitions than with inten- 26, 1957. sifying U.S.-China economic competition 68 APACL, September 1954-Febrary 1955, 11-11- Introduction and fears that Huawei equipment could 17-01-008, Archive of the Institute of Modern 77 Steven Phillips, “‘Yuandong de beiyue’: present a security risk to the United States. History, Academia Sinica, 111. guomindang yu quyu junshi hezuo” [“A Far Going back to the 1949 founding of the “One can say, without exaggeration, that Eastern NATO”: The Nationalists and Regional People’s Republic, China has frequently this is part of an economic war on China, 69 Wang Enmei, Contradictions and Conflicts Military Cooperation], Studies of Social been affected by American unilateral and a reckless one at that,” wrote Colum- between Korea and the ROC on the Dominant Sciences (Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences) sanctions, whether as a target or as a party bia University economist Jeffrey Sachs.3 Power around Asian Nation’s Anti-Communist (2010), 6: 138. carrying out actions against third countries Nationalistic Chinese newspaper the League, Seoul: Studies of Asia, 56:3 (2013), – willingly or not. In recent years, sanctions Global Times called the case a “U.S. polit- cited in Chen Tzu-chi, “Zhanhou taiwan have become an increasing point of conten- ical game against Huawei, forged to look duihan zhengce xingcheng yu bianqian tion between the United States and China, like a lawsuit.”4 President Donald Trump (1945-1960),” 90. major companies in strategic sectors, such fueled such speculation with public state- as telecommunications giants ZTE and ments that he might intervene in the case 70 Conversation Records of Chiang Kai-shek met Huawei, face U.S. accusations of espionage. to secure a better trade deal with China.5 with Japan Congressmen Goodwill Visiting America’s centrality to the global financial Group and Japan Observational Group of the system limits China’s ability to avoid com- Similarly, partly state-owned Chinese tele- APACL, President Chiang’s Document, August pliance, but Beijing appears to be working communications company ZTE,6 faced 26, 1955, 002-080106-00065-021, Archive of to build international opposition to the being banned from buying products from Academia Historica. sanctions and developing its own forms of the United States for seven years, as pun- economic pressure. This paper describes ishment for violating U.S. sanctions by the mechanisms behind U.S. sanctions, trac- selling items to Iran and North Korea.7 ing the history of Chinese experience with The ban would likely have put ZTE out
30 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 31 CHINA
of business, but after a personal appeal has expressed a willingness...to choke off Though the United States has imposed uni- website describes the role of sanctions as
from China’s President Xi Jinping, Presi- critical supplies of U.S.-origin hardware, lateral sanctions and supported UN efforts “defending the U.S. and global financial STUDIES dent Trump decided to take the pressure software and technology.”14 since the start of the Cold War, the use of systems against abuse and... using finan- off, insisting the sanctions be removed in financial measures intensified after 9/11. cial intelligence and authorities to combat return for ZTE paying a fine. “Too many Writing just after President Donald Trump’s In Treasury’s War, Juan C. Zarate writes of those who threaten our nation’s security jobs in China lost. Commerce Department election, York University political science how he and a group of “guerrillas in gray and core objectives.” The post goes on to has been instructed to get it done!,”8 he professor Gregory Chin posits that “puni- suits”16 at the Treasury Department created explain “before taking action, we coordi- REVIEW tweeted. Many in Congress were outraged, tive trade measures” will push China to a newfound mission for the department nate closely with a number of government including Senator Marco Rubio who said “reconsider its global monetary strategy,” through “a novel set of financial strategies agencies—including the State Department, at the time, “I fought so hard to put ZTE including “a stronger push to use its own that harness the international financial and the intelligence community, and others—to
9 15 out of business.” Since then, bills have currency internationally.” Such measures commercial systems to ostracize rogue ensure that our actions are consistent with vol 6 twice been introduced in Congress to could ultimately weaken America’s ability actors and constrict their funding flows, and complement other U.S. government
10 17 22 |
reinstate sanctions on ZTE. Senator Tom to impose unilateral sanctions. inflicting real pain.” Treasury relied on activities.” Zarate terms it “strategic sua- 2020 Cotton, introducing a similar bill that tar- Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to sion”: “the directed use of American power gets Huawei, wrote that such companies label and isolate “bad banks” anywhere and influence to align influential state and deserve “nothing less than the death pen- Unique and Powerful U.S. in the world that facilitate transactions nonstate actors and networks with Ameri- alty” for violating U.S. sanctions.11 Yet the Methods to Impose Sanctions for sanctioned groups. Less common but can interests.”23 tenor of the official statements from Amer- more controversial secondary sanctions ican leaders suggest the enforcement was Financial sanctions are an effective form of target non-U.S. entities that do business Zarate’s “bureaucratic insurgents”24 who less about stopping commerce with Iran pressure when they completely cut a coun- with sanctioned countries or entities.18 design sanctions regimes argue that it and North Korea than with targeting spe- try or group off from international trade and “The twenty-first-century financial and is necessary to sanction entities in third cific Chinese companies, which are seen as banking. International trade is most often commercial environment had its own eco- countries “both to combat sanctions abuse an extension of the Chinese state. denominated in dollars, and international system that could be leveraged uniquely and to demonstrate our seriousness of to American advantage. In this system, the purpose.”25 But using sanctions to further banks were prime movers,” writes Zarate.19 foreign policy goals opens the United States to accusations of abusing sover- What Zarate calls a “new financial-warfare eign privilege, especially after President paradigm”20 grew out of a desire to find Trump’s internationally unpopular decision Beijing appears to be working to build international a new way to put pressure on interna- to reimpose sanctions on Iran. “It is Ameri- opposition to the sanctions and developing its own tional actors without resorting to military ca’s central role in the global economy that action. “What else fills in the gap between gives it the exorbitant privilege of imposing forms of economic pressure. pounding your breast and indulging in its way in boardrooms across the world,” empty rhetoric and going to war besides according to an Economist article about economic sanctions?” Richard Holbrooke, concerns of “creeping extraterritoriality” President Bill Clinton’s ambassador to in sanctions enforcement.26 Within China, the UN, asked in a 2003 New York Times there is growing concern that the United In November 2018, the Department of banks often have correspondent accounts Magazine article examining the impact of States “wants to use financial hegemony Justice announced a China Initiative to in major U.S. banks, such as Citibank, to Clinton-era sanctions on Iraq.21 However, to achieve diplomatic goals.”27 combat economic espionage,12 part of facilitate those transactions. Therefore, statements from U.S. government officials the department’s “strategic priority of transactions that pass through the U.S. exhibit ambiguity over what sanctions are However, there are important reasons to countering Chinese national security financial system or use dollars are subject intended to do: are they meant to protect maintain these tools: these new methods threats.”13 Soon after, in January 2019, the to U.S. jurisdiction. A bank found to work the global financial system, effect changes wiped out Al Qaeda’s financing network law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & with a sanctioned entity can be cut off from in behavior, or create pressure for future within a decade.28 Fighting terrorism, Flom LLP released a memo highlighting a the American financial system – making it negotiations? The unclear or changing human-rights violations, and rogue nuclear quiet but aggressive increase in enforce- virtually impossible to do business globally. justifications may be one factor encour- states through financial means are all ment efforts aimed at Chinese companies. This is also the mechanism through which aging other countries—especially China, “single best effort” collective action prob- The authors believe that the moves are a foreign company, such as Huawei, can which is sensitive to issues of national sov- lems29 best addressed by a unitary actor. aimed at “putting Chinese companies get caught up in enforcement issues over ereignty—to push back against carrying out “It should concern us if certain international on notice that it will vigorously pursue alleged transactions with Iran. policies they didn’t sign on to or suspect transactions would start circumventing the export-related violations, particularly those have ulterior motives. A post titled “Sanc- U.S. dollar or the international financial involving U.S.-embargoed countries, and tions 101” on the Treasury Department’s system because if that starts happening,
32 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 33 CHINA
we also lose track of those transactions North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia; but Beijing encouraged six-party talks, China practice (i.e. development of nuclear weap-
and we might not have a good oversight also capitalist U.S. allies such as Japan and became more amenable to supporting ons). In its capacity to support or thwart STUDIES of what’s going on outside of our purview,” Western European countries.35 After the sanctions regimes. China cooperated with sanctions regimes on other parties, China said Heleen Bakker, deputy chief of mission deaths of student protesters in Tiananmen UN sanctions when alternatives narrowed, has been much more supportive of the use at the Netherlands embassy, during a panel Square during June 1989, China was again the United States made concessions on the of tactical sanctions.48 discussion in February 2019 sponsored by the target of sanctions passed by U.S. Con- scope and language of resolutions, Amer- the Atlantic Council.30 gress. Most of the restrictions have been ican diplomats intervened, and, in most In the case of North Korea, which is both REVIEW lifted, but the arms embargo remains in cases, regional partners came on board.40 China’s neighbor and an important regional place and came up in recent trade talks.36 For example, in negotiating a 2006 reso- trading partner, increased pressure from China’s Experience as Sanctions lution, China lobbied for concessions that the United States may not be enough to
Target and Enforcer Perhaps in light of its own difficulties, when narrowed the scope of sanctions and asked push China into actions that counter its vol 6 faced with supporting UN sanctions against for softer language on the escalation of national interest. “China will not be strong- |
Early experiences with American finan- other countries, China historically took a pressure and limits on the types of weap- armed into a course of action that it believes 2020 cial pressure set the tone for how China position of “radical anti-interventionism and ons embargoed.41 imperils its national security,” warns Adam responds today. Tong Zhao, a doctoral deference to sovereignty.”37 However over Szubin, distinguished practitioner-in-res- student in the United States and former the past two decades, China has begun During the same period, Chinese banks idence at the Johns Hopkins University Chinese government worker, writes that to support some sanctions regimes. Joel became caught up in sanctions enforce- School of Advanced International Stud- China is one of the few countries to have Wuthnow analyzes China’s behavior in the ment. In 2005, with the six-party talks ies and a former acting undersecretary in “very rich experience” in both undergo- UN Security Council regarding sanctions faltering, the U.S. Treasury invoked section Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial ing sanctions and having the capacity to in his dissertation, “Beyond the Veto.” In 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act to designate Intelligence, testifying before the Senate impose sanctions on other countries.31 In the case of Iran, a major Chinese trading Macau-based Banco Delta Asia as a primary Banking Committee in 2017.49 In fact, his- 1950, the fledgling People’s Republic of partner, China agreed to three rounds of money laundering concern, alleging the bank torical experiences help explain Chinese China intervened on behalf of Kim Il Sung’s sanctions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear provided financial services to North Korean resistance to recent U.S. measures. communist government during the Korean program. But in 2009 and 2010, China government agencies and front companies.42 War. As a result, China faced trade embar- held out, ultimately agreeing to back the Banco Delta Asia froze $25 million in North goes from the UN and the United States, resolution in the face of increasing “intran- Korean assets, while other Chinese banks China’s Growing Alarm the latter of which was only lifted in 1972.32 sigence” from Iran, concessions from the also began freezing their North Korean During the war, Hong Kong businessmen United States with regard to Iran’s energy assets. The news also caused a run on Wu Quan, a spokesperson for China’s found ways to circumvent the blockade, sector, pressure from other members of Banco Delta Asia, requiring the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, called 2018 smuggling medication and iron sheets into the Security Council, and Russia’s chang- government to step in to stabilize it.43 sanctions placed on China for military col- mainland China.33 After the end of hostil- ing position.38 “Perhaps the most important lesson was laboration with Russia “a flagrant breach of that the Chinese could in fact be moved basic rules of international relations” and “a to follow the U.S. Treasury’s lead and act stark show of hegemonism,” as reported in against their own stated foreign policy and Xinhua.50 Based on such concerns, Chinese China cooperated with UN sanctions when alternatives political interests,” Zarate writes.44 By 2007, academics have proposed a number of narrowed, the United States made concessions on the the funds were returned to North Korea as methods for improving the country’s “out- part of an effort to restart nuclear talks.45 side options”—“the expectations leaders scope and language of resolutions, American diplomats The response from Beijing was fairly muted: have about what will happen if cooperation intervened, and, in most cases, regional partners a spokesperson expressed “deep regret” were to fail.”51 about the sanctions as the bank worked came on board. with American officials to return the funds In an editorial for The Chinese Banker, to North Korea.46 Liu Dongmin and Shi Chen of the Chi- nese Academy of Social Sciences write ities in the Korean War, the persistence of On North Korea sanctions, Wuthnow argues Zhao divides sanctions into two categories: that, with the globalization of finance, the American sanctions “made China realize that China acts based on concerns about tactical and strategic. Strategic sanctions financial system has become “one of the how dangerous it is to rely on the support three destabilizing factors: the North against China were “generally viewed by most important weapons in the U.S. for- of a single country [the Soviet Union] for all Korean government collapsing, harsh the Chinese government as intended to eign policy ‘arms arsenal’ to dominate the its needs.”34 The risk became even more measures provoking extreme reactions challenge the Communist rule” and did world.”52 Sun Haiyong of the Shanghai acute after the Sino-Soviet split around from Pyongyang, or an American invasion not have the intended effect.47 In con- Institutes for International Studies53 argues, 1960, following which China increased of North Korea.39 Throughout the 2000s, trast, China usually complied when faced “when necessary, China needs to use the trade with communist countries such as as Pyongyang conducted nuclear tests and with “tactical” sanctions aimed at curbing a differences between the United States and
