6 ’s industrialisation From colonial entrepôt port to The Study an industrial export economy

Imaginaries of Industrial Estate, Singapore1

Loh Kah Seng Jurong Industrial Estate is a symbol and metaphor for Singapore’s transformation from a colonial entrepôt port to an industrial export economy in the 1960s and 1970s. It is regularly referred to as ‘Goh’s Folly’, so-named after , Singapore’s Minister for Finance at the time and the architect of the project. Used in the context of Jurong’s development into a vibrant industrial hub, the epithet repudiates accusations of bad economics and demonstrates the sound thinking of Goh, and by extension the Singapore government. This official imaginary of Jurong is central to Singapore’s economic history.

Lee Kuan Yew (middle) and other Singapore officials in Jurong, c. early 1960s. Photo is obtained with permission from Alex Tan Tiong Hee.

n his memoirs, former Prime Minister Lee rapid growth of the population after the war, By this time, many of the ‘baby boomers’ rift between the Fabian socialists and left Kuan Yew recounted an epic story of Jurong had become problematic for the future of had reached working age. The PAP declared wing socialists within the PAP. The party had Iin multiple initial failures and eventual postcolonial Singapore. Between 1947 and 1957, a policy of industrial expansion to create won the 1959 elections largely because of the success; of Goh’s alleged folly, Lee imagined as families settled down with multiple children jobs for the general population, which was left’s support among workers, Chinese-stream that “He was not that self-deprecatory instead of returning to their home countries, implemented with the 1961 State Development students, squatters, and farmers. However, when Jurong was barren”.2 Current Prime Singapore’s population grew at a rapid rate Plan. For various practical reasons, the the leftists were not given a major role in the Minister recently retold this of 4.5% per annum. These settled families industrialisation programme centred on Jurong, government, which was controlled by the narrative in hailing the role of the statutory and locally-born children could no longer be a largely-undeveloped region in the western Fabians led by and Goh Keng board most closely associated with Jurong’s repatriated in an economic downturn, and the part of Singapore. The state owned most of Swee. Still, the leadership was under pressure history – JTC Corporation (formerly Jurong entrepôt trade would not likely supply the jobs the land there, and the population was sparse, to demonstrate its anti-colonial and anti- Town Corporation) – at the 50th anniversary they needed, especially as newly-independent comprising of farmers and fishermen, which capital credentials. Industrial programming of its formation in 1968. While Jurong’s states in the region began to develop their own minimised the task of resettlement. Unlike the had to negotiate difficult questions on the narrative arc is well-known, less so are other ports and industries, bypassing Singapore. much smaller existing industrial estates, nationalisation of industry, relationship early imaginaries which helped realise the In the late 1950s, the British colonial the development of Jurong was a milestone: between capital and labour, and dominance government’s vision of industrial development. government launched estates for light industries it would be built from scratch, mainly for heavy of British capital. The first was the work of international experts at Redhill and Tanglin Halt, which obtained their industry and with no catchment population who advised the government on industrial workforce from residential areas nearby. residing nearby. policy around the same time in 1960-61: Albert An Industrial Promotion The politics of Singapore in international Winsemius on the feasibility of Singapore’s Board was set up in the early 1960s were industrialisation; Y. Yanagisawa’s team of 1957 to promote and Jurong was a embedded in the society Japanese experts on heavy industry in Jurong; develop manufacturing. industrialisation Outside of these local contexts, Singapore’s and Philippe Schereschewsky’s response The British also milestone: built mainly programme in several industrialisation also took place against a to a proposed iron and steel project. The commissioned the ways. The government broader backdrop of what Akira Iriye has termed other imaginary lay in the origin of Jurong’s first expert surveys for heavy industry, was expected to fulfil a “global community” and an “international showpiece heavy industry: National Iron and of industry, including with no catchment its electoral promises society” after the war.3 The end of war heralded Steel Mills, a product of the imaginaries of a 1958 study by F.J. in order to succeed at a move away from the intense national the Singapore government, local investors, Lyle, who endorsed the population nearby the next polls. (This competition that had brought about the global and foreign advisers. prevailing sentiment for pressure was the conflict towards technical cooperation on the island to establish a political factor that, as developmental matters. In the 1950s and 1960s, common market with the Federation of Malaya. we will see, shaped the work of Winsemius and Singapore received much technical assistance Jobs, Jurong, and politics Singapore and Malaya, despite having long- Schereschewsky). There was also the question from the United Nations (UN) and Colombo Singapore’s industrialisation was not a standing political and economic ties, had been of the common market with the Federation Plan, and from Britain and . purely technical matter but one shaped by the separated into two administrative