34 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 35 CHINA
Europe and other important economies to tools at its disposal to intensify financial China’s Response and the true ambitions, even if they weren’t being
Global Financial System
strengthen the coordination of interests pressure against Iran while protecting the affected by changing U.S. policies. STUDIES and prevent the United States from form- U.S. financial system from illicit activity,” ing a unified front against China.”54 Sun Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Throughout the history of the People’s Within China, the 2008 recession prompted encourages strengthening China’s power Intelligence David S. Cohen said in a press Republic, the Chinese leadership has bal- questions of whether it is wise for the dollar to compete, but also believes China has release. The sanctions barred Kunlun from anced two contradictory needs: to be a part to play such a central role in the global leverage because the United States needs access to the U.S. financial system,63 but of the global financial system, and to be pro- financial system. In 2009, Zhou Xiaochuan, REVIEW China’s cooperation to pressure North since the bank was designed to not touch tected from it. China’s central banker, famously called for Korea and Iran.55 the U.S. system or use dollars (transactions an international reserve currency “discon- were usually processed in yuan or euros), As the Treasury Department took on a more nected from economic conditions and
Zhou Fufang of China’s Ministry of Finance they had no real impact on the bank. Even prominent international role after 9/11, those sovereign interests of any single country” vol 6 International Finance Center56 calls finan- so, China suspended the bank’s activities. within the organization felt, “we needed to and increased use of special drawing rights |
cial sanctions “high intensity” economic “The Chinese certainly objected diplomat- bring China and Russia into the fold of the (a basket of currencies mostly used as a unit 2020 sanctions.57 Referencing Treasury’s War, ically, but they reacted the way that we leading financial centers to give them a stake of account by the IMF).73 The RMB was des- Zhou suggests the United States is acting would have hoped,” Zarate said during in the legitimacy, transparency, and defense ignated a special drawing rights currency “above international law,” given that there Congressional testimony in 2017, noting of the international financial system.”69 In with the IMF in 2016, and other countries is no international channel that sanctioned similarities with the reaction to the Banco 2007, China joined the Financial Action have increased their RMB holdings. The use countries can appeal to for relief or recon- Delta Asia sanctions in 2005.64 Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental of RMB has increased most dramatically sideration.58 Zhou also raises concern body set up to promote “legal, regulatory, in Asia, but has also risen in some African about the U.S. debt held in Treasury bonds, In 2018, after the United States exited and operational measures for combating and Latin American countries, according which could theoretically be frozen in the the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action money laundering, terrorist financing, and to Chin’s research.74 In 2019, Russia, a fre- future, and suggests increasing the amount (JCPOA, commonly referred to as the Iran other related threats to the integrity of the quent target of American sanctions, bought of foreign exchange China holds in curren- nuclear deal), Chinese Foreign Ministry international financial system.”70 a quarter of the world’s yuan reserves (as cies other than the dollar; promoting more spokesperson Hua Chunying said China multilateral economic trade and financial “regrets” the American decision and “noted cooperation; and speeding the internation- the widespread opposition to the unilateral alization of the RMB. Zhou also calls for an sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction among “early warning and response system”59 to the international community.”65Although China played a key role in stabilizing the euro and the study the organizations and mechanisms she said China will continue to trade with dollar after their crises, Chin notes, but also pushed for for carrying out U.S. sanctions, and help Iran in a responsible manner, Bank of Chinese financial institutions avoid “falling Kunlun again stopped accepting yuan- diversification away from the dollar. into the third-party sanctions trap.”60 Finally, and euro-denominated payments from Zhou suggests China develop its own sanc- Iran amid new U.S. pressure.66 tions system in order to “better safeguard national interests, fairness, and justice.”61 Initially China received a waiver that would York University political science professor well as yen and euros).75 European central allow it to continue importing Iranian oil, Gregory Chin argues China engages in banks are also beginning to trade some a “more cautious approach” than defy- “true revisionism” in global financial gov- dollar reserves for yuan.76 President Xi also Case Study: Bank of Kunlun ing the sanctions. Writing for Bloomberg ernance. The “PRC is seeking change in advocates for expanded development and Opinion, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj asserts the system, as the immediate and medi- use of cryptocurrency, which could take The development of Bank of Kunlun illus- that waivers for China may be a strategic um-term goal, aiming to preserve a leading more transactions out of U.S. jurisdiction.77 trates how China has begun to look for move by the United States to “undermine role for the U.S. dollar, though not ‘the’ options outside the U.S. financial system, the broader international effort to defy the leading role.”71 China played a key role China has made additional moves into while continuing to be responsive to extraterritoriality of U.S. sanctions” and in stabilizing the euro and the dollar after international finance. UnionPay, the Chi- American pressure. A banking subsidiary “could weaken Chinese resolve to find a their crises, Chin notes, but also pushed for nese state-controlled credit card issuer, of state-owned China National Petroleum purpose-built banking mechanism for other diversification away from the dollar. Chin launched in 2002 to take the place of U.S. Corporation, Bank of Kunlun was struc- trade.”67 Yet in April 2019, as the Trump looks at the public statements from Chinese issuers Visa and MasterCard.78 By the end tured to process Chinese oil payments to administration withdrew those waivers. officials, and finds appeals for reform and of last year, more than 100 million cards Iran without contact with the U.S. finan- China again formally complained about a more diversified system, but says “their had been issued outside of China, includ- cial system.62 It became subject to U.S. the U.S. “long-arm jurisdiction,”68 but took normative and policy preferences have ing a dual Euro-RMB debit card issued by secondary sanctions in 2012 as part of no additional action. been left somewhat ambiguous.”72 This the Bank of China Paris Branch.79 Treasury’s “commitment to use all the ambiguity makes it hard to discern China’s
36 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 37 CHINA
China’s financial market remains largely Mirroring the United States: to South Korea,93 and authorities closed Payment System, introduced by the Peo-
Chinese Financial Pressure
closed to international investors, but inter- several branches of South Korean super- ple’s Bank of China in 2015. According to STUDIES national investors can purchase so-called market Lotte (citing fire concerns) before Nikkei Asian Review, its use increased 80 “dim sum bonds,” RMB-denominated bonds The Chinese government continues to the brand left the mainland market alto- percent last year, and CIPS is especially issued by banks in Hong Kong.80 “Panda develop and refine methods of financial gether.94 Scholar of Chinese law Jacques attractive to countries “exposed to U.S. bonds,” in contrast, are RMB-denominated confrontation.In 2019, China threatened deLisle suggests that China’s use of these sanctions, such as Russia and Turkey, as well bonds issued to Chinese investors by for- to sanction American firms involved with sorts of coercive measures challenges uni- as African nations on the receiving side of REVIEW eign banks.81 In 2016, China spearheaded a proposed $8 billion sale of F-16s to versal norms, “but only uncertainly, given China-led infrastructure projects under Bei- the creation of the Asia Infrastructure and Taiwan.88 The deal went through by the how uncertain and contested international jing’s Belt and Road Initiative.”101 While an Investment Bank, a development bank end of the summer, and although the law is in this area.”95 important step, the value of all transactions
headquartered in Beijing, with some of its sanctions never materialized, Chinese aca- processed by CIPS in a year was still less vol 6 loans denominated in RMB.82 demics and political leaders have begun than what SWIFT processes in a single day.
The Role of Global Governance |
outlining tactics for future cases. Chinese 2020 However, international use of the RMB commentators have floated the idea of cre- A Foreign Policy article titled “China and is far from widespread. According to the ating an “unreliable entities list” in response Within the UN, China can veto or abstain the EU Are Growing Sick of U.S. Finan- Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial to U.S. trade restrictions.89 Writing for the from sanctions packages, but it is largely cial Power” catalogs the ways that other Telecommunication (SWIFT), in November Brookings Institution, Kaitan Vivian Zhang powerless to oppose unilateral U.S. sanc- countries are trying to erode American 2019 the RMB was ranked fifth in global says Chinese sanctions are “by and large, tions or find international redress when economic leverage, citing London banks payments by value — just 1.93 percent of symbolic and serve as a signaling device.”90 it feels that its banks have been unfairly that court Chinese and Russian customers payments recorded through the system,83 Following the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, for targeted. In international economic nego- as a key example. “If Beijing could count — and only about about 2.01percent of the example, China banned Canadian canola tiations, China frequently lobbies on behalf on a more cooperative London, with its world’s reserves were held in RMB as of oil. In response to maritime disputes in of developing nations, employing what key financial services, to circumvent U.S. the third quarter of 2019.84 Capital account the South China Sea, China suspended Scott Kastner, Margaret Pearson, and Chad jurisdiction, it could seriously damage the controls, which limit the amount of RMB imports of bananas from the Philippines Rector call a “hold-up strategy.” After 2008, U.S. sanctions edifice,” the authors write.102 that can leave the country, do much to con- for a time.91 for example, China lobbied for a greater Recently the European Union created the strain the influence of the RMB,85 as does proportion of voting rights and more rep- Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges the opaque financial system, including the Other actions have had more lasting resentation for developing countries in the (INSTEX), a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to lack of an independent central bank.86 impacts. In 2010, at a time of increased World Trade Organization (WTO).96 More- continue trading with Iran after the United tensions with Japan over disputed waters, over, “Chinese initial investments in groups States pulled out of the JCPOA.103 The Although options for circumventing the China banned shipments of rare-earth like the CMI [Chiang Mai Initiative] and the SPV will only be used in limited cases, but— dollar and American banks are limited in minerals to Japan, cutting off a critical BRIC countries can be viewed as down much like China’s Bank of Kunlun, set up the short term, China seems to be pushing component for several high-tech man- payments on the development of outside to sidestep contact with the U.S. system—it for incremental change. “The observable ufacturing industries.92 In 2017, when options over the long run,” they write.97 is an example of an innovation intended to regain control of foreign policy deci- Chinese commentators also stress the sion-making from the United States. importance of SWIFT neutrality. The Bel- gium-based organization, the main body responsible for facilitating clearing trans- Conclusion If the United States can control SWIFT, it can control actions between international banks, cut off most of the cross-border payments in the world today. Iranian banks under pressure from Amer- Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou, who at this writ- ica and began sharing information with ing remains in Vancouver awaiting trial, the Treasury Department after 9/11.98 “If has become a folk hero among Chinese the United States can control SWIFT, it can netizens for her resistance to American control most of the cross-border payments pressure, making court appearances with in the world today,” write Liu and Shi.99 Ira- her GPS-monitor ankle bracelet visible trends and patterns...suggest that the South Korea deployed the missile-defense nians began using faxes and exchanging above designer heels.104 However her case current CCP leadership leans normatively system THAAD, which Chinese authorities messages online to get around SWIFT is resolved, the response to her arrest is toward wanting change, however, given its believe could be used to spy into Chinese messaging,100 illustrating the difficulty indicative of growing suspicion of how the low tolerance for destabilization, it will want territory, China responded with “soft sanc- of working around American authorities. United States imposes and enforces sanc- the transition to be gradual and evolution- tions.” Travel agents received “unofficial” China developed its own alternative to the tions. The Economist writes, “America’s aims ary,” writes Chin.87 instructions to stop selling travel packages SWIFT system, the Cross-border Interbank are often laudable. Much wrongdoing has
38 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 39 CHINA
been brought to light, and probably pre- 2 Kate Conger, “Huawei Executive Took Part in 10 “U.S. Lawmakers Target China’s ZTE with 18 “Top 10 Things to Know About President
Sanctions Fraud, Prosecutors Say,” The New Sanctions Bill,” Reuters, February 5, 2019. Trump’s Decision to Withdraw from the Iran vented, as a result of its actions.” However, STUDIES the piece continues, critics have begun to York Times, December 7, 2018. https://www. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade- Nuclear Agreement,” Latham & Watkins Client refer to American “financial imperialism,” nytimes.com/2018/12/07/technology/huawei- china-zte/u-s-lawmakers-target-chinas-zte-with- Alert, May 10, 2018. https://www.lw.com/ especially as it impacts foreign compa- meng-wanzhou-fraud.html sanctions-bill-idUSKCN1PU2MU thoughtLeadership/top-10-president-trump- nies.105 Former Treasury Secretary Jacob decision-withdraw-iran-nuclear-agreement REVIEW Lew and former Deputy Coordinator for 3 Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The War on Huawei,” Project 11 “U.S. Lawmakers Seek to Ban Chip Sales Sanctions Policy at the State Department Syndicate, December 11, 2018. https://www. to China’s Huawei and ZTE for ‘Violating 19 Zarate, 151. Richard Nephew raise similar concerns: project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-war- American Sanctions,’” South China Morning “Secondary sanctions are a tempting on-huawei-meng-wanzhou-arrest-by-jeffrey-d- Post, January 17, 2019. https://www.scmp. 20 Zarate, 211.
policy tool, since using them is far easier sachs-2018-12 com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2182439/ vol 6 than working through international insti- us-lawmakers-seek-ban-chip-sales-chinas- 21 David Rieff, “Were Sanctions Right?” The New
4 Editorial, “Meng strikes back at U.S. political huawei-and-zte York Times Magazine, July 27, 2003. https:// | tutions or diplomacy, they write in Foreign 2020 Affairs, cautioning the United States persecution against Huawei,” Global Times, www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/magazine/ should be sparing in the application of March 4, 2019. http://www.globaltimes.cn/ 12 United States Department of Justice, were-sanctions-right.html secondary sanctions and work to build content/1140856.shtml “Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces international consensus.106 “The outlook New Initiative to Combat Chinese Economic 22 Adam Szubin, “Sanctions 101, Part I of II: A for U.S. economic statecraft, if it contin- 5 “Donald Trump says he would intervene in Espionage,” remarks as prepared for delivery, Powerful Financial Tool,” Treasury Notes, U.S. ues on its present trajectory, is bleak,” Lew arrest of Huawei CFO Sabrina Meng Wanzhou November 1, 2018, Washington, D.C. https:// Department of Treasury, May 30, 2014. https:// and Nephew continue. “When it comes to if it helped secure trade deal with China,” The www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney- www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/ sanctions, other countries will likely soon South China Morning Post, December 12, general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative- Sanctions-101-Pt-1-.aspx begin challenging or ignoring measures 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ combat-chinese-economic-espionage that have been imposed by Washington diplomacy/article/2177540/donald-trump- 23 Zarate, 431. without international support.”107 says-would-intervene-arrest-huawei-cfo- 13 United States Department of Justice, “Attorney sabrina General Jeff Sessions’s China Initiative Fact 24 Zarate, xi. Aside from a few high-profile instances, Sheet,” November 1, 2018. https://www.justice. disputes over sanctions rarely make front- 6 Sara Salinas, “Six Top U.S. Intelligence Chiefs gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download 25 Secondary Sanctions Against Chinese page news. The details fill the fine print of Caution Against Buying Huawei Phones,” Institutions: Assessing their Utility for legal documents and are pored over by CNBC, February 13, 2018. https://www.cnbc. 14 Michael E. Leiter, Ivan A. Schlager, Donald L. Constraining North Korea: Hearing Before the compliance officers at international banks. com/2018/02/13/chinas-hauwei-top-us- Vieira, Jonathan M. Gafni, Daniel J. Gerkin, Senate Subcommittee on National Security and But if current U.S.-China tensions con- intelligence-chiefs-caution-americans-away. and Nicholas A. Klein, “Enhanced U.S. Export International Trade and Finance, 115th Cong., tinue, the weaponizing of both countries’ html Controls and Aggressive Enforcement Likely 1st sess. (2017) (prepared testimony of Adam financial systems could continue apace. to Impact China,” Skadden’s 2019 Insights, Szubin, distinguished practitioner-in-residence Last spring, former Trump chief strategist 7 Ana Swanson and Kenneth P. Vogel, “Faced January 17, 2019. https://www.skadden.com/ at the Johns Hopkins University School of Steve Bannon wrote in The Washington with Crippling Sanctions, ZTE Loaded Up on insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/ Advanced International Studies). Post that the United States and China are Lobbyists,” The New York Times, August 1, enhanced-us-export-controls in “an economic and strategic war.”108 If 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/ 26 “America’s Legal Forays Against Foreign that sentiment prevails in Washington, the us/politics/zte-sanctions-lobbying.html 15 Gregory Chin, “True Revisionist: China and the Companies Vex Other Countries,” The United States will likely use all the tools at its Global Monetary System,” in China’s Global Economist, January 17, 2019. https://www. disposal to fight a new type of war without 8 Donald J. Trump, Twitter, May 13, 2018, 8:01 Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and economist.com/business/2019/01/17/ military conflict, and should anticipate an a.m. https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/ Influence in the 21st Century, ed. Jacques americas-legal-forays-against-foreign-firms- increasingly combative Chinese response. status/995680316458262533?lang=en deLisle and Avery Goldstein (Washington, vex-other-countries D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 59. 1 Lily Kuo, “Huawei: Chinese Media Accuses U.S. 9 Lara Seligman, “Congress Caves to Trump in 27 Zhou Fufang, “Analysis of American Foreign of ‘Hooliganism’ over Meng Wanzhou Arrest,” Fight Over China’s ZTE,” Foreign Policy, July 25, 16 Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing Financial Sanctions Mechanisms and Risk The Guardian, December 7, 2018. https:// 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/25/ of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: Prevention (美国对外金融制裁机制简析及风 www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/ congress-caves-to-trump-in-fight-over-chinas- PublicAffairs, 2013), xi. 险防范),” Fiscal Science 31, no. 1 (2019), 156. dec/07/huawei-chinese-media-accuses-us-of- zte/ (Original: 欲用金融霸权达成外交目的) http:// hooliganism-over-meng-wanzhou-arrest 17 Zarate, ix. ow.ly/p9n150yLLU8
40 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 41 CHINA
28 Zarate, 90. 38 Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond the Veto: Chinese 50 “Chinese military voices ‘strong indignation’ 62 Chen Aizhu and Shu Zhang, “Exclusive:
Diplomacy in the United Nations Security over U.S. ‘sanctions,’” Xinhua, September As U.S. Sanctions Loom, China’s Bank of STUDIES 29 Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate?: The Incentive to Council” (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 22, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/ Kunlun to Stop Receiving Iran Payments Supply Global Public Goods. (Oxford: Oxford 2011), 175. english/2018-09/22/c_137486505.htm - Sources,” Reuters, October 23, 2018. University Press, 2007), 2. https://www.reuters.com/article/ 39 Wuthnow, 118. 51 Scott L. Kastner, Margaret M. Pearson, and us-china-iran-banking-kunlun-exclusive/ REVIEW 30 Heleen Bakker, “Sanctions Discussion with Chad Rector, China’s Strategic Multilateralism: exclusive-as-u-s-sanctions-loom-chinas-bank- Former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew,” filmed 40 Wuthnow, 171. Investing In Global Governance (Cambridge, of-kunlun-to-stop-receiving-iran-payments- on February 19, 2019 at Atlantic Council, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, sources-idUSKCN1MX1KA Washington, DC. https://www.atlanticcouncil. 41 Wuthnow, 142. 2019), 12.
org/events/webcasts/sanctions-discussion- 63 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury vol 6 with-former-treasury-secretary-jacob-j-lew-2 42 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury 52 Liu Dongmin and Shi Chen, “U.S. Financial Sanctions Kunlun Bank in China and Elaf Bank
Note: At other points in the conversation she Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Sanctions Imposed on Other Countries: in Iraq for Business with Designated Iranian | 2020 raised concerns about the overuse of U.S. Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act,” Trends, Characteristics, and the Technology Banks,” press release, July 31, 2012. https:// sanctions. press release, September 15, 2005. https:// Platform It Relies On 美 国 实施金融制裁的趋 www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 势、特征及其依赖的技术平台,” The Chinese pages/tg1661.aspx 31 Tong Zhao, “Sanction Experience and Sanction pages/js2720.aspx Banker 银行家 (August 2018), 114-115. http:// Behavior: An Analysis of Chinese Perception ow.ly/B6fW50yLMbn 64 Secondary Sanctions Against Chinese and Behavior on Economic Sanctions,” 43 Josh Meyer, “Squeeze on North Korea’s money Institutions: Assessing their Utility for Contemporary Politics 16, no. 3 (2010): 265. supply yields results,” Los Angeles Times, 53 More information on his research can be Constraining North Korea: Hearing Before the https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ November 2, 2006. https://www.latimes.com/ found here: http://www.siis.org.cn/Research/ Senate Subcommittee on National Security and 13569775.2010.501639 world/la-fg-macao2nov02-story.html Expert?id=101 International Trade and Finance, 115th Cong., 1st sess. (2017) (testimony of Juan C. Zarate, 32 Xin-Zhu J. Chen, “China and the US Trade 44 Zarate, 243. 54 Sun Haiyong, “American Pressure Strategy chairman and cofounder of the Financial Embargo, 1950-1972,” American Journal of on Chinese Science and Technology: Integrity Network). https://www.govinfo.gov/ Chinese Studies 13, no. 2 (2006): 169. http:// 45 Tan Ee Lyn, “Frozen North Korean funds Development Situation, Strategic Logic, and content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg26242/html/ www.jstor.org/stable/44288827. released from Macau bank,” Reuters, Influencing Factors美国对华科技施压战略 : CHRG-115shrg26242.htm June 13, 2007. https://www.reuters. 发展态势、战略逻辑与影响因素,“ Modern 33 James Pomfret, “Hong Kong Tycoon Henry com/article/us-korea-north/frozen-north- International Relations, no. 1 (2019), 44. 65 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Fok Dies at 83,” Reuters, January 19, 2007. korean-funds-released-from-macau-bank- (Original: 在必要时中国需利用美国与欧洲、其 Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong- idUSTKV00349020070614 他重要经济体之间的分歧,有针对性地加强利益 Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press fok/hk-tycoon-henry-fok-dies-at-83- 协调,防止美国结成对华制裁统一战线) http:// Conference on November 5, 2018,” transcript, idUSHKG14438020061029 46 Demetri Sevastopulo and Andrew ow.ly/4nr150yLM0e November 5, 2018. https://www.fmprc.gov. Yeh, “China ‘Regrets’ U.S. Sanctions on cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ 34 Chen, 180. Macao Bank, Financial Times, March 55 Sun, 44. t1610459.shtml 15, 2007. https://www.ft.com/content/ 35 Chen, 181. c1b4ead8-d261-11db-a7c0-000b5df10621 56 财政部国际财经中心 66 Aizhu and Zhang.
36 Michael Caster, “The ‘Tiananmen’ Sanctions 47 Zhao, 266. 57 Zhou, 155. (Original: 金融制裁作为一种”高烈 67 Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “Trump’s Iran Should be Strengthened, Not Lifted,” CNN 度”的经济制裁措施) Waivers Are Not the Concessions They Opinion, June 4, 2018. https://www.cnn. 48 Zhao, 265. Seem,” Bloomberg Opinion, November 8, com/2018/06/04/opinions/tiananmen- 58 Zhou, 156. (Original: 只有美国长期凌驾于国际 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ sanctions-us-china-trade-caster-intl/index.html 49 Secondary Sanctions Against Chinese 法) articles/2018-11-08/trump-seeks-to-divide- Institutions: Assessing their Utility for with-iran-waivers-for-china-italy-greece 37 Jacques deLisle, “Remarks by Jacques Constraining North Korea: Hearing Before the 59 Zhou, 155. (Original: 及早研究构建对美国金融 deLisle,” American Society of International Senate Subcommittee on National Security and 制裁预警和应对机制) 68 Wendy Wu, “China Protests Over End to Law Proceedings of the Annual Meeting International Trade and Finance, 115th Cong., American Waivers on Iranian Oil Imports,” 111 (2017). https://search.proquest.com/ 1st sess. (2017) (prepared testimony of Adam 60 Zhou, 159. (Original: 避免落入第三方制裁陷阱) South China Morning Post, April 23, 2019. docview/2194331890?accountid=11752 Szubin, distinguished practitioner-in-residence https://www.scmp.com/news/china/ at the Johns Hopkins University School of 61 Zhou, 159. (Original: 更好维护国家利益与公平 diplomacy/article/3007365/china-protests- Advanced International Studies). 正义) over-end-american-waivers-iranian-oil-imports
42 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 43 CHINA
69 Zarate, 159. 80 NASDAQ, Glossary of Stock Market Terms. 90 Ketian Vivian Zhang, “Chinese Non-Military 102 Elizabeth Rosenberg and Edoardo Saravalle,
https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/d/ Coercion: Tactics and Rationale,” The “China and the EU are going Sick of U.S. STUDIES 70 Financial Action Task Force, “Who We Are.” dim-sum-bond Brookings Institution, January 22, 2019. Financial Power,” Foreign Policy, November 16, https://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese- 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/16/ 81 Emma Dunkley, “Dim sum renaissance non-military-coercion-tactics-and-rationale/ us-eu-china-trump-sanctions/ 71 Chin, 36. powered by rising RMB,” Financial Times, April REVIEW 6, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/7197f006- 91 Michael Peel and Grace Ramos, “Philippine 103 Stephanie Zable, “INSTEX: A Blow to 72 Chin, 38. 372a-11e8-8eee-e06bde01c544 Banana Bonanza Sparks Debate on Shift U.S. Sanctions,” Lawfare blog, March 6, to China,” Financial Times, March 14, 2017. 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 73 Zhou Xiaochuan, “Reform the International 82 “Annual Corporate Procurement Report,” https://www.ft.com/content/3f6df338-056b- instex-blow-us-sanctions
Monetary System,” essay posted on the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank, 11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9 vol 6 Bank for International Settlements website, 2016. https://www.aiib.org/en/opportunities/ 104 “Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in the limelight
March 23, 2009. https://www.bis.org/review/ business/.content/index/_download/annual- 92 Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks in China for her fashion taste,” Global Times, | 2020 r090402c.pdf corporate-procurement-report.pdf Vital Exports to Japan,” The New York Times, December 4, 2019. http://www.globaltimes. September 23, 2010. https://www.nytimes. cn/content/1172220.shtml 74 Chin, 50-51. 83 SWIFT, RMB Tracker, December 2019. com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/ 105 “America’s Legal Forays Against Foreign 75 Natasha Doff and Anna Andrianova, “Russia compliance-and-shared-services/business- 93 Ankit Panda, “China and South Korea: Companies Vex Other Countries,” The Buys Quarter of World Yuan Reserves in intelligence/renminbi/rmb-tracker/ Examining the Resolution of the THAAD Economist, January 17, 2019. https://www. Shift from Dollar,” Bloomberg, January 9, document-centre?tl=en#topic-tabs-menu Impasse,” The Diplomat, November 13, 2017. economist.com/business/2019/01/17/ 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-and- americas-legal-forays-against-foreign-firms- articles/2019-01-09/russia-boosted-yuan-euro- 84 International Monetary Fund, Currency south-korea-examining-the-resolution-of-the- vex-other-countries holdings-as-it-dumped-dollars-in-2018 Composition of Official Foreign Exchange thaad-impasse/ and Jethro Mullen, “China’s Reserves, Q3 2019. http://data.imf.org/regular. ‘Unofficial’ Sanctions Rattle South Korea,” CNN 106 Jacob J. Lew and Richard Nephew, “The Use 76 Eshe Nelson, “Europe’s Central Banks Are aspx?key=41175 Money, March 3, 2017. https://money.cnn. and Misuse of Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Starting to Replace Dollar Reserves with the com/2017/03/03/news/economy/china-south- Affairs, October 15, 2018. https://www. Yuan,” Quartz, January 16, 2018. 85 “China’s Capital Controls to Hamper Yuan korea-thaad-tourism-trade-sanctions/ foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-10-15/ Internationalization: Fitch,” Reuters, May 2, use-and-misuse-economic-statecraft 77 Ryan Browne, “Bitcoin had a wild weekend, 2017. 94 Zhang. briefly topping $10,000, after China’s Xi sang 107 Lew and Nephew. blockchain’s praises,” CNBC, October 28, 86 Chin, 49. 95 deLisle. 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/28/ 108 Stephen K. Bannon, “We’re in an Economic bitcoin-btc-price-climbs-as-chinas-xi-jinping- 87 Chin, 58. 96 Kastner et al, 159. War with China: It’s Futile to Compromise,” The embraces-blockchain.htm Washington Post, May 7, 2019. 88 Chun Han Wong, “China Threatens Sanctions 97 Kastner et al, 156. 78 Martin Arnold and Gabriel Wildau, “China Over Planned U.S. Sale of Jet Fighters to UnionPay Kicks Off European Expansion with Taiwan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 98 Zarate, 53. UK Launch,” Financial Times, September 16, 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china- 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/61bceaf2- threatens-sanctions-over-planned-u-s-sale-of- 99 Liu and Shi, 115. (Original: 美 国 如 果 能够 控 b98d-11e8-8274-55b72926558f fighter-jets-to-taiwan-11566393409 制 SWIFT 系统 , 就能够控制 当 今世 界大部分 的 跨境货 币 支付) 79 UnionPay International, “UnionPay Cards 89 “China publication of ‘unreliable entities list’ Issued Outside Mainland China Exceeds depends on Sino-U.S. trade talks: sources,” 100 Zarate, 284. 100 Million,” press release via PR Newswire, Reuters, October 11, 2019. https://www. October 18, 2018. https://www.prnewswire. reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-entities/ 101 Kazuhiro Kida, Masayuki Kubota, and Yusho com/news-releases/unionpay-cards-issued- china-publication-of-unreliable-entities-list- Cho, “Rise of the yuan: China-based payment outside-mainland-china-exceeds-100- depends-on-sino-u-s-trade-talks-sources- settlements jump 80%,” Nikkei Asian Review, million-300733635.html idUSKBN1WQ28L May 20, 2019. https://asia.nikkei.com/ Business/Markets/Rise-of-the-yuan-China- based-payment-settlements-jump-80
44 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The Role of Sanctions in U.S.-China Economic Competition 45 CHINA
in each country’s export reduction is not
China’s Use of directly related to the level of Chinese STUDIES animosity towards that country; instead, Trade Retaliation in it has to do with the elasticity of demand for the partnering country’s export goods. Territorial Disputes: This finding sheds light on the Chinese government’s possible thinking when REVIEW Interdependence it considers retaliatory trade measures during times of territorial conflict. More- with a Difficult but over, this empirical research contributes
to the current theoretical debate on the vol 6 Rational Power relationship between trade and conflict. |
It supports the conclusion that an autoc- 2020 racy like China is also subject to economic rules when considering political decisions such as trade retaliation in response to territorial conflicts. Qiang Wu The incorporation of the People’s Republic of China into the existing world order is Qiang (Steven) Wu is a second-year MA perhaps the most crucial event of the past candidate with a concentration in China thirty years; observers in many countries Studies. His research interest lies in the rela- have taken note of China’s behavior and tionship between China and the world. He wondered about the formidable country’s earned his M.A. in Economics at Kyoto Uni- capabilities, desires, and intentions. Along versity, Japan and B.A. in Political Science with the creation of new terms like “sharp at Peking University, China. power”1 and “weaponized interdepen- dence,”2 certain international observers Note: Additional data can be found in have suggested that countries should Appendices 1-8, in the online edition exercise caution in developing cultural of this article, at http://www.saiscsr.org exchanges or economic interdependence with an autocratic China, which could leave them vulnerable to coercion.3 The validity Introduction of this concern deserves to be examined, and the nature of the potential risk must This research explores China’s retaliatory be determined. Is China’s behavior totally trade behaviors in the context of territorial unpredictable, or is the country constrained disputes, incorporating both quantitative by economic rules to act in a rational fash- and qualitative methods to analyze territo- ion? This research explores this theme by rial conflicts between China and four of its examining China’s economic statecraft neighboring countries: Japan, India, Viet- during the periods in which it has engaged nam, and the Philippines. This paper finds in territorial conflicts with other countries, that territorial conflicts with China are simul- focusing on four main events: the Senkaku/ taneously accompanied by a reduction in Diaoyu Island dispute between China and the partner’s exports to China, though the Japan, the Doklam road construction degree of this reduction varies by country. standoff between China and India, the To analyze the reasons for this variance, Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Dao dispute this study examines subjective factors between China and the Philippines, and from China and objective factors from the Ocean Oil 981 standoff between China each foreign country in each of the four and Vietnam. cases. This study reveals that the variance
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes: Interdependence with a Difficult but Rational Power 47 CHINA
The first section of this paper introduces the Haavard Hegre, Oneal John, and Russett Do Countries That Clash with There are three possible sources for this
China Put Trade at Risk?