units after the of Malaya, which the government endorsed. Key to the collaboration were the technical socio-economic and political contexts arising war. These late-colonial efforts constituted the Although the island’s politicians looked upon experts who routinely advised the governments after the Second World War. The impetus for first imaginaries of Singapore’s industrialisation. the reunification of Singapore and Malaya of colonies and newly-independent states. In manufacturing was the belief that it would In 1959, Singapore became a self-governing as a matter of faith, the Malay-dominant the current literature, they are often criticised provide more jobs than the existing entrepôt state. The newly-elected People’s Action Federation government was less keen, fearing for imposing their narrow experiences, usually trade. Unemployment and under-employment Party (PAP) government managed domestic – the political influence of Singapore’s majority- drawn from their own countries, or ignoring had been part of the socio-economic land- including industrial – affairs, while the British Chinese population and by extension, the local conditions, often with underwhelming scape of colonial Singapore, but with the retained control over foreign policy and security. PAP. The third political issue was a growing results. Singapore’s encounter with the experts The Newsletter No. 81 Autumn 2018 7 The Study

was more nuanced. The PAP government was, levelling of the hills to develop the coast for Subsequently though, UN officials judged the Jurong were rooted in external worldviews from the start, willing to consult experts who heavy industries and shipyards, while the deep project to be unsound. They urged no immediate of industrial development – Dutch, Japanese, were not doctrinaire socialists. To the extent waters off Jurong suited the construction of a action on the blast furnace, though this was the Southeast Asian, Latin American, and that the city-state eventually became an ‘Asian port for industrial cargo (which became Jurong project on which the Singapore government was elsewhere – their advice was often reconciled Tiger’, the experts emerge as generally positive Port). Jurong would be zoned as a complete the most keen, as it depended on investment with the Singaporean context. This involved and benign influences. As an economist noted town, not only with industry and housing, but from “a Japanese iron and steel group.” 11 accommodating the political as well as socio- in the early 1970s, the industrialisation policy also a civic centre, social amenities and green economic circumstances and sentiments was guided by international expertise, some areas for a large population of up to 200,000 prevailing in the city-state, including of it tracing to the late-colonial period.4 It is, people. The Yanagisawa team presented National Iron and Steel Mills disagreements between the government and however, instructive to examine how the experts only a preliminary report to the government, The imagined Japanese role highlighted the left, the question of the common market, negotiated the socio-economic and political but it became the basis of a five-year crash how financial and political considerations and Britain’s role in the economy. dimensions of Singapore’s industrialisation. programme in the State Development Plan to underpinned the iron and steel project. From Subsequent to the work of the three teams, develop the first phase of Jurong. The plan, the beginning, the government was anxious Jurong slowly took shape as an industrial put together by Goh Keng Swee, reiterated to ensure that the plant was self-supporting. estate. The government allotted $45 million the team’s assessment, explaining that Jurong Politically, the left saw in the project the – or 13% of the industry and commerce The first expert discussed here is also the was “probably the only waterfront area in question of British economic influence budget – in the State Development Plan to the best known in Singapore – Albert Winsemius, Singapore that possesses all the necessary in Singapore. In December 1960, James development of Jurong. The EDB carried out the Dutch economic planner credited with his conditions for development as an integrated Puthucheary expressed what colonial officials the initial development of some 500 hectares, country’s economic recovery after the war. town with sea access.”7 deemed to be “wild ideas” to obtain Japanese resettling farmers, levelling hills, filling mangrove Winsemius led two UN teams to study the However, British officials believed that the investment for the purpose of “smashing British swamps and prawn ponds, and building feasibility of industrialisation for Singapore in Japanese intended to use Singapore as a capitalism” and establishing socialism.12 Goh factories, infrastructure, public housing, and October-December 1960 and March-May 1961. ‘foothold’ and ‘stepping stone’ for their industry Keng Swee assured the officials in February social amenities. As the Yanagisawa team had He possessed no knowledge of the city-state, to expand into the region.8 The Japanese that the Yanagisawa mission was free of endorsed, the heart of Jurong was the heavy which was “neither an underdeveloped, nor a appeared to have been particularly interested charge with “no strings attached.”13 But they industries lining the seafront. Central to this half-developed or a highly developed country.” in iron and steel, an industry widely viewed as still reckoned in September 1961: “We are swathe of industry was NISM, close to which Winsemius concluded that Singapore should, the backbone of a modern industrial economy. right at the heart of the politics of Singapore’s were coastal lots