theoretical findings in the current literature, Bruce confirmed with an empirical study loss in trade: the effects of the Chinese gov- STUDIES poses a research question, and presents that commercial relations promote peace, ernment’s retaliatory trade policy; Chinese three hypotheses. The second section ana- while at the same time conflict reduces This research aims to contribute to the consumers’ conscious boycotting activi- lyzes the three hypotheses respectively, trade.7 Beth Simmons focuses on territo- aforementioned theoretical gap by con- ties; and the voluntary decision of foreign through four case studies. Finally, the third rial disputes and militarized conflict. She ducting a case study of territorial disputes exporters to refuse to trade with China.10 section concludes with some key thoughts finds that an ongoing territorial dispute has between China and its neighboring Nevertheless, the influence of the Chi- REVIEW and elucidates the contemporary signifi- an immediate and negative effect on trade countries, examining the impact of these nese government is significant among all cance of this research. and suggests that the causal effect stems conflicts on their trade relationship. The three potential causes. Along with China’s primarily from policy uncertainties and a specific research question is: increasing economic power, the coun-
8 reduction in jurisdictional control. try tends to use its significant economic vol 6 Theories of Conflict and Trade To what extent and under what conditions leverage to achieve its political objectives, |
Han Dorussen delves deeper into the issue do China’s trade partners suffer from export despite its membership in the WTO, whose 2020 The interaction between economic cooper- by disaggregating trade by type. He asserts losses when they are engaged in a territo- rules limit the use of trade restrictions as a ation and political conflict is a key question that trade broadly has a positive effect on rial conflict with China? political tool.11 For example, research on within the study of International Relations. reducing conflict but argues that not all the “Dalai Lama effect” demonstrates that On the one hand, liberal academics such trade carries the same weight. For Dorus- Territorial disputes have occurred rela- countries whose highest political leader as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye hold sen, the elasticity of trade is crucial (i.e., the tively frequently in recent years between establishes an official meeting with the a positive view of this interaction and con- more elastic the goods, the lower the effect China and neighboring countries, provid- Dalai Lama will be punished by a reduction tend that increasing interdependence, they have on reducing conflict, due to the ing a unique opportunity for comparative in exports to China.12 especially trade dependency between lower opportunity costs generated if trade analysis. Moreover, territorial issues are so countries, will decrease the possibility of in those goods is disrupted). Dorussen allo- territorial issues are so highly political and In the territorial conflict space, there is conflict and provide incentives for coun- cates manufactured goods (incorporating sensitive sensitive in China that territorial evidence of China attempting to employ tries to seek compromise.4 Scholars have both low-skilled and high-skilled labor) and conflicts provide legitimacy in Chinese soci- economic statecraft to achieve its political introduced concepts like “commercial primary chemical and metal products to the ety for the government to conduct trade aims. For example, in the China-Philip- peace” and “trade peace” to illustrate this category of inelastic goods, while he places retaliation against foreign countries with pines dispute on Scarborough Shoal/ insight. Anita Kellogg qualifies this theory, non-manufactured goods and food prod- which it has disputes. This research ana- Huangyan Dao, Chinese Ambassador to noting that the business sector must be suf- ucts into the category of elastic goods.9 lyzes specific bilateral territorial disputes ASEAN Tong Xiaoling warned that “if the between China and four countries: Japan, Philippines continues to go its own way, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam. the bilateral relations, including trade and Certain international observers have suggested that countries should exercise caution in developing cultural Chart 1: Trade, Elasticity of Goods, and Regime Type exchanges or economic interdependence with an Trade Partner autocratic China which could leave them vulnerable to coercion. Autocracy (-) Democracy (+)
High Medium Elastic Goods (-) ficiently influential in domestic politics for Chart 1 (on the following page) illustrates conflict possibility conflict possibility a reduction effect to take place,5 a finding these theories and their connections. To Goods that connects the theory of “trade peace” summarize, current theories indicate that Elasticity 6 with the “democratic peace” theory” . This trade reduces the likelihood for conflict, but Medium Low Inelastic Goods (+) research suggests that democracies, as this effect varies, depending specifically on conflict possibility conflict possibility compared to autocracies, are more hesi- regime type and goods elasticity. Although tant to engage in conflicts with each other. inverse relations may exist, to date, there is insufficient research on whether reductions Note: However, some researchers have a less opti- in trade are influenced by other factors, like (+) and ( - ) show the possibility of reducing conflict mistic interpretation of the virtuous cycle of the severity of the conflict or discrepancies (+) means higher possibility while ( - ) means lower interdependence and conflict mitigation. in goods elasticity.
48 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 49 CHINA
business relations, will be damaged.”13 Hypothesis 2: The degree of trade reduc- constrains the possibilities of countries Regression Equation 17
Coincidently, in May 2012, the Chinese tion is not in accordance with the level of involved in conflicts. This paper will STUDIES government alleged “pest problems” as China’s animosity towards the conflict and focus on whether, in the case of China, a exportst = β1djapant + β3dindiat a reason to impound Philippine bananas, consequent desire for economic retaliation. trade disaggregating effect exists in the + β4dphilippinest + β5dvietnamt then the Philippines’ fifth largest export “conflict-trade” direction. + β6gdpt + β7popt + β8excht good; its banana sales to China reached Assuming that Hypothesis 1 holds, the + β9indiat + β10philippinest US $360 million in 2011.14 next question is what factors influence + β11vietnamt + β12febt + β13mart REVIEW these varying degrees of trade reduction. Evidence and Case Studies: Japan, + β14aprt+ β15mayt+ β16junt Therefore, there are reasons to believe that This paper considers two types of factors: India, the Philippines, and Vietnam + β17jult + β18augt + β19sept the Chinese government has contemplated subjective and objective, or willingness and + β20octt + β21novt +β22dect + εt
or conducted retaliatory trade activity in feasibility. Willingness is measured by Chi- This section combines regression analysis vol 6 its territorial conflicts with neighboring na’s level of animosity toward the offending with case studies on territorial disputes The dependent variable, exports, stands for |
countries, though it has made no official country, which is presumed exogeneous to with China. The reason to employ this each country’s monthly exports to China. 2020 declaration on this issue. any objective economic factors between dual methodology is that quantitative This data is taken from the International analysis provides the necessary evi- Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Sta- dence while qualitative analysis reveals tistics Database.19 It is necessary to note, important differences between cases, however, that the data of monthly exports There are reasons to believe that the contributing a more plausible and to China is calculated by combining the nuanced reasoning to our understanding exports to both mainland China and Hong Chinese government has contemplated or conducted of the link between trade retaliation and Kong, China. The reason for this is that Hong retaliatory trade activity in its territorial conflicts with conflict more broadly. The four cases out- Kong is a well-known hub for world trade to lined in this paper include the Senkaku/ and from China. Meanwhile, the exports to neighboring countries. Diaoyu Island dispute between China Hong Kong are too large to be ignored (as and Japan, the Doklam road construc- opposed to those of Macao, China). In this tion standoff between China and India, research, the duration of the exports data the Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Dao starts in January 2002 and ends in Decem- Between 2002 and 2018, Three Hypotheses China and the offending country. Hypoth- dispute between China and the Philip- ber 2018. The starting month is right after esis 2 maintains that this subjective factor pines, and the Ocean Oil 981 standoff China joined the WTO in December 2001, there were three diplomatic crises concerning Having synthesized the findings of current does not accord with these countries’ between China and Vietnam. The study which served as a critical point at which the islands: the deportation of Chinese activists who literature with the above analysis, this paper trade reduction to China. In other words, conducts a regression of the territorial China started to engage more in trade introduces the following hypotheses to Hypothesis 2 suggests that China might be disputes’ influence on bilateral trade in activities with the world. The end month is landed on the islands in 2004; the detention of a Chinese address the research question: a more rational power than some interna- each case. Subsequently, based upon the simply decided by the fact that it reflects captain whose fishing boat collided with a Japanese tional observers believe – one that treats regression results and various subjective the most recent data of all variables that can Hypothesis 1: Territorial conflicts with its trade counterparts differently by means and objective conditions inherent to each be surveyed at the time of this research. For Coast Guard vessel in 2010; and the Japanese central China are simultaneously accompanied of pragmatic calculation, as discussed in case, this section discusses the relative the sake of a more comprehensive compar- government’s nationalization of three of the by a reduction in trade, to varying degrees Hypothesis 3. explanatory power of the three hypoth- ison among different countries whose trade across countries. eses outlined in Section 1. volumes with China vary substantially, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. Hypothesis 3: The degree of trade reduc- log of this data is calculated for regression. This hypothesis seems rather self-evident tion is in accordance with the trade elasticity The basic idea is to run a regression of the according to Hegre, John, and Bruce’s of the export goods from the offending exports to China based on each country’s The variables of interest in this paper are general findings in part which indicated country. dispute status. In design, this research djapan, dindia, dphilippines, and dvietnam. that conflicts lead to trade reduction.15 uses the widely recognized gravity They are dummy variables that are binary. Nonetheless, empirical evidence must In contrast to Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 model 18 in trade analysis to control the The “d” before each country’s name means be presented to illustrate how this thesis considers objective issues within the coun- underlying link between countries’ trade “dispute”. Thus, the value of the variable is applies to China, an autocratic state, which terpart country. Specifically, Hypothesis 3 relationship with China. The regression 1 if the dispute is ongoing in the month in theory behaves in a more bellicose discusses the feasibility of substituting each function is designed as follows: under study and 0 if it is not. This research manner than the average foreign eco- country’s exports to China (i.e., the trade references official Chinese media articles nomic partner.16 It is also worth exploring elasticity of these countries’ export goods). and other academic research to determine whether this trade reduction effect varies This hypothesis is supported by the cur- the start and end dates of a conflict. The based upon the country in question and rent literature, albeit from the “trade-peace” case studies reveal further details. type of dispute. direction, which argues that trade elasticity
50 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 51 CHINA
The control variables include monthly to the “reversion” treaty of 1971).21In the China-India Dispute: China-Vietnam Dispute:
Daulat Beg and Doklam Plateau The South China Sea
dummy variables, country dummy vari- time period this research focuses on (2002- STUDIES ables, and gravity model variables. Monthly 2018), there were three diplomatic crises dummy variables include feb, mar, apr, may, concerning the islands: the deportation of Two major territorial conflicts occurred Though the dispute between China and jun, jul, aug, sep, oct, nov, and dec (jan is Chinese activists who landed on the islands during the 2002-2018 period between Vietnam over the South China Sea existed omitted due to collinearity). These monthly in 2004; the detention of a Chinese captain China and India. The first is the Daulat Beg throughout the research period (2002 - 2018), dummy variables are used to control the whose fishing boat collided with a Japa- Oldi Incident, a standoff between border the Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff was the most REVIEW seasonal factors that influence trade, with nese Coast Guard vessel in 2010; and the forces on both sides in 2013. 26 It began serious demonstration of that dispute, involv- a value equal to 1 if the trade data falls in Japanese central government’s nationaliza- in April and ended in May, 27 with both ing both countries’ official ships. The conflict that month and 0 if not. Country dummy tion of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in China and India agreeing to withdraw from started in May 2014, with skirmishes following
22 28 variables include india, philippines, and 2012. Because the 2004 and 2010 incidents the disputed area. The second was the China’s move to station an oil rig known as vol 6 vietnam (japan is omitted due to collinear- were initiated by civilians, this research treats Doklam Road Construction Standoff, which the Hai Yang Shi You 981 in waters contested
34 |
ity). These country dummy variables are these events as insufficient to trigger official lasted longer and proved to be more influ- by Vietnam. This action triggered a series of 2020 used to control each country’s fixed effects trade retaliation. Hence, the research focuses ential. It began when the Chinese People’s anti-China protests in Vietnam, which led to that influence trade. The number is 1 if the only on the 2012 conflict. Liberation Army (PLA) started to build a road more than a dozen foreign-owned factories trade data comes from that country and 0 in a disputed region of the Doklam Plateau, being torched by protestors.35 After two and if not. Meanwhile, gravity model variables To decide the value of the djapan variable, near the Bhutan-China-India tri-junction in a half months, China moved the rig out of the include GDP (gdp), population (pop), and it is necessary to confirm the starting and June 2017. After Bhutan turned to India for waters that Vietnam considers to be its exclusive exchange rate (exch). GDP refers to the ending month of the 2012 conflict. The start- assistance, the Indian Army entered the area economic zone.36 Accordingly, the dvietnam counterpart country’s GDP in current US ing date is easier to distinguish. On April to halt construction. Subsequently, military variable is set to be 1 from May to July 2014. dollars in that year, and population to the 2012, then-Tokyo Metropolitan Governor units from China and India became involved country’s population in that year. Finally, Shintaro Ishihara proposed that Tokyo buy in a close confrontation, which eventually exchange rate refers to the country’s offi- the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private ended when the Chinese forfeited the road Testing Hypothesis 1 cial exchange rate in that year, denoted by owner.23 Unsurprisingly, this proposal imme- construction and both armies left the area in its local currency units relative to the Chi- diately gave rise to criticism from the Chinese August.29 Thus, in this research, the dindia Chart 3 summarizes the four countries’ dis- nese Yuan. To make these variables more government. The ending month, however, is variable is set to be 1 for April-May 2013 and putes with China. It is worth noting that China standardized in the regression, the log of somewhat ambiguous, because the situation June-August 2017. was the first mover in the India and Vietnam GDP and population are taken. Data on gradually stabilized without an official end cases, but the second mover in the Japan these gravity model variables has been date. To solve this problem, the paper refer- and Philippines cases; this difference is crucial collected entirely from the World Bank’s ences two sources, determining that, for the China-Philippines Dispute: for the analysis. With the four dispute-related World Development Indicators.20 εt reflects number assignment of the djapan variable, Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Dao variables constructed, this study carries out an a stochastic error. the end of this crisis is October 2012. This Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Chart is due to the fact that the Japanese Prime In the South China Sea, China’s dispute 3 demonstrates the regression result. Generally For purposes of the regression analysis in Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged to dissolve with the Philippines began on April 8, 2012, speaking, the model is very good at explain- this study, we must infer the starting and Japan’s parliament in November 2012, so the with the Philippine Navy’s apprehension of ing the exports to China from these countries, ending (or stabilizing) time of the dispute, future direction of Japanese foreign policy eight mainland Chinese fishing vessels near with R-squared valued at 0.966. Most control to determine the number assignment of became unclear.24 Meanwhile, Shinzo Abe the disputed Scarborough Shoal/Huang- variables show a certain degree of statistical the disputes variable. became Prime Minister, in a transition of yan Dao.30 Between April and June 2012, significance. In terms of the four dispute-related power from the Democratic Party to the Lib- China and the Philippines engaged in a variables, all coefficients display the desired eral Democratic Party.25 This dynamic served tense standoff.31 In mid-June 2012, the negative signs, though three of them are sta- China-Japan Dispute: as an opportunity for both Japan and China two countries withdrew their civilian vessels tistically insignificant. In terms of the degree of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to seek a “cooling down” period. From the on the pretext of the onset of the typhoon trade reduction influenced by disputes, the Chinese point of view, a search of related arti- season, aiming to de-escalate the tension.32 four countries’ coefficients vary substantially. The territorial conflict between China cles in the official mediaPeople’s Daily reveals Afterwards, both countries persisted in However, it remains unclear what causes and Japan is mainly over the Senkaku/ that articles with a subject including the key claiming sovereignty over the shoal,33 yet these differences. Possible explanations will Diaoyu Islands. They have been a source word “钓鱼岛”(Diaoyu Island) significantly tensions between the two sides over the be discussed in Hypotheses 2 and 3. Overall, of dispute since the early 1970s, when decreased after this month (i.e., only one dispute have been markedly lower. Thus, based on the regression results, it is reason- the United States transferred the island’s article was published with this key word in in this research, the dphilippines variable able to confirm that territorial conflicts with “administrative rights” to Japan (in the November, as compared to 24 in October). is set to be 1 only from April to June 2012. China are simultaneously accompanied by broader context of returning Okinawa and Thus, in the China-Japan case, the djapan trade reduction, with varying degrees across the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, according variable is set to be 1 for April-October 2012. countries. In other words, Hypothesis 1 holds.
52 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 53 CHINA
Chart 2: Regression Result That said, it is necessary to mention the lim- Chart 3: Summary of Disputes
itations of this OLS regression. The first is STUDIES Omitted Variable Bias (OVB), given that it is (1) exports quite difficult to rule out the possibility that Country Japan India Philippines Vietnam other factors contributed to the trade vari- (0.607) ance. As such, there could be some other djapan -0.0494 Daulat Beg REVIEW control variables that should have been Scarborough Senkaku- Oldi Incident Hai Yang dindia -0.257* (0.022) included in this regression. The second is Shoal / Dispute Diaoyu Island Shi You 981 the issue of reverse causation. Although Huangyan Dao dphilippines -0.176 (0.219) Dispute Doklam Road Standoff it sounds counterintuitive, there is a small Standoff
Construction dvietnam -0.176 (0.224) possibility that a decrease in exports causes vol 6 gdp 1.434*** (0.000) territorial disputes. April - May |
2013 2020 pop -3.197*** (0.000) Period of April 2012 to April - June May - July Testing Hypothesis 2 Conflict October 2012 2012 2014 exch 0.000405*** (0.000) June - August 2017 india 6.940*** (0.000) Hypothesis 2 focuses on the relationship between trade reduction and China’s will- Conflict philippines 1.035*** (0.000) 7 months 5 months 3 months 3 months ingness to punish a rival country. In this Duration vietnam 0.473 (0.051) hypothesis, willingness is equivalent to feb 0.00485 (0.908) China’s level of animosity and resentment First Mover Japan China Philippines China toward the rival country, measured by a mar 0.196*** (0.000) new variable: China’s “Animosity Index”. apr 0.0927 (0.028) This has been calculated by counting the number of relevant articles published by a it is the first. Hence, it is natural to infer that the djapan variable than on the dindia may 0.127** (0.003) Chinese official media source,The People’s increasing Chinese animosity would lead to variable. This lower coefficient demon- jun 0.0171** (0.000) Daily, whose articles were retrieved from a Chinese-imposed economic punishment strates a lower degree of export reduction the CNKI China core newspapers’ full-text of the offending country, according to the in Japan’s dispute with China than in the jul 0.169*** (0.000) database.37 These articles were searched existing level of contention. case of India. Additionally, the coefficient aug 0.190*** (0.000) by respective keywords during the dispute’s of djapan is statistically insignificant with a period. The key word for the China-Japan However, this supposition is not sup- very high p-value (0.607), while the coeffi- sep 0.239*** (0.000) dispute is “钓鱼岛” (Diaoyu Island); for the ported when comparing the “Animosity cient of dindia is statistically significant in oct 0.214*** (0.000) China-India dispute, “印度&领土” (India & Index” in Chart 4 with the coefficients of the 0.05 significance level. Meanwhile, the Territory); for the China-Philippines dispute, the four dispute-related variables in Chart Philippines and Vietnam cases are similar nov 0.188*** (0.000) “黄岩岛” (Huangyan Dao); and, for the Chi- 3. Before making a case –by-case analysis, to Japan and India’s. The Philippines’ “Ani- dec 0.230*** (0.000) na-Vietnam dispute, “越南&南海” (Vietnam it is necessary to distinguish between the mosity Index” is about four times higher & South China Sea). The number of articles countries. Considering the power asym- than Vietnam’s, though the two countries’ _cons 26.98*** (0.001) is further standardized by averaging the metries among these four countries, the coefficients on the dispute variables are R-sq 0.966 duration of the disputes. Chart 4 displays research places Japan and India in one the same. the search results and calculates China’s group while placing the Philippines and F 1059.0 “Animosity Index”. Vietnam in another. The countries in each Moreover, the “Animosity Index” is also N 816 group are closely related in terms of their helpful in distinguishing the trade reduc- Examining Chart 4, it is necessary to note economic strength. Coincidently, there is tion effects caused by different sources that China was the first mover, or breaker one country in each group that acts as a – namely, the government, consumers, p-values in parentheses of the “status quo” in the cases of India first mover in its conflict with China, while and exporters. It is reasonable to assume * p<0.05 and Vietnam, while in the case of Japan the other country acts as a second mover. that, compared to the Chinese govern- and the Philippines, China was passively ment, Chinese consumer behavior is more ** p<0.01 involved, as a “status quo” taker. These facts Comparing Japan and India, we find that, influenced by the media.38 Therefore, it is *** p<0.001 are reflected in the “Animosity Index,” sug- even though Japan has a rating about plausible to suggest that the media expo- gesting that China will be more offended if 20 times that of India on the “Animosity sure of a dispute should largely correlate it is the second mover, but less offended if Index,” it has a much lower coefficient on with a consumer reduction in purchasing
54 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 55 CHINA
Chart 4: China’s “Animosity Index” in the Four Disputes Philippines) should suffer less from trade of commodities (“Nuclear reactors” is the
reduction than countries exporting higher only one that belongs to the manufac- STUDIES elasticity goods (i.e., India and Vietnam). tured category) are high elasticity goods, Country Japan India Philippines Vietnam Comparing the results of Chart 5 with the especially of the raw material/agricultural regression results of Chart 3 conclusively variety. This finding further bolsters the verifies this speculation; especially in the above argument by verifying that China’s
Number of REVIEW 111 4 27 7 Articles Japan-India group, where Japan suffers trade retaliation has generally concentrated less, and India suffers more. In the Philip- on the raw material/agricultural sector. Months of pines-Vietnam group, the Philippines and 7 5 3 3 Duration Vietnam suffer the same trade reduction, To summarize, the analysis of the four coun-
although China has a much higher “Ani- tries’ cases confirms that, when territorial vol 6 China’s mosity Index” towards the Philippines. disputes take place, the trade elasticity of