for shipbreaking. The company and could, industrialise, as the country’s Following the Yanagisawa survey, Fuji Iron and industrialisation … The Government are well duly implemented Schereschewsky’s proposal “greatest asset is the high aptitude of her Steel, a major Japanese steel company, indeed known to be, for political reasons, in a hurry for the rolling mill, which began processing people to work in manufacturing industries. despatched a team of experts to Singapore to to get some form of iron/steel started … are scrap from ships in 1963. It employed 400 They can rank among the best factory study the feasibility of a steel mill. This brings known to be suspicious of British ‘economic workers at the time. The light industries were workers in the world.”5 us to the third imaginary of Jurong. imperialism’ and to favour some spreading of located further inland near the first residential Two of Winsemius’ economic recommend- the net among foreign capitalist interests”.14 neighbourhood, Taman Jurong. ations became policy. First, Singapore should As it turned out, this policy proved difficult In 1968, the development of Jurong was manufacture for the world rather than the home Philippe Schereschewsky to implement, and the Singapore government passed on to the Jurong Town Corporation, market. On the potentially tricky question of the The UN had already organised an iron encountered considerable difficulty in finding which expanded it into a better-settled common market, Winsemius deftly sidestepped and steel study for Singapore led by French Japanese investors. From August 1960 to the garden industrial town with a town centre and it by positioning it as one of several regional industrialist Philippe Schereschewsky. following spring, the government commenced additional social amenities and green areas. export markets Singapore should cultivate. Although, like Winsemius, Schereschewsky preliminary discussions with Japanese steel By this time, Singapore’s merger and common Winsemius also proposed that industrialisation had little knowledge of Singapore, he claimed companies, and Goh Keng Swee spoke with market with had failed, the left be led by foreign private capital, rather than relevant expertise from his experience in Latin steelmakers in Tokyo. As Schereschewsky was excised from domestic politics, and the state capital. This proposal was opposed by America. His role, forgotten like Yanagisawa’s, intimated in his 2nd progress report in early island had become a sovereign state in single- the leftist chairman of the Industrial Promotion was critical, for the government had made 1961, the Japanese government made an minded pursuit of global capital investment, Board, James Puthucheary, who advocated iron and steel separate from the remit of the informal offer to help Singapore establish, as Winsemius had urged. From 1969, Jurong state ownership of heavy industry. But Winsemius mission. An earlier study in 1954 through Fuji Iron and Steel, a steel plant. Fuji grew rapidly, welcoming an influx of investors; Winsemius was able to convince Goh Keng by the International Bank for Reconstruction sent three successive missions to Singapore a decade later, it had become the preferred Swee to limit the state’s role to only providing and Development had deemed the industry that year, and at one point was ostensibly site for the majority of them. By then, some infrastructure and a conducive environment impractical because Malaya and Singapore prepared to help build the mill. In April 1961, 5600 hectares of land had been developed for industry, and in lacked coking coal. In Goh Keng Swee appeared to confirm Fuji’s and allocated to over 1200 companies, which ensuring stable relations November 1959, Goh involvement in a public speech. employed 93,000 workers. Goh Keng Swee’s between capital and Keng Swee revisited Henceforth, however, the matter unravelled. project had become a major industrial estate labour. Winsemius is the only the subject by asking At the end of September 1961, two local for multinationals and a new town for a However, interest- the UN for a feasibility establishments were in the running with Fuji young, growing population. ingly, Winsemius delved expert among the study for an iron and to set up the steel plant: Sim Lim, a company into political matters. trio to have rendered steel plant, based on with interests in importing building materials Loh Kah Seng University of Western He felt that his unwritten imported iron ore and and in shipbreaking, and Tat Lee, a rubber Australia [email protected] mandate was to help political advice coal from the region import-export firm. The government had the government win the and to be established difficulty reaching an agreement with Fuji, next elections. Privately, over two or three stages. which initially wanted 70% holding of the mill he advised Singaporean The plant would act while the government was only willing to allow Notes leaders that industrialisation hinged on two as a catalyst to industrialisation by creating 50%. Although the Japanese did agree to this, 1 This article draws from the research non-technical factors: retaining the statue secondary industries and jobs. the main problem, according to a Sim Lim project, ‘Theatres of History and Memory: of (the British founder of In July 1960, the month that Schereschewsky representative, was that “Fuji was not interested Industrial Heritage of 20th Century Singapore) as a gesture to foreign investors, carried out his preliminary study, the govern- in the Singapore project, as such.” British Singapore’, which is supported by the and getting rid of the communists who ment announced that the “proposed iron and officials surmised that Fuji was only