15.9 0.8 9.0 2.3 | Animosity Index the offending country’s exports is the key 2020 Chart 6 (on the following page) demon- factor that influences its degree of trade Source: CNKI China Core Newspares’ Full-text Database strates the commodities that suffered the reduction vis-à-vis China. In other words, most serious export declines in the year Hypothesis 3 holds. preceding the onset of the dispute. The that country’s goods. A similar logic can trade elasticity is considered the objective chart shows that seven out of eight types be applied to exporters. If this is the case, factor that influences the Chinese govern- the significant contrast between China’s ment’s decision on trade retaliation policy. Chart 5: Disaggregated Trade in Year of Dispute “animosity level” and the trade reduc- tion effect on the four countries cannot To analyze trade elasticity, this research be attributed to factors related to the collects disaggregated trade data from To Mainland China consumer or the exporter. Rather, the the United Nations COMTRADE data- contrast must be related to the Chinese base.39 Details of the four countries’ top government’s differential trade retaliation ten exports to mainland China and Hong Manufacturing Goods Raw Materials / Agricultural Country policies which, instead of being subject Kong, both in the year when the dispute Total Percentage Total Percentage to the “Animosity Index,” must be related happened and in the year preceding the Japan to China’s rational judgment of these dif- dispute, are displayed in Appendices 1 77.64% 2.70% 40 ferent counterpart countries. through 8, with one finding especially Inda 25.95% 49.12% worth mentioning. Although there was Philippines Overall, the above phenomenon and evidence demonstrating that China had 75.97% 15.91% subsequent analysis strongly supports put in place some embargo regulations Vietnam 26.30% 44.93% Hypothesis 2, which affirms that the degree on the Philippines’ banana exports,41 of trade reduction is not in accordance with “edible fruit and nuts” from the Philip- To Hong Kong the “Animosity Index.” pines continued to increase in 2012, as the dispute was happening.42 Manufacturing Goods Raw Materials / Agricultural Country Total Percentage Total Percentage Testing Hypothesis 3 Chart 5 summarizes the eight appendices (found at saiscsr.org) and finds that Japan Japan 71.02% 8.56% In contrast to Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3 and the Philippines have a much lower focuses on the objective aspect of these rate of raw material/agricultural product Inda 2.45% 94.29% disputes: namely, the characteristics of the exports to China than India and Vietnam. four involved countries. Now that Hypoth- Both Japan and the Philippines reflect very Philippines 87.57% 8.92% esis 2 has affirmed that the subjective high rates of manufactured goods, while reasons (i.e., the Chinese government’s India and Vietnam exhibit lower rates. Con- Vietnam 81.30% 7.88% level of animosity towards its offending sidering that manufactured goods are in counterpart) are dissociated from the general more difficult to substitute than raw Note: The percentage is calculated based on that country’s top ten exports. level of trade reduction, we must consider material/agricultural products, it is reason- Data in Appendices 1-8 (saiscsr.org). whether any objective elements can explain able to speculate that countries that export Source: United Nations COMTRADE database. this reduction in trade. In Hypothesis 3, lower elasticity goods (i.e., Japan and the
56 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 57 CHINA
Chart 6: Decrease in Commodity Exports Conclusion determine whether the Chinese govern-
ment exhibits different trade retaliation STUDIES Combining regression analysis and case preferences when dealing with different To Mainland China studies, this paper suggests that all three types of perceived aggression. hypotheses hold when tested in the context Proportion in Proportion in the Country Commodity Decrease of the four cases described. The research From a theoretical standpoint, this research Dispute Year Year before Dispute REVIEW finds that, in China’s case, territorial con- also serves as an empirical example to com- flicts accompany an immediate reduction plement existing studies on “trade peace” Nuclear reactors, boilers, in the rival country’s exports to China. The or “democratic peace.” It demonstrates that, Japan machinery and degree of this reduction does not depend although conflicts simultaneously lead to
20.76% 24.24% -14.36% mechanical appliances; upon how angry or vindictive China is, but trade reduction, the strength of the trade vol 6 parts thereof rather on the elasticity of demand for the relationship (i.e., trade inelasticity) matters. |
offending country’s export goods. This The more inelastic the trade, the more resil- 2020 finding suggests that, although China can ient trade will be during political conflicts. India Cotton 9.23% 14.17% -34.86% be a difficult power to engage with, it is, This consistency in trade relationships may like other countries, largely rational when in turn serve to stabilize conflicts between Philippines Copper & articles thereof 2.34% 5.37% -56.42% employing trade retaliation as a policy of the two sides, according to “trade peace” economic statecraft. theory. This finding strongly underscores Vietnam Rubber & articles thereof 5.57% 9.14% -39.06% the idea that interdependence is valuable The research also finds that the first mover to peace by confirming that an autocratic in these disputes matters. On the one hand, country like China is at the same time To Hong Kong if the rival country moves first in a territo- pragmatic and subject to economic rules, rial conflict, China will be more offended; so long as it continues to engage in the Proportion in Proportion in the Commodity Decrease on the other hand, if China moves first, it world trade system. Country Dispute Year Year before Dispute will be less offended. In any case, China’s level of animosity in the conflict does not Such a belief in interdependence and Mineral fuels, mineral oils influence the degree of its reduction in in the relevance of international “trade and products of their importing the rival country’s goods. Con- peace” is even more significant in the Japan 2.70% 4.59% 6.97% distillation; bituminous sidering that China’s level of animosity contemporary era, with anti-globalization, substances; mineral waxes should accord with the purchasing patterns nationalist, and populist ideologies sweep- of Chinese consumers, as well as with the ing across the globe, in autocracies and hesitance of a rival country’s exporters to democracies alike. Some in the U.S. have India Raw hides and skins (other 49.12% 1.81% -19.34% than fur skins) and leather continue exporting to China, this paper promoted more extreme ideas, such as Philippines strongly suggests that the difference in the fundamentally “decoupling” the U.S. from Copper & articles thereof 15.91% 1.77% -37.85% degree of reduction in the rival country’s China. However, there is no evidence in this exports to China chiefly derives from the research to suggest that an autarkic country Vietnam Cereals 44.93% 2.59% -30.12% Chinese government’s behavior (e.g., trade of China’s magnitude would be easier to retaliation policy). deal with, or even be able to coexist, with liberal democracies in the West. The chal- Notes: For further studies, it would be helpful to lenges of interdependence with a difficult 1. This chart shows the decrease of the commodity whose export proportion decreased the most investigate whether there is any official but rational power are considerable, but in the dispute year, compared with the year before the dispute. All data come from Appendices evidence that the Chinese government these challenges pale in comparison to the 1-8 (see saiscsr.org). conducted specific trade retaliation pol- prospect of cold war with such a power. 2. The number in the “Proportion in Dispute Year” and “Proportion in the Year before Dispute” icies against offending countries during column is the ratio of that time period’s goods to the whole export of that country to China. its periods of territorial conflict with 3. The “Decrease Rate” is calculated by the following equation: them. Moreover, considering the possi- ble delay in policy implementation, the Note: Additional data can be found in (“Proportion in Dispute Year” - “Proportion in the Year before Dispute”) lagging effect of trade retaliation policy Appendices 1-8, in the online edition / “Proportion in the Year before Dispute” would also be worth exploring. Finally, by of this article, at http://www.saiscsr.org Source: United Nations COMTRADE database comparing territorial conflicts with other types of conflicts, it might be possible to
58 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 59 CHINA
1 The Hamilton Spectator (Online), Hamilton, 11 Xianwen Chen and Roberto Javier 21 Paul J. Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island 29 Ganguly, Sumit and Andrew Scobell, “The
“China’s Sharp Power,” Torstar Syndication Garcia, “Economic Sanctions and Trade Controversy,” Naval War College Review 66, Himalayan Impasse: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the STUDIES Services, a Division of Toronto Star Diplomacy: Sanction-Busting Strategies, no. 2 (2013): 27-44. Wake of Doklam,” The Washington Quarterly Newspapers Limited, Jan 26, 2018. Market Distortion and Efficacy of China’s 41, no. 3 (Fall, 2018): 177. Restrictions on Norwegian Salmon Imports,” 22 Sanaa Yasmin Hafeez, “The Senkaku/ 2 Stacy Smith and Cardiff Garcia, Weaponized China Information, no. 30 (2016), 29-57, Diaoyu Islands Crises of 2004, 2010, and 30 Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Timeline, REVIEW Interdependence: The End of Globalization? 2016, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 2012: A Study of Japanese-Chinese Crisis Inquirer.net, May 2012, https://globalnation. Washington: NPR, Jun 3, 2019, https://www. full/10.1177/0920203X15625061. Management,” Asia Pacific Review 22, no. 1 ( inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal- npr.org/2019/06/03/729401275/weaponized- 2015): 73-99. standoff-a-historicaltimeline. interdependence-the-end-of-globalization 12 Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, “Paying
a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International 23 Kyodo, Ishihara seeking to buy Senkaku 31 Taffer, Andrew, “State Strategy in Territorial vol 6 3 Ibid. Trade,” Journal of International Economics 91, Islands. Japan Times, April 18, 2012, https:// Conflict: A Conceptual Analysis of
no. 1 (2013), 164-177. www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/04/18/ China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” | 2020 4 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: national/ishihara-seeking-to-buy-senkaku- Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 1 (04, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 13 Times Weekly (时代周报), 佟晓玲：如果菲政府 islands/#.XeGatJNKgTk. 2015): 85-108. Economy (Princeton: Princeton University 在黄岩岛事件上一意孤行将损害包括经贸关系在 Press, 1984); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 内的中菲双边关系, 25 July 2012, http://pdap. 24 Chico Harlan, Japan set for elections as 32 De Castro, R. C., The 12 July 2016 Permanent S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World mfa.gov.cn/chn/zxdt/t955260.htm Premier Yoshihiko Noda pledges to dissolve Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) Award: The Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little, Brown, and parliament, Washington Post, November 14, Philippines’ Lawfare versus China’s Realpolitik Company, 1977). 14 Maria Ortuoste, “The Philippines in the South 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ in the South China Sea Dispute, International China Sea: Out of Time, Out of Options?” world/japan-set-for-elections-as-pm-noda- Journal of China Studies, 2017, 8(3): 347-372. 5 Anita Renda Kellogg, “How the Power Southeast Asian Affairs (2013), 240-253. pledges-to-dissolve-parliament/2012/11/14/ of Business Affects the Commercial b6778ba0-2e43-11e2-b631-2aad9d9c73ac_ 33 Ibid. Peace: Commercial Interests, Economic 15 Haavard Hegre, John R. Oneal, and Bruce story.html. Interdependence, and Militarized Conflict,” Russett, “Trade Does Promote Peace: New 34 “China/Vietnam: China’s South China Sea PhD Dissertation, Order No. 10688755, Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal 25 Japan election: Shinzo Abe and LDP in Strategy Unmoved by Vietnam Protests,” Asia University of California, Los Angeles, 2017. Effects of Trade and Conflict,” 763-774. sweeping win, BBC News, December News Monitor, May 20, 2014. 16, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 6 Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 16 Toke S. Aidt, Martin Gassebner, “Do Autocratic world-asia-20745165. 35 Niam Seet, W. E. I, “China - Vietnam China’s top Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs States Trade Less?”, The World Bank Economic officer to visit Vietnam amid South China Sea 12, no. 3 (1983), 205-235. Review, no. 24, (1, 2010), 38–76, https://doi. 26 Indrani Bagchi, Depsang Bulge Incursion dispute,” Bernama: Malaysian National News org/10.1093/wber/lhp022. Accidental, Chinese Military Thinktank Agency, Dec 22, 2014. 7 Havard Hegre, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Says, Times of India, Jul 15, 2013, https:// Russett, “Trade does Promote Peace: New 17 Han Dorussen, “Heterogeneous Trade Interests timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Depsang- 36 “A View from the Sea, as China Flexes Muscle,” Simultaneous Estimates of the Reciprocal and Conflict: What You Trade Matters”, 87-107. Bulge-incursion-accidental-Chinese-military- New York Times, Aug 9, 2014. Effects of Trade and Conflict,”Journal of Peace thinktank-says/articleshow/21088756.cms. Research 47, no. 6 (2010), 763-774. 18 Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, “The Gravity Equation 37 CNKI China core newspapers full-text in International Trade: Some Microeconomic 27 Sawant, Gaurav C, “India is No Pushover: database, accessed December 5, 2019, http:// 8 Beth A. Simmons, “Rules Over Real Estate: Foundations and Empirical Evidence,” The Salmand Khurshid,” India Today, 26 April 2013. new.oversea.cnki.net.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/ Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (3, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/neighbours/ kns/brief/result.aspx?dbPrefix=CCND. Borders as Institution,” Journal of Conflict 1985): 474–481. story/china-india-china-incursion-indo-china- Resolution 49, no. 6 (2005): 823-848. border-160085-2013-04-26. 38 Habibi, Mohammad Reza, Michel Laroche, and 19 http://data.imf.org.proxy1.library.jhu. Marie-Odile Richard, “Testing an extended 9 Han Dorussen, “Heterogeneous Trade Interests edu/?sk=388DFA60-1D26-4ADE-B505- 28 Bukhari, Fayaz, & Bhattacharjya, Satarupa, model of consumer behavior in the context and Conflict: What You Trade Matters,” Journal A05A558D9A42, accessed November 29, “India and China Withdraw Troops of social media-based brand communities,” of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 1 (2006), 87-107. 2019. from Himalayan Face Off,” Global Post, Computers in Human Behavior, 62 (2016): 7 May 2013, https://web.archive.org/ 292-302. 10 Beth A. Simmons, “Rules Over Real Estate: 20 World Development Indicators, World web/20131211131312/http://www.globalpost. Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Bank, accessed December 5, 2019. com/dispatch/news/thomson-reuters/130507/ 39 Accessed December 1, 2019, https:// Borders as Institution,” 823-848. https://databank.worldbank.org/reports. india-and-china-withdraw-troops-himalayan- comtrade-un-org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/data. aspx?source=world-development-indicators. face.