interested in Heritage Research Grant of the National controlled the militant unions. Lee Kuan Yew steel plant will be the core of the medium and setting up a small scrap mill, not a large smelting Heritage Board, Singapore. laughed at the second suggestion, though heavy industry centre in Jurong, around which plant. The search for investment, the Sim Lim 2 Lee Kuan Yew. 2000. From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965-2000: his government soon broke with the left. ancillary industries…can be established.”9 representative suggested, had been protracted Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Winsemius is the only expert among the trio The envisioned plant consisted of two parts: because the government favoured a local firm, Singapore Press Holdings: Times Editions, to have rendered political advice and stepped a large blast furnace of at least 500,000 tons, but “For political reasons … they were set p.61. beyond the UN’s narrow terms of reference. producing pig iron for export, primarily to upon quick and spectacular results”, and 3 Akira Iriye. 2004. Global Community: Remarkably, his opinions were well-received, Japan, and an integrated steel mill of medium initially doubted Sim Lim’s ability to deliver.15 The Role of International Organisations in and he became an unofficial economic adviser size (60,000 tons) producing for Singapore It may be that Tat Lee’s involvement was decisive the Making of the Contemporary World. to the Singaporean government for two and and the immediate region. Schereschewsky in this regard. The British noted the Singaporean Berkeley: California University Press. a half decades. assembled a team to undertake a full study, government’s parting ways with Fuji in 4 Lee Soo Ann. 1973. Industrialisation which supplemented its fieldwork in Singapore March 1962. in Singapore. Camberwell: Longman. with trips to shipbreaking and rolling mills In August 1961, National Iron and Steel Mills 5 United Nations, Bureau of Technical Y. Yanagisawa Assistance Operations. 1963. A Proposed in Japan, , the , and (NISM) was incorporated with a nominal capital Industrialisation Programme for the State Winsemius provided a blueprint for Australia. The team concluded that the iron of $50 million. It was funded mainly by local of Singapore, pp.xxiii, 195. industrialisation, but the site for it still had to and steel project was on the whole viable, and Indonesian-Chinese, rather than Japanese, 6 CO 1030/1176, Report on the Plans of be determined. The role of Japanese experts but was to be broken into three constituent capital. Sim Lim and Tat Lee contributed equally Japanese Survey Mission in Singapore. led by Y. Yanagisawa, an engineer, in the projects by order of feasibility. The most towards 80% of the capital. Soon Peng Yam 7 Ministry of Finance. 1961. State of physical planning of Jurong industrial town realistic undertaking, based on the precedent of Sim Lim was appointed NISM’s chairman, Singapore Development Plan, 1961-1964. in November 1960 has long been forgotten. in Hong Kong, was a rolling mill for scrap. while Goh Tjoei Kok and Goh Seong Pek of Tat 8 CO 1030/1176, Jurong Industrial The team endorsed the prospects for heavy Though having a modest annual capacity Lee became the vice chairman and managing Development Plan. industry in Singapore: “the possibility of of 20-30,000 tons and producing mostly director respectively. The company’s driving 9 CO 1030/1176, Singapore Government Press Release, 4 July 1960. success is very high.”6 This was a bold for the local market, it would have important force was Goh Tjoei Kok, an Indonesian- 10 S-0175-1801-02 SING (130-2) PART statement, for Winsemius had initially been knock-on effects on industrial activity. The mill Chinese businessman who had settled in B, Report on the Feasibility of a Steel sceptical about heavy industry and had would expand Singapore’s small shipbreaking Singapore from Jakarta in 1949. The Economic Industry in Singapore, August 1961, p.19. preferred that Singapore focus on light industry, which would provide the scrap, and Development Board (EDB), a government 11 S-0175-1801-02 SING (130-2) PART A, industry, although his report did make thus generate jobs. Schereschewsky deemed agency responsible for Singapore’s industrial Memo from Lurie to Schereschewsky, technical studies for the shipbuilding/repair, this mill, despite not being in the government’s development, contributed 20% of the capital, 8 March 1961. metal and engineering, electrical, and initial plan, “the indispensable base of the aligned with Winsemius’ call for a minor 12 CO 1130/1176, Memo from Bourdillon chemical industries. new steel industry,” and called for it to be government role in investment. The mill would to Wallace, 9 February 1961; Memo from The Yanagisawa team’s frame of reference implemented promptly.10 initially employ 200 workers. Woodruff to Bourdillon, 22 December was thoroughly Japanese (as Winsemius’ On the proposed larger projects in the 1960. 13 CO 1130/1176, Memo from Bourdillon was Dutch). The team assessed Jurong’s government’s mind, the Schereschewsky study Conclusion to Wallace, 9 February 1961. waterfront to be suitable for heavy industry, preached caution. The integrated mill merited 14 CO 1130/1176, Note of conversation as it was similar to Japan’s southern coasts. further research, though raw materials were The three teams of experts worked between Whitley and Toh, 25 September It also advised on other technical matters that available in the region: iron ore from Malaya productively with the Singaporean government 1961. later became policy: land reclamation and and coal/coke from Australia and . through 1960-1961. While their imaginaries of 15 Idem.