60 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS China’s Use of Trade Retaliation in Territorial Disputes 61 CHINA
40 Appendices 1 through 8 appear in the online full development and expansion during
version of the article, found at saiscsr.org. Between Harmony these years. STUDIES
41 Ortuoste, 240-253. and Chaos: This paper focuses on the Ming dynasty’s changing strategy through a series of case 42 Appendices 5 and 6 can be found in online An Analysis of studies. By dividing the Ming dynasty into REVIEW version of this article at saiscsr.org. three independent but interrelated peri- Grand Strategy in ods, we can identify a period of ascent (1368-1410), a period of initial decline the Ming Dynasty (1410-1449), and the period of furthest
decline (1449-1644). This paper primarily vol 6 relies on anecdotal data of state capacity |
and the judgment of historians as indirect 2020 indicators of relative power. Relative power in this paper is equated with the compar- Hongyi Lin ison of relative military strength between the Chinese Ming dynasty and the Mongols, their primary military challenger. Although Hongyi Lin is a second-year SAIS M.A. the Ming enjoyed a more advanced econ- student concentrating in International omy and sophisticated transportation Economics and International Law & Orga- network than its rival, it ultimately failed to nizations. His research interests include effectively defend its northern lands from Chinese Banking Law and Regulations, the Mongols. International Investment Law, and the Law of Sea. He previously finished his undergrad- uate study at China’s Southwest University Understanding the Chinese of Political Science and Law. He can be Tributary System reached at [email protected]. Among scholars, it is widely accepted that hierarchical order was fundamental Introduction to the East Asian tributary system; equally accepted is the importance of the distinc- The system describes the pre-colonial tion between Chinese and “barbarian” hierarchical order of East Asia, a structure culture, with Chinese culture being supe- underpinned by a network of extensive rior to any other. Embedded within the bilateral trade between China and its neigh- principle of “clear distinction between boring tributary states. The tributary system advanced [Han Chinese] civilization and reached its full development during Chi- crude barbarians” (华夷之辨),2 classical na’s Ming Dynasty, which ruled from 1368 Confucian philosophy assumed that sov- to 1644. As the only unified dynasty ruled ereigns in vassal states would be required by Han Chinese after the collapse of the to acknowledge the superiority of the Song dynasty in 1279, the Ming left clear Chinese emperor and accept their own historic and physical legacies representing subordinate position. China’s strategic culture; the Forbidden City manifests China’s majesty, and the Great However, scholars do not agree on how Wall exhibits China’s concern for defense. many participants were active in the tribu- Not only was China the clear regional tary system throughout its history, or the hegemon under the rule of the Ming particular balance of power these partici- Dynasty’s Hongwu Emperor (1368-1398) pants accepted. Morris Rossabi refers to and the Yongle Emperor (1403-1424),1 the tribute system as a multilateral frame- but the tributary system also reached its work among states sharing relatively equal
62 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 63 CHINA
power, for example, observing that China power in a state of anarchy. In an anarchic self-enforcing norms naturally emerging tributary states. China might interfere with
experienced relatively balanced interna- world, in which power is the key deciding between the central government and its their domestic affairs when neighboring STUDIES tional relations during the Song period factor governing relationships between tributary states. 9 The tributary system can countries transitioned from one leader to (960-1279) when the Chinese military was states, the stronger state sets up rules be seen as an endogenous framework for the next, but would otherwise largely dis- weaker than that of the northern nomad serving its own interests while weaker rulers of the tributary states; to solidify their regard their internal affairs. Yet despite this states.3 Bongjin Kim proposes a similar idea, states defer to the stronger for survival. domestic legitimacy, the recognition of a minimal oversight, China’s hegemonic posi- stating that the tribute system was a multi-lay- 5 Yuan-Kang Wang, a prominent disciple Chinese sovereign could be essential. tion was backed up by material prowess. REVIEW ered international society with an emphasis of realist John Mearsheimer, merges this China’s hegemonic reign would come to on the feng-gong system (朝贡体系), a ritual concept of structural realism with the trib- However, the constructivist perspective an end when the northern nomads over- and institutional mechanism to regulate the ute system, suggesting that the premodern can be challenged on empirical grounds. powered a Chinese regime, as was the case
Not only was China the clear regional hegemon under relationship between the Chinese court and East Asian hierarchy was a consequence Stanford University’s Stephen Krasner during the end of the Song dynasty and at vol 6 the outsider tributary states. 4 of China’s preponderance of material posits a theory of “organized hypocrisy,” the end of the Ming dynasty. the rule of the Ming Dynasty’s Hongwu Emperor 6 |
power. Wang believes that periods of and demonstrates that material interests 2020 (1368-1398) and the Yongle Emperor (1403-1424), Nevertheless, these observations only par- apparent peace can be explained by tially explain the full scope of the tributary Chinese domination; dynasties like the but the tributary system also reached its full development system. According to the historical record, Tang, the Ming, and the early Qing were during these years. the architecture of the system does not so much stronger than their competitors The concept of houwangbolai (厚往薄来) was depend on the number of participants, that weaker states submitted to the Chi- but hinges instead on the number of major nese court to avoid war. 7 key to the tribute system, in which gifts from outside powers capable of shaping it. The tributary countries were superfluous but Chinese products given to system is most easily recognizable when By contrast, many constructivist scholars dominated by a unipolar Chinese state, but use institutionalization and socialization foreigners in exchange were vital and valuable. there are examples from the Song dynasty to explain the tributary system; these ana-
are historically more consequential than Theories of China’s normative considerations.10 Under the Grand Strategy of War tributary system, shared principles were The key factor behind a paradigm shift, the rise or fall conspicuously violated in eras when China’s There are three schools of thought among weakening power could no longer sustain Western theorist that stand out in explain- of a Chinese state, was whether a revisionist power them. In contrast with the pluralistic order ing the occurrence of “major war” between capable of challenging Chinese domination emerged. of premodern Europe, with its extensive the two most powerful countries in an inter- multilateral connections between many national system.12 For the long cycle states, intrastate relationships in premod- theorists, war is a selection process of find- ern East Asia consisted primarily of bilateral ing a new leading power; the primary cause relations between the Chinese court and of war is the uneven rate of development of the tributary system co-existing with lysts focus on the social dimensions of the each tributary state; there were few indi- among the actors of the international competing states of relatively equal power. system. Scholars in this camp believe that cators of wider institutionalization. system.13 The hegemonic stability theory, That said, aside from the periods when the asymmetrical distribution of material developed by Robert Gilpin and others, the present territory of China was ruled power does not capture the complexities China’s governance in the tributary system states that a hegemonic war reshapes the by the militarily weak Song dynasties, the and durability of the Chinese hegemonic was built on a mixture of symbolic impor- systemic order between the dominant East Asian international order has mainly position. The legitimacy of imperial China’s tance and material prowess. Although power in the system and the rising chal- shifted between unipolarity and bipolarity. hegemony was not only underpinned by its China concretely controlled the relationship lenger; this kind of hegemony may occur The key factor behind a paradigm shift, the superiority of its material power, but also at the symbolic and ritual level, exacting with an increasing disequilibrium rise or fall of a Chinese state, was whether by the consent of neighboring states; a suf- material resources from neighboring states between existing political organizations a revisionist power capable of challenging ficiently benign Chinese government was was not sufficiently important to imperial and the actual distribution of capabili- Chinese domination emerged. thus capable of maintaining regional peace courts. The concept of houwangbolai (厚 ties.14 To minimize threats, a declining and stability for extended periods of time.8 往薄来) was key to the tribute system, in hegemon might initiate a preventive war Scholars also disagree on the source of Despite the different focal points they which gifts from outside countries were to weaken or destroy the challenger in legitimacy for the tributary system. For address, these scholars generally agree superfluous but Chinese products given to order to avoid a later debacle.15 Similarly, structural realists, the equilibrium of a hier- that shared norms and rules are fundamen- foreigners in exchange were vital and valu- the theorists of power transition Abramo archy can be explained by the asymmetry of tal components of the tributary system, with able.11 China gave substantial latitude to Organski and Jacek Kugler argue that a
64 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 65 CHINA
challenger unsatisfied with the status Rather than focusing on the dichotomy of moral realism that the effect of material The Tributary System in the Early
Ming Period (1368-1410)
quo would initiate war to revise the “offensive” and “defensive” realism, Alastair power and structural element is indetermi- STUDIES existing order.16 Iain Johnston coined the term “cultural real- nate for the Court’s grand strategy is wrong. ism,” arguing that China’s decision to use In contrast, the orientation of strategic The zenith of the Ming’s military prowess The logic of preventive war in hegemonic force is rooted in China’s strategic culture. choices were sensitive to the outer envi- occurred during the reigns of the Hongwu stability is most convincing in the case of The Seven Military Classics (武经七书), a col- ronment where power distributions shifted and Yongle emperors. During the Yongle China. For instance, when the Longxing lection of Chinese military texts compiled dynamically. Compared to Johnston’s period from 1360-1424, the Ming had REVIEW northern expedition (隆兴北征) occurred in in the eleventh century, is a clear example assertion that “structural realpolitik can be approximately 1.5-2.5 million soldiers 1206, The Xiaozong Emperor of the South- of this martial strain.19 Johnston noted that subsumed within the cultural realpolitik throughout the country, as well as plentiful ern Song dynasty took advantage of the “strategic culture is a prism through which model”22 or Yan Xuetong’s argument that food reserves for military campaigns.25 The
rival Jin dynasty’s domestic instability by changes in relative capability are inter- “political leadership [is] the foundation on number of horses, an essential indicator of vol 6 launching massive warfare. However, one preted. Absent this paradigm, changes in which resource strengths play their roles,”23 military strength during the steppe warfare |
common limitation for these three theo- relative capabilities should, in a sense, be it may be more accurate to say that the Chi- of the time, steadily rose from 37,993 to 2020 ries is that they fail to take fundamental meaningless.”20 Yan Xuetong, a prominent nese emperors’ perception of their own 1,585,322 during the Yongle reign.26 The elements of the East Asian context into Chinese realist scholar at Tsinghua Univer- power subsumed other factors in determin- Ming dynasty was powerful enough to be account, such as an anti-militarist culture sity, focuses his vision of moral realism on ing their choice between benevolence considered the clear hegemon of the time. defined by the Confucian worldview. leadership, contending that the choice of and aggression. Neither Japan nor Korea could be consid- leaders is the key factor in determining the ered major powers, and the Mongols had not yet recovered from the collapse of the The Example of the Ming Yuan dynasty. 27
According to Yan Xuetong, a state of humane authority The Ming dynasty’s complete trajectory Consistent with the theory of hegemonic practices moral principles and maintains high credibility, of relative power, from the heights of the stability, both the Hongwu and Yongle Yongle Emperor to defeat by the Manchus, emperors made enthusiastic use of their but a state of tyrannical authority prefers to violate makes it the best sample to test theories overwhelming strength to expand the international norms and adopt amoral policies.21 of imperial China’s strategic statecraft. Ming’s geopolitical influence and provide Given that the tributary system during public goods in the regions where it dom- the early Ming period is recognized as inated. The Yongle Emperor established the full-fledged version of the Sino-cen- this Sino-centralized regional order to con- Consistent with the theory of hegemonic stability, both Given that theories originating in the grand strategy of states. According to Yan, the Hongwu and Yongle emperors made enthusiastic West may not be entirely compatible with a state of humane authority practices moral Chinese history, theories with East Asian principles and maintains high credibility, use of their overwhelming strength to expand the Ming’s characteristics offer strong alternatives to but a state of tyrannical authority prefers The Ming dynasty’s complete trajectory of relative power, geopolitical influence and provide public goods in the explain Chinese grand strategy. The influ- to violate international norms and adopt ence of Confucian pacifism upon Chinese amoral policies.21 from the heights of the Yongle Emperor to defeat by the regions where they dominated. state actions is a widely held tenet in schol- Manchus, makes it the best sample to test theories arship regarding China’s strategic behavior. Despite their broader appeals, each of Confucian pacifist theorists such as Edward these four theories (Confucian pacificism, of imperial China’s strategic statecraft. Boylan and Mark Mancall hold that Chi- offensive structural realism, cultural realism, nese dynasties primarily used noncoercive and moral realism) fails to provide a com- acts and a defensive strategy, expanding plete explanation. The theoretical struggle their influence by means of culture. 17 In between Confucian pacifism and offensive tric regional order, testing the degree of solidate his claim to the “mandate of contrast, Yuan-Kang Wang incorporates structural realism falls short by over-gener- coercion during the apex of Ming power heaven”, socializing other states to the Con- Mearsheimer’s offensive structural realism alization; empirical findings show that can illustrate whether Confucian antimil- fucian beliefs of universal benevolence and theory when examining imperial China’s imperial China usually alternated between itarist tenets dissuaded Chinese courts harmony. This acceptance of values was the grand strategy. According to Wang’s analy- benevolence and coercion in its foreign from an offensive grand strategy.24 At first step in persuading the rulers of the sis, Chinese dynasties with a strong military policy, contingent not only upon material the same time, the strategies of defense surrounding states to accept the Sino-cen- tended to adopt an offense-oriented grand power, but also the willingness of emperors and appeasement during the declining tric regional order.28 To facilitate the strategy by escalating their war aims to total to protect the rulers of tributary states rec- phase of the Ming’s power exemplify the process of socialization, the Hongwu and military victory, political destruction of their ognized by the Chinese court. However, the challenges of grand strategy when the Yongle emperors proactively engaged with adversaries, or annexation of territory. 18 viewpoint of both cultural realism and hegemon’s position is challenged. their neighbors to demonstrate the
66 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 67 CHINA
benevolence and cultural attractiveness of the use of coercive strategy during the height superiority in the steppe. As a response to The year 1449 was another inflection point
the Middle Kingdom. The Hongwu regime of Ming power was the invasion of Dai Viet the rising Mongols, the Ming’s strategy of the Sino-Mongol balance of power. In STUDIES maintained frequent exchanges of envoys in 1406 to suppress an internal rebellion and towards the Mongols gradually shifted to 1449, the Zhengtong Emperor (1435-1464) between the Chinese court and the tributary protect the Vietnamese rulers professing loy- coercion. of the Ming dynasty decided to personally states, including Annam, Champa, Cambo- alty to the Ming court.33 During the Yongle lead the northern expedition against the dia, Siam, Japan, Brunei, and Korea.29 During reign, the Sino-Mongolian relationship was To re-establish the Ming dynasty’s pre-em- Mongols to defend China’s northern lands the Yongle period, the Ming court sent seven characterized by the tributary relationship inence, the Yongle Emperor personally and assert his military supremacy. This full- REVIEW maritime expeditions led by Admiral Zheng among the Ming and two major Mongolian led five grand-scale offensive campaigns scale invasion resulted in a devastating He to demonstrate China’s cultural achieve- tribes, the Eastern Mongols and the Oirats, against the Mongols in 1410, 1414, 1422, debacle at Tumu, in which the Mongols ments and military might along the coastlines both of which presented intermittent trib- 1423, and 1424.37 Although the Ming captured the Zhengtong Emperor.
34 of the Southeast Asian countries. Although utes to the Ming court. vol 6 military preparation was evident in the fleets |
of Zheng He, Yuan-Kang Wang’s assertion 2020 that “Zheng He’s voyages manifested a great The Rise of the Mongols level of coerciveness” does not accord with (1410-1449) The Sino-centric tributary system of the Ming, the written record according to some schol- ars.30 Instead, two prominent historians of The Ming’s unsurpassed military strength which existed for approximately 200 years, East Asia, Yoshihara Toshi and James R. in the steppe had started to decline at the had gradually fallen to the Mongols. Holmes, assert that Zheng He’s voyages were beginning of the 15th century. The expense not for looting resources, but for friendship. of maintaining the tributary system led to In trade with foreign countries, he gave much sharply deteriorating economic condi- more than he took, fostering understanding, tions, making defensive actions along the friendship and trade relations between the northern border increasing unaffordable.35 ended the five campaigns claiming victory, After the defeat at Tumu in 1449, the these preemptive strikes failed to funda- Ming court started avoiding direct con- mentally eradicate the rising Mongolian frontations with the Mongols. Instead it threat. Aside from the 1410 campaign, adopted a grand strategy of defense, which was a defensive counterstrike against withdrawing from the steppe zone and This full-scale invasion resulted in a devastating the Mongolian assault, the remaining four beginning construction of the Great Wall. debacle at Tumu, in which the Mongols captured the out of five northern expeditions during The Ming emperor also began a strategy of Yongle’s reign were examples of massive appeasement by granting Mongolian tribes Zhengtong Emperor. warfare initiated by the Ming. The military honorary titles and trade privileges.40 expeditions were committed to “assert Chinese military superiority on the steppe” by seeking the devastation of Mongolian Defensive Strategy During the power.38 However, given that the terrains Declining Phase (1449-1644) Ming Dynasty and foreign countries in South- Additionally, the rise of the Mongolian situated between Ming China and the east Asia.”31 In short, the strategy of power in the first half century of the 1400s Mongolian heartland created a buffer zone According to Columbia University historian socialization to the Ming’s moral authority and triggered a disadvantageous shift of relative that shielded the Mongols from the Yongle Ray Huang’s analysis, there is evidence of predominant strength was significant, and power for the Ming dynasty, challenging its emperor’s attacks, the Ming’s expeditions the accelerating decline of Ming military the Ming dynasty expended considerable clear hegemonic position. failed to destroy Mongolian power. strength following the Tumu blunder in his resources throughout this process for the study of Ming military expenditures.41 Fol- sake of regional stability. The Yongle Emperor made a strategic The year 1434 was the turning point; in lowing his data, the Ming’s ability to feed decision to retract the Ming’s northern that year, Esen, the most competent leader soldiers in garrison posts weakened con- During its early period, the Ming court was outer defensive line, pulling back one of the Oriat Mongols, united the steppe siderably, and Huang states that, “by the very hesitant to adopt coercive strategies garrison after another.36 Without the pres- forcefully and reconstructed the Mongolian early sixteenth century, a military colony in in order to resolve differences. Instead, the sure of the Ming’s military, the Mongols Empire from Manchuria in the east to Xin- the interior at 10 percent of its prescribed Hongwu and Yongle emperors were inclined leaders were able to gradually suppress jiang in the far west (a span of more than strength set up in the Emperor Hongwu’s to use political or economic sanctions to anarchic tribal competition and begin 2,500 miles).39 The Xianzong Emperor reign. Farm income of Liao-tung in 1412 enforce their wills; the threat of retracting reviving their “Golden Age” of steppe (1425-1435), successor of the Yongle was 716,100 piculs; in the early 16th cen- recognition from regional rulers was a more hegemony. The growing Mongolian military Emperor, initiated a series of wasteful cam- tury 383,800 piculs, the latter being 53 common tactic than war.32 The only record of buildup appeared to challenge the Ming’s paigns that failed to stop this shift in power. percent of the former. The same of Ta-t’ung
68 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 69 CHINA
in 1442 was 513,904 piculs and in 1535 was of Peking was abolished in 1558; this was throughout Chinese imperial history. The 8 Zhang Yongjin, and Barry Buzan. “The
Tributary System as International Society in 112,998 piculs, the latter being 22 percent made worse by the fact that Mongolian Yuan Emperor of the Han dynasty and Tai- STUDIES of the former.”42 power under the rule of Altan Khan contin- zong Emperor of the Tang dynasty also Theory and Practice.” The Chinese Journal of ued to grow. formulated marriage alliances with the International Politics 5, no. 1 (2012): 3-36:12; The decline of Ming power also resulted in neighboring leaders when the Middle Bozeman Adda B. Politics and Culture in the collapse of the tributary system. Begin- Although the Ming government fully com- Kingdom’s national power was at its peak. International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton REVIEW ning in the 1460s, the Ming government prehended the changed balance of power, The largest military strikes, the Yuanshuo University Press, 1960, 143; Womack, B. (2012). terminated naval expeditions to Southeast it was still humiliating in the extreme for the expeditions (元狩北征) of the Han dynasty Asymmetry and China’s Tributary System. Asia, and strictly prohibited maritime trade Chinese to reach a diplomatic compromise (128-123 BCE) and Zhengguan expeditions Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5(1), activities. 43 with the nomads. In the eyes of Ming pol- (贞观北征) of the Tang dynasty (627-649 37-54: 25; Reus-Smit, Christian. The Moral
icy-makers, the Middle Kingdom should AD), occurred when the Middle Kingdom’s Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, vol 6 The Oirat Mongols took advantage of still stand at the center of the regional national security was threatened by pow- and Institutional Rationality in International
51 (俺答汗 Relations. Princeton University Press, 1999:30. | the power vacuum after the Ming with- hierarchy. Altan Khan ) repeatedly erful northern nomads. Regardless of how 2020 drawal from the steppes to occupy the requested more trade frontiers between rituals and norms were underpinned by the strategically important Ordos and use it 1541 to 1549, but these requests were tributary system, rational and calculated 9 Zhou Fangyin. “Equilibrium Analysis of the as a base to invade the heartland of the rejected by the Ming court of the time. Nev- responses dominated imperial China’s Tributary System.” The Chinese Journal of Middle Kingdom.44 The hawkish Chinese ertheless, the Ming gradually had no choice grand strategy in international relations. International Politics 4, no. 2 (2011): 147-178: voices advocating recovery of the Ordos but to adopt a strategy of appeasement. In 152; Park, Seo-Hyun. Sovereignty and status in by military force were suppressed by the 1571, in the face of Altan Khan’s threatened 1 Zhang Feng. “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: East Asian international relations. Cambridge Chenghua emperor (1464-1487), who invasion, the Longqing Emperor decided Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Histor- University Press, 2017,51. was an advocate of the advantages of to compromise and buy peace from the ical East Asian Politics.” The Chinese Journal of defense.45 Because of military weakness, Mongols. Altan Khan accepted the title International Politics 2, no. 4 (2009): 545-574:560. 10 Yuan-Kang Wang. “Explaining the Tribute the Ming court initiated only one conflict “obedient and righteous king “(顺义王)” System: Power, Confucianism, and war in during the period from 1449 to 1474 — far from the Longqing Emperor and secured 2 Yang Shao-yun. The Way of the Barbarians: Medieval East Asia.” Journal of East Asian less than the period of offensive grand the right for the Mongols to trade with Redrawing Ethnic Boundaries in Tang and Song Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 207-232: 220. strategy which averaged 1.6 aggressive the Chinese in eleven border cities.52 The China. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, Ming actions per year.46 In 1474, the Ming Sino-centric tributary system of the Ming, 2019), 134. 11 Rossabi, Morris, ed. China among Equals: The court started to build a defensive system which had existed for approximately 200 Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th composed of a series of garrisons and for- years, had gradually fallen to the Mongols. 3 Rossabi, Morris, ed. China among Equals: The Centuries. (Berkeley: University of California tifications, extending from the Yalu River in Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Press, 1983), 11-13. the east to the Taolai River in the west, to Centuries. Univ of California Press, 1983: ward off the Mongolian raids.47 This cultural The Tributary System 11-13. 12 Charles F. Doran. Systems in Crisis: New heritage would later become the Great Wall in Perspective Imperatives of High Politics at Century’s End. of China, traditionally recognized by his- 4 Kim Bongjin. “Rethinking the Traditional East (Cambrdige: Cambridge University Press, torians as the physical representation of The Ming dynasty’s foreign policy revealed Asian Regional Order: The Tribute System as a 1991). China’s cultural preference for defense. 48 a mixture of benevolence and aggression. Set of Principles, Norms, and Practices.” Taiwan As analyzed above, the ritual and sym- Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no. 1 (2017): 13 George Modelski. “The Long Cycle of Global As the discrepancy in military strength bolic elements of the tribute system were 128-30. Politics and the Nation-State.” Comparative between the Ming and the Mongols wid- deeply embedded in concerns of realpo- studies in society and history 20, no. 2 (1978): ened, Mongol assaults became a severe litik for coercion and appeasement. The 5 John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great 226. challenge to the Ming court. The construc- Ming’s strategic culture made use of both Power Politics. (New York: WW Norton & tion costs of the defensive fortifications benevolence and coercion, but the stra- Company, 2001), 31. 14 Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World became an enormous burden for the Ming tegic demonstration of benevolence was Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University treasury. Soldiers constructing the wall in traditionally privileged by the Court when 6 Yan-Kang Wang. “Explaining the Tribute Press, 1981), 199. some districts were unpaid and obliged they had the strength and ability to make system: Power, Confucianism, and War in to provide their own equipment when the choice. Medieval East Asia.” Journal of East Asian 15 Idid, 90-103. called to active service.49 During 1550, Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 207-232: 209. only 140,000 of a nominal 380,000 troops Arguably, the strategy of other Han-Chi- 16 Abramo F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. The were assembled; only 50,000 to 60,000 nese dynasties also corresponds with the 7 Ibid, 215. War Ledger. (Chicago: University of Chicago had been properly trained.50 Even the Ming’s grand strategy. The high level of Press, 1981), 59. system of troops safeguarding the capital flexibility and pragmatism were perpetual
70 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 71 CHINA
17 Mark Mancall. China at the Center: 300 years 28 Shu Min. “Hegemony and Instability: Pre- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 51 Arthur Waldron. The Great Wall of China:
of Foreign Policy. (London: Collier Macmillan, Colonial Southeast Asia under the Tribute 1988), 182-304, 269. From History to Myth. (Cambridge, Cambridge STUDIES 1984), 11; Edward S. Boyland. “The Chinese System.” 早稲田大学高等研究所紀要 4 University Press, 1990), 140. Cultural Style of Warfare.” Comparative (2012): 45-62: 49. See also in Feng, Zhang. 38 Ibid, 83. Strategy 3, no. 4 (1982): 341-364:345. “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening 52 Ibid, 160. the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian 39 Ibid, 87. REVIEW 18 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: politics.” The Chinese Journal of International Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics 2, no. 4 (2009): 545-574:565. 40 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power 2010),32. 29 Wade, G., George, C., Davidson, J. S., Lindsay, Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press,
J., Frost, M., & Ying, T. Y. (2004). Ming China 2010),142. vol 6 19 Ibid, 20. and Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: A
Reappraisal,” No. 28 Working Paper Series, 41 Ray Huang. “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth | 2020 20 Alastair Iain Johnston. Cultural Realism: Asia Research Institute, National University of Century Ming China.” Oriens Extremus 17, no. Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Singapore, July 2004, 5. 1/2 (1970): 39-62. Chinese History. Vol. 75. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 51. 30 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: 42 Ibid, 43-4. Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. 21 Yan Xuetong. “Political Leadership and Power Columbia University Press, 2010, 111. 43 Benjamin A. Elman, The Chinese State at Redistribution.” The Chinese Journal of the Borders, ed. Diana Lary. “Ming-Qing International Politics 9, no. 1 (2016): 1-26:23. 31 Yoshihara Toshi, and James R. Holmes. Border Defense, the Inward Turn of Chinese “China’s Energy-Driven ‘Soft Power’.” Orbis 52, Cartography, and Qing Expansion in Central 22 Alastair Iain Johnston. Cultural Realism: no. 1 (2008): 123-137: 132. Asia in the Eighteenth Century.” (Vancouver: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in University of British Columbia Press, 2007): Chinese History. Vol. 75. (New Jersey: 32 Wade, G., George, C., Davidson, J. S., Lindsay, 29-56, 30. Princeton University Press, 1995), 264. J., Frost, M., & Ying, T. Y. (2004). Ming China and Southeast Asia in the 15th Century: A 44 Arthur Waldron. The Great Wall of China: From 23 Yan Xuetong. “Political Leadership and Power Reappraisal,” No. 28 Working Paper Series, History to Myth. (Cambridge: Cambridge Redistribution.” The Chinese Journal of Asia Research Institute, National University of University Press, 1990), 140. International Politics 9, no. 1 (2016): 1-26: 13. Singapore, July 2004, 2-16. 45 Ibid, 101-3. 24 David Shambaugh. “China Engages Asia: 33 Geoff Wade, and James K. Chin, eds. China Reshaping the Regional Order.” International and Southeast Asia: Historical Interactions. 46 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: Security 29, no. 3 (2005): 64-99,65. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018),92. Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics. (Columbia University Press, 2010),125. 25 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: 34 Zhang Feng. “How Hierarchic was the Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Historical East Asian system?” International 47 Ibid, 128. Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, Politics 51, no. 1 (2014): 1-22, 12. 2010),110-11. 48 Andrew Scobell. China and Strategic Culture. 35 Morris Rossabi, ed. China Among Equals: The (Pennsylvania, Strategic Studies Institute, 26 Ibid, 111; See also in Farmer, Edward L. Middle Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th-14th 2002),108. Early Ming Government: The Evolution of Centuries. Univ of California Press, 1983: 3-5. Dual Capitals. Vol. 66. (Cambridge: Harvard 49 Ray Huang. “Military Expenditures in Sixteenth University Press, 1976), 171. 36 Arthur Waldron. The Great Wall of China: From Century Ming China.” Oriens extremus 17, no. History to Myth. (Cambridge: Cambridge 1/2 (1970): 39-62,42. 27 June Teufel Dreyer. “The ‘Tianxia Trope’: Will University Press, 1990), 76. China Change the International System?.” 50 Yuan-Kang Wang. Harmony and War: Journal of Contemporary China 24, no. 96 37 Chan Hok-lam. “The Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power (2015): 1015-1031:1017. Hung-hsi, and Hsuan-te reigns, 1399– Politics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1435.” The Cambridge History of China 7, 2010),139.
72 THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS Between Harmony and Chaos: An Analysis of Grand Strategy in the Ming Dynasty 73 CHINA
STUDIES REVIEW
vol 6 | 2020
THE CHINA STUDIES PROGRAM | SAIS The China Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) offers unparalleled opportunities for graduate-level study of China and international relations. Students may elect to concentrate in China Studies, with over a dozen courses taught by leading China scholars and practitioners, or take advantage of a range of expertise and courses related to China and Asia across programs such as International Development; Energy, Resources, and Environment; International Political Economy; and other functional and area studies programs. SAIS China encompasses SAIS-wide formal activities across greater China, including China Studies in Washington, D.C., the Hopkins- Nanjing Center in Nanjing, and a dual-degree program with Tsinghua University in Beijing.
Aside from China itself, Washington, D.C. is ground zero for the study of contemporary China and China policy. China Studies is in the center of Washington — amidst embassies, think tanks, NGOs, and government agencies — all with considerable China involvement and expertise. Given their unmatched opportunity to study China from both the inside and outside, SAIS graduates are employed in government, business, multilateral organizations, and NGOs around the world.
China Studies Program The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Rome Building, Suite 606-612 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: +1 202 663 5816 http://www.sais-jhu.edu/content/china-studies#overview [